Accept Engagement Without Certificate (Action 1) → Licensure Violation Occurs (Event 1)
BER 96-8 Peer Review Confidentiality vs. Safety Reporting Tension
From Review Engineer A's signing of the confidentiality agreement through the Board's determination that safety reporting supersedes confidentiality
Review Engineer A was asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement' whereby he agreed not to disclose confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Bound State
Review Engineer A's confidentiality obligation under the peer review program agreement
Board determination that public safety violation reporting obligation supersedes confidentiality when genuine danger exists
the Board also disposed of the confidentiality issue, noting that if in fact there was truly a violation that posed a serious danger to the public health and safety, the confidentiality issue would become a secondary matter
Review Engineer A signing the confidentiality agreement as a condition of peer reviewer appointment
BER 96-8 Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery
From the moment Review Engineer A identified potential safety code violations during the peer review visit through resolution
Review Engineer A discovered that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery State
Review Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's potential safety code violations during peer review
Discussion between Review Engineer A and Engineer B, or escalation to proper authorities if unresolved
if Review Engineer A determined that Engineer B's work is, or may be, in violation of state and local safety requirements and endangers public health, safety, and welfare, the appropriate action would be for Review Engineer A to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B
Review Engineer A's examination of technical documentation revealing potential violations of state and local safety code requirements
A good instructive example of the intersection between these sometimes competing ethical concerns is BER Case 96-8
As illustrated in BER Case 96-8, when an engineer becomes aware of a violation of the state engineering licensure law, the engineer's first ethical obligation may be to refrain from jumping to conclusions
Said the Board in Case 96-8, 'assuming from the facts that Review Engineer A determined that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements...a more appropriate action would be for Review Engineer A to expeditiously discuss these issues with Engineer B'
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in the present case analysis
Cited as the primary instructive precedent for how an engineer should handle discovery of a potential safety or licensure violation by a professional colleague during peer review — establishing the obligation to first discuss with the offending engineer before escalating to authorities, and addressing the subordination of confidentiality to public safety
CausalLink_Accept Engagement Without Cert
CausalLink_Decide Response to Discovered
CausalLink_Obtain Certificate of Authorit
CausalLink_Report Violation to Authoritie
Client L Former Client Now Retaining Competitor
{'location': 'State P', 'prior_relationship': 'Former client of ABC Engineering (Engineer A)'}
Client L, located in State P, is a former client of ABC Engineering who has retained XYZ Engineering for a project in State P, unknowingly engaging a firm without a certificate of authority to practice in the state.
{'type': 'current_client_of', 'target': 'Engineer X XYZ Engineering Owner Unlicensed Firm Practice'}
{'type': 'former_client_of', 'target': 'Engineer A ABC Engineering Owner Reporter'}
Former Client Now Retaining Competitor Stakeholder
Client L is a former client of Engineer A's firm
Engineer X is retained to provide engineering services for Client L located in State P for a project in State P
Client L's relationship with Engineer A before Client L retaining Engineer X
Client Relationship Transferred (Event 2) → Violation Discovered by Engineer A (Event 3)
Collegial Notification Before Reporting Standard — Present Case Application
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (derived from BER Case 96-8 and professional practice norms)
Professional Norm of Collegial Direct Communication Prior to Regulatory Reporting
Collegial Notification Before Reporting Standard
part of the discussion between Engineer A and Engineer X would presumably include an explanation by Engineer A of the reasons for the certificate of authority requirement
Assuming Engineer X is a reasonable and prudent individual, we believe Engineer A's counsel to Engineer X would be all that would be necessary to convince Engineer X to take all appropriate steps to obtain the certificate of authority
potential violators should first be advised of the potential violation especially when a professional colleague, albeit a competitor, becomes aware of the potential infraction
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in guiding Engineer A's response to Engineer X's potential violation
Applied by the Board to conclude that Engineer A's first obligation upon discovering Engineer X's failure to obtain a certificate of authority is to communicate directly with Engineer X to explain the requirement and seek voluntary compliance, rather than immediately reporting to the state board
Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement Invoked by Engineer A Toward Engineer X
Engineer X XYZ Engineering Owner Unlicensed Firm Practice
Jurisdiction-Specific Misconduct Reporting Threshold
Mandatory Competitor Misconduct Reporting Obligation
Unlicensed Practice Prohibition and Challenge Obligation
Engineer A, upon discovering that competitor Engineer X's firm lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P, is advised to first counsel Engineer X directly — explaining the reasons for the requirement and its consequences — before escalating to formal reporting to the licensing board, on the grounds that the violation appears inadvertent
The principle requires Engineer A to treat the certificate of authority violation as presumptively inadvertent and to engage Engineer X collegially before triggering formal reporting mechanisms, calibrating the response to the apparent nature of the violation
Engineer A ABC Engineering Owner Reporter
Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement Obligation for Inadvertent Violations
Inadvertent and unintentional violations of laws and regulations are not uncommon, and potential violators should first be advised of the potential violation especially when a professional colleague, albeit a competitor, becomes aware of the potential infraction.
Collegial pre-reporting engagement is prioritized over immediate formal reporting because the violation appears inadvertent; formal reporting remains obligatory if Engineer X fails to cure the violation after being advised
Assuming Engineer X is a reasonable and prudent individual, we believe Engineer A's counsel to Engineer X would be all that would be necessary to convince Engineer X to take all appropriate steps to obtain the certificate of authority.
a more prudent approach—both from an ethical and a collegial perspective—would be to communicate with the potentially offending engineer to obtain clarification regarding the matter in question.
Competitive Fairness Dimension of XYZ Engineering's Unauthorized Practice
XYZ Engineering's practice in State P without a certificate of authority creates an unfair competitive advantage over firms like ABC Engineering that have obtained and maintained proper authorization, as XYZ avoids the compliance costs and procedural requirements that authorized firms bear
Competitive fairness requires that all firms competing for work in a jurisdiction comply with the same licensure requirements; unauthorized practice by one firm undermines the level competitive playing field that the certificate of authority system is designed to maintain
Engineer X is retained to provide engineering services for Client L located in State P for a project in State P.
The competitive fairness violation reinforces rather than conflicts with the reporting obligation; reporting serves both professional integrity and competitive fairness simultaneously
Client L is a former client of Engineer A's firm.
Engineer A is the owner of ABC Engineering in State P.
Competitive Motivation Scrutiny in Engineer A's Reporting Decision
Engineer A must ensure that any report to the State P licensing board about XYZ Engineering's lack of certificate of authority is motivated by professional duty to uphold licensure integrity rather than by competitive desire to recover Client L or harm XYZ Engineering's standing
The fact that Client L is a former client of ABC Engineering creates a competitive context that requires Engineer A to examine whether the reporting motivation is professional duty or competitive self-interest; the prohibition applies to malicious or false injury, not to good-faith factual reporting
Prohibition on Reputation Injury Through Competitive Critique
Good-faith, factually grounded reporting of a genuine licensing violation does not constitute malicious reputation injury even when the reporter has a competitive interest; the prohibition targets malicious or false injury, not legitimate reporting
Engineer A learns that XYZ Engineering does not have a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P.
Engineer A should communicate with Engineer X to obtain clarification regarding the matter in question.
The Board's first formal determination is that Engineer A must first engage Engineer X directly and collegially to seek clarification before taking any formal reporting action, reflecting the collegial pre-reporting sequencing norm.
Before initiating collegial contact with Engineer X, Engineer A bears an affirmative epistemic duty to independently verify XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status through available public records maintained by the State P licensure board. The Board's recommendation to communicate with Engineer X presupposes that Engineer A's belief in the violation is reasonably grounded, not merely speculative or competitively motivated. If Engineer A proceeds to collegial contact — or worse, to formal reporting — on the basis of unverified suspicion, and it subsequently emerges that XYZ Engineering did in fact hold a valid certificate of authority, Engineer A would face serious exposure under Code provision III.7, which prohibits malicious or false injury to a competitor's professional reputation. The verification step is therefore not merely procedurally courteous; it is a threshold ethical obligation that protects Engineer X's rights, preserves Engineer A's own integrity, and ensures that the reporting mechanism is not weaponized through competitive animus. The standard of certainty required is not absolute proof, but it must be sufficient to constitute a reasonable professional judgment — meaning Engineer A should have consulted publicly accessible licensure records and found no certificate of authority on file before treating the matter as a confirmed violation warranting any further action.
The Board's graduated sequence — collegial contact first, formal report only if Engineer A remains unsatisfied — implicitly assumes that Engineer A can engage in collegial outreach with motivational integrity despite being a direct competitor who previously served Client L. This assumption deserves explicit scrutiny that the Board did not provide. Engineer A's structural position creates a dual-motivation problem: the same act of reporting simultaneously advances Engineer A's legitimate professional duty and Engineer A's competitive business interest in recovering or retaining Client L's business. Because these motivations are inseparable in outcome, Engineer A cannot resolve the conflict simply by asserting good faith. Instead, Engineer A should apply heightened self-scrutiny at each decision point — asking not only whether a violation appears to exist, but whether the urgency, framing, and sequencing of Engineer A's response would be identical if Engineer X were not a competitor for Client L's work. If Engineer A cannot honestly answer that question affirmatively, the collegial contact should be conducted with particular care to avoid any language that could be construed as leveraging the regulatory situation for competitive advantage, and Engineer A should document the basis for each step taken to demonstrate that the reporting process was driven by professional duty rather than business interest. The Board's framework is sound, but its application requires Engineer A to exercise a degree of self-monitoring that the Board left unstated.
The Board's recommendation that Engineer A 'may be required' to report to the State P licensure board if unsatisfied with Engineer X's explanation understates the conditionality and clarifies too little about what 'sufficiently satisfied' means in practice. The Board's language implies that formal reporting remains discretionary even after collegial contact fails to resolve the matter, but this reading is difficult to reconcile with Code provision II.1.f, which imposes a reporting obligation on engineers who have knowledge of alleged violations. Once Engineer A has verified the non-compliance and received an explanation from Engineer X that does not establish that XYZ Engineering has obtained or is imminently obtaining a certificate of authority, the violation is no longer merely alleged — it is confirmed and ongoing. At that point, Engineer A's obligation to report to the State P licensure board becomes substantially less discretionary and more mandatory. The word 'may' in the Board's conclusion should therefore be understood as reflecting the contingency of the factual predicate — i.e., whether Engineer X's explanation resolves the matter — rather than as granting Engineer A ongoing discretion to decline reporting once the violation is confirmed. Particularly where the unauthorized practice is willful or continues after collegial notice, the professional reciprocity norm cannot be stretched to justify indefinite forbearance, because doing so would allow ongoing unlicensed practice to harm the public and undermine the licensure system that protects it.
The Board's analysis is silent on Engineer A's obligations toward Client L, yet the facts present a distinct ethical dimension that the Board's two conclusions do not address. Client L is currently receiving engineering services from a firm that lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P, which means Client L may be exposed to legal, contractual, and safety risks arising from that non-compliance — including the possibility that engineering work product produced without proper authorization may be unenforceable, uninsured, or subject to regulatory challenge. While Engineer A's primary reporting obligation runs to the State P licensure board, Code provision I.4 — requiring engineers to act as faithful agents or trustees — and the broader public welfare mandate embedded in the Code suggest that Engineer A has at minimum a duty to consider whether Client L should be made aware of the situation. However, this consideration must be handled with extreme care: proactively contacting Client L to inform it of XYZ Engineering's non-compliance would be ethically permissible only if done in a manner that is factually accurate, professionally measured, and not designed to solicit Client L's business for ABC Engineering. If Engineer A's communication with Client L were framed or timed in a way that exploited the regulatory situation to recover a lost client, it would cross from professional duty into the kind of competitive conduct that Code provision III.7 is designed to prohibit. The Board's silence on this dimension leaves Engineer A without guidance on a genuinely difficult question, and the safest course is for Engineer A to focus on the collegial and regulatory channels the Board identified, rather than independently notifying Client L.
The Board's graduated reporting framework — collegial contact preceding formal regulatory report — draws implicit support from the analogous structure established in BER Case 96-8, where a reviewing engineer was directed to discuss safety findings with the engineer under review before escalating to authorities. However, the analogy has a critical limit that the Board did not articulate: in BER 96-8, the confidentiality agreement governing the peer review relationship created a genuine competing obligation that justified a deliberate, sequenced approach. In the present case, no such confidentiality obligation exists between Engineer A and Engineer X. The collegial-first sequence here is grounded not in a competing duty of confidentiality but in professional courtesy, the possibility of inadvertent non-compliance, and the risk that Engineer A's competitive interest might distort a premature formal report. These are legitimate but weaker justifications for delay than those present in BER 96-8. Consequently, the window for collegial resolution in the present case should be understood as narrower and less tolerant of prolonged forbearance than the BER 96-8 framework might suggest. If Engineer X does not respond promptly to collegial contact, or responds in a manner that confirms the violation without committing to immediate remediation, Engineer A's obligation to report to the State P board should be treated as triggered without further delay. The cross-case analogy is instructive but should not be read to import BER 96-8's more extended deliberative tolerance into a context where no confidentiality constraint justifies it.
If Engineer A is not sufficiently satisfied with Engineer X's explanation, Engineer A may be required to report this matter to the state engineering licensure board.
The Board's second formal determination establishes a conditional graduated reporting obligation: if Engineer X's explanation does not satisfy Engineer A, Engineer A may be required to escalate the matter to the state engineering licensure board, invoking the reporting obligation under II.1.f and the conformance with state registration laws under III.8.a.
In response to Q101, Engineer A does bear an affirmative duty to verify XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status before treating the matter as a confirmed violation warranting either collegial contact or formal reporting. The epistemic threshold required, however, is not absolute certainty but rather reasonable professional confidence — meaning Engineer A must make a good-faith inquiry into publicly available licensure records in State P, which are typically accessible through the state engineering licensure board's online registry. If those records confirm the absence of a certificate of authority, Engineer A has satisfied the verification obligation and may proceed to collegial contact. Engineer A is not required to conduct an exhaustive investigation or to give Engineer X advance notice before verifying the public record. The verification obligation exists primarily to protect Engineer X from a report grounded in error or assumption, and to protect Engineer A from the professional and ethical consequences of a false or malicious report under Code provision III.7. Once publicly available records confirm non-compliance, the epistemic threshold is met and Engineer A's subsequent obligations are triggered.
In response to Q102, Engineer A's status as a direct competitor of Engineer X — and specifically as the firm that previously served Client L — creates a structural conflict of interest that does not eliminate Engineer A's reporting obligations but does impose a heightened duty of self-scrutiny throughout the decision-making process. The conflict is structural rather than merely incidental because Engineer A stands to benefit materially if XYZ Engineering is removed from the State P market or loses the Client L engagement. This benefit is not hypothetical: it is the direct consequence of a successful report. The ethical framework does not permit Engineer A to suppress the reporting duty on account of competitive motivation, nor does it permit Engineer A to weaponize the reporting mechanism as a competitive tool. The resolution lies in procedural discipline: Engineer A must verify the violation through objective public records rather than assumption, must approach collegial contact with genuine corrective intent rather than as a performative step before an inevitable report, and must examine whether the urgency and framing of any formal report reflects the public interest rather than competitive advantage. The Board's graduated sequence — collegial contact first, formal report only if unsatisfied — is itself a structural safeguard against competitive misuse of the reporting mechanism, because it creates a record of good-faith corrective engagement before escalation.
In response to Q103, the distinction between inadvertent and willful non-compliance by XYZ Engineering is ethically significant and should affect both the sequencing and the urgency of Engineer A's reporting obligations, though it does not eliminate those obligations in either case. Where non-compliance appears inadvertent — for example, where Engineer X is unaware of State P's certificate of authority requirement or has simply failed to complete the administrative process — the collegial-first approach prescribed by the Board is not only appropriate but ethically required, because it gives Engineer X a meaningful opportunity to cure the violation before formal regulatory consequences attach. The public interest is adequately served by prompt correction, and the profession's interest in collegial self-regulation supports this approach. Where, however, Engineer A has reason to believe the non-compliance is willful — for example, where Engineer X has previously been informed of the requirement and has continued practice without compliance, or where Engineer X explicitly acknowledges the deficiency and refuses to remedy it — the collegial step either collapses into futility or has already been effectively completed. In that circumstance, Engineer A's obligation to report to the State P licensure board becomes more immediate and less discretionary, because the public welfare rationale for graduated response is undermined when the violating party has demonstrated deliberate disregard for jurisdictional licensure requirements. The inadvertent-versus-willful distinction therefore functions as a variable that calibrates the weight Engineer A should give to the collegial step relative to the formal reporting obligation.
In response to Q104, Engineer A's ethical obligations toward Client L are more constrained than they might initially appear. The NSPE Code's public welfare provisions create a general duty to protect the public from engineering practice that does not meet jurisdictional requirements, but this duty does not straightforwardly translate into an affirmative obligation for Engineer A to proactively contact Client L and inform them of XYZ Engineering's non-compliance. Several considerations counsel restraint: first, Client L is a former client, not a current one, so Engineer A's fiduciary duty as a faithful agent under Code provision I.4 does not directly apply to this relationship. Second, proactive disclosure to Client L — particularly given Engineer A's competitive interest in recovering that client relationship — risks crossing the line from public welfare protection into conduct that maliciously or falsely injures a competitor's professional reputation under Code provision III.7, especially if the violation is inadvertent and potentially curable. Third, the appropriate mechanism for protecting Client L and the public is the licensure board, not a direct communication from a competitor. Engineer A's obligation to Client L is therefore best discharged indirectly: by following the Board's graduated reporting sequence, which, if it results in a formal report to the State P licensure board, will trigger the regulatory process designed to protect clients and the public from unlicensed practice. Direct contact with Client L by Engineer A would be ethically problematic unless Engineer A had independent reason to believe that Client L faced imminent safety risk from the unlicensed engagement — a circumstance not established by the facts as presented.
In response to Q201, the tension between the Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement principle and the Mandatory Reporting Obligation principle is real and is sharpened — though not resolved differently — by Engineer A's competitive interest. The risk that collegial outreach functions as a delay tactic rather than a genuine corrective mechanism is not merely theoretical: Engineer A could use the collegial contact phase to gather information about XYZ Engineering's client relationships, to signal to Client L that XYZ Engineering is non-compliant, or simply to extend the period during which XYZ Engineering is exposed to regulatory risk. The ethical resolution requires that Engineer A treat the collegial contact phase as time-bounded and purpose-specific. Its purpose is to give Engineer X a genuine opportunity to cure the violation or to provide information that changes Engineer A's assessment of whether a violation has occurred. It is not an open-ended deliberative period. If Engineer X responds promptly and demonstrates that corrective action is underway, Engineer A's obligation to report is substantially reduced. If Engineer X is unresponsive, dismissive, or continues practice without remediation, the collegial phase has served its purpose and Engineer A's reporting obligation becomes operative without further delay. The competitive interest does not change this sequencing but does require Engineer A to be especially vigilant that the collegial phase is not being unconsciously extended or instrumentalized in ways that serve competitive rather than corrective ends.
In response to Q301 and Q304 considered together from a deontological perspective, Engineer A does not have an unconditional duty to report immediately to the State P licensure board, but does have a categorical duty to ensure that the epistemic verification obligation does not become a procedural mechanism for indefinite delay. Deontological analysis under a Kantian framework would hold that Engineer A's duty to report unauthorized practice is grounded in the universalizability of the rule that engineers must uphold licensure integrity — a rule that cannot be suspended merely because the reporter has a competitive interest in the outcome. However, the same framework's requirement of fairness to Engineer X as a rational agent entitled to due consideration supports the verification obligation: Engineer A must not report on the basis of assumption or incomplete information, because doing so would treat Engineer X as a means to Engineer A's competitive ends rather than as a professional peer entitled to accurate treatment. The deontological resolution is therefore that the verification obligation is a genuine duty of fairness, not a loophole — but it must be discharged promptly and in good faith. Once verification is complete and collegial contact has been attempted without satisfactory resolution, the duty to report becomes categorical and is not diminished by Engineer A's competitive interest, because the duty's foundation is the integrity of the licensure system and the protection of the public, not the purity of Engineer A's motivation.
In response to Q302, the collegial-first approach prescribed by the Board does reflect the disposition of a professionally virtuous engineer when applied in good faith, but it carries a genuine virtue ethics risk that Engineer A's competitive self-interest masquerades as professional courtesy. Virtue ethics analysis focuses on the character of the agent and the integrity of the motivational structure behind the action, not merely on whether the action conforms to a prescribed sequence. An engineer of genuinely virtuous character would approach the collegial contact with Engineer X from a disposition of professional solidarity — a sincere desire to give a colleague the opportunity to correct an inadvertent error — rather than from a disposition of competitive calculation. The risk is that Engineer A, operating in a context of competitive motivation, performs the collegial contact as a procedural formality while internally treating it as a step toward a predetermined outcome of formal reporting that will benefit ABC Engineering. The virtue ethics framework would require Engineer A to engage in honest self-examination about the motivational structure of the collegial contact: Is Engineer A genuinely open to being persuaded that no violation has occurred, or that the violation is being remedied? Is Engineer A prepared to forgo formal reporting if Engineer X provides a satisfactory explanation? If the answer to these questions is no — if the collegial contact is a performance rather than a genuine engagement — then the Board's prescribed sequence, while procedurally followed, is not being executed with the virtuous character it presupposes.
In response to Q303, the Board's graduated reporting sequence — collegial contact first, formal report only if unsatisfied — produces better aggregate outcomes for public welfare, licensure system integrity, and professional trust than an immediate mandatory report would, for several interconnected reasons. From a consequentialist perspective, the relevant outcomes include not only the specific case of XYZ Engineering's compliance but also the systemic effects on how engineers across the profession respond to discovered violations. A regime of immediate mandatory reporting without collegial engagement would likely produce a higher rate of reports grounded in error or assumption, would damage professional relationships and trust, and would impose disproportionate regulatory burdens on licensure boards that must investigate every report regardless of whether the violation was inadvertent and self-correcting. The graduated sequence, by contrast, filters out cases where the violation is inadvertent and promptly remedied — which are likely the majority of certificate of authority cases — while preserving the formal reporting mechanism for cases where collegial engagement fails. The public welfare is served because the ultimate outcome in non-compliant cases is the same: either Engineer X obtains the certificate of authority, or the matter is reported to the licensure board. The licensure system's integrity is served because the board's investigative resources are directed toward cases that genuinely require regulatory intervention. Professional trust is served because the collegial mechanism demonstrates that the profession takes self-regulation seriously without treating every administrative deficiency as a matter requiring immediate formal sanction. The one consequentialist risk of the graduated sequence — that it allows ongoing unlicensed practice during the collegial engagement period — is real but is mitigated by the time-bounded nature of the collegial phase and by the fact that certificate of authority violations, while serious, typically do not present the same immediacy of public safety risk as, for example, structural engineering errors.
In response to Q401, if Engineer A had no prior business relationship with Client L and no competitive stake in XYZ Engineering's engagement, the Board's ethical analysis and reporting sequence would likely remain structurally identical — the graduated approach of collegial contact followed by formal reporting if unsatisfied is grounded in the nature of the violation and the profession's self-regulatory norms, not in the reporter's competitive status. However, the presence of competitive motivation does not merely require heightened self-scrutiny as a procedural add-on; it structurally alters the ethical texture of Engineer A's obligations in at least two ways. First, it introduces a duty of motivational transparency that would not exist for a disinterested reporter: Engineer A must be prepared to examine and, if asked, to account for the fact that the report serves competitive as well as public interest ends. Second, it raises the threshold of care Engineer A must apply to the verification obligation, because the consequences of a mistaken or premature report fall not only on Engineer X but also on the integrity of Engineer A's own professional standing. A disinterested reporter who makes a good-faith error in verification faces primarily the consequence of having caused an unnecessary investigation; Engineer A, as a competitor, faces the additional consequence of having potentially violated Code provision III.7 by injuring a competitor's professional reputation through a false report. The competitive relationship therefore does not change the sequence of obligations but does increase the ethical stakes attached to each step in that sequence.
In response to Q402, if Engineer X, upon collegial contact by Engineer A, acknowledged the missing certificate of authority but continued providing engineering services in State P while claiming the application was pending, Engineer A's obligation to report to the State P licensure board would become substantially more immediate and considerably less discretionary, though the analysis requires nuance. The acknowledgment of the deficiency combined with continued practice eliminates the possibility that the violation is based on Engineer X's ignorance of the requirement — the inadvertence rationale for the collegial-first approach no longer applies. The claim that an application is pending is a mitigating factor but not a dispositive one: a pending application does not confer the legal authority to practice, and Engineer X's continuation of services during the pendency of the application means that the public and Client L remain exposed to the risks that the certificate of authority requirement is designed to prevent. In this circumstance, Engineer A should report to the State P licensure board, because the collegial engagement has run its course — Engineer X has been informed, has acknowledged the deficiency, and has chosen to continue practice rather than suspend it pending compliance. The report at this stage is not premature or competitive in character; it is the appropriate escalation that the Board's graduated framework contemplates when collegial engagement does not produce corrective action. Engineer A should document the collegial exchange to demonstrate that the reporting sequence was followed in good faith.
In response to Q404, if Engineer A had immediately reported XYZ Engineering to the State P licensure board without first contacting Engineer X, and it subsequently emerged that XYZ Engineering had in fact obtained a certificate of authority that Engineer A had simply failed to verify, Engineer A would face significant ethical exposure under Code provision III.7, which prohibits engineers from attempting to injure, maliciously or falsely, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation of another engineer. The critical question would be whether Engineer A's failure to verify constituted a false report within the meaning of that provision. If Engineer A had access to publicly available licensure records and failed to consult them before reporting — particularly given Engineer A's competitive interest in the outcome — the failure to verify would be difficult to characterize as a good-faith error. The competitive context transforms what might otherwise be an innocent oversight into conduct that at minimum raises the inference of reckless disregard for Engineer X's professional reputation. Engineer A could also face consequences under the state licensing board's rules of professional conduct, which in many jurisdictions treat false or misleading statements to regulatory authorities as independent grounds for disciplinary action. This counterfactual powerfully illustrates why the epistemic verification obligation is not merely a procedural nicety but a substantive ethical requirement: it is the mechanism by which Engineer A demonstrates that the report is grounded in fact and public interest rather than competitive motivation, and its omission — especially by a competitor — exposes Engineer A to the very type of professional misconduct charge that Code provision III.7 is designed to prevent.
The central principle tension in this case — between Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement and Mandatory Reporting Obligation — is resolved not by subordinating one to the other but by sequencing them. The Board treats collegial contact as a procedural precondition to formal reporting, not as an alternative to it. This sequencing reflects a broader principle prioritization logic: where a violation may be inadvertent and correctable without regulatory intervention, the profession's interest in self-governance through peer correction takes temporary precedence over the state's interest in immediate enforcement. However, this priority is strictly conditional and time-limited. Once collegial engagement fails to produce a satisfactory explanation or remediation, the Mandatory Reporting Obligation reasserts itself with full force and is not further defeatable by appeals to professional courtesy or competitive neutrality. The case thus teaches that Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement is a duty-modifying principle — it shapes how and when the reporting duty is discharged — but it cannot extinguish the underlying reporting obligation. The sequencing is not a loophole; it is a structured pathway that preserves both professional reciprocity and licensure integrity.
The most structurally complex principle tension in this case is the conflict between Competitive Motivation Scrutiny and the Epistemic Verification Obligation. Engineer A's competitive interest in the outcome — as the firm that previously served Client L and now stands to benefit if XYZ Engineering is removed from the State P market — creates a genuine risk that the threshold of certainty Engineer A applies before concluding a violation has occurred will be biased downward by self-interest. The Epistemic Verification Obligation principle demands that Engineer A confirm XYZ Engineering's non-compliance status before initiating either collegial contact or formal reporting, precisely because acting on unverified information against a competitor could constitute the kind of malicious or false injury to professional reputation prohibited under Code provision III.7. The resolution the Board implicitly adopts is that these two principles are mutually reinforcing rather than conflicting: the competitive motivation scrutiny obligation requires Engineer A to apply a higher standard of epistemic care, not a lower one, before acting. This means Engineer A must affirmatively verify the certificate of authority status through available public records or direct inquiry before treating the matter as a confirmed violation. The case teaches that when competitive interest is present, the verification threshold rises — competitive motivation does not license faster action; it demands more careful action.
The Engineering Business-Profession Duality principle — which acknowledges that Engineer A simultaneously holds legitimate competitive interests and professional regulatory obligations — cannot be resolved by cleanly separating self-interested from duty-driven motivation, because in this case both motivations point toward the same action: reporting XYZ Engineering's non-compliance. The Board's framework implicitly accepts this motivational entanglement as ethically tolerable provided that Engineer A's conduct satisfies the procedural and epistemic standards the Code imposes independently of motivation. This reflects a deontologically significant insight: the ethical validity of Engineer A's reporting obligation does not depend on the purity of Engineer A's motivation, but on whether the action is taken in conformity with the Code's prescribed sequence — verification, collegial contact, and formal report only if necessary. The Licensure Integrity principle and the Jurisdiction-Specific Compliance Violation principle together establish that the public interest in enforcing certificate of authority requirements is a sufficient independent justification for reporting, regardless of whether Engineer A also benefits competitively. The case therefore teaches that mixed-motive reporting is ethically permissible when the underlying duty is genuine, the procedural sequence is followed, and the epistemic standard is met — but that the presence of competitive motivation imposes a continuing self-scrutiny obligation on Engineer A throughout the process to ensure that competitive interest does not distort the timing, framing, or escalation of the report.
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Invoked in BER Case 96-8 Peer Review Context
Engineer B Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation
Review Engineer A, bound by a confidentiality agreement as peer reviewer, discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work; the Board held that public safety obligations override the confidentiality agreement, requiring Engineer A to first discuss with Engineer B, then warn of intent to report, and finally notify authorities if unresolved
The confidentiality agreement assumed by a peer reviewer yields to the overriding public welfare obligation when genuine safety code violations are discovered; the sequencing of engagement-warning-reporting mirrors the collegial pre-reporting engagement principle
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discoverer
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation in Peer Review
Public safety obligation overrides confidentiality agreement; confidentiality becomes a secondary matter when genuine public danger exists
Review Engineer A would have an obligation to inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, Review Engineer A's only alternative is to notify and inform the proper authorities
a more appropriate action would be for Review Engineer A to expeditiously discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution of this issue
Contact Engineer X Directly (Action 3) → Certificate of Authority Obtained (Event 5)
Must Engineer A independently verify XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status through authoritative sources before taking any formal or informal action, and what level of epistemic certainty is required before treating the matter as a confirmed violation?
Before taking any action regarding XYZ Engineering's apparent lack of a certificate of authority in State P, Engineer A must decide whether to independently verify XYZ Engineering's licensure status through authoritative public records — such as the State P licensing board's public database — or to proceed on the basis of his existing belief that the violation has occurred. This decision is complicated by Engineer A's competitive interest in the outcome, which creates a structural risk that confirmation bias or self-interest could distort his epistemic assessment of the facts.
Before contacting Engineer X or filing any report, Engineer A independently confirms XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status by consulting the State P licensing board's publicly available records, ensuring that any subsequent action — collegial or formal — is grounded in verified fact rather than assumption or competitive inference.
Engineer A treats his existing knowledge or belief that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority as sufficient and proceeds directly to collegial contact or board reporting without first consulting authoritative public records, risking action based on erroneous or incomplete information.
Engineer A engages legal counsel to conduct the licensure status verification and advise on the threshold for reportable misconduct under State P's rules, adding a layer of professional objectivity that partially mitigates the structural conflict of interest arising from his competitive relationship with XYZ Engineering.
Engineer A Epistemic Verification XYZ Certificate of Authority Status Before Report
Should Engineer A first contact Engineer X directly to counsel him about the certificate of authority deficiency and afford an opportunity to remedy it, or should Engineer A proceed immediately to file a report with the State P licensing board?
Having verified that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority in State P, Engineer A must decide how to respond to the discovered violation. The central tension is between the collegial pre-reporting engagement norm — which requires Engineer A to first contact Engineer X directly and afford an opportunity to remedy the apparent inadvertent violation — and the mandatory reporting obligation, which requires eventual escalation to the State P licensing board. Engineer A's status as a direct competitor of Engineer X, having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering, creates a structural conflict of interest that requires him to scrutinize his own motivations before acting.
Engineer A reaches out directly to Engineer X to advise him of the certificate of authority deficiency, explain the substantive reasons for the requirement and its legal consequences, and afford Engineer X a reasonable opportunity to obtain the certificate before any formal report is filed — consistent with the graduated-duty framework and the professional reciprocity norm.
Engineer A bypasses collegial contact and files a report directly with the State P licensing board upon confirming the violation, treating the mandatory reporting obligation as unconditional and immediate — but risking violation of the collegial pre-reporting engagement norm and potentially exposing the report to scrutiny as competitively motivated.
Engineer A concludes that his competitive interest in the outcome — having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering — is so substantial that he cannot act without the appearance of self-interest, and therefore takes no action, neither contacting Engineer X nor reporting to the board — but risks suppressing a legitimate reporting obligation through competitive self-interest, which itself constitutes an ethics violation.
Engineer A Collegial Counsel to Engineer X Before Board Report
When contacting Engineer X, should Engineer A provide a full explanation of the certificate of authority requirement's purposes and legal consequences of non-compliance, or limit the communication to a bare notification of the apparent violation?
When Engineer A contacts Engineer X as part of collegial counsel, Engineer A must decide the substantive content and scope of that communication. Specifically, Engineer A must determine whether to limit the contact to a bare notification of the potential violation, or to fulfill the fuller collegial duty by explaining the substantive reasons for the certificate of authority requirement — including its purposes of identifying licensed engineers in the state, their licensure status, office locations, and engineers in responsible charge — and the practical legal consequences of non-compliance, such as impaired ability to seek judicial redress, inability to enforce contracts, and inability to obtain payment for engineering services rendered in State P.
Engineer A explains to Engineer X both the regulatory purpose of the certificate of authority requirement — identifying licensed engineers present in the state, their licensure status, office locations, and engineers in responsible charge — and the practical legal consequences of non-compliance, including impaired ability to seek judicial redress, inability to enforce contracts, and inability to obtain payment for services rendered in State P, enabling Engineer X to make a fully informed decision to remedy the violation.
Engineer A limits his communication to informing Engineer X that XYZ Engineering appears to lack a required certificate of authority in State P and that Engineer A may be required to report this to the licensing board, without explaining the underlying regulatory purposes or legal consequences — fulfilling the bare notification duty but falling short of the full collegial counsel obligation.
Engineer A Certificate of Authority Consequence Explanation to Engineer X
If Engineer X fails to remedy the certificate of authority deficiency after collegial contact, is Engineer A obligated to report XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice to the State P licensing board, and how should Engineer A ensure the report is professionally rather than competitively motivated?
After Engineer A has contacted Engineer X collegially and afforded a reasonable opportunity to remedy the certificate of authority deficiency, Engineer A must decide whether to escalate to formal reporting with the State P licensing board if Engineer X fails to obtain the certificate or provides an unsatisfactory explanation. This decision requires Engineer A to assess whether the reporting threshold under State P's specific rules of professional conduct has been met, to confirm that his motivation remains grounded in professional duty rather than competitive self-interest, and to determine whether the competitive discomfort of reporting a firm that has taken a former client should suppress what may be a legitimate mandatory reporting obligation.
After collegial contact fails to produce remedy and Engineer A has confirmed through self-examination that the report is motivated by professional duty to protect the public and the integrity of the licensure system — not by competitive self-interest in recovering Client L or eliminating XYZ Engineering as a competitor — Engineer A files a factually verified report with the State P licensing board, fulfilling the mandatory reporting obligation and preserving licensure system integrity.
Engineer A declines to file a report with the State P licensing board on the grounds that his competitive interest in the outcome — having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering — makes any report appear self-serving and potentially constitutes an ethics violation, thereby allowing the unauthorized practice to continue unchallenged — but this itself constitutes a failure of professional ethics by allowing competitive self-interest to suppress a legitimate reporting obligation.
Engineer A, recognizing the structural conflict of interest created by his competitive relationship with XYZ Engineering, refers the matter to a neutral professional body — such as a state engineering society ethics committee — for an independent assessment of whether the facts warrant a board report, partially mitigating the appearance of competitive motivation while preserving the reporting obligation.
Engineer A Competitor Unlicensed Firm Practice State Board Report XYZ Engineering
How should Engineer A structure his internal deliberation and external conduct to ensure that competitive self-interest does not corrupt his professional motivation at any stage of the response to XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency?
Throughout the entire decision sequence — from discovery of the apparent violation through collegial contact and potential board reporting — Engineer A must continuously examine and ensure that his motivations are grounded in professional duty to protect the public and the integrity of the licensure system, rather than in the competitive desire to recover Client L or eliminate XYZ Engineering as a competitor. This motivational scrutiny obligation is not a one-time assessment but a continuous constraint that conditions the ethical permissibility of every action Engineer A takes in response to the discovered violation. The structural conflict of interest — Engineer A lost Client L to XYZ Engineering — creates a persistent risk that competitive self-interest could corrupt the professional motivation required for ethical action.
Before each discrete action — verification, collegial contact, and any board report — Engineer A explicitly examines whether his motivation at that moment is grounded in professional duty to protect the public and the licensure system, documents that self-examination, and proceeds only when satisfied that competitive self-interest is not the primary driver, treating the motivational purity obligation as a continuous constraint rather than a one-time threshold.
Engineer A proceeds through the response sequence — verification, collegial contact, and potential reporting — relying on a general good-faith belief that his actions are professionally motivated, without conducting explicit structured self-examination at each stage, risking that competitive self-interest subtly distorts his professional judgment in ways he does not consciously recognize.
Engineer A consults with a state engineering society ethics advisor or trusted senior colleague — who has no competitive interest in the outcome — to obtain an external perspective on whether his proposed course of action appears professionally motivated or competitively driven, using external validation as a structural safeguard against the distorting effects of competitive self-interest on his professional judgment.
Engineer A Reporting Motivation Purity Competitive Interest Scrutiny
Decide Response to Discovered Violation (Action 2) → Contact Engineer X Directly (Action 3) → Direct Contact Outcome Determined (Event 4)
Direct Contact Outcome Determined (Event 4) — Failure Outcome → Report Violation to Authorities (Action 4)
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (State P)', 'firm_role': 'Owner/Principal', 'firm': 'ABC Engineering', 'jurisdiction': 'State P'}
Engineer A, owner of ABC Engineering in State P, discovers that competing firm XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P and must evaluate obligations to report this unlicensed firm practice to the appropriate state licensing board.
{'type': 'competitor', 'target': 'Engineer X XYZ Engineering Owner'}
{'type': 'former_provider', 'target': 'Client L'}
Jurisdiction-Specific Misconduct Reporter Engineer
Engineer A is the owner of ABC Engineering in State P
Engineer A learns that XYZ Engineering does not have a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P
Engineer A ABC Engineering Unlicensed Practice Recognition XYZ
Unlicensed Practice Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that XYZ Engineering's performance of engineering services in State P without a current certificate of authority constitutes a form of unlicensed firm practice under State P's engineering licensure laws.
Engineer A, as owner of ABC Engineering in State P, recognized that a competing firm was practicing without the required firm-level authorization.
Engineer A's identification that XYZ Engineering lacks a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P.
Engineer A counsels Engineer X about XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority to practice in State P; the explanation is intended to motivate Engineer X to voluntarily remedy the violation.
Certificate of Authority Consequence Explanation Collegial Duty Obligation
As part of his collegial counsel to Engineer X, Engineer A is obligated to explain the substantive reasons for the certificate of authority requirement and the practical legal consequences of non-compliance, including impaired ability to seek judicial redress and inability to enforce contracts or obtain payment in State P.
part of the discussion between Engineer A and Engineer X would presumably include an explanation by Engineer A of the reasons for the certificate of authority requirement (e.g., identifying the professional engineers present in the state and their licensure status, office location(s), engineers in responsible charge)
During the collegial counsel conversation with Engineer X
the failure by Engineer X to obtain the certificate of authority would impair Engineer X and his firm in their efforts to seek redress in the courts of State P, and might result in XYZ's inability to enforce its contracts and obtain payment for engineering services
Engineer A Certificate of Authority Practical Consequence Articulation to Engineer X
Certificate of Authority Practical Consequence Articulation Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to articulate to Engineer X the concrete legal and business consequences of XYZ Engineering's failure to obtain a certificate of authority in State P, including impaired court access, contract unenforceability, and payment collection risk.
As part of collegial counsel to Engineer X, Engineer A was expected to explain not just the regulatory requirement but its practical business and legal consequences to motivate voluntary compliance.
Explaining to Engineer X that lack of certificate of authority would impair XYZ's ability to seek court redress in State P and might result in inability to enforce contracts and obtain payment
Engineer A Certificate of Authority Regulatory Framework Knowledge State P
Certificate of Authority Regulatory Framework Knowledge Capability
Engineer A possessed knowledge of State P's certificate of authority requirements sufficient to recognize that XYZ Engineering's lack of such a certificate constituted a potential violation of State P's engineering practice laws.
Engineer A's recognition of the certificate of authority deficiency demonstrates knowledge of the regulatory framework distinguishing firm-level authorization from individual PE licensure.
Engineer A's ability to identify that XYZ Engineering does not have a current certificate of authority and to understand the significance of this deficiency.
Engineer A Collegial Clarification-First Reporting Sequencing XYZ Engineering
Collegial Clarification-First Reporting Sequencing Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to correctly sequence his response to XYZ Engineering's apparent certificate of authority violation by first seeking clarification and providing collegial counsel to Engineer X, reserving formal board reporting for the contingency that collegial resolution failed.
Engineer A's discovery of XYZ Engineering's potential licensure violation required application of the clarification-first sequencing norm — contacting Engineer X before escalating to formal reporting — consistent with the principle applied in BER Case 96-8.
Refraining from immediately filing a report with the State P licensing board upon discovering XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency, instead pursuing collegial clarification first
this duty does not require the engineer to do so immediately (unless there is an imminent public danger) or to refrain from taking steps to resolve what might otherwise be an oversight or misunderstanding by a professional colleague
when an engineer becomes aware of a violation of the state engineering licensure law, the engineer's first ethical obligation may be to refrain from jumping to conclusions
Engineer A Collegial Correction Priority Before Formal Reporting
From Engineer A's discovery of Engineer X's non-compliance through Engineer A's collegial communication with Engineer X
a more prudent approach—both from an ethical and a collegial perspective—would be to communicate with the potentially offending engineer to obtain clarification regarding the matter in question
Inadvertent Peer Regulatory Violation Collegial Correction Priority State
Engineer A's ethical obligation sequencing upon discovering Engineer X's inadvertent certificate of authority non-compliance
Engineer X taking corrective action to obtain the certificate of authority, or failure of collegial resolution triggering formal reporting obligation
Inadvertent and unintentional violations of laws and regulations are not uncommon, and potential violators should first be advised of the potential violation especially when a professional colleague, albeit a competitor, becomes aware of the potential infraction
Engineer A becoming aware that competitor Engineer X's firm lacks a required certificate of authority in State P, with no indication of willful non-compliance or imminent public danger
Engineer A Collegial Counsel Priority Before Board Report XYZ Engineering
Engineer A, a competitor of XYZ Engineering who lost Client L to XYZ, discovered that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P. The constraint requires Engineer A to first counsel Engineer X before filing a formal board complaint.
Collegial Notification Priority Before Formal Competitor Regulatory Report Constraint
Engineer A is constrained from immediately filing a formal complaint with the State P licensing board upon discovering XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority; Engineer A must first communicate directly with Engineer X to seek clarification and afford an opportunity for voluntary correction before escalating to formal regulatory reporting.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-8 precedent; professional collegial norms
Upon discovery of XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority non-compliance, prior to any formal board filing
Engineer A, owner of ABC Engineering in State P, learns that competitor XYZ Engineering (owned by Engineer X, licensed in State Q) has been performing engineering services in State P for Client L without obtaining the required certificate of authority.
Inadvertent Licensure Violation Collegial Counsel Before Reporting Obligation
Engineer A, upon discovering that Engineer X's firm (XYZ Engineering) lacks a certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P, is obligated to first communicate directly with Engineer X to advise him of the potential violation and afford him an opportunity to remedy it before filing any report with the State P licensing board.
Upon discovery of the certificate of authority deficiency, before any board report is filed
Engineer A Collegial Notification Priority Before Board Report XYZ Engineering
The certificate of authority deficiency may be an inadvertent administrative oversight by Engineer X, making collegial notification the appropriate first step before formal regulatory escalation.
Upon verifying that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority in State P, Engineer A is constrained to first notify Engineer X privately of the apparent non-compliance and afford a reasonable opportunity for voluntary correction before escalating to a formal report to the State P licensing board, given that the violation appears to be an administrative oversight rather than a deliberate circumvention of licensure requirements.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-8 collegial notification precedent; professional norms of peer self-regulation
Immediately upon verification of non-compliance and prior to formal board complaint submission
Engineer A Collegial Unlicensed Practice Advisor
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'jurisdiction': 'State P', 'relationship_to_engineer_x': 'Competitor and professional colleague'}
A licensed engineer in State P who became aware that competitor Engineer X's firm (XYZ) was practicing engineering in State P without the required certificate of authority, and bore an obligation to first counsel Engineer X collegially — explaining the legal and professional consequences — before considering formal reporting.
{'type': 'collegial_advisor_to', 'target': 'Engineer X Out-of-State Firm Owner'}
{'type': 'competitor_of', 'target': 'Engineer X Out-of-State Firm Owner'}
Collegial Unlicensed Practice Advisor Engineer
Assuming Engineer X is a reasonable and prudent individual, we believe Engineer A's counsel to Engineer X would be all that would be necessary
Engineer A may find himself in a similar circumstance and one can only suspect that Engineer A would value and appreciate a professional colleague steering him in the right direction
Engineer A Competitive Interest Neutrality XYZ Engineering Board Report
Client L is a former client of Engineer A, creating a direct competitive financial interest in the outcome of any report that might disqualify XYZ Engineering from the State P engagement.
Competitor Misconduct Reporting Competitive Interest Neutrality Constraint
Engineer A's decision to report XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority to the State P licensing board must be grounded in genuine public interest and professional ethics — not in competitive self-interest arising from the fact that Client L is a former client of Engineer A — and Engineer A must not allow competitive discomfort or the appearance of self-interest to deter reporting of a genuine violation, nor weaponize the reporting obligation as a mechanism for competitive harassment.
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections III.6, III.7; Competitor Misconduct Reporting Competitive Interest Neutrality Constraint
Throughout the decision-making process regarding whether and how to report XYZ Engineering's non-compliance
Engineer A Competitive Interest Non-Subordination Reporting Duty Self-Monitoring
Competitive Interest Non-Subordination of Reporting Duty Self-Monitoring Capability
Engineer A must exercise the capability to examine and monitor their own motivations when considering reporting XYZ Engineering — specifically ensuring that the competitive discomfort of reporting a firm that took a former client does not suppress a legitimate reporting obligation, and that the appearance of self-interest does not cause Engineer A to withhold a report that professional ethics require.
Engineer A faces a direct competitive financial interest in the outcome of any report against XYZ Engineering, as XYZ has taken a former client. This creates a risk that competitive discomfort or appearance of self-interest could suppress a legitimate reporting duty.
The obligation to ensure reporting motivation purity given that Client L is a former client of ABC Engineering now retained by XYZ Engineering.
Engineer A Competitive Interest Non-Subordination Reporting Duty Self-Monitoring XYZ
Engineer A possessed the capability to continuously monitor his own motivations when considering whether to report XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency, ensuring that his competitive financial interest in the outcome — having lost Client L to XYZ — did not suppress a legitimate reporting duty.
Engineer A's competitive financial interest in the outcome of reporting XYZ Engineering — having lost Client L to that firm — created a risk that competitive motivations could distort his professional reporting judgment in either direction.
Critically examining whether the decision to report or not report XYZ Engineering was driven by genuine professional obligation rather than competitive advantage-seeking or competitive discomfort
Engineer A must examine and ensure that any report filed with the State P licensing board regarding XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority is motivated by genuine professional obligation and public interest rather than competitive advantage-seeking
Engineer A Competitive Interest Non-Subordination of Reporting Duty State P
Engineer A lost Client L to competitor XYZ Engineering, which lacks a certificate of authority in State P; Engineer A must distinguish between professional duty to report and competitive motivation.
Competitive Interest Non-Subordination of Licensure Reporting Duty Obligation
Engineer A's competitive financial interest in the outcome — having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering — does not extinguish any applicable obligation to report Engineer X's certificate of authority violation to the State P licensing board, provided the report is factually verified and professionally motivated; however, Engineer A must ensure the report is not motivated primarily by competitive self-interest.
While it is true that most state engineering licensure boards impose an obligation upon engineers to report violations of state engineering licensure laws or regulations to the state board
When deciding whether and how to report the certificate of authority violation
As a business pursuit, engineers compete with one another for clients in order to maximize individual and firm profits
Engineer A Competitive Interest Non-Subordination of Reporting Duty XYZ
Engineer A is a direct competitor of XYZ Engineering and lost Client L to XYZ Engineering, creating a competitive motivation contamination risk that must be actively managed in the reporting decision.
Engineer A is constrained to ensure that any decision to report XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority non-compliance is grounded in genuine public interest and professional ethics — not in competitive self-interest arising from having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering — and must not allow competitive motivation to either drive premature reporting or suppress a legitimate reporting obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7; professional ethics norms on competitive conduct
the obligation to engage with other professionals in a collegial and cooperative manner, where appropriate
Throughout Engineer A's deliberation and action regarding XYZ Engineering's non-compliance
the Board has stressed the importance of exercising independent judgment and discretion in all business and professional areas
Engineer A Competitive Interest Non-Suppression of Reporting Duty XYZ Engineering
The fact that Client L is a former client of ABC Engineering creates a competitive dynamic that might cause Engineer A to hesitate in reporting, or might cause others to question the motivation; neither consideration extinguishes the reporting duty.
Engineer A must not allow the competitive discomfort of reporting a firm that has taken a former client — or the appearance of self-interest — to suppress the legitimate reporting obligation triggered by XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P.
Throughout the decision-making process regarding whether to report XYZ Engineering
Engineer A Competitive Motivation Contamination Risk
From Engineer A's discovery of Engineer X's non-compliance through resolution of the matter
As a business pursuit, engineers compete with one another for clients in order to maximize individual and firm profits.
Regulatory Violation Competitive Motivation Contamination Risk State
Engineer A's position as a competitor of Engineer X who has discovered Engineer X's regulatory non-compliance
Engineer A taking action clearly grounded in professional obligation (collegial correction) rather than competitive interest
At some point down the road of professional practice, Engineer A may find himself in a similar circumstance and one can only suspect that Engineer A would value and appreciate a professional colleague steering him in the right direction
Engineer A, as a competitor of Engineer X in State P, becoming aware of Engineer X's failure to obtain a certificate of authority
Engineer A Competitor Misconduct Reporting Threshold Assessment XYZ Engineering
Competitor Misconduct Reporting Threshold Assessment Capability
Engineer A must assess whether XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P rises to the threshold of 'knowledge or reason to believe' that triggers a mandatory reporting obligation to the State P licensing board.
Engineer A's decision about whether to report XYZ Engineering requires applying the competitor misconduct reporting threshold to the specific facts of the certificate of authority deficiency.
The obligation to evaluate whether the identified certificate of authority deficiency constitutes reportable misconduct under applicable professional conduct rules.
Engineer A has learned that XYZ Engineering is performing engineering services in State P without the required certificate of authority; after epistemic verification and motivation scrutiny, a reporting obligation is triggered.
Competitor Unlicensed Firm Practice State Board Reporting Obligation
Upon verifying that XYZ Engineering lacks a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P and confirming that this meets State P's reporting threshold, Engineer A is obligated to report XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice to the State P licensing board, provided the report is motivated by professional duty rather than competitive self-interest.
After verification of facts and assessment of State P's reporting threshold
Engineer A Cooperative Disclosure Pathway via Collegial Communication
From Engineer A's discovery of the non-compliance through Engineer A's decision on how to proceed
Cooperative Disclosure Pathway Available State
Engineer A's access to a collegial, private communication pathway with Engineer X before formal regulatory reporting
Engineer A initiating collegial communication with Engineer X, or determination that formal reporting is immediately required
Engineer A identifying that a direct collegial conversation with Engineer X is available as a first-step resolution mechanism
Engineer A Cross-Case BER Precedent Analogical Transfer 96-8 to Certificate of Authority
Cross-Case Ethical Precedent Analogical Transfer Capability
Engineer A (and the BER) possessed the capability to recognize that the ethical principles established in BER Case 96-8 — specifically the clarification-first, graduated escalation approach to discovered violations — were analogically transferable to the certificate of authority violation context, despite the different factual setting.
The BER explicitly drew on BER Case 96-8 as a precedent for the collegial-clarification-first approach applicable to Engineer A's situation with XYZ Engineering, requiring analogical transfer of the principle across different factual contexts.
Applying the BER 96-8 principle that collegial discussion and clarification should precede formal reporting to the certificate of authority violation scenario, recognizing the shared normative structure across both cases
Engineer A Discovery of XYZ Non-Compliance
From the moment Engineer A learns of XYZ Engineering's lack of certificate of authority onward
Competitor Regulatory Non-Compliance Discovery State
Engineer A's knowledge that competitor XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority in State P
Not described — state is ongoing; would terminate upon reporting or resolution of XYZ's non-compliance
Engineer A learning that XYZ Engineering does not hold a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P
Engineer A Engineering Business Ethics Competitive Context Awareness ABC Engineering
Engineering Business Ethics Competitive Context Awareness Capability
Engineer A possessed awareness of the intersection between competitive business interests and professional ethics obligations, enabling him to recognize that his competitive financial interest in the outcome of reporting XYZ Engineering must not suppress legitimate reporting duties or distort his professional judgment.
Engineer A's situation exemplified the intersection of engineering as a business pursuit and engineering as a profession, requiring awareness of how competitive dynamics interact with professional ethics obligations.
Navigating the tension between competitive interest (having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering) and professional obligations to report licensure violations and engage collegially with competitors
the practice of engineering, as with all professional pursuits, is also a business. As a business pursuit, engineers compete with one another for clients in order to maximize individual and firm profits
Engineer A Epistemic Verification XYZ Certificate of Authority Status
Engineer A 'learns' of XYZ's non-compliance, but the source and reliability of that information is unspecified; verification is required before formal action.
Epistemic Verification Before Competitor Regulatory Violation Report Constraint
Before filing any formal report with the State P licensing board regarding XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority, Engineer A is constrained to independently verify — through public licensing records or direct inquiry — that XYZ Engineering in fact lacks a current certificate of authority, and may not file a complaint based solely on secondhand information or competitive suspicion.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional norms of responsible reporting
Prior to submission of any formal complaint to the State P licensing board
Engineer A 'learns' that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority, but the source and reliability of this information is unspecified; Engineer A must confirm this through authoritative channels before acting on it.
Epistemic Verification Before Competitor Misconduct Report Obligation
Before filing any report with the State P licensing board regarding XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority, Engineer A is obligated to verify through authoritative sources — such as the State P licensing board's public records — that XYZ Engineering does not in fact hold a current certificate of authority.
Before filing any report or taking formal action against XYZ Engineering
Engineer A Former Client Relationship with Client L
From the point Engineer A learns of XYZ Engineering's engagement with Client L onward
Former Client Competitor Engagement Awareness State
Engineer A's awareness that former client Client L has engaged competitor XYZ Engineering
Not described — state is ongoing at time of case analysis
Engineer A learning that Client L — a former client of ABC Engineering — has retained XYZ Engineering for a State P project
Engineer A Inadvertent Licensure Violation Collegial Counsel Delivery XYZ Engineering
Inadvertent Licensure Violation Collegial Counsel Delivery Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to approach Engineer X collegially about XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P, explain the requirement's rationale, and provide Engineer X an opportunity to cure the violation before any formal report was filed.
Engineer A, owner of ABC Engineering in State P, discovered that competing firm XYZ Engineering lacked a certificate of authority to practice in State P and was obligated to counsel Engineer X before escalating to formal reporting.
Engaging Engineer X in direct discussion about the certificate of authority requirement rather than immediately filing a report with the State P licensing board
Engineer A Inadvertent vs Willful Distinction XYZ Certificate of Authority
Inadvertent vs Willful Licensure Violation Distinction Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess that XYZ Engineering's failure to obtain a certificate of authority in State P appeared to be an inadvertent oversight rather than a willful violation, and to calibrate his response accordingly by pursuing collegial counsel before formal reporting.
Engineer A's discovery that XYZ Engineering lacked a certificate of authority required assessment of whether this was inadvertent non-compliance or deliberate unlicensed practice, which determined the appropriate response pathway.
Treating XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency as a potential oversight warranting collegial guidance rather than immediate formal reporting to the State P licensing board
Inadvertent and unintentional violations of laws and regulations are not uncommon, and potential violators should first be advised of the potential violation
what might otherwise be an oversight or misunderstanding by a professional colleague
Engineer A Independent Judgment Competitive Business Context Constraint
The NSPE Board has consistently stressed independent judgment and discretion in business and professional areas over its 50+ year history of BER decisions, making this a foundational constraint applicable to Engineer A's competitive conduct decisions.
Business Pressure Technical Recommendation Separation Constraint
Engineer A is constrained to exercise independent professional judgment and discretion in all business and professional decisions — including the decision of whether and how to report XYZ Engineering's non-compliance — prohibiting the subordination of that judgment to competitive business pressures or profit-maximization motivations arising from the competitive relationship with XYZ Engineering.
NSPE Code of Ethics; NSPE BER 50-year business ethics precedent
Throughout Engineer A's professional engagement with the XYZ Engineering non-compliance situation
While engineering is a profession, the practice of engineering, as with all professional pursuits, is also a business
Engineer A Jurisdiction-Specific Misconduct Reporting Threshold Compliance State P XYZ
Jurisdiction-Specific Misconduct Reporting Threshold Compliance Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to identify and apply State P's specific reporting threshold standard for triggering a mandatory reporting obligation to the state licensing board, and to evaluate whether XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority met that threshold.
Engineer A's reporting decision regarding XYZ Engineering required application of State P's specific reporting threshold standard, which may differ from other states' standards.
Evaluating whether XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency met State P's specific threshold (e.g., 'knowledge,' 'reason to believe,' or 'reasonable grounds to believe') before determining whether to file a formal report
most state engineering licensure boards impose an obligation upon engineers to report violations of state engineering licensure laws or regulations to the state board
Engineer A Jurisdiction-Specific Reporting Threshold Assessment XYZ Certificate of Authority
Engineer A must possess the capability to identify and apply State P's specific threshold standard for mandatory reporting of competitor misconduct to the licensing board, and to evaluate whether XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority meets that threshold.
Engineer A must determine whether State P's licensing board rules impose a 'knowledge,' 'reason to believe,' or other threshold standard and whether the known facts about XYZ Engineering satisfy that standard.
The obligation to assess whether XYZ Engineering's conduct meets State P's reportable misconduct threshold before filing a report.
Engineer A Licensure System Integrity Preservation Advocacy XYZ Engineering
Licensure System Integrity Preservation Advocacy Capability
Engineer A must recognize their role as an active steward of State P's engineering licensure system and understand that the obligation to report XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority is owed to the system's public protection function — not merely to competitive self-interest — and that this stewardship duty persists even when reporting is competitively uncomfortable.
Engineer A's situation — where a former client has been taken by a competitor practicing without proper authorization — creates a tension between competitive self-interest and systemic integrity stewardship that requires this capability to navigate correctly.
The obligation to preserve the integrity of State P's engineering licensure system by reporting XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice, even though Engineer A has a competitive interest in the outcome.
Engineer A Licensure System Integrity Preservation XYZ Unauthorized Practice
XYZ Engineering's practice without a certificate of authority in State P erodes the licensure system that State P has established to protect the public, and Engineer A's awareness of this violation creates a professional duty to act.
Licensure System Integrity Preservation Obligation
Engineer A, as a licensed professional engineer in State P, bears an obligation to actively preserve the integrity of State P's engineering licensure system by not ignoring XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice, recognizing that permitting such practice to continue unchallenged undermines public protection and the competitive fairness of the State P engineering market.
Upon learning of XYZ Engineering's lack of certificate of authority
Engineer A Non-Immediate Board Reporting for Engineer X Inadvertent Violation
Engineer A discovers that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority in State P; the violation appears inadvertent rather than willful, and there is no indication of imminent public danger.
Non-Immediate Reporting Restraint for Inadvertent Licensure Violation Obligation
Engineer A is obligated to refrain from immediately filing a report with the State P licensing board upon discovering Engineer X's certificate of authority deficiency, and instead to first counsel Engineer X and allow a reasonable opportunity for remedy, absent any imminent public danger.
Upon discovery of the violation, prior to any board report
Engineer A Non-Immediate Reporting Constraint XYZ Certificate of Authority
XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority is an administrative regulatory violation without imminent public safety implications, distinguishing it from violations requiring immediate reporting under the imminent danger exception.
Non-Imminent Licensure Violation Immediate Reporting Non-Compulsion Constraint
Engineer A's duty to report XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority non-compliance to the State P licensing board does not require immediate filing upon discovery, because the violation poses no imminent public danger; Engineer A is constrained to first pursue collegial resolution before treating the reporting duty as requiring instantaneous formal action.
State P engineering licensure law; NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-8 precedent
most state engineering licensure boards impose an obligation upon engineers to report violations of state engineering licensure laws or regulations to the state board, this duty does not require the engineer to do so immediately (unless there is an imminent public danger) or to refrain from taking steps to resolve what might otherwise be an oversight or misunderstanding by a professional colleague
From the moment of discovery of XYZ Engineering's non-compliance through the collegial resolution process
Engineer A Professional Reciprocity Deliberation Before Formal Report
Engineer A has a competitive interest in the outcome (having lost Client L to XYZ Engineering), making the reciprocity deliberation particularly important as a check against self-interested reporting.
Professional Reciprocity Reporting Deliberation Constraint
Before deciding whether and how to report XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority non-compliance, Engineer A is constrained to apply the professional reciprocity standard — considering how Engineer A would wish to be treated if the roles were reversed — as a check on the motivation and proportionality of the reporting decision.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional reciprocity norms
During Engineer A's deliberation about whether to file a formal board complaint regarding XYZ Engineering
Engineer A Professional Reciprocity Deliberation in Reporting Decision
Engineer A weighs whether to immediately report Engineer X to the State P licensing board or to first counsel Engineer X collegially about the certificate of authority deficiency.
Professional Reciprocity Golden Rule Collegial Restraint Obligation
Engineer A is obligated to consider the professional reciprocity norm — that he may one day find himself in a similar circumstance and would value collegial guidance — as part of his ethical deliberation about how to respond to Engineer X's certificate of authority violation, informing his choice of a collegial, counseling-first approach.
During the ethical deliberation about how to respond to the discovered violation
Included in this is the obligation to engage with other professionals in a collegial and cooperative manner, where appropriate
Engineer A Professional Reciprocity Perspective-Taking XYZ Reporting Decision
Professional Reciprocity Perspective-Taking Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to engage in professional reciprocity perspective-taking — imagining himself in Engineer X's position and recognizing that he would value collegial counsel before formal reporting — and to allow this reasoning to appropriately temper the timing of any formal report.
Engineer A's reporting decision regarding XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority violation required weighing competitive interests, reporting obligations, and professional reciprocity norms.
Deliberating on whether to immediately report XYZ Engineering or first counsel Engineer X, informed by recognition that Engineer A himself might one day benefit from similar collegial guidance
Engineer A Public Confidence in Profession Protection XYZ Unauthorized Practice
Public Confidence in Profession Protection Capability
Engineer A must recognize that acquiescing in XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice in State P — by failing to report it — would undermine public confidence in the engineering profession and the intent of the licensure system, and must act to protect that confidence by fulfilling the reporting obligation.
Engineer A's decision about whether to report XYZ Engineering has implications for public confidence in the profession's self-regulatory mechanisms and the effectiveness of the licensure system.
The obligation to preserve the integrity of State P's engineering licensure system through active reporting of XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority deficiency.
Client L is a former client of Engineer A's firm who has now retained XYZ Engineering, creating a direct competitive financial interest that could color Engineer A's motivation for reporting.
Competitor Unlicensed Practice Reporting Motivation Purity Obligation
Engineer A must examine and ensure that any report filed with the State P licensing board regarding XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority is motivated by professional duty to protect the public and the licensure system, not by the competitive desire to recover Client L or eliminate XYZ Engineering as a competitor.
Before and at the time of filing any report with the State P licensing board
Engineer A Reporting Motivation Purity Competitive Interest Scrutiny Capability
Engineer A must scrutinize whether the motivation to report XYZ Engineering is grounded in professional duty and public interest rather than competitive self-interest in recovering Client L or disadvantaging XYZ Engineering.
The fact that Client L is a former client of ABC Engineering creates a specific competitive motivation that Engineer A must examine and ensure does not corrupt the reporting decision.
The obligation to examine reporting motivations before filing any report with the State P licensing board regarding XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status.
Engineer A State P Jurisdiction-Specific Reporting Threshold Assessment XYZ
State P may have specific rules defining what constitutes reportable misconduct; Engineer A must apply State P's rules rather than a generic standard when assessing the reporting obligation.
Jurisdiction-Specific Misconduct Reporting Threshold Compliance Obligation
Engineer A must evaluate whether XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P meets State P's specific threshold for reportable misconduct under State P's rules of professional conduct before concluding that a reporting obligation is triggered.
Before filing any report with the State P licensing board
Engineer A Unlicensed Firm Practice Reporting Obligation State P Board
XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority constitutes unauthorized practice of engineering in State P, triggering Engineer A's affirmative reporting obligation once the violation is confirmed and collegial correction has been attempted.
Unlicensed Practice Reporting Constraint
Upon verifying that XYZ Engineering is practicing engineering in State P without a required certificate of authority, and after affording Engineer X a reasonable opportunity for collegial correction, Engineer A is constrained to report the continuing unauthorized practice to the State P licensing board and may not passively acquiesce in XYZ Engineering's ongoing unauthorized practice.
NSPE Code of Ethics; State P Engineering Licensure Law; Unlicensed Practice Reporting Constraint
After verification of non-compliance and after collegial notification has failed to produce correction
Engineer A Unlicensed Practice Reporting and Challenge XYZ Engineering State P Board
Unlicensed Practice Reporting and Challenge Capability
Upon verifying that XYZ Engineering lacks a current certificate of authority and confirming that this meets State P's reporting threshold, Engineer A must possess the capability to formulate, document, and communicate a professional report to the State P licensing board.
Engineer A's reporting obligation, once triggered, requires the practical capability to file a report with the appropriate state licensing authority regarding XYZ Engineering's unauthorized firm practice in State P.
The obligation to report XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority to the State P licensing board once verification and threshold conditions are satisfied.
Engineer A informing Engineer X of intent to notify authorities before reporting to proper authorities
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'review_context': 'Organized peer review program', 'finding': 'Potential safety code violations in recent design projects'}
Engineer whose firm was visited by Review Engineer A as part of an organized peer review program; design work found to potentially violate state and local safety code requirements, triggering collegial discussion obligations.
{'type': 'reviewed_by', 'target': 'Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discoverer'}
Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings
Review Engineer A visited Engineer B's firm
Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
the appropriate action would be for Review Engineer A to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B
Engineer B Peer Review Cooperation Obligation Recognition Safety Findings
Peer Review Cooperation Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer B, whose design work was found to potentially violate state and local safety codes during a peer review, must recognize the obligation to cooperate fully with the peer review process and to address the identified safety concerns rather than resist or obstruct the review findings.
Engineer B is the subject of a peer review that identified potential safety code violations, creating an obligation to cooperate with the review process and address the findings.
The obligation to cooperate with Review Engineer A's peer review findings regarding potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design work.
Engineer B Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings — Engineer whose firm was visited by Review Engineer A as part of an organized peer review program; design work found to potentially violate state and local safety codes.
Engineer Reporting Obligation to Licensing Board Standard
State P Licensing Board / NCEES Model Rules
State licensing board rules on duty to report violations by other licensees or firms
Engineer A in evaluating whether to report XYZ Engineering to the State P licensing board
Establishes Engineer A's affirmative duty to report XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority to the relevant state licensing board in State P
Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Licensing Board — Graduated Duty
State Engineering Licensure Board Reporting Obligation Standard
Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in analyzing Engineer A's obligations toward Engineer X
Referenced as the general professional norm that most state engineering licensure boards impose on engineers to report violations of licensure laws or regulations, but qualified by the principle that this duty is not immediate (absent imminent danger) and does not preclude collegial resolution steps first
Engineer Solicitation and Competition Ethics Standard
Professional norms governing ethical competition and solicitation among engineers
Engineer A in assessing the ethical propriety of any action taken regarding XYZ Engineering
Relevant because Engineer A is a competitor of Engineer X (Client L is a former client of Engineer A), raising the question of whether Engineer A's motivation for reporting is legitimate professional duty or self-interested competitive conduct
Engineer X Firm Certificate of Authority Non-Compliance
From the time Engineer X's firm began providing engineering services in State P without a certificate of authority through remediation
Firm Unauthorized Jurisdiction Practice State
Engineer X's firm XYZ operating in State P without a required certificate of authority
Engineer X obtaining the required certificate of authority following Engineer A's collegial counsel
Inadvertent and unintentional violations of laws and regulations are not uncommon
Engineer X's firm undertaking engineering services in State P without obtaining the required certificate of authority
Engineer X Out-of-State Firm Owner Without Certificate of Authority
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (home state)', 'firm': 'XYZ Engineering', 'violation': 'No certificate of authority in State P', 'violation_character': 'Inadvertent/unintentional'}
Owner of XYZ engineering firm, licensed in another state, who accepted and performed engineering services in State P without obtaining the required certificate of authority, subject to collegial counsel from Engineer A and potential formal reporting if non-compliant.
{'type': 'advised_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Collegial Unlicensed Practice Advisor'}
{'type': 'competitor_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Collegial Unlicensed Practice Advisor'}
Out-of-State Firm Owner Practicing Without Certificate of Authority
the failure by Engineer X to obtain the certificate of authority would impair Engineer X and his firm in their efforts to seek redress in the courts of State P
might result in XYZ's inability to enforce its contracts and obtain payment for engineering services
Engineer X XYZ Engineering Certificate of Authority Pre-Practice Self-Assessment
Out-of-State Certificate of Authority Pre-Practice Compliance Self-Assessment Capability
Engineer X, as owner of XYZ Engineering licensed in State Q, was required to possess and exercise the capability to verify that XYZ Engineering held a current certificate of authority from State P before accepting and performing engineering services for Client L on a project in State P.
Engineer X accepted a project in State P without verifying or obtaining the required firm-level certificate of authority, indicating a failure to exercise this compliance self-assessment capability.
Absence of this capability demonstrated by XYZ Engineering's failure to obtain a certificate of authority from State P prior to commencing practice there.
Engineer X is the owner of XYZ Engineering in State Q.
Engineer X XYZ Engineering Certificate of Authority Regulatory Framework Knowledge
Engineer X was required to possess knowledge of State P's certificate of authority requirements for out-of-state engineering firms, including the distinction between individual PE licensure and firm-entity authorization.
XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P while performing engineering services there reflects a failure to understand or apply the firm-level authorization framework.
Failure to obtain a certificate of authority from State P before practicing there indicates a gap in this regulatory framework knowledge.
Engineer X XYZ Engineering Certificate of Authority State P Pre-Practice Compliance
XYZ Engineering accepted and performed engineering services for Client L in State P without obtaining the required certificate of authority from State P, constituting unauthorized firm-level practice of engineering in State P.
Out-of-State Firm Certificate of Authority Pre-Practice Compliance Obligation
Engineer X, as owner of XYZ Engineering (licensed in State Q), was obligated to obtain a current certificate of authority from State P before accepting and performing engineering services for Client L on a project located in State P.
Prior to accepting the engagement from Client L for the State P project
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (State Q, presumed)', 'firm_role': 'Owner/Principal', 'firm': 'XYZ Engineering', 'home_jurisdiction': 'State Q', 'practice_jurisdiction': 'State P', 'certificate_of_authority_State_P': 'None/Expired'}
Engineer X, owner of XYZ Engineering (licensed in State Q), accepts and performs engineering services for Client L on a project in State P without holding a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P, constituting unlicensed firm practice.
{'type': 'competitor', 'target': 'Engineer A ABC Engineering Owner Reporter'}
{'type': 'service_provider_to', 'target': 'Client L'}
Engineer X is the owner of XYZ Engineering in State Q
XYZ Engineering does not have a current certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P
Engineer X being retained by Client L without certificate of authority before Engineer A learning of the licensure violation
Engineering Business-Profession Duality Framing of Engineer A Competitive Reporting Decision
The Board frames Engineer A's decision about whether and how to respond to Engineer X's certificate of authority violation within the broader context of engineering as simultaneously a profession and a business, requiring independent judgment and collegial engagement rather than purely competitive or purely punitive responses
The business-profession duality means Engineer A cannot treat the competitive context as either irrelevant (pure professional duty to report) or determinative (self-interested reporting to eliminate a competitor); independent judgment and collegial engagement are required
Free and Open Competition as Engineering Ethics Boundary Condition
While engineering is a profession, the practice of engineering, as with all professional pursuits, is also a business.
Independent judgment and collegial engagement are required to navigate the intersection of competitive business interests and professional ethical obligations
In many of these cases, the Board has stressed the importance of exercising independent judgment and discretion in all business and professional areas.
Included in this is the obligation to engage with other professionals in a collegial and cooperative manner, where appropriate.
Epistemic Verification Obligation Before Engineer A Reports XYZ
Before reporting XYZ Engineering to the State P licensing board, Engineer A must verify that XYZ Engineering truly lacks a current certificate of authority and must not act on incomplete or potentially mistaken information, given the competitive stakes involved
The competitive context heightens the epistemic obligation: Engineer A must be confident in the factual basis of the report before proceeding, to avoid unjustly injuring XYZ Engineering's professional standing based on incomplete information
Incomplete Situational Knowledge Restraint in Competitor Critique
The restraint principle requires verification but does not require certainty; 'knowledge or reason to believe' is the applicable threshold, and Engineer A's direct knowledge that XYZ lacks a certificate of authority satisfies this threshold once verified
Free and Open Competition Boundary Condition in State P Engineering Market
The competitive market for engineering services in State P requires that all participating firms comply with State P's licensure requirements as a precondition of market participation; XYZ Engineering's unauthorized practice violates the boundary conditions within which free and open competition is ethically permissible
Free and open competition is valuable precisely because it occurs within a framework of professional standards; firms that circumvent licensure requirements are not competing freely and openly but are instead obtaining an illegitimate competitive advantage
The free competition principle does not protect unauthorized market participation; the boundary condition is that competition must occur within applicable professional and licensure standards
Jurisdiction-Specific Compliance Violation by Engineer X in State P
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
Engineer X accepted and performed engineering services for Client L on a project in State P without obtaining the certificate of authority required by State P, violating the jurisdiction-specific compliance obligation applicable to out-of-state engineers practicing in State P
State P's certificate of authority requirement is a jurisdiction-specific professional conduct obligation that Engineer X was required to satisfy before accepting the State P project; failure to do so constitutes an ethics violation regardless of Engineer X's licensure in State Q
Jurisdiction-Specific Ethics Compliance Obligation
Jurisdiction-specific compliance obligations are not overridden by client loyalty or faithful agent duties; compliance is a precondition of lawful practice
Licensure Integrity Invoked in Certificate of Authority Requirement Explanation
Engineer A's collegial counsel to Engineer X includes an explanation of the reasons for the certificate of authority requirement — identifying professional engineers present in the state, their licensure status, office locations, and engineers in responsible charge — grounding the regulatory requirement in the public protection rationale of the licensure system
The certificate of authority requirement serves the same public protection function as individual licensure; explaining this rationale to Engineer X is part of the collegial engagement obligation and reinforces the legitimacy of the regulatory requirement
Licensure Integrity and Public Protection Principle
Licensure integrity supports both the requirement itself and the collegial explanation of its rationale as a means of achieving compliance
Licensure Integrity Undermined by XYZ Engineering's Unauthorized Practice
XYZ Engineering's practice in State P without a certificate of authority undermines the licensure system that State P has established to protect its public from unqualified engineering practice, as Client L is unknowingly receiving engineering services from a firm not authorized to practice in the jurisdiction
The certificate of authority requirement exists to ensure that firms practicing in State P meet State P's standards; bypassing this requirement deprives Client L and the public of the protection the licensure system is designed to provide
Licensure integrity is not subordinated to client service convenience; the public protection rationale of licensure overrides the commercial interest in accepting out-of-state work without proper authorization
Mandatory Reporting Obligation of Engineer A Despite Competitive Interest
Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization
Engineer A, having knowledge that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P, is obligated to report this violation to the State P licensing board in writing, notwithstanding that Engineer A has a competitive interest in the outcome as a competitor who lost Client L to XYZ Engineering
The mandatory reporting obligation applies even when the reporting engineer stands to benefit competitively from the report; the competitive interest does not negate the duty but does require that the report be factually grounded and not maliciously motivated
The reporting obligation is not negated by competitive interest; however, the manner of reporting must be professional, factual, and non-malicious to avoid violating the prohibition on reputation injury through competitive critique
NSPE BER 50-Year Business Ethics Case History
NSPE Board of Ethical Review — Accumulated Case History on Business of Engineering
Over the more than 50 years of existence, the NSPE Board of Ethical Review has examined a variety of ethical matters relating to the business of engineering, including advertising, contingent fees, using an employer's facilities, firm names, ownership of design drawings, proprietary interests, remuneration, unfair competition, and other topics
NSPE Board of Ethical Review as contextual grounding for the present analysis
Cited as the body of accumulated BER decisions over 50+ years addressing business ethics topics including advertising, contingent fees, firm names, ownership of design drawings, unfair competition, and related matters, establishing the broader professional context for the present case
NSPE Board of Ethical Review examination of BER Case 96-8 before present case analysis
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer A in evaluating ethical obligations
Primary normative authority governing Engineer A's obligations upon discovering that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority to practice in State P, including duties to report unlicensed practice and obligations regarding competition with other engineers
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement (BER 96-8 Context)
Organized peer review program administering body
Confidentiality Agreement for Organized Peer Review Program
Review Engineer A in BER Case 96-8 peer review program
Referenced as the instrument signed by Review Engineer A in BER Case 96-8 prohibiting disclosure of confidential information from peer-reviewed firms; the Board determined this agreement becomes secondary when genuine public safety violations are at stake
Professional Reciprocity Norm Invoked in Engineer A Counsel to Engineer X
The Board grounds Engineer A's obligation to counsel Engineer X before reporting in the reciprocity norm: Engineer A may one day find himself in a similar circumstance and would value collegial guidance, which generates a present obligation to extend that same courtesy to Engineer X despite their competitive relationship
The Golden Rule applied to professional community membership generates an affirmative obligation of collegial engagement that constrains purely adversarial competitive conduct, even when the engineer has a personal competitive interest in the outcome of the other's violation
Professional Reciprocity and Collegial Solidarity Principle
At some point down the road of professional practice, Engineer A may find himself in a similar circumstance and one can only suspect that Engineer A would value and appreciate a professional colleague steering him in the right direction.
Reciprocity norm supports collegial engagement first; competitive interest does not override the professional community obligation to treat colleagues as one would wish to be treated
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked as Override of Peer Review Confidentiality in BER 96-8
In BER Case 96-8, the Board held that when Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements and endanger public health, safety, and welfare, Review Engineer A's obligation to protect the public overrides the confidentiality agreement and requires notification of proper authorities
Public welfare paramount operates as the foundational override principle that subordinates contractual confidentiality obligations when genuine public safety is at stake
Review Engineer A discovered that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Public welfare paramount overrides confidentiality; the confidentiality issue becomes secondary when genuine public danger exists
Review Engineer A must inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, Engineer A's only alternative would be to cooperate with the proper authorities
if in fact there was truly a violation that posed a serious danger to the public health and safety, the confidentiality issue would become a secondary matter
What are Engineer A’s ethical obligations under these facts?
Does Engineer A have an affirmative duty to verify XYZ Engineering's certificate of authority status before concluding a violation has occurred, and if so, what level of epistemic certainty is required before initiating either collegial contact or formal reporting?
To what extent does Engineer A's status as a direct competitor of Engineer X — and as the firm that previously served Client L — create a structural conflict of interest that should require Engineer A to apply heightened self-scrutiny before deciding whether and how to report the certificate of authority violation?
Does the ethical framework change if Engineer A has reason to believe that XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority is willful rather than inadvertent, and should the distinction between inadvertent and deliberate non-compliance affect the sequencing or urgency of Engineer A's reporting obligations?
What obligation, if any, does Engineer A have toward Client L — a former client now potentially receiving engineering services from an unlicensed firm — and does Engineer A's duty to protect the public extend to proactively informing Client L of XYZ Engineering's non-compliance?
Does the Collegial Pre-Reporting Engagement principle conflict with the Mandatory Reporting Obligation principle when Engineer A's competitive interest in the outcome creates a risk that collegial outreach is used as a delay tactic rather than a genuine corrective mechanism — and if so, how should Engineer A resolve this tension?
Does the Competitive Fairness Dimension of XYZ Engineering's Unauthorized Practice — which benefits Engineer A if XYZ is removed from competition — conflict with the Epistemic Verification Obligation principle, in that Engineer A's competitive interest may bias the threshold of certainty Engineer A applies before concluding a violation has occurred and acting on it?
Does the Licensure Integrity principle — which demands that unauthorized practice be reported to protect the profession and the public — conflict with the Professional Reciprocity Norm when Engineer A must decide how much latitude to extend to Engineer X before escalating to formal reporting, given that excessive deference to reciprocity could allow ongoing unlicensed practice to harm the public?
Does the Engineering Business-Profession Duality principle — which acknowledges Engineer A's legitimate competitive interests — conflict with the Jurisdiction-Specific Compliance Violation principle when Engineer A must decide whether to report, given that the same act of reporting simultaneously serves Engineer A's business interest and the profession's regulatory integrity, making it impossible to cleanly separate self-interested from duty-driven motivation?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A have an unconditional duty to report XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority to the State P licensure board, regardless of whether Engineer A's competitive interest in the matter might taint the motivation behind the report?
From a virtue ethics standpoint, does the collegial-first approach prescribed by the Board reflect the disposition of a professionally virtuous engineer, or does it risk allowing Engineer A's competitive self-interest to masquerade as professional courtesy, thereby undermining the integrity of the reporting process?
From a consequentialist perspective, does the Board's graduated reporting sequence — collegial contact first, formal report only if unsatisfied — produce better outcomes for public welfare, licensure system integrity, and professional trust than an immediate mandatory report to the State P board would?
From a deontological perspective, does the epistemic verification obligation — requiring Engineer A to confirm XYZ Engineering's non-compliance before reporting — represent a genuine duty of fairness owed to Engineer X, or does it create a procedural loophole that allows unauthorized practice to continue unchecked while Engineer A deliberates?
If Engineer A had no prior business relationship with Client L — and therefore had no competitive stake in XYZ Engineering's engagement — would the Board's ethical analysis and reporting sequence have differed, and does the presence of competitive motivation structurally alter Engineer A's obligations or merely require heightened self-scrutiny?
What if Engineer X, upon being contacted collegially by Engineer A, acknowledged the missing certificate of authority but continued providing engineering services in State P while claiming the application was pending — would Engineer A's obligation to report to the State P licensure board become immediate and unconditional at that point?
If the BER 96-8 peer review precedent had established that confidentiality obligations fully override reporting duties even in cases of safety violations, how would that alternative precedent have affected the graduated reporting framework the Board applied to Engineer A's certificate of authority discovery?
What if Engineer A had immediately reported XYZ Engineering to the State P licensure board without first contacting Engineer X, and it subsequently emerged that XYZ Engineering had in fact obtained a certificate of authority that Engineer A had simply failed to verify — what ethical and professional consequences would Engineer A face under Code provisions governing malicious or false injury to a competitor's professional reputation?
Review Engineer A Collegial Discussion Before Authority Notification BER 96-8
BER Case 96-8 established the precedent that collegial discussion and clarification must precede external authority notification even in safety-related peer review contexts, provided the violation is not immediately imminent.
Inadvertent Licensure Violation Collegial Counsel Priority Constraint
Review Engineer A was constrained to first discuss the discovered safety code concerns with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution before notifying proper authorities, and was further constrained to inform Engineer B of the intent to notify authorities if the issue could not be resolved collegially.
the appropriate action would be for Review Engineer A to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution of the issues
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during the peer review visit, prior to any external authority notification
Review Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Override of Public Safety BER 96-8
Review Engineer A had signed a confidentiality agreement as part of the peer review program but discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work that could endanger the public.
Confidentiality Scope Limitation for Public Danger Disclosure Obligation
Review Engineer A's confidentiality agreement as peer reviewer did not override the obligation to disclose Engineer B's safety code violations to proper authorities when those violations posed a genuine danger to public health, safety, and welfare; the confidentiality obligation became secondary to the public safety obligation.
Upon determination that Engineer B's work posed a genuine public safety risk
Review Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Framework Navigation BER 96-8
Peer Review Confidentiality Framework Navigation Capability
Review Engineer A possessed the capability to navigate the confidentiality agreement signed as peer reviewer, correctly determining that the confidentiality obligation became secondary when Engineer B's work posed a serious danger to public health and safety requiring disclosure to proper authorities.
Review Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as part of the peer review program but discovered potential safety code violations, requiring navigation of the tension between contractual confidentiality and public safety disclosure obligations.
Recognizing that the confidentiality agreement governing the peer review program did not override the obligation to disclose Engineer B's safety code violations to proper authorities when public safety was genuinely at risk
Review Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Framework Navigation Safety Override
Review Engineer A must navigate the confidentiality agreement signed as part of the peer review program, recognizing when the discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work override the confidentiality obligation and require public safety disclosure.
Review Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement before visiting Engineer B's firm and must determine whether the discovered safety violations override that confidentiality commitment.
The obligation to balance confidentiality agreement obligations against the paramount duty to report safety code violations discovered during the peer review.
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discoverer — signed a confidentiality agreement, visited Engineer B's firm, discovered potential safety code violations.
Review Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override BER 96-8
Review Engineer A discovered during a peer review visit that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare. The confidentiality agreement signed as a condition of peer review participation was held not to override the public safety reporting obligation.
Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override Constraint
Review Engineer A's confidentiality agreement as peer reviewer did not override the obligation to disclose Engineer B's safety code violations to proper authorities if Engineer B failed to resolve the issues after collegial discussion; the confidentiality constraint was rendered secondary by the public safety imperative.
BER Case 96-8; NSPE Code of Ethics; peer review program confidentiality agreement
Upon discovery of Engineer B's potential safety code violations during the peer review visit
Review Engineer A Peer Review Program Public Benefit Recognition BER 96-8
Peer Review Program Public Benefit Recognition Capability
Review Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize the professional and public benefits of the organized peer review program in which he participated, understanding its role in improving professional practice and ultimately enhancing public safety through quality improvement.
Review Engineer A served as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice, requiring recognition of the program's dual collegial and public safety purposes.
Participating in the organized peer review program designed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice, and understanding the program's collegial and public benefit purposes
Review Engineer A served as a peer reviewer as part of an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Code Sequential Escalation BER 96-8
Review Engineer A served as peer reviewer under a confidentiality agreement, visited Engineer B's firm, and discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design work that could endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Sequential Escalation Obligation
Review Engineer A, having discovered that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements during a peer review visit, was obligated to first discuss the issues with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution, and if unresolved, to inform Engineer B that the only alternative was to notify proper authorities, and then to do so notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during the peer review visit
If they were unable to resolve the issue, Review Engineer A would have an obligation to inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, Review Engineer A's only alternative is to notify and inform the proper authorities
the confidentiality issue would become a secondary matter
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Escalation Sequencing BER 96-8
Peer Review Safety Escalation Sequencing Capability
Review Engineer A possessed the capability to correctly sequence his response to Engineer B's potential safety code violations — first discussing the issues with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution, then advising Engineer B of intent to notify authorities if resolution failed, and finally reporting to proper authorities.
Review Engineer A, serving as peer reviewer under a confidentiality agreement, discovered that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements, requiring application of the correct graduated escalation sequence.
Following the graduated escalation sequence: collegial discussion with Engineer B → notification of intent to report → reporting to proper authorities, rather than immediately escalating to external authorities upon discovering potential violations
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Escalation Sequencing Capability
Review Engineer A, upon discovering potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design work during a confidential peer review, must possess the capability to correctly sequence escalation steps — first discussing concerns with Engineer B, then advising of intent to report if unresolved, and finally reporting to appropriate authorities.
Review Engineer A discovered potential safety violations during a peer review of Engineer B's firm and must navigate the tension between confidentiality obligations and public safety reporting duties through correct escalation sequencing.
The obligation to follow a graduated escalation sequence when safety code violations are discovered during a confidential peer review of Engineer B's firm.
Review Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discoverer — Served as peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, signed a confidentiality agreement, visited Engineer B's firm, discovered potential safety code violations.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'program_role': 'Peer reviewer in organized peer review program', 'confidentiality_bound': True, 'safety_violation_discovered': True}
Served as peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, signed a confidentiality agreement, visited Engineer B's firm, discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design work, and bore obligations to discuss findings collegially before notifying authorities.
{'type': 'bound_by', 'target': 'Confidentiality Agreement'}
{'type': 'peer_review_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Peer-Reviewed Engineer'}
Peer Review Safety Violation Discovering Engineer
Review Engineer A served as a peer reviewer as part of an organized peer review program
Review Engineer A discovered that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements
Review Engineer A was asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement'
Review Engineer A visiting Engineer B's firm before discovery of potential safety code violations
State Licensing Board Rules of Professional Conduct — State P
State P Board of Professional Engineers Rules of Professional Conduct
State Licensing Board Rules of Professional Conduct
Engineer A in determining state-specific professional conduct obligations
State-level regulatory rules that may independently impose obligations on Engineer A to report XYZ Engineering's non-compliance with the certificate of authority requirement
State P Certificate of Authority to Practice Engineering Requirement
State P Firm Licensure / Certificate of Authority Regulation
Certificate of Authority to Practice Engineering Standard
Engineer A in identifying the nature of XYZ Engineering's non-compliance
The specific regulatory instrument requiring out-of-state engineering firms to obtain a certificate of authority before practicing in State P; XYZ Engineering's non-compliance is the central factual trigger of the ethical dilemma
State P Engineering Practice Act / Licensure Statute
Engineer A in assessing whether XYZ Engineering is in violation of State P law
Establishes the legal requirement for engineering firms to hold a certificate of authority to practice in State P, making XYZ Engineering's lack of such a certificate a potential statutory violation
State P Jurisdiction-Specific Reporting Threshold Applied by Engineer A
Engineer A must evaluate whether XYZ Engineering's lack of a certificate of authority in State P meets State P's specific threshold for reportable misconduct, applying State P's licensing board standards rather than a generic national standard
State P's certificate of authority requirement is a jurisdiction-specific rule; whether its violation constitutes reportable misconduct under State P's ethics and licensing framework must be evaluated against State P's specific standards
Practicing without a certificate of authority is a clear, objective, verifiable violation of State P's licensure requirements, which in most jurisdictions meets the threshold for reportable misconduct without ambiguity
Unlicensed Practice Obligation Invoked Against XYZ Engineering by Engineer A
XYZ Engineering's practice in State P without certificate of authority
Engineer A, upon learning that XYZ Engineering lacks a certificate of authority to practice engineering in State P, faces an obligation to challenge or report this unlicensed practice to the appropriate State P licensing authority
The certificate of authority requirement in State P constitutes a licensure prerequisite; practicing without it is a form of unlicensed practice triggering the reporting obligation of licensed engineers who discover it
The reporting obligation is genuine and not negated by Engineer A's competitive interest, provided the report is factually grounded and not maliciously motivated
Professional norms governing duty to report unlicensed engineering practice
Engineer A in determining reporting obligations
Governs Engineer A's ethical obligation upon discovering that XYZ Engineering is practicing without a certificate of authority in State P — whether and how to report this violation
XYZ Engineering State P Certificate of Authority Pre-Practice Requirement
Engineer X accepted a State P engineering engagement without holding the required State P certificate of authority, creating the regulatory non-compliance that Engineer A subsequently discovered.
Out-of-State Firm Certificate of Authority Jurisdictional Practice Constraint
XYZ Engineering, as an out-of-state firm licensed in State Q, was required to obtain a current certificate of authority from State P before accepting or performing engineering services for Client L on a project located in State P; its failure to do so constitutes unauthorized practice of engineering in State P.
State P Engineering Licensure Law; NSPE Code of Ethics
From the moment XYZ Engineering accepted the engagement in State P through the completion of services
XYZ Engineering Unauthorized State P Practice
From the time Engineer X accepted the engagement with Client L in State P through the present (no termination event described)
XYZ Engineering's engagement to provide engineering services in State P
XYZ Engineering accepting an engineering services engagement in State P without holding a current certificate of authority to practice in that jurisdiction
clarification discussion between Engineer A and Engineer X before Engineer X obtaining certificate of authority
direct communication between Engineer A and Engineer X before reporting violation to state licensing authorities
discussion between Engineer A and Engineer X (failed resolution) before Engineer A informing Engineer X of intent to notify authorities