Anticipatory Escalation Obligation If Formal Presentations Fail
From completion of formal presentations through any further escalation actions required by persistent MWC non-compliance
However, in the event that these formal presentations fail to sway the MWC to change its plans, given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety, Engineers A and B have an obligation to further pursue the matter.
Formal Escalation Obligation Pending Presentation Failure State
Engineers A and B's ongoing obligation to further pursue the matter if formal presentations to MWC and regulatory agency do not produce corrective action
MWC changing plans, engineers completing further escalation, or safety risk being resolved
As Engineers A and B are required to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public, and as this duty is a fundamental canon of the NSPE Code of Ethics, the consent of the MWC is not required.
Formal presentations failing to sway MWC to change its plans, given the gravity of danger to public health and safety
NSPE Board of Ethical Review — Cases on Engineer Obligations When Client Overrules Safety Recommendations
Despite those recommendations, the MWC voted to proceed simultaneously with the accelerated evaluation and design of needed water treatment improvements and the change in water source
Ethical analysis of Engineer A and Engineer B's obligations
Analogical precedents from the NSPE BER addressing situations where engineers provided safety-based recommendations that were rejected by clients or public bodies, establishing patterns for engineer obligations regarding public notification, withdrawal, and continued participation
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 00-5
In a case that has been cited many times, BER Case No. 00-5 centered on the reopening of a dangerous, closed bridge by a nonengineer public works director.
The NSPE Board of Ethical Review stressed the importance of holding the public safety paramount.
Board of Ethical Review in grounding the public safety escalation obligation
Cited as a frequently referenced precedent involving a nonengineer public works director reopening a dangerous closed bridge; establishes the importance of holding public safety paramount when engineering judgment is overruled by non-engineers
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 19-10
in BER Case No. 19-10 Engineer A was hired by Client B to provide a building investigation after a fire.
Engineer A had an obligation to continue to pursue a resolution of the matter by working with Client B and in contacting in writing the supervisor of the county official, the fire marshal, or any other agency with jurisdiction, advising them of the structural deficiencies.
Board of Ethical Review in establishing the obligation to formally notify authorities of structural deficiencies
Cited as a recent precedent in which an engineer investigating a fire-damaged building found structural instability and was obligated to pursue resolution by contacting supervisors, the fire marshal, or other agencies with jurisdiction; establishes the duty to escalate safety concerns formally and in writing
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 89-7
In BER Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was retained to investigate the structural components of an apartment building.
it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities
we believe Engineer A could have taken other steps to address the situation, not the least of which was his paramount professional obligation to notify the appropriate authority if his professional judgment is overruled under circumstances where the safety of the public is endangered.
Board of Ethical Review in establishing that confidentiality does not override the duty to report safety violations
Cited as precedent establishing that an engineer's duty to report safety violations to appropriate public authorities supersedes confidentiality agreements with clients; directly supports the conclusion that Engineers A and B must report safety concerns regardless of client consent
BER Precedent Application Constraint Engineers A and B MWC Case
The Board grounded its analysis in three BER precedents establishing the duty to hold public safety paramount and to report safety concerns to appropriate authorities, applying these as binding precedential constraints on Engineers A and B's professional conduct.
Engineers A and B were constrained by the well-established BER precedent framework — including BER Cases 00-5, 19-10, and 89-7 — to recognize and apply the established duty to report safety concerns to appropriate authorities, prohibiting treatment of the MWC water source case as a novel situation without applicable precedent guidance.
BER Case No. 00-5; BER Case No. 19-10; BER Case No. 89-7; NSPE Code of Ethics
As stated in the previous cases, the need to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public is well established.
Throughout all professional decision-making related to the MWC water source change
The remaining referenced Code sections provide a step-by-step path forward in this case for Engineer A and Engineer B with Section II.1. in mind.
CausalLink_Formally Advise MWC of Project
CausalLink_Formally Notify State Regulato
CausalLink_Further Escalate If Formal Ste
CausalLink_Jointly Recommend Delaying Sou
CausalLink_MWC Votes to Override Engineer
CausalLink_Produce Treatment Needs Report
CausalLink_Retain Engineer B for Evaluati
Client Consent Non-Requirement for Public Safety Escalation Invoked Against MWC
Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority Individual
State Regulatory Agency Notification Authority
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
Engineers A and B do not need the MWC's consent to report their safety concerns to the state regulatory agency; the paramount duty to protect public health and welfare operates independently of the client relationship and cannot be withheld by the MWC's refusal to authorize escalation
The MWC's status as client/governing body does not give it authority to block engineers from fulfilling their paramount professional obligation to protect public safety; the engineers' duty to the public is independent of and superior to their duty of deference to the client
Engineer A Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer
Engineer B Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer
Client Consent Non-Requirement for Public Safety Escalation
as Engineers A and B are required to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public, and as this duty is a fundamental canon of the NSPE Code of Ethics, the consent of the MWC is not required.
The non-consent rule is categorical for public safety escalations; client authority over project decisions does not extend to blocking engineers' independent professional obligations to the public
In fulfillment of their ethical obligations under the Code, Engineers A and B should formally communicate their concerns to the MWC, including that they believe the project will not be successful.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineers A and B should formally communicate their concerns to the MWC, Engineer A's dual role as both MWC superintendent and chief engineer creates a structural tension that the Board did not address. As superintendent, Engineer A is an administrative employee whose institutional loyalty runs to the MWC as an organization. As chief engineer, Engineer A holds an independent professional license whose paramount obligation runs to public safety. When the MWC voted to override the engineers' recommendations, these two roles pulled in opposite directions: the administrative role counseled deference to the commission's democratic authority, while the professional role demanded persistent objection and escalation. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A should formally communicate concerns to the MWC implicitly resolves this tension in favor of the professional role, but the resolution is incomplete. Engineer A should be understood as acting in his capacity as a licensed professional engineer — not as a managerial subordinate — when escalating safety concerns, and that professional capacity is not extinguishable by the administrative employment relationship. The dual role does not create a conflict that paralyzes Engineer A; rather, it clarifies that the professional obligation categorically supersedes the administrative one when public health is at stake.
The Board's conclusion that Engineers A and B should formally communicate their concerns to the MWC — including that the project will not be successful — must be understood as a necessary but not sufficient step. Code provision III.1.b imposes a faithful agent notification obligation, but fulfilling that obligation does not discharge the engineers' broader public safety duties under II.1. and II.1.a. There is a meaningful risk that the MWC, upon receiving a formal written notification of project failure risk, could interpret that communication as the engineers having discharged their professional duty and thereby acquiescing to the commission's override. Engineers A and B must therefore structure their formal communication to the MWC in a way that explicitly preserves — and indeed announces — their intention to escalate to state regulatory authorities if the MWC does not reverse course. The faithful agent notification and the public safety escalation obligation are sequential, not alternative, duties. Completing the first does not satisfy the second, and the formal communication to the MWC should make that sequencing explicit so that no inference of acquiescence can be drawn from it.
The Board's conclusion that Engineers A and B have ethical obligations to notify the MWC and other appropriate authorities leaves unresolved the question of whether confidentiality under Code provision II.1.c. constrains what Engineers A and B may disclose to state regulatory authorities about the MWC's internal deliberations and financial motivations. The BER 89-7 precedent establishes that confidentiality obligations do not bar disclosure when public safety is endangered, and this case falls squarely within that precedent: the risk of lead leaching above drinking water standards into the homes of an unknowing public is precisely the category of danger that overrides confidentiality. Engineers A and B are therefore not ethically required to obtain the MWC's prior consent before disclosing to state regulatory authorities the commission's decision, its financial rationale, and the engineers' documented objections. However, the engineers should limit their disclosures to information that is directly relevant to the public health risk — the corrosion control precondition, the three-year timeline requirement, the MWC's override decision, and the lead leaching danger — rather than using the safety escalation as a vehicle for broader disclosure of unrelated commission deliberations. The confidentiality non-applicability principle is scoped to the safety concern, not a blanket license to disclose all client information.
The Board's conclusion that Engineers A and B have obligations to notify appropriate authorities does not address the significance of the sparsely attended public meeting or the resulting information gap among affected residents. The low public attendance at the MWC meeting means that the population most directly at risk — residents in the MWC service area, particularly those in older housing stock with lead service pipes, including children and pregnant women — may have no awareness that the water source change is proceeding without the corrosion control safeguards that Engineers A and B identified as prerequisites. Notification to state regulatory authorities is necessary but may not be sufficient to protect these residents in the near term, because regulatory processes can be slow relative to the pace of implementation. Engineers A and B should therefore consider whether their public safety obligations extend to proactive communication with the public — through local media, community organizations, or public health channels — about the specific risk of lead leaching. This is not merely a supererogatory act of civic virtue; it is a direct extension of the paramount public welfare obligation under Code provision II.1., which does not limit the engineer's duty to formal regulatory channels when those channels may be insufficient to protect identifiable, vulnerable populations from a known and documented risk.
The Board's conclusions do not address the question of what Engineers A and B must do if their formal notifications to the MWC and to state regulatory authorities fail to halt the premature water source change. The escalation obligations under Code provision II.1.a. are not discharged by a single formal report to a regulatory agency; they persist as long as the endangerment to public health continues and the engineers retain the professional standing and information necessary to act. Engineers A and B should understand their obligations as graduated and iterative: first, formal written notification to the MWC; second, formal presentation to state regulatory authorities; third, if those steps prove insufficient, further escalation to additional authorities — including public health agencies, environmental regulators, or elected officials with oversight authority — and, ultimately, consideration of whether continued participation in the project constitutes implicit endorsement of a decision that endangers public health. Withdrawal from the engagement is not the first resort, but it becomes an ethically relevant option if all escalation pathways have been exhausted and the engineers' continued involvement would lend professional credibility to a project they have formally identified as unsafe. The graduated escalation framework ensures that the engineers do not prematurely abandon their ability to influence the outcome from within, while also ensuring that they do not indefinitely defer their independent professional obligations to the public.
The Board's conclusions implicitly treat the MWC's financial motivation — reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates — as ethically irrelevant in the face of the lead contamination risk. This treatment is correct but deserves explicit analytical grounding. The financial benefit of the accelerated water source change is real and distributed across the entire ratepayer population, while the lead contamination risk is concentrated among a subset of that population — specifically, residents in older housing with lead service pipes, who are disproportionately likely to include lower-income households that may have fewer resources to mitigate exposure through point-of-use filtration or bottled water. This distributional asymmetry means that the MWC's cost-benefit framing — aggregate savings for all ratepayers versus probabilistic risk for some — is ethically inadequate on its own terms, quite apart from the categorical priority that Code provision II.1. assigns to public safety. Engineers A and B are not required to accept the MWC's framing of the decision as a legitimate balancing of competing public goods. The nature and severity of lead contamination risk — particularly its irreversible neurological effects on children — places it in a category of harm that is not commensurable with rate reduction benefits, and Engineers A and B should make this incommensurability explicit in their formal communications to both the MWC and state regulatory authorities.
The Board's conclusions do not address the coordination dynamic between Engineers A and B, and specifically whether one engineer's independent escalation obligations can be delayed or suppressed by the other's reluctance to act jointly. The Board encourages coordinated joint action, and joint escalation is preferable because it presents a unified professional front and reduces the risk that the MWC or regulatory authorities will discount either engineer's concerns as idiosyncratic. However, the coordinated joint escalation obligation cannot be permitted to function as a veto that one engineer holds over the other's independent professional duties. If Engineer B, as a consulting engineer without an ongoing employment relationship with the MWC, were more willing to escalate immediately to state regulatory authorities than Engineer A — who faces greater institutional exposure as MWC superintendent — Engineer A's hesitation could not ethically delay Engineer B's independent obligation to report. Conversely, if Engineer A were prepared to escalate and Engineer B were reluctant, the same principle applies in reverse. Each engineer holds an independent professional license and an independent obligation under Code provision II.1.a. that is not contingent on the other's concurrence. The preferred sequence is joint action; the required minimum is that neither engineer's independent duty is subordinated to the other's institutional calculus.
Both Engineers A and B have ethical obligations to notify the MWC and other appropriate authorities that prematurely changing the water source puts the public health and safety at risk.
Engineer A's dual role as both MWC superintendent and chief engineer creates a structural conflict of interest that is itself an independent ethical problem, separate from the water source decision. As superintendent, Engineer A serves as an administrative employee of the MWC, with institutional loyalty obligations to the commission as an employer. As chief engineer, Engineer A holds an independent professional license that imposes a paramount duty to public safety that cannot be subordinated to employer directives. These two roles pull in opposite directions when the MWC overrides a safety recommendation: the superintendent role creates institutional pressure to implement the commission's decision, while the chief engineer role creates a non-waivable obligation to escalate safety concerns beyond the client. The Board's conclusion that Engineers A and B should formally communicate concerns to the MWC implicitly assumes Engineer A can act independently within that dual role, but the structural reality is that Engineer A's administrative position may suppress the very independence that the professional role demands. This dual-role arrangement should itself be examined as an organizational ethics problem, and Engineer A should be aware that when the two roles conflict on a matter of public safety, the professional engineering duty categorically takes precedence over the administrative employment relationship.
The sparse public attendance at the MWC meeting creates an independent obligation for Engineers A and B to proactively inform the broader public beyond formal regulatory channels. The public meeting process, as it functioned here, did not provide meaningful notice to the residents most at risk — particularly those in older housing stock with lead service pipes who are the primary population endangered by premature corrosion control failure. The fact that the meeting was sparsely attended means that the democratic legitimacy of the MWC's override decision is weakened, and the practical reality is that affected residents remain unaware of the lead contamination risk being imposed on them. Engineers A and B's obligation to hold public safety paramount is not discharged merely by presenting findings to the MWC and notifying state regulatory authorities. Where the public notification mechanism has functionally failed, engineers bear a residual obligation to consider additional means of informing affected residents, which may include public statements, engagement with local media, or direct communication with community organizations representing vulnerable populations such as families with young children. This obligation is independent of and supplementary to the formal regulatory escalation obligation.
Engineers A and B reach the threshold of ethical obligation to consider withdrawal from their respective roles only after a graduated sequence of escalation steps has been exhausted and the MWC continues to proceed with the premature water source change in the face of documented safety risk. Withdrawal is not the first or even an early response — it is a last resort that becomes ethically required when continued participation would make the engineers complicit in an ongoing public health endangerment that they have been unable to prevent through all available professional channels. The graduated sequence includes: formal written notification to the MWC of the project failure risk, formal presentation to state regulatory authorities, persistent follow-up if initial regulatory contact is insufficient, and consideration of broader public notification. Only if all of these steps fail to halt the dangerous implementation does withdrawal become not merely permissible but obligatory, because at that point continued service would lend professional legitimacy to a decision that the engineers have formally determined endangers public health. Engineer A's withdrawal from the superintendent role would be particularly significant because it would remove the administrative cover that the MWC's decision currently enjoys from a licensed professional.
The MWC's financial motivation to reduce water rates does not constitute a competing public good that Engineers A and B must weigh against the lead contamination risk in a conventional cost-benefit analysis. While lower water rates do benefit the ratepayer population broadly, the nature and severity of lead contamination risk — which is irreversible in its neurological effects on children, concentrated among the most vulnerable residents in older housing, and not distributed proportionally to those who receive the financial benefit — categorically overrides cost-benefit reasoning in the engineering ethics framework. The NSPE Code's paramountcy provision is not a balancing test; it establishes public safety as a threshold constraint rather than a factor to be weighed. Engineers A and B are not required to treat the financial benefit as an offset against the health risk, and doing so would misapply the ethical framework. The appropriate analysis is whether the safety preconditions have been met, not whether the aggregate economic benefit to ratepayers justifies accepting a probabilistic harm concentrated among the most vulnerable. The answer to the latter question is no, and the engineers' ethical obligations are not diminished by the genuine financial benefits the MWC seeks to achieve.
The Faithful Agent Notification Obligation — requiring Engineers A and B to advise the MWC that the project will not be successful — does not conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle in the way the tension question suggests, but it does require careful framing to avoid the misinterpretation risk identified. Formally notifying the MWC that the accelerated timeline will not succeed is not an act of acquiescence; it is a distinct professional duty under Code provision III.1.b that runs parallel to and does not replace the safety escalation obligation under II.1.a. The risk that the MWC might interpret a project failure notification as tacit acceptance of the accelerated timeline is real but manageable: Engineers A and B should structure their formal written communication to the MWC so that the project failure risk notification is explicitly coupled with a reiteration of their safety objection and a clear statement that they do not accept the accelerated timeline as professionally appropriate. The two obligations are complementary rather than conflicting when properly executed — the faithful agent duty informs the client of consequences, while the public safety duty escalates beyond the client when the client refuses to act on those consequences.
The Coordinated Joint Escalation Obligation does create a genuine tension with each engineer's independent Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation, and this tension must be resolved in favor of independent action when coordination would result in delay. The preference for Engineers A and B to act together in escalating to state regulatory authorities reflects the practical reality that a unified professional presentation carries greater weight and reduces the risk of the regulatory agency receiving conflicting signals. However, this preference for coordination cannot be allowed to function as a veto that one engineer's reluctance imposes on the other's independent duty. If Engineer A, due to the institutional pressures of the superintendent role, is unwilling or unable to join a formal regulatory escalation, Engineer B retains a fully independent obligation to proceed with that escalation unilaterally. The coordinated escalation preference is a means of maximizing effectiveness, not a procedural prerequisite that conditions the existence of the individual obligation. Each engineer's duty to report to state regulatory authorities when public safety is endangered exists independently and cannot be suspended by the other's inaction.
The BER 89-7 precedent establishing confidentiality non-applicability to public safety disclosures resolves the apparent tension between Code provision II.1.c and the escalation obligation under II.1.a by establishing a categorical hierarchy rather than a narrow case-by-case exception. When disclosure is necessary to prevent endangerment to life or public health, the confidentiality provision does not create a competing obligation that engineers must balance against the safety duty — it simply does not apply. Engineers A and B are not required to obtain MWC consent before disclosing to the state regulatory agency the commission's internal deliberations, financial motivations, or the fact that it overrode professional safety recommendations. The relevant boundary is not consent but necessity: Engineers A and B should disclose to the regulatory authority all information that is necessary to enable the agency to assess and respond to the public health risk, and no more. The MWC's financial motivations are relevant context for the regulatory agency's assessment of why the premature change is occurring and are therefore appropriately disclosed. This is not a narrow exception requiring fresh justification in each case; it is a structural feature of the Code's priority ordering that public safety obligations are not conditioned on client consent.
When Engineers A and B face the simultaneous demands of continuing to press the MWC internally and redirecting escalation energy toward state regulatory authorities, the appropriate prioritization is sequential rather than exclusive: internal MWC escalation and external regulatory escalation are not mutually exclusive activities, and the urgency of the public health risk means that both tracks should be pursued concurrently rather than in strict sequence. The Persistent Escalation Obligation When Formal Presentations Fail to Sway MWC and the Escalation Obligation When Initial Regulatory Report Is Insufficient are not competing demands that require engineers to choose between them — they operate on different institutional channels simultaneously. Engineers A and B should not wait for internal MWC escalation to be fully exhausted before initiating formal regulatory contact, because the lead contamination risk is activated at the moment the water source change proceeds without completed corrosion control improvements. The practical resolution is that formal written notification to the MWC and formal presentation to the state regulatory agency should occur on a parallel rather than sequential timeline, with the regulatory escalation proceeding immediately upon the MWC's override of the engineers' recommendations.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer A's dual role does create a genuine conflict of duty, but it is not irreconcilable in the way that would make the role itself impermissible. The conflict is resolved by the categorical precedence of the professional engineering duty over the administrative employment obligation when the two directly conflict on a matter of public safety. Kant's categorical imperative framework supports this resolution: if all engineers in dual administrative-professional roles were to subordinate their professional safety duties to their employer's institutional preferences, the entire system of professional engineering licensure as a public safety mechanism would be undermined. The administrative obligation to serve the MWC's institutional interests is a conditional duty — it holds only within the limits set by the unconditional duty to protect public health. Engineer A cannot coherently claim both that the professional engineering license imposes a paramount safety duty and that the superintendent role can override that duty when the two conflict. The deontological answer is clear: the professional duty takes categorical precedence, and Engineer A must act on it even at the cost of the administrative role.
From a consequentialist perspective, the MWC's financial motivation to reduce water rates does not justify accepting the lead contamination risk, and this conclusion holds even under a rigorous consequentialist analysis rather than merely a deontological one. The aggregate economic benefit of lower water rates is real but modest in magnitude per ratepayer, widely distributed, and reversible — rates can be adjusted in the future. The harm from lead contamination is severe, irreversible in its neurological effects on children, concentrated among the most vulnerable members of the population who have the least capacity to protect themselves, and not offset by any corresponding benefit to those most harmed. A consequentialist calculation that properly accounts for the severity and irreversibility of harm, the disproportionate impact on children and pregnant women, and the asymmetry between who receives the financial benefit and who bears the health risk would not support the MWC's decision. Furthermore, the probabilistic framing understates the risk: the corrosion control precondition is not a speculative concern but a technically documented requirement, making the harm not merely probable but near-certain if the source change proceeds without the required improvements. Engineers A and B are therefore correct to treat the public safety obligation as overriding the cost-reduction goal under any coherent ethical framework.
From a virtue ethics standpoint, Engineer B's production of a formal report documenting the corrosion control precondition demonstrates technical competence and professional integrity but does not by itself satisfy the virtue of courage that the situation demands. The virtue of courage in professional ethics requires not merely documenting findings in a report that may be ignored, but actively and persistently advocating for those findings in every available forum — including public forums beyond the sparsely attended MWC meeting. Engineer B's integrity requires that the report's conclusions be communicated in terms that make the stakes unmistakably clear: not as a recommendation for delay that the MWC can weigh against financial considerations, but as a statement that proceeding without completing corrosion control improvements will create an unacceptable and documented public health risk. The virtue of integrity further requires that Engineer B not allow the report's findings to be characterized as merely advisory once the MWC has overridden them — Engineer B must continue to stand behind those findings publicly and in communications with regulatory authorities. A virtuous engineer in Engineer B's position would not treat the completion of the report as the end of the professional obligation.
Well-attended public participation at the MWC meeting would not have reduced Engineers A and B's independent obligation to escalate to the state regulatory agency, because the escalation obligation under Code provision II.1.a is triggered by the override of engineering judgment under circumstances that endanger life — not by the absence of public awareness. The regulatory escalation obligation exists independently of the level of public awareness at any given meeting because the state regulatory agency performs a distinct function from the public: it has technical authority, enforcement power, and legal jurisdiction over drinking water safety standards that the public does not possess. An informed public might apply democratic pressure to the MWC, but it cannot substitute for regulatory oversight of lead contamination standards. However, well-attended public participation would have strengthened the engineers' position by creating a public record of informed community objection, potentially deterring the MWC from overriding the recommendations, and reducing the information gap that sparse attendance created. The escalation obligation to regulatory authorities is therefore not contingent on public awareness, but public awareness is independently valuable as a complementary mechanism of accountability.
If Engineer B had structured the consulting report to include an explicit written statement that proceeding without completing corrosion control improvements would constitute an unacceptable public health risk — rather than framing the findings as a recommendation for delay — the ethical and practical consequences would have been significant but would not have legally foreclosed the MWC from overriding the engineers' judgment. The MWC retains decision-making authority as the client and governing body regardless of how the report is framed. However, an explicit unacceptable-risk statement would have: (1) made Engineer A's escalation obligations under II.1.a more immediately and unambiguously triggered, since the endangerment finding would have been formally documented rather than implied; (2) created a stronger basis for the state regulatory agency to act upon receiving the engineers' report; and (3) reduced the MWC's ability to characterize the engineers' concerns as merely advisory preferences rather than professional safety determinations. The framing of engineering findings as recommendations for delay rather than as safety threshold determinations is itself an ethical choice, and Engineer B's obligation to communicate safety concerns clearly and unambiguously under the Code suggests that the explicit unacceptable-risk framing would have been more consistent with professional duty.
The existence of prior informal regulatory contact by Engineers A and B creates a heightened ethical obligation to formalize that contact immediately upon the MWC's override decision, and it also has a practical consequence for the engineers' escalation timeline. Having already made informal contact, Engineers A and B cannot credibly claim that they were unaware of the regulatory channel or that formalization required additional deliberation — the path to formal escalation was already partially established. The informal contact also means that the state regulatory agency may already have some awareness of the situation, creating a risk that the agency's inaction in the absence of a formal report could be misinterpreted as tacit acceptance of the MWC's decision. Engineers A and B therefore bear an obligation to formalize the regulatory contact promptly not only to fulfill their own escalation duties but to ensure that the regulatory agency has the complete, formal record it needs to act. Whether prior formal contact would have deterred the MWC from overriding the recommendations is speculative, but the existence of a formal regulatory record before the vote would have made the MWC's override decision more legally and politically costly, and Engineers A and B's failure to formalize earlier does not reduce — and may increase — their obligation to do so immediately after the override.
If Engineer A as MWC superintendent had the administrative authority to unilaterally delay implementation of the water source change independent of the MWC board vote, exercising that authority would represent an improper substitution of individual engineering judgment for legitimate democratic governance rather than a fulfillment of the paramount public safety obligation — unless the delay was strictly limited in scope and duration to the minimum necessary to enable formal regulatory intervention. The MWC is a democratically constituted governing body with legitimate authority over water system policy, and Engineer A's professional role does not confer authority to override that governance structure unilaterally on policy grounds. However, if Engineer A's administrative authority included the power to implement an emergency operational hold pending regulatory review — a narrower action than a policy override — exercising that authority to create time for the state regulatory agency to assess the situation would be more defensible. The ethical boundary is between using administrative authority to substitute engineering judgment for democratic governance (impermissible) and using it to preserve the regulatory process's ability to function before irreversible harm occurs (potentially permissible). Engineer A should seek legal counsel on the scope of that authority and act within it rather than beyond it.
The tension between the Faithful Agent Notification Obligation and the Public Welfare Paramount principle was resolved in this case by treating them as sequentially complementary rather than genuinely competing duties. Engineers A and B are first required to formally advise the MWC that the project will not be successful — fulfilling the faithful agent role — but that notification does not exhaust their obligations and cannot be interpreted as acquiescence to the accelerated timeline. The Board's reasoning makes clear that the faithful agent duty operates as a necessary precondition to escalation, not as a substitute for it: by formally documenting their objections to the MWC, Engineers A and B create an unambiguous record that their professional judgment was overruled, which then activates the independent public safety escalation obligation under Code provision II.1.a. The risk that the MWC might misread formal notification as tacit acceptance is real but does not diminish the obligation; rather, it places an additional burden on Engineers A and B to frame their communications in terms that make continued objection unmistakably clear. Public welfare paramountcy is therefore not in conflict with the faithful agent duty — it is the principle that governs what happens after the faithful agent duty has been discharged and ignored.
The Confidentiality Non-Applicability principle, established by BER 89-7 precedent, resolves the apparent tension between Code provision II.1.c — which conditions disclosure of client information on prior consent — and the independent escalation obligation under II.1.a by establishing a categorical hierarchy rather than a case-by-case balancing test. When public health and safety are at genuine and documented risk, confidentiality obligations do not merely yield to safety obligations after weighing competing interests; they are structurally inapplicable from the outset. In this case, the lead contamination risk created by the MWC's premature water source change is precisely the kind of danger that removes confidentiality as a legitimate constraint on disclosure. Engineers A and B are therefore not required to obtain MWC consent before notifying state regulatory authorities, and the MWC's financial motivations and internal deliberations may be disclosed to regulators to the extent necessary to convey the full scope of the risk. This resolution teaches a broader principle: confidentiality in engineering ethics is a default rule protecting client interests in ordinary commercial contexts, not a shield that clients may invoke to suppress safety-critical information from the authorities responsible for protecting the public.
The Coordinated Joint Escalation Obligation and each engineer's independent Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation interact in a way that reveals an important structural principle: coordination is ethically preferred but cannot be permitted to become a mechanism for suppressing individual duty. Engineers A and B are encouraged to act together because joint escalation carries greater institutional weight and reduces the risk that either engineer's concerns will be dismissed as idiosyncratic. However, the independent escalation obligation is not contingent on the other engineer's agreement to proceed. If Engineer A, constrained by the dual role as MWC superintendent, were to hesitate or decline to escalate formally, Engineer B's independent obligation to notify state regulatory authorities would remain fully intact and immediately operative. This case therefore teaches that coordinated action is a means of fulfilling the public safety obligation more effectively, not a precondition for fulfilling it at all. The ethical floor is set by the individual duty; coordination raises the ceiling of effectiveness. Furthermore, Engineer A's dual role as both MWC superintendent and chief engineer creates a structural vulnerability in the coordination dynamic: administrative loyalty to the MWC could suppress the professional escalation that the chief engineer role independently demands, making Engineer B's independent escalation capacity a critical backstop for public safety in this specific institutional configuration.
Confidentiality Non-Applicability Invoked in BER 89-7 Precedent
Confidentiality agreement in BER 89-7 structural investigation
MWC water source safety escalation by analogy
In BER Case No. 89-7, a confidentiality agreement between Engineer A and the client did not bar — and did not excuse the failure to make — disclosure of electrical and mechanical safety violations to appropriate public authorities
Confidentiality obligations do not override the paramount duty to report safety violations; the ethics code's public welfare purpose supersedes client confidentiality when public danger exists
Engineer B Water Treatment Evaluation Consultant
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure
The agreement between the client and Engineer A indicated that the structural report was to remain confidential. Engineer A did not report the electrical and mechanical deficiencies to the appropriate authorities.
Confidentiality yields to public safety disclosure obligation; the Board held it was unethical not to report despite the confidentiality agreement
the NSPE Board of Ethical Review determined that 'it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities'
Confirmed Lead Risk with Deferred Safeguards
From Engineer B's report recommending improvements prior to source change, through MWC vote to proceed simultaneously
Engineer B...provided a report to Engineer A recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline
Confirmed Risk Without Adequate Safeguards State
Engineer B's documented risk assessment and MWC's decision to proceed without completing protective measures
Not yet terminated — safeguards not yet in place
Despite those recommendations, the MWC voted to proceed simultaneously
The improvements are needed prior to the change in water source to ensure that sufficient corrosion control is provided
Engineer B's report identifying the need for corrosion control improvements before source change, followed by MWC's decision to proceed without completing those improvements first
Coordinated Joint Escalation Obligation Invoked for Engineers A and B
MWC Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority
Because Engineers A and B jointly presented their findings and recommendations to the MWC, their escalation actions must be coordinated and in concert — though not necessarily identical — to ensure that the joint professional judgment is not undermined by unilateral silence or divergent action
The joint nature of the original engagement creates a shared but individually-held obligation to coordinate escalation; each engineer retains independent professional responsibility but must act in a manner consistent with the joint advisory record
It is important to note that Engineers A and B have presented the findings and recommendations jointly and, as such, their actions should be in concert, although not identical.
The joint engagement structure requires coordinated action; neither engineer's individual inaction can discharge the shared obligation
After the MWC overrides their joint safety recommendation, how should Engineers A and B formally communicate their objections to the commission — and what must that communication accomplish to satisfy both the faithful agent notification duty and the public welfare paramount obligation?
Engineers A and B must decide how to formally communicate their professional objections to the MWC after the commission voted to override their joint recommendation to delay the water source change pending completion of corrosion control improvements. The core question is whether formal written notification to the MWC — advising that the project will not succeed in protecting the public — is sufficient to discharge their obligations, or whether that notification must be explicitly coupled with a stated intention to escalate to state regulatory authorities.
Deliver a formal joint written communication to the MWC that explicitly states the project will not succeed in protecting the public from lead contamination, reiterates the safety objection to the accelerated timeline, and announces the engineers' intention to make a formal presentation to the state regulatory agency if the MWC does not reverse course
Deliver a formal joint written communication to the MWC documenting the project failure risk and safety objection, treating that notification as the complete discharge of professional obligations under the faithful agent duty, without announcing any intention to escalate to regulatory authorities
Deliver separate individual written communications to the MWC — rather than a coordinated joint communication — each documenting the respective engineer's safety objection and project failure assessment, on the basis that each engineer's independent professional obligation does not require joint authorship of the notification
Following the MWC's override of their joint safety recommendation, how should Engineers A and B escalate the lead contamination risk to the state regulatory agency — and can either engineer's independent escalation obligation be delayed or conditioned on the other's agreement to act jointly?
After formally notifying the MWC of the project failure risk, Engineers A and B must decide whether and how to escalate to the state regulatory agency — and whether their independent escalation obligations can be conditioned on coordinated joint action or delayed by one engineer's institutional reluctance. The decision is complicated by Engineer A's dual role as MWC superintendent, which creates structural pressure against escalation, and by the existence of prior informal regulatory contact that has not yet been formalized.
Make a coordinated joint formal presentation to the state regulatory agency immediately and concurrently with the formal written notification to the MWC, disclosing the corrosion control precondition, the three-year timeline requirement, the MWC's override decision, and the lead leaching danger — without seeking MWC consent and without waiting for internal escalation to be exhausted
Pursue internal MWC escalation to completion first — including formal written notification and a request for reconsideration — before initiating formal regulatory contact, on the basis that the MWC retains legitimate governing authority and should be given a final opportunity to reverse course before external regulatory intervention is triggered
If Engineer A declines to join a coordinated regulatory escalation due to institutional pressures from the superintendent role, Engineer B proceeds independently with a formal presentation to the state regulatory agency without waiting for Engineer A's concurrence, while Engineer A separately pursues the formal written notification to the MWC
If formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency fail to halt the premature water source change, what further escalation steps do Engineers A and B's professional obligations require — and does the sparse public attendance at the MWC meeting independently obligate them to proactively inform affected residents through channels beyond formal regulatory notification?
If the formal presentations to both the MWC and the state regulatory agency fail to halt the premature water source change, Engineers A and B must decide what further escalation steps — if any — their professional obligations require, and at what point continued participation in the project constitutes implicit endorsement of a decision they have formally identified as unsafe. This decision point also encompasses the sparse public attendance problem: whether the engineers bear an independent obligation to proactively inform affected residents beyond formal regulatory channels.
Pursue a graduated sequence of additional escalation steps — including formal contact with public health agencies and environmental regulators beyond the initial state regulatory agency, proactive communication with affected residents through local media and community organizations about the specific lead leaching risk, and, if all escalation pathways are exhausted without halting the source change, withdrawal from the respective roles to avoid lending professional legitimacy to the unsafe decision
Treat the formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency as the complete discharge of escalation obligations, remaining in the respective roles to monitor implementation and mitigate harm from within — on the basis that withdrawal would remove the last qualified professional check on the unsafe decision and that regulatory authorities are better positioned than the engineers to compel compliance through enforcement mechanisms
Escalate to additional regulatory and public health authorities beyond the initial state agency contact, but limit proactive public communication to formal channels — such as requesting that the regulatory agency issue a public advisory — rather than engaging directly with local media or community organizations, on the basis that direct public communication by the engineers exceeds the scope of their professional role and risks undermining the regulatory process
After the MWC overrides their safety recommendation, should Engineers A and B formally advise the MWC in writing that the project will not be successful and immediately initiate formal escalation to state regulatory authorities, or should they pursue a more bounded response that preserves the client relationship while still discharging their professional notification duty?
Engineers A and B must decide how to respond after the MWC votes to override their joint recommendation to delay the water source change, given the documented lead leaching risk and the sparsely attended public meeting. The core decision involves whether to formally advise the MWC in writing that the project will not succeed, and whether to simultaneously or sequentially escalate to state regulatory authorities — without waiting for MWC consent to disclose internal deliberations.
Jointly deliver formal written notification to the MWC stating that the project will not succeed and explicitly announcing intent to escalate to state regulatory authorities, then immediately file a formal report with the state regulatory agency disclosing the MWC's override decision, financial rationale, and the documented lead leaching risk — without seeking MWC consent — while also considering proactive public communication to reach residents who were absent from the sparsely attended meeting
Deliver formal written notification to the MWC that the project will not succeed and request that the MWC itself notify state regulatory authorities or grant consent for the engineers to do so, treating the faithful agent notification as the primary discharge of professional duty and deferring external escalation unless the MWC refuses to act within a defined response period
Formalize the prior informal regulatory contact by submitting a written report to the state regulatory agency immediately upon the MWC's override, while simultaneously delivering the formal MWC notification — but limit the regulatory disclosure to technical safety findings and the corrosion control precondition, omitting the MWC's internal financial deliberations on the grounds that only safety-relevant technical information is necessary to trigger regulatory review
Federal and state environmental/public health regulatory authorities
Drinking Water Safety Standards — Lead Contaminant Levels
sufficient corrosion control is provided so that old service pipes in the MWC service area don't leach lead at levels in excess of drinking water standards
Engineer B in evaluating water treatment needs; Engineer A in advising the MWC
Explicitly referenced as the regulatory benchmark that old service pipes must not exceed; corrosion control improvements are required to prevent lead leaching above permissible levels, establishing the public safety threshold at the center of the ethical conflict
NSPE / professional engineering ethics community
a meeting sparsely attended by the public
old service pipes in the MWC service area don't leach lead at levels in excess of drinking water standards
Engineer A and Engineer B in evaluating post-recommendation options
Addresses whether Engineer A and/or Engineer B, having fulfilled their professional advisory obligations, may or must take additional actions as concerned citizens — such as notifying the public, media, or regulatory bodies — given the potential for lead contamination of the water supply affecting the MWC service area
Both Engineer A and Engineer B met with the MWC at a meeting sparsely attended by the public and recommended that the change in water source be substantially delayed
Despite those recommendations, the MWC voted to proceed
Engineer A and Engineer B in determining their response to the MWC's decision
Provides structured guidance for Engineer A and Engineer B on whether they are ethically obligated to refuse continued participation, withdraw from the project, or formally dissent after the MWC voted to proceed contrary to their safety-based recommendations
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard
Engineer A and Engineer B following MWC vote to proceed
Governs the continuing obligations of Engineer A and Engineer B after the MWC overruled their recommendations; addresses whether and how engineers must escalate public health concerns — including potential lead contamination — to regulatory authorities or the public when a client proceeds contrary to professional advice
Engineer A Accelerated Timeline Public Health Risk Objection
Accelerated Infrastructure Timeline Public Health Risk Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess the public health risks created by the MWC's decision to proceed simultaneously with the water source change and the accelerated evaluation and design of improvements, and to formally object to and document opposition to this compressed timeline.
Engineer A was obligated to formally object to and document opposition to the MWC's proposed accelerated timeline following the commission's override vote.
Jointly recommending with Engineer B that the water source change be substantially delayed, and being obligated to formally object to the MWC's accelerated timeline decision.
Despite those recommendations, the MWC voted to proceed simultaneously with the accelerated evaluation and design of needed water treatment improvements and the change in water source.
Engineer A Accelerated Timeline Public Health Risk Objection at MWC
The MWC voted to proceed simultaneously with the accelerated evaluation and design of water treatment improvements and the water source change, compressing the three-year timeline Engineer B had recommended.
Accelerated Timeline Public Health Risk Objection Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to formally object to and document opposition to the MWC's proposed accelerated timeline that would proceed with the water source change simultaneously with — rather than after completion of — the required corrosion control improvements.
Both Engineer A and Engineer B met with the MWC at a meeting sparsely attended by the public and recommended that the change in water source be substantially delayed until improvements could be completed.
At and following the MWC decision meeting
Engineer A Client Consent Non-Prerequisite Safety Reporting Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Client Consent Non-Prerequisite Safety Reporting Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's consent was not required to proceed with formal regulatory reporting of the lead contamination risk, given the paramount professional duty under NSPE Code Section II.1
Engineer A as MWC chief engineer following MWC override of joint safety recommendation
Proceeding with regulatory escalation without MWC authorization, grounded in recognition that paramount safety duty overrides consent requirement
Engineer A Client Risk Consequence Communication to MWC
Engineer A recommended delay of the water source change; the obligation extends to communicating the consequences to the MWC of overriding that recommendation, including potential regulatory violations and liability for lead contamination.
Client Risk Consequence Communication Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to communicate to the MWC not only the public health rationale for delaying the water source change, but also the specific professional, legal, and regulatory risks to the MWC of proceeding with the source change before adequate corrosion control improvements were in place.
At the MWC decision meeting and in any follow-up communications prior to the vote
Engineer A Competing Public Goods Recognition Cost vs Safety
Competing Public Goods Conflict Recognition and Advisory Capability
Engineer A needed to recognize and explicitly address the conflict between two legitimate public goods — reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates (economic benefit) versus preventing lead contamination in drinking water (public health safety) — and to advise the MWC on this tradeoff in a manner that made the competing goods and their relative weights transparent.
The MWC's cost-reduction motivation directly conflicted with the public health obligation to prevent lead contamination, creating a competing public goods dilemma.
Joint recommendation to delay the water source change, reflecting the judgment that public health safety outweighed the cost-reduction benefit of the accelerated timeline.
In order to reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates, the MWC has been considering changing its water supply source.
The improvements are needed prior to the change in water source to ensure that sufficient corrosion control is provided so that old service pipes in the MWC service area don't leach lead at levels in excess of drinking water standards.
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure MWC Water Source Case
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess that any confidentiality considerations arising from the client relationship did not bar disclosure of the lead contamination risk to state regulatory authorities, consistent with BER 89-7 precedent
Engineer A applying BER 89-7 precedent to assess whether client relationship confidentiality barred regulatory reporting
Recognition that BER 89-7's holding — that confidentiality does not bar reporting of safety violations — applied to the MWC water source change scenario
In BER Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was retained to investigate the structural components of an apartment building... The agreement between the client and Engineer A indicated that the structural report was to remain confidential. Engineer A did not report the electrical and mechanical deficiencies to the appropriate authorities.
the NSPE Board of Ethical Review determined that 'it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities.'
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Override Safety Reporting BER 89-7 Precedent Application
The Discussion invokes BER 89-7 as precedent establishing that confidentiality does not override the duty to report safety violations; this precedent is applied to confirm that Engineers A and B need not obtain MWC consent before escalating to the state regulatory agency.
Engineer A (in BER 89-7 precedent, as applied to current case)
Confidentiality Non-Override of Imminent Structural Safety Obligation
As established in BER 89-7 and applied to the current case, a confidentiality agreement between an engineer and a client does not bar — and does not excuse the failure to make — disclosure of safety violations to appropriate public authorities; Engineers A and B's obligation to report the lead contamination risk to the state regulatory agency is not conditioned on MWC consent.
In BER Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was retained to investigate the structural components of an apartment building... the NSPE Board of Ethical Review determined that 'it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities'
Applicable throughout the escalation process; the confidentiality/consent non-requirement is a standing condition
Engineer A Corrosion Control Pre-Condition Recognition
Corrosion Control Pre-Condition Technical Assessment Capability
Engineer A, as MWC chief engineer, possessed sufficient technical capability to receive, evaluate, and act upon Engineer B's corrosion control pre-condition findings, recognizing their significance for the water source transition decision.
Engineer A served as superintendent and chief engineer of the MWC and received Engineer B's technical report on corrosion control requirements.
Jointly recommending with Engineer B that the water source change be substantially delayed until corrosion control improvements could be completed.
Engineer A Disproportionate Impact Assessment Water Safety
Disproportionate Impact Assessment Capability
Engineer A needed to assess and communicate the disproportionate public health burden that the accelerated water source change would impose on MWC service area residents — particularly vulnerable populations — through lead contamination risk from aging service pipes.
Engineer A served as MWC chief engineer responsible for advising the commission on public health implications of the water source change.
Joint recommendation to delay the water source change, reflecting awareness of the disproportionate health risk to affected community members.
Engineer A Dual Role as Superintendent and Chief Engineer
Throughout the water source change evaluation and decision process
Engineer A is a professional engineer who serves as the superintendent and chief engineer for the Metropolitan Water Commission (MWC)
Engineer A's simultaneous roles as MWC superintendent (administrative/managerial) and chief engineer (technical/professional)
Engineer A's appointment to combined superintendent and chief engineer role at MWC
Engineer A Environmental Justice Awareness Water Safety
Environmental Justice Awareness Capability
Engineer A needed to recognize that the MWC's decision to proceed with the accelerated water source change without adequate corrosion control disproportionately burdened MWC service area residents — particularly vulnerable populations — with lead contamination risk, and to apply environmental justice principles in evaluating the ethical dimensions of this decision.
The MWC service area residents, particularly vulnerable populations, faced disproportionate lead contamination risk from the accelerated water source change.
Obligation to assess and communicate the disproportionate public health burden imposed on affected community members by the accelerated timeline decision.
Both Engineer A and Engineer B met with the MWC at a meeting sparsely attended by the public.
Engineer A Faithful Agent Written Risk Notification to MWC
Engineer A received Engineer B's report and jointly presented findings to the MWC; the faithful agent role required written documentation of the risk notification to create a formal record of the safety concern.
Faithful Agent Written Risk Notification Without Investigation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, as the MWC's chief engineer and faithful agent, to provide written notification of the lead contamination risk to the MWC even before the full three-year evaluation was complete, given that the preliminary findings already indicated a material public health risk from proceeding with the water source change without corrosion control improvements.
Engineer B, a consulting engineer retained by the MWC charged with evaluating water treatment needs for the change in water source, provided a report to Engineer A recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline for further evaluation of water quality, design, and construction of improvements.
Upon receipt of Engineer B's report and prior to the MWC vote
Engineer A Formal Regulatory Presentation Supplementation MWC Water Source Case
Engineers A and B have made informal contact with the state regulatory agency regarding the MWC's decision to proceed with the water source change without adequate corrosion control infrastructure; the Board finds this informal contact insufficient.
Engineer A (Water Utility Chief Engineer)
Formal Regulatory Presentation Supplementation of Informal Contact Obligation
Engineer A is obligated to supplement the existing informal contact with the state regulatory agency with a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations regarding the lead contamination risk from the proposed water source change, in coordination with Engineer B.
It appears that the state regulatory agency has been contacted; however, there should be a formal presentation of the facts, findings, and recommendations.
Immediately upon recognition that informal contact has been made but formal presentation has not yet occurred; prior to any MWC vote to proceed with the accelerated timeline
The formal presentations satisfy Engineer A's and Engineer B's duty to report.
Engineer A Graduated Escalation Before Withdrawal from MWC Role
Engineer A faced the question of whether to continue serving as chief engineer after the MWC overrode the safety recommendation; the graduated escalation obligation required pursuing all available escalation channels before withdrawal.
Graduated Escalation Before Project Withdrawal Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, before considering withdrawal from the chief engineer role, to pursue a graduated sequence of escalation steps — including formal written objection to the MWC, proposal of a documented engineering report for regulatory consideration, and escalation to state regulatory authorities — recognizing that withdrawal is a last resort after good-faith escalation efforts have been exhausted.
Following the MWC vote and before any decision to withdraw from the chief engineer role
Engineer A Gray Area Public Welfare Threshold Judgment Post-Override
Gray Area Public Welfare Threshold Judgment Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise professional judgment to determine whether the residual lead contamination risk — following the MWC's override — was sufficiently grave and certain to require escalation to the state regulatory authority, or whether it remained in a gray area requiring further evaluation before escalation.
Following the MWC's override, Engineer A faced the professional judgment question of whether the residual risk threshold for regulatory escalation had been met.
Obligation to evaluate whether the residual lead contamination risk was sufficiently grave to require escalation beyond the MWC to the state regulatory authority.
Engineer A Informal-to-Formal Regulatory Contact Escalation MWC Water Source Case
Informal-to-Formal Regulatory Contact Escalation Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that informal contact with the state regulatory agency was insufficient and to escalate to a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations
Engineer A as MWC chief engineer and joint public safety escalation engineer following MWC override
Recognition that existing informal contact with state regulatory agency required supplementation with formal structured presentation
This action may also address Section II.1.c.
Engineer A Informal Regulatory Contact Formalization Requirement MWC Water Source Case
Engineer A (MWC superintendent/chief engineer) had made informal contact with the state regulatory agency but had not yet made a formal presentation; the Board determined this informal contact was procedurally insufficient given the gravity of the public health risk from potential lead leaching.
Informal-to-Formal Regulatory Escalation Formalization Constraint
Engineer A's informal contact with the state regulatory agency regarding the lead contamination risk from the MWC water source change was insufficient; Engineer A was constrained to supplement that informal contact with a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations to the state regulatory agency.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.a; BER Case 19-10; BER Case 89-7
Following MWC override of joint engineering recommendation and prior to any further escalation steps
Engineer A Informed Decision Facilitation at MWC Meeting
Informed Decision-Making Process Facilitation Capability
Engineer A needed to structure and present the public health risk analysis in a manner that ensured MWC decision-makers had complete and accurate information — including the lead contamination risk, corrosion control pre-conditions, and timeline requirements — to make a genuinely informed decision about the water source change.
Engineer A served as MWC chief engineer and was the primary professional responsible for ensuring the commission had complete information for its decision.
Jointly presenting findings and recommendations at the MWC meeting, and being obligated to ensure decision-makers had complete information about the public health risks of proceeding without adequate corrosion control.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'joint_reporting': True, 'judgment_overruled_by': 'Metropolitan Water Commission'}
One of two engineers who jointly presented findings and recommendations to the MWC regarding water supply safety; engineering judgment was overruled; obligated to formally escalate to state regulatory agency and other appropriate authorities, and to advise the MWC that the project cannot succeed safely without recommended safeguards.
{'type': 'client_authority', 'target': 'Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority'}
{'type': 'co-reporter', 'target': 'Engineer B Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
{'type': 'notification_target', 'target': 'State Regulatory Notification Authority'}
Engineers A and B have presented the findings and recommendations jointly
Engineers A and B are required to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
Engineers A and B have an obligation to further pursue the matter
The engineering judgments of Engineer A and Engineer B were overruled by the MWC
Engineer A Multi-Precedent Public Safety Duty Synthesis MWC Water Source Case
Multi-Precedent Public Safety Duty Synthesis Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to identify and apply the synthesized framework from BER Cases 00-5, 19-10, and 89-7 to determine the step-by-step escalation path following the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation
Engineer A serving as MWC chief engineer following MWC override of joint recommendation to delay water source change
Application of three BER precedents to determine that formal regulatory presentation and continued pursuit were required after MWC override
Engineer A Non-Acquiescence to MWC Override of Safety Recommendation
The MWC voted to proceed simultaneously with the accelerated evaluation and design of water treatment improvements and the water source change, overriding Engineer A's recommendation for substantial delay.
Non-Acquiescence to Client Safety Override Obligation
Engineer A was obligated not to acquiesce to the MWC's decision to proceed simultaneously with the water source change and the evaluation/design of improvements, given that Engineer A had determined that the improvements were necessary prior to the source change to prevent lead contamination.
Following the MWC vote to proceed against engineering recommendations
Engineer A Persistent Safety Escalation Beyond MWC Override MWC Water Source Case
Persistent Safety Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Authority Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's override and failure to change plans did not discharge the professional obligation, and to continue pursuing the matter through additional escalation pathways given the gravity of the public health danger
Engineer A as MWC chief engineer in post-formal-presentation phase of escalation
Continued pursuit obligation recognized after formal presentations failed to change MWC plans
Engineer A Post-Client-Override Public Safety Escalation Beyond MWC
The MWC voted to proceed against the joint recommendations of Engineers A and B; Engineer A's paramount duty to public welfare required evaluation of whether escalation beyond the MWC was warranted.
Post-Client-Override Public Safety Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, after the MWC overrode the joint engineering recommendation, to evaluate whether the residual lead contamination risk was sufficiently serious to require escalation beyond the client relationship to state regulatory or public health authorities, and to take such escalation steps given the gravity of the risk.
Following the MWC vote overriding the engineering recommendations
Engineer A Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Assessment MWC Water Source Case
Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess that the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation required formal escalation to the state regulatory agency, and to act on that assessment by proceeding with formal regulatory reporting
Engineer A as MWC chief engineer assessing escalation obligations following MWC override
Assessment that gravity of lead contamination risk required formal regulatory escalation following MWC override
If Engineers A and B believe life or property is endangered, Section II.1.a. provides that not only shall the employer or client be notified, but also all other appropriate authorities.
Engineer A Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Water Safety
After the MWC voted to proceed against the joint recommendations of Engineers A and B, Engineer A faced the obligation to escalate to state regulatory authorities given the gravity of the lead contamination risk to the public water supply.
Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation in Water Safety Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, following the MWC's override of the joint engineering recommendation to delay the water source change, to escalate the public health and safety concerns regarding lead contamination risk to the applicable state regulatory agency.
Engineer A Precedent-Based Public Safety Reporting Obligation Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Precedent-Based Public Safety Reporting Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize and apply established BER precedents — including BER 00-5, 19-10, and 89-7 — to identify the mandatory reporting obligation triggered by the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation
Engineer A as MWC chief engineer applying BER precedent to determine escalation obligations
Application of BER precedent framework to determine that formal regulatory reporting was obligatory regardless of client override
Engineer A Public Safety Escalation Beyond MWC
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation created a residual lead contamination risk requiring escalation beyond the client relationship to the state regulatory authority.
Engineer A was obligated to escalate public health and safety concerns beyond the MWC following the commission's override of the joint engineering recommendation.
Obligation to evaluate whether the residual lead contamination risk was sufficiently grave to require escalation to the state regulatory authority and to act on that evaluation.
Engineer A Public Water Authority Informed Decision Facilitation at MWC Meeting
Engineer A served as superintendent and chief engineer of MWC and received Engineer B's report; both engineers presented to the MWC at a sparsely attended public meeting recommending delay of the source change.
Public Water Authority Informed Decision Facilitation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to ensure that the MWC decision-makers had complete and accurate information about the public health risks of proceeding with the water source change before adequate corrosion control improvements were in place, including the specific risk of lead leaching from aging service pipes.
Prior to and at the MWC decision meeting
Engineer A Public Welfare Paramountcy Over Cost Reduction
Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed to recognize that the public health obligation to prevent lead contamination in drinking water must be held paramount over the MWC's goal of reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates through the accelerated water source change.
The MWC's primary motivation for the water source change was to reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates, creating a direct conflict with the public health obligation to prevent lead contamination.
Joint recommendation to delay the water source change despite the MWC's cost-reduction motivation, and obligation to maintain that position following the commission's override.
Engineer A Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the paramount professional obligation to protect public health, safety, and welfare overrode the faithful agent duty to the MWC, enabling escalation without client consent
Recognition that MWC override did not extinguish the paramount safety duty and that escalation was required regardless of client preference
The role of the professional engineer in protecting the public health, safety, and welfare is fundamental to the practice of engineering and is the overriding charge in the NSPE Code of Ethics.
Engineer A Safety Obligation Paramount to Cost Reduction Goal
The MWC's motivation for the water source change was to reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates; Engineer A's paramount safety obligation required that this economic goal not override the public health risk from proceeding without adequate corrosion control.
Engineer A was obligated to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — specifically the risk of lead contamination in drinking water — over the MWC's goal of reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates through the accelerated water source change.
In order to reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates, the MWC has been considering changing its water supply source from purchasing water from remote reservoirs from another regional authority to using the local river as the MWC's source.
Throughout the evaluation and decision process
Engineer A Sparse Public Attendance Information Gap Remediation
Sparse Public Attendance Information Gap Recognition and Remediation Capability
Engineer A needed to recognize that the sparse public attendance at the MWC meeting created a material information gap for affected water rate payers and to take proactive steps to remediate that gap through alternative notification or outreach mechanisms.
Engineer A presented safety findings at an MWC meeting sparsely attended by the public, creating an obligation to ensure affected water rate payers received adequate safety information.
Obligation to recognize the information gap created by sparse attendance and identify supplemental outreach pathways to reach affected community members.
Engineer A Sparse Public Attendance Safety Information Gap Remediation
The MWC meeting at which Engineers A and B presented their safety recommendations was sparsely attended by the public, meaning the water rate payers most affected by the lead contamination risk had limited opportunity to participate in or respond to the decision.
Sparse Public Attendance Safety Information Gap Remediation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the sparse public attendance at the MWC meeting created an information gap for affected water rate payers, and to take additional steps to ensure the affected public had a meaningful opportunity to receive and respond to the safety information before the MWC voted.
At the MWC meeting and in the period between the meeting and the MWC vote
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'position': 'Superintendent and Chief Engineer', 'employer': 'Metropolitan Water Commission'}
Serves as superintendent and chief engineer of the MWC; received Engineer B's report; jointly recommended delaying the water source change until treatment improvements were completed; was overruled by the MWC board's vote to proceed simultaneously with evaluation and the source change.
{'type': 'employer', 'target': 'Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority'}
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer B Water Treatment Evaluation Consultant'}
{'type': 'public_responsibility', 'target': 'MWC Service Area Public'}
Engineer A and Engineer B met with the MWC at a meeting sparsely attended by the public and recommended that the change in water source be substantially delayed
Engineer A and B Joint Engineering Recommendation Unified Escalation
Both engineers jointly presented findings and recommendations to the MWC; after the MWC overrode those recommendations, the joint nature of their original presentation creates a shared obligation to pursue coordinated escalation to the state regulatory agency.
Engineer A Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer; Engineer B Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer
Joint Engineering Recommendation Unified Escalation Obligation
Engineers A and B were jointly obligated to coordinate and jointly escalate their safety concerns to the state regulatory authority following the MWC's override of their joint recommendation, recognizing that their shared professional responsibility for the joint recommendation creates a unified escalation duty.
Following the MWC vote overriding the joint engineering recommendations
Engineer A and B Joint Escalation Coordination
Joint Engineering Recommendation Coordination and Unified Escalation Capability
Engineers A and B jointly possessed the capability to coordinate their post-override escalation strategy and jointly report their safety concerns to the state regulatory authority following the MWC's override of their joint recommendation.
Engineers A and B had jointly presented findings and recommendations to the MWC; following the override, they were jointly obligated to escalate to the state regulatory agency.
Joint obligation to coordinate and jointly escalate safety concerns to the state regulatory authority following the MWC's override vote.
Engineer B Accelerated Timeline Public Health Risk Objection
Engineer B possessed the capability to assess and formally object to the MWC's decision to compress the three-year evaluation and construction timeline by proceeding simultaneously with the water source change and the needed improvements.
Engineer B was the technical expert who had established the three-year timeline requirement and was therefore positioned to assess the risks of compressing it.
Jointly recommending delay of the water source change and being obligated to formally object to the accelerated timeline.
Engineer B Accelerated Timeline Public Health Risk Objection at MWC
Engineer B's report had recommended a three-year timeline; the MWC voted to proceed on an accelerated basis that bypassed this recommended sequencing.
Engineer B was obligated to formally object to the MWC's decision to compress the three-year evaluation and construction timeline by proceeding with the water source change simultaneously with the required improvements, and to communicate the specific public health consequences of this acceleration.
Engineer B Client Consent Non-Prerequisite Safety Reporting Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's consent was not required to proceed with formal regulatory reporting of the lead contamination risk
Engineer B as water treatment evaluation consultant following MWC override of joint safety recommendation
Proceeding with regulatory escalation without MWC authorization as a consulting engineer
Engineer B Competence Obligation Water Treatment Evaluation
Engineer B was retained specifically to evaluate water treatment needs for the proposed water source change; the obligation required that the evaluation be performed with appropriate technical competence in water treatment and corrosion control engineering.
Engineer B was obligated to perform the water treatment evaluation only within the scope of competence, applying appropriate technical expertise in water quality, corrosion control, and drinking water standards to produce a reliable assessment of the capital investments and timeline required for the water source change.
Throughout the water treatment evaluation engagement
Engineer B Corrosion Control Pre-Condition Safety Disclosure to MWC
Engineer B was retained by MWC to evaluate water treatment needs for the proposed change from reservoir water to local river water; the evaluation revealed that corrosion control improvements were necessary before the source change to prevent lead contamination.
Corrosion Control Pre-Condition Safety Disclosure Obligation
Engineer B was obligated to disclose to Engineer A and the MWC that extensive capital investments and a three-year evaluation and construction timeline were required as a pre-condition to the water source change in order to prevent lead leaching from aging service pipes into drinking water.
Upon completion of the water treatment evaluation report and prior to the MWC decision meeting
Engineer B Corrosion Control Pre-Condition Technical Assessment
Engineer B possessed advanced technical capability to assess corrosion control pre-conditions for the MWC water source transition, including identifying capital investment requirements and a three-year evaluation and construction timeline necessary to prevent lead leaching from aging service pipes.
Engineer B was retained by MWC to evaluate water treatment needs for the proposed change from remote reservoir supply to local river supply.
Production of a report recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline for evaluation, design, and construction of corrosion control improvements prior to the water source change.
Engineer B Environmental Justice Awareness Water Safety
Engineer B needed to recognize the environmental justice dimensions of the lead contamination risk — particularly the disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations — and to incorporate this awareness into the evaluation report and joint recommendation.
Engineer B's evaluation report was required to address the specific risks to vulnerable populations from lead contamination through aging service pipes.
Obligation to specifically identify and disclose the disproportionate risk of lead contamination to vulnerable populations in the evaluation report.
Engineer B Formal Regulatory Presentation Supplementation MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B produced the original report recommending extensive capital investment before the water source change; the informal regulatory contact must be formalized to discharge the reporting obligation.
Engineer B (Water Treatment Evaluation Consultant)
Engineer B is obligated to participate in and contribute to a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations to the state regulatory agency regarding the lead contamination risk, coordinated with Engineer A, supplementing the prior informal contact.
Coordinated with Engineer A; prior to any MWC vote to proceed with the accelerated timeline
Engineer B Informal-to-Formal Regulatory Contact Escalation MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize that informal contact with the state regulatory agency was insufficient and to participate in a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations
Engineer B as water treatment evaluation consultant and joint public safety escalation engineer following MWC override
Obligation to participate in formal regulatory presentation supplementing prior informal contact
Engineer B Informal Regulatory Contact Formalization Requirement MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B (consulting engineer) jointly presented findings with Engineer A to the MWC; the Board determined that the subsequent regulatory contact required formalization into a formal presentation.
Engineer B's participation in informal contact with the state regulatory agency was insufficient; Engineer B was constrained to participate in and contribute to a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations to the state regulatory agency, coordinated with Engineer A.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.a; BER Case 19-10
Following MWC override of joint engineering recommendation
Engineer B Informed Decision Facilitation at MWC Meeting
Engineer B needed to structure the evaluation report and MWC presentation to ensure decision-makers had complete information about water treatment requirements, corrosion control pre-conditions, and public health risks to make a genuinely informed decision.
Engineer B was the technical expert whose evaluation report formed the evidentiary basis for the MWC's decision-making process.
Producing a comprehensive evaluation report and jointly presenting findings at the MWC meeting.
{'type': 'co-reporter', 'target': 'Engineer A Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
Engineer B Lead Contamination Vulnerable Population Risk Disclosure
Lead Contamination Vulnerable Population Drinking Water Risk Disclosure Capability
Engineer B was obligated to possess and exercise the capability to specifically identify and disclose in the evaluation report the disproportionate risk of lead contamination to vulnerable populations — including children and pregnant women — from aging service pipes under the proposed water source change.
Engineer B's evaluation report addressed water treatment needs for the MWC water source change, including corrosion control requirements for aging service pipes.
Required to incorporate population-specific lead contamination risk analysis into the water treatment evaluation report submitted to Engineer A and the MWC.
Engineer B Lead Contamination Vulnerable Population Specific Risk Disclosure
Engineer B's report addressed the need for corrosion control improvements to prevent lead leaching from old service pipes; the report should have specifically identified the populations most at risk from lead contamination.
Lead Contamination Vulnerable Population Specific Risk Disclosure Obligation
Engineer B was obligated to specifically identify and disclose in the evaluation report the disproportionate risk of lead contamination to vulnerable populations — including children and pregnant women — who face heightened health consequences from lead leaching through aging service pipes in the MWC service area.
In the water treatment evaluation report delivered to Engineer A and the MWC
Engineer B Multi-Precedent Public Safety Duty Synthesis MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to identify and apply the synthesized framework from BER Cases 00-5, 19-10, and 89-7 to determine the step-by-step escalation path following the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation
Engineer B serving as water treatment evaluation consultant following MWC override of joint recommendation
Engineer B Persistent Safety Escalation Beyond MWC Override MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's override and failure to change plans did not discharge the professional obligation, and to continue pursuing the matter through additional escalation pathways
Engineer B as water treatment evaluation consultant in post-formal-presentation phase of escalation
Engineer B Post-Client-Override Public Safety Escalation Beyond MWC
Engineer B's technical findings formed the basis of the safety recommendation; after the MWC override, Engineer B retained an independent professional obligation to escalate the public health risk.
Engineer B was obligated, after the MWC overrode the joint engineering recommendation, to evaluate whether the residual lead contamination risk was sufficiently serious to require escalation beyond the client relationship to state regulatory or public health authorities, and to take such escalation steps given the gravity of the risk.
Engineer B Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Assessment MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to assess that the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation required formal escalation to the state regulatory agency as a consulting engineer
Engineer B as water treatment evaluation consultant assessing escalation obligations following MWC override
Engineer B Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Water Safety
Engineer B, as the consulting engineer whose technical findings formed the basis of the joint recommendation, faced an independent obligation to escalate to state regulatory authorities after the MWC overrode the safety recommendation.
Engineer B was obligated, following the MWC's override of the joint engineering recommendation, to escalate the public health and safety concerns regarding lead contamination risk to the applicable state regulatory agency, notwithstanding the client's decision to proceed.
Engineer B Precedent-Based Public Safety Reporting Obligation Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize and apply established BER precedents to identify the mandatory reporting obligation triggered by the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation
Engineer B as water treatment evaluation consultant applying BER precedent to determine escalation obligations
Application of BER precedent framework to determine that formal regulatory reporting was obligatory as a consulting engineer
The remaining referenced Code sections provide a step-by-step path forward in this case for Engineer A and Engineer B.
Engineer B Public Safety Escalation Beyond MWC
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize that the MWC's override of the joint safety recommendation required escalation beyond the client relationship to the state regulatory authority.
Engineer B was obligated to escalate public health and safety concerns beyond the MWC following the commission's override of the joint engineering recommendation.
Obligation to evaluate whether the residual lead contamination risk required escalation to the state regulatory authority and to act on that evaluation.
Engineer B Public Water Authority Informed Decision Facilitation at MWC Meeting
Engineer B jointly presented findings and recommendations with Engineer A at the MWC meeting, recommending substantial delay of the water source change.
Engineer B was obligated to ensure that the MWC decision-makers had complete and accurate information about the public health risks of proceeding with the water source change without first completing the required corrosion control improvements.
At the MWC decision meeting and through the report delivered to Engineer A
Engineer B Public Welfare Paramountcy Over Cost Reduction
Engineer B needed to recognize that the public health obligation to prevent lead contamination must be held paramount over the MWC's cost-reduction goals, and to maintain that position in the evaluation report and joint recommendation.
Engineer B's evaluation report recommended costly improvements that conflicted with the MWC's cost-reduction objective.
Recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline despite the MWC's cost-reduction motivation, and jointly recommending delay of the water source change.
Engineer B, a consulting engineer retained by the MWC charged with evaluating water treatment needs for the change in water source, provided a report to Engineer A recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline.
Engineer B Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition MWC Water Source Case
Engineer B possessed the capability to recognize that the paramount professional obligation to protect public health, safety, and welfare overrode any deference to the MWC's decision as client
Recognition that MWC override did not extinguish the paramount safety duty for a consulting engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (implied)', 'engagement_type': 'Consulting engineer retained by MWC', 'deliverable': 'Water treatment evaluation report'}
Retained by MWC to evaluate water treatment needs for the proposed water source change; produced a report recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year evaluation/construction timeline; jointly presented recommendations to MWC alongside Engineer A; recommendations were overridden by MWC's vote.
{'type': 'client', 'target': 'Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority'}
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Utility Chief Engineer'}
{'type': 'report_recipient', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Utility Chief Engineer'}
Engineer B, a consulting engineer retained by the MWC charged with evaluating water treatment needs for the change in water source
provided a report to Engineer A recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline for further evaluation of water quality, design, and construction of improvements
Engineer B's report and recommendations before MWC meeting and vote
Engineers A and B Client Loyalty Subordinated to Public Safety MWC Case
The competing duties tension between Engineers A and B's roles as faithful agents of the MWC and their paramount duty to public safety was resolved by the priority constraint establishing public safety as the overriding obligation.
Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
Engineers A and B's obligations of loyalty and faithful service to the MWC as client were constrained by and subordinated to the paramount duty to protect public health and safety from lead contamination risk; client loyalty could not justify withholding safety information from regulatory authorities or acquiescing to the MWC's override of the joint engineering recommendation.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 89-7; BER Case 00-5
Throughout all professional actions related to the MWC water source change decision
Engineers A and B Competing Duties — Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Paramount
From MWC override through resolution of safety concerns
Engineers A and B's tension between obligations to MWC as client and paramount duty to protect public health and safety
Resolution of safety concerns or formal disassociation from project
if project success is defined as 'the public will not be endangered at all,' then Engineers A and B should advise their client that they believe the project will not be successful.
MWC overruling engineering judgment, requiring engineers to prioritize between client authority and public safety obligation
Engineers A and B Concurrent Joint Engineering Action Coordination MWC Water Source Case
Concurrent Joint Engineering Action Coordination Capability
Engineers A and B possessed the capability to coordinate their escalation and advisory actions in concert — ensuring unified professional position while allowing for non-identical individual actions — following the MWC's override of their jointly-presented safety recommendation
Joint escalation coordination obligation of Engineers A and B following MWC override
Coordinated formal regulatory presentations and client advisories following joint presentation to MWC, acting in concert though not identically
Engineers A and B have an obligation to further pursue the matter.
Engineers A and B Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety Reporting BER 89-7 Application
BER Case 89-7 established that an engineer's confidentiality agreement with a client does not bar reporting safety violations to appropriate public authorities; this precedent was applied to Engineers A and B's situation with the MWC water source change.
Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety-Critical Regulatory Disclosure Constraint
Any confidentiality obligations Engineers A and B held toward the MWC did not bar them from disclosing public health and safety findings regarding lead contamination risk to appropriate regulatory authorities, as established by BER Case 89-7 precedent applied to the water source change scenario.
BER Case No. 89-7; NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1
In BER Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was retained to investigate the structural components of an apartment building... The agreement between the client and Engineer A indicated that the structural report was to remain confidential. Engineer A did not report the electrical and mechanical deficiencies to the appropriate authorities. In this case, the NSPE Board of Ethical Review determined that 'it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities.'
Throughout the escalation process following MWC override
Engineers A and B Formal Client Project Failure Risk Notification MWC Water Source Case
The MWC has overruled the engineering judgments of Engineers A and B regarding the need for corrosion control infrastructure before the water source change; Engineers A and B believe the public will be endangered if the project proceeds as planned.
Formal Client Project Failure Risk Notification Obligation
Engineers A and B are obligated to formally advise the MWC in writing that they believe the project — defined as ensuring the public will not be endangered — will not be successful under the current plan, and that this advisement must proceed in a formal manner consistent with their formal presentation to the state regulatory agency.
Concurrent with or immediately following the formal presentation to the state regulatory agency; prior to any MWC vote to proceed
Again, as with the state regulatory agency, this advisement should proceed in a formal manner.
Engineers A and B Joint Coordinated Formal Presentation Action MWC Water Source Case
Engineers A and B jointly presented safety recommendations to the MWC; the MWC overruled their joint engineering judgment; the Board finds their escalation actions must be coordinated.
Because Engineers A and B jointly presented their findings and recommendations to the MWC, their escalation actions — including formal presentations to the state regulatory agency and formal advisement to the MWC of project failure risk — must be coordinated and in concert, though not necessarily identical.
Throughout the escalation process following the MWC's override of their joint recommendations
Engineers A and B Joint Presenter Coordinated Escalation MWC Water Source Case
Engineers A and B jointly presented safety findings to the MWC regarding the lead contamination risk from the proposed water source change; the Board determined their escalation actions must be coordinated given the joint nature of their original presentation.
Joint Presenter Coordinated Escalation Action Constraint
Because Engineers A and B jointly presented their findings and recommendations to the MWC, their subsequent escalation actions — including formal presentations to the state regulatory agency and written advisements to the MWC — were constrained to be conducted in concert, though not necessarily identically.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case analysis of joint professional obligations
Throughout all escalation actions following MWC override of joint recommendation
Engineers A and B Persistent Escalation Obligation If Formal Presentations Fail MWC Case
The Board determined that if formal presentations failed to sway the MWC, the gravity of the danger to public health and safety from lead contamination of drinking water obligated Engineers A and B to continue pursuing resolution beyond the initial formal presentations.
Persistent Safety Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Authority Constraint
If formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency failed to change the MWC's plans to proceed with the water source change without adequate corrosion control, Engineers A and B were constrained from treating those failed presentations as a complete discharge of their safety obligation and were required to further pursue the matter given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case 19-10; BER Case 00-5
Contingent on failure of formal presentations to MWC and state regulatory agency to produce corrective action
Engineers A and B Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Lead Contamination Risk
The MWC overruled the joint engineering judgment of Engineers A and B regarding the timeline for the water source change; the Board determined this override triggered the obligation to escalate to the state regulatory agency.
Post-Client-Override Public Safety Regulatory Escalation Constraint
Following the MWC's override of the joint engineering recommendation to delay the water source change pending corrosion control improvements, Engineers A and B were constrained from passively accepting that override as a complete discharge of their professional obligations and were required to escalate the public health and safety concerns to the state regulatory agency.
The engineering judgments of Engineer A and Engineer B were overruled by the MWC.
Engineers A and B Post-Formal-Presentation Continued Safety Pursuit MWC Water Source Case
Post-Formal-Presentation Continued Safety Pursuit Capability
Engineers A and B possessed the capability to recognize that completion of formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency satisfied but did not extinguish their professional duty, and to further pursue the matter given the gravity of the public health danger if those presentations failed to change MWC plans
Post-formal-presentation phase of Engineers A and B's escalation following MWC override of joint safety recommendation
Recognition of continuing obligation to pursue safety concerns beyond formal presentation phase when client has not changed plans
Engineers A and B Post-Formal-Presentation Persistent Pursuit MWC Water Source Case
The MWC has overruled the engineering judgments of Engineers A and B; formal presentations are required but may be insufficient; the Board finds a continuing obligation to pursue the matter if formal presentations fail.
Post-Formal-Presentation Persistent Safety Pursuit Obligation
If the formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency fail to change the MWC's plans to proceed with the water source change without adequate corrosion control, Engineers A and B are obligated to further pursue the matter through additional escalation channels given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety.
Triggered if and when formal presentations to MWC and state regulatory agency fail to produce corrective action by the MWC
Engineers A and B Project Failure Risk Formal Notification to MWC
The Board determined that if project success is defined as 'the public will not be endangered at all,' Engineers A and B were obligated to advise the MWC formally that they believed the project would not be successful under the accelerated timeline without corrosion control improvements.
Project Success Adverse Notification Constraint
Engineers A and B were constrained to formally advise the MWC in writing that they believed the project — defined as ensuring the public would not be endangered — would not be successful if the water source change proceeded without adequate corrosion control infrastructure, and this advisement was required to proceed in a formal rather than informal manner.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.1.b; BER Case analysis
Additionally, if project success is defined as 'the public will not be endangered at all,' then Engineers A and B should advise their client that they believe the project will not be successful.
Following MWC override of joint engineering recommendation and concurrent with formal regulatory escalation
Engineers A and B Project Success Redefinition for Safety Failure Advisory MWC Water Source Case
Project Success Redefinition for Safety Failure Advisory Capability
Engineers A and B possessed the capability to redefine project success in terms of the public safety objective — 'the public will not be endangered at all' — and on that basis to formally advise the MWC that the project would not be successful as currently planned
Joint advisory obligation of Engineers A and B following MWC override of recommendation to delay water source change
Formal advisory to MWC that the water source change project, as planned without corrosion control pre-conditions, would fail to achieve its public safety objective
Engineers A and B Public Safety Paramount Over MWC Client Authority
The Board grounded all of its analysis in the fundamental canon that public safety, health, and welfare must be held paramount, citing multiple BER precedents and applying this as the overriding constraint on Engineers A and B's professional conduct.
Engineers A and B were constrained from subordinating the paramount duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare to the MWC's authority as client and governing body; the fundamental canon of public safety paramount bounded all decisions about whether and how to escalate the lead contamination risk.
NSPE Code of Ethics fundamental canon; BER Case 00-5; BER Case 19-10; BER Case 89-7
Throughout all professional actions related to the MWC water source change
Escalation Obligation When Initial Regulatory Report Is Insufficient Invoked for State Agency Contact
Confidentiality of Employer Information in Public Agency Context
Engineers A and B's informal contact with the state regulatory agency is insufficient to discharge their professional obligation; a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations is required to properly escalate the water supply safety concern
Initial contact with a regulatory authority does not satisfy the escalation obligation unless it takes the form of a formal, complete presentation; informal contact must be supplemented with structured documentation
Escalation Obligation When Initial Regulatory Report Is Insufficient
it appears that the state regulatory agency has been contacted; however, there should be a formal presentation of the facts, findings, and recommendations.
The insufficiency of informal contact requires formal supplementation regardless of client preference; the regulatory notification obligation is not discharged by mere contact
Faithful Agent Notification Obligation Invoked for Project Success Risk to MWC
Engineers A and B must advise the MWC formally that they believe the project — defined as ensuring the public will not be endangered — will not be successful if the water source change proceeds without the recommended treatment infrastructure
The faithful agent obligation requires Engineers A and B to formally advise the MWC that the project will fail on its public safety objective, framing the notification in terms of project success rather than merely regulatory compliance
Faithful Agent Notification Obligation for Project Success Risk
The faithful agent notification is complementary to — not in tension with — the public safety escalation; both obligations run concurrently and reinforce each other
Formal Presentation Requirement for Safety Escalation Invoked for State Agency and MWC
Engineers A and B's existing informal contact with the state regulatory agency must be supplemented by a formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations; similarly, their advisement to the MWC regarding project success risk must proceed in a formal manner
Formality of presentation is a procedural requirement for discharging the safety escalation obligation — informal contact is necessary but not sufficient; the formal record creates accountability and enables regulatory action
Formal Presentation Requirement for Safety Escalation
there should be a formal presentation of the facts, findings, and recommendations. This action may also address Section II.1.c.
The procedural requirement of formal presentation is non-negotiable once the safety escalation obligation is triggered; client preference for informal handling does not satisfy the professional standard
there should be a formal presentation of the facts, findings, and recommendations.
this advisement should proceed in a formal manner.
Formally Advise MWC of Project Failure Risk
Formally Notify State Regulatory Authorities
Informal Regulatory Contact Without Formal Presentation
From initial informal contact with state regulatory agency until formal written presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations is delivered
Informal Regulatory Contact Requiring Formalization State
Engineers A and B's preliminary contact with state regulatory agency regarding water system safety concerns
Delivery of formal presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations to the state regulatory agency
Engineers A and B contacting the state regulatory agency without yet providing a formal documented presentation
Jointly Recommend Delaying Source Change
Jointly Recommend Delaying Source Change → Engineer Recommendations Overruled
Lead Leaching Public Health Risk from Premature Source Change
From MWC vote to proceed simultaneously through completion of corrosion control improvements (not yet achieved)
The improvements are needed prior to the change in water source to ensure that sufficient corrosion control is provided so that old service pipes in the MWC service area don't leach lead at levels in excess of drinking water standards
Premature Operational Change with Deferred Safety Infrastructure State
MWC water distribution system and public health of service area residents
Not yet terminated — improvements not yet complete at time of case
the MWC voted to proceed simultaneously with the accelerated evaluation and design of needed water treatment improvements and the change in water source
MWC decision to change water source before corrosion control improvements are in place, creating foreseeable lead leaching risk from old service pipes
MWC Consent Non-Prerequisite for Engineers A and B Regulatory Escalation
The MWC overrode the joint engineering recommendation to delay the water source change pending corrosion control improvements; Engineers A and B were obligated to escalate to the state regulatory agency without requiring MWC consent, given the paramount public safety duty.
Client Consent Non-Prerequisite for Safety Escalation Constraint
Engineers A and B were constrained from treating MWC's consent or approval as a prerequisite for escalating public health and safety concerns to the state regulatory agency; the paramount duty to protect public safety superseded any requirement for MWC authorization of regulatory escalation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; NSPE Code of Ethics fundamental canon on public safety paramount
MWC Financial Motivation for Accelerated Water Source Change
From MWC's initiation of water source change consideration through the vote to proceed simultaneously with improvements and source change
In order to reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates, the MWC has been considering changing its water supply source
Cost-Reduction Pressure Overriding Safety Timeline State
Metropolitan Water Commission's decision-making context regarding water source transition
Not yet terminated — MWC voted to proceed on accelerated basis despite engineer recommendations
MWC's stated goal of reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates by switching water supply sources
{'authority_type': 'Public water authority governing board', 'decision': 'Voted to proceed with simultaneous source change and treatment improvement evaluation despite engineering recommendations to delay'}
Governing body of the water utility that commissioned the water source change evaluation; received joint recommendations from Engineers A and B to delay the change; voted to override those recommendations and proceed simultaneously with accelerated evaluation/design and the water source change, creating a public health risk.
{'type': 'client', 'target': 'Engineer B Water Treatment Evaluation Consultant'}
{'type': 'decision_authority_over', 'target': 'MWC Service Area Public'}
{'type': 'employer', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Utility Chief Engineer'}
Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority
the MWC has been considering changing its water supply source
MWC Override of Engineer Recommendations on Water Source Timeline
From the MWC vote to proceed simultaneously with improvements and source change, ongoing
Both Engineer A and Engineer B met with the MWC at a meeting sparsely attended by the public and recommended that the change in water source be substantially delayed until improvements could be completed
Regulatory Body Override of Engineering Judgment State
MWC's authority relationship with Engineer A and Engineer B regarding the water source change timeline
Not yet terminated — decision stands as voted
MWC voted to proceed despite both Engineer A and Engineer B recommending substantial delay until improvements were completed
MWC Override of Engineers A and B Joint Judgment
From MWC's decision to override engineering recommendations through any formal presentations and potential further escalation
Joint Engineering Judgment Override State
Municipal Water Commission's rejection of Engineers A and B's jointly presented safety findings and recommendations
MWC changing its plans in response to formal presentations, or engineers completing further escalation
MWC overruling the jointly presented engineering judgments of Engineers A and B regarding the water system change
MWC Service Area Public Water Rate Payer Stakeholder
{'risk_exposure': 'Lead leaching from old service pipes exceeding drinking water standards', 'interest': 'Lower water rates and safe drinking water', 'representation': 'Sparse attendance at public meeting'}
Community members served by the MWC water utility who stand to benefit from lower water rates but face lead contamination risk from aging service pipes if the water source is changed before adequate corrosion control improvements are in place; sparsely represented at the public meeting where the decision was made.
{'type': 'protected_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Water Utility Chief Engineer'}
{'type': 'protected_by', 'target': 'Engineer B Water Treatment Evaluation Consultant'}
{'type': 'served_by', 'target': 'Metropolitan Water Commission Decision Authority'}
reduce municipal expenditures and lower water rates
MWC Votes to Override Engineers → Public Health Risk Created
MWC vote to proceed before required formal notifications to state regulatory authorities
{'authority_type': 'Public water commission', 'action': 'Overruled engineering recommendations'}
The public water authority that overruled the engineering judgments of Engineers A and B; the entity whose consent is not required for engineers to escalate safety concerns to regulatory authorities; the body that must be formally advised that the project will not be successful if safety recommendations are not adopted.
{'type': 'overruled_engineers', 'target': 'Engineer A Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
{'type': 'overruled_engineers', 'target': 'Engineer B Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
Engineers A and B should advise their client that they believe the project will not be successful
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer B provided a report recommending extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline
Both Engineer A and Engineer B recommended that the change in water source be substantially delayed
Primary normative authority governing the obligations of Engineer A (superintendent/chief engineer) and Engineer B (consulting engineer) when their professional recommendations to delay the water source change were overruled by the MWC, particularly regarding the duty to hold public safety paramount
the overriding charge in the NSPE Code of Ethics
Section II.1.a. provides that not only shall the employer or client be notified, but also all other appropriate authorities
as this duty is a fundamental canon of the NSPE Code of Ethics
the remaining referenced Code sections provide a step-by-step path forward in this case for Engineer A and Engineer B with Section II.1. in mind
Engineers A and B in determining their ethical obligations to report safety concerns to the MWC, state regulatory agency, and other authorities
Cited as the overriding authority establishing the fundamental canon that engineers must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public; specific sections II.1., II.1.a., and II.1.c. are invoked to define Engineers A and B's step-by-step obligations
Persistent Escalation Obligation When Formal Presentations Fail to Sway MWC
If the formal presentations to the MWC and state regulatory agency fail to change the MWC's plans, Engineers A and B must continue to pursue the matter further given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety — the initial formal report does not terminate their professional obligation
The persistence obligation scales with the gravity of the public health risk; lead contamination of a public water supply is sufficiently grave to require continued pursuit beyond initial formal presentations
Persistent Escalation Obligation When Initial Safety Report Is Unacknowledged
in the event that these formal presentations fail to sway the MWC to change its plans, given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety, Engineers A and B have an obligation to further pursue the matter.
The gravity of the danger overrides any argument that formal presentations constitute a complete discharge of professional obligation
Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation Invoked by Engineers A and B
MWC decision to override engineering recommendations on water source change
State regulatory agency notification adequacy assessment
After the MWC overruled their engineering judgment, Engineers A and B must assess whether the MWC's refusal to act — combined with the severity of lead contamination risk — requires escalation to the state regulatory agency and further pursuit beyond initial contact
The MWC's rejection of engineering recommendations does not discharge the engineers' professional obligation; it triggers an assessment of whether further escalation is required given the gravity of the public health risk
Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation
Client refusal is treated as a trigger for escalation assessment, not as a discharge of professional obligation; the gravity of the danger requires further pursuit
Produce Treatment Needs Report → Lead Leaching Risk Activated
Public Safety at Risk — Lead Contamination of Drinking Water
From MWC vote to proceed with simultaneous source change and improvements, ongoing until corrosion control is operational
MWC service area public exposed to potential lead leaching above drinking water standards
Completion and verification of corrosion control improvements, or reversal of source change decision
Engineer B...recommended extensive capital investments and a three-year timeline for further evaluation of water quality, design, and construction of improvements
MWC decision to change water source before corrosion control improvements are complete, with documented risk of lead leaching from old service pipes
Public Safety at Risk — Water System Users
Persists from MWC's override decision through resolution of the water system safety concerns
Public health and safety of water system users endangered by MWC's decision to proceed without adequate safety infrastructure
Implementation of adequate safety infrastructure or reversal of MWC decision
given the gravity of the danger to public health and safety, Engineers A and B have an obligation to further pursue the matter.
MWC overruling engineering recommendations and proceeding with operational change without required safety measures
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked by Engineers A and B in Water Source Safety Dispute
Lead contamination risk to public water supply
Engineers A and B hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — specifically water rate payers at risk of lead contamination — over the MWC's decision to proceed with the water source change without required treatment infrastructure
In this context, public welfare paramountcy requires Engineers A and B to escalate their safety concerns beyond the MWC to state regulatory authorities and to continue pursuing resolution even after their engineering judgment is overruled
Public welfare obligation overrides deference to the MWC as client/employer; NSPE Canon 1 establishes this as the overriding professional charge, and the MWC's consent is explicitly not required
What are the ethical obligations of Engineer A and Engineer B in this circumstance?
Does Engineer A's dual role as both MWC superintendent (an administrative employee) and chief engineer (a licensed professional) create a structural conflict of interest that compromises his ability to independently escalate safety concerns, and should that dual role itself be examined as an ethical problem separate from the water source decision?
Given that the public meeting was sparsely attended, do Engineers A and B have an independent obligation to proactively inform the broader public — beyond formal regulatory channels — about the lead contamination risk created by the MWC's decision, particularly given that affected residents may be unaware of the danger?
At what point, if any, do Engineers A and B become ethically obligated to withdraw from their respective roles with the MWC if the commission continues to proceed with the premature water source change despite formal escalation to state regulatory authorities?
Does the MWC's financial motivation for accelerating the water source change — reducing municipal expenditures and lowering water rates — constitute a competing public good that Engineers A and B must weigh against the lead contamination risk, or does the nature and severity of the health risk categorically override cost-benefit considerations?
What should Engineer A and Engineer B do?
Does the Faithful Agent Notification Obligation — which requires Engineers A and B to advise the MWC that the project will not be successful — conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle when fulfilling that faithful agent duty might be interpreted by the MWC as tacit acceptance of the accelerated timeline rather than a continued objection to it?
Does the Coordinated Joint Escalation Obligation — which encourages Engineers A and B to act together — create tension with each engineer's independent Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation, such that one engineer's reluctance to escalate could improperly delay or suppress the other's independent duty to report to state regulatory authorities?
Does the Confidentiality Non-Applicability principle — established by BER 89-7 precedent — conflict with the Formal Presentation Requirement for Safety Escalation when the MWC, as client, has not explicitly consented to disclosure of its internal deliberations and financial motivations to the state regulatory agency, and how should Engineers A and B navigate that boundary?
Does the Persistent Escalation Obligation When Formal Presentations Fail to Sway MWC conflict with the Escalation Obligation When Initial Regulatory Report Is Insufficient, in the sense that Engineers A and B may face competing demands — continuing to press the MWC internally versus redirecting escalation energy entirely toward state regulatory authorities — and how should they prioritize these simultaneous obligations?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's dual role as both MWC superintendent and chief engineer create an irreconcilable conflict of duty — specifically, does the administrative obligation to serve the MWC's institutional interests structurally undermine the independent professional duty to hold public safety paramount, and if so, which duty takes categorical precedence?
From a consequentialist perspective, does the MWC's financial motivation to reduce water rates — a benefit distributed across the entire ratepayer population — ever justify accepting a probabilistic risk of lead contamination concentrated among the most vulnerable users, such as children and pregnant women in older housing stock, and how should engineers weigh aggregate economic benefit against disproportionate harm to a subset of the public?
From a virtue ethics standpoint, does Engineer B demonstrate the professional virtue of courage — as distinct from mere technical competence — by producing a report that formally documents the corrosion control precondition, and does the virtue of integrity require Engineer B to go further by actively advocating for that report's findings in public forums beyond the sparsely attended MWC meeting?
From a deontological perspective, does Code provision II.1.c — which conditions disclosure of client information on prior consent — create a genuine moral tension with the independent escalation obligation under II.1.a, and does the BER 89-7 precedent resolve this tension by establishing that confidentiality duties are categorically subordinate to public safety duties, or does it merely carve out a narrow exception that engineers must justify case by case?
If the MWC meeting had been well-attended by the public rather than sparsely attended, would Engineers A and B have faced a reduced independent obligation to escalate to the state regulatory agency — on the theory that an informed public could itself apply democratic pressure — or does the escalation obligation to regulatory authorities exist independently of the level of public awareness at any given meeting?
If Engineer B had structured the consulting report to include an explicit written statement that proceeding without completing corrosion control improvements would constitute an unacceptable public health risk — rather than framing the findings as a recommendation for delay — would the MWC have been legally and ethically foreclosed from overriding the engineers' judgment, and would Engineer A's subsequent escalation obligations have been triggered more immediately?
If Engineers A and B had already made formal written contact with the state regulatory agency before the MWC vote — rather than only informal preliminary contact — would the MWC have been deterred from overriding their recommendations, and does the existence of prior informal regulatory contact create a heightened ethical obligation to formalize that contact immediately upon the MWC's override decision?
If Engineer A, as MWC superintendent, had the administrative authority to delay implementation of the water source change unilaterally — independent of the MWC board vote — would exercising that authority constitute a fulfillment of the paramount public safety obligation, or would it represent an improper substitution of individual engineering judgment for legitimate democratic governance, and how should the engineer navigate that boundary?
Sparse Public Attendance at MWC Water Source Decision Meeting
At the MWC meeting where Engineer A and Engineer B presented recommendations
Public participation process for MWC water source change decision
Meeting concluded with MWC vote to proceed
MWC held a public meeting on a significant public health infrastructure decision that was sparsely attended by the public
Sparsely Attended Meeting Outcome → Engineer Recommendations Overruled
{'jurisdiction': 'State-level', 'domain': 'Water supply / public health regulation', 'contact_status': 'Initially contacted; formal presentation still required'}
The state regulatory agency that has been contacted by Engineers A and B regarding the water supply safety concerns; identified as requiring a formal written presentation of facts, findings, and recommendations beyond the initial contact already made.
{'type': 'notification_recipient', 'target': 'Engineer A Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
{'type': 'notification_recipient', 'target': 'Engineer B Joint Public Safety Escalation Engineer'}
it appears that the state regulatory agency has been contacted; however, there should be a formal presentation of the facts, findings, and recommendations
accelerated evaluation and design of water treatment improvements overlaps change in water source
corrosion control improvements before water source change (as recommended)
fire before building investigation by Engineer A (BER 19-10)
formal presentations to MWC and state regulatory agency before further escalation of the matter
joint presentation of findings and recommendations by Engineers A and B before MWC vote to override recommendations
three-year evaluation/design/construction timeline before change in water source