City Engineer / Director of Public Works
Allowing an unlicensed technician to hold responsible charge of a public safety system without licensed PE oversight
Continued public health risk without licensed engineering oversight of the sanitary system
Implicitly legitimizing Administrator C's circumvention of engineering authority
Engineers shall not permit their professional authority to be overridden by non-engineers on safety matters
Obligation to report improper assumption of engineering responsibility by unqualified persons
Public safety paramount (NSPE Code Section I.1)
Retain employment and nominal position as City Engineer while avoiding direct confrontation with Administrator C over the reassignment
Judgment on when administrative reassignment crosses into unlawful or unethical territory
Knowledge of PE licensure requirements for responsible charge
Understanding of legal and ethical obligations when engineering authority is usurped
After receiving Administrator C's letter removing her from sanitary system responsibility and placing Technician B in charge
Obligation not to allow professional authority to be circumvented by non-engineers on public safety matters
Obligation to ensure licensed PE oversight of public safety engineering systems
Obligation to report to proper authorities when non-engineer assumes responsible charge of engineering work
Obligation to withdraw from project and report to proper authorities when public safety is endangered
After being formally removed from responsibility for the sanitary system by Administrator C's letter placing Technician B in direct charge, Engineer A accepted the reduced role and assumed no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, without formally protesting this reassignment to any authority.
Accept Reduced Role Passively (Action 4) + Decline to Report to State Authority (Action 6) → Imminent Overflow Crisis Materializes (Event 7)
After being formally removed from responsibility for the sanitary system by Administrator C's letter, Engineer A accepted the reduced role passively and subsequently declined to report to state authority, together constituting a failure to exercise the last available professional mechanism to prevent the foreseeable public health crisis
Accept Reduced Role Passively (Action 4) + Decline to Report to State Authority (Action 6)
Had Engineer A reported to state authority at any point after internal channels were exhausted, particularly after formal removal, regulatory intervention could have prevented the crisis; passive acceptance alone did not cause the crisis but eliminated the most effective remaining safeguard
Imminent Overflow Crisis Materializes (Event 7)
Administrator C's removal of Engineer A from oversight
Engineer A's decision not to report to state authority
Engineer A's passive acceptance of removal without external escalation
The foreseeable triggering event (storms + canning season)
Engineer A (significant contributory); Administrator C (primary causal agent)
Passive acceptance of removal + failure to report externally + known system inadequacy + triggering natural event = realized crisis
Administrator C Communication Channeling Directive — Safety Reporting Non-Compliance
Administrator C ordered Engineer A to discuss sanitary system problems only with him and warned that her job was in danger if she disobeyed, effectively attempting to suppress all external safety escalation through an administrative communication protocol.
Non-Engineer Administrative Authority Engineering Communication Channeling Non-Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from complying with Administrator C's directive to channel all sanitary system communications exclusively through him, to the extent that such compliance would suppress mandatory regulatory reporting to the state water pollution control authority or prevent escalation of imminent public safety hazards to city council members and other proper authorities.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; state water pollution control reporting law; BER Case 88-6
City Administrator C orders Engineer A to discuss the problems only with him and warns her that her job is in danger if she disobeys.
From the date of Administrator C's communication restriction order through the resolution of the overflow crisis
City Administrator C has told Engineer A that 'we will face the problem when it comes.'
Administrator C Deferred Problem Resolution Safety Deferral — Sanitary System Overflow
Administrator C responded to Engineer A's overflow capacity warnings with a deferral posture, which the Board found did not discharge Engineer A's escalation obligation
Deferred Problem Resolution Safety Deferral Non-Acceptance Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from accepting Administrator C's 'we will face the problem when it comes' deferral posture as a legitimate resolution of the identified imminent sanitary system overflow risk; such temporal deferral by a non-engineer authority did not discharge Engineer A's obligation to escalate to state water pollution control authorities.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6 Discussion
such reporting should have occurred at such time as Engineer A was reasonably certain that no action would be taken concerning her recommendations either by City Administrator C or the members of the city council
At the point Administrator C deferred action on Engineer A's overflow capacity warnings
Engineer A's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue
Administrator C 'Face the Problem When It Comes' Deferral — Non-Acceptance by Engineer A
After Engineer A notified Administrator C of inadequate capacity and offered possible solutions, Administrator C responded with a temporal deferral rather than corrective action, which Engineer A was ethically prohibited from treating as a sufficient response.
Engineer A was constrained from accepting Administrator C's 'we will face the problem when it comes' response as a legitimate resolution of the identified inadequate capacity risk, and was required to treat this deferral as a trigger for further escalation to city council members and ultimately to state regulatory authorities.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Non-Engineer Manager Safety Decision Finality Prohibition; BER Case 82-5
From the date of Administrator C's deferral response through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A notifies Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds to handle the potential overflow during the rainy season and offers possible solutions.
Administrator C Non-Engineer Administrative Authority Engineering Communication Channeling — Sanitary System
Administrator C directed Engineer A to channel all sanitary system communications through himself, effectively suppressing mandatory external reporting to state water pollution control authorities
Engineer A was prohibited from complying with Administrator C's directive to channel all sanitary system safety communications exclusively through him, because the effect of such channeling was to suppress mandatory regulatory reporting to state water pollution control authorities and prevent escalation of imminent public safety hazards.
Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer under circumstances involving the public safety
Throughout the period Administrator C directed Engineer A to channel all communications through him
Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials
Administrator C Non-Engineer Manager Safety Authority Boundary Recognition Failure
Non-Engineer Manager Safety Authority Boundary Recognition Capability
Administrator C lacked or failed to exercise the capability to recognize the limits of non-engineering administrative authority over safety-critical engineering determinations, instead substituting managerial judgment for professional engineering safety findings and suppressing Engineer A's overflow warnings.
Demonstrated through Administrator C's pattern of dismissing, suppressing, and ultimately removing Engineer A from responsible charge rather than facilitating corrective action in response to her professional safety findings.
Administrator C dismissed Engineer A's overflow warnings with 'we will face the problem when it comes,' ordered Engineer A not to discuss the matter, and ultimately removed Engineer A from responsible charge — all actions exceeding legitimate non-engineer administrative authority over engineering safety.
City Administrator C has told Engineer A that 'we will face the problem when it comes'
City Administrator C orders Engineer A to discuss the problems only with him and warns her that her job is in danger if she disobeys
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system
Administrator C Prohibition on Reassigning Responsible Charge to Technician B
Administrator C removed Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system by letter instructing Technician B to take responsible charge and report directly to Administrator C, bypassing the licensed PE entirely.
Administrative Responsible Charge Reassignment to Unlicensed Personnel Prohibition Constraint
Administrator C was prohibited from formally reassigning engineering responsible charge of the city sanitary system from licensed PE Engineer A to unlicensed Technician B, as this constituted an impermissible administrative conferral of a professional-legal designation that can only be held by a licensed professional engineer.
State engineering practice act; NSPE Code Section II.1.e; professional licensing regulations
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command by a letter instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge of the sanitary system and report directly to City Administrator C.
From the date of the letter formally reassigning responsible charge to Technician B
Technician B asks for a clarification and is again instructed via memo by City Administrator C that he, Technician B, is completely responsible and is to report any interference by a third party to City Administrator C.
Internal reporting channel is exhausted without resolution; the safety hazard remains active; Engineer A's obligation to escalate is now triggered
Immediately following Engineer A's notification to Administrator C
City Administrator C receives Engineer A's report of sanitary system inadequacy and dismisses her concerns without remedial action. This organizational rejection of a legitimate safety finding creates an unresolved hazard and forces Engineer A to choose between deference to authority and her professional obligations.
Administrator Dismisses Concerns (Event 2) → Privately Contact Council Members (Action 2)
After Administrator C dismissed her concerns with 'we will face the problem when it comes,' Engineer A escalated by privately contacting council members to communicate the unresolved public health risk
Administrator Dismisses Concerns (Event 2)
Had Administrator C taken meaningful action, Engineer A would have had no reason to contact council members privately
Privately Contact Council Members (Action 2)
Absence of any remedial action by Administrator C
Administrator C's explicit dismissal of Engineer A's formal report
Engineer A's continued belief that the public health risk was real and unresolved
Engineer A's knowledge of alternative internal channels (city council members)
Engineer A (primary); Administrator C (contributing)
Dismissal of formal report + unresolved public health danger + availability of council as alternative authority
City officials may still fail to act, leaving Engineer A exposed without having resolved the problem
Direct insubordination with high probability of disciplinary consequences
Exercise professional courage in face of employment threat
Hold paramount public safety, health, and welfare
Persist in reporting public health danger despite employer resistance
Ethical obligation to report known dangers even at personal cost
Professional obligation supersedes employer directives when public safety is at stake
Compel city officials to take action on the public health risk despite Administrator C's suppression of the issue, prioritizing public welfare over personal job security
Judgment on adequacy of internal escalation channels
Professional courage to act against explicit employer directive
Technical communication of ongoing risk to city officials
After Administrator C's explicit warning and job threat, before Engineer A's removal from sanitary system responsibility
Explicit directive from City Administrator C not to discuss the matter
Organizational chain-of-command compliance
After Administrator C explicitly warned Engineer A that her job was in danger and ordered her to discuss the problem only with him, Engineer A again privately brought the sanitary system problem to other city officials.
In Case 65-12, we dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that certain machinery was unsafe, and we determined that the engineers were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question.
As we noted in Cases 65-12 and 82-5, the engineer who makes the decision to 'blow the whistle' will in many instances be faced with the loss of employment.
We recognized in that case that such action by the engineers would likely lead to the loss of employment.
Cited as precedent establishing that engineers are ethically justified in refusing to participate in production or processing of a product they believe to be unsafe, even at the risk of loss of employment; used analogically to support Engineer A's obligation to act on public safety concerns
More recently, in Case 82-5, the engineer was employed by a large industrial company and after reviewing plans for materials supplied by a subcontractor, determined that they were inadequate both from a design and a cost stand point and therefore should be rejected.
In finding that an engineer does not have an ethical obligation to continue an effort to secure a change in the policy of an employer under these circumstances, or to report his concerns to the proper authority, we stated, nevertheless, that the engineer has an ethical 'right' to do so as a matter of personal conscience.
We concluded that 'the Code only requires that the engineer withdraw from a project and report to proper authorities when the circumstances involve endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare.'
We emphasized, however, that the case then before us did not directly involve the protection of the public safety, health, and welfare, but rather was an internal dispute between an employer and an employee.
the situation presented has become well known in recent years as 'whistleblowing' and if an engineer feels strongly that an employer's course of action is improper when it relates to public concerns, and if the engineer feels compelled to 'blow the whistle' to expose the facts as he sees them, he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment.
Cited as the most directly relevant precedent: distinguishes between an internal employer-employee dispute (where the engineer has an ethical 'right' but not 'obligation' to blow the whistle) and situations involving public safety endangerment (where the engineer has an ethical 'obligation' to report and withdraw); also introduces the concept of whistleblowing and its employment consequences in the engineering context
BER Ethics Board BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation Application
BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation Capability
The NSPE BER demonstrated the capability to triangulate among Cases 65-12, 82-5, and the present case to identify the critical factual variable — direct danger to public health and safety — that determines whether escalation is a mandatory ethical duty versus a permissible personal conscience right.
The BER applied this triangulation capability in its formal ethical analysis to determine the correct normative category for Engineer A's situation.
The BER's systematic analysis of Cases 65-12 and 82-5 to establish the normative framework, and its application of that framework to determine that Engineer A had a mandatory ethical obligation in the present case.
The Board has faced this most difficult issue on two other occasions in somewhat dissimilar circumstances.
In Case 65-12, we dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that certain machinery was unsafe...
More recently, in Case 82-5, the engineer was employed by a large industrial company...
Case 65-12 Engineers Group Unsafe Process Refusing Industrial Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineers (implied)', 'sector': 'Industrial/manufacturing', 'case_reference': 'Case 65-12', 'group_action': True}
Group of engineers referenced from Case 65-12 who believed certain machinery was unsafe and were determined to be ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question, establishing the precedent that engineers may refuse unsafe work even at the cost of employment.
{'type': 'refuses_participation_in', 'target': 'Unsafe Machinery Processing'}
a group of engineers believed that certain machinery was unsafe
we determined that the engineers were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question
we recognized in that case that such action by the engineers would likely lead to the loss of employment
The Board has faced this most difficult issue on two other occasions... In Case 65-12... More recently, in Case 82-5
Case 82-5 Industrial Engineer Private Industry Safety Whistleblower Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (implied)', 'sector': 'Private industrial', 'case_reference': 'Case 82-5'}
Engineer referenced from Case 82-5 who, employed by a large industrial company, identified design and cost deficiencies in subcontractor materials, reported to superiors whose recommendations were rejected, was placed on probation, and faced termination — establishing the precedent that engineers have an ethical right (not obligation) to blow the whistle on employer conduct related to public concerns.
{'type': 'employed_by', 'target': 'Large Industrial Company Employer'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'Industrial Company Superiors'}
Private Industry Safety Whistleblower Engineer
the engineer was employed by a large industrial company and after reviewing plans for materials supplied by a subcontractor, determined that they were inadequate both from a design and a cost stand point
the engineer advised his superiors of the deficiencies but his recommendations were rejected
the engineer has an ethical 'right' to do so as a matter of personal conscience
the engineer persisted with his recommendations and was placed on probation
More recently, in Case 82-5, the engineer was employed by a large industrial company... Clearly, the case presently before the Board involves 'endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare'
CausalLink_Accept Reduced Role Passively
CausalLink_Again Contact City Officials P
CausalLink_Decline to Report to State Aut
CausalLink_Notify Administrator of Inadeq
CausalLink_Privately Contact Council Memb
City Administrator C Safety-Suppressing Non-Engineer Municipal Administrator
{'license': 'None (non-engineer)', 'title': 'City Administrator', 'authority': 'Direct supervisor of City Engineer'}
Non-engineer immediate superior of Engineer A who received internal reports of water supply contamination risk and demonstrated a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law, failing to act on Engineer A's recommendations and effectively suppressing escalation to proper authorities.
{'type': 'supervisor_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Supply Contamination Reporting Public Engineer'}
{'type': 'suppresses_escalation_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Supply Contamination Reporting Public Engineer'}
Safety-Suppressing Non-Engineer Municipal Administrator
Engineer A has fulfilled this specific aspect of her obligation by reporting her concerns to City Administrator C
Engineer A was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate superior
Engineer A's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and appeared to make Engineer A an 'accessory' to the actions of City Administrator C and the others
City Administrator C's communication restriction order before Engineer A's second unauthorized contact with city officials
City Administrator C orders Engineer A to discuss the problems only with him and warns her that her job is in danger if she disobeys. Engineer A again privately brings the problem up to other city officials.
City Administrator C's communication restriction order
Engineer A's second unauthorized contact with city officials
City Council Members Political Authority
{'role_type': 'Elected legislative/political authority', 'license': 'None (non-engineers)'}
Elected city council members who received Engineer A's internal reports of water supply contamination risk but failed to act, participating in the pattern of ongoing disregard for the law that necessitated escalation to state authorities.
{'type': 'fails_to_act_on', 'target': 'Water Supply Contamination Risk'}
{'type': 'receives_report_from', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Supply Contamination Reporting Public Engineer'}
reporting her concerns to City Administrator C and thereafter to certain members of the city council
Engineer A was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate superior as well as members of the city council
the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials
City Council Members Safety Escalation Recipients
{'license': 'None (elected officials)', 'position': 'City Council Members', 'role_in_case': "Recipients of Engineer A's unauthorized escalation"}
Elected city officials to whom Engineer A privately escalated the sanitary system capacity problem without Administrator C's permission; recipients of informal safety warnings outside the formal chain of command.
{'type': 'received_warning_from', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'subject_to_authority_of', 'target': 'City Administrator C (administratively)'}
Engineer A has also discussed the problem privately with certain members of the city council without the permission of City Administrator C
Engineer A again privately brings the problem up to other city officials
Engineer A's internal communication channels are now formally restricted; organizational pressure against safety reporting has been institutionalized
After Engineer A's first private contact with council members
Following Engineer A's unauthorized contact with city council members, Administrator C formally restricts Engineer A's ability to communicate with city officials without prior permission. This administrative action constrains Engineer A's ability to use internal escalation channels going forward.
Communications Restriction Imposed (Event 3) + Engineer A Removed From Role (Event 4) → Technician B Placed In Charge (Event 5)
Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility for the sanitary system and places unlicensed Technician B in charge, directly substituting unqualified oversight for qualified professional engineering judgment
Communications Restriction Imposed (Event 3) + Engineer A Removed From Role (Event 4)
Had Engineer A not been removed, a licensed engineer would have retained oversight; had a licensed replacement been appointed, the competency gap would not have materialized
Absence of any requirement enforced by the city to maintain licensed oversight
Administrator C's authority to reassign personnel
Administrator C's decision to remove Engineer A
Availability of Technician B as a replacement
Administrative authority to reassign + removal of Engineer A + appointment of unlicensed Technician B
Engineer A did not fulfill her ethical obligations by informing the City Administrator and certain members of the city council of her concerns.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A failed to fulfill her ethical obligations by limiting escalation to City Administrator C and certain council members, Engineer A committed a distinct and independent ethical violation by passively accepting the reassignment of responsible charge over the sanitary system to unlicensed Technician B. The NSPE Code's prohibition against completing or sealing work not in conformity with applicable engineering standards, read alongside the paramount public safety obligation, implies an affirmative duty to formally resist — not merely privately circumvent — an administratively imposed transfer of engineering authority to an unlicensed person over a public safety system. Engineer A's covert advisory to Technician B, conducted without Administrator C's knowledge, did not cure this violation; it merely created a shadow engineering arrangement that left the public exposed to the legal and practical consequences of unlicensed responsible charge while giving Engineer A a false sense of partial compliance. The ethical obligation required Engineer A to formally object in writing to the reassignment, document that objection, and if overruled, escalate that specific violation — the unlicensed practice issue — to the appropriate authority, independent of and in addition to her obligation to report the overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A did not fulfill her ethical obligations implicitly identifies a precise triggering point that the Board left underarticulated: Engineer A's ethical obligation to report externally to the state water pollution control authority became mandatory — not merely permissible — no later than the moment City Administrator C removed her from responsible charge and placed unlicensed Technician B in command of the sanitary system. At that juncture, three conditions converged simultaneously: internal escalation had been exhausted and actively suppressed, the engineering safety system was being operated without licensed oversight, and the known overflow risk remained unmitigated. Each of these conditions independently would have counseled external reporting; their convergence made it non-deferrable. The subsequent materialization of the imminent overflow crisis during the winter canning season did not create Engineer A's reporting obligation — it merely confirmed that the danger she had already identified was real and immediate. Framing the obligation as arising only at the moment of imminent overflow, as the facts might suggest, understates the ethical standard: Engineer A should have reported to the state water pollution control authority when the internal system of oversight collapsed, not only when the physical crisis became undeniable.
The Board's finding that Engineer A's internal escalation was ethically insufficient exposes a deeper structural tension that the Board did not resolve: Engineer A's role as a public employee — City Engineer and Director of Public Works — imposed a heightened and non-waivable duty to report to the state water pollution control authority that was categorically different from the discretionary whistleblowing calculus applicable to engineers in private practice. In private employment, the NSPE Code's framework for balancing faithful agent obligations against public safety reporting involves a graduated analysis in which employment consequences are weighed. For a public engineer holding a statutory public trust, however, the faithful agent obligation itself is defined by the public interest, not by the directives of a non-engineer municipal administrator. City Administrator C's authority to direct Engineer A's conduct was bounded by the limits of lawful administrative authority; it did not and could not extend to ordering Engineer A to suppress a mandatory statutory report to a state regulatory body. When Administrator C ordered Engineer A not to report to the state water pollution control authority — an order that directly required Engineer A to violate state law — that order was void as a matter of both law and professional ethics, and Engineer A's compliance with it constituted an independent ethical failure. The Board should have explicitly stated that no employment threat, however credible, can convert a mandatory statutory reporting obligation into a discretionary personal choice, and that Engineer A's status as a public servant made this principle even more stringent than it would be in a private practice context.
Engineer A's passive acceptance of the reassignment of responsible charge to unlicensed Technician B constituted a separate and independent ethical violation beyond her failure to report to the state water pollution control authority. By receiving the memo reassigning responsible charge and continuing in her role without formally objecting, resigning from the position, or reporting the unlicensed practice arrangement to the appropriate licensing authority, Engineer A effectively facilitated the unlicensed practice of engineering over a public safety system. The NSPE Code's prohibition against completing or sealing plans not in conformity with applicable engineering standards extends by analogy to acquiescing in an administrative arrangement that places a non-licensed technician in responsible charge of a sanitary system whose failure could cause widespread environmental harm. Engineer A's covert advisory role did not cure this violation — it merely preserved a shadow of technical oversight while the formal, legally cognizable responsible charge was held by someone unqualified to hold it. The two violations are analytically distinct: one concerns the failure to report an imminent environmental hazard to the state regulatory authority; the other concerns the failure to resist or formally challenge an unlicensed practice arrangement that itself endangered public safety independently of the overflow crisis.
Engineer A's ethical obligation to report externally to the state water pollution control authority became mandatory — not merely permissible — at the moment Administrator C responded to her initial warning with 'we will face the problem when it comes' and then restricted her communications. At that precise juncture, the internal escalation pathway was effectively foreclosed by the person with authority over it, and the danger to public safety was both identified and unaddressed. Each subsequent event — the unauthorized council contacts, the removal from responsible charge, the probation order, and finally the imminent overflow crisis — compounded the urgency but did not create the obligation anew; it had already crystallized. The graduated internal escalation principle, which Engineer A arguably satisfied by warning Administrator C and privately contacting council members, does not extend indefinitely when the supervisor with authority over the matter has explicitly refused to act and has weaponized the employment relationship to suppress further escalation. At that point, the Internal-to-External Escalation Trigger was activated, and the Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation became non-deferrable. The imminent overflow crisis during the winter canning season was not the trigger for the obligation — it was the consequence of Engineer A's failure to act on an obligation that had already matured weeks or months earlier.
Engineer A's covert advisory role to Technician B did not satisfy any meaningful portion of her ethical obligation to protect public safety and instead created a dangerous illusion of technical oversight while leaving the fundamental public danger unaddressed through proper regulatory channels. The covert advisory arrangement had three critical deficiencies. First, it was structurally invisible to the regulatory system: because Administrator C had formally placed Technician B in responsible charge, any advice Engineer A provided was legally and administratively unattributed, meaning the state water pollution control authority had no basis to know that any licensed engineering judgment was being applied to the system. Second, the arrangement was inherently fragile — Administrator C's memo explicitly instructed Technician B to report any interference by a third party, meaning Engineer A's covert advice could be terminated at any moment, leaving Technician B entirely unsupported. Third, and most critically, the covert advisory arrangement did nothing to address the structural inadequacy of the sanitary system's capacity, which was the root cause of the public danger. Engineer A's ethical obligation was not merely to provide informal technical guidance to an unlicensed technician but to ensure that the proper regulatory authority was informed of an imminent statutory violation. The covert advisory role addressed none of that obligation.
Engineer A's failure to report the imminent overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority exposed her to legal liability independent of and in addition to her ethical violations under the NSPE Code. State law explicitly required reporting this condition to the state water pollution control authority, making Engineer A's silence a potential statutory violation in its own right. The Board's analysis, while ethically sound, did not directly address this intersection of statutory duty and professional ethical duty, which is a significant analytical gap. The statutory reporting obligation was not contingent on Administrator C's permission, was not subject to the employment relationship, and was not dischargeable by internal escalation to city officials. It was a direct legal duty imposed on persons with knowledge of the condition — and Engineer A unambiguously had that knowledge. The convergence of the statutory duty and the NSPE Code's paramount public safety obligation means that Engineer A faced not a conflict between law and ethics but a reinforcing alignment of both, pointing unambiguously toward external reporting. Administrator C's order not to discuss the matter further could not lawfully override a statutory reporting obligation, and Engineer A's compliance with that order in the face of an imminent statutory violation compounded her ethical failure with potential legal exposure.
When the Faithful Agent Obligation and the Public Welfare Paramount principle are genuinely irreconcilable — as they were here — the Public Welfare Paramount principle must yield to no other consideration, including employer loyalty. The NSPE Code's structure is hierarchical, not merely advisory: Section I.1 places public safety, health, and welfare paramount, and Section II.1.a explicitly addresses the scenario where an engineer's judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life or property, requiring notification to the proper authority. The Faithful Agent Obligation under Section II.4 is explicitly bounded by the phrase 'within ethical limits,' which means it cannot be invoked to justify silence in the face of an imminent public health catastrophe. Administrator C's directives — to restrict communications, to accept removal from responsible charge, and to refrain from discussing the matter under threat of termination — were each individually and collectively beyond the lawful scope of a non-engineer administrator's authority to direct a licensed professional engineer's conduct with respect to mandatory public safety obligations. Engineer A's compliance with those directives did not represent faithful agency within ethical limits; it represented the subordination of a paramount professional duty to an employment relationship, which the Code explicitly prohibits.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer A failed her categorical duty to protect public safety by limiting her escalation to Administrator C and select council members. The NSPE Code imposes a paramount obligation — not a contextual preference — to hold public safety above all other considerations. A categorical duty does not admit of partial performance: Engineer A cannot satisfy a duty to report an imminent public health hazard by reporting it to persons who lack the authority or the will to act on it. City council members, contacted privately and without formal authority to compel remediation, were not the 'proper authority' contemplated by Section II.1.a. The state water pollution control authority was the legally designated proper authority, and Engineer A's failure to contact it was not a matter of degree but of kind. From a consequentialist perspective, the outcome — an imminent uncontrolled waste discharge into the river — retroactively confirms that Engineer A's partial escalation was not merely insufficient in degree but causally connected to the worst foreseeable outcome. From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A's accommodation of Administrator C's suppression — accepting removal from responsible charge, continuing only covert advisory, and declining to report to the state authority — reflected a failure of the virtues of courage and professional accountability that a licensed public engineer in a position of singular responsibility is obligated to embody. All three ethical frameworks converge on the same conclusion: Engineer A's conduct was ethically insufficient.
The Board would very likely have found Engineer A's ethical obligations fulfilled if she had formally reported the sanitary system overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority at the moment Administrator C first dismissed her concerns. At that juncture, the internal escalation pathway had been exhausted at the supervisory level, the danger was identified and quantified, and the proper external authority was clearly the state water pollution control authority under the applicable state law. Reporting at that moment would have satisfied the Internal-to-External Escalation Trigger, the Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation, and the Public Welfare Paramount principle simultaneously. Conversely, if Engineer A had resigned from her position without concurrently reporting to the state water pollution control authority, she would not have discharged her ethical obligations. Resignation without reporting would have removed her from the employment pressure but would have left the public danger entirely unaddressed and the state regulatory authority uninformed. The ethical obligation to report is not discharged by withdrawal from the situation — it is discharged only by ensuring that the proper authority receives the information necessary to protect public safety. Had Engineer A formally and openly continued advising Technician B, simultaneously documented her concerns in writing to both the city council and the state water pollution control authority, that combined course of action would most likely have satisfied the Board's standard, even under threat of termination, because it would have placed the mandatory statutory report with the proper authority while preserving a record of Engineer A's professional conduct.
Even if the city council members whom Engineer A privately contacted had taken decisive corrective action and ordered remediation of the sanitary system before the canning and rainy seasons coincided, the Board's framework would likely still require that Engineer A have reported to the state water pollution control authority, because the statutory reporting obligation was triggered by the condition itself — not by the failure of internal remediation. The Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable principle is not contingent on whether internal escalation might succeed; it is activated by the existence of a reportable condition under state law. The state water pollution control authority's role is not merely remedial — it is regulatory and supervisory, and its right to be informed of conditions within its jurisdiction exists independently of whether the regulated entity is taking corrective action. However, the Board's analysis might have acknowledged that successful internal remediation would have substantially mitigated the ethical harm, even if it did not fully discharge the statutory reporting obligation. The distinction between the ethical obligation and the statutory obligation is important here: the ethical obligation might be satisfied by successful internal escalation that prevents the harm, but the statutory obligation — which is non-discretionary — would remain independently unfulfilled absent the required report to the state authority.
The Whistleblowing Right versus Obligation Distinction — which frames external reporting as a personal conscience choice — is fundamentally inapplicable to Engineer A's situation, and the Board's framework implicitly recognizes this even if it does not articulate it explicitly. Engineer A's role as City Engineer and Director of Public Works, as the sole licensed professional engineer in a position of responsibility in the city government, and as the person with direct statutory knowledge of an imminent reportable condition under state law, converted what might be a discretionary whistleblowing right in private practice into a non-negotiable professional and legal obligation. The Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation principle applies with particular force here: Engineer A held a public trust role, was compensated by public funds, and was responsible for a public safety system. Her obligation to the public she served was not mediated by her employment relationship with Administrator C in the way that a private sector engineer's obligation might be mediated by a client relationship. The termination threat, while real and serious, did not alter the nature of the obligation — it merely raised the personal cost of fulfilling it. The NSPE Code explicitly contemplates that engineers may face employment consequences for fulfilling their public safety obligations and implicitly requires acceptance of those consequences when the alternative is allowing a foreseeable public health catastrophe to occur unreported.
The tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation and the Public Welfare Paramount principle was not genuinely resolved by Engineer A — it was evaded. Engineer A treated these two principles as though they occupied the same normative tier, allowing Administrator C's directives to function as a practical ceiling on her safety escalation. The NSPE Code, however, establishes a clear lexical ordering: public safety is paramount, and faithful agency operates only 'within ethical limits.' When Administrator C's orders directly prevented Engineer A from fulfilling her mandatory statutory reporting obligation to the state water pollution control authority, the Faithful Agent Obligation ceased to be operative. Engineer A's continued deference to Administrator C's communication restrictions after internal escalation had demonstrably failed — and after the imminent overflow crisis had materialized — reflects a category error: she treated a subordinate principle as though it could override the paramount one. This case teaches that when the two principles become irreconcilable in practice, the Faithful Agent Obligation must yield entirely and without qualification to the Public Welfare Paramount principle, not merely be 'balanced' against it.
The Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting principle and the Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable principle are not genuinely in tension in this case — they operate on different timelines and different triggering conditions, and Engineer A's conflation of the two produced her central ethical failure. Graduated internal escalation is a procedural norm that governs how an engineer should sequence her efforts before going outside the organizational chain of command; it is satisfied when internal channels have been genuinely exhausted and have demonstrably failed. The Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation, by contrast, is a legal and ethical floor that is activated by the objective condition of imminent public danger — not by the subjective exhaustion of internal patience. By the time the winter storms materialized and overflow became imminent, both triggers had independently fired: internal escalation had been exhausted (Administrator C had dismissed concerns, restricted communications, removed Engineer A from responsible charge, and imposed probation), and the statutory reporting condition had been met (state law explicitly required reporting the overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority). Engineer A's error was treating the two principles as sequential steps in a single ladder rather than as independently operative obligations. This case teaches that once the statutory reporting trigger activates, no amount of prior internal escalation — however thorough — substitutes for or delays the mandatory external report.
The Covert Advisory Continuation as Partial Ethical Compliance principle and the Engineering Authority Non-Circumvention Obligation reveal a deep structural contradiction in Engineer A's conduct that the Board's conclusion implicitly condemns but does not fully anatomize. By continuing to advise Technician B secretly, Engineer A simultaneously undermined two distinct ethical imperatives: she tacitly ratified the unlicensed responsible charge assignment by making it functionally workable — thereby facilitating unlicensed engineering practice over a public safety system — while creating a false appearance of safety oversight that may have reduced the perceived urgency of formal regulatory reporting. The covert advisory role was not a partial satisfaction of Engineer A's ethical obligations; it was an ethical liability in its own right. It allowed Administrator C's improper reassignment to persist without formal resistance, it left the state water pollution control authority uninformed of both the unlicensed practice and the imminent overflow risk, and it substituted a private workaround for the public accountability that the regulatory framework demands. This case teaches that covert compliance theater — doing informally and secretly what one is ethically required to do formally and openly — does not satisfy professional ethical obligations and may affirmatively deepen the engineer's complicity in the underlying violation.
The Whistleblowing Right vs. Obligation Distinction principle is fundamentally transformed — and effectively dissolved — when applied to a licensed public engineer holding statutory responsibilities over a public safety system. In private practice contexts, external reporting beyond the client relationship may be framed as a matter of professional conscience, with the engineer exercising judgment about when the threshold of public danger justifies the step. But Engineer A's situation was categorically different: she was a public servant, the sole licensed professional engineer in city government, holding direct statutory responsibility for a system that state law explicitly required to be reported to a regulatory authority upon imminent overflow. The Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation principle converts what might be a discretionary whistleblowing right in private practice into a non-negotiable affirmative duty in Engineer A's context. The combination of her public trust role, the explicit statutory reporting requirement, and the imminent materialization of the overflow crisis left no ethical space for treating external reporting as a personal conscience election. This case teaches that the whistleblowing right-versus-obligation distinction is context-sensitive and role-sensitive: the more direct and statutory the engineer's public safety responsibility, the less room exists to treat external reporting as optional, and the more clearly it becomes a categorical professional obligation that employment pressure cannot lawfully or ethically displace.
Administrator C remained unaware, preventing any legitimate resolution of the authority structure
Covert advising without formal authority could create ambiguous liability
Technician B remained formally responsible without PE oversight on record
The arrangement did not constitute proper licensed engineering oversight of the system
Partial attempt to maintain technical safety guidance over the system
Some effort to protect public welfare through informal channel
Engineers shall report to proper authorities, not substitute informal workarounds for formal reporting
Professional integrity requires transparency in exercise of engineering authority
Provide technical guidance to the unlicensed Technician B to reduce the risk of a public health crisis, while avoiding direct confrontation with Administrator C that could result in termination
Ability to communicate operational guidance to unlicensed technician
Judgment on adequacy of informal vs. formal oversight mechanisms
Technical knowledge of sanitary system operations
After removal from sanitary system responsibility and placement on probation, continuing through the winter canning season
Obligation not to conceal professional activities from employer in ways that undermine legitimate authority structures
Obligation to ensure proper licensed PE oversight is formally in place for public safety systems
Obligation to report to proper authorities (state water pollution control authority) rather than operate covertly
Obligation to withdraw formally from project and report when public safety is endangered
While officially holding no responsibility for the sanitary system, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B on the sanitary system without the knowledge of City Administrator C, attempting to maintain informal technical oversight despite her formal removal.
Covertly Advise Technician B (Action 5) → Imminent Overflow Crisis Materializes (Event 7)
While officially holding no responsibility for the sanitary system, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly, creating an ambiguous arrangement that neither restored licensed oversight nor triggered external regulatory intervention, leaving the system in a state of informal and inadequate management
Had Engineer A either formally retained responsibility or reported to state authority instead of covert advising, the oversight gap would have been addressed through legitimate channels; the covert arrangement provided a false sense of mitigation without resolving the structural problem
Engineer A's continued knowledge of system risks
Engineer A's removal from formal responsibility
Technician B's willingness to receive covert advice
The covert arrangement remaining undisclosed to state authorities
Engineer A (contributing); Administrator C (primary)
Informal advisory role without formal authority + unlicensed technician in formal charge + no state reporting = continued inadequate oversight
When City Administrator C dismisses the overflow risk and prohibits further escalation, should Engineer A accept the deferral and remain within the chain of command, escalate privately to city council members despite the prohibition, or immediately report to the state water pollution control authority?
Engineer A has identified that the disposal plant and beds lack adequate capacity to handle the coincidence of canning season industrial discharge and rainy season stormwater, creating an imminent overflow risk. She has notified City Administrator C, who dismissed the concern with a 'we will face the problem when it comes' deferral and restricted her from communicating directly with city council members. At this juncture, Engineer A must decide whether to accept the administrator's deferral or escalate beyond the immediate supervisor.
Comply with Administrator C's directive, document the warning internally, and take no further escalation action until the overflow condition materializes, subordinating professional safety judgment to administrative convenience.
Contact select city council members privately without Administrator C's permission to warn of the imminent overflow risk, fulfilling the graduated internal escalation obligation by reaching the next tier of internal authority despite the employer's communication channeling prohibition.
Bypass remaining internal channels and report the imminent overflow condition directly to the state regulatory authority, invoking the statutory reporting obligation and treating Administrator C's dismissal as sufficient evidence that internal escalation is futile.
When Administrator C formally assigns engineering responsible charge to an unlicensed technician, removes Engineer A from authority, and threatens termination, should Engineer A passively accept the reduced role, formally resist the unlicensed assignment through escalation, or report the imminent overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority at the cost of potential termination?
Engineer A has privately contacted city council members, but they have taken no corrective action. Administrator C has now formally assigned 'responsible charge' of the entire sanitary system to unlicensed Technician B via letter and memo, explicitly removing Engineer A from the chain of command and placing her on probation with a termination threat. The overflow crisis is imminent. Engineer A must decide how to respond to this formal reassignment and the escalating employment pressure.
Comply with Administrator C's reassignment directive, cease asserting engineering authority over the sanitary system, and allow Technician B's responsible charge designation to stand unchallenged in order to preserve employment.
Issue a formal written objection to Administrator C's assignment of responsible charge to an unlicensed technician, document the professional licensure law violation, and make a final internal escalation to city council members asserting that the assignment is unlawful and must be reversed.
Report the imminent wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority as required by statute, simultaneously notifying the state of the unlicensed responsible charge assignment, accepting that this action may result in termination as the mandatory cost of fulfilling the public safety obligation.
Should Engineer A covertly advise Technician B on sanitary system management as a safety-preservation measure, or should she treat covert advisory as an ethically insufficient substitute for the mandatory external reporting and genuine project withdrawal obligations she has not yet fulfilled?
Having been formally removed from responsible charge and placed on probation, Engineer A has not reported to the state water pollution control authority. She is now aware that Technician B, who lacks the competence to manage the sanitary system safely, is solely responsible for a system facing imminent overflow. Engineer A must decide whether to continue providing technical guidance to Technician B covertly — without Administrator C's knowledge — as a means of mitigating immediate safety risk while avoiding termination.
Continue providing technical guidance to Technician B secretly, reasoning that this partially mitigates immediate public safety risk in the absence of any other available mechanism, while avoiding the termination that overt advisory or external reporting would trigger.
Terminate all professional involvement with the sanitary system — including covert advisory — and formally notify Administrator C and appropriate authorities of the withdrawal, recognizing that a unilateral internal declaration of non-responsibility does not constitute genuine withdrawal under the NSPE Code.
Report the imminent overflow condition and the unlicensed responsible charge arrangement to the state water pollution control authority, simultaneously disclosing that Technician B has been operating without licensed engineering oversight, thereby fulfilling both the statutory reporting obligation and the genuine withdrawal requirement.
At the point where internal escalation is fully exhausted, a pattern of administrative disregard is established, and state law mandates external reporting, should Engineer A decline to report to the state authority in deference to Administrator C's directive, or fulfill the mandatory statutory reporting obligation regardless of the employment consequences?
The full sequence of internal escalation has now been exhausted: Administrator C dismissed the concern, city council members took no corrective action, Engineer A was removed from responsible charge and placed on probation, and the overflow condition is imminent or has materialized. State law explicitly requires reporting of wastewater overflow conditions to the state water pollution control authority. Administrator C has ordered Engineer A not to report externally. Engineer A must make a final decision about whether to fulfill the statutory reporting obligation.
Refrain from contacting the state water pollution control authority in compliance with Administrator C's explicit order, treating the employer's communication channeling directive as a legally and ethically sufficient basis for non-reporting despite the statutory mandate and the exhaustion of internal channels.
Contact the state water pollution control authority to report the imminent or actual wastewater overflow condition as required by state law, invoking the statutory reporting obligation that cannot be deferred or suppressed by a non-engineer municipal administrator's directive, and accepting the employment consequences of this action.
Consult with an attorney to confirm the scope and enforceability of the statutory reporting obligation before acting, using the legal consultation period to document the pattern of administrative disregard and prepare a comprehensive report to the state authority that minimizes personal legal exposure.
Continued unaddressed public health risk from inadequate sanitary system capacity
Engineer A becoming effectively complicit in Administrator C's ongoing violation of law
State authority remained uninformed of a legally reportable condition
When crisis occurred, no proactive regulatory oversight was in place
Engineers have an ethical obligation, not merely a right, to report to proper authorities when public safety is endangered
Public servant engineers bear heightened obligation to protect public welfare
The proper authority in this context was the state water pollution control authority, not city officials
deliberate omission, chose not to act on external reporting obligation
Preserve employment while attempting to manage risk informally through covert advising of Technician B
Courage to report to external authorities despite employment threat
Knowledge of state water pollution control authority's jurisdiction and reporting requirements
Professional judgment on when internal escalation has been exhausted
Understanding of distinction between 'proper authorities' within city government vs. state regulatory bodies
From the point Engineer A was reasonably certain city officials would not act (identified by the Discussion as the critical decision point) through the winter canning season crisis
Legal obligation under state law to report certain conditions to state water pollution control authority
Obligation as public servant to uphold public welfare above organizational loyalty
Obligation not to be complicit in employer's disregard for public safety law
Obligation to report endangerment to public safety to proper authorities (NSPE Code)
Obligation to withdraw from project and report when public safety is at risk
Despite knowing that the public health danger remained unresolved and that city officials had repeatedly refused to act, Engineer A did not report the situation to the state water pollution control authority, the legally designated proper authority, at any point before the winter crisis, choosing instead to rely on covert advising of Technician B.
Decline to Report to State Authority (Action 6) → Imminent Overflow Crisis Materializes (Event 7)
Despite knowing that the public health danger remained unresolved and that city officials had repeatedly refused to act, Engineer A declined to report to the state authority, leaving the only remaining intervention point unused as the crisis materialized
Decline to Report to State Authority (Action 6)
Had Engineer A reported to the state authority, regulatory intervention could have compelled system upgrades or operational restrictions before the crisis; without the storm and canning season coincidence, the crisis might not have materialized at this time
Continued inadequacy of the sanitary system
Engineer A's awareness that internal channels had been exhausted
Engineer A's decision not to escalate to state authority
Engineer A's knowledge of the unresolved public health risk
Occurrence of heavy storms during canning season (Event 6)
Engineer A (significant); Administrator C (primary structural cause); City Council (contributing)
Known system inadequacy + exhausted internal channels + failure to report externally + triggering weather/demand event
NSPE / professional engineering ethics bodies
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard
Engineer A has also discussed the problem privately with certain members of the city council without the permission of City Administrator C.
Engineer A continues to advise Technician B without the knowledge of City Administrator C.
Engineer A when deciding whether to continue warning city officials despite Administrator C's prohibition
Governs Engineer A's duty to escalate the sanitary overflow risk beyond City Administrator C to city council members and other officials when C refuses to act, and to continue advising Technician B covertly, even under threat of termination.
Engineer Safety Recommendation Rejection Standard
Engineer A after Administrator C dismisses her overflow warnings with 'we will face the problem when it comes'
Governs Engineer A's obligations after City Administrator C rejects her recommendations about inadequate sanitary system capacity, including her duty to document, escalate, and determine whether the refusal creates a public safety threat requiring action beyond the client relationship.
Engineer A Acquiescence to Responsible Charge Removal — Unlicensed Practice Facilitation
Engineer A assumed no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds after the administrative reassignment, while Technician B held formal responsible charge — creating an unlicensed practice condition for a safety-critical public infrastructure system.
Non-Aiding Unlicensed Engineering Practice Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from acquiescing to or facilitating the arrangement whereby unlicensed Technician B held formal responsible charge of the sanitary system without PE supervision, as this constituted aiding unlicensed engineering practice regardless of the administrative order compelling the arrangement.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; state engineering practice act
Engineer A continues in her capacity as City Engineer/Director of Public Works, assumes no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, but continues to advise Technician B without the knowledge of City Administrator C.
From the date of the administrative reassignment order through the resolution of the responsible charge dispute
Engineer A Affirmative Public Safety Reporting Action Determination Wastewater
Affirmative Public Safety Reporting Action Determination Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to determine the specific affirmative actions required to fulfill her public health, safety, and welfare obligations regarding the wastewater overflow — including identifying the state water pollution control authority as the mandatory reporting recipient and recognizing that the statutory obligation required active reporting rather than passive awareness.
Applied when the imminent overflow condition triggered the mandatory statutory reporting obligation to the state water pollution control authority.
Engineer A's recognition that state law required reporting to the state water pollution control authority, and her assessment of what specific reporting actions were required to fulfill both statutory and professional obligations.
Under state law, this condition is required to be reported to the state water pollution control authority, the agency responsible for monitoring and overseeing water quality in state streams and rivers
Engineer A BER Case 82-5 Precedent Distinguishability — Public Safety vs Internal Dispute
The Board applied BER Cases 65-12 and 82-5 as precedent but distinguished them from the current case on the basis that the current case directly involved public safety endangerment
BER Precedent Cross-Domain Analogical Application Constraint
The Board was constrained to distinguish BER Case 82-5 (internal employer-employee dispute without public safety impact, generating only a personal conscience right) from the current case (direct public safety endangerment, generating a mandatory obligation), prohibiting mechanical application of Case 82-5's 'personal conscience right only' conclusion to a situation involving water supply contamination.
The Board has faced this most difficult issue on two other occasions in somewhat dissimilar circumstances
At the time of the Board's ethical analysis
we emphasized, however, that the case then before us did not directly involve the protection of the public safety, health, and welfare, but rather was an internal dispute between an employer and an employee
Engineer A BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation
Engineer A was obligated to possess the capability to triangulate among BER Cases 65-12, 82-5, and the present case to correctly identify that the water supply contamination scenario fell into the mandatory-obligation category (direct public health danger) rather than the personal-conscience-right category (internal employer dispute without direct public danger).
The BER applied this triangulation capability in its analysis to determine that Engineer A had a mandatory ethical obligation, not merely a personal conscience right, to report to proper authorities.
The BER's explicit triangulation among Cases 65-12, 82-5, and the present case to determine the correct normative category and corresponding obligation level for Engineer A.
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Applicability Wastewater Overflow State Authority
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Assessment Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to assess that Administrator C's internal communication restriction did not constitute a legitimate confidentiality obligation barring disclosure of the wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, correctly determining that the public danger pre-empted any confidentiality claim.
Applied when assessing whether Administrator C's communication restriction could legitimately prevent Engineer A from reporting the overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority as required by state law.
Engineer A recognized that Administrator C's order to discuss problems only with him did not constitute a professional confidentiality obligation that would bar mandatory statutory reporting to the state water pollution control authority.
City Administrator C orders Engineer A to discuss the problems only with him
Under state law, this condition is required to be reported to the state water pollution control authority
Engineer A Covert Advisory Continuation Ethical Permissibility Assessment
Covert Safety Advisory Continuation Ethical Permissibility Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess the ethical permissibility of continuing to provide informal safety guidance to Technician B after being formally removed from responsible charge, recognizing this as a partial ethical compliance measure to preserve public safety.
Engineer A exercised this capability by continuing to advise Technician B covertly, though this did not substitute for the mandatory external reporting obligation.
Engineer A's continuation of advisory guidance to Technician B after Administrator C formally assigned responsible charge to the unlicensed technician.
Engineer A's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and appeared to make Engineer A an 'accessory' to the actions of City Administrator C and the others.
Engineer A Covert Advisory to Technician B — Safety Preservation Permissibility
After being formally removed from sanitary system responsibility and placed on probation, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly to help manage the system safely, while the imminent overflow risk materialized during heavy winter storms.
Covert Safety Advisory Continuation Ethical Permissibility Constraint
Engineer A's covert advisory continuation to Technician B after formal removal from responsible charge was ethically permissible as a safety-preservation measure, subject to the constraint that it must be accompanied by simultaneous formal escalation to proper authorities and must not substitute for mandatory regulatory reporting.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 82-5; public safety paramount principle
From the date of administrative removal from responsible charge through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A Covert Safety Advisory Continuation Ethical Permissibility
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to assess the ethical permissibility of continuing to advise Technician B covertly on sanitary system management after being formally removed from responsible charge, determining that such advisory activity was justified to preserve public safety in the absence of any licensed engineering oversight.
Applied after Engineer A was formally removed from responsible charge and placed on probation, yet continued to provide covert advisory guidance to Technician B to preserve safety oversight of the sanitary system.
Engineer A continued to advise Technician B without the knowledge of Administrator C after being formally removed from responsible charge and placed on probation with threat of termination.
Engineer A continues in her capacity as City Engineer/Director of Public Works, assumes no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, but continues to advise Technician B without the knowledge of City Administrator C
Engineer A Employer-Prohibited Governing Body Safety Escalation Permissibility
Employer-Prohibited Governing Body Safety Escalation Permissibility Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that Administrator C's prohibition on communicating with city council members was ethically invalid in the face of an imminent public health risk, and to correctly determine that escalating to elected city officials was permissible and obligated despite the prohibition.
Applied when Administrator C ordered Engineer A to discuss problems only with him and threatened termination, yet Engineer A continued to escalate to city council members.
Engineer A discussed the sanitary system problem privately with city council members both before and after Administrator C's explicit prohibition, recognizing the governing body as a legitimate escalation target.
Engineer A Employment Pressure Non-Subordination Safety Determination
Employment Pressure Non-Subordination of Safety Determination Capability
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the risk of employment loss — referenced in Cases 65-12 and 82-5 — did not constitute an ethical justification for subordinating her professional safety determination regarding the water supply contamination risk.
Engineer A was obligated to exercise this capability by accepting potential employment loss as the cost of fulfilling her mandatory public safety reporting obligation.
The BER's acknowledgment that the engineer who makes the decision to blow the whistle will in many instances face loss of employment, but that this sobering fact cannot override the obligation to the Code in matters of public health and safety.
While we recognize this sobering fact, we would be ignoring our obligation to the Code and hence to the engineering profession if, in matters of public health and safety, we were to decide otherwise.
Engineer A Employment Pressure Safety Abrogation Prohibition — Administrator C Termination Threat
Administrator C threatened Engineer A with termination for escalating sanitary system safety concerns; the Board affirmed that employment pressure cannot override the paramount duty to public safety
Employment Situation Safety Abrogation Prohibition Constraint
Engineer A was absolutely prohibited from bowing to Administrator C's employment pressure and termination threat when great dangers to public safety — sanitary system overflow and water supply contamination — were present; the paramount obligation to public safety superseded employment self-preservation.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Cases 65-12, 82-5, 88-6
the engineer's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of his professional duties, is probably among the most basic
From the point Administrator C issued termination threats through the period of inaction on external reporting
we would be ignoring our obligation to the Code and hence to the engineering profession if, in matters of public health and safety, we were to decide otherwise
Engineer A Employment Situation Safety Abrogation — Sanitary System Overflow
Engineer A faced direct employment consequences — probation and termination threat — for escalating sanitary system safety concerns, creating a direct conflict between employment self-preservation and the paramount duty to public safety.
Engineer A was absolutely prohibited from abrogating her paramount public safety obligation regarding the sanitary system overflow risk in response to Administrator C's employment pressure, institutional hierarchy, or termination threats — establishing that her duty to escalate to proper authorities superseded deference to her administrative superior.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 82-5; BER Case 65-12
Throughout the period of employment pressure and through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A is placed on probation and ordered not to discuss this matter further and that if she does she will be terminated.
Engineer A Engineering Authority Non-Circumvention Acquiescence — Administrator C Override
Administrator C, a non-engineer, formally overrode Engineer A's engineering safety determinations regarding the sanitary system, reassigned responsible charge to an unlicensed technician, and prohibited external reporting
Non-Engineer Authority Safety Override Resistance Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from permitting City Administrator C — a non-engineer — to circumvent and overrule her engineering authority over the sanitary system under circumstances involving public safety; her acquiescence to this circumvention constituted an independent ethical violation requiring reporting to proper authorities.
Throughout the period Administrator C overrode Engineer A's engineering authority over the sanitary system
As the legally established city engineer and director of public works, Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer
It is clear that Engineer A had an ethical obligation to report this occurrence to the 'proper authorities' as stated above
Engineer A Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise Through Safety Compliance
Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise Through Public Safety Compliance Capability
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that permitting her professional obligations to be compromised to the point of endangering public safety caused grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers, and to act on this recognition as an additional motivation for fulfilling her public safety reporting obligations.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she allowed her professional obligations to be compromised by Administrator C's directives.
The BER's closing statement that individual ethics failures in safety-critical situations cause profession-wide reputational harm, and that the Board would be ignoring its obligation to the Code and the engineering profession if it decided otherwise.
For an engineer to permit her professional obligations and duties to be compromised to the point of endangering the public safety and health does grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers.
Engineer A Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise — Sanitary System Safety Compliance
The Board concluded that Engineer A's acquiescence to Administrator C's suppression of safety reporting damaged not only the immediate public but the image and interests of all engineers
Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise Through Safety Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from permitting her professional obligations and duties to be compromised to the point of endangering public safety and health, because such compromise causes grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers and the engineering profession.
For an engineer to permit her professional obligations and duties to be compromised to the point of endangering the public safety and health does grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers
Throughout Engineer A's tenure as city engineer and director of public works
Engineer A Environmental Regulatory Compliance — Sanitary System Overflow
The city's sanitary system received large amounts of vegetable waste from food processing plants during canning season, and the combined canning and rainy season load exceeded disposal plant and bed capacity — creating an environmental regulatory compliance constraint on the system's operation.
Environmental Regulatory Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was bound by environmental regulatory compliance requirements establishing that the city's sanitary system must not discharge untreated waste into the local river, and that the imminent overflow condition — whether through controlled release or levee overflow — constituted a regulatory violation requiring immediate notification to the state water pollution control authority.
State water pollution control law; environmental regulatory standards; NSPE Code of Ethics
The city has several large food processing plants that discharge very large amounts of vegetable wastes into the city's sanitary system during the canning season.
Throughout Engineer A's tenure as City Engineer/Director of Public Works, with heightened application during the winter storm overflow event
Part of the canning season coincides with the rainy season.
Under state law, this condition is required to be reported to the state water pollution control authority, the agency responsible for monitoring and overseeing water quality in state streams and rivers.
Engineer A Faithful Agent Public Safety Paramount Classical Dilemma Recognition
Faithful Agent Public Safety Paramount Classical Dilemma Recognition Capability
Engineer A was obligated to recognize and correctly frame the classical ethical dilemma between her faithful agent duty to Administrator C and her paramount public safety obligation, and to correctly resolve it in favor of public safety by escalating to state authorities.
Engineer A failed to fully exercise this capability when she subordinated her public safety obligation to her faithful agent duty to Administrator C by not escalating to state authorities.
The BER's analysis that where the conflict is between one important obligation or loyalty and the protection of the public, the latter must be viewed as the higher obligation — and that Engineer A failed to correctly resolve this dilemma.
it seems clear that where the conflict is between one important obligation or loyalty and the protection of the public, for the engineer the latter must be viewed as the higher obligation.
ethics frequently involves a delicate balance between competing and, often times, conflicting obligations.
Engineer A Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Pressure-Abrogation Resistance
Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Pressure-Abrogation Recognition and Resistance Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that acquiescing to Administrator C's employment threats and suppression orders when she believed great dangers to public health were present would constitute an abrogation of her most fundamental professional responsibility, and to actively resist such abrogation.
Applied throughout the case as Administrator C escalated employment threats from job-in-danger warnings to formal probation and termination threats.
Despite being placed on probation and threatened with termination, Engineer A continued to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk and continued to advise Technician B covertly.
Engineer A is placed on probation and ordered not to discuss this matter further and that if she does she will be terminated
Engineer A Genuine Withdrawal vs Responsibility Disclaimer Distinction
Genuine Withdrawal vs Responsibility Disclaimer Distinction Capability
Engineer A was obligated to possess the capability to recognize that her decision to assume no responsibility for the plant and beds did not constitute a genuine withdrawal from further service on the project, and that a genuine withdrawal — combined with reporting to proper authorities — was required to discharge her ethical obligation.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she substituted a responsibility disclaimer for genuine project withdrawal.
The BER's finding that Engineer A's decision to assume no responsibility did not constitute a withdrawal from further service on the project as required by the Code.
Nor do we believe, Engineer A's decision to assume no responsibility for the plant and beds constitutes a 'withdrawal from further service on the project.'
the Code only requires that the engineer withdraw from a project and report to proper authorities when the circumstances involve endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare
Engineer A Graduated Escalation — Sanitary System Danger Severity Calibration
The case presents a graduated escalation sequence: initial notification to Administrator C, private discussions with city council members, and ultimately the imminent overflow condition requiring state regulatory notification — each stage requiring calibrated escalation response.
Graduated Escalation Calibrated to Danger Imminence and Employment Context Constraint
Engineer A was required to calibrate her escalation response to the evolving severity of the sanitary system overflow risk — beginning with notification to Administrator C, proceeding to city council members when C deferred, and ultimately escalating to the state water pollution control authority when the overflow became imminent during the winter storms — with her public employee status amplifying the escalation obligation at each stage.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 82-5; BER Case 88-6
Throughout the period from initial capacity warning through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A again privately brings the problem up to other city officials.
It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will over flow the levees and dump all waste into the river.
Engineer A Honest and Truthful Public Safety Reporting Integrity Wastewater
Honest and Truthful Public Safety Reporting Integrity Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to maintain honest and truthful reporting of the sanitary system overflow risk to all escalation targets — Administrator C, city council members, and ultimately the state water pollution control authority — despite institutional resistance and employment threats.
Applied throughout the case as Engineer A maintained honest and complete reporting of the overflow risk despite institutional pressure to suppress or defer the concern.
Engineer A consistently and honestly reported the overflow risk through multiple escalation channels, maintaining the integrity of her technical findings despite Administrator C's attempts to suppress the reporting.
Engineer A notifies Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds to handle the potential overflow during the rainy season and offers possible solutions
Engineer A Imminent Widespread Environmental Danger — Full-Bore Multi-Authority Escalation
The imminent overflow of waste ponds into the local river during heavy winter storms — affecting public water supply and the environment — constituted an imminent widespread danger requiring immediate multi-authority escalation beyond the prior graduated internal escalation attempts.
Imminent Widespread Danger Full-Bore Multi-Authority Escalation Constraint
When the winter storm overflow became imminent and obvious, Engineer A was required to pursue full-bore multi-authority escalation — including immediate notification to the state water pollution control authority, city council, and any other authority with jurisdiction — rather than passive reliance on prior internal notifications that had produced no corrective action.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6; state water pollution control reporting law
That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur in the city.
Activated when it became obvious that overflow was imminent during the winter canning season storms
Engineer A Inaction-as-Accessory-to-Ongoing-Violation Self-Recognition
Inaction-as-Accessory-to-Ongoing-Violation Self-Recognition Capability
Engineer A was obligated to possess the capability to recognize that her sustained inaction — after multiple failed internal escalation attempts and in the face of a known pattern of ongoing legal disregard — transformed her into an effective accessory to the continuing violation, triggering a mandatory obligation to escalate to state authorities.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability, allowing her inaction to constitute accessory status to the ongoing sanitary system violation.
The BER's explicit finding that Engineer A's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and appeared to make her an accessory to Administrator C's actions.
After several attempts to modify the views of her superiors, it is our view that Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials
Engineer A Inaction Accessory Liability — State Regulatory Non-Reporting
Engineer A had made multiple attempts to modify the views of Administrator C and city council members without success, and continued in her role without external reporting — creating accessory liability for the ongoing statutory violation.
Inaction Accessory Liability Proper Authority Non-Identification Constraint
Engineer A's continued presence in her role without reporting the imminent overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority — after recognizing that local officials including Administrator C and city council members were themselves the source of ongoing disregard for the law — made her an accessory to the ongoing statutory violation and environmental harm.
Engineer A continues in her capacity as City Engineer/Director of Public Works, assumes no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds
From the point at which Engineer A recognized that internal escalation had been exhausted without corrective action
Engineer A Internal Escalation Failure — State Authority Re-Identification
Engineer A had escalated to Administrator C (who deferred), then to city council members (who took no action), exhausting local internal channels — requiring recognition that the state water pollution control authority was the proper external authority.
Internal Escalation Failure Proper External Authority Re-Identification Constraint
After exhausting internal escalation to Administrator C and city council members without achieving corrective action, Engineer A was required to re-identify the 'proper authorities' as the state water pollution control authority rather than continuing to treat local city officials — who were complicit in the deferral — as the appropriate escalation targets.
After city council members failed to take corrective action following Engineer A's private discussions with them
Engineer A Internal Reporting Non-Equivalence to Proper Authority Reporting — Sanitary System
Engineer A repeatedly reported sanitary system overflow risks to Administrator C and city council members, but both failed to act; the Board found this did not constitute reporting to proper authorities
Engineer A's reporting of sanitary system overflow concerns to City Administrator C and city council members did not constitute reporting to 'proper authorities' under the NSPE Code, because those officials were themselves the source of ongoing disregard for the law; proper authorities were state water pollution control officials.
we do not believe that Engineer A's act of reporting her concerns to City Administrator C or certain members of the city council constituted a reporting to the 'proper authorities' as intended under the Code
From the point Engineer A recognized a pattern of disregard by local officials through the period of inaction
Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials (i.e., state water pollution control authority)
Engineer A Mandatory State Water Pollution Reporting — Winter Storm Overflow
During particularly heavy winter storms, it became obvious that waste ponds would overflow levees unless waste was released to the local river — a condition explicitly required by state law to be reported to the state water pollution control authority.
Mandatory Statutory Environmental Overflow Reporting Constraint
Engineer A was legally required under state law to report the imminent wastewater overflow condition — where releasing waste to the river or allowing levee overflow were the only options — to the state water pollution control authority, and this obligation could not be deferred or suppressed by Administrator C's communication directives or termination threats.
State water pollution control reporting law; NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1
Activated upon Engineer A's awareness of the imminent overflow condition during the winter canning season storms
Engineer A Mandatory Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting — State Water Pollution Control Authority
Engineer A identified imminent overflow of waste ponds into the local river and contamination of the public water supply, triggering mandatory statutory reporting obligations to state water pollution control authorities
Engineer A was subject to an inviolable legal and ethical constraint requiring her to report the imminent wastewater overflow condition and water supply contamination to the state water pollution control authority, regardless of Administrator C's suppression directives, internal communication restrictions, or employment consequences.
State water pollution control law; NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6
From the point the overflow condition met the statutory reporting threshold through the period of inaction
Engineer A Non-Engineer Authority Engineering Integrity Circumvention Resistance
Non-Engineer Authority Engineering Integrity Circumvention Resistance Capability
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that Administrator C's circumvention and overruling of her engineering authority over the sanitary system safety matter was an ethically impermissible abrogation of engineering authority, and to resist this circumvention and report it to proper authorities as an independent ethical obligation.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she allowed Administrator C to circumvent her engineering authority without reporting this to proper authorities.
The BER's finding that Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer under circumstances involving public safety, and that she had an ethical obligation to report this occurrence to proper authorities.
As the legally established city engineer and director of public works, Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer under circumstances involving the public safety.
It is clear that Engineer A had an ethical obligation to report this occurrence to the 'proper authorities' as stated above.
Engineer A Non-Engineer Authority Safety Override Resistance — Administrator C
Administrator C, a non-engineer administrative authority, overrode Engineer A's professional safety determinations through a series of escalating directives — deferral, communication restriction, responsible charge reassignment, and termination threats — none of which superseded Engineer A's professional safety obligation.
Engineer A was required to resist Administrator C's override of her professionally grounded safety determinations regarding sanitary system overflow risk — including the deferral posture, the communication channeling directive, and the responsible charge reassignment — by escalating to city council members, state regulatory authorities, and other officials with jurisdiction.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 00-5; BER Case 82-5
From the date of Administrator C's first deferral response through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A Non-Engineer Principal Engineering Authority Boundary Recognition Administrator C
Non-Engineer Principal Engineering Authority Boundary Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that Administrator C, as a non-engineer administrator, lacked the authority to override professional engineering safety determinations regarding the sanitary system overflow risk or to validly assign engineering responsible charge to an unlicensed technician.
Applied throughout the case as Administrator C repeatedly attempted to suppress Engineer A's professional safety determinations and ultimately removed her from responsible charge.
Engineer A recognized that Administrator C's dismissal of the overflow concern ('we will face the problem when it comes') and his assignment of responsible charge to Technician B exceeded his legitimate administrative authority over engineering safety determinations.
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command by a letter instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge
Engineer A Passive Safety Acquiescence — Administrator C Suppression Compliance
Engineer A complied with Administrator C's directive to channel all communications through him and did not escalate to state water pollution control authorities, constituting passive acquiescence to an ongoing safety violation
Passive Safety Acquiescence Independent Ethical Violation Constraint
Engineer A's passive acquiescence to Administrator C's suppression of external safety reporting — going along without effective dissent or escalation to state authorities — constituted an independent ethical violation beyond any failure to report, establishing that passive non-objection in the face of known safety violations is itself an ethical failure.
Throughout the period Engineer A complied with Administrator C's communication restrictions without escalating to state authorities
In addition, we find it troubling that Engineer A would permit her professional integrity to be compromised in the manner herein described
Engineer A Passive Safety Acquiescence — Sanitary System Responsible Charge Removal
After being formally removed from sanitary system responsibility, Engineer A assumed no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds — a passive acquiescence to an arrangement that placed an unlicensed technician in responsible charge of a safety-critical system.
Engineer A's assumption of no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds after the administrative reassignment — without actively insisting on restoration of proper engineering oversight or formally protesting the unlicensed practice arrangement — constituted passive acquiescence that was itself an independent ethical violation, distinct from and in addition to any failure to report to external authorities.
From the date of the administrative reassignment order through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A Pattern of Law Disregard Accessory Liability Escalation Trigger — Sanitary System
After multiple failed attempts to secure corrective action from Administrator C and city council members, Engineer A's continued inaction made her an accessory to the ongoing legal violation
Engineer A was constrained from continuing inaction after recognizing a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by Administrator C and city council members; at the point she was reasonably certain no action would be taken and probable public danger existed, she was required to escalate to state water pollution control authorities or become an accessory to the ongoing violation.
From the point Engineer A recognized the pattern of disregard and exhausted internal escalation channels
Engineer A Post-Client-Override State Regulatory Escalation — Sanitary Overflow
Engineer A's recommendations were overridden by Administrator C's deferral posture and city council members' inaction, requiring escalation to the state water pollution control authority as the proper external regulatory authority.
Post-Client-Override Public Safety Regulatory Escalation Constraint
After Administrator C overrode Engineer A's safety recommendations and city council members failed to take corrective action, Engineer A was required to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority — the applicable state regulatory agency — when the gravity of the potential danger to public health and safety warranted such escalation.
After exhaustion of internal escalation channels and activation of the imminent overflow condition
Engineer A Proper External Authority Identification After Internal Escalation Failure
Proper External Authority Identification After Internal Escalation Failure Capability
Engineer A possessed — or was obligated to possess — the capability to correctly identify that after multiple failed internal escalation attempts to Administrator C and city council members, the proper authorities were state officials (state water pollution control authority), not local city officials.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she did not escalate to the state water pollution control authority after recognizing a pattern of disregard by local officials.
The BER's finding that Engineer A knew or should have known that proper authorities were state officials, and that her failure to escalate to state authorities made her an accessory to the ongoing violation.
After several attempts to modify the views of her superiors, it is our view that Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials (i.e., state water pollution control authority).
We cannot find it credible that a City Engineer/Director of Public Works for a medium-sized town would not be aware of this basic obligation.
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Institutional Safety Responsibility
Public Employee Heightened Safety Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A, as the sole licensed professional engineer in the city government with assigned institutional responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, was obligated to recognize that her public employee role created a heightened ethical obligation compelling both professional and civic action to address the identified safety risks.
Engineer A failed to fully exercise this capability when she did not escalate to state authorities despite her heightened public employee safety obligation.
The BER's finding that Engineer A's role as a public servant (city engineer and director of public works) made the mandatory nature of external reporting particularly clear, and that her inaction was particularly troubling given this heightened responsibility.
We believe this is particularly clear when the engineer involved is a public servant (city engineer and director of public works).
In addition, we find it troubling that Engineer A would permit her professional integrity to be compromised in the manner herein described.
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Sanitary System Safety Escalation
Engineer A was the only licensed PE in the city government with responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, giving her a unique institutional safety responsibility that amplified her escalation obligation beyond the standard graduated-response applicable to private engineers.
Public Employee Heightened Safety Escalation Constraint
As the sole licensed professional engineer in the city government with assigned institutional responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, Engineer A bore a heightened escalation obligation — beyond that of a private engineer — requiring comprehensive multi-authority action including state regulatory notification when the sanitary system overflow risk became imminent.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6; public employee heightened duty principle
Engineer A is employed as the City Engineer/Director of Public Works for a medium sized city and is the only licensed professional engineer in a position of responsibility in the city government.
Throughout Engineer A's tenure as City Engineer/Director of Public Works
Engineer A has the responsibility for the disposal plant and beds and is directly responsible to City Administrator C.
Engineer A Public Safety Escalation Wastewater Overflow
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that the wastewater overflow risk exceeded the internal client relationship and required escalation to regulatory authorities, and to act on that recognition by pursuing escalation through multiple channels including city council and ultimately the state water pollution control authority.
Applied throughout the case as Engineer A recognized the public health risk of the wastewater overflow and pursued escalation through all available channels.
Engineer A escalated the sanitary system overflow risk from Administrator C to city council members and ultimately faced the obligation to report to the state water pollution control authority under state law.
Engineer A notifies Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds
Engineer A has also discussed the problem privately with certain members of the city council
Engineer A Public Safety Mandatory Obligation vs Personal Conscience Right — Water Contamination
The Board distinguished Case 82-5 (internal dispute, personal conscience right only) from the current case (public safety endangerment, mandatory obligation) to establish Engineer A's mandatory reporting duty
Public Health Safety Threshold Mandatory vs Personal Conscience Whistleblowing Distinction Constraint
Engineer A's situation — involving contamination of the public water supply — crossed the threshold from a personal conscience right to escalate (as in Case 82-5's internal employer-employee dispute) to a mandatory ethical obligation to report to proper authorities and withdraw from the project, because public safety, health, and welfare were directly endangered.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Cases 82-5, 88-6
the case then before us did not directly involve the protection of the public safety, health, and welfare, but rather was an internal dispute between an employer and an employee
From the point Engineer A identified the water supply contamination risk
Clearly, the case presently before the Board involves 'endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare' the contamination of the water supply
where an engineer determines that a case may involve a danger to the public safety, the engineer has not merely an 'ethical right' but has an 'ethical obligation' to report the matter to the proper authorities
Engineer A Public Safety Paramount Over Employment Loyalty — Sanitary System
Engineer A faced a conflict between her faithful agent duty to Administrator C and her paramount obligation to protect public safety from sanitary system overflow and water supply contamination
Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from subordinating her paramount obligation to public safety to her faithful agent duty to Administrator C and the city; where the conflict was between employer loyalty and protection of the public, the latter was the higher obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I; BER Case 88-6 Discussion
where the conflict is between one important obligation or loyalty and the protection of the public, for the engineer the latter must be viewed as the higher obligation
Throughout the period of conflict between Administrator C's directives and Engineer A's safety obligations
The engineer's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of his professional duties, is probably among the most basic
Engineer A Public Safety Paramount — Sanitary System Overflow Risk
The risk of raw domestic and vegetable waste overflow into the local river — affecting public water supply and environmental quality — constituted a public safety, health, and welfare concern that Engineer A was required to hold paramount over all competing considerations.
Engineer A's paramount obligation to hold public safety above all other considerations — including employer loyalty, employment security, and administrative hierarchy — required her to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk to proper authorities regardless of Administrator C's directives and termination threats.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I; BER Case 82-5; BER Case 65-12
Public Safety at Risk from Sanitary System Overflow
Engineer A Public Servant Heightened External Reporting Threshold Recognition
Public Servant Engineer Heightened External Reporting Threshold Recognition Capability
Engineer A, as city engineer and director of public works, was obligated to recognize that her public servant status created a heightened and particularly clear mandatory obligation to report to external proper authorities — state officials — when local officials demonstrated a pattern of disregard for the law.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she did not escalate to state authorities despite her public servant role making the mandatory reporting obligation particularly clear.
The BER's finding that the mandatory nature of external reporting was 'particularly clear' when the engineer involved is a public servant, and that it was not credible that a City Engineer/Director of Public Works would be unaware of this basic obligation.
Engineer A Public Servant Heightened Proper Authority Reporting — City Engineer Role
The Board emphasized that Engineer A's public servant role as city engineer and director of public works made her heightened reporting obligation particularly clear, and that a city engineer of a medium-sized town would be expected to know her basic statutory reporting obligations
Engineer A, as city engineer and director of public works, bore a heightened obligation to identify state water pollution control authorities as the proper authorities for escalation and to report to them — beyond what would be required of a private engineer — arising from her dual role as professional engineer and public servant with specific custodial responsibility for the sanitary system.
We believe this is particularly clear when the engineer involved is a public servant (city engineer and director of public works)
We cannot find it credible that a City Engineer/Director of Public Works for a medium-sized town would not be aware of this basic obligation
Engineer A Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Sanitary System
Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Capability
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the paramount obligation to hold public safety, health, and welfare as the first obligation of the NSPE Code of Ethics required overriding her faithful agent duty to Administrator C and escalating to state authorities.
Engineer A partially exercised this capability by escalating internally, but failed to complete the exercise by escalating to state authorities.
The BER's opening statement that the obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public is probably among the most basic, and its application to Engineer A's situation.
The engineer's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of his professional duties, is probably among the most basic.
Clearly, its importance is evident by the fact that it is the very first obligation stated in the NSPE Code of Ethics.
Qualified licensed engineer removed from safety-critical role; unlicensed technician placed in charge; Engineer A's formal authority over the system is severed while the hazard remains unresolved
After Engineer A's second unauthorized contact with city officials
Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility for the sanitary system, places unlicensed Technician B in charge of the system, and puts Engineer A on formal probation with explicit termination threats. This reassignment creates a dangerous gap in qualified oversight of a safety-critical system.
Engineer A Responsibility Disclaimer Non-Equivalence to Genuine Withdrawal — Sanitary System
Engineer A declared she assumed no responsibility for the plant and beds after being removed from responsible charge, but the Board found this did not satisfy the Code's withdrawal requirement
Responsibility Disclaimer Non-Equivalence to Genuine Project Withdrawal Constraint
Engineer A's decision to 'assume no responsibility' for the disposal plant and beds did not constitute a genuine withdrawal from further service on the project as required by the NSPE Code when public safety is endangered; genuine withdrawal required both actual disengagement and reporting to proper authorities.
we do not believe, Engineer A's decision to assume no responsibility for the plant and beds constitutes a 'withdrawal from further service on the project'
At the point Engineer A declared she assumed no responsibility for the plant and beds
Engineer A Sanitary System Hydraulic Capacity Assessment
Sanitary System Hydraulic Capacity Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed advanced technical capability to assess the hydraulic capacity of the city's disposal plant and beds relative to combined canning season industrial discharge and rainy season stormwater loading, enabling her to identify the overflow risk and formulate remediation options.
Applied when Engineer A identified that the disposal plant and beds lacked sufficient capacity to handle combined food processing plant discharge and rainy season conditions, and communicated this with proposed solutions.
Engineer A notified Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds to handle potential overflow during the rainy season and offered possible solutions.
Engineer A Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting Recognition
Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting Requirement Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed — or was obligated to possess — the capability to recognize that state law triggered a mandatory reporting obligation to the state water pollution control authority upon identification of an imminent wastewater overflow condition, independent of employer authorization.
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she did not escalate to the state water pollution control authority despite recognizing a pattern of disregard by local officials.
The BER's finding that Engineer A knew or should have known that the proper authorities were state officials, and that she had a mandatory statutory reporting obligation that she failed to fulfill.
Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials (i.e., state water pollution control authority).
Engineer A Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting Requirement Recognition
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that state law mandated reporting of the imminent wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, and that this statutory duty was triggered independently of employer authorization.
Applied when it became obvious that wastewater ponds would overflow levees during the heavy winter storms, triggering the state statutory reporting obligation.
Recognition that the imminent overflow condition met the statutory threshold requiring mandatory reporting to the state water pollution control authority under state law.
Engineer A Superior Authority Suppression Non-Compliance — State Water Authority Reporting
Administrator C directed all sanitary system communications through himself and prohibited external reporting, while simultaneously being the authority whose deferral posture created the unmitigated safety risk — making him an improper 'proper authority' for escalation purposes.
Superior Authority Environmental Regulatory Reporting Suppression Non-Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was required not to comply with Administrator C's directive suppressing external regulatory reporting, and was obligated to report the imminent overflow condition directly to the state water pollution control authority — recognizing that internal reporting to Administrator C did not constitute reporting to 'proper authorities' when Administrator C was himself the source of the suppression.
State water pollution control reporting law; NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6
Activated upon awareness of the imminent overflow condition; applies throughout the period of Administrator C's suppression directives
Engineer A Supervisory Chain Environmental Compliance Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Supervisor
Supervisory Chain Environmental Compliance Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Supervisor Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize, after Administrator C repeatedly dismissed the sanitary system overflow concern and city council members took no action, that the proper authorities for reporting were not the unresponsive local officials but rather the state water pollution control authority, and to escalate accordingly.
Applied when all internal escalation channels — Administrator C and city council — proved unresponsive, requiring recognition that the state water pollution control authority was the appropriate next escalation target.
After Administrator C dismissed the overflow concern and city council members failed to act, Engineer A faced the obligation to escalate to the state water pollution control authority as the appropriate external regulatory body.
Engineer A Termination Threat — Safety Escalation Non-Deterrence
Administrator C issued escalating employment threats — first a job-in-danger warning, then formal probation with termination threat — in direct response to Engineer A's safety escalation activities, attempting to deter further escalation.
Employment Termination Threat Safety Escalation Non-Deterrence Constraint
Administrator C's explicit termination threats — first warning Engineer A her job was in danger for discussing the problem with city officials, then placing her on probation with a termination warning — did not constitute a legitimate constraint on Engineer A's obligation to continue escalating the imminent overflow risk to proper authorities, including the state water pollution control authority.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Employment Situation Safety Abrogation Prohibition; BER Case 82-5
From the initial termination warning through the winter storm overflow event
Engineer A Unlicensed Practice Recognition Technician B Assignment
Unlicensed Practice Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that Administrator C's formal assignment of responsible charge to Technician B constituted an arrangement for unlicensed engineering practice, as Technician B was not a licensed professional engineer.
Applied when Engineer A received the memo designating Technician B as completely responsible for the sanitary system.
Engineer A recognized that Technician B, a non-licensed technician, was being formally assigned engineering responsible charge of the entire sanitary system by a non-engineer administrator.
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command by a letter instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge of the sanitary system
Engineer A is employed as the City Engineer/Director of Public Works for a medium sized city and is the only licensed professional engineer in a position of responsibility in the city government
Engineer A Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Resistance
Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Assignment Resistance Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that Administrator C's formal assignment of engineering responsible charge to Technician B — a non-licensed technician — was impermissible, and to resist and escalate this assignment through appropriate channels.
Engineer A failed to fully exercise this capability when she did not formally resist and escalate Administrator C's assignment of responsible charge to Technician B to proper authorities.
The BER's analysis that Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer, indicating partial failure to exercise this capability fully.
Engineer A Unsupervised Unlicensed Sanitary System Operation — Public Safety Harm
Administrator C's administrative order placed unlicensed Technician B in formal responsible charge of the sanitary system — a safety-critical public infrastructure system — without any licensed PE supervision, creating the specific harm condition addressed by this constraint.
Unsupervised Unlicensed Practice Public Safety Harm Constraint
The arrangement whereby Technician B held formal responsible charge of the city sanitary system without direct PE supervision created a cognizable public safety harm — constraining Engineer A from acquiescing in this arrangement without simultaneously pursuing formal escalation to restore proper engineering oversight.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; state engineering practice act; professional licensing regulations
Technician B, is completely responsible and is to report any interference by a third party to City Administrator C.
Engineer A Wastewater Overflow Environmental River Contamination Risk Assessment
Wastewater Overflow Environmental River Contamination Risk Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed the technical capability to assess the environmental contamination risk posed by the imminent wastewater overflow event — including evaluating the consequences of levee overtopping and uncontrolled discharge of domestic and industrial waste into the local river — providing the technical basis for mandatory regulatory reporting.
Applied when heavy winter storms made it obvious that wastewater ponds would overflow levees and dump all waste into the river, requiring technical assessment of the environmental contamination risk.
Engineer A's technical assessment of the disposal plant and beds capacity and the overflow risk during combined canning and rainy season conditions enabled recognition that the overflow would dump all waste into the river if levees were overtopped.
It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will over flow the levees and dump all waste into the river
Engineer A notifies Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds to handle the potential overflow during the rainy season
Engineer A Whistleblower Employment Loss Acceptance — Sanitary System Reporting
Engineer A faced termination threat from Administrator C for escalating sanitary system safety concerns; the Board affirmed that employment loss does not excuse failure to fulfill mandatory safety reporting obligations
Engineer A was constrained from treating the prospect of employment loss as a sufficient justification for failing to report the sanitary system overflow risk and water supply contamination to state water pollution control authorities; the Code required acceptance of employment consequences as the cost of fulfilling mandatory safety reporting obligations.
the engineer who makes the decision to 'blow the whistle' will in many instances be faced with the loss of employment
From the point Engineer A faced termination threat through the period of inaction on external reporting
While we recognize this sobering fact, we would be ignoring our obligation to the Code and hence to the engineering profession if, in matters of public health and safety, we were to decide otherwise
if an engineer feels compelled to 'blow the whistle' to expose the facts as he sees them, he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment
Engineer A Whistleblowing Right vs Mandatory Duty Discrimination
Whistleblowing Right vs Mandatory Duty Discrimination Capability
Engineer A was obligated to correctly distinguish between the personal conscience right to whistleblow (applicable in Case 82-5 where no direct public health danger existed) and the mandatory ethical obligation to report to proper authorities and withdraw (applicable in her case involving direct water supply contamination endangerment).
Engineer A failed to exercise this capability when she treated her reporting obligation as discretionary rather than mandatory, stopping at internal escalation rather than proceeding to state authorities.
The BER's analysis distinguishing Case 82-5 (internal employer-employee dispute, personal conscience right) from the present case (direct public health endangerment, mandatory ethical obligation), and finding that Engineer A had not merely an ethical right but an ethical obligation to report.
as noted in Case 82-5 and in the Code, where an engineer determines that a case may involve a danger to the public safety, the engineer has not merely an 'ethical right' but has an 'ethical obligation' to report the matter to the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project.
Engineer A covertly advising Technician B during period between removal from responsibility and winter crisis
Engineer A continues in her capacity as City Engineer/Director of Public Works, assumes no responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, but continues to advise Technician B without the knowledge of City Administrator C. That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur.
Engineer A covertly advising Technician B
period between removal from responsibility and winter crisis
Entity1 occurs entirely within the duration of Entity2
Engineer A's first unauthorized contact with city council members before City Administrator C's communication restriction order
Engineer A has also discussed the problem privately with certain members of the city council without the permission of City Administrator C. City Administrator C orders Engineer A to discuss the problems only with him and warns her that her job is in danger if she disobeys.
Engineer A's first unauthorized contact with city council members
Engineer A's initial notification to City Administrator C before rainy/canning season overlap crisis
Engineer A notifies Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the plant and beds to handle the potential overflow during the rainy season and offers possible solutions... That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur
Engineer A's initial notification to City Administrator C
Engineer A's probation and removal from responsibility before point at which Board says Engineer A should have reported to state authorities
It is difficult for us to say exactly at what point Engineer A should have reported her concerns to the 'appropriate authorities.' However, we would suggest that such reporting should have occurred at such time as Engineer A was reasonably certain that no action would be taken concerning her recommendations either by City Administrator C or the members of the city council.
Engineer A's probation and removal from responsibility
point at which Board says Engineer A should have reported to state authorities
Engineer A's removal from sanitary system responsibility equals Engineer A's probation and termination warning
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system... In addition, Engineer A is placed on probation and ordered not to discuss this matter further and that if she does she will be terminated.
Engineer A's removal from sanitary system responsibility
Engineer A's probation and termination warning
Entity1 and Entity2 have the same start and end times
Engineer A's reporting to City Administrator C and city council before state authority reporting obligation identified by the Board
Engineer A's act of reporting her concerns to City Administrator C or certain members of the city council constituted a reporting to the 'proper authorities' as intended under the Code... Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials (i.e., state water pollution control authority).
Engineer A's reporting to City Administrator C and city council
state authority reporting obligation identified by the Board
Engineer A's second unauthorized contact with city officials before Engineer A's removal from sanitary system responsibility
Engineer A again privately brings the problem up to other city officials. City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command by a letter instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge.
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard (NSPE Code-derived)
where an engineer determines that a case may involve a danger to the public safety, the engineer has not merely an 'ethical right' but has an 'ethical obligation' to report the matter to the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project
Applied to determine that Engineer A's reporting to City Administrator C and city council members did not constitute reporting to 'proper authorities,' and that she had an obligation to escalate to state water pollution control authorities once it was clear local officials would not act
Environmental Compliance Standard (Wastewater Discharge)
It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will overflow the levees and dump all waste into the river.
Engineer A in assessing the regulatory significance of the overflow risk
Establishes the environmental regulatory baseline that the city's sanitary system must meet, providing the technical and legal context for Engineer A's assessment that the system has inadequate capacity and that overflow would constitute a regulatory violation.
Environmental Hazard — Waste Overflow to River
From the onset of heavy winter storms through resolution of the overflow emergency
That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur in the city
Actual environmental hazard posed by potential uncontrolled release of domestic and vegetable processing waste into the local river
Controlled release, regulatory intervention, or overflow event
If waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will overflow the levees and dump all waste into the river
Particularly heavy winter storms during canning season creating imminent overflow conditions
Food Processing Plants Industrial Dischargers
{'license': 'N/A (industrial entities)', 'position': 'Industrial wastewater dischargers', 'role_in_case': 'Source of the capacity-exceeding waste load'}
Large food processing facilities that discharge very large amounts of vegetable wastes into the city's sanitary system during the canning season, creating the capacity overload problem that coincides with the rainy season.
{'type': 'contributes_to_problem_faced_by', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'discharges_into', 'target': 'City sanitary system'}
The city has several large food processing plants that discharge very large amounts of vegetable wastes into the city's sanitary system during the canning season
Graduated Escalation Obligation — Sanitary System Danger Severity
From Engineer A's initial capacity notification through the winter storm emergency
Graduated Escalation Obligation Calibrated to Danger Severity State
Engineer A's obligation to calibrate escalation intensity to the evolving severity of the sanitary system overflow risk — from initial capacity warning through imminent emergency
Escalation to imminent emergency status requiring mandatory external reporting
Engineer A's identification of inadequate capacity creating a foreseeable but not yet imminent public health risk
Heavy Storms Occur During Canning Season
Predicted risk condition is now realized; system is approaching overflow threshold; legal reporting trigger conditions are met; emergency status is active
Heavy winter storms arrive simultaneously with the canning season, creating the exact combined demand scenario that Engineer A had previously identified as exceeding the sanitary system's capacity. This exogenous weather event transforms the predicted risk into an imminent crisis.
Legal reporting obligation is now mandatory and time-sensitive; environmental harm is imminent; controlled release into a public waterway is required; all parties with knowledge of the condition are legally and ethically obligated to report
During the winter storm/canning season overlap; immediately following the heavy storms
The combined effect of heavy storms and canning season loads brings the sanitary system to the point of imminent overflow, requiring a controlled release of wastewater into the local river. This condition meets the legal threshold for mandatory reporting to the state water pollution control authority.
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer A continues to advise Technician B without the knowledge of City Administrator C
Engineer A in deliberating whether to continue warning city officials and Technician B about the overflow risk
Governs Engineer A's obligations to hold public safety paramount, to escalate safety concerns beyond her immediate supervisor (City Administrator C), and to continue advising on the sanitary overflow risk despite employer prohibition and threat of termination.
its importance is evident by the fact that it is the very first obligation stated in the NSPE Code of Ethics
Engineer A had an ethical obligation under the Code to go considerably farther
Cited as the primary normative authority establishing the engineer's paramount obligation to hold public safety, health, and welfare above all other duties; specifically invoked to determine Engineer A's obligation to report water contamination to proper authorities and withdraw from the project
NSPE / state engineering licensure boards
Non-Engineer Supervisor Authority Limitation Standard
Engineer A in assessing whether Administrator C's orders are ethically and professionally binding
Establishes the limits of City Administrator C's authority to override Engineer A's professional safety judgments, order her to suppress safety warnings, and reassign engineering responsibility to an unlicensed technician.
Non-Engineer Supervisor Authority Limitation Standard (NSPE Code-derived)
Applied to the finding that Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by City Administrator C, a non-engineer, in circumstances involving public safety — establishing this as an ethical violation
Administrator C might dismiss the concern without action
Engineer A might face political resistance to costly infrastructure improvements
Advise employer of consequences of overriding professional engineering judgment
Report known dangers to employer/supervisor
Professional honesty and transparency with employer
Prompt administrative action to address infrastructure deficiency before a public health crisis occurred
Engineering assessment of plant capacity
Professional communication of technical findings to non-engineer administrator
Risk analysis of seasonal overflow conditions
Early employment period, before the rainy/canning season
Engineer A formally notified City Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds to handle potential overflow during the rainy/canning season overlap, and offered possible solutions.
City council members might also fail to act, leaving the problem unresolved
Violation of chain-of-command norms could anger Administrator C
Attempt internal escalation when immediate supervisor fails to act on safety concern
Persist in reporting known public health dangers
Engineer's duty to escalate when supervisor disregards safety recommendations
Internal escalation before external reporting
Escalate the public safety concern to city officials with authority to override or pressure Administrator C into taking corrective action
Ability to communicate technical risk to non-engineer city officials
Professional judgment on severity of public health risk
Understanding of city governance structure
After Administrator C's initial dismissal, before C's first formal warning
Adherence to employer's chain-of-command directives (organizational loyalty)
Implicit duty to seek permission before bypassing supervisor
After Administrator C dismissed her concerns with 'we will face the problem when it comes,' Engineer A privately discussed the sanitary system problem with certain members of the city council without obtaining permission from City Administrator C.
Did Engineer A fulfill her ethical obligation by informing City Administrator C and certain members of the city council of her concerns?
Did Engineer A's passive acceptance of the reassignment of responsible charge to unlicensed Technician B constitute facilitation of unlicensed engineering practice, and did that acceptance itself represent a separate and independent ethical violation beyond the failure to report to the state authority?
At what precise point in the sequence of events — initial warning ignored, communications restricted, responsible charge removed, probation imposed, or imminent overflow crisis materialized — did Engineer A's ethical obligation to report externally to the state water pollution control authority become mandatory rather than merely permissible?
Does Engineer A's covert advisory role to Technician B, conducted without Administrator C's knowledge, satisfy any portion of her ethical obligation to protect public safety, or does it merely create an illusion of compliance while leaving the fundamental public danger unaddressed through proper regulatory channels?
Given that state law explicitly requires reporting the imminent overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, does Engineer A's failure to make that report expose her to legal liability independent of and in addition to her ethical violations under the NSPE Code, and should the Board have addressed the intersection of statutory duty and professional ethical duty more directly?
Does the Faithful Agent Obligation requiring Engineer A to act within the chain of command and follow Administrator C's directives directly conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle requiring her to report the imminent overflow to the state authority, and when the two are irreconcilable, which principle must yield and on what basis?
Does the Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting principle — which Engineer A arguably satisfied by warning Administrator C and privately contacting council members — conflict with the Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable principle, which would require immediate external reporting to the state authority regardless of whether internal channels have been exhausted?
Does the Covert Advisory Continuation as Partial Ethical Compliance principle — under which Engineer A continued advising Technician B secretly — conflict with the Engineering Authority Non-Circumvention Obligation, which would require Engineer A to formally resist or refuse the unlicensed responsible charge assignment rather than tacitly enabling it through covert workarounds?
Does the Whistleblowing Right vs. Obligation Distinction principle — which frames external reporting as a personal conscience choice — conflict with the Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation principle, which imposes a stricter affirmative duty on Engineer A precisely because she holds a public trust role as City Engineer, effectively converting what might be a discretionary right in private practice into a non-negotiable professional obligation?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill her categorical duty to protect public safety by limiting her escalation to City Administrator C and select council members, given that the NSPE Code imposes a paramount obligation to hold public safety above all other considerations, including employer loyalty?
From a consequentialist perspective, did Engineer A's decision to stop short of reporting the imminent overflow to the state water pollution control authority — despite knowing that uncontrolled waste discharge into the river was likely — produce the worst foreseeable outcome for public welfare, and does that outcome retroactively condemn her partial escalation as ethically insufficient?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer A demonstrate the professional integrity and moral courage expected of a licensed public engineer when she accepted removal from responsible charge, continued only covert advisory to Technician B, and declined to report the overflow crisis to the state water pollution control authority — or did her accommodation of Administrator C's suppression reflect a failure of the virtues of courage and professional accountability?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A violate a distinct and non-waivable duty by acquiescing to Administrator C's reassignment of responsible charge to unlicensed Technician B — thereby facilitating unlicensed practice of engineering over a public safety system — independent of and in addition to her failure to report to the state water pollution control authority?
Would the Board have found Engineer A's ethical obligations fulfilled if she had formally reported the sanitary system overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority at the moment Administrator C first dismissed her concerns with 'we will face the problem when it comes,' rather than continuing to seek resolution through internal city channels?
If Engineer A had formally resigned from her position as City Engineer rather than accepting the reduced role after Administrator C removed her from responsible charge over the sanitary system, would she have discharged her ethical obligations — or would resignation without concurrent reporting to the state water pollution control authority still have constituted an ethical failure given the imminent public danger?
Had Engineer A formally and openly — rather than covertly — continued to advise Technician B on the sanitary system overflow risk, and had she simultaneously documented her concerns in writing to both the city council and the state water pollution control authority, would that combined course of action have satisfied the Board's standard for fulfilling her ethical obligations even under threat of termination?
If the city council members whom Engineer A privately contacted had taken decisive corrective action — ordering remediation of the sanitary system's inadequate capacity before the canning and rainy seasons coincided — would Engineer A's internal escalation strategy have been retroactively validated as ethically sufficient, or does the Board's framework require external regulatory reporting regardless of whether internal escalation might have succeeded?
System status changes from 'assumed adequate' to 'identified as inadequate'; Engineer A now holds active knowledge of a public safety risk, triggering reporting obligations
Before rainy/canning season overlap; early in the case narrative
Engineer A discovers that the city's sanitary disposal system lacks sufficient capacity to handle the overlapping demands of the rainy season and canning season. This technical finding establishes the foundational public health and environmental risk that drives the entire case.
Sanitary System Inadequacy Identified (Event 1) → Notify Administrator of Inadequacy (Action 1)
Engineer A discovers that the city's sanitary disposal system lacks sufficient capacity, prompting her to formally notify City Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant
Sanitary System Inadequacy Identified (Event 1)
Without the discovery of inadequacy, no formal notification would have been triggered; without professional duty, Engineer A might have remained silent
Notify Administrator of Inadequacy (Action 1)
Engineer A's access to and authority to communicate with Administrator C
Engineer A's awareness of her professional duty to report safety hazards
Engineer A's professional discovery of system inadequacy
Combination of identified public health risk + professional engineering duty + formal reporting channel
State legislature / state environmental regulatory agency
State Water Pollution Control Reporting Statute
Water Pollution Reporting Obligation Standard
Engineer A and Technician B as the legal trigger for mandatory reporting of the overflow condition
Establishes the mandatory legal obligation to report the imminent wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, creating a legal duty that supersedes City Administrator C's order to remain silent.
State Water Pollution Control Authority Regulatory Body
{'license': 'N/A (governmental agency)', 'position': 'State regulatory authority', 'statutory_role': 'Mandatory notification recipient for water pollution events'}
State agency designated by law as the mandatory recipient of reports of wastewater overflow conditions into state waterways; the entity to whom Engineer A has a statutory obligation to report the imminent overflow crisis.
{'type': 'must_be_notified_by', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'oversees', 'target': 'State streams and rivers water quality'}
State Water Pollution Control Regulatory Authority
System oversight responsibility is now formally held by an unlicensed individual; the city is in violation of professional practice standards; a second layer of regulatory violation is now active alongside the capacity inadequacy
Concurrent with Engineer A's removal from the role
Unlicensed Technician B is formally assigned responsibility for managing the city's sanitary disposal system, a safety-critical system with a known inadequacy, despite lacking the professional licensure and qualifications required for such oversight. This creates a structural safety deficiency independent of the seasonal crisis.
Technician B Unlicensed Responsible Charge Assignee
{'license': 'None (non-licensed technician)', 'position': 'Technician', 'assigned_responsibility': "Responsible charge of sanitary system per Administrator C's memo"}
Non-licensed technician who previously reported to Engineer A, then formally assigned 'responsible charge' of the entire sanitary system by Administrator C to circumvent Engineer A; seeks clarification of the assignment; receives covert advisory guidance from Engineer A during the crisis.
{'type': 'formerly_reported_to', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'instructed_to_report_interference_by', 'target': 'City Administrator C'}
{'type': 'now_reports_to', 'target': 'City Administrator C'}
{'type': 'receives_covert_advice_from', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
Unlicensed Technician Assigned Engineering Responsible Charge
Technician B asks for a clarification and is again instructed via memo by City Administrator C that he, Technician B, is completely responsible and is to report any interference by a third party to City Administrator C
Technician B Unlicensed Responsible Charge Complicity Recognition
Cooperative Impaired Practice Complicity Recognition Capability
Technician B faced the need to recognize that accepting formal responsible charge of the entire sanitary system as an unlicensed technician constituted participation in an impermissible engineering practice arrangement, even though the assignment came from a legitimate administrative authority.
Applied when Technician B received the formal assignment of responsible charge from Administrator C and sought clarification before accepting the role.
Technician B sought clarification from Administrator C about the responsible charge assignment, suggesting some recognition of the unusual nature of the arrangement, though ultimately accepted the assignment.
Technician B placed in responsible charge before winter canning season storm crisis
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility... instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge of the sanitary system... That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur in the city.
Technician B placed in responsible charge
State engineering licensure law; NSPE Code of Ethics
Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Assignment Standard
Technician B asks for a clarification and is again instructed via memo by City Administrator C that he, Technician B, is completely responsible
Engineer A and Technician B in understanding the professional and legal implications of the reassignment
Governs the impermissibility of Administrator C's reassignment of responsible charge of the city sanitary system to Technician B, an unlicensed technician, and grounds Engineer A's continued covert advisory role as a professional obligation.
Whistleblower Protection Framework (NSPE BER interpretive standard)
the engineer who makes the decision to 'blow the whistle' will in many instances be faced with the loss of employment.
Invoked to acknowledge the professional and employment consequences engineers face when blowing the whistle on public safety violations, while affirming that the Code nonetheless obligates such action when public safety is at stake
canning season overlaps rainy/winter season
Part of the canning season coincides with the rainy season... That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur in the city.
Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.91
The public danger disclosure exception to confidentiality/communication restrictions is activated by the imminent overflow risk; Engineer A's obligation to report to the state authority was not barred by Administrator C's orders
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.92
The faithful agent obligation yielded to the public welfare paramount and statutory reporting obligations; Engineer A's escalation over Administrator C's objection was ethically required
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.93
The statutory duty to report to the state water pollution control authority supersedes the internal chain of command; the graduated internal escalation principle does not apply when a mandatory legal reporting duty is triggered
The statutory reporting obligation is non-deferrable by employer order; organizational authority cannot nullify a legal duty to report to regulatory authorities.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
The non-subordination principle required Engineer A to continue escalating despite Administrator C's deferral; the deferral did not constitute a professionally valid safety determination
Public welfare obligation is deemed the higher obligation when in conflict with employer loyalty or organizational hierarchy; the latter cannot override the former in matters of public safety endangerment.
Public welfare paramount overrides employer loyalty and faithful agent obligations when the employer's directive would suppress reporting of an imminent public health hazard; Engineer A's repeated escalation was ethically required
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
The prohibition on unlicensed responsible charge assignment is non-waivable by administrative fiat; Engineer A's ethical obligation was to challenge the assignment formally, not merely to continue covert advisory
The non-engineer administrator's organizational authority does not extend to overriding professional engineering safety determinations; the engineer's obligation to escalate persists regardless of non-engineer supervisor dismissal.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
Once internal authorities demonstrate a pattern of disregard, they cease to constitute 'proper authorities' for purposes of the public safety reporting obligation; the engineer must identify and report to external regulatory bodies.
The heightened public trust duty of a public employee engineer reinforces rather than competes with the general public safety obligation; it makes the external reporting obligation particularly clear and non-deferrable.
Internal escalation was attempted and failed; the graduated escalation principle was satisfied, activating the external reporting obligation; note that the statutory reporting duty may independently require external reporting regardless of internal escalation status
Non-engineer administrators cannot make final safety determinations on engineering matters; Engineer A was ethically required to escalate beyond Administrator C's authority
Covert advisory mitigates immediate risk but does not substitute for formal escalation; Engineer A's full ethical obligation required both the covert advisory and formal reporting to state authorities
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
The principle establishes that organizational pressure, however severe (including job loss), does not override the engineer's public safety obligations; Engineer A's resistance was ethically required
The collective professional interest in maintaining public trust and the individual ethical obligation to protect public safety together override the personal interest in employment security when public safety is genuinely at stake.
The withdrawal obligation is not satisfied by informal distancing; it requires affirmative action that includes both disengagement and reporting to proper authorities.
The dual-condition threshold balances the value of internal resolution against the imperative of external protection; once both conditions are met, the balance tips decisively toward mandatory external reporting.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.94
The engineer's professional authority on safety matters cannot be validly overridden by organizational hierarchy; the engineer's obligation to report the circumvention is independent of and in addition to the obligation to report the underlying safety concern.
Administrative deferral of a known engineering safety risk — particularly one that will predictably materialize during a foreseeable seasonal event — constitutes an impermissible subordination of public safety to administrative convenience
The pattern of disregard and the threshold of reasonable certainty of no-action combined with probable danger resolved the tension in favor of mandatory external escalation; continued inaction beyond this threshold constitutes accessory complicity.
heavy storms during canning season and winter season overlap
That winter during the canning season, particularly heavy storms occur in the city. It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will overflow the levees.
canning season and winter season overlap
Engineer A identified that inadequate sanitary system capacity during the rainy/canning season would cause wastewater overflow into the local river, threatening public health and water quality, and repeatedly escalated this concern despite
The potential overflow of wastewater ponds into the local river — carrying domestic waste and vegetable processing effluent — presented a direct threat to river water quality and the broader watershed, invoking Engineer A's environmental st
After internal escalation to Administrator C failed and city council escalation produced no action, Engineer A's unresolved public safety concern about sanitary system overflow required escalation to multiple authorities simultaneously — in
Engineer A proactively identified and communicated the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds before the canning/rainy season crisis materialized, offering possible solutions — demonstrating the professional obligation to disclo
As the sole licensed professional engineer in the city government with assigned responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, Engineer A bore a heightened dual obligation — as both a licensed engineer and a public trust holder — to pursue
Engineer A's verbal and private communications of the sanitary system overflow risk to Administrator C and city council members should have been supplemented with written documentation to create an unambiguous, actionable record — particula
Engineer A satisfied the graduated internal escalation obligation by first reporting to Administrator C, then escalating to city council members, before the situation reached the point of mandatory external reporting to the state water poll
Engineer A continued to escalate sanitary system safety concerns to city council members and continued covert advisory to Technician B despite Administrator C's explicit orders, probation, and termination threats — demonstrating that organi
Engineer A's faithful agent obligation to Administrator C required compliance with reasonable employer directives, but that obligation was bounded by the ethical limit that it could not require Engineer A to suppress mandatory safety report
Any confidentiality or internal communication restriction imposed by Administrator C on Engineer A's discussions of the sanitary system overflow risk did not bar Engineer A from advising the state water pollution control authority of the ap
State law mandated reporting of the wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority; Administrator C's orders and termination threats could not lawfully or ethically override this statutory reporting obligation,
After being removed from formal sanitary system responsibility, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly — without Administrator C's knowledge — representing a partial mitigation of public safety risk but an insufficient substit
Administrator C, a non-licensed municipal administrator, dismissed Engineer A's technically grounded warnings about sanitary system overflow risk with the statement 'we will face the problem when it comes' and suppressed further reporting —
Administrator C's response of 'we will face the problem when it comes' represented a deferral of safety action that subordinated public safety to administrative convenience and political inertia; Engineer A's obligation was to refuse this s
Administrator C formally assigned Technician B — a non-licensed technician — 'responsible charge' of the entire sanitary system via memo, removing the only licensed engineer (Engineer A) from the chain of command, in direct violation of the
Engineer A was obligated to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk to city council members despite Administrator C's explicit prohibition and termination threat, because the paramount duty to public safety superseded the employer's supp
Engineer A's statutory obligation to report wastewater overflow conditions to the state water pollution control authority could not be deferred or nullified by City Administrator C's orders or by the city council's failure to act; the statu
Engineer A, as the legally established city engineer and director of public works, permitted her professional engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by City Administrator C (a non-engineer) in matters involving public safety
City Administrator C, as a non-licensed non-engineer municipal administrator, lacked the professional authority to override Engineer A's safety determinations regarding sanitary system capacity and water supply contamination, and his dismis
The NSPE Board affirms that holding paramount public safety, health, and welfare is the most basic and first-stated obligation of the engineering profession, grounded in the public trust rationale for professional licensure, and that when t
The Board specifically emphasizes that Engineer A's status as a public servant — city engineer and director of public works — makes her public safety reporting obligation particularly clear and heightened, because her public employment role
The Board articulates the specific threshold at which Engineer A's obligation to report to state authorities was triggered: when she was reasonably certain that no action would be taken by City Administrator C or city council members, and w
Engineer A's reporting of water supply contamination concerns to City Administrator C and city council members did not constitute reporting to 'proper authorities' because both had demonstrated a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law; th
The Board distinguishes Case 82-5 (internal employer-employee dispute not directly involving public safety, where whistleblowing is a right of personal conscience) from the present case (direct public safety endangerment, where whistleblowi
The Board acknowledges that Engineer A, like engineers in Cases 65-12 and 82-5, would likely face employment consequences for reporting to state authorities against her supervisor's wishes, but holds that this foreseeable cost does not dimi
Engineer A's decision to 'assume no responsibility' for the plant and beds did not constitute adequate withdrawal from further service on the project as required by the Code; proper withdrawal requires affirmative disengagement and reportin
Engineer A's failure to escalate to state authorities after recognizing a pattern of disregard constituted a failure of professional accountability; by permitting her professional integrity to be compromised and allowing her engineering aut
Engineer A's continued inaction after recognizing a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by City Administrator C and city council members — despite repeated internal reports — made her ethically complicit as an 'accessory' to the contin
Engineer A, as a public servant in the role of city engineer and director of public works, bore a heightened obligation to report the water supply contamination risk to external state authorities — beyond what would be required of a private
After exhausting internal escalation channels — Administrator C dismissed the concern, city council members took no action, and Engineer A was removed from responsible charge and placed on probation — Engineer A was obligated to report the
Engineer A was obligated to fulfill her public safety obligations not only for the immediate benefit of the public but also to preserve the integrity and public trust upon which the engineering profession depends, recognizing that permittin
Engineer A continued to escalate sanitary system safety concerns to city council members and continued covert advisory to Technician B despite Administrator C's explicit orders, probation, and termination threats
wastewater overflow crisis recognition meets legal obligation to report to state water pollution control authority
It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will over flow the levees and dump all waste into the river. Under state law, this condition is required to be reported to the state water pollution control authority.
legal obligation to report to state water pollution control authority
Entity1 ends exactly when Entity2 begins
Competing Duties — Safety Obligation vs. Employer Loyalty
Throughout the period of Engineer A's awareness of the contamination and the city's inaction
ethics frequently involves a delicate balance between competing and, often times, conflicting obligations
Engineer A's simultaneous obligations to her employer (city administration) and to the paramount duty to protect public safety
Conflict between Engineer A's duty of loyalty to her employer and the paramount NSPE obligation to protect public health and safety
Engineer A Accessory Liability Through Inaction
From the point Engineer A's internal escalation failed through the period of continued inaction
Accessory Liability Through Inaction on Known Regulatory Violation State
Engineer A's continued presence in her role without external reporting
Engineer A's failure to report to state authorities despite awareness of ongoing legal violations and failed internal escalation
Engineer A Employment Pressure Abrogating Safety Obligation
From the point of failed internal escalation through Engineer A's decision to assume no responsibility for the plant and beds
Employment Pressure Abrogation of Safety Obligation State
Engineer A's professional conduct under pressure from City Administrator C and city council
Not terminated — Engineer A did not overcome the pressure to report externally
Engineer A's decision to assume no responsibility for the plant and beds constitutes a 'withdrawal from further service on the project'
Organizational pressure from City Administrator C and city council members causing Engineer A to defer external reporting
Engineer A Public Servant Heightened External Reporting Obligation
Throughout the period in which Engineer A held the public-servant role and was aware of the ongoing water supply contamination and legal violations
Public Servant Engineer Heightened External Reporting Obligation State
Engineer A in her role as city engineer and director of public works
Not terminated — Engineer A did not fulfill the heightened obligation by reporting to state authorities
Engineer A's dual status as a licensed PE and a public-servant city engineer/director of public works, combined with awareness of ongoing legal violations and failed internal escalation
Engineer A Unauthorized Council Escalation
From Engineer A's first unauthorized council discussion through formal probation and removal from responsibility
Engineer A's decision to privately discuss the sanitary system problem with city council members without Administrator C's permission
Formal removal from sanitary system responsibility and probation order
Engineer A's decision to privately bring the problem to city council members without Administrator C's permission
Environmental Stewardship Invoked for River Water Quality Protection
Domestic waste and vegetable processing effluent discharge
Potential wastewater overflow into local river
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
The potential overflow of wastewater ponds into the local river — carrying domestic waste and vegetable processing effluent — presented a direct threat to river water quality and the broader watershed, invoking Engineer A's environmental stewardship obligation to prevent engineering system failures from causing environmental harm
Environmental stewardship in this context requires Engineer A to treat the river as a protected resource and to take all available professional steps to prevent the sanitary system from discharging untreated waste into it
Engineer A City Engineer Sanitary System
Environmental Stewardship in Engineering Practice
Environmental stewardship reinforces the public welfare paramount obligation; both principles converge on the requirement to report and prevent the overflow
Imminent Environmental Discharge Mandatory State Notification — Water Supply
From the point Engineer A identified the contamination through the period of inaction
Imminent Environmental Discharge Requiring Mandatory State Notification State
The ongoing contamination of the public water supply requiring mandatory notification to the state water pollution control authority
Not terminated — mandatory notification was not made within the case facts
Identification of water supply contamination meeting the threshold for mandatory state reporting
Inadequate Sanitary System Capacity Warning Ignored by Administrator C
From Engineer A's initial notification to Administrator C through the onset of the winter storm emergency
Inadequate Infrastructure Capacity Warning Ignored State
City sanitary disposal system capacity relative to combined canning season and rainy season load
Onset of heavy winter storms making overflow imminent and obvious to all parties
Administrator C's explicit response that 'we will face the problem when it comes' following Engineer A's formal notification of inadequate capacity
Professional Accountability Applied to Engineer A Complicity Through Inaction
Engineer A's acquiescence to Administrator C's override
Engineer A's inaction after repeated internal escalation failures
Engineer A's failure to escalate to state authorities after recognizing a pattern of disregard constituted a failure of professional accountability; by permitting her professional integrity to be compromised and allowing her engineering authority to be circumvented, she became accountable for the continuing public safety violation.
Professional accountability requires engineers to take responsibility for the consequences of their inaction as well as their actions; failing to escalate when the escalation threshold is met is itself an accountable professional failure.
Professional accountability to the public and the profession overrides the organizational loyalty that led Engineer A to defer to Administrator C's directives.
Water Supply Contamination Public Safety Endangerment
From the point Engineer A identified the contamination risk through the period of inaction by city officials
General public served by the water supply
the case presently before the Board involves 'endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare' the contamination of the water supply
Public water supply served by the municipal system under Engineer A's jurisdiction
Not terminated within the case — the risk persists due to inaction
Engineer A's identification of water supply contamination constituting a danger to public health and safety
Whistleblowing Right vs. Obligation Distinction Applied to Engineer A
The Board distinguishes Case 82-5 (internal employer-employee dispute not directly involving public safety, where whistleblowing is a right of personal conscience) from the present case (direct public safety endangerment, where whistleblowing is a mandatory ethical obligation), establishing that the right-vs.-obligation distinction turns on whether public safety is directly at stake.
The principle is invoked to distinguish its scope: where public safety is NOT directly at stake, whistleblowing is a personal conscience right; where it IS directly at stake (as in Engineer A's case), it becomes a mandatory ethical obligation, not merely a right.
Whistleblowing as Personal Conscience Right Without Mandatory Duty Principle
The Board uses the whistleblowing-as-right principle to mark the boundary of its scope, clarifying that Engineer A's situation falls outside that boundary and into the mandatory-obligation category.
we found in Case 82-5 that the situation presented has become well known in recent years as 'whistleblowing' and if an engineer feels strongly that an employer's course of action is improper when it relates to public concerns, and if the engineer feels compelled to 'blow the whistle' to expose the facts as he sees them, he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment.
Written Documentation Requirement for Safety Notification Invoked for Engineer A Escalation
Private communications to city council members
Engineer A's verbal and private communications of the sanitary system overflow risk to Administrator C and city council members should have been supplemented with written documentation to create an unambiguous, actionable record — particularly given the pattern of dismissal and suppression by Administrator C
Written documentation of safety notifications is especially critical when the supervisor is actively suppressing verbal reports; written records protect the engineer's ability to demonstrate discharge of professional obligation and create pressure for institutional response
Written Documentation Requirement for Safety Notification
The written documentation obligation reinforces rather than conflicts with the escalation obligations; Engineer A's written notifications would have strengthened the case for institutional response
Engineer A Sanitary System Overflow Proactive Capacity Warning to Administrator C
Engineer A identified that the city's sanitary system lacked capacity to handle the combined load of industrial vegetable waste discharge during canning season and stormwater during the rainy season, and notified Administrator C with proposed solutions.
Engineer A (City Engineer/Director of Public Works)
Sanitary System Overflow Proactive Capacity Warning Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to proactively notify Administrator C of the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds to handle potential overflow during the rainy/canning season and to offer possible solutions.
During the course of employment, prior to the canning/rainy season crisis
Proper Authority Identification Obligation Applied to Engineer A State Reporting
Engineer A's escalation to City Administrator C
Engineer A's escalation to city council members
State water pollution control authority as proper reporting recipient
Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Obligation
Engineer A's reporting of water supply contamination concerns to City Administrator C and city council members did not constitute reporting to 'proper authorities' because both had demonstrated a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law; the proper authorities were the state water pollution control authority, which Engineer A as a licensed city engineer should have known.
In this context, 'proper authorities' means the external regulatory body with jurisdiction and enforcement capacity over wastewater violations — not the internal organizational hierarchy that has already demonstrated disregard for the law.
Proper Authority Identification Obligation in Public Safety Escalation
we do not believe that Engineer A's act of reporting her concerns to City Administrator C or certain members of the city council constituted a reporting to the 'proper authorities' as intended under the Code.
Administrator C Unlicensed Responsible Charge Assignment Prohibition Violation
Administrator C, a non-licensed municipal administrator, formally assigned Technician B — a non-licensed technician — complete responsible charge of the sanitary system, removing the licensed Engineer A from the chain of command.
Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Assignment Resistance Obligation
Administrator C violated the prohibition against assigning engineering responsible charge to an unlicensed technician by formally designating Technician B as having complete responsible charge of the entire sanitary system via letter and memo.
Upon issuance of the letter and subsequent memo assigning responsible charge to Technician B
City Administrator C Safety-Suppressing Supervisor
{'license': 'None (non-engineer)', 'position': 'City Administrator', 'authority': 'Direct supervisor of City Engineer; controls chain of command for public works'}
Non-engineer municipal administrator who is Engineer A's direct supervisor; dismisses reported sanitary system capacity warnings, orders Engineer A to restrict communications, reassigns engineering responsible charge to unlicensed Technician B, places Engineer A on probation, and threatens termination to suppress safety escalation.
{'type': 'reassigned_responsibility_to', 'target': 'Technician B'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'suppresses_reporting_of', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
Engineer A is directly responsible to City Administrator C
Engineer A is placed on probation and ordered not to discuss this matter further
Engineer A Covert Advisory to Technician B
From Engineer A's formal removal and probation order through the winter emergency
Covert Advisory Continuation Under Termination Threat State
Engineer A's ongoing covert technical guidance to Technician B after formal removal from sanitary system responsibility and under active termination threat
Engineer A's decision to continue advising Technician B without Administrator C's knowledge despite formal removal and termination threat
Engineer A Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise Sanitary System
The Board concluded its analysis by noting that Engineer A's failure to fulfill her public safety obligations did grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers, grounding the obligation in the collective professional interest as well as individual duty.
Engineering Profession Image Non-Compromise Through Ethics Compliance Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to fulfill her public safety obligations not only for the immediate benefit of the public but also to preserve the integrity and public trust upon which the engineering profession depends, recognizing that permitting her professional duties to be compromised to the point of endangering public safety caused grave damage to the image and interests of all engineers.
Throughout the period of inaction on the sanitary system safety concern
the premise upon which professional engineering exists the engineering registration process is founded upon the proposition that in order to protect the public health and safety, the state has an interest in regulating by law the practice of the profession.
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Institutional Safety Responsibility Sanitary System
Engineer A was the only licensed professional engineer in a position of responsibility in the city government, with specific assigned responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, making her the sole qualified professional capable of identifying and escalating the overflow risk.
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Institutional Safety Responsibility Obligation
As the sole licensed professional engineer in the city government with assigned institutional responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, Engineer A bore a heightened safety obligation requiring more aggressive escalation than would be required of a private engineer encountering the same risk incidentally.
Throughout the duration of Engineer A's employment as City Engineer/Director of Public Works
Engineer A Public Servant Heightened External Reporting City Engineer Role
The Board specifically emphasized that Engineer A's status as a public servant made her public safety obligation particularly clear, and found it not credible that a City Engineer/Director of Public Works for a medium-sized town would not be aware of the obligation to report to state authorities.
Public Servant Engineer Heightened External Reporting Obligation
Engineer A, as a public servant in the role of city engineer and director of public works, bore a heightened obligation to report the water supply contamination risk to external state authorities — beyond what would be required of a private engineer — because her institutional role, legal authority, and access to public safety information created a stronger and more clearly defined duty to escalate externally when internal channels failed.
Upon recognition that internal city authorities had demonstrated a pattern of disregard for the law
Engineer A Sanitary System Overflow Proactive Capacity Warning Canning Season
Engineer A identified that the sanitary system lacked adequate capacity to handle the combined load of food processing plant discharges during canning season and rainy season stormwater, and reported this to Administrator C — who dismissed the concern with 'we will face the problem when it comes.'
Engineer A was obligated to proactively identify and formally communicate to supervisory authorities the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds to handle the coincidence of canning season industrial discharge and rainy season stormwater, before the crisis materialized, and to persist in that communication despite Administrator C's resistance.
Engineer A proactively identified and communicated the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds before the canning/rainy season crisis materialized
Prior to the canning/rainy season when overflow risk was foreseeable
Administrator C's response of 'we will face the problem when it comes' represented a deferral of safety action
Engineer A Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Resistance Administrator C Assignment
Administrator C formally assigned Technician B 'responsible charge' of the entire sanitary system via memo, removing Engineer A from the chain of command. Engineer A did not adequately resist this assignment or escalate it to proper authorities.
Engineer A was obligated to resist Administrator C's formal assignment of responsible charge of the entire sanitary system to Technician B — a non-licensed technician — by escalating to appropriate authorities, recognizing that the formal assignment of engineering responsible charge to an unlicensed individual constituted an unlawful and ethically impermissible act endangering public safety.
Upon receipt of Administrator C's memo formally assigning responsible charge to Technician B
Engineer A Whistleblower Employment Jeopardy
Throughout the period in which Engineer A faced the decision whether to escalate to state authorities
Engineer A's employment situation as city engineer and director of public works
The recognized consequence that reporting to state authorities would likely result in loss of employment
Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A for Sanitary System Overflow
State water pollution control authority as mandatory reporting recipient
Unresolved sanitary system overflow risk after internal escalation failure
After internal escalation to Administrator C failed and city council escalation produced no action, Engineer A's unresolved public safety concern about sanitary system overflow required escalation to multiple authorities simultaneously — including the state water pollution control authority (mandated by law) and potentially the state engineering licensing board regarding the unlicensed responsible charge assignment
When internal escalation to Administrator C and city council produced no remedial action, Engineer A's obligation expanded to encompass simultaneous escalation to all authorities with jurisdiction — the state water pollution control authority for the overflow condition and the licensing board for the unlicensed responsible charge assignment
Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation for Unresolved Public Safety Threats
After exhausting internal channels without resolution, the multi-authority escalation obligation activated; the graduated internal escalation principle was satisfied by Engineer A's repeated internal reports, triggering the external escalation duty
Non-Engineer Safety Decision Authority Limitation Invoked Against Administrator C
Administrator C's dismissal of Engineer A's overflow warnings
Administrator C's suppression of escalation to city council and state authority
Administrator C, a non-licensed municipal administrator, dismissed Engineer A's technically grounded warnings about sanitary system overflow risk with the statement 'we will face the problem when it comes' and suppressed further reporting — exercising safety decision authority that properly belongs to licensed engineering judgment, not administrative convenience
A non-engineer administrator's decision to defer action on an engineer-identified safety risk does not constitute a professionally valid safety determination; Engineer A's obligation to escalate persisted despite Administrator C's dismissal
Non-Engineer Safety Decision Authority Limitation Principle
From Engineer A's initial identification of inadequate capacity through the winter storm emergency
Risk of raw domestic and vegetable waste overflow into the local river due to inadequate pond capacity during combined canning and rainy season
Not resolved within the case facts; escalates to imminent emergency during winter storms
It becomes obvious to those involved that if waste water from the ponds containing the domestic waste is not released to the local river, the ponds will overflow the levees and dump all waste into the river
Engineer A's technical assessment that the disposal plant and beds have inadequate capacity to handle combined canning and rainy season loads
Superior Authority Suppression of State Regulatory Reporting
Throughout the period of Engineer A's internal escalation attempts
Superior Authority Suppression of Regulatory Reporting Obligation State
City Administrator C's direction channeling Engineer A's reporting internally rather than to state water pollution control authority
City Administrator C's pattern of disregarding the law and redirecting Engineer A's concerns away from state authorities
Accessory Liability Through Inaction Applied to Engineer A Water Supply Case
Engineer A's failure to escalate to state water pollution control authority
Ongoing water supply contamination violation
Premature External Escalation Reputational Harm Avoidance Principle
Engineer A's continued inaction after recognizing a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by City Administrator C and city council members — despite repeated internal reports — made her ethically complicit as an 'accessory' to the continuing water supply contamination violation.
Once Engineer A had accumulated sufficient evidence of a pattern of disregard and could reasonably conclude that no internal action would be taken and that probable public danger existed, her continued inaction transitioned from passive non-escalation to active ethical complicity in the ongoing violation.
Accessory Liability Through Inaction After Pattern-of-Disregard Recognition
Engineer A was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate superior as well as members of the city council.
we would suggest that such reporting should have occurred at such time as Engineer A was reasonably certain that no action would be taken concerning her recommendations either by City Administrator C or the members of the city council and, that in her professional judgment, a probable danger to the public safety and health then existed.
Engineer A Employer-Prohibited City Council Safety Escalation Permissibility
Administrator C ordered Engineer A not to discuss the sanitary system overflow risk with city council members under threat of termination. Engineer A nonetheless privately escalated to certain council members, which the Board found was appropriate — though ultimately insufficient because city officials were not the 'proper authorities.'
Employer-Prohibited City Council Safety Escalation Permissibility Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that Administrator C's order not to discuss the sanitary system safety matter with city council members — under threat of termination — was ethically impermissible, and that escalating the safety concern to elected city council members was not only permissible but obligatory.
Under the facts it appears that Engineer A has fulfilled this specific aspect of her obligation by reporting her concerns to City Administrator C and thereafter to certain members of the city council.
Upon Administrator C's order prohibiting communication with city council about the safety concern
However, under the facts of this case, we believe Engineer A had an ethical obligation under the Code to go considerably farther.
Internal-to-External Escalation Trigger Applied to Engineer A Reporting Timeline
Engineer A's internal escalation to City Administrator C and city council
Transition point to mandatory external reporting to state water pollution control authority
The Board articulates the specific threshold at which Engineer A's obligation to report to state authorities was triggered: when she was reasonably certain that no action would be taken by City Administrator C or city council members, and when in her professional judgment a probable danger to public safety and health existed — both conditions being necessary.
The dual-condition threshold (reasonable certainty of no internal action + probable danger in professional judgment) defines the precise moment at which continued internal advocacy becomes ethically insufficient and external reporting becomes mandatory.
Internal-to-External Escalation Trigger Upon Demonstrated Pattern of Disregard
After several attempts to modify the views of her superiors, it is our view that Engineer A knew or should have known that the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials
It is difficult for us to say exactly at what point Engineer A should have reported her concerns to the 'appropriate authorities.' However, we would suggest that such reporting should have occurred at such time as Engineer A was reasonably certain that no action would be taken concerning her recommendations either by City Administrator C or the members of the city council and, that in her professional judgment, a probable danger to the public safety and health then existed.
Project Withdrawal Obligation Applied to Engineer A Sanitary System Disengagement
Engineer A's informal disengagement from sanitary system responsibility
Engineer A's decision to 'assume no responsibility' for the plant and beds did not constitute adequate withdrawal from further service on the project as required by the Code; proper withdrawal requires affirmative disengagement and reporting, not merely informal assumption of non-responsibility.
In this context, withdrawal from further service requires affirmative, formal disengagement accompanied by reporting to proper authorities — informal assumption of non-responsibility does not satisfy the ethical withdrawal obligation.
Project Withdrawal as Ethical Recourse When Safety Standards Rejected
the Code only requires that the engineer withdraw from a project and report to proper authorities when the circumstances involve endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare.
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Obligation Applied to Engineer A
Engineer A's obligation to report to state water pollution control authority
Engineer A's role as city engineer and director of public works
Employer Policy Compliance Obligation in Concurrent Private Practice
The Board specifically emphasizes that Engineer A's status as a public servant — city engineer and director of public works — makes her public safety reporting obligation particularly clear and heightened, because her public employment role creates both a professional engineering duty and a public trust duty that reinforce each other.
A licensed engineer in a formal public agency role with legal designation bears a heightened obligation to pursue public safety concerns through all available channels, including external regulatory authorities, beyond what might be expected of a private consulting engineer.
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation
City Administrator C Non-Engineer Override of Engineer A's Authority
Throughout the period in which City Administrator C directed the course of action regarding the water supply contamination, overriding Engineer A's professional recommendations
Non-Engineer Authority Directing Engineering Safety Decision State
City Administrator C's exercise of authority over engineering safety matters within Engineer A's domain
It is clear that Engineer A had an ethical obligation to report this occurrence to the 'proper authorities'
City Administrator C's rejection of Engineer A's safety recommendations and circumvention of her engineering authority
Engineer A Employment Pressure and Termination Threat
From Administrator C's first warning that Engineer A's job is in danger through the winter emergency
Engineer A's employment security versus professional obligation to escalate sanitary system safety concerns
Onset of imminent overflow emergency requiring mandatory regulatory notification
Administrator C's explicit warning that Engineer A's job is in danger if she continues to discuss the problem with city officials
Engineer A Internal Escalation Exhausted — City Officials Complicit
After Engineer A reported to City Administrator C and certain city council members without corrective action being taken
State water pollution control authority (not yet notified)
Engineer A's internal reporting pathway within the city government
Not terminated — Engineer A did not proceed to external escalation
After several attempts to modify the views of her superiors
City Administrator C and city council members failed to act on Engineer A's repeated safety concerns
Engineering Authority Non-Circumvention Obligation Applied to Engineer A
Assignment of responsible charge to Technician B
City Administrator C's override of Engineer A's professional safety determinations
Engineer A, as the legally established city engineer and director of public works, permitted her professional engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by City Administrator C (a non-engineer) in matters involving public safety, constituting an independent ethical violation requiring reporting to proper authorities.
The circumvention of a licensed engineer's professional authority by a non-engineer supervisor on safety-critical matters is itself an ethical violation that must be reported to proper authorities, independent of the underlying safety concern.
Engineering Authority Non-Circumvention by Non-Engineer Supervisors in Public Safety Matters
Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Satisfied by Engineer A
Pending escalation to state water pollution control authority
Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable by Employer Order
Engineer A satisfied the graduated internal escalation obligation by first reporting to Administrator C, then escalating to city council members, before the situation reached the point of mandatory external reporting to the state water pollution control authority — demonstrating that internal channels were exhausted before external escalation was triggered
Engineer A's sequential internal escalation — from direct supervisor to elected officials — satisfied the graduated internal escalation requirement, and the failure of both internal channels to produce remedial action triggered the external reporting obligation to the state authority
Imminent Waste Discharge Mandatory State Reporting Obligation Activated
From the point at which it becomes obvious that overflow is imminent during the heavy winter storms
The imminent overflow of waste ponds into the local river during the winter storm, triggering mandatory statutory reporting to the state water pollution control authority
Notification to state water pollution control authority, or actual discharge event
Heavy winter storms making it obvious that waste ponds will overflow levees and dump all waste into the river unless controlled release occurs
Internal Escalation Exhausted — Sanitary System Safety
From Administrator C's second warning and probation order through the winter emergency
Engineer A's exhaustion of all available internal escalation channels — direct supervisor, city council members — without achieving corrective action on the sanitary system capacity deficiency
Onset of imminent overflow emergency requiring mandatory external regulatory notification
Administrator C's formal probation order prohibiting further discussion, after Engineer A had already escalated to both Administrator C and city council members
Non-Engineer Administrator Directing Engineering Safety System
From the administrative reorganization letter through the winter emergency
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command
Administrator C exercising direct command authority over the city sanitary system — a safety-critical engineering system — without engineering credentials, bypassing the licensed PE
Technician B is completely responsible and is to report any interference by a third party to City Administrator C
Administrator C's directive placing Technician B directly under his command for the sanitary system, removing Engineer A from the engineering chain of command
Non-Engineer Safety Decision Authority Limitation Applied to Administrator C Override
City Administrator C's dismissal of Engineer A's safety warnings
City Administrator C, as a non-licensed non-engineer municipal administrator, lacked the professional authority to override Engineer A's safety determinations regarding sanitary system capacity and water supply contamination, and his dismissal of Engineer A's concerns did not discharge Engineer A's professional obligation to escalate.
Non-engineer supervisors cannot make final determinations on safety-critical engineering matters; their failure to act on engineer-identified safety concerns does not discharge the engineer's professional obligation and requires the engineer to escalate beyond non-engineer management.
Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer under circumstances involving the public safety.
Proactive Risk Disclosure Invoked by Engineer A for Overflow Warning
Proposed solutions for overflow prevention
Sanitary system capacity inadequacy warning to Administrator C
Engineer A proactively identified and communicated the inadequate capacity of the disposal plant and beds before the canning/rainy season crisis materialized, offering possible solutions — demonstrating the professional obligation to disclose identified risks before harm occurs rather than waiting for the crisis
Proactive risk disclosure required Engineer A to communicate the overflow risk with sufficient specificity and urgency to enable remedial action, and to persist in that communication when initial reports were dismissed
Proactive risk disclosure obligation was not discharged by a single internal report; Engineer A's repeated escalation to multiple authorities reflected proper fulfillment of the proactive disclosure duty
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation Invoked by Engineer A as City Engineer
City Engineer/Director of Public Works role
Sanitary system disposal plant and beds responsibility
As the sole licensed professional engineer in the city government with assigned responsibility for the disposal plant and beds, Engineer A bore a heightened dual obligation — as both a licensed engineer and a public trust holder — to pursue sanitary system safety concerns through all available channels, including direct escalation to city council and ultimately to state regulatory authorities
Engineer A's public employment role amplifies the standard engineering public safety obligation: as the only licensed PE in city government, her failure to escalate would leave the public with no professional advocate within the institution
The heightened public safety obligation of a public employee engineer overrides deference to the internal chain of command when the chain of command is actively suppressing safety reporting
Administrator C Suppression of Regulatory Reporting
From Administrator C's first directive through the winter emergency
Administrator C's directives channeling all sanitary system communications through himself and prohibiting Engineer A from reporting to external authorities
Imminent overflow emergency activating mandatory statutory reporting obligation
Administrator C's order restricting Engineer A's communications and threatening termination for disobedience
Engineer A Non-Engineer Supervisor Override Engineering Authority Preservation Administrator C
Administrator C, a non-licensed non-engineer municipal administrator, formally removed Engineer A from responsible charge of the sanitary system, assigned Technician B, and ordered Engineer A not to discuss the matter with city council — all of which Engineer A permitted without adequate resistance or escalation to proper authorities.
Non-Engineer Supervisor Safety Override Engineering Authority Preservation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to resist Administrator C's circumvention and overruling of her engineering authority over the sanitary system safety matter, rather than permitting a non-engineer administrator to override her professional safety determinations under circumstances involving public safety.
Upon Administrator C's formal removal of Engineer A from responsible charge and subsequent orders suppressing safety communication
Engineer A Public Safety Mandatory Obligation vs Personal Conscience Right Water Contamination
The Board distinguished this case from Case 82-5 (internal dispute, whistleblowing = right) and Case 65-12 (unsafe machinery, refusal = justified), finding that water supply contamination constitutes direct public safety endangerment triggering mandatory reporting obligation rather than discretionary right.
Public Safety Endangerment Whistleblowing Mandatory Obligation Non-Equivalence to Personal Conscience Right Obligation
Engineer A bore a mandatory ethical obligation — not merely a personal conscience right — to report the water supply contamination risk to proper authorities and withdraw from the project, because the situation directly involved endangerment of public safety, health, and welfare, distinguishing it from the Case 82-5 scenario which was an internal employer-employee dispute not directly involving public safety.
where an engineer determines that a case may involve a danger to the public safety, the engineer has not merely an 'ethical right' but has an 'ethical obligation' to report the matter to the proper authorities and withdraw from further service on the project.
Upon determination that the sanitary system overflow posed a probable danger to public safety and health
Clearly, the case presently before the Board involves 'endangerment to the public safety, health and welfare' the contamination of the water supply and therefore it is clear that Engineer A has an obligation to report the matter to her employer.
Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable Applied to Wastewater Overflow
City Administrator C's orders suppressing external reporting
Engineer A's statutory obligation to report wastewater overflow conditions to the state water pollution control authority could not be deferred or nullified by City Administrator C's orders or by the city council's failure to act; the statutory duty ran independently of the internal organizational chain of command.
The mandatory statutory reporting obligation to the state water pollution control authority superseded Administrator C's organizational authority and the city council's political inaction; Engineer A's compliance with internal orders did not discharge the statutory duty.
Administrator-Ordered Responsible Charge Transfer to Technician B
From Administrator C's letter to Technician B through the winter emergency
City Administrator C removes Engineer A from responsibility of the entire sanitary system and the chain of command by a letter instructing Technician B that he is to take responsible charge of the sanitary system and report directly to City Administrator C
Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Delegation by Administrative Order State
Formal administrative reassignment of responsible charge over the city sanitary system from licensed PE Engineer A to unlicensed Technician B
Not resolved within the case facts; persists through the emergency
Administrator C's written letter instructing Technician B to take responsible charge of the sanitary system and report directly to Administrator C, bypassing Engineer A
Employment Loss Acceptance Obligation Applied to Engineer A Whistleblowing Decision
Engineer A's decision whether to report to state water pollution control authority
Engineering profession's collective integrity
At-Will Employment Symmetry and Engineer Mobility Right
The Board acknowledges that Engineer A, like engineers in Cases 65-12 and 82-5, would likely face employment consequences for reporting to state authorities against her supervisor's wishes, but holds that this foreseeable cost does not diminish the ethical obligation, and that permitting professional obligations to be compromised by fear of employment loss causes grave damage to the engineering profession.
The employment loss risk is acknowledged as real and sobering, but is explicitly held insufficient to excuse non-compliance with the public safety reporting obligation; the collective professional harm from individual capitulation to employment pressure outweighs the individual cost of compliance.
Employment Loss Acceptance as Cost of Public Safety Whistleblowing
Engineer A Mandatory Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting to State Authority
During the canning/rainy season, it became obvious that wastewater ponds would overflow levees and dump waste into the local river; state law mandated reporting this condition to the state water pollution control authority.
Mandatory Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting Obligation
Engineer A was obligated under state law and professional ethics to report the imminent wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, notwithstanding Administrator C's orders to the contrary.
Upon it becoming obvious that overflow was imminent during the heavy storms of the canning season
Engineer A Water Supply Contamination Reporting Public Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'title': 'City Engineer and Director of Public Works', 'sector': 'Public/Municipal', 'gender': 'Female (she/her)'}
City Engineer and Director of Public Works who identified water supply contamination risk, reported internally to City Administrator C and city council members, but failed to escalate to state water pollution control authorities, allowing the violation to continue and rendering her an accessory to the ongoing legal violation.
{'type': 'obligated_to_report_to', 'target': 'State Water Pollution Control Authority'}
{'type': 'protects', 'target': 'Water Supply Public Stakeholder'}
{'type': 'reports_to_internally', 'target': 'City Council Members'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'City Administrator C'}
City Engineer Public Welfare Escalation Obligated Engineer
Engineer A has an obligation to report the matter to her employer
Engineer A allowed her engineering authority to be circumvented and overruled by a non-engineer
Engineer A's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and appeared to make Engineer A an 'accessory'
the engineer involved is a public servant (city engineer and director of public works)
Engineer A Covert Advisory Continuation Technician B Sanitary System
After being removed from formal sanitary system responsibility, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly without Administrator C's knowledge. The Board acknowledged this as a partial measure but found it insufficient to discharge Engineer A's full public safety obligations.
Covert Advisory Continuation Safety Preservation Obligation
Engineer A's covert advisory to Technician B after being formally removed from responsible charge constituted a partial ethical compliance measure to preserve public safety, but was insufficient as a substitute for the full obligations of external reporting and genuine project withdrawal.
Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly — without Administrator C's knowledge
After Administrator C's formal removal of Engineer A from responsible charge and assignment of Technician B
It is clear under the facts of this case that Engineer A was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate superior as well as members of the city council.
Engineer A Employment Loss Acceptance Public Safety Whistleblowing Sanitary System
Administrator C threatened Engineer A with termination if she escalated the sanitary system safety concern to city council members. The Board acknowledged this employment risk but affirmed that the mandatory public safety obligation required Engineer A to report to state authorities regardless of the employment consequence.
Employment Loss Acceptance as Mandatory Cost of Public Safety Whistleblowing Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to accept the potential loss of employment as the cost of fulfilling her mandatory public safety reporting obligation to state authorities, recognizing that the NSPE Code's requirement to report to proper authorities when public safety is endangered cannot be conditioned on employment security.
Upon recognition that reporting to state authorities was required and that such reporting would likely result in employment loss
Engineer A Genuine Project Withdrawal Non-Substitution Sanitary System
After Administrator C removed Engineer A from formal responsibility for the sanitary system and assigned Technician B, Engineer A declared she assumed no responsibility for the plant and beds — which the Board found insufficient as a withdrawal from further service.
Genuine Project Withdrawal Non-Substitution by Responsibility Disclaimer Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to genuinely withdraw from further service on the sanitary system project rather than merely declaring she assumed no responsibility for the plant and beds, because the latter did not constitute the withdrawal required by the NSPE Code when public safety was endangered.
Upon recognition that internal authorities would not act on safety concerns and that public safety was endangered
Engineer A Non-Subordination Safety Reporting Political Budgetary Deferral
Administrator C responded to Engineer A's overflow warnings with a deferral strategy rather than corrective action, effectively treating the safety concern as a future administrative problem rather than an immediate engineering obligation.
Non-Subordination of Safety Reporting to Political Bargaining Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to accept Administrator C's 'we will face the problem when it comes' deferral as a legitimate resolution of the sanitary system overflow risk, recognizing that deferring safety action to a future crisis moment subordinates public safety to administrative convenience.
Upon Administrator C's response of 'we will face the problem when it comes'
Engineer A Unlicensed Technician Responsible Charge Assignment Resistance
Administrator C removed Engineer A from the chain of command via letter and then memo, formally assigning Technician B — a non-licensed technician — complete responsible charge of the sanitary system.
Engineer A was obligated to resist and escalate Administrator C's formal assignment of engineering responsible charge of the entire sanitary system to Technician B, an unlicensed technician, as this constituted an unlawful and ethically impermissible act.
Upon receipt of Administrator C's letter and subsequent memo assigning responsible charge to Technician B
Non-Subordination of Public Safety Obligation to Political or Budgetary Bargaining Invoked Against Administrator C Deferral
Administrator C's deferral of sanitary system remediation
Administrator C's suppression of Engineer A's escalation
Administrator C's response of 'we will face the problem when it comes' represented a deferral of safety action that subordinated public safety to administrative convenience and political inertia; Engineer A's obligation was to refuse this subordination and insist on proactive remediation
Non-Subordination of Public Safety Obligation to Political or Budgetary Bargaining
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked as Highest Engineering Obligation
Water supply contamination reporting obligation
The NSPE Board affirms that holding paramount public safety, health, and welfare is the most basic and first-stated obligation of the engineering profession, grounded in the public trust rationale for professional licensure, and that when this obligation conflicts with employer loyalty or organizational hierarchy, public welfare must prevail.
In this context, public welfare paramount requires Engineer A to report water supply contamination to state authorities even against employer directives, because the contamination of a public water supply constitutes direct endangerment of public health and welfare.
where the conflict is between one important obligation or loyalty and the protection of the public, for the engineer the latter must be viewed as the higher obligation.
Engineer A Confidentiality Scope Limitation Wastewater Overflow State Authority
Administrator C ordered Engineer A to discuss the problem only with him, effectively imposing an internal communication restriction; this restriction could not lawfully or ethically bar Engineer A from reporting to the state water pollution control authority as required by state law.
Confidentiality Scope Limitation for Public Danger Disclosure Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that Administrator C's internal communication restriction did not constitute a legitimate confidentiality obligation barring disclosure of the wastewater overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority, because the paramount duty to protect public welfare from environmental contamination superseded any internal communication restriction.
From the date of Administrator C's communication restriction order through the overflow crisis
Under state law, this condition is required to be reported to the state water pollution control authority.
Engineer A Covert Advisory Continuation to Technician B
After being placed on probation and removed from sanitary system responsibility, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B without Administrator C's knowledge, while Technician B managed the system under formal responsible charge assignment.
Engineer A was ethically justified and partially obligated to continue advising Technician B covertly on sanitary system management after being formally removed from responsible charge, as a partial compliance measure to preserve public safety in the absence of any other available mechanism.
From the date of formal removal from responsible charge through the canning/rainy season crisis
Engineer A Employer-Prohibited City Council Safety Escalation
Administrator C ordered Engineer A to discuss the problem only with him and warned her job was in danger if she disobeyed; Engineer A nonetheless privately brought the problem to city council members and other city officials.
Engineer A was obligated to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk to city council members despite Administrator C's explicit prohibition and termination threat, because the paramount duty to public safety superseded the employer's suppression directive.
After Administrator C's prohibition order and before the canning/rainy season crisis
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked by Engineer A Sanitary System Overflow
Potential wastewater overflow into local river during canning/rainy season
Engineer A identified that inadequate sanitary system capacity during the rainy/canning season would cause wastewater overflow into the local river, threatening public health and water quality, and repeatedly escalated this concern despite organizational suppression
In this context, public welfare paramount requires Engineer A to report the overflow risk to all available authorities — including city council members and ultimately the state water pollution control authority — even against explicit employer orders and termination threats, because the public's access to uncontaminated water is a non-negotiable welfare interest
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Invoked for State Authority Reporting
Administrator C's orders restricting Engineer A's communications
State water pollution control authority reporting obligation
Any confidentiality or internal communication restriction imposed by Administrator C on Engineer A's discussions of the sanitary system overflow risk did not bar Engineer A from advising the state water pollution control authority of the apparent danger to public water quality, because such disclosure serves the public welfare purpose of the ethics code
Internal employer confidentiality or communication restrictions cannot operate to suppress disclosure of public danger to regulatory authorities; the public danger disclosure exception applies to override Administrator C's suppression orders
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure
Engineer A Employment Pressure Non-Subordination Sanitary System Safety
Administrator C warned Engineer A that her job was in danger if she continued to escalate the sanitary system overflow concern; Engineer A was subsequently placed on probation and ordered not to discuss the matter further under threat of termination.
Employment Pressure Non-Subordination of Public Safety Determination Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to subordinate her professional safety determination regarding sanitary system overflow risk to Administrator C's employment threats, probation order, and termination warnings.
Throughout the period of Administrator C's escalating employment threats
Engineer A Graduated Internal Escalation Sanitary System Overflow
Engineer A first reported to Administrator C, then escalated privately to city council members when Administrator C dismissed the concern, satisfying the graduated internal escalation requirement before the statutory external reporting obligation was triggered.
Graduated Internal Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to pursue graduated internal escalation of the sanitary system overflow risk — first to Administrator C, then to city council members — before or in conjunction with external escalation to the state water pollution control authority.
From initial identification of capacity inadequacy through the canning/rainy season crisis
Engineer A Pattern-of-Disregard State Authority Escalation Sanitary Overflow
Engineer A reported to Administrator C and privately to city council members, but neither took action. The Board found that after recognizing this pattern of disregard, Engineer A should have escalated to the state water pollution control authority — the proper external authority — rather than continuing to rely on internal channels.
Pattern-of-Disregard-Triggered State Authority Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to escalate the sanitary system overflow risk to the state water pollution control authority once she recognized a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by Administrator C and city council members, because at that point internal officials no longer constituted 'proper authorities' under the NSPE Code.
At such time as Engineer A was reasonably certain that no action would be taken by Administrator C or city council members and that a probable danger to public safety existed
Engineer Pressure Resistance Invoked by Engineer A Against Administrator C Termination Threat
Engineer A continued to escalate sanitary system safety concerns to city council members and continued covert advisory to Technician B despite Administrator C's explicit orders, probation, and termination threats — demonstrating that organizational pressure does not extinguish professional ethical obligation
Termination threats and probationary orders from a non-engineer supervisor do not constitute ethical justification for suppressing mandatory safety reporting; Engineer A's continued escalation reflects proper resistance to organizational pressure
Engineer Pressure Resistance and Ethical Non-Subordination to Organizational Demands
Unlicensed Responsible Charge Assignment Prohibition Violated by Administrator C
Formal assignment of sanitary system responsible charge to Technician B
Removal of Engineer A from sanitary system chain of command
Administrator C formally assigned Technician B — a non-licensed technician — 'responsible charge' of the entire sanitary system via memo, removing the only licensed engineer (Engineer A) from the chain of command, in direct violation of the principle that responsible charge can only be held by a licensed professional engineer
Administrator C's administrative memo cannot legally or ethically transfer engineering responsible charge to an unlicensed technician; the assignment is void as a matter of professional ethics and public protection, and Engineer A retained an obligation to challenge it
Unlicensed Responsible Charge Assignment Prohibition
Engineer A Mandatory Statutory Wastewater Overflow Reporting State Authority
State law mandated reporting of wastewater overflow conditions to the state water pollution control authority. Administrator C ordered Engineer A not to report and threatened termination. The Board found Engineer A had a mandatory statutory obligation to report that could not be overridden by Administrator C.
Engineer A was obligated under state law to report the wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority, regardless of Administrator C's orders to the contrary, because the statutory reporting obligation could not be deferred or suppressed by a non-engineer municipal administrator's directive.
Upon awareness that a wastewater overflow condition existed or was imminent
Engineer A Post-Internal-Exhaustion External Reporting State Water Authority
Internal escalation to Administrator C and city council members produced no corrective action; the overflow became imminent during the canning/rainy season, triggering both the statutory and ethical external reporting obligation.
Post-Internal-Exhaustion Conditional External Reporting Obligation
After exhausting internal escalation channels — Administrator C dismissed the concern, city council members took no action, and Engineer A was removed from responsible charge and placed on probation — Engineer A was obligated to report the imminent overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority.
Upon exhaustion of internal escalation mechanisms and imminence of overflow condition
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Tension with Administrator C Orders
Administrator C's orders to restrict communication
Administrator C's removal of Engineer A from sanitary system responsibility
Engineer A's faithful agent obligation to Administrator C required compliance with reasonable employer directives, but that obligation was bounded by the ethical limit that it could not require Engineer A to suppress mandatory safety reporting or accept an unlicensed responsible charge assignment — at which point the faithful agent duty yielded to the public welfare obligation
The faithful agent obligation is conditional on the employer's directives remaining within ethical bounds; Administrator C's orders crossed that boundary by suppressing mandatory statutory reporting and assigning unlicensed responsible charge
Covert Advisory Continuation as Partial Ethical Compliance Invoked by Engineer A
Covert advisory to Technician B after removal from sanitary system responsibility
After being removed from formal sanitary system responsibility, Engineer A continued to advise Technician B covertly — without Administrator C's knowledge — representing a partial mitigation of public safety risk but an insufficient substitute for formal escalation to the state water pollution control authority and the licensing board regarding the unlicensed responsible charge assignment
Engineer A's covert advisory represents a good-faith effort to maintain some professional oversight of a safety-critical system, but does not discharge the formal obligations to report the unlicensed assignment and the overflow risk to appropriate authorities
Covert Advisory Continuation as Partial Ethical Compliance Principle
Mandatory Statutory Reporting Obligation Non-Deferrable by Employer Order Invoked for Wastewater Overflow
State-law mandatory reporting of wastewater overflow to state water pollution control authority
State law mandated reporting of the wastewater overflow condition to the state water pollution control authority; Administrator C's orders and termination threats could not lawfully or ethically override this statutory reporting obligation, and Engineer A was required to report to the state authority regardless of internal organizational directives
The statutory reporting obligation is externally imposed by state law and runs directly to the regulatory authority; it cannot be nullified by an employer's internal chain-of-command directive or employment threat
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (PE)', 'position': 'City Engineer / Director of Public Works', 'status': 'Sole licensed PE in city government', 'employment_status': 'On probation, threatened with termination', 'formal_responsibility': 'Removed from sanitary system responsibility by Administrator C'}
Licensed City Engineer/Director of Public Works who identifies inadequate sanitary system capacity, escalates internally to Administrator C and privately to city council members, is stripped of sanitary system responsibility and placed on probation, but continues covertly advising Technician B; faces imminent statutory obligation to report overflow conditions to state water pollution control authority.
{'type': 'escalated_to', 'target': 'City Council Members'}
{'type': 'must_notify', 'target': 'State Water Pollution Control Authority'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'City Administrator C'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Technician B'}
Municipal Environmental Compliance Engineer
Engineer A is employed as the City Engineer/Director of Public Works
Engineer A Competing Loyalty Public Safety Primacy Administrator C Faithful Agent Tension
Engineer A faced a conflict between her faithful agent duty to comply with Administrator C's directives (including not discussing the matter with city council) and her paramount obligation to protect public safety by reporting the water contamination risk to proper authorities. The Board affirmed that public safety must prevail.
Competing Loyalty Public Safety Primacy Resolution Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to resolve the conflict between her faithful agent duty to Administrator C and her public safety obligation in favor of public safety as the higher obligation, recognizing that where the conflict is between an important loyalty and the protection of the public, the latter must be viewed as the higher obligation for engineers.
Throughout the period of conflict between Administrator C's directives and Engineer A's public safety obligations
the engineer's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of his professional duties, is probably among the most basic.