{'organization': 'U.S. Army', 'authority_type': 'Institutional directing authority'}
Army official who requested Engineer A certify arms storage rooms and racks under specialized regulations outside Engineer A's competence.
{'type': 'directs', 'target': 'Engineer A BER-98-8 Certifying Engineer'}
An Army official requested that Engineer A certify that certain arms storage rooms and arms storage racks on the military installation were in accordance with certain specific, lengthy, and detailed Army physical security, arms, ammunition, and explosive regulations
BER 85-3 Chemical Engineer County Surveyor Employment
From county commissioners' appointment of the chemical engineer through Board's ethical determination
county commissioners met and decided to appoint an engineer, a P.E., with experience and educational background solely in the field of chemical engineering
Employment Context Competence Constraint State
Chemical engineer's acceptance of county surveyor position requiring surveying oversight competence
Board determination that acceptance of the position was unethical
The duties and responsibilities of the position of county surveyor included oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects
it was unethical for Engineer A to accept the position as county surveyor
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible in the usual employment context, for a county surveyor with no background or expertise in surveying to perform effective oversight
whatever course of action he took would result in unethical conduct and compromise his role as county surveyor
County commissioners' appointment of a PE with solely chemical engineering background to county surveyor position requiring oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects
BER 94-8 Engineer A Peer Competence Challenge Obligation
From Engineer A's identification of Engineer B's competence concerns through resolution
Engineer A had reservations concerning the competence of Engineer B to design the structural footings and reported his concerns to the contractor
Peer Competence Challenge Reporting Obligation State
Engineer A's obligation upon identifying Engineer B's competence deficiency on shared project
Engineer A reporting concerns to contractor; Board's ethical determination
Engineer A had an ethical obligation to confront Engineer B to make his concerns known
Engineer A had an ethical responsibility to question Engineer B's competency and report his concerns to the contractor
Engineer A had an objective basis to determine whether Engineer B had sufficient education, experience, and training
If Engineer B refused to acquiesce to Engineer A's recommendation, Engineer A had an obligation under the NSPE Code of Ethics to bring the matter to the attention of his client and to the authorities as appropriate
Engineer A's recognition that Engineer B lacked apparent training in foundation design for the assigned structural footing task
BER 94-8 Engineer B Chemical Engineer Structural Footing Assignment
From Engineer B's retention by construction contractor through Board's ethical determination
Engineer B's degree and background were in chemical engineering
Domain-Specific Incompetence with General Licensure State
Engineer B's retention to design structural footings despite chemical engineering background
Board determination that Engineer B's performance of structural footing design would be unethical
Engineer A was unable to establish that Engineer B had any apparent subsequent training in foundation design
Engineer B was retained specifically for the sole and exclusive purpose of designing the structural footings
it would be unethical for Engineer B to perform the design of the structural footings
Construction contractor's retention of Engineer B (chemical engineer) specifically to design structural footings for industrial facility
From the time Army official requested certification through Engineer A's ethical refusal
Engineer A had no significant training or knowledge in these areas
Training Funds Unavailable for Competence Remediation State
Engineer A's assignment to certify arms storage facilities at U.S. Army installation
Board determination that certification would be unethical; Engineer A's ethical refusal
There were comprehensive training programs available for this type of work, but training funds were not available
competency issues at stake posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety
insufficient funds exist for Engineer A to participate in such programs
it would not be ethical for Engineer A to certify as a qualified engineer the arms storage rooms and arms storage racks
Army official's request that Engineer A certify arms storage rooms and racks under detailed Army physical security regulations outside Engineer A's competence
In another case, BER Case 85-3, a local county ordinance required that the position of county surveyor be filled by a Professional Engineer.
After considering the two earlier cases, the Board decided it was unethical for Engineer A to accept the position as county surveyor.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review as analogical precedent for the present case
Cited as precedent establishing that it is unethical for an engineer to accept a professional position (county surveyor) that requires competencies outside their area of expertise, distinguishing between consulting practice flexibility and employment context constraints
In BER Case 94-8, Engineer A, a professional engineer, was working with a construction contractor on a design/build project
Importantly, in BER Case 94-8, the Board also noted that Engineer A had an objective basis to determine whether Engineer B had sufficient education, experience, and training
Cited as precedent establishing that it is unethical for an engineer to perform design work outside their competency area, and that a supervising engineer has an ethical obligation to question and report competency concerns to the client and relevant authorities, and to recommend withdrawal if necessary
In BER Case 98-8, the Board had the opportunity to review the question of the ethical obligation of licensed engineers to practice solely within their area of competency.
as suggested in BER Case 98-8, seek appropriate education and training before undertaking new and different tasks
Cited as precedent establishing that a licensed engineer must not certify work outside their area of competency, especially where doing so poses a clear and present danger to public health and safety; also cited for the duty to seek appropriate education and training before undertaking new tasks
CausalLink_Design Using Established Princ
CausalLink_Proceed Without Literature Rev
CausalLink_Release Design for Constructio
Causal Nexus Requirement Applied To Engineer A Design Failure Culpability
Ethical culpability determination for structural design failure
Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization
The Board's ethical evaluation of Engineer A requires establishing that (1) Engineer A's failure to apply the newly published severe weather design parameters fell below the applicable standard of care, and (2) this failure was causally necessary for the structural damage — both elements being required before an ethical violation finding is warranted.
The causal nexus is explicitly established in the case: 'had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred.' This counterfactual causation satisfies the causal nexus element. The remaining ethical question is whether Engineer A's conduct fell below the standard of care — i.e., whether the failure to know and apply the new standards was a breach of professional duty or an understandable knowledge gap given the recency of publication.
Engineer A Present Case Design Failure Subject
Causal Nexus Requirement for Design Failure Ethical Culpability
It is determined that had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred.
The causal nexus is clear, but causal connection alone does not establish ethical culpability — the conduct must also have been below the standard of care. The Board's analysis must separate the question of causation (established) from the question of standard-of-care breach (contested given recency of published standards). Proportionality in misconduct characterization further counsels against treating an honest knowledge gap as equivalent to deliberate disregard.
Engineer A, who has experience with structural designs in this area of the country, designs the structural system based upon what Engineer A believes constitutes sound structural engineering principles
It is determined that had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred
While Engineer A generally attempts to stay current on changing structural design trends, Engineer A was not familiar with this recent technical literature
Competence Principle Invoked in BER 94-8 Structural Footing Design
Structural footing design for industrial facility by chemical PE
Employer and Client Pressure Non-Exemption from Competence Boundary
Engineer B, a chemical PE, was retained to design structural footings for an industrial facility; the Board held this unethical because Engineer B lacked apparent training in foundation design, and the engagement was specifically for that out-of-competence task.
A chemical PE's credentials do not extend to structural footing design; the fact that Engineer B was retained specifically for that task made referral to a competent structural engineer implausible under the facts
Engineer B BER-94-8 Out-of-Competence Structural Designer
The Board determined that it would be unethical for Engineer B to perform the design of the structural footings as part of the facility and also that Engineer A had an ethical responsibility to question Engineer B's competency and report his concerns to the contractor.
Competence boundary requires refusal of the engagement; the option of sub-retaining a structural engineer was not feasible given the specific nature of the retention
Engineer B's degree and background were in chemical engineering.
The Board determined that it would be unethical for Engineer B to perform the design of the structural footings as part of the facility
Competence Principle Invoked in BER 98-8 Arms Storage Certification
Arms storage room and rack certification under Army physical security regulations
Engineer A, a civil PE, was directed to certify arms storage rooms and racks under specialized Army regulations outside his expertise; the Board held this would be unethical because Engineer A lacked the required knowledge and training funds were unavailable.
Competence requires not only general professional licensure but domain-specific knowledge of the specialized regulations and procedures at issue; civil PE credentials do not extend to military hardware storage compliance
making certain that a military hardware storage facility was designed and built safely involves keen awareness of many complex and detailed procedures, rules, and regulations that are unique to this field of endeavor and while Engineer A may be a very competent engineer, Engineer A is clearly not knowledgeable in this very technical and complicated area.
Competence boundary holds even when employer requests certification and training funds are unavailable
While there may be comprehensive training programs available, the facts reveal that insufficient funds exist for Engineer A to participate in such programs.
Competence Standard Evolution — Severe Weather Structural Design
From publication of new severe weather design parameters through the structural failure determination
Structural engineering profession broadly
new and improved design methods have recently been developed to address the severe weather conditions
The professional landscape of severe weather structural design standards at the time of Engineer A's design
Not terminated within the case timeframe
These new and improved severe weather design standards have been published in the most recent technical literature
it is determined that had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred
Development and publication of new and improved severe weather design methods in technical literature
It was not unethical for Engineer A to fail to follow the most recent design parameters for structural design in severe weather areas published in the most recent technical literature.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A's failure to follow the most recent severe weather design parameters was not unethical, the analysis reveals a meaningful but underexplored distinction between the obligation to comply with formally adopted standards and the obligation to track emerging best practices. Because the severe weather design parameters existed only in recent technical literature and had not yet been promulgated as binding code requirements at the time of Engineer A's design, the Board correctly declined to treat their non-adoption as a per se ethical violation. However, this distinction should not be read as eliminating any affirmative currency obligation. The NSPE Code's continuing competence provisions impose an ongoing duty on engineers to remain current in their area of practice, and an engineer who knowingly practices in a high-risk severe weather zone bears a heightened — not merely average — duty of domain-targeted literature vigilance. The Board's conclusion is defensible on its facts, but it implicitly sets a precedent that 'generally attempting to stay current' satisfies the currency obligation even in specialized, high-risk practice environments. That precedent deserves qualification: the reasonableness of an engineer's currency efforts must be calibrated to the known risk profile of the practice domain, meaning that an engineer practicing in a severe weather zone should be held to a more proactive standard of literature review than one practicing in a low-hazard environment, even when new parameters have not yet achieved formal standardization.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A did not act unethically rests substantially on the absence of intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct — a proportionality-in-misconduct framework that shields good-faith practitioners from ethical sanction when their knowledge gaps are inadvertent. While this framework is appropriate and consistent with prior Board precedent, it creates a tension with the Standard of Care as Ethical Floor principle, which holds that the ethical obligation to meet the standard of care exists independently of whether harm actually results or whether the practitioner acted in good faith. The Board's analysis does not adequately resolve this tension. A more complete analysis would acknowledge that the standard of care functions as an objective floor: an engineer's subjective good faith may mitigate the severity of the ethical finding or inform the appropriate remedy, but it does not dissolve the underlying obligation to meet that floor. Applied here, Engineer A's good faith is relevant to culpability and proportionate response, but it does not mean that his design met the standard of care. The Board's conclusion would be strengthened — and less susceptible to misapplication as a blanket currency excuse — if it explicitly stated that Engineer A's conduct, while not rising to an ethical violation given the pre-standardization status of the parameters and his general currency efforts, nonetheless fell short of the optimal standard of care, and that this shortfall carries professional lessons even if it does not carry ethical sanction.
The Board's conclusion, while exonerating Engineer A from an ethical violation, leaves unaddressed a significant post-failure obligation that flows directly from the Code's public welfare and personal responsibility provisions. Once the post-failure analysis established that following the recently published severe weather design parameters would have prevented the structural failure, Engineer A acquired an affirmative ethical obligation to acknowledge the missed opportunity, engage in honest self-assessment, and — consistent with the profession's broader duty to protect public welfare — communicate the lessons learned to other practitioners working in severe weather zones. This obligation is distinct from the question of whether Engineer A violated the Code in designing the building; it arises from the Code's requirement that engineers accept personal responsibility for their professional activities and from the public welfare paramount principle, which extends beyond the individual project to the broader engineering community. The Board's analysis, by focusing exclusively on whether Engineer A's pre-failure conduct was unethical, misses this forward-looking dimension entirely. A complete ethical analysis of this case should affirm that Engineer A, having now been made aware of the gap between his design assumptions and the available severe weather parameters, bears a professional obligation to ensure that this knowledge gap does not persist — either in his own future practice or, through appropriate professional channels, in the practice of peers who may face the same vulnerability. Failure to act on this post-failure obligation would itself constitute a departure from the ethical high road that the Board implicitly invites Engineer A to take.
Comparing the Board's reasoning in the present case to its holdings in BER 98-8 and BER 94-8 reveals a potentially inconsistent threshold between domain-boundary competence gaps and intra-domain currency gaps. In BER 98-8 and BER 94-8, the Board held engineers strictly accountable for accepting assignments that fell outside their demonstrated area of competence, treating the domain boundary as a bright ethical line. In the present case, however, the Board applies a more forgiving reasonableness standard to Engineer A's failure to incorporate recently published parameters within a domain he unquestionably occupies. The practical risk to building occupants in both scenarios may be equivalent — indeed, the present case resulted in actual structural failure — yet the ethical treatment diverges significantly. This asymmetry suggests that the Board's competence framework is more sensitive to categorical domain crossings than to qualitative currency failures within a domain, even when the latter produce equivalent or greater public harm. A more coherent and internally consistent framework would recognize that the ethical obligation of competence has two equally binding dimensions: the obligation not to practice outside one's domain, and the obligation to maintain sufficient currency within one's domain to deliver services that meet the evolving standard of care. The Board's present case analysis, while reaching a defensible outcome on its specific facts, would benefit from explicitly acknowledging this dual structure and clarifying that the reasonableness standard for currency does not create a lower tier of ethical obligation for intra-domain knowledge gaps in high-risk practice environments.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted ethically does implicitly establish a precedent that engineers may rely on their existing expertise without systematic, domain-targeted monitoring of recent technical literature, provided their general effort to stay current is reasonable under the circumstances. However, this precedent sits in uncomfortable tension with the Code's continuing competence obligations. The Code's mandate that engineers perform services only in areas of their competence is not a static snapshot of competence at the time of licensure — it is a dynamic, ongoing obligation. In a rapidly evolving technical domain such as severe weather structural design, where the consequences of outdated methods are demonstrably catastrophic, 'generally attempting to stay current' may fall below the threshold that the continuing competence obligation actually demands. The Board's precedent, while defensible on proportionality grounds, risks normalizing a passive approach to professional currency that the Code's affirmative language does not clearly sanction. Engineers practicing in high-risk, rapidly evolving domains should not read this precedent as permission to rely on periodic, unfocused literature awareness when domain-specific developments with direct safety implications are being actively published.
After the structural failure is attributed to Engineer A's unfamiliarity with recently published severe weather design parameters, an affirmative ethical obligation to disclose lessons learned to the broader professional community arises, even though the Board did not explicitly address it. The Code's requirement that engineers accept personal responsibility for their professional activities, combined with the paramount obligation to protect public welfare, supports the conclusion that Engineer A bears a post-failure duty to communicate the nature of the knowledge gap and its consequences to peers practicing in severe weather zones. This obligation is not punitive — it does not retroactively convert an ethical act into an unethical one — but it is prospective and affirmative. The engineering profession's self-regulatory legitimacy depends in part on practitioners sharing failure-derived knowledge so that systemic gaps in practice currency can be corrected. Silence following a preventable structural failure, even one that does not rise to an ethical violation, would itself represent a failure of the professional integrity that the Code demands. Engineer A's most ethically constructive post-failure path is proactive disclosure through professional channels, not passive acceptance of the Board's exoneration.
The ethical analysis should meaningfully distinguish between an engineer's obligation to comply with formally promulgated mandatory standards and an obligation to track emerging best practices published in technical literature. These are not equivalent duties, and conflating them distorts the culpability calculus. Formal standards carry the force of legal and regulatory obligation; failure to comply with them is both a legal and ethical breach that requires no further causal analysis. Emerging best practices in technical literature occupy a different normative space: they represent the profession's evolving frontier of knowledge, and an engineer's obligation to engage with them is real but graduated by factors including the rate of publication, the accessibility of the literature, the domain's risk profile, and the degree to which the new parameters depart from established practice. In the present case, the severe weather design parameters had not achieved formal standardization, which appropriately reduces Engineer A's culpability. However, this distinction does not eliminate the ethical obligation entirely — it calibrates it. An engineer knowingly practicing in a high-risk severe weather zone bears a heightened duty to monitor domain-specific emerging literature precisely because the consequences of currency failure are foreseeable and severe. The pre-standardization status of the parameters mitigates but does not extinguish the ethical weight of Engineer A's knowledge gap.
The Board's analysis does not adequately address whether Engineer A bore an ongoing ethical obligation during the plan-review and construction-administration stages to revisit his design assumptions in light of newly available information. Engineering design is not a single discrete act — it extends through plan review, construction administration, and in some interpretations through the service life of the structure. If the severe weather design parameters were published and accessible before construction was completed, Engineer A had at least one additional opportunity to identify and correct the deficiency. The ethical obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public does not terminate when drawings are sealed; it persists as long as the engineer retains a professional relationship with the project. The Board's silence on this ongoing duty is a significant analytical gap. Even accepting that Engineer A's initial design did not constitute an ethical violation, the failure to conduct any literature review during the construction period — particularly for a building in a known severe weather zone — may represent a separate and underexamined ethical shortcoming that the Board's single-question framing did not capture.
The Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization principle — which shields Engineer A from an unethical finding because his knowledge gap was neither intentional nor reckless — does conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle in a meaningful and unresolved way. The Public Welfare Paramount principle is outcome-oriented and agent-neutral: it demands that the safety of building occupants take precedence regardless of the engineer's subjective mental state. Proportionality in misconduct characterization, by contrast, is agent-centered and intent-sensitive. The Board resolves this tension by privileging the proportionality principle, effectively holding that good faith effort, even when it produces a preventable catastrophic outcome, is sufficient to satisfy the Code's ethical demands. This resolution is defensible as a matter of professional discipline — the Code cannot function as strict liability — but it is incomplete as a matter of ethical analysis. A fully adequate ethical framework would acknowledge that even where no violation is found, the outcome represents a failure of the profession's core commitment to public safety, and that the absence of moral culpability does not mean the outcome was ethically acceptable in any broader sense. The Board's conclusion is correct as a disciplinary matter but should not be read as an affirmation that Engineer A's conduct was optimal or that the public's interests were adequately served.
The Reasonableness Standard for Currency and the Continuing Competence Currency Obligation are not easily reconciled in the present case, and the Board's analysis does not fully confront the tension between them. The Reasonableness Standard excuses Engineer A's unfamiliarity with recently published literature on the grounds that his general effort to stay current was adequate. The Continuing Competence Currency Obligation, however, is not satisfied by general effort alone — it requires that engineers remain current in their area of practice, which in Engineer A's case is explicitly severe weather structural design in a severe weather zone. These two principles can be reconciled only if 'reasonableness' is defined with reference to the specific risk profile of the domain. A reasonable currency standard for a structural engineer practicing in a low-risk, stable technical environment is appropriately less demanding than one for an engineer who knowingly accepts commissions in a high-risk severe weather zone where design parameters are actively evolving. The Board's application of a uniform reasonableness standard, without calibrating it to the domain's risk profile and the engineer's known practice environment, understates the continuing competence obligation and sets a precedent that may be too permissive for high-risk specialty practice.
The Causal Nexus Requirement — which conditions an ethical violation finding on a demonstrated link between Engineer A's knowledge gap and the structural failure — does conflict with the Standard of Care as Ethical Floor principle, and the Board does not fully resolve this conflict. The Standard of Care as Ethical Floor holds that the ethical obligation to meet the standard of care exists independently of whether harm actually results. Under this principle, the absence of a causal nexus between Engineer A's knowledge gap and the structural failure would be irrelevant to the ethical analysis: if Engineer A failed to meet the standard of care, that failure is itself an ethical breach regardless of outcome. The Board's reliance on causal nexus as a threshold condition for finding a violation effectively converts the ethical analysis into a harm-based inquiry, which is more characteristic of tort law than professional ethics. The more principled approach would be to assess whether Engineer A's conduct met the standard of care at the time of design, and to treat the structural failure as evidence bearing on that question rather than as a necessary condition for finding a violation. The Board's causal nexus framing, while pragmatically defensible, risks conflating ethical obligation with legal liability in a way that weakens the Code's independent normative force.
Comparing the Board's treatment of domain-boundary competence gaps in BER 98-8 and BER 94-8 with its treatment of currency gaps within an acknowledged domain in the present case reveals an asymmetry that is difficult to justify on principled grounds. In BER 98-8 and BER 94-8, engineers were held strictly accountable for accepting assignments outside their demonstrated expertise — the ethical violation was found without requiring proof of harm or causal nexus. In the present case, Engineer A's currency gap within his acknowledged domain of severe weather structural design is excused on reasonableness grounds, even though the practical risk to building occupants was equivalent to or greater than the risks in the prior cases. The Board appears to apply a stricter threshold for domain-boundary competence gaps than for currency gaps within a domain, treating the former as categorically impermissible and the latter as subject to a reasonableness balancing test. This distinction may be defensible on the grounds that domain-boundary gaps are more readily identifiable and avoidable, while currency gaps are inherently gradual and contextual. However, when the currency gap is in a high-risk specialty domain and the engineer is knowingly practicing in that domain, the practical risk equivalence undermines the justification for differential treatment. The Board should either articulate a principled basis for the asymmetry or apply a more demanding currency standard to high-risk specialty practice.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer A's general effort to stay current does not fully satisfy the categorical duty to maintain competence currency when that duty is examined in light of the specific practice environment. Kant's categorical imperative requires that a maxim be universalizable: if every structural engineer practicing in a known severe weather zone were to rely on general, unfocused literature awareness rather than systematic, domain-targeted monitoring, the profession's capacity to protect public safety in high-risk environments would be systematically undermined. The maxim 'I will generally attempt to stay current but will not systematically monitor domain-specific literature in my high-risk specialty area' cannot be universalized without producing outcomes that contradict the very purpose of professional engineering. A deontological analysis therefore suggests that Engineer A's general effort, while not reckless, falls short of the categorical duty that the Code's competence and public welfare provisions impose. The duty to maintain competence currency in a high-risk specialty domain requires affirmative, systematic, and domain-targeted literature monitoring — not merely a general disposition toward awareness — regardless of whether new parameters have achieved formal standardization.
From a consequentialist standpoint, the magnitude of the preventable harm in this case does expose a deficiency in the Board's conclusion, even when the pre-standardization status of the severe weather parameters is taken into account. Consequentialist ethics evaluates the ethical quality of conduct by reference to its outcomes and the foreseeability of those outcomes. The structural failure caused significant damage; it was determined that following the published parameters would have prevented it; and Engineer A was knowingly practicing in a severe weather zone where the risk of exactly this type of failure was foreseeable. A consequentialist analysis would ask whether a different decision rule — one that required domain-targeted literature monitoring for engineers in high-risk specialty zones — would have produced better outcomes across the population of similar cases. The answer is almost certainly yes. The Board's conclusion, while defensible under a deontological proportionality framework, does not adequately account for the preventable harm dimension that consequentialist ethics demands. The pre-standardization status of the parameters reduces but does not eliminate the consequentialist case for finding Engineer A's conduct ethically deficient, because the parameters were accessible, the risk was foreseeable, and the harm was preventable.
From a virtue ethics perspective, an engineer of good professional character who knowingly practices in a severe weather zone does not demonstrate sufficient diligence and prudence by only 'generally attempting' to stay current. Virtue ethics asks what a person of excellent professional character — one who has fully internalized the values of the engineering profession — would do in Engineer A's situation. Such a person, aware that they practice in a high-risk severe weather environment, would recognize that the virtue of professional integrity demands more than passive openness to new information: it demands proactive, targeted engagement with the literature most directly relevant to the safety of the structures they design. The virtuous engineer in a severe weather zone would treat domain-specific literature review not as an optional enhancement but as a constitutive element of professional practice in that environment. Engineer A's general approach to currency, while not vicious, falls short of the standard of professional excellence that virtue ethics demands. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted ethically is defensible as a minimum threshold judgment, but virtue ethics reveals that Engineer A's conduct, while not blameworthy in the disciplinary sense, was not the conduct of a fully excellent professional.
From a deontological perspective, the NSPE Code's mandate to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public does impose a duty on Engineer A that is independent of whether the severe weather design parameters had achieved formal standardization. The Code's public welfare provision is not contingent on the existence of formal standards — it is a categorical obligation that applies whenever an engineer's design decisions foreseeably affect public safety. An engineer who knowingly accepts a commission in a severe weather zone thereby assumes a heightened duty of literature vigilance with respect to severe weather design, because the connection between currency failure and public harm is direct and foreseeable in that practice environment. The pre-standardization status of the parameters is relevant to the legal compliance analysis but not to the deontological ethical analysis: the duty to protect public safety exists independently of whether the profession has formally codified the best available methods for doing so. Engineer A's failure to discharge this heightened duty of literature vigilance — even if not reckless or intentional — represents a deontological shortcoming that the Board's conclusion does not fully acknowledge.
If the severe weather design parameters had been formally adopted as a mandatory code standard at the time of Engineer A's design, the Board would almost certainly have reached a different conclusion and found an ethical violation. This distinction reveals a significant and troubling gap between legal compliance and ethical obligation in professional engineering practice. The Code's ethical obligations are not coextensive with formal legal requirements — they are intended to set a higher standard that anticipates and exceeds minimum legal compliance. When the Board effectively treats formal standardization as the threshold for ethical obligation, it collapses the distinction between ethics and law that the Code is designed to maintain. The ethical obligation to protect public safety through competent, current design practice should not depend on whether the profession's standard-setting bodies have completed their formal adoption processes. Engineers in high-risk specialty domains bear an ethical obligation to engage with the best available knowledge, not merely the most recently codified knowledge. The Board's implicit reliance on the pre-standardization status of the parameters as a decisive factor in the culpability analysis understates the independent normative force of the Code's public welfare and competence provisions.
If Engineer A had conducted a targeted review of severe weather structural design literature before beginning the project and had discovered the new design parameters but chosen not to adopt them, the Board's analysis would have shifted from a question of currency failure to one of deliberate non-adoption, and that shift would almost certainly have produced a finding of ethical violation. Deliberate non-adoption of known, published safety-relevant parameters in a high-risk practice environment would be difficult to characterize as anything other than a reckless disregard for public welfare. This counterfactual illuminates an important asymmetry in the Board's analysis: the ethical outcome turns entirely on whether Engineer A knew about the parameters, not on whether his design adequately protected the public. The building's occupants were equally at risk regardless of Engineer A's subjective awareness. This asymmetry is defensible as a matter of professional discipline — intent and knowledge are relevant to culpability — but it should prompt the profession to ask whether the current framework adequately incentivizes proactive literature review. An engineer who avoids reading the literature avoids the knowledge that would trigger a clear ethical obligation, which creates a perverse incentive structure that the Board's analysis does not address.
If Engineer A had engaged a subconsultant with specific expertise in severe weather structural design — as the Board suggested was appropriate in the analogous BER 85-3 competence gap scenario — the structural failure would likely have been avoided, and the failure to consider subconsultant engagement represents a missed ethical obligation that the Board underweighted. BER 85-3 established that when an engineer's competence is insufficient for a specific assignment, engaging a qualified subconsultant is the ethically appropriate response. While the Board in the present case did not find that Engineer A lacked competence in severe weather structural design generally, the specific currency gap regarding recently published parameters created a functional competence deficiency with respect to the most current design methods. The ethical logic of BER 85-3 applies with equal force to currency-based competence deficiencies as to domain-boundary deficiencies: when an engineer's knowledge is insufficient to deliver the level of protection that the public is entitled to expect, the ethical response is to supplement that knowledge through consultation, not to proceed on the basis of what one already knows. The Board's failure to address the subconsultant option in the present case leaves a significant gap in its analysis and suggests that the BER 85-3 principle was not applied with sufficient consistency.
If the severe weather event had not occurred and the structural deficiency had never been discovered, Engineer A's failure to review the recent technical literature would still constitute a latent ethical breach, even though its consequences remained unrealized. The Standard of Care as Ethical Floor principle holds that the ethical obligation to meet the standard of care exists independently of whether harm results. An engineer who designs a structure that is more vulnerable to foreseeable severe weather than the best available methods would have permitted has failed a professional obligation at the moment of design, not at the moment of structural failure. The profession should treat such latent ethical breaches as real and significant, even when they are never discovered, because the ethical obligation is owed to the public at the time of design — not contingent on the occurrence of harm. This principle has important implications for how the engineering profession approaches self-assessment, peer review, and continuing education: engineers should evaluate their practice against the best available knowledge, not merely against the outcomes their designs have produced. A profession that treats undiscovered deficiencies as non-events will systematically underinvest in the currency maintenance that public safety demands.
The Board resolved the tension between Public Welfare Paramount and Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization by implicitly subordinating the absolute public-safety imperative to a subjective moral-culpability filter. Rather than treating the duty to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public as an independent, outcome-oriented obligation — one that is satisfied or violated regardless of the engineer's intent — the Board conditioned an ethical violation finding on evidence of intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct. This resolution is analytically coherent within the Board's framework but carries a significant cost: it allows a demonstrably preventable structural failure, causally linked to a knowledge gap in a known high-risk practice environment, to escape ethical censure entirely. The case thereby teaches that, as applied by this Board, Public Welfare Paramount functions as a background aspiration rather than a strict liability floor — a prioritization choice that is defensible in individual cases but that, if generalized, weakens the Code's protective force precisely in the high-consequence scenarios where it should be strongest.
The Board's application of the Reasonableness Standard for Currency to excuse Engineer A's unfamiliarity with recently published severe weather design parameters stands in unresolved tension with the Continuing Competence Currency Obligation, and the case fails to reconcile them. The Continuing Competence Currency Obligation — grounded in Code Section II.2 and reinforced by the analogous competence cases BER 98-8 and BER 94-8 — imposes an affirmative, forward-looking duty on engineers to remain current in their area of practice. The Reasonableness Standard for Currency, as the Board applies it here, effectively converts that affirmative duty into a passive one: an engineer satisfies it by 'generally attempting' to stay current, even when that general effort fails to capture domain-specific literature directly relevant to a known high-risk practice environment. The tension is sharpest because Engineer A's practice domain — severe weather structural design — is precisely the domain in which the new parameters were published. A reasonableness standard calibrated to general awareness may be appropriate for peripheral or tangential developments, but applying it to core-domain literature in a high-consequence specialty effectively nullifies the Continuing Competence Currency Obligation in the cases where it matters most. The Board's failure to distinguish between peripheral and core-domain currency gaps leaves this tension unresolved and creates an internally inconsistent competence framework.
Taken together, the Board's treatment of the Causal Nexus Requirement, the Standard of Care as Ethical Floor, and the pre-standardization status of the severe weather parameters reveals a three-layered insulation against ethical liability that, while individually defensible, compounds into an outcome that is difficult to square with the Code's foundational public-safety mandate. First, the pre-standardization status of the parameters reduces the normative weight of Engineer A's knowledge gap — the parameters were best practices, not binding rules. Second, the Reasonableness Standard for Currency excuses the gap as a non-reckless oversight. Third, the Causal Nexus Requirement, while satisfied here in fact, is framed as a necessary condition for an ethical violation, meaning that identical conduct producing no structural failure would generate no ethical scrutiny at all. The Standard of Care as Ethical Floor principle — which holds that the ethical obligation to meet the standard of care exists independently of whether harm results — is nominally invoked but functionally overridden by this layered framework. The case therefore teaches that the Board prioritizes a fault-based, harm-contingent model of ethical accountability over a duty-based, conduct-contingent model, and that this prioritization is most consequential — and most contestable — in rapidly evolving technical domains where the gap between emerging best practices and formal standards is both real and foreseeable.
{'role_type': 'Construction contractor and project client'}
Construction contractor on the design/build project who separately retained Engineer B for structural footing design and received Engineer A's competency concerns.
{'type': 'receives_report_from', 'target': 'Engineer A BER-94-8 Competency Challenger'}
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Engineer B BER-94-8 Out-of-Competence Structural Designer'}
Engineer A, a professional engineer, was working with a construction contractor on a design/build project
the construction contractor separately retained the services of Engineer B
Continuing Competence Currency Obligation Invoked By Engineer A Present Case
Structural system design for building in severe weather region
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region using established but outdated methods, failing to incorporate newly published severe weather design standards that were available in the technical literature at the time of design, despite generally attempting to stay current with design trends.
The principle requires that engineers actively monitor and incorporate current published standards in their specialty. Engineer A's general effort to stay current was insufficient in this instance — the newly published severe weather design parameters were material to the project and their omission was causally linked to the structural failure. The ethical question is whether the gap between general currency efforts and actual knowledge of this specific literature constitutes a breach of the competence currency obligation.
Continuing Competence Currency Obligation
While Engineer A generally attempts to stay current on changing structural design trends, Engineer A was not familiar with this recent technical literature.
The Board must determine whether the recently published standards had sufficiently penetrated the profession to be within the reasonable knowledge of a competent practitioner in this specialty. If so, Engineer A's failure to know them breaches the currency obligation. If the standards were too newly published to be reasonably expected knowledge, the standard of care may not yet have incorporated them, and the ethical violation finding would be weakened.
new and improved design methods have recently been developed to address the severe weather conditions in the location in which Engineer A practices
Continuing Competence Currency Obligation Invoked in Present Case
Engineer A Present Case Design Failure Subject's obligation to follow severe weather design developments
Moral Culpability Threshold for Ethical Violation in Design Failure
Reasonableness Standard for Knowledge Currency in Engineering Practice
The Board affirmed that engineers have a duty to seek to stay current on design trends and technology, and must maintain current knowledge about new practice developments in their specific practice area — but bounded this obligation by the reasonableness standard and the standards/emerging-literature distinction.
The currency obligation is real and enforceable, but its scope is bounded: it extends to established standards and generally accepted practice, not to every new technique or parameter not yet peer-reviewed or incorporated into standards
An engineer certainly has a duty to seek to stay current on design trends and technology, and as suggested in BER Case 98-8, seek appropriate education and training before undertaking new and different tasks.
The currency obligation and the reasonableness standard operate together: the obligation is to follow established standards, and failure to do so may be unethical; but failure to follow emerging literature that has not yet become a standard is not unethical absent moral culpability
In addition, it is critical for engineers practicing in a specific area to maintain current knowledge about new practice developments and incorporate those methods, as appropriate, into their professional practice.
{'authority_type': 'Public appointing authority'}
County commissioners who appointed an out-of-competence chemical PE to the county surveyor position after the first appointee was found unqualified.
{'type': 'appoints', 'target': 'Engineer A BER-85-3 County Surveyor Appointee'}
The county commissioners met and decided to appoint an engineer, a P.E., with experience and educational background solely in the field of chemical engineering
Given that Engineer A practices structural design in a known severe weather zone and new design parameters had been published in technical literature (though not yet formally adopted as binding standards), what level of literature review and parameter adoption was ethically required before releasing the design for construction?
Engineer A's obligation to actively monitor and incorporate newly published severe weather structural design parameters before releasing the design for construction, given that the parameters existed in technical literature but had not yet been formally codified as mandatory standards.
Conduct targeted, domain-specific review of recently published severe weather structural design literature before finalizing and releasing the design, and incorporate any parameters that have achieved meaningful professional circulation even absent formal codification
Release the design based on established structural engineering principles and general professional currency efforts, treating the absence of formal standardization of the new parameters as sufficient justification for non-adoption
Engage a subconsultant with demonstrated current expertise in severe weather structural design to review and supplement the design before release, addressing the currency gap through collaborative practice rather than independent literature review
Engineer A — Structural Designer in Severe Weather Zone
Before finding that Engineer A committed an ethical violation for failing to apply newly published severe weather design parameters, must the ethics board establish both (a) a demonstrable causal nexus between that failure and the structural failure, and (b) that Engineer A's conduct rose to the level of intentional, reckless, or malicious disregard — or is the causal link alone, combined with a showing that the parameters were accessible, sufficient to support an ethical violation finding?
The ethics board's obligation to establish both a causal nexus between Engineer A's knowledge gap and the structural failure, and a threshold of moral culpability (intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct), before finding that Engineer A's failure to follow recently published severe weather design parameters constituted an ethical violation.
Find no ethical violation, requiring both a demonstrated causal nexus and evidence of intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct before imposing ethical sanction, and treating Engineer A's inadvertent knowledge gap as insufficient to meet the moral culpability threshold despite the established causal link
Find an ethical violation based on the established causal nexus and the accessibility of the published parameters, treating the demonstrated link between the knowledge gap and the structural failure as sufficient for culpability without requiring a separate showing of intentional or reckless conduct
Find no ethical violation for the pre-failure design conduct but issue a formal finding that Engineer A's design fell below the optimal standard of care, and impose a prospective remedial obligation — including targeted continuing education in severe weather design and disclosure of lessons learned to the profession — without characterizing the pre-failure conduct as an ethical breach
Ethics Board Evaluating Engineer A's Design Failure
After the post-failure analysis establishes that Engineer A's unfamiliarity with recently published severe weather design parameters causally contributed to the structural failure, what affirmative post-failure obligations does Engineer A bear — specifically, must Engineer A publicly acknowledge the knowledge gap and communicate lessons learned to the broader professional community, or is the Board's exoneration of the pre-failure conduct sufficient to discharge all ethical obligations arising from the incident?
Engineer A's post-failure obligation to honestly acknowledge the knowledge gap, assess whether the design fell short of the best available standard of care, and proactively communicate lessons learned to peers practicing in severe weather zones — as a forward-looking ethical duty distinct from the pre-failure design conduct question.
Proactively communicate the lessons learned from the structural failure — including the nature of the knowledge gap and the role of the recently published parameters — through professional channels such as peer publications, continuing education presentations, or professional society reporting, treating this disclosure as an affirmative ethical obligation arising from the public welfare paramount principle
Conduct an honest internal self-assessment of the design decisions and knowledge gap, update personal practice to incorporate the newly published severe weather parameters going forward, and respond candidly to direct professional inquiries about the failure without initiating broader public disclosure
Treat the Board's exoneration as resolving all ethical obligations arising from the incident, making no affirmative post-failure disclosure beyond what is legally required, on the grounds that the pre-standardization status of the parameters and the absence of reckless conduct fully discharge Engineer A's professional responsibilities with respect to this failure
Engineer A — Post-Failure Professional Responsibility
When designing a structure in a known severe weather zone, what level of domain-specific literature review satisfies the engineer's continuing competence and public welfare obligations before releasing the design for construction?
Engineer A's decision to release a structural design for construction in a known severe weather zone without conducting a targeted review of recently published severe weather design parameters, relying instead on established principles and a general approach to staying current.
Conduct a targeted, domain-specific review of recent severe weather structural design literature before finalizing and releasing the design, and incorporate or explicitly document the decision not to adopt any newly identified parameters
Release the design for construction based on established structural principles and a general ongoing awareness of professional developments, without conducting a project-specific severe weather literature search, on the grounds that the parameters have not yet been formally adopted as binding standards
Engage a subconsultant with demonstrated current expertise in severe weather structural design to review and supplement the design before release, treating the currency gap as a functional competence deficiency requiring supplemental expertise consistent with BER 85-3
After a post-failure analysis causally links a structural failure to an engineer's knowledge gap regarding recently published design parameters, what affirmative ethical obligations does the engineer bear with respect to self-assessment, disclosure of lessons learned, and communication to the broader professional community?
Engineer A's post-failure ethical obligations after a post-failure analysis establishes that his unfamiliarity with recently published severe weather design parameters contributed to structural damage — specifically, whether the Board's exoneration of pre-failure conduct exhausts the ethical analysis or whether affirmative forward-looking obligations arise independently.
Proactively communicate the lessons learned from the post-failure analysis — including the nature of the knowledge gap and the role of the recently published parameters — through professional channels such as peer-reviewed publication, conference presentation, or professional society reporting
Incorporate the lessons from the post-failure analysis into Engineer A's own future practice and firm protocols without broader public disclosure, on the grounds that the Board's exoneration of pre-failure conduct limits the scope of any affirmative post-failure obligation and that broader disclosure carries litigation risk
Cooperate fully with any formal post-failure investigation or standard-setting process initiated by the relevant professional body or regulatory authority, providing technical findings from the post-failure analysis to those bodies without independently initiating broader public disclosure
Employer and Client Pressure Non-Exemption Invoked Across Competence Cases
Engineer A BER-85-3 county commissioner appointment
Engineer B BER-94-8 contractor retention
The Board synthesized BER Cases 98-8, 94-8, and 85-3 to articulate the general principle that employer and client pressures — including resource constraints and institutional appointments — do not exempt engineers from the obligation to practice solely within their area of competence.
Whether the pressure comes from a military employer, a private contractor client, or a governmental appointing authority, the competence boundary is non-negotiable and cannot be waived by institutional authority
licensed engineers must make all efforts to perform professional services solely within their area of competence and not be unduly influenced either by employer or client pressures that could cause grave danger to the public health and safety.
Public welfare and professional competence obligations override institutional pressure; the employment context does not expand competence boundaries, though it may affect available remedies
Obviously there are important distinctions in applying the NSPE Code language to a consulting practice and applying the language in the context of an employment relationship.
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible in the usual employment context, for a county surveyor with no background or expertise in surveying to perform effective oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects for the county.
Engineer A BER-85-3 County Surveyor Appointee
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Chemical Engineering', 'position': 'County Surveyor', 'competency_gap': 'Land surveying and highway improvement oversight'}
Chemical PE appointed as county surveyor despite having no background or expertise in surveying; Board found it unethical to accept the position because the competency gap made effective oversight of surveying reports and highway projects impossible.
{'type': 'appointed_by', 'target': 'County Commissioners BER-85-3'}
{'type': 'employer', 'target': 'County Government BER-85-3'}
Out-of-Competence Public Sector Appointee Engineer
the county commissioners met and decided to appoint an engineer, a P.E., with experience and educational background solely in the field of chemical engineering
Engineer A BER-85-3 County Surveyor Appointment Acceptance Prohibition
County commissioners appointed a chemical PE as county surveyor after the first appointee was found unqualified. The county surveyor position required oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects. The engineer accepted the position.
Engineer A (BER Case 85-3, Chemical PE appointed as county surveyor)
Public Sector Out-of-Competence Appointment Acceptance Prohibition Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to decline the appointment as county surveyor because Engineer A's background was solely in chemical engineering and Engineer A lacked the competence to perform effective oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects.
The Board decided it was unethical for Engineer A to accept the position as county surveyor.
At the time the county commissioners offered the county surveyor appointment
whatever course of action he took would result in unethical conduct and compromise his role as county surveyor.
Engineer A BER-85-3 Domain-Specific Competence Boundary Recognition County Surveyor
Domain-Specific Competence Boundary Recognition Capability
Engineer A should have demonstrated the capability to recognize that the county surveyor position — requiring oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects — fell outside the boundary of chemical engineering competence, and declined the appointment accordingly.
BER Case 85-3 — Chemical PE appointed as county surveyor despite having no background or expertise in surveying
Board's finding that it was unethical for Engineer A to accept the county surveyor position given that Engineer A's background was solely in chemical engineering with no surveying expertise
The county commissioners met and decided to appoint an engineer, a P.E., with experience and educational background solely in the field of chemical engineering.
it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible in the usual employment context, for a county surveyor with no background or expertise in surveying to perform effective oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects
the Board decided it was unethical for Engineer A to accept the position as county surveyor.
Engineer A BER-94-8 Competency Challenger
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'project_role': 'Design/build project engineer', 'action_taken': 'Reported competency concerns to contractor'}
PE working on the same design/build project who identified Engineer B's competency gap in structural footing design, reported concerns to the contractor, and bore obligations to confront Engineer B, escalate to client, and if necessary withdraw.
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer B BER-94-8 Out-of-Competence Structural Designer'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'Construction Contractor BER-94-8'}
Competency-Challenging Co-Project Engineer
Engineer A was unable to establish that Engineer B had any apparent subsequent training in foundation design and Engineer A had reservations concerning the competence of Engineer B
Engineer A had an ethical obligation to confront Engineer B to make his concerns known to Engineer B, thus, recommending that Engineer B withdraw from the project
Engineer A BER-94-8 Peer Competency Challenge and Escalation
Engineer A, working on the same design/build project, identified that Engineer B (a chemical PE) lacked competence to design structural footings. Engineer A reported concerns to the contractor.
Engineer A (BER Case 94-8, PE on design/build project)
Out-of-Competence Peer Competency Challenge and Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to: (1) confront Engineer B directly and recommend withdrawal from the structural footing design task; (2) if Engineer B refused, report concerns to the contractor; and (3) if concerns remained unaddressed, escalate to appropriate authorities and, if necessary, withdraw from the project.
Engineer A had an ethical responsibility to question Engineer B's competency and report his concerns to the contractor.
Upon Engineer A's determination that Engineer B lacked requisite competence for structural footing design
Engineer A had an ethical obligation to confront Engineer B to make his concerns known to Engineer B, thus, recommending that Engineer B withdraw from the project.
If Engineer B refused to acquiesce to Engineer A's recommendation, Engineer A had an obligation under the NSPE Code of Ethics to bring the matter to the attention of his client and to the authorities as appropriate, and if necessary, withdraw from the project if his concerns were not met.
Engineer A BER-94-8 Peer Competency Objective Basis Assessment
Peer Competency Objective Basis Assessment Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to objectively assess Engineer B's competence for structural footing design by evaluating Engineer B's chemical engineering background and absence of subsequent training in foundation design, establishing a reasonable objective basis to conclude Engineer B lacked the required competence.
BER Case 94-8 design/build project where Engineer B (chemical PE) was retained to design structural footings
Engineer A's identification that Engineer B's chemical engineering degree and lack of apparent subsequent training in foundation design provided an objective basis to challenge Engineer B's competence for structural footing design
Engineer A had an objective basis to determine whether Engineer B had sufficient education, experience, and training to perform the required structural design services.
Engineer A was unable to establish that Engineer B had any apparent subsequent training in foundation design and Engineer A had reservations concerning the competence of Engineer B to design the structural footings
there was at least a reasonable basis for Engineer A to conclude that Engineer B did not possess the competence to perform the required task.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Civil Engineering', 'employer': 'U.S. Army installation', 'competency_gap': 'Army physical security, arms, ammunition, and explosive regulations'}
Civil PE serving as Civilian Building and Grounds Division Chief directed by Army official to certify arms storage rooms and racks under regulations outside his competence; Board found it would be unethical to do so.
{'type': 'directed_by', 'target': 'Army Official BER-98-8'}
{'type': 'employer', 'target': 'U.S. Army Installation'}
Engineer A, a professional engineer with expertise in civil engineering, served as a Civilian Building and Grounds Division Chief at a U.S. Army installation
Engineer A BER-98-8 Domain-Specific Competence Boundary Recognition
Engineer A demonstrated (or should have demonstrated) the capability to recognize that certifying arms storage rooms and racks under specialized Army physical security regulations fell outside the boundary of civil engineering competence, given the absence of significant training or knowledge in those specialized regulations.
BER Case 98-8 — Civil PE serving as Civilian Building and Grounds Division Chief directed to certify arms storage facilities under specialized Army regulations
The Board's finding that Engineer A lacked the competence to certify the arms storage facilities, noting the specialized and complex nature of the Army physical security regulations and the absence of relevant training
making certain that a military hardware storage facility was designed and built safely involves keen awareness of many complex and detailed procedures, rules, and regulations that are unique to this field of endeavor
Engineer A had no significant training or knowledge in these areas.
Engineer A may be a very competent engineer, Engineer A is clearly not knowledgeable in this very technical and complicated area.
Engineer A BER-98-8 Out-of-Competence Certification Refusal
Engineer A, a civil PE serving as Civilian Building and Grounds Division Chief at a U.S. Army installation, was requested by an Army official to certify arms storage rooms and racks under detailed Army physical security, arms, ammunition, and explosive regulations. Engineer A had no significant training or knowledge in these areas, and training funds were unavailable.
Engineer A (BER Case 98-8, Civil PE, Building and Grounds Division Chief)
Out-of-Competence Assignment Refusal Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to certify the arms storage rooms and arms storage racks under specialized Army physical security regulations, because Engineer A lacked the requisite training and knowledge in that specialized domain, and the unavailability of training funds did not excuse the competence requirement.
The Board determined that it would not be ethical for Engineer A to certify as a qualified engineer the arms storage rooms and arms storage racks as requested by the Army official, noting that the competency issues at stake posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety.
At the time the Army official's certification request was made
Engineer A is clearly not knowledgeable in this very technical and complicated area.
Engineer A Competence Currency Severe Weather Structural Design Domain
Engineer A had general structural design competence and experience in the severe weather region but lacked specific currency with the most recently published improved design parameters, creating a competence gap that contributed to the structural failure
Engineer A's competence in severe weather structural design was constrained by the boundaries of their actual knowledge at the time of design, specifically the gap created by non-familiarity with recently published improved design methods and parameters for severe weather conditions, limiting the quality of protection Engineer A could provide to building occupants and the public.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b; Hallamaa & Kalliokoski 2022
Although Engineer A has knowledge and experience in structural design, new and improved design methods have recently been developed to address the severe weather conditions
Engineer A Ethical High Road Recognition Post-Structural Failure
Ethical High Road Identification Beyond Standard of Care Capability
Engineer A needed Ethical High Road Identification Beyond Standard of Care Capability to recognize that proactively seeking out and applying newly published severe weather design standards — even before they became universally adopted — would have constituted the ethical high road beyond the minimum standard of care, and to communicate this distinction in post-accident reflection.
The ethics board's analysis required distinguishing between the minimum ethical floor (standard of care compliance) and the ethical high road (proactive adoption of newly published improved design standards), with Engineer A's failure to apply the new standards potentially representing a failure to take the ethical high road rather than an ethical violation.
The case illustrates that applying newly published severe weather design parameters before they became universally adopted would have represented going above and beyond the minimum standard of care — the ethical high road — even if not yet strictly required by the then-current standard of care.
Engineer A Evolving Standard Awareness Deficit Present Case
Evolving Professional Standard Awareness Capability
Engineer A demonstrated insufficient Evolving Professional Standard Awareness Capability by failing to recognize and incorporate newly published severe weather design standards into practice, despite generally attempting to stay current with structural design trends.
The newly published severe weather design standards represented an evolution in the professional standard applicable to structural design in Engineer A's practice region; Engineer A's failure to track this evolution contributed to the design deficiency.
Engineer A's general effort to stay current with design trends was not sufficient to capture the newly published severe weather design standards, indicating a gap in the systematic monitoring of evolving technical standards relevant to the engineer's practice domain.
Engineer A Lessons Learned Communication Post-Structural Failure
Lessons Learned Post-Accident Communication Capability
Even if the ethics board concluded that Engineer A did not commit an ethical violation, Engineer A was required to exercise Lessons Learned Post-Accident Communication Capability by honestly acknowledging that applying the newly published severe weather design standards would have prevented the structural failure, and communicating this lesson to colleagues and the profession.
The obligation to acknowledge missed opportunities and communicate lessons learned arose from the structural failure, requiring Engineer A to contribute to professional knowledge advancement by honestly characterizing what could have been done differently.
Following the structural failure, Engineer A faced the obligation to acknowledge that the newly published severe weather design parameters, had they been applied, would have prevented the failure — communicating this as a lessons-learned finding without necessarily characterizing the original design as a professional error.
Within one year following construction, severe weather conditions cause significant structural damage to the building
Engineer A Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment Post-Structural Failure
Following the structural failure causally linked to Engineer A's non-application of newly published severe weather design standards, Engineer A faced an obligation to acknowledge the missed opportunity and advance professional learning, regardless of the ultimate ethical violation finding.
Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment and Lessons Learned Communication Obligation
Even if the Board concludes that Engineer A did not commit an ethical violation because the newly published severe weather design standards had not yet sufficiently permeated professional practice, Engineer A was obligated to honestly acknowledge the missed opportunity to apply those standards and to communicate lessons learned to colleagues and the profession to prevent similar outcomes.
Following the structural failure and its causal determination
Engineer A Missed Opportunity Lessons Learned Severe Weather Structural Failure
The Board's discussion explicitly notes that even without an ethical violation finding, Engineer A should acknowledge the missed opportunity represented by the newly published severe weather design standards
Missed Opportunity Lessons Learned Disclosure Constraint
Even if the Board concludes that Engineer A did not commit an ethical violation because the newly published severe weather design parameters had not yet achieved mandatory standard status, Engineer A is constrained to affirmatively acknowledge in post-accident professional statements that the newly published technical literature represented a missed opportunity that, had it been incorporated, would have prevented the structural failure.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Missed Opportunity Lessons Learned Disclosure Constraint (ontology)
Post-structural failure, in any professional statements or proceedings
Engineer A Missed Opportunity vs Error Distinction Present Case
Missed Opportunity vs Error Distinction Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise Missed Opportunity vs Error Distinction Capability to correctly characterize whether the failure to apply newly published severe weather design standards — which had not yet been universally adopted — constituted a professional error (deviation from standard of care) or a missed opportunity (failure to go above and beyond the then-current standard of care).
The ethics board evaluated whether Engineer A's design failure constituted an ethical violation, requiring application of the missed opportunity vs. error distinction to determine whether the standard of care at the time required application of the newly published severe weather design parameters.
The case requires distinguishing between Engineer A's failure to apply newly published but not yet universally adopted severe weather design standards as either a professional error triggering acknowledgment obligations or a missed opportunity that, while regrettable, did not constitute an ethical violation.
Engineer A Post-Accident Hindsight Non-Retroactive Error Imposition Severe Weather Failure
The structural failure and subsequent determination that the new design parameters would have prevented it creates hindsight pressure to characterize Engineer A's design as erroneous; this constraint limits that retroactive imposition
Post-Accident Hindsight Non-Retroactive Error Imposition Constraint
The ethics board and Engineer A are constrained from characterizing Engineer A's design decision as a professional error solely because post-accident analysis reveals that application of the newly published severe weather design parameters would have prevented the structural failure, absent evidence that those parameters constituted the applicable standard of care at the time of design.
NSPE BER adjudicative principles; Post-Accident Hindsight Non-Retroactive Error Imposition Constraint (ontology)
Engineer A Post-Accident Honest Self-Assessment Structural Failure
Engineer A's structural design failed within one year of construction due to severe weather conditions. The failure was causally linked to non-application of newly published design standards. Engineer A had acted in good faith but had not maintained currency with the relevant technical literature.
Post-Accident Objective Self-Assessment and Honest Characterization Obligation
Following the structural failure of the building Engineer A designed, Engineer A was obligated to conduct an honest and objective self-assessment of their design decisions — acknowledging both the good-faith reliance on established principles and the failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design standards — and to communicate that honest characterization to relevant stakeholders without either falsely claiming error where good faith existed or suppressing recognition of the knowledge gap.
Following the structural failure and causal determination
Engineer A Post-Accident Self-Assessment Present Case
Post-Accident Design Self-Assessment and Error Threshold Determination Capability
Engineer A was required to exercise Post-Accident Design Self-Assessment and Error Threshold Determination Capability following the structural failure, honestly evaluating whether the failure to apply newly published severe weather design standards constituted a professional error or a missed opportunity, and correctly characterizing the situation in light of the applicable standard of care at the time of design.
Post-structural failure, Engineer A faced the obligation to honestly characterize whether the design decision — using established but outdated methods — constituted an ethical violation or a missed opportunity, given that the new standards had been published but were not yet universally adopted.
Following the structural failure of the building Engineer A designed, Engineer A was obligated to conduct an honest and objective self-assessment of prior design decisions, including evaluating whether the failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters crossed the threshold from a missed opportunity into a professional error.
Engineer A Pre-Standardization Technical Literature Currency Severe Weather Design
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather area without incorporating recently published improved design parameters; the building subsequently suffered structural failure during a severe weather event that the new parameters would have prevented
Pre-Standardization Technical Literature Currency Constraint
Engineer A, as a structural engineer with experience designing in a severe weather region, was constrained to actively monitor and incorporate newly published severe weather design methods and parameters from technical literature, even though those parameters had not yet been codified into formal mandatory standards, given that Engineer A generally attempted to maintain professional currency and was practicing in a domain with known severe weather hazard sensitivity.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b; Professional standard of care for structural engineering in severe weather regions
At the time of structural design, prior to building construction
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'design_context': 'Severe weather structural design', 'outcome': 'Design failure', 'ethical_finding': 'Not unethical — no moral culpability demonstrated'}
Engineer whose severe weather structural design resulted in failure; Board evaluated whether failure constituted unethical conduct and concluded Engineer A acted within basic standards of the profession, finding no moral culpability (intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct).
{'type': 'serves', 'target': 'Building Project Client'}
Design Failure Moral Culpability Engineer
Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession of engineering
Had those parameters and methods constituted 'standards,' this Board may have reached another result
the Board cannot conclude that Engineer A acted unethically
the mere fact that an engineer did not follow the most recent literature and the professional practice resulted in some harm is insufficient
Engineer A Present Case Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment Post-Failure
Following the structural failure, the Board declined to find Engineer A unethical but noted the importance of staying current on design trends. The missed opportunity to incorporate newer methods, while not unethical, warranted acknowledgment.
Engineer A (present case, post-design-failure)
Even though the Board found no ethical violation, Engineer A bore an obligation to acknowledge the missed opportunity to incorporate newly published severe weather design methods and to communicate lessons learned to colleagues and the profession, without characterizing the original design as an ethical error.
an engineer certainly has a duty to seek to stay current on design trends and technology
Following the Board's determination that no ethical violation occurred
it is critical for engineers practicing in a specific area to maintain current knowledge about new practice developments and incorporate those methods, as appropriate, into their professional practice.
the Board is of the view that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession of engineering
Engineer A Present Case Missed Opportunity vs Error Distinction
Engineer A's situation illustrates the missed opportunity vs. error distinction: the failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters constituted a missed opportunity to go above and beyond the standard of care, not a professional error, because those parameters had not yet achieved mandatory standard status.
Post-structural failure evaluation of whether Engineer A's design choices constituted errors or missed opportunities
Board's conclusion that Engineer A did not commit an ethical violation, implicitly characterizing the failure to adopt new parameters as a missed opportunity rather than an error requiring acknowledgment
the Board is of the view that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession
Had those parameters and methods constituted 'standards,' this Board may have reached another result.
the facts and circumstances in this case do not indicate that the severe weather design parameters and methods constituted 'standards.'
Engineer A Present Case Moral Culpability Threshold Not Met Design Failure
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region using established but outdated methods, resulting in structural failure. The Board evaluated whether this constituted an ethical violation.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (evaluating Engineer A's design failure)
Moral Culpability Threshold Requirement for Design Failure Ethical Violation Finding Obligation
The Board was obligated to require demonstration of moral culpability — intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct — before finding Engineer A unethical for the design failure resulting from use of outdated severe weather design methods, and correctly declined to find an ethical violation absent such a showing.
in order for an engineer to be found unethical for a design failure, the engineer must demonstrate some level of moral culpability.
During the Board's ethical evaluation of Engineer A's design failure
the Board is of the view that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession of engineering and the Board cannot conclude that Engineer A acted unethically.
the mere fact that an engineer did not follow the most recent literature and the professional practice resulted in some harm is insufficient, in the Board's view, to find the engineer to be deemed unethical.
there must be some demonstration that the engineer was acting in an intentional, reckless, or malicious manner.
Engineer A Present Case Reasonable Currency Standard Compliance
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region using established but outdated methods. The Board evaluated whether failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters constituted an ethical violation.
Engineer A (present case, severe weather structural design)
Reasonable Currency Standard Compliance Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to maintain currency with technical developments to a reasonable degree — following methods constituting accepted standards at the time of practice — but was not obligated to incorporate the newly published severe weather design parameters and methods because those had not yet achieved the status of recognized standards permeated throughout professional practice.
the Board believes that the definition of what is 'current' must be reasonable as engineers cannot be expected to incorporate each and every new and innovative technique or parameter that has not been fully tested or peer reviewed.
At the time Engineer A performed the severe weather structural design
the facts and circumstances in this case do not indicate that the severe weather design parameters and methods constituted 'standards.' Had those parameters and methods constituted 'standards,' this Board may have reached another result.
Engineer A Present Case Standard of Care Ethical Sufficiency Boundary
The Board evaluated whether Engineer A's use of established but outdated severe weather design methods, rather than newly published parameters not yet constituting standards, fell below the ethical standard of care.
Standard of Care Compliance as Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Obligation
The Board correctly recognized that Engineer A's compliance with the basic standards of the profession — using established structural engineering principles applicable at the time — constituted the ethical floor, and that failure to exceed that floor by adopting not-yet-standard innovative methods did not constitute an ethical violation.
the Board is of the view that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession of engineering, as well as most professions and the Board cannot conclude that Engineer A acted unethically.
Engineer A Present Case Standard of Care Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Recognition
Standard of Care Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Recognition Capability
Engineer A's conduct demonstrated compliance with the ethical sufficiency floor established by the accepted professional standard of care — using established structural engineering methods — which the Board recognized as sufficient to avoid an ethical violation finding, even though the engineer did not incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters.
Structural design failure case where engineer used established methods meeting standard of care but not the most current published parameters
Board's finding that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession, establishing that standard of care compliance was ethically sufficient in the absence of moral culpability
Engineer A Present Case Technical Literature Currency Maintenance
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region. Newly published severe weather design parameters existed but had not yet achieved standard status in professional practice.
Technical Literature Currency Maintenance Obligation
Engineer A bore an ongoing obligation to actively monitor and incorporate newly published technical standards and design methods relevant to severe weather structural design in the region, but the Board found this obligation was not violated because the newly published parameters had not yet permeated professional practice to the degree that a reasonably diligent engineer would be expected to have encountered and adopted them.
Throughout Engineer A's practice in the severe weather structural design domain
an engineer certainly has a duty to seek to stay current on design trends and technology, and as suggested in BER Case 98-8, seek appropriate education and training before undertaking new and different tasks.
Engineer A Professional Literature Currency Gap in Severe Weather Design
From publication of relevant severe weather design parameters through completion of Engineer A's design
an engineer has a duty to seek to stay current on design trends and technology
Professional Literature Currency Failure State
Engineer A's failure to incorporate recently published severe weather design parameters into completed design work
Board's determination that non-incorporation did not constitute ethical violation given pre-standard status of parameters
how far it is necessary for an engineer to go in order to remain current?
it is critical for engineers practicing in a specific area to maintain current knowledge about new practice developments and incorporate those methods, as appropriate, into their professional practice
Publication of severe weather design parameters in professional literature that Engineer A did not incorporate into design
Engineer A Severe Weather Design Failure Without Moral Culpability
From materialization of design failure through Board's ethical determination
Is performing engineering design work that may result in a failure unethical?
Design Failure Without Moral Culpability State
Engineer A's design failure in severe weather zone without evidence of intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct
Board determination that Engineer A did not act unethically absent moral culpability
an engineer may design a facility that fails and that alone does not mean that the engineer is negligent—much less unethical
in order for an engineer to be found unethical for a design failure, the engineer must demonstrate some level of moral culpability
there must be some demonstration that the engineer was acting in an intentional, reckless, or malicious manner
Design failure attributable to non-application of emerging severe weather design parameters that had not yet achieved standard status
Engineer A Severe Weather Design Standard Proactive Adoption Present Case
Engineer A designed a structural system for a building in a severe weather region. Newly published severe weather design standards existed at the time of design but were not incorporated. The structural failure was causally linked to the failure to apply those updated parameters.
Severe Weather Design Standard Proactive Adoption Obligation
Engineer A, as a structural engineer with experience designing in a severe weather region, was obligated to proactively seek out and apply newly published severe weather design parameters when designing the subject building's structural system, given the foreseeable risk that outdated methods might be inadequate for the known hazard environment.
Engineer A is involved in the design of the structural system on a building project in an area of the country that experiences severe weather conditions
At the time of structural system design for the subject building project
Engineer A Severe Weather Structural Design Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (implied)', 'specialty': 'Structural engineering design', 'geographic_context': 'Severe weather region', 'knowledge_gap': 'Unfamiliar with recently published severe weather design parameters', 'experience_level': 'Experienced in regional structural design'}
Designed the structural system for a building in a severe weather region using established but outdated methods, failing to incorporate newly published severe weather design standards, resulting in structural damage when severe weather occurred within one year of construction
{'type': 'public_responsibility_to', 'target': 'Building occupants and general public'}
{'type': 'service_provider_to', 'target': 'Building Project Client (implied)'}
Severe Weather Structural Design Engineer
Engineer A completes his design which is later incorporated in the plans and specifications for the building
had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred
Engineer A Severe Weather Structural Design Parameter Application Present Case
Structural Engineering Design Competence
Engineer A possessed structural engineering design competence sufficient to design based on established methods but lacked current application of newly published severe weather design parameters, representing a gap in the currency of their domain-specific competence.
Engineer A had experience with structural designs in a severe weather region and applied established methods, but the newly published severe weather design standards — which would have prevented the failure — were not incorporated.
Engineer A designed the structural system based on what they believed constituted sound structural engineering principles, drawing on knowledge and experience in structural design, but without applying the newly published severe weather design parameters.
Engineer A Standard of Care Ethical Floor Present Case
Engineer A relied on established structural engineering principles without incorporating newly published severe weather design standards. The ethical evaluation requires determining whether those new standards had sufficiently permeated professional practice to constitute the standard of care at the time of design.
Engineer A was obligated to meet the accepted professional standard of care for structural design in a severe weather region, including incorporation of newly published design standards where those standards had sufficiently permeated professional practice to constitute the standard of care; the ethical evaluation turns on whether Engineer A's reliance on established but outdated methods fell below or met this standard.
Engineer A Standard of Care Ethical Floor Recognition Present Case
Engineer A needed Standard of Care Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Recognition Capability to understand whether designing to established structural engineering principles — without incorporating newly published but not yet universally adopted severe weather design standards — met the ethical floor of the accepted professional standard of care, and whether the failure to apply the new standards crossed that floor into ethical violation.
The ethics board evaluated whether Engineer A's design met the accepted professional standard of care, which is the ethical sufficiency floor below which conduct constitutes a professional error; the newly published but not yet universally adopted severe weather design standards were central to this determination.
The case requires determining whether Engineer A's reliance on established structural engineering principles, without incorporating newly published severe weather design parameters, met the accepted professional standard of care at the time of design, establishing the ethical sufficiency boundary for culpability assessment.
Engineer A designs the structural system based upon what Engineer A believes constitutes sound structural engineering principles
Engineer A Standard of Care Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Severe Weather Structural Design
The Board must assess whether Engineer A's design, based on sound structural engineering principles without the newly published severe weather parameters, met the applicable standard of care, and whether meeting that standard is ethically sufficient to avoid a violation finding
Standard of Care Compliance Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Constraint
Engineer A's ethical sufficiency in structural design was bounded by compliance with the applicable professional standard of care for severe weather structural design at the time of design; if Engineer A met that standard of care — including the degree to which newly published but pre-standardization literature was required to be incorporated — then standard-of-care compliance constitutes an ethical floor below which culpability attaches, while not foreclosing the ethical opportunity to have adopted the improved methods voluntarily.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b; Standard of Care Compliance Ethical Sufficiency Boundary Constraint (ontology)
At the time of structural design and during post-accident ethics review
Although Engineer A has knowledge and experience in structural design, new and improved design methods have recently been developed
Engineer A Technical Literature Currency Maintenance Deficit Present Case
Technical Literature Currency Maintenance Capability
Engineer A possessed a general disposition to stay current with structural design trends but failed to exercise sufficient Technical Literature Currency Maintenance Capability with respect to newly published severe weather design standards, resulting in a design that did not incorporate improved methods that would have prevented structural failure.
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region without awareness of newly published severe weather design parameters; the building subsequently suffered structural failure that the new parameters would have prevented.
Engineer A generally attempted to stay current on changing structural design trends but was not familiar with the recent technical literature publishing new severe weather design standards, indicating an intermediate-level capability that was not adequately exercised in this instance.
new and improved severe weather design standards have been published in the most recent technical literature
Engineer A Technical Literature Currency Maintenance Present Case
Engineer A designed a structural system in a severe weather region using established but outdated methods, having generally attempted to stay current but not having encountered the newly published severe weather design standards that would have prevented the structural failure.
Engineer A was obligated to actively monitor and incorporate newly published severe weather structural design standards into their design practice, given their specialization in structural design in a severe weather region, and their general awareness of evolving design trends in that domain.
Ongoing throughout active practice in the severe weather region; specifically applicable at the time of design of the subject building
Engineer A — Professional Literature Currency Failure
From publication of new severe weather design standards through completion of Engineer A's design (and arguably through the structural failure event)
Engineer A's awareness of recently published severe weather design standards
Not terminated prior to design completion; Engineer A completed design without awareness of new standards
Publication of new and improved severe weather design standards in technical literature while Engineer A was engaged in the structural design
Engineer A's design completion before incorporation into plans and specifications
Engineer A's design phase during period when new severe weather standards existed in literature but were not yet adopted as standards
Engineer A's general awareness of design trends before publication of new severe weather design standards
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Chemical Engineering', 'task_assigned': 'Structural footing design', 'competency_gap': 'Foundation/structural design'}
Chemical PE retained by construction contractor specifically to design structural footings for an industrial facility, a task outside his competence; Board found it unethical for him to perform this work.
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer A BER-94-8 Competency Challenger'}
{'type': 'retained_by', 'target': 'Construction Contractor BER-94-8'}
Out-of-Competence Engineering Contractor
Engineer B, a professional engineer, to design structural footings as part of the facility
it would be unethical for Engineer B to perform the design of the structural footings as part of the facility
Engineer B BER-94-8 Out-of-Competence Structural Footing Design Refusal
Engineer B, a chemical PE, was separately retained by a construction contractor to design structural footings for an industrial facility on a design/build project. Engineer B had no apparent subsequent training in foundation design.
Engineer B (BER Case 94-8, Chemical PE retained for structural footing design)
Engineer B was obligated to refuse to design structural footings for the industrial facility, because Engineer B's background was in chemical engineering and Engineer B lacked demonstrated competence in foundation/structural design.
The Board determined that it would be unethical for Engineer B to perform the design of the structural footings as part of the facility.
At the time Engineer B accepted the structural footing design engagement
Engineer A was unable to establish that Engineer B had any apparent subsequent training in foundation design.
Engineering Firm Consulting Practice Competence Gap Subconsultant Engagement BER-85-3
The Board in BER 85-3 distinguished the consulting practice context from the employment context, noting that consulting firms have greater flexibility to structure their workforce and engage subconsultants to address competence gaps.
Engineering consulting firms generally (as distinguished from public sector employment context in BER 85-3)
Consulting Practice Competence Gap Subconsultant Engagement Obligation
An engineering consulting firm retained to perform services including land surveying, when lacking in-house surveying expertise, is obligated to engage qualified subconsultants, establish joint ventures, or hire qualified personnel to fill that competence gap, rather than performing the out-of-competence work directly.
if an engineering firm is retained to perform engineering and land surveying services and the firm does not have expertise in the area of land surveying, under the provisions of the NSPE Code, the firm should retain individuals with that expertise.
At the time a consulting firm accepts an engagement that includes work outside its competence
Because of the relatively dynamic nature of private consulting practice, engineering firms frequently establish joint ventures and subcontracts, hire additional qualified personnel, or make other arrangements in order to serve the needs of a client more effectively and efficiently.
engineering firms frequently establish joint ventures and subcontracts, hire additional qualified personnel, or make other arrangements in order to serve the needs of a client more effectively and efficiently.
Ethics Board Causal Nexus Assessment Engineer A Design Failure
Causal Nexus Establishment for Design Failure Culpability Assessment Capability
The ethics board evaluating Engineer A's design failure exercised Causal Nexus Establishment for Design Failure Culpability Assessment Capability by determining whether a demonstrable causal nexus existed between Engineer A's failure to apply newly published severe weather design standards and the resulting structural failure, using the counterfactual finding that the failure would not have occurred had the new parameters been followed.
The ethics board was required to establish a causal nexus between Engineer A's failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design standards and the structural failure before finding ethical culpability, applying counterfactual causal analysis as a prerequisite to the culpability determination.
The determination that 'had Engineer A followed the severe weather design parameters, the structural failure would not have occurred' represents the causal nexus finding that the ethics board was obligated to establish before making any ethical culpability determination.
Ethics Board Causal Nexus Establishment Engineer A Design Failure
The Board evaluated whether Engineer A's use of established but outdated structural design methods in a severe weather region constituted an ethical violation. The causal link between the knowledge gap and the structural failure was affirmatively established, supporting the culpability finding.
Ethics Board / Professional Review Authority
Causal Nexus Establishment Before Design Failure Ethical Culpability Finding Obligation
The ethics board evaluating Engineer A's design failure was obligated to establish a demonstrable causal nexus between Engineer A's failure to apply the newly published severe weather design standards and the structural failure before finding an ethical violation — a nexus that is affirmatively established in this case by the determination that the failure would not have occurred had the updated parameters been applied.
At the time of ethics adjudication following the structural failure
Ethics Board Design Failure Ethical Violation Threshold Assessment Present Case
Design Failure Ethical Violation Threshold Assessment Capability
The Board demonstrated the capability to correctly assess that Engineer A's design failure did not cross the threshold from a legal/negligence matter into an ethical violation, applying cross-professional analogical reasoning and the moral culpability standard to reach this conclusion.
Ethics board evaluation of whether structural design failure in severe weather region constituted an ethical violation
Board's analysis distinguishing ethical impropriety from design failure, applying the medicine and law analogies, and concluding Engineer A acted within basic professional standards
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (Present Case)
Clearly, there is a distinction between ethical issues and legal issues.
an engineer may design a facility that fails and that alone does not mean that the engineer is negligent—much less unethical.
in medicine, physicians take steps that sometimes cause patients to die and in the law attorneys take steps that cause clients to lose lawsuits and those events are not generally considered to be unethical per se
Ethics Board Employment vs Consulting Distinction BER-85-3
Employment vs Consulting Competence Flexibility Distinction Capability
The Board demonstrated the capability to distinguish between consulting practice — where firms can engage subconsultants and restructure their workforce to fill competence gaps — and employment contexts — where such flexibility is unavailable and the individual must personally possess the required competence — applying this distinction to find Engineer A's acceptance of the county surveyor position unethical.
BER Case 85-3 review of chemical PE accepting county surveyor appointment without surveying background
Board's analysis distinguishing consulting firm flexibility from employment context rigidity in BER Case 85-3, finding it impossible for a chemical PE to perform county surveyor duties without surveying expertise
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (BER Case 85-3)
obviously there are important distinctions in applying the NSPE Code language to a consulting practice and applying the language in the context of an employment relationship.
In the former situation, the firm has a good deal more discretion and flexibility and may be able to structure its workforce to fit the needs and requirements of a particular job for which the firm is being retained.
from a practical standpoint, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible in the usual employment context, for a county surveyor with no background or expertise in surveying to perform effective oversight
Ethics Board Moral Culpability Threshold Discrimination Present Case
Moral Culpability Threshold Discrimination Capability
The Board demonstrated the capability to correctly apply the moral culpability threshold, finding that Engineer A's failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters did not constitute intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct and therefore did not rise to the level of an ethical violation.
Ethics board review of structural design failure in severe weather region where engineer used established but not most current design parameters
Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted within basic standards of the profession despite the design failure, because no moral culpability was demonstrated
It is the Board's view that in order for an engineer to be found unethical for a design failure, the engineer must demonstrate some level of moral culpability.
Ethics Board Pre-Standardization Culpability Threshold Engineer A Design Failure
The Board must determine whether Engineer A's failure to apply newly published but not-yet-formally-standardized severe weather design parameters constitutes an ethical violation, given that the parameters existed in technical literature but had not achieved mandatory standard status at the time of design
Pre-Standardization Culpability Threshold Constraint
The ethics board evaluating Engineer A's design failure was constrained from finding an ethical violation based solely on the post-accident determination that application of the pre-standardization severe weather design parameters would have prevented the structural failure, without first establishing that the literature had achieved sufficient professional consensus to define the standard of care at the time of design and that a demonstrable causal nexus existed between Engineer A's non-adoption and the harm.
NSPE BER adjudicative standards; principles of fair professional ethics adjudication
During ethics board review following the structural failure
Ethics Board Precedent-Informed Competence Standard Application Present Case
Precedent-Informed Competence Standard Application Capability
The Board demonstrated the capability to retrieve and apply BER Cases 98-8, 94-8, and 85-3 as precedents for the fundamental principle that engineers must practice within their area of competence, while distinguishing those cases from the present case which raised the different question of whether a design failure constitutes an ethical violation.
Ethics board analysis of structural design failure case using prior BER competence precedents
Board's triangulation of three prior BER cases to establish the competence principle, then distinguishing the present case as raising a different threshold question about design failure and moral culpability
The NSPE Board of Ethical Review (Board) considered the issue of professional competency on several occasions.
Although, the cases cited are not precisely the same as the facts in the present case, the Board believes these cases illustrate the important fundamental point that licensed engineers must make all efforts to perform professional services solely within their area of competence
a fundamental question that must be addressed is a somewhat different question for the Board: Is performing engineering design work that may result in a failure unethical?
Ethics Board Reasonable Currency Definition Present Case
Reasonable Currency Definition and Calibration Capability
The Board demonstrated the capability to define 'reasonable currency' by distinguishing between newly published parameters not yet constituting standards (which need not be immediately adopted) and fully peer-reviewed, adopted standards (which must be followed), calibrating Engineer A's currency obligation accordingly.
Ethics board evaluation of whether Engineer A's failure to incorporate newly published severe weather design parameters constituted a currency failure
Board's articulation that engineers cannot be expected to incorporate every new technique not fully tested or peer-reviewed, and that the severe weather parameters had not yet achieved 'standard' status
The Board believes that the definition of what is 'current' must be reasonable as engineers cannot be expected to incorporate each and every new and innovative technique or parameter that has not been fully tested or peer reviewed.
Following a reasonable period of time, innovative techniques and parameters may be incorporated into generally accepted practice and at such time, once well defined, and as part of the body of technical knowledge, such techniques become standards that should be followed.
Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment Obligation Invoked By Engineer A Post-Failure
Post-failure professional reflection and learning obligation
Personal Privacy Right in Professional Self-Disclosure
Even if the Board concludes that Engineer A did not commit an ethical violation — because the newly published standards had not yet permeated the profession sufficiently to be required knowledge — Engineer A nonetheless missed an opportunity to apply better design methods that would have prevented the structural failure, and professional integrity requires honest acknowledgment of this missed opportunity to promote learning.
The Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment Obligation applies precisely in cases where the standard of care was technically met but better outcomes were achievable. It does not require Engineer A to characterize the design as an error if it was not, but it does require honest acknowledgment that the newly published standards, had they been known and applied, would have prevented the harm. This supports professional learning without requiring self-incrimination.
Missed Opportunity Acknowledgment Obligation
The obligation to acknowledge missed opportunities is a professional virtue obligation, not a disciplinary one. It operates independently of whether an ethical violation occurred. Engineer A can simultaneously maintain that no ethical violation occurred (if the standard of care was met) and acknowledge that the outcome reveals the importance of more rigorous literature monitoring in severe weather design specialties.
Moral Culpability Threshold Invoked in Present Case Design Failure
Engineer A Present Case Design Failure Subject's severe weather structural design
Engineer A's severe weather structural design resulted in failure; the Board declined to find ethical violation because there was no showing of intentional, reckless, or malicious conduct, and the methods used met the applicable standard of care at the time even if they were not the most current in the literature.
Design failure, even one that could have been avoided by following more recent literature, does not constitute ethical violation absent moral culpability; the ethics inquiry requires more than outcome-based assessment
It is the Board's view that in order for an engineer to be found unethical for a design failure, the engineer must demonstrate some level of moral culpability. In other words, there must be some demonstration that the engineer was acting in an intentional, reckless, or malicious manner.
The Board resolved the tension between public welfare (which suffered harm from the failure) and professional accountability (which requires moral culpability) by requiring intentionality, recklessness, or malice as the threshold — mere negligence or failure to follow emerging literature is insufficient
In other words, there must be some demonstration that the engineer was acting in an intentional, reckless, or malicious manner.
Under the facts presented, the Board is of the view that Engineer A's actions were within the basic standards of the profession of engineering, as well as most professions and the Board cannot conclude that Engineer A acted unethically.
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer A generally attempts to stay current on changing structural design trends
Engineer A (implicitly governing professional obligations)
Establishes the professional obligation for engineers to maintain competence and stay current with evolving technical knowledge and standards in their field of practice
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Section II.1.b
Had those parameters and methods constituted 'standards,' this Board may have reached another result. (See NSPE Code Section II.1.b.)
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in the present case
Cited at the conclusion of the discussion as the provision that would have been implicated had the severe weather design parameters and methods constituted formal 'standards,' potentially changing the Board's ethical conclusion
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Section II.2.b
the Board could not see any way in which the engineer could be acting in accordance with NSPE Code Section II.2.b. under these facts
Engineer A had an obligation under the NSPE Code of Ethics to bring the matter to the attention of his client and to the authorities as appropriate
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in evaluating all referenced BER cases and the present case
Cited as the specific provision governing engineers practicing within their area of competence; the Board references it as the standard Engineer A (county surveyor) could not satisfy, and as the obligation Engineer A (design case) had to report concerns and withdraw if necessary
New Standards Published → Structural Damage Occurs
Post-Failure Analysis Completed → Responsibility Attribution to Engineer A's Design Deficiency
Proceed Without Literature Review → Structural Damage Occurs
Professional Competence Invoked in BER 85-3 County Surveyor Appointment
County surveyor position requiring oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects
A chemical PE accepted appointment as county surveyor despite having no background or expertise in surveying; the Board held this unethical because the engineer could not perform effective oversight of surveying reports and highway improvement projects regardless of the employment context.
Accepting a public sector position whose duties require competence the engineer does not possess is unethical, even when the appointment comes from a legitimate governmental authority; the employment context does not expand competence boundaries
The Board could not see any way in which the engineer could be acting in accordance with NSPE Code Section II.2.b. under these facts, because whatever course of action he took would result in unethical conduct and compromise his role as county surveyor.
The Board found no ethical path available to the engineer under the facts — whatever course of action he took would result in unethical conduct — reinforcing that accepting the position itself was the ethical error
NSPE and professional engineering community
Professional Competence and Currency of Knowledge Standard
Engineer A in structural design practice
Governs the obligation of Engineer A to remain current with newly published severe weather design standards and to apply state-of-the-art methods in structural design practice
NSPE / engineering professional community
Professional Competence Standard – Practice Within Area of Expertise
licensed engineers must make all efforts to perform professional services solely within their area of competence and not be unduly influenced either by employer or client pressures that could cause grave danger to the public health and safety
engineers have a fundamental ethical obligation to practice in a professional and competent manner
NSPE Board of Ethical Review as the governing normative standard across all cited cases and the present case
The overarching professional norm, synthesized across BER cases and the NSPE Code, that engineers must practice solely within their area of competence and must not be unduly influenced by employer or client pressures to exceed those boundaries; used as the primary evaluative framework throughout the discussion
Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization Applied To Engineer A Knowledge Gap
Ethics board characterization of design failure conduct
The Board must calibrate its characterization of Engineer A's conduct proportionately: Engineer A had relevant experience, made a good-faith effort to stay current, and applied what were established (if outdated) principles — distinguishing this from deliberate disregard of known standards or incompetent practice, and warranting a measured rather than severe ethical characterization.
Proportionality requires distinguishing between: (1) deliberate disregard of known standards (highest culpability); (2) failure to discover recently published standards despite general currency efforts (moderate, context-dependent culpability); and (3) design failure from unforeseeable events (no culpability). Engineer A's situation falls in category 2, and proportionality counsels against treating it as equivalent to category 1.
Although Engineer A has knowledge and experience in structural design, new and improved design methods have recently been developed to address the severe weather conditions in the location in which Engineer A practices.
Proportionality does not immunize Engineer A from ethical scrutiny — the structural failure was real and causally linked to the knowledge gap. But it does require that any ethical finding and sanction reflect the nature of the conduct: an honest knowledge gap in a rapidly evolving technical area, not deliberate or reckless disregard of known safety standards.
Public Welfare Paramount Implicated By Structural Failure From Outdated Design
Building structural system design in severe weather region
The structural failure caused by Engineer A's use of outdated severe weather design methods resulted in significant structural damage to a building, implicating the fundamental engineering obligation to hold paramount the safety and welfare of the public — specifically the building's occupants and users who relied on the structural integrity of the design.
Public welfare paramount is the foundational principle against which Engineer A's conduct is measured. The public welfare obligation does not require perfect outcomes, but it does require that engineers apply current, competent methods to protect those who cannot evaluate the adequacy of engineering designs. The structural failure is the concrete manifestation of public welfare harm that triggers ethical scrutiny.
Within one year following construction, severe weather conditions cause significant structural damage to the building.
Public welfare paramount does not impose strict liability on engineers for all harmful outcomes. The principle is balanced against the standard of care: if Engineer A's methods were consistent with competent practice at the time, the public welfare obligation was discharged even though harm resulted. The principle does, however, support the Continuing Competence Currency Obligation as a derived duty — staying current with published standards is one way engineers operationalize public welfare protection.
severe weather conditions cause significant structural damage to the building
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Competence Cases
Engineer A BER-85-3 county surveyor appointment
Engineer A BER-98-8 arms storage certification
Engineer B BER-94-8 structural footing design
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
The Board grounded its competence boundary enforcement across BER Cases 98-8, 94-8, and 85-3 in the obligation to protect public health and safety from engineers practicing outside their competence, treating this as a fundamental ethical anchor for all competence-related obligations.
Public welfare requires that engineers not practice outside their competence regardless of institutional pressure, because out-of-competence practice poses a clear and present danger to public health and safety
Public welfare obligation overrides employer/client loyalty and institutional pressure when competence boundaries are at stake
the competency issues at stake posed a clear and present danger to the public health and safety
Was it ethical for Engineer A to fail to follow the most recent design parameters for structural design in severe weather areas published in the most recent technical literature?
Does the Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted ethically implicitly set a precedent that engineers in rapidly evolving technical domains can rely on their existing expertise without actively monitoring recent literature, and if so, how does that precedent square with the Code's continuing competence obligations?
What affirmative obligations, if any, does Engineer A bear after the structural failure is attributed to his unfamiliarity with the recent severe weather design parameters — specifically, is there an ethical duty to publicly disclose the lessons learned so that other practitioners in severe weather zones can avoid the same gap?
Because the severe weather design parameters had been published in technical literature but had not yet been formally adopted as a binding standard, should the ethical analysis distinguish between an engineer's obligation to track emerging best practices versus an obligation to comply with formally promulgated standards — and does that distinction meaningfully change the culpability calculus here?
Given that the building was actually constructed and occupied before the severe weather event, did Engineer A have any ethical obligation at the plan-review or construction-administration stage to revisit his design assumptions in light of any newly available information, and does the Board's analysis adequately address that ongoing duty?
Does the Proportionality in Misconduct Characterization principle — which shields Engineer A from an unethical finding because his knowledge gap was not intentional or reckless — conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle, which demands that the safety of building occupants take precedence regardless of the engineer's subjective good faith?
How should the Reasonableness Standard for Currency — which excuses Engineer A's unfamiliarity with recently published literature — be reconciled with the Continuing Competence Currency Obligation, which affirmatively requires engineers to stay current in their area of practice, particularly when they are knowingly working in a high-risk severe weather zone?
Does the Causal Nexus Requirement — which conditions an ethical violation finding on a demonstrated link between Engineer A's knowledge gap and the structural failure — conflict with the Standard of Care as Ethical Floor principle, which holds that the ethical obligation to meet the standard of care exists independently of whether any harm actually results?
When the Competence Principle — as applied in BER 98-8 and BER 94-8 to require engineers to refuse assignments outside their demonstrated expertise — is compared to the Reasonableness Standard for Currency applied in the present case, does the Board apply an inconsistent threshold: holding engineers strictly accountable for domain-boundary competence gaps while excusing currency gaps within an acknowledged domain, even when the practical risk to the public is equivalent?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's general effort to stay current on design trends satisfy the categorical duty to maintain competence currency, or does the duty require affirmative and systematic monitoring of domain-specific technical literature regardless of whether new standards have been formally adopted?
From a consequentialist standpoint, given that the structural failure caused significant damage and that following the new severe weather design parameters would have prevented it, does the magnitude of the preventable harm retroactively expose a deficiency in the Board's conclusion that Engineer A's conduct was not unethical, even if the pre-standardization status of those parameters is taken into account?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does an engineer of good professional character who practices in a severe weather zone demonstrate sufficient diligence and prudence by only 'generally attempting' to stay current, or does the virtue of professional integrity demand a more proactive and domain-targeted approach to literature review given the known risks of the practice environment?
From a deontological perspective, does the NSPE Code's mandate to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public impose a duty on Engineer A that is independent of whether new severe weather design parameters have achieved formal standardization status, such that practicing in a known severe weather zone creates a heightened duty of literature vigilance that Engineer A failed to discharge?
If the new severe weather design parameters had been formally adopted as a mandatory code standard rather than existing only in recent technical literature at the time of Engineer A's design, would the Board have reached a different conclusion about the ethical violation, and what does that distinction reveal about the gap between legal compliance and ethical obligation in professional engineering practice?
What if Engineer A had conducted a targeted review of severe weather structural design literature before beginning the project and had discovered the new design parameters — would the Board's analysis have shifted from a question of currency failure to one of deliberate non-adoption, and would that have constituted a clearer ethical violation?
If Engineer A had engaged a subconsultant with specific expertise in severe weather structural design — as the Board suggested was appropriate in the analogous BER-85-3 competence gap scenario — would the structural failure have been avoided, and does the failure to consider subconsultant engagement represent a missed ethical obligation that the Board underweighted in its analysis?
What if the severe weather event had not occurred within the first year and the structural deficiency had never been discovered — would Engineer A's failure to review the recent technical literature still constitute a latent ethical breach, and how should the engineering profession treat ethical violations whose consequences remain unrealized?
Reasonableness Standard for Currency Invoked in Present Case
Engineer A Present Case Design Failure Subject's severe weather structural design methods
The Board declined to hold Engineer A unethical for failing to follow the most recent severe weather design parameters and methods, because those parameters had not yet been incorporated into generally accepted practice as 'standards,' and engineers cannot be required to follow every new technique not yet fully tested or peer-reviewed.
The ethical currency obligation extends to established standards, not to every recent publication; the Board explicitly noted that had the parameters constituted 'standards,' the result might have been different
The reasonableness standard limits the currency obligation to established standards, with the standards/emerging-literature distinction as the operative ethical boundary; public welfare is protected by requiring adherence to established standards while not chilling practice through over-broad currency demands
The Board would note that the facts and circumstances in this case do not indicate that the severe weather design parameters and methods constituted 'standards.' Had those parameters and methods constituted 'standards,' this Board may have reached another result.
Release Design for Construction → Building Constructed
Engineering professional community / technical literature
Severe Weather Structural Design Parameters and Methods
Severe Weather Structural Design Standard
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in evaluating Engineer A's design conduct
Referenced at the conclusion of the Board's discussion as the technical knowledge domain at issue; the Board explicitly notes that because these parameters and methods had not yet risen to the level of formal 'standards,' Engineer A's failure to follow the most recent literature did not constitute unethical conduct — but had they been standards, the result might differ
Severe Weather Design Zone — Building Project
From project inception through design, construction, and post-construction period
The building project's geographic location and Engineer A's structural design commission
Not terminated within the case timeframe; persists through structural failure event
Engineer A accepts structural design commission for building in severe weather region
Severe Weather Parameters Pre-Standardization Status
At the time of Engineer A's design work through Board's determination
engineers cannot be expected to incorporate each and every new and innovative technique or parameter that has not been fully tested or peer reviewed
Severe weather design parameters existing in professional literature but not yet constituting formal standards at time of Engineer A's design
Parameters achieving formal standard status (prospective); Board's determination that parameters were not yet standards at relevant time
Following a reasonable period of time, innovative techniques and parameters may be incorporated into generally accepted practice and at such time, once well defined, and as part of the body of technical knowledge, such techniques become standards that should be followed
the facts and circumstances in this case do not indicate that the severe weather design parameters and methods constituted 'standards'
Publication of severe weather design parameters in professional literature without formal adoption as binding standards
Severe Weather Structural Design Standard — Recent Technical Literature
Engineering professional bodies and researchers
Recent Technical Literature on Severe Weather Structural Design Parameters
Structural engineers practicing in severe weather regions
Defines the improved design methods and parameters for structural systems in severe weather regions; the standard Engineer A failed to apply, resulting in structural failure
Most recent publication at time of design
Standard of Care as Ethical Floor Invoked In Engineer A Design Failure Evaluation
Structural design methodology selection for severe weather region building
The Board's evaluation of Engineer A's design failure turns on whether Engineer A's use of established structural engineering principles — without incorporating newly published severe weather design parameters — met the standard of care applicable at the time of design, and whether falling below that standard (if found) constitutes an ethical violation rather than merely a technical error.
The standard of care as ethical floor means that if Engineer A's methods were consistent with what a competent practitioner in the specialty would have done at the time — even if better methods existed — no ethical violation occurred. Conversely, if the newly published standards had sufficiently permeated the profession that a competent practitioner would have known and applied them, Engineer A's design fell below the ethical floor.
Engineer A, who has experience with structural designs in this area of the country, designs the structural system based upon what Engineer A believes constitutes sound structural engineering principles.
The standard of care is determined at the time of design, not retrospectively. The recency of the published standards is critical: if they were so newly published that their adoption was not yet expected of a competent practitioner, Engineer A met the ethical floor. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A did not violate ethics (as indicated by the role label 'Design Failure Moral Culpability Engineer' and the Board's evaluation) reflects this analysis.
Standard of Care as Ethical Floor Invoked in Present Case Design Failure
Engineer A Present Case Design Failure Subject's structural design evaluation
The Board found Engineer A's actions within the basic standards of the profession, treating compliance with the standard of care applicable at the time of design as the ethical floor below which unethical conduct begins — and above which, even if better methods existed, no ethical violation occurs.
Meeting the standard of care at the time of design is sufficient to avoid ethical violation for design failure; the ethical floor is not defined by the most recent literature but by generally accepted practice
Standard of care compliance establishes the ethical floor; the moral culpability threshold and reasonableness currency standard together define when deviation from that floor rises to ethical violation
Ethical impropriety involves more than the fact that an engineer designed a facility that fails.
Structural Failure — Severe Weather Damage to Building
From the severe weather event causing structural damage through the causal determination
Structural Failure Harm Materialized State
The completed building's structural system following severe weather event
Not terminated within the case timeframe; causal determination confirms design deficiency
Severe weather conditions cause significant structural damage to the building within one year of construction
building construction before severe weather structural damage event
incorporation into plans and specifications before building construction
publication of new severe weather design standards in technical literature before Engineer A's design completion
severe weather structural damage event before post-failure determination
severe weather structural damage event during one-year post-construction window