{'profession': 'Attorney', 'context': 'BER Case 21-9'}
Attorney who retained Engineer A to provide non-engineering expert testimony in State M legal proceedings, establishing the client relationship that triggered Engineer A's obligations regarding licensure disclosure.
{'type': 'retained', 'target': 'Engineer A Forensic Expert Witness BER 21-9'}
Attorney X contacted Engineer A, seeking the services of a non-engineering expert to provide testimony in State M
The Board of Ethical Review (BER) Case 08-8 provides helpful precedent.
BER Case 08-8 concluded that one of the most fundamental outcomes of these antitrust actions and rules was the basic principle that federal, state, and local laws governing procedures to procure engineering services are not affected and remain in full force and effect.
Provides precedent establishing that federal, state, and local laws governing procedures to procure engineering services are not affected by antitrust-driven code revisions and remain in full force and effect
BER Case 21-9, where Engineer A was a licensed professional engineer in three states (C, D, and E) and was a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering.
the BER concluded that if Engineer A qualified as an expert without relying on engineering qualifications, Engineer A's self-presentation as a consultant-expert without identifying status as a licensed professional engineer was not unethical. However, when Engineer A claimed status as a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering, Engineer A's self-presentation became unethical.
Provides precedent on licensure compliance obligations, establishing that engineers must conform with state registration laws and that self-presentation using engineering credentials in unlicensed jurisdictions is unethical
Recent BER cases demonstrate that an engineer's careful compliance with licensure law is expected. For example, BER Case 22-1 introduced Engineer A, a consulting engineer...
Engineer A had an obligation to report 'Transportation Engineer' B for unlicensed practice
the BER found it was unlawful and therefore not ethical for 'Transportation Engineer' B to engage in the practice of engineering without having fulfilled the requirements for licensure
Provides precedent that engineers must comply carefully with licensure law, and that practicing engineering without fulfilling licensure requirements is unlawful and therefore unethical; also establishes obligation to report unlicensed practice
BER Case 23-3 discussed Engineer D, a licensed professional engineer, who worked as the City Engineer in a mid-sized municipality...
the BER acknowledged: Some might assert that because Engineer A's employment contract with the City did not include a revolving door prohibition, nothing more needs to be said. But the BER does not hold this perspective.
Provides precedent on revolving door ethics for engineers transitioning from public agency roles to private firms, establishing that the spirit of the ethics code applies beyond contractual provisions
BER Case 58-1 speaks of the 'purity of the enterprise, of avoiding 'dishonor to the profession, and how engineers must consider not only the letter but the spirit of the ethics code.
BER in analysis of BER Case 23-3 and current case
Cited within BER Case 23-3 analysis for the principle of 'purity of the enterprise' and avoiding dishonor to the profession, establishing that engineers must consider not only the letter but the spirit of the ethics code
BER Case 80-1 examined a state agency's selection method that mixed qualifications screening with a post-scoping meeting price proposal.
Earlier BER opinions confirm that engineers may, and sometimes must, challenge procurement practices that could compromise the public interest.
The BER held that lodging such a protest was not an unfair competitive act under the Code.
Provides precedent that engineers may challenge procurement practices that compromise the public interest, and that protesting an award on grounds of inadequate design is not an unfair competitive act under the Code
CausalLink_Award Three Compliant Firm Z C
CausalLink_City Engineer Dismisses Correc
CausalLink_Engineer A Investigates Report
CausalLink_Engineer B Reports Contracting
CausalLink_Escalate to City Manager and A
CausalLink_Report Findings to City Engine
CausalLink_Unilaterally Award Contracts W
City D Council Authorization and RFQ Threshold Requirement
City D Municipal Procurement Rules — Contract Authorization Thresholds
Public Contracting Threshold Requirement
the two most recent contracts were awarded solely on the approval of the City Engineer without an RFQ process, even though their dollar amounts exceeded the threshold requiring City D's Council authorization and an RFQ process
City D's Engineer acknowledges that the two most recent contracts with Firm Z did not comply with contracting requirements
Specifies the dollar-amount threshold above which City D contracts require both City Council authorization and a competitive RFQ process; the two most recent Firm Z contracts violated this requirement, forming the core compliance concern investigated by Engineer A
{'entity_type': 'Municipal government', 'jurisdiction': 'State with codified QBS procurement laws'}
Municipal employer of Engineer A (and City D's Engineer), subject to QBS procurement laws, whose contracting practices are under investigation for non-compliance
{'type': 'contracts_with', 'target': 'Firm X'}
{'type': 'contracts_with', 'target': 'Firm Z'}
{'type': 'employs', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
{'type': 'employs', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
Engineer A, a licensed professional engineer, joins City D's engineering department
City D is in a jurisdiction with strong qualification-based selection (QBS) procurement laws at the state and local levels
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'position': 'City Engineer', 'employer': 'City D'}
The City Engineer of City D whose department awarded contracts to Firm Z outside required competitive QBS procurement processes, and who refused to address the contract arrangement with Firm Z when raised by Engineer A, triggering escalation obligations.
{'type': 'awarded_contracts_to', 'target': 'Firm Z'}
{'type': 'refused_to_address_concerns_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Engineering Procurement Whistleblower'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Engineer A Procurement Compliance Engineer'}
the City D Engineer and those engineers employed by Firm Z are in violation of the procurement law
the City D Engineer's refusal to address the contract arrangement with Firm Z
{'license': 'Licensed Professional Engineer', 'position': 'City Engineer', 'employer': 'City D'}
Approved the two most recent Firm Z contracts without RFQ process despite exceeding Council authorization thresholds; acknowledged non-compliance but dismissed need for corrective action citing convenience and longstanding relationship
{'type': 'dismissed_findings_of', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
City D's Engineer, a licensed professional engineer
City D's Engineer acknowledges that the two most recent contracts with Firm Z did not comply with contracting requirements but dismisses the need for corrective action
the two most recent contracts were awarded solely on the approval of the City Engineer without an RFQ process
City D Engineer Dismissal of Procurement Concern
From City D Engineer's refusal to act through the present unresolved state
the third question asks what steps must Engineer A take given the City D Engineer's refusal to address the contract arrangement with Firm Z
Superior Authority Dismissal of Compliance Concern State
City D Engineer's refusal to address Firm Z contract non-compliance after Engineer A's investigation and notification
Not yet terminated — unresolved at time of analysis
Engineer D's authority should be respected, and all facts must be carefully checked and verified
City D Engineer declined to take corrective action regarding the non-QBS contracts with Firm Z despite Engineer A's findings
City D Engineer Licensure Board Self-Reporting Assessment Own Violations
Licensure Board Self-Reporting Assessment Capability
The City D Engineer, having acknowledged non-compliance with procurement requirements, was required to assess self-reporting obligations to the state licensure board regarding their own violations of Code section III.8.a
City D Engineer's acknowledgment of procurement non-compliance and refusal to take corrective action
Obligation to consider self-reporting to licensure board following acknowledgment of non-compliant Firm Z contract awards
Engineer A, Engineer B, and City D's Engineer must also consider any obligations they may have to report to the state licensure board.
For this reason, the City D Engineer and those engineers employed by Firm Z are in violation of the procurement law, and also Code section III.8.a.
City D Engineer Procurement Law Knowledge Deficiency
City D's Engineer possessed awareness of procurement law requirements but failed to apply them, acknowledging non-compliance while rationalizing inaction — indicating a failure of capability application rather than knowledge absence.
Demonstrated through the City Engineer's response to Engineer A's compliance findings, where knowledge of the violation was acknowledged but not acted upon.
City D's Engineer acknowledged that the two most recent Firm Z contracts did not comply with contracting requirements but dismissed corrective action, citing convenience and longstanding relationship.
City D's Engineer acknowledges that the two most recent contracts with Firm Z did not comply with contracting requirements but dismisses the need for corrective action, citing the convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z as justification.
City D Engineer Procurement Rationalization Resistance Failure
Public Agency Contracting Ethics Capability
The City D Engineer demonstrated deficient capability to resist rationalization of procurement violations, acknowledging non-compliance but refusing corrective action — failing to apply the spirit as well as the letter of the ethics code
City D Engineer's response to Engineer A's investigation findings regarding non-compliant Firm Z contracts
Refusal to take corrective action on confirmed Firm Z procurement violations despite acknowledgment of non-compliance
This case also discusses how engineers must conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, and fairly so as to maintain the public's trust in professional procurement matters.
The City D Engineer and those engineers employed by Firm Z are in violation of the procurement law, and also Code section III.8.a.
City D Engineer Public Agency Contracting Ethics Failure
City D's Engineer demonstrated a failure of public agency contracting ethics capability by rationalizing procurement violations on grounds of administrative convenience and longstanding relationships rather than taking required corrective action.
Demonstrated through the City Engineer's response to Engineer A's compliance findings.
Explicit acknowledgment of non-compliance followed by dismissal of corrective action, citing convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z as justification.
From seven years ago through present; contract within original RFQ scope with four optional extensions remaining
City D hired Firm X seven years ago through an RFQ process to maintain the citywide traffic model and review traffic studies submitted by private developers
City D's contract with Firm X for traffic engineering services
Not terminated; contract remains compliant
The contract includes an option for annual extensions for up to 10 years
The work provided by Firm X aligns with the original scope of the RFQ and the resulting contract, with four optional extensions remaining
City D hired Firm X seven years ago through a proper RFQ process; contract includes annual extension options for up to 10 years
City D Firm Z Contracting History Records
City D — Firm Z Civil Engineering Contract Records (Six-Year History)
City D has entered into five separate contracts with Firm Z over the past six years, with no recorded issues
However, the two most recent contracts were awarded solely on the approval of the City Engineer without an RFQ process
Records show the first three contracts were awarded through a competitive RFQ process that attracted, on average, four submissions per advertisement
Provides the evidentiary basis for Engineer A's investigation findings; documents that the first three Firm Z contracts were competitively procured via RFQ while the two most recent were not, establishing the pattern of non-compliance that Engineer A brings to City D's Engineer
City D Firm Z Early Contracts Compliance State
Over the past six years; first three contracts awarded through competitive RFQ process
City D's first three contracts with Firm Z for civil engineering services
Superseded by non-compliant contracting for the two most recent contracts
City D initiated competitive RFQ processes attracting an average of four submissions per advertisement for the first three Firm Z contracts
City D Firm Z Recent Contracts Non-Compliance State
From the award of the two most recent Firm Z contracts through present; unresolved as of Engineer A's investigation
Other qualified firms excluded from competition
City D's two most recent contracts with Firm Z, awarded without RFQ process and without Council authorization
Not yet terminated; City D's Engineer has dismissed corrective action
City D's Engineer acknowledges that the two most recent contracts with Firm Z did not comply with contracting requirements but dismisses the need for corrective action, citing the convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z as justification
City Engineer approved two contracts with Firm Z unilaterally, bypassing required RFQ process and Council authorization despite dollar amounts exceeding applicable thresholds
City D Jurisdiction QBS Procurement Laws
State legislature and local government of City D's jurisdiction
State and Local Qualification-Based Selection Procurement Statutes (Jurisdiction of City D)
Qualification-Based Selection Procurement Law
City D is in a jurisdiction with strong qualification-based selection (QBS) procurement laws at the state and local levels codified within the state's professional engineering licensure laws
Engineer B alleges that City D is exclusively awarding traffic engineering contracts to Firm X and civil engineering contracts to Firm Z without utilizing the request for qualifications (RFQ) process
Engineer A, Engineer B, City D's Engineer
Establishes the legal mandate for RFQ processes in awarding engineering contracts; defines the compliance baseline against which City D's contracting practices with Firm X and Firm Z are evaluated; grounds Engineer A's professional obligation to investigate and report non-compliant contracting
City D Procurement Non-Compliance with Firm Z
From the time the two non-QBS contracts were awarded to Firm Z through the present unresolved state
City D's two recent contract awards to Firm Z appear to have violated the procurement law
the City D Engineer and those engineers employed by Firm Z are in violation of the procurement law, and also Code section III.8.a
City D awarded two contracts to Firm Z without following required QBS competitive selection procedures
City D's Engineer Superior Authority Dismissal State
From the moment City D's Engineer dismissed Engineer A's corrective action recommendations through present; unresolved
City D's Engineer's response to Engineer A's compliance findings and recommendations
Not yet terminated; dismissal stands as of the case facts
Engineer A brings these findings to City D's Engineer, a licensed professional engineer, recommending improvements to address compliance concerns with the contracting process
City D's Engineer acknowledged non-compliance but explicitly declined corrective action, citing convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z
City Engineer Dismisses Corrective Action
City Engineer Dismisses Corrective Action (Action 7) → Escalate to City Manager and Attorney (Action 8)
City Engineer dismissing corrective action before Engineer A's required next steps (escalation)
Collegial Obligation Engineer A Response to Engineer B
Engineer B, a competing firm owner with no prior relationship to Engineer A, raised concerns about City D's contracting practices. Engineer A committed to investigating those concerns.
Engineer A was obligated to treat Engineer B's concerns about exclusionary contracting practices with professional respect and to conduct a genuine investigation, recognizing Engineer B's legitimate professional interest in fair access to public engineering contracts.
Engineer A acknowledges the value of the RFQ and QBS processes in securing engineering services for public entities and commits to investigating Engineer B's concerns.
Upon being approached by Engineer B with procurement concerns
Engineers A and B have no historical relationship.
Competitive Procurement Fairness City D Engineer Firm Z Awards
City D exclusively awarded civil engineering contracts to Firm Z over six years, with the two most recent contracts bypassing the RFQ process that had previously attracted an average of four competing submissions.
Competitive Procurement Fairness Obligation
City D's Engineer was obligated to ensure that civil engineering contracts awarded to Firm Z were subject to open, competitive RFQ processes providing all qualified firms a fair opportunity to compete, and was obligated to refrain from establishing an exclusive contracting relationship with Firm Z that circumvented competitive procurement requirements.
Engineer B alleges that City D is exclusively awarding traffic engineering contracts to Firm X and civil engineering contracts to Firm Z without utilizing the request for qualifications (RFQ) process.
Throughout the period of awarding contracts to Firm Z, particularly for the two most recent non-compliant contracts
Engineer B expresses frustration that this practice excludes other qualified firms from competing for City D contracts.
Records show the first three contracts were awarded through a competitive RFQ process that attracted, on average, four submissions per advertisement.
Competitive Procurement Fairness Constraint — City D Exclusive Firm Z Awards
City D awarded the two most recent Firm Z contracts without RFQ, excluding other qualified firms from competition despite the first three Firm Z contracts having attracted an average of four submissions per competitive advertisement
Competitive Procurement Fairness Constraint
City D's Engineer was legally and ethically constrained from systematically awarding civil engineering contracts exclusively to Firm Z without competitive RFQ processes, as this practice denied other qualified firms the opportunity to compete for public contracts in violation of QBS procurement law requirements.
City D jurisdiction QBS procurement laws; NSPE Code of Ethics; NSPE BER Case 08-8; NSPE BER Case 80-1
Throughout the period of the two most recent Firm Z contract awards
Engineer B expresses frustration that this practice excludes other qualified firms from competing for City D contracts
It was not only ethical for Engineer B to complain to Engineer A, it was ethically required that Engineer B report his belief that statutory obligations were not being followed.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer B was ethically required to report the suspected procurement violations to Engineer A, Engineer B's status as a competitor with a direct financial interest in the outcome does not diminish or nullify the ethical obligation to report. The NSPE Code's duty to report known violations is categorical and does not contain a carve-out for self-interested reporters. However, Engineer B's competitive motivation does impose an independent obligation of objectivity: Engineer B was required to report only facts and reasonable beliefs grounded in observable contracting records, not exaggerated or maliciously framed allegations designed to injure Firm Z or Firm X. The distinction matters because Code Section III.7 prohibits engineers from attempting to injure the professional reputation of other engineers through false or malicious statements. So long as Engineer B's report was factually grounded and not embellished to gain competitive advantage, the mixed motive of self-interest and public duty does not render the report unethical. The Board's conclusion that reporting was ethically required should therefore be understood as conditioned on Engineer B's good-faith, fact-based framing of the concern.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer B was ethically required to report raises a further question the Board did not address: whether Engineer B bore any independent obligation to report directly to City D's governing council, the city manager, or the state engineering licensure board, rather than routing the concern exclusively through Engineer A. The answer is that Engineer B's initial approach to Engineer A was the appropriate first step under the principle of lowest-level resolution, which favors addressing compliance concerns at the most proximate level capable of correcting them before escalating externally. Engineer A, as Assistant City Engineer with direct oversight responsibility for contracting practices, was precisely the internal actor best positioned to investigate and remedy the concern without triggering the reputational and institutional disruption of an external complaint. Engineer B's choice to approach Engineer A first was therefore not only permissible but strategically and ethically sound. However, if Engineer A had declined to investigate or had been complicit in the violations, Engineer B's obligation would have shifted toward direct reporting to the city council or the state licensure board, because the internal channel would have been demonstrably unavailable.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A's investigation was ethical should be extended to recognize that Engineer A's investigation also served as a necessary precondition for Engineer A's own compliance with Code Section II.1.e., which prohibits aiding or abetting unlawful practice. By joining City D and assuming supervisory responsibility over contracting, Engineer A became a potential instrument through which non-compliant procurement could continue. Without a prompt and thorough investigation, Engineer A risked unwitting complicity in ongoing statutory violations. The investigation was therefore not merely a collegial response to Engineer B's concerns or a routine familiarization exercise; it was an affirmative step required to ensure that Engineer A's own conduct remained lawful and consistent with the Code. This framing also clarifies that the ethical weight of the investigation derived from Engineer A's independent professional obligations, not solely from Engineer B's complaint, meaning the investigation would have been ethically required even if Engineer B had never raised the concern.
The Board's approval of Engineer A's investigation implicitly validates the distinction Engineer A drew between Firm X's contract and Firm Z's two non-compliant contracts, but the Board did not articulate the analytical basis for that distinction. The Firm X contract was procured through a proper RFQ seven years ago and includes contractually authorized optional extensions that remain within the original scope. Exercising those extensions does not constitute a new procurement and therefore does not trigger a fresh RFQ obligation under QBS law. By contrast, the two most recent Firm Z contracts were entirely new engagements awarded without any RFQ process and without Council authorization, despite exceeding the dollar threshold that mandates both. Engineer A's investigation correctly identified this structural difference, and the Board's endorsement of the investigation implicitly confirms that not all exclusive contractor relationships are ethically equivalent: the compliance status of a contract depends on whether the original award and any subsequent modifications conform to applicable procurement law, not merely on whether a single firm has received repeated work. This nuance is important because it prevents a superficial reading of the facts that would treat Firm X's relationship with City D as equally suspect.
The Board's conclusions, taken together, establish the ethical foundation for Engineer A's next required steps after the City D Engineer's refusal to act, even though the Board's explicit conclusions do not address Q3 directly. Once internal escalation to the immediate superior has been exhausted without result, Engineer A's obligations under Code Sections I.4, I.6, and II.1.f. require graduated escalation to the next available internal authority — most immediately the City Manager or the City Council — before proceeding to external bodies such as the state engineering licensure board. This sequencing reflects the principle that faithful agency to the public employer does not end with the City D Engineer; City D as an institution includes its elected and appointed governing authorities, who have an independent interest in lawful procurement and who were bypassed when the City D Engineer unilaterally approved the non-compliant Firm Z contracts. Engineer A's duty as a faithful agent to City D is therefore best fulfilled, not violated, by escalating to the City Manager or Council, because those bodies represent the legitimate institutional principal whose procurement authority was usurped. Only if those internal channels also fail to produce corrective action does Engineer A's obligation shift unambiguously to external reporting to the state licensure board.
A significant ethical dimension the Board did not address is the independent obligation of the City D Engineer, as a licensed professional engineer, with respect to the state engineering licensure board. The City D Engineer is not merely an administrator who made a procedural error; the City D Engineer is a licensed professional engineer who personally approved contracts that violated state QBS procurement laws codified within the professional engineering licensure statutes, acknowledged those violations when confronted, and then affirmatively refused to take corrective action. This sequence — knowing violation, acknowledgment, and deliberate non-correction — constitutes a failure of professional conduct that the Code requires licensed engineers to report to appropriate professional or technical societies and public authorities. The City D Engineer's licensed status does not merely make the violation more serious; it triggers a self-reporting obligation that the City D Engineer has failed to honor, and it creates an independent reporting obligation for Engineer A toward the state licensure board once internal remedies are exhausted. The Board's silence on this point leaves a material gap in the ethical analysis.
The Board's conclusions do not address the ethical position of the engineers at Firm Z who accepted the two non-compliant contracts. Under Code Section III.8.a., engineers are required to conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering, and where QBS procurement laws are codified within the state's professional engineering licensure statutes, accepting a contract awarded in violation of those statutes is not a neutral act. The engineers at Firm Z who executed or performed work under the non-compliant contracts had an independent obligation to satisfy themselves that the procurement was lawful before proceeding, particularly given that the first three Firm Z contracts had been properly awarded through an RFQ process, making the absence of an RFQ on the fourth and fifth contracts a detectable departure from established practice. While the primary legal and ethical responsibility for the non-compliant awards rests with the City D Engineer who approved them, Firm Z's engineers are not entirely insulated from ethical scrutiny, and their continued performance under those contracts after any point at which the procurement irregularity became or should have become apparent to them warrants examination under the Code's non-aiding provision.
From a systemic perspective that the Board did not develop, Engineer B's report and Engineer A's investigation together illustrate that peer reporting by competing engineers is a structurally important mechanism for detecting procurement violations in public agencies, particularly where the violations are concealed within internal administrative records that external auditors may not routinely examine. The counterfactual in which Engineer B remains silent — whether from fear of retaliation, professional awkwardness, or uncertainty about the outcome — is one in which the Firm Z non-compliance likely continues indefinitely, compounding the harm to competitive fairness and public procurement integrity with each successive non-compliant contract. This systemic observation supports a reading of Code Section II.1.f. that treats the reporting obligation not merely as a personal ethical duty but as a collective professional responsibility: the engineering profession's self-regulatory legitimacy depends in part on practitioners being willing to surface violations even when doing so is professionally uncomfortable or competitively motivated. The Board's conclusions, while framed in individual terms, implicitly endorse this systemic function of peer reporting.
It was ethical for Engineer A to investigate City D’s contracting practices, both as a part of A’s own familiarization process and to follow up on Engineer B’s complaints.
Engineer B was not ethically required to exhaust direct reporting channels to City D's governing council or a state licensing board before approaching Engineer A. The NSPE Code does not impose a strict sequencing requirement that compels a reporting engineer to bypass the most accessible and appropriate internal authority. Engineer A, as the newly appointed Assistant City Engineer with direct oversight responsibility for contracting practices, was precisely the correct initial recipient of Engineer B's concerns. Moreover, Engineer B's competitive interest in City D contracts does not disqualify the report or transform it into an improper act. The Code's provisions on injuring the reputation of other engineers apply to malicious or false statements, not to factually grounded concerns about statutory procurement violations. Because Engineer B's allegations were ultimately confirmed through independent investigation, the competitive motivation does not retroactively taint the ethical validity of the report. Engineer B's approach was both procedurally appropriate and ethically sound as a first step.
The engineers at Firm Z bear an independent ethical obligation under the NSPE Code that is distinct from City D's internal procurement failures. By accepting contracts that were awarded without the required RFQ process and without City Council authorization, Firm Z's engineers participated in an arrangement that they, as licensed professionals with knowledge of QBS procurement law in their jurisdiction, should have recognized as non-compliant. The Code requires engineers to conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering and to conduct themselves lawfully. Accepting a public contract procured in violation of state QBS statutes is not a passive act; it is an affirmative participation in a non-compliant process. Firm Z's engineers were not obligated to refuse work categorically, but they were obligated to raise the procurement irregularity with City D before executing the contracts. Their failure to do so represents a breach of the obligation to act lawfully and to avoid aiding arrangements that circumvent statutory requirements.
The City D Engineer's status as a licensed professional engineer significantly amplifies the ethical gravity of the decision to approve the two non-compliant Firm Z contracts and subsequently refuse corrective action. A licensed engineer occupying a senior public agency role is held to a heightened standard of lawful conduct precisely because their licensure signals to the public and to governing bodies that procurement decisions carry professional integrity. When the City D Engineer acknowledged the non-compliance but dismissed the need for corrective action on grounds of convenience and relationship, that rationalization constituted a knowing violation of QBS procurement law by a licensed professional. This triggers a self-reporting obligation under the Code's provision requiring engineers with knowledge of violations to report to appropriate professional bodies. While self-reporting is uncomfortable, the Code does not exempt licensed engineers from this obligation when they are themselves the source of the violation. The City D Engineer's failure to self-report compounds the original procurement violation with a secondary ethical failure.
Engineer A's continued employment at City D after the City D Engineer's refusal to act does not immediately constitute aiding or abetting the unlawful procurement practice, provided Engineer A takes active steps to escalate the matter through appropriate channels. The Code's prohibition on aiding unlawful practice is directed at affirmative facilitation, not at the mere fact of continued employment while pursuing legitimate remediation. However, this protection is conditional and time-limited. If Engineer A remains employed, takes no further action, and allows the non-compliant Firm Z contracts to continue without escalation, the passive acceptance of that arrangement would eventually cross into complicity. The ethical calculus favors remaining employed and escalating internally to the City Manager, City Attorney, or City Council before resorting to external reporting, because internal escalation preserves the opportunity for the most direct and least disruptive correction. Engineer A's strategic value in remaining positioned to escalate is real, but it does not justify indefinite delay. The obligation to escalate becomes urgent and non-deferrable once internal channels are exhausted.
Engineer A's duty to the public takes categorical precedence over the duty of faithful agency to City D when the City D Engineer, as Engineer A's direct superior, explicitly refuses to correct documented statutory violations. The NSPE Code establishes public welfare as the paramount obligation, and the faithful agent duty is expressly bounded by that paramount obligation. The Code does not require engineers to subordinate lawful public contracting requirements to employer preferences. When the employer's representative — here the City D Engineer — directs by inaction that a statutory violation persist, the employer-client relationship itself becomes the vehicle for the violation, and Engineer A's loyalty obligation cannot extend to protecting that violation. Engineer A must therefore escalate beyond the City D Engineer to the City Manager, City Attorney, or City Council. This escalation is not a betrayal of the employer relationship; it is a fulfillment of Engineer A's obligation to ensure that City D, as an institution, complies with the law, even when one of its officers does not.
Engineer B's potential financial motivation for reporting does not ethically compromise the weight that should be given to the allegations, provided the allegations are factually grounded. The principle of fairness in professional competition and the principle of procurement integrity are not undermined simply because the person raising them stands to benefit from their enforcement. The relevant ethical test is whether the allegations are true and whether the reporting mechanism was appropriate, not whether the reporter is disinterested. Engineer A was correct to investigate the concerns on their merits rather than dismissing them because of Engineer B's competitive position. However, Engineer A's investigation needed to be conducted with objectivity and without allowing Engineer B's interest to shape the findings. Because the investigation confirmed the violations independently, the competitive motivation of Engineer B is ethically irrelevant to the validity of the outcome. The Code's prohibition on malicious or false injury to competitors would have been implicated only if Engineer B's allegations had been fabricated or exaggerated, which the facts do not support.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer B fulfilled a categorical duty to report the suspected statutory violations, and that duty existed independently of any competitive benefit Engineer B might derive. The Kantian framework underlying the NSPE Code's reporting obligations treats the duty to report known or suspected violations as a universal rule: if all licensed engineers with knowledge of procurement violations remained silent to avoid professional awkwardness or competitive appearances, the entire system of QBS procurement law would be rendered unenforceable. The universalizability of the reporting obligation confirms that Engineer B acted in accordance with categorical duty. The fact that Engineer B also stood to benefit competitively does not negate the deontological validity of the act; mixed motives do not transform a categorically required action into an impermissible one. The ethical weight of the report rests on its conformity with the universal rule, not on the purity of the reporter's intentions.
From a consequentialist perspective, the City D Engineer's justification of convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z does not produce net public benefit sufficient to outweigh the harms of the non-compliant procurement. The claimed benefits — administrative efficiency and continuity of service — are real but modest and achievable through lawful means, including a properly conducted RFQ that Firm Z could have won on its merits given its prior compliant contract history. Against these modest benefits, the harms are substantial: exclusion of qualified competing firms from public contracts, erosion of public trust in government procurement, violation of statutory QBS requirements that exist precisely to protect the public interest, and the precedent-setting effect of a senior licensed engineer normalizing convenience-based rationalization of legal non-compliance. The systemic harm to public procurement integrity is particularly significant because it is not confined to the two non-compliant contracts; it signals to all participants in the local engineering market that statutory requirements are negotiable when relationships are sufficiently entrenched.
From a virtue ethics perspective, the City D Engineer's dismissal of Engineer A's documented compliance findings represents a fundamental failure of professional character. The virtues of integrity, honesty, and practical wisdom — which the NSPE Code embodies through its requirements of honorable, responsible, and lawful conduct — demand that a licensed engineer in a position of public trust acknowledge legal non-compliance and initiate corrective action, even when doing so is inconvenient or disrupts established relationships. The City D Engineer's rationalization of convenience is not a defensible exercise of professional judgment; it is a rationalization that substitutes personal comfort for professional obligation. A person of genuine professional integrity would have recognized that the longstanding relationship with Firm Z, far from justifying the non-compliance, made it more important to correct the record and restore lawful procurement practices, both to protect the public and to protect Firm Z itself from the reputational and legal risks of contracts awarded outside statutory authority.
From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A's willingness to investigate Engineer B's concerns despite having no prior relationship with Engineer B, despite the potential risk to a new employment position, and despite the possibility that the investigation would implicate Engineer A's own superior, reflects the professional courage and integrity that the NSPE Code demands of licensed engineers in public agency roles. Professional courage is not merely the willingness to act when the path is clear; it is the willingness to pursue truth and compliance when doing so creates personal professional risk. Engineer A's conduct in this regard exemplifies the virtue of practical wisdom: recognizing that the obligation to investigate was real, conducting the investigation with objectivity, and reporting findings honestly to the appropriate superior even knowing that the findings were unwelcome. This conduct stands in direct contrast to the City D Engineer's failure of character and illustrates why the Code's emphasis on honorable and responsible conduct is not merely aspirational but operationally essential in public engineering contexts.
The systemic harms to public trust in government procurement that would result from Engineer A choosing not to escalate beyond the City D Engineer substantially outweigh the short-term professional risks Engineer A faces by escalating externally. If Engineer A remains silent after the City D Engineer's refusal, the non-compliant Firm Z contracts remain in force, the statutory QBS requirements are effectively nullified for City D, qualified competing firms continue to be excluded without lawful basis, and the precedent is set that a senior engineer's personal convenience can override statutory procurement requirements. These harms compound over time: each subsequent contract cycle that proceeds without correction deepens the institutional normalization of non-compliance. By contrast, the professional risks to Engineer A from escalating — potential friction with the City D Engineer, possible employment instability — are real but manageable, particularly because Engineer A's escalation is grounded in documented findings and is directed at restoring lawful compliance rather than attacking any individual. The Code's structure, which places public welfare paramount and requires reporting of violations, reflects precisely this consequentialist judgment: the long-term public interest in procurement integrity outweighs the short-term personal costs of reporting.
If Engineer B had not reported the contracting concerns to Engineer A, City D's procurement violations with Firm Z would very likely have continued undetected, at least in the near term. Engineer A, as a newly appointed Assistant City Engineer still in the familiarization phase, might eventually have discovered the non-compliance through routine review of contracting records, but there is no certainty of that outcome, and the discovery would have been delayed. This counterfactual underscores the systemic importance of peer reporting obligations in public engineering contexts: the distributed knowledge held by competing firms and other market participants often provides the most timely and reliable signal of procurement irregularities that internal staff may not yet have encountered. The NSPE Code's reporting obligation in Section II.1.f. is not merely an individual ethical requirement; it functions as a systemic compliance mechanism that depends on the willingness of engineers across the profession — including competitors — to report suspected violations. Engineer B's report was therefore not only individually ethical but institutionally valuable.
If the City D Engineer had acknowledged the Firm Z non-compliance and initiated corrective action upon Engineer A's recommendation, Engineer A's obligations under the NSPE Code would have been substantially satisfied without requiring external reporting. The Code's graduated escalation framework — which prioritizes resolution at the lowest effective level — supports the conclusion that successful internal remediation fulfills the reporting obligation when the violation is acknowledged and corrected. However, Engineer A would still have needed to assess whether the corrective action was adequate: whether the non-compliant contracts were formally addressed, whether future procurement would be conducted lawfully, and whether the City Council was appropriately informed of the prior non-compliance given that the contracts exceeded the Council authorization threshold. If the City D Engineer had corrected the process going forward but concealed the prior violations from the Council, Engineer A's obligations would not have been fully discharged, because the Council's oversight authority over contracts above the authorization threshold was itself violated and the Council had a right to know.
If the two non-compliant Firm Z contracts had fallen below the Council authorization and RFQ threshold, the ethical landscape would have been materially different but not entirely clear. A procedural irregularity that does not rise to a statutory violation would not trigger the same mandatory reporting obligations under the NSPE Code, because the Code's reporting requirement in Section II.1.f. is keyed to violations of the Code and applicable law, not to every administrative imperfection. Engineer A would still have had an obligation to recommend corrective action as part of the faithful agent and procurement integrity duties, but the urgency and the external escalation obligation would have been reduced. Engineer B's complaint, however, would still have been ethically permissible — and arguably ethically appropriate — because the exclusion of qualified competitors from public contracts raises fairness concerns even when the dollar thresholds for statutory compliance are not met. The ethical weight of Engineer B's complaint would have rested more heavily on the fairness principle and less on the statutory violation principle, but it would not have been ethically improper.
If Engineer A had been employed at City D for several years before discovering the Firm Z non-compliance, the extended period of unwitting participation in the non-compliant contracting environment would not, by itself, create additional ethical liability under the NSPE Code, provided the non-compliance was genuinely unknown to Engineer A during that period. The Code does not impose strict liability for unknowing participation in violations by others. However, the extended period would create heightened obligations upon discovery: the longer the violations had persisted, the more urgent the need for corrective action and the more clearly Engineer A would need to document the timeline of discovery to establish that prior participation was unwitting. Additionally, if Engineer A had signed off on any documents related to the non-compliant contracts during the period of employment — even without knowing of the procurement irregularity — Engineer A would need to assess whether any representations made in those documents required correction or disclosure. The practical lesson is that early familiarization with contracting records, as Engineer A undertook upon joining City D, is not merely good practice but an ethical obligation for engineers in public agency oversight roles.
In response to Q404: If Engineer A had been a long-tenured employee with deep institutional loyalty and a close working relationship with the City Engineer, those relational factors would not ethically justify a more deferential or delayed response to the documented procurement violations. The underlying legal and professional obligations of a licensed engineer are not modified by tenure, personal history, or institutional loyalty. Code Section I.6 requires engineers to conduct themselves lawfully regardless of their employment history, and Code Section II.1.f requires reporting of known violations regardless of the reporter's relationship to the violator. Institutional loyalty is a legitimate professional value when it operates within the bounds of law and ethics, but it cannot function as a shield against compliance obligations. Indeed, a long-tenured engineer with deep knowledge of City D's operations would have greater, not lesser, awareness of the statutory requirements and the significance of the violations — which would heighten rather than diminish the reporting obligation. The relational factors might affect the manner and tone of internal escalation — a long-tenured engineer might reasonably attempt more extended internal dialogue before escalating externally — but they cannot alter the ultimate obligation to report if internal channels fail.
The tension between Engineer A's duty as a faithful agent to City D and the paramount obligation to protect public welfare was resolved decisively in favor of public welfare once internal remediation failed. The NSPE Code establishes a clear hierarchy: loyalty to an employer is a genuine and enforceable obligation, but it is explicitly subordinate to the duty to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount. In this case, that hierarchy was not immediately triggered by the discovery of the Firm Z violations, because Engineer A's first obligation was to attempt internal correction—reporting findings to the City D Engineer and recommending remediation. Only when the City D Engineer refused corrective action did the employer-loyalty obligation reach its boundary. At that point, continued silence would have transformed Engineer A's faithful-agent role into complicity in an ongoing statutory violation. The case therefore teaches that employer loyalty is not a shield against public-welfare obligations; it is a procedural first step that, when exhausted without result, gives way to escalation. The principle prioritization is sequential, not absolute: loyalty governs the method and order of action, while public welfare governs the ultimate outcome.
The principle of fairness in professional competition, raised by Engineer B's complaint, and the principle of procurement integrity, which governs Engineer A's investigative obligations, are not in tension with each other even though Engineer B is a competitor with a potential financial interest in the outcome. The case teaches that the ethical validity of a reported concern is determined by the substance of the allegation, not the motive of the reporter. Engineer B's potential self-interest does not corrupt the underlying statutory obligation to use RFQ processes and obtain Council authorization; those requirements exist independently of Engineer B's preferences. Engineer A was therefore correct to treat Engineer B's complaint as a trigger for a fact-grounded investigation rather than as a self-interested grievance to be discounted. The principle of procurement integrity absorbed and superseded any concern about Engineer B's competitive motivation, because the investigation's purpose was to verify compliance with public law, not to adjudicate a dispute between competitors. This resolution also illustrates that fairness in professional competition is best protected not by scrutinizing the motives of those who report violations, but by rigorously enforcing the procurement rules that create a level playing field for all qualified firms.
The principle of professional accountability, which demands that Engineer A escalate beyond the City D Engineer after the refusal to act, and the principle of honoring the employer-client relationship, which counsels deference to organizational hierarchy, were resolved through a graduated escalation framework rather than an immediate leap to external reporting. The case teaches that these two principles are not binary opposites but points on a continuum: the engineer's accountability obligation intensifies proportionally as internal remediation options are exhausted. Engineer A's duty was first to report findings to the immediate superior, the City D Engineer; when that avenue was closed by the City D Engineer's explicit refusal, the obligation migrated upward within City D's governance structure to the City Manager, City Attorney, and City Council before reaching external bodies such as the state licensure board. This graduated approach honors the employer relationship to the maximum extent possible while ensuring that accountability is never permanently subordinated to organizational loyalty. The City D Engineer's status as a licensed professional engineer adds a further dimension: that licensed status does not grant immunity from accountability but instead amplifies it, because the City D Engineer's approval of non-compliant contracts constitutes a violation of the Code by a person whose professional license carries an independent obligation of lawful and honorable conduct. The case therefore establishes that professional accountability ultimately prevails over employer deference, but the path to that outcome must be methodical, documented, and exhaustive of internal options before external escalation is pursued.
The contrast between the Firm X and Firm Z contract histories illuminates a principle that compliance history does not create a license for future non-compliance, but it does carry distinct ethical weight in diagnosing institutional character. Firm X's contract is fully compliant — procured through RFQ, extended within authorized scope, with four optional extensions remaining — and the fairness in professional competition principle is not violated by its continuation, even though it forecloses competitive access for other firms for up to four more years. Firm Z's early compliance through three competitive RFQ awards similarly demonstrates that the City D Engineer knew the correct process and chose to deviate from it in the two most recent awards. This prior knowledge of correct procedure transforms the City D Engineer's non-compliance from possible ignorance into deliberate circumvention, which is ethically more serious and undermines any claim that the longstanding relationship with Firm Z constitutes a legitimate mitigating factor. The case teaches that a history of compliance raises, rather than lowers, the ethical standard for subsequent conduct by demonstrating that compliance was achievable and known.
The City D Engineer's invocation of convenience and a longstanding relationship as justification for bypassing mandatory procurement law represents a direct collision between the principle of honorable and lawful conduct and the principle of institutional loyalty — and the case makes clear that institutional loyalty expressed through procedural shortcuts is not a recognized ethical value but a rationalization that compounds the original violation. A licensed professional engineer in a position of public trust occupies a dual fiduciary role: to the employing public entity and to the public whose interests that entity serves. When those two obligations diverge — as they do when an engineer prioritizes administrative convenience over statutory compliance — the public welfare paramount principle governs. The City D Engineer's failure to self-correct after being formally notified by Engineer A further implicates the principle of professional accountability and raises the question of whether the City D Engineer's conduct constitutes a reportable violation to the state engineering licensure board, not merely an internal management failure.
Convenience Rationalization Prohibition — City D Engineer Firm Z Dismissal
City D's Engineer acknowledged non-compliance but dismissed corrective action citing convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z, which does not constitute a legally or ethically permissible basis for bypassing mandatory procurement procedures
Convenience-Based Sole Source Prohibition Constraint
City D's Engineer was ethically and legally constrained from using administrative convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z as justification for dismissing corrective action on procurement non-compliance, as such rationalizations do not constitute legally recognized exceptions to mandatory QBS procurement procedures.
NSPE Code of Ethics; City D jurisdiction QBS procurement laws; NSPE BER Case 08-8
At the time City D's Engineer dismissed Engineer A's corrective action recommendations
Should Engineer A Public Responsibility fulfill the Procurement Investigation Objectivity Obligation given the circumstances?
Engineer A Public Responsibility: Procurement Investigation Objectivity Obligation
Alternative approach to Report Findings to City Engineer
Should Engineer fulfill the Procurement Investigation Objectivity Engineer A Investigation given the circumstances?
Engineer: Procurement Investigation Objectivity Engineer A Investigation
Should Engineer fulfill the Collegial Obligation Engineer A Response to Engineer B given the circumstances?
Engineer: Collegial Obligation Engineer A Response to Engineer B
Alternative approach to Engineer B Reports Contracting Concerns
Should Engineer A Public Responsibility fulfill the Graduated Internal Escalation Obligation given the circumstances?
Engineer A Public Responsibility: Graduated Internal Escalation Obligation
Engineer A Investigates Reported Concerns
Alternative approach to Engineer A Investigates Reported Concerns
Did Engineer A correctly distinguish between the Firm X contract situation — procured through a compliant RFQ with extensions within authorized scope — and the Firm Z situation involving unauthorized awards, and would Engineer A have been equally obligated to report Firm X violations had they existed?
Distinguishing Firm X's Compliant Contract from Firm Z's Non-Compliant Awards and Applying Uniform Procurement Standards
Treat Firm X and Firm Z situations as categorically distinct based on procurement compliance status, uphold the compliant Firm X contract, and apply the same objective compliance standard to all contracts including Firm X's extensions
Treat Firm X's long-term contract as ethically equivalent to Firm Z's non-compliant awards on competitive fairness grounds and recommend re-bidding the Firm X engagement to restore competitive access for other firms
Limit the investigation selectively to Firm Z contracts as identified in Engineer B's complaint without applying the same compliance scrutiny to Firm X's contract extensions
Did the engineers employed by Firm Z bear ethical responsibility for knowingly entering into contracts awarded outside the required RFQ process, and were they obligated to flag the procurement irregularity or decline the engagements until proper procedures were followed?
Firm Z Engineers' Ethical Responsibility for Entering Non-Compliant Contract Awards
Inquire whether the required RFQ process and City Council authorization had been obtained before accepting the engagements, and flag the absence of a competitive solicitation as a recognizable anomaly given prior compliant contract history
Accept the contract engagements without inquiring into the City's procurement procedures, treating compliance with contracting law as solely the client agency's responsibility
Duty to Report Engineer A Procurement Violations
Engineer A confirmed procurement violations and reported internally to City D's Engineer, who dismissed corrective action. The violations involve laws codified within the state's professional engineering licensure laws, implicating Engineer A's professional obligations as a licensed engineer.
Engineer A bore a duty to report the discovered procurement violations to appropriate authorities, having confirmed that two Firm Z contracts were awarded without required RFQ processes in violation of QBS laws codified in state professional engineering licensure law, and having received no corrective response from City D's Engineer.
City D is in a jurisdiction with strong qualification-based selection (QBS) procurement laws at the state and local levels codified within the state's professional engineering licensure laws.
Following City D's Engineer's dismissal of corrective action, on an ongoing basis
Engineer A brings these findings to City D's Engineer, a licensed professional engineer, recommending improvements to address compliance concerns with the contracting process.
Employer Loyalty Boundary Constraint — Engineer A Post-Dismissal
Engineer A faced tension between employer loyalty constraint and professional obligation to report confirmed procurement violations externally after internal escalation was dismissed
Engineer A's duty of loyalty to City D as employer constrained Engineer A from unilaterally acting against City D's institutional interests, but this loyalty constraint was bounded by the overriding ethical obligation not to conceal confirmed procurement law violations, preventing the loyalty constraint from functioning as a justification for suppressing external reporting.
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections III.6, III.7; NSPE BER Case 80-1
Following City D's Engineer's dismissal of corrective action recommendations
Employer Loyalty Boundary Engineer A Post-Dismissal
Engineer A faces a tension between loyalty to City D as employer and the obligation to uphold QBS procurement laws and public interest in fair contracting, following City D's Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
Engineer A's duty of loyalty to City D as employer does not extend to acquiescing in or concealing the City Engineer's refusal to take corrective action on acknowledged procurement violations; Engineer A's loyalty obligation is bounded by the paramount duty to uphold public welfare and legal compliance, requiring escalation rather than deference when the employer refuses to remedy confirmed legal violations.
Employer Loyalty Boundary Engineer A Post-Refusal
City D Engineer refused corrective action on confirmed procurement violations; Engineer A faces tension between employer loyalty and the duty to escalate.
Engineer A's obligation of loyalty to City D as employer does not extend to acquiescing in or concealing the City D Engineer's refusal to address confirmed procurement violations; Engineer A's loyalty is bounded by the paramount duty to uphold legal compliance and public welfare.
Engineer A also has an obligation to the City to act as a faithful agent or trustee.
Following the City D Engineer's refusal to take corrective action
It is in City D's interest – legally, ethically, and politically – to procure its consultant services in accordance with the laws of the state where its engineers are licensed.
The BER holds that per Code sections II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.8.a, appropriate action must be taken.
{'license': 'Licensed Professional Engineer', 'position': 'Assistant City Engineer', 'employer': 'City D'}
Joined City D's engineering department, investigated contracting irregularities after complaint from Engineer B, discovered non-compliant contracts with Firm Z, and brought findings with corrective recommendations to the City Engineer
{'type': 'employed_by', 'target': 'City D'}
{'type': 'investigates_complaint_from', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
Engineer A, a licensed professional engineer, joins City D's engineering department as the Assistant City Engineer
Engineer A acknowledges the value of the RFQ and QBS processes and commits to investigating Engineer B's concerns
Engineer A brings these findings to City D's Engineer, recommending improvements to address compliance concerns
Engineer A Causal Reasoning Procurement Violations
Engineer A demonstrated causal reasoning capability in tracing the chain of responsibility for procurement violations — from the City Engineer's approval of non-compliant contracts to the exclusion of qualified competing firms — and in establishing the causal relationship between the absence of RFQ processes and the violation of procurement law.
Applied during investigation of City D contracting practices.
Investigation establishing that the two most recent Firm Z contracts were caused to be non-compliant by the City Engineer's sole approval without RFQ process, despite exceeding authorization thresholds.
the two most recent contracts were awarded solely on the approval of the City Engineer without an RFQ process, even though their dollar amounts exceeded the threshold requiring City D's Council authorization and an RFQ process.
Engineer A Client Relationship Established - City D
From Engineer A's appointment as Assistant City Engineer through present
Engineer A, a licensed professional engineer, joins City D's engineering department as the Assistant City Engineer, responsible for overseeing department staff, managing capital improvement programs, and supervising private development projects
Engineer A's employment relationship with City D as Assistant City Engineer
Not terminated; active employment relationship
Engineer A joins City D's engineering department as Assistant City Engineer with defined responsibilities
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to receive concerns from a fellow engineer — with whom there was no prior relationship — with professional respect and genuine investigative commitment, treating Engineer B's complaint as a legitimate professional concern warranting thorough investigation.
Demonstrated when Engineer B approached Engineer A to raise concerns about City D's contracting practices.
Engineer A's commitment to investigate Engineer B's concerns about exclusionary contracting practices despite having no prior relationship with Engineer B and Engineer B's status as a competitor for City D contracts.
Engineer A Collegial Concern Response Engineer B Complaint
Engineer A demonstrated capability to receive Engineer B's concerns about exclusionary contracting practices with professional respect and to conduct a genuine, objective investigation in response
Engineer A's response to Engineer B's approach regarding City D's exclusionary contracting practices
Conducting thorough investigation of all five Firm Z contracts and Firm X contract following Engineer B's complaint, providing accurate feedback on findings
Engineer A can in good faith report to Engineer B that there are no issues with Firm X and can also point out other avenues for Engineer B to raise concerns, for example, the state licensing agency or the City Attorney.
It is reasonable to question whether Engineer A is 'the proper authority' – e.g., is there another more appropriate group or individual B should have contacted?
From the moment City D's Engineer dismissed corrective action recommendations through present
Engineer A's position as Assistant City Engineer facing conflict between organizational loyalty to City D's Engineer and professional/legal obligations under QBS law
Not yet terminated; Engineer A must decide whether and how to escalate
City D's Engineer's dismissal of compliance concerns placed Engineer A in direct tension between deference to supervisory authority and obligations under professional licensure law and public interest duties
Engineer A Competitive Procurement Fairness Assessment
Competitive Procurement Fairness Assessment Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to assess whether City D's contracting practices provided fair competitive opportunity, distinguishing between compliant competitive RFQ processes and exclusionary sole-source awards.
Applied during investigation of Engineer B's complaint about exclusionary contracting practices.
Investigation distinguishing Firm X's compliant contract (awarded through RFQ with annual extensions within original scope) from Firm Z's non-compliant recent contracts (awarded without RFQ despite exceeding authorization thresholds).
City D hired Firm X seven years ago through an RFQ process... The work provided by Firm X aligns with the original scope of the RFQ and the resulting contract.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'context': 'BER Case 22-1'}
Consulting engineer who presented signed and sealed design contract documents to a state agency and discovered that the reviewing 'Transportation Engineer' was unlicensed, triggering an obligation to report unlicensed practice.
{'type': 'obligated_to_report', 'target': 'Transportation Engineer B Unlicensed Engineering Reviewer'}
{'type': 'submitted_work_to', 'target': 'Transportation Engineer B Unlicensed Engineering Reviewer'}
Engineer A, a consulting engineer, who presented signed and sealed design contract documents to the State Agency manager
Engineer A learned that 'Transportation Engineer' B was neither a licensed engineer nor even a degreed engineer
Engineer A Employer Loyalty Boundary Recognition
Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Capability
Engineer A required the capability to recognize that loyalty to City D as employer does not extend to acquiescing in confirmed procurement law violations, and that public interest in lawful competitive procurement overrides the employer loyalty duty in this context.
Manifested when City D's Engineer dismissed corrective action despite acknowledging non-compliance, placing Engineer A's employer loyalty duty in conflict with public procurement integrity obligations.
The ethical tension created when City D's Engineer dismissed corrective action, requiring Engineer A to determine whether employer loyalty or public procurement integrity takes precedence.
Engineer A's duty of loyalty to City D as employer does not extend to acquiescing in or concealing the City Engineer's refusal to take corrective action.
Engineer A bears a paramount obligation to uphold public interest in lawful, fair, and competitive public engineering procurement.
Engineer A Ethical Perception Procurement Context
Engineer A demonstrated ethical perception in recognizing the ethically salient features of Engineer B's complaint — including the public interest dimensions of competitive procurement fairness and the potential for procurement law violations — and in perceiving the ethical significance of the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
Applied throughout the case from initial receipt of Engineer B's complaint through the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
Recognition that Engineer B's complaint raised legitimate public interest concerns warranting investigation, and subsequent recognition that the City Engineer's rationalization was ethically inadequate.
City D's Engineer acknowledges that the two most recent contracts with Firm Z did not comply with contracting requirements but dismisses the need for corrective action.
Engineer A Forensic Expert Witness BER 21-9
{'license': 'Professional Engineer in States C, D, E', 'certification': 'Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering', 'context': 'BER Case 21-9'}
Licensed professional engineer in three states who agreed to provide expert testimony in State M without being licensed there, signing a report as 'Consultant A, Board-certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering' without disclosing licensure status, which the BER found unethical when engineering credentials were implicitly claimed.
{'type': 'provides_testimony_in', 'target': 'State M Court'}
{'type': 'retained_by', 'target': 'Attorney X'}
Engineer A was a licensed professional engineer in three states (C, D, and E) and was a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering
Engineer A signed the report as 'Consultant A, Board-certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering,' and made no reference whatsoever to licensure status
Engineer A Graduated Escalation Navigation Post-City Engineer Refusal
Graduated Escalation Navigation Capability
Engineer A was required to navigate a graduated escalation pathway after the City D Engineer refused to take corrective action, proceeding through internal channels (City Manager, City Attorney) before considering external licensure board reporting
Post-investigation phase after City D Engineer's refusal to address confirmed Firm Z procurement violations
Recognition that escalation must proceed advisedly, carefully, and sensitively through approved channels while considering licensure board reporting obligations
Such action should proceed advisedly, carefully, and sensitively, with a view to complying with the law and Code sections I.4, I.6, III.6, III.7, while simultaneously promoting the interests of all stakeholders to the extent possible.
Ideally, Engineer A should proceed within the City's approved channels of communication.
It may be prudent to solicit input from other stakeholders such as the City Manager, the City Attorney, and other engineers who are knowledgeable of the situation.
Engineer A Internal Compliance Reporting
Internal Compliance Reporting Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to formulate and communicate compliance findings to the City Engineer, including specific identification of non-compliant contracts and recommendations for corrective action.
Applied after completing the investigation of City D's contracting practices.
Engineer A bringing investigation findings to City D's Engineer and recommending improvements to address compliance concerns with the contracting process.
Engineer A Internal Compliance Reporting City D Engineer Findings
Engineer A demonstrated capability to formulate and communicate findings of procurement non-compliance to the City D Engineer, reporting confirmed violations of QBS procurement law requirements for the two most recent Firm Z contracts
Engineer A's reporting of confirmed Firm Z procurement violations to the City D Engineer
Reporting investigation findings to City D Engineer with recommendation for corrective action
Reviewing contracting procedures and notifying relevant parties about potential violations of established procedures is consistent with these Code of Ethics requirements.
The third question asks what steps must Engineer A take given the City D Engineer's refusal to address the contract arrangement with Firm Z.
Engineer A Internal Escalation Exhausted — Firm Z Contracts
From City D Engineer's refusal through Engineer A's determination of next steps
Engineer A, Engineer B, and City D's Engineer must also consider any obligations they may have to report to the state licensure board
Engineer A's position after City D Engineer refused to address Firm Z non-compliance, requiring consideration of external reporting
Not yet terminated — Engineer A must determine whether to report to state licensure board, City Manager, or City Attorney
It may be prudent to solicit input from other stakeholders such as the City Manager, the City Attorney, and other engineers who are knowledgeable of the situation
appropriate action must be taken per Code sections II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.8.a
City D Engineer declined corrective action, exhausting the primary internal escalation channel available to Engineer A
Engineer A Licensure Board Self-Reporting Assessment Firm Z Violations
Engineer A was required to assess whether confirmed Firm Z procurement violations — constituting violations of Code section III.8.a — rose to the level requiring reporting to the state licensure board
Post-investigation phase following confirmation of two non-compliant Firm Z contract awards
Consideration of licensure board reporting obligations following confirmation of non-compliant Firm Z contracts
Engineer A Licensure Misrepresentation in State M
From signing the report with the forensic engineering credential through BER determination of ethical violation
Engineer A's use of 'Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering' title in State M expert testimony without disclosing absence of State M licensure
BER determination that the self-presentation was unethical
The licensing statute in State M specified that any engineer providing expert testimony in a State M court must be licensed in State M
when Engineer A claimed status as a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering, Engineer A's self-presentation became unethical
Engineer A signed expert report using forensic engineering credential in State M, where licensure was required for engineering expert testimony, without disclosing unlicensed status in State M
Engineer A Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Recognition Firm Z
Engineer A demonstrated capability to recognize that awareness of potential unlawful procurement practices created an obligation to not aid or abet those practices, even as a faithful agent of the employing City
Engineer A's response to potential unlawful procurement practices involving Firm Z contracts
Recognition that investigating and reporting procurement violations — rather than acquiescing — was required by professional obligations overriding employer loyalty
Engineer A was made aware of potential unlawful practices, so A has an obligation to not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering.
Engineer A demonstrated norm competence by storing and applying QBS procurement norms, recognizing when those norms were violated in City D's contracting practices, and understanding the conflict between employer loyalty norms and public procurement integrity norms.
Applied throughout the investigation and in responding to the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
Application of QBS and RFQ norms to identify non-compliant Firm Z contracts, and recognition of the normative conflict between employer loyalty and public procurement whistleblower obligations.
Engineer A Precedent Based Ethical Reasoning Procurement
Precedent-Based Ethical Reasoning Capability
Engineer A required the capability to draw on prior BER decisions and professional ethics precedents regarding whistleblower obligations, employer loyalty boundaries, and public procurement integrity to reason through the novel ethical situation created by the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
Required in determining the appropriate response to the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action.
The ethical analysis required to determine whether Engineer A's obligations extend beyond internal reporting to external escalation, drawing on established professional ethics precedents regarding the limits of employer loyalty.
Engineer A Procurement Compliance Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'position': 'Assistant City Engineer', 'employer': 'City D'}
Assistant City Engineer who investigated potential procurement law violations involving Firm X and Firm Z contracts, bearing obligations to act as faithful agent to the City, investigate irregularities, and report violations while working within approved channels.
{'type': 'oversees_contracts_with', 'target': 'Firm X'}
{'type': 'oversees_contracts_with', 'target': 'Firm Z'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'Engineer B Engineering Procurement Whistleblower'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'Engineer D City Engineer'}
Engineer A was made aware of potential unlawful practices, so A has an obligation to not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering
Engineer A also has an obligation to the City to act as a faithful agent or trustee
Engineer A can in good faith report to Engineer B that there are no issues with Firm X
Engineer A Procurement Investigation Objectivity Firm Z Contracts
Procurement Irregularity Investigation Capability
Engineer A demonstrated capability to conduct an objective, thorough investigation of suspected procurement violations, correctly distinguishing compliant from non-compliant contracts across all five Firm Z awards and three Firm X extensions
Engineer A's investigation of City D contracting practices following Engineer B's complaint
Investigation establishing no issues with Firm X or three of five Firm Z contracts, while confirming two most recent Firm Z contracts violated procurement law
Engineer A was able to establish there were no issues with Firm X or with three of the five contracts Firm Z had with the City.
Engineer A also has an obligation to the City to act as a faithful agent or trustee. Reviewing contracting procedures and notifying relevant parties about potential violations of established procedures is consistent with these Code of Ethics requirements.
Engineer A Procurement Irregularity Investigation
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to conduct a systematic and objective investigation of City D's contracting practices, reviewing historical contract records, identifying compliant and non-compliant awards, and accurately documenting findings.
Applied in response to Engineer B's complaint about exclusionary contracting practices at City D.
Investigation of seven years of City D contracting history, distinguishing compliant RFQ-based awards from non-compliant sole-source awards for Firm Z, and identifying the specific contracts that violated procurement thresholds.
Through the investigation, Engineer A discovers that over the past seven years, City D has awarded consultant contracts exclusively to two firms: Firm X and Firm Z.
Records show the first three contracts were awarded through a competitive RFQ process that attracted, on average, four submissions per advertisement. However, the two most recent contracts were awarded solely on the approval of the City Engineer without an RFQ process.
Engineer A possessed knowledge of QBS procurement laws and RFQ requirements sufficient to recognize that the two most recent Firm Z contracts violated applicable procurement statutes and Council authorization thresholds.
Applied during investigation of City D contracting practices following Engineer B's complaint about exclusionary contracting.
Investigation revealing that two Firm Z contracts exceeded dollar thresholds requiring City Council authorization and RFQ process, and were awarded without those required processes.
Engineer A Procurement Law Knowledge QBS Threshold Analysis
Engineer A demonstrated capability to understand and apply QBS procurement law requirements — including dollar thresholds requiring City Council authorization and RFQ process mandates — to correctly identify which Firm Z contracts violated procurement law
Engineer A's investigation of City D contracting practices
Correct identification that two most recent Firm Z contracts exceeded thresholds requiring competitive RFQ and Council authorization, while three earlier contracts were compliant
This case focuses on the engineer's ethical obligation to comply with local and state procurement laws, including state registration board rules of professional conduct, that require consultant selection through a competitive QBS process.
Turning to the first question for consideration, the facts establish that whereas City D's hiring of Firm X complied with procurement law, City D's two recent contract awards to Firm Z appear to have violated the procurement law.
Engineer A Procurement Precedent Application BER Case Analysis
Engineer A demonstrated capability to apply BER case precedents — including BER Cases 08-8, 80-1, 22-1, 23-3, and 21-9 — to analyze the procurement compliance situation at City D and reach justified conclusions about obligations
Engineer A's investigation of City D contracting practices, applying BER precedent to determine compliance status of five Firm Z contracts
Investigation of Firm X and Firm Z contracts using BER precedent framework to distinguish compliant from non-compliant awards
BER Case 08-8 provides helpful precedent.
Engineer A Public Agency Contracting Ethics
Engineer A demonstrated ethical awareness sufficient to recognize that the City Engineer's rationalization of procurement violations on grounds of convenience and longstanding relationships was ethically inadequate and required further action.
Manifested when City D's Engineer dismissed corrective action despite acknowledging non-compliance, placing Engineer A in a position of having to decide whether to accept the rationalization or escalate.
Engineer A's recognition that the City Engineer's dismissal of corrective action did not resolve the ethical and legal compliance issue, and the implicit obligation to escalate beyond the internal dismissal.
Engineer A Public Procurement Whistleblower Escalation
Engineer A faced the obligation to escalate procurement violation findings beyond the internal dismissal by City D's Engineer to appropriate external authorities, requiring the capability to recognize when internal reporting has been exhausted and external escalation is required.
Arises after City D's Engineer dismisses corrective action, leaving Engineer A with unresolved confirmed procurement violations.
The situation created by City D's Engineer's dismissal of corrective action despite acknowledged non-compliance, which triggered Engineer A's obligation to consider escalation to regulatory or oversight authorities.
Having reported procurement violation findings internally to City D's Engineer and received a dismissal of corrective action, Engineer A bears a primary obligation to escalate.
{'license': 'Licensed Professional Engineer', 'obligation_trigger': 'Discovery of non-compliant public contracting practices'}
Engineer A bears a paramount obligation to uphold public interest in lawful, fair, and competitive public engineering procurement, which may conflict with employer directives when the City Engineer dismisses corrective action
{'type': 'conflict_with', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
{'type': 'owes_duty_to', 'target': 'The Public'}
Engineer A acknowledges the value of the RFQ and QBS processes in securing engineering services for public entities
Engineer A Stakeholder Interest Balancing Procurement Dispute
Engineer A demonstrated capability to balance competing stakeholder interests — City D's legal and political interests, public interest in lawful procurement, Engineer B's competitive fairness concerns, and Firm Z's contractual interests — while seeking a mutually acceptable solution
Engineer A's post-investigation navigation of procurement violation response at City D
Framing escalation strategy to simultaneously serve City D's interests and fulfill professional obligations to public and law
Within this context, Engineer A will hopefully be able to influence responsible parties to follow a legal, ethical, and mutually acceptable solution.
Engineer A joining City D meets Engineer B approaching Engineer A
Engineer A's investigation before Engineer A reporting findings to City Engineer
Engineer B Competing Engineering Firm Principal
{'license': 'Licensed Professional Engineer', 'position': 'Owner, local civil engineering firm'}
Approached Engineer A to raise concerns about City D's exclusionary contracting practices, alleging contracts were awarded to Firm X and Firm Z without required RFQ processes, thereby triggering Engineer A's investigation
{'type': 'complainant_to', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'excluded_from_competing_with', 'target': 'Firm X'}
{'type': 'excluded_from_competing_with', 'target': 'Firm Z'}
Engineer B, also a licensed professional engineer, the owner of a local civil engineering firm, who raises concerns about City D's contracting practices
Engineer B Competitive Procurement Fairness Assessment
Engineer B demonstrated awareness of competitive procurement fairness requirements sufficient to identify and report exclusionary contracting patterns that denied qualified firms the opportunity to compete for public engineering contracts.
Engineer B's identification and reporting of City D's exclusive contracting practices to Engineer A, alleging that contracts were awarded without RFQ processes.
Engineer B Competitive Procurement Fairness Assessment City D Firm Z
Engineer B demonstrated capability to assess whether City D's contracting practices provided fair competitive opportunity, identifying that contracts were awarded to Firm Z without RFQ processes and raising formal concerns
Engineer B's approach to Engineer A regarding City D's exclusionary contracting practices with Firm Z
Identification of exclusionary contracting patterns and formal reporting to Engineer A as the appropriate authority
Engineer B has an obligation, per Code section II.1.f, to report 'any alleged violation of this Code,' and B has done so.
Engineer B's actions are consistent with the BER's analysis of past cases.
Engineer B Engineering Procurement Whistleblower
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'affiliation': 'Competing Engineering Firm Principal'}
Engineer who identified and reported suspected procurement law violations by City D regarding contracts awarded to Firm Z outside competitive QBS processes, acting under Code section II.1.f obligations.
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'Engineer A Procurement Compliance Engineer'}
{'type': 'reports_violations_regarding', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
{'type': 'reports_violations_regarding', 'target': 'Firm Z'}
Engineer B has an obligation, per Code section II.1.f, to report 'any alleged violation of this Code,' and B has done so
Engineer B's actions are consistent with the BER's analysis of past cases
Engineer B Licensure Board Self-Reporting Assessment Procurement Concerns
Engineer B, having identified and reported suspected procurement violations, was required to assess obligations to report those violations to the state licensure board in addition to raising concerns with Engineer A
Engineer B's role as whistleblower regarding City D's exclusionary contracting practices
Engineer B's obligation to consider licensure board reporting after raising procurement concerns with Engineer A
Accordingly, Engineer B has an obligation, per Code section II.1.f, to report 'any alleged violation of this Code,' and B has done so.
Engineer B Reports Contracting Concerns (Action 4) → Engineer A Investigates Reported Concerns (Action 5)
Engineer B Unverified Concern State - Initial Allegation
From Engineer B's initial approach to Engineer A through completion of Engineer A's investigation
Engineer B's initial allegations about City D's contracting practices before Engineer A's investigation
Engineer A's investigation confirmed the substance of Engineer B's concerns, elevating them from allegation to documented finding
Engineer A acknowledges the value of the RFQ and QBS processes in securing engineering services for public entities and commits to investigating Engineer B's concerns
Engineer B raises concerns about City D exclusively awarding contracts to Firm X and Firm Z without RFQ processes
Engineer B approaching Engineer A with concerns before Engineer A's investigation
From Engineer D's announcement of departure and acceptance of position at Firm AE&R onward
Engineer D announced plans to step down as the City Engineer and indicated that they accepted a position at an unnamed engineering firm in the City
Post-Employment Conflict of Interest State
Engineer D's transition from City Engineer to associate at Firm AE&R, which conducted substantial business with the City during Engineer D's tenure
Not resolved in the case — BER analysis ongoing
AE&R completed many projects for the City during Engineer D's tenure as City Engineer
engineers must consider not only the letter but the spirit of the ethics code
the City did not include 'revolving door' provisions in employment contracts for its senior-level employees
Engineer D accepted employment at Firm AE&R shortly after leaving the City Engineer role, despite AE&R having completed many projects for the City during Engineer D's tenure
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'prior_position': 'City Engineer', 'new_position': 'Associate at Firm AE&R'}
City Engineer who stepped down from municipal leadership and accepted a position at private firm AE&R, which had completed many projects for the City during Engineer D's tenure, raising ethical concerns about conflicts of interest and public trust even absent a contractual revolving door prohibition.
{'type': 'formerly_employed_by', 'target': 'City D'}
{'type': 'newly_employed_by', 'target': 'Firm AE&R'}
{'type': 'prior_authority_over', 'target': 'Firm AE&R contracts'}
Engineer D announced plans to step down as the City Engineer and indicated that they accepted a position at an unnamed engineering firm
Engineer D announcing plans to step down before Firm AE&R announcing Engineer D as newly hired associate
Engineering Procurement Whistleblower Obligation Invoked By Engineer A
Engineer A investigated Engineer B's allegations, confirmed procurement violations, reported findings internally to the City Engineer with recommendations for corrective action, and now faces the question of whether to escalate externally given the City Engineer's refusal to act
Having completed the internal reporting step and received a refusal to act, Engineer A's whistleblower obligation now requires consideration of escalation to appropriate external oversight authorities, including potentially the state engineering licensing board or other oversight bodies
Engineering Procurement Whistleblower Obligation
The principle requires escalation when internal remediation fails; Engineer A must weigh the obligation to report against professional risks, but the obligation is not extinguished by the City Engineer's refusal
Ethical Conduct Obligation City D Engineer Procurement Rationalization
City D's Engineer acknowledged non-compliance with contracting requirements but rationalized inaction by citing convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z, subordinating legal and ethical obligations to organizational convenience.
City D's Engineer was obligated to conduct themselves ethically in the administration of public engineering contracts, which precluded rationalizing acknowledged procurement violations on grounds of convenience and established relationships, and required taking corrective action consistent with applicable law and professional ethics.
Upon acknowledging the procurement non-compliance to Engineer A
Expert Testimony Licensure Disclosure Constraint Engineer A State M
Engineer A, licensed in States C, D, and E but not State M, signed expert report as 'Board-certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering' without disclosing absence of State M licensure, in a jurisdiction requiring licensure for engineering expert testimony
Expert Testimony Licensure Disclosure Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from presenting credentials as a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering in State M expert testimony without disclosing the absence of State M licensure, as the State M licensing statute required licensure for engineers providing expert testimony, and use of engineering certification titles created an impermissible misleading impression of jurisdictional compliance.
State M Professional Engineering Licensure Statute; NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.8.a; BER Case 21-9
The licensing statute in State M specified that any engineer providing expert testimony in a State M court must be licensed in State M.
Throughout the expert testimony engagement in State M
Engineer A signed the report as 'Consultant A, Board-certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering,' and made no reference whatsoever to licensure status.
When Engineer A claimed status as a Board Certified Diplomate in Forensic Engineering, Engineer A's self-presentation became unethical.
Fact-Grounded Investigation Constraint — Engineer A Response to Engineer B
Engineer B, as owner of a competing firm excluded from City D contracts, had a potential interest in the investigation outcome, requiring Engineer A to conduct an independent, fact-based investigation before drawing conclusions or taking action
Engineer A was constrained from acting on or reporting Engineer B's allegations as established findings until completing an objective investigation, prohibiting premature conclusions or actions based on unverified concerns from a competitor firm owner with a potential interest in the outcome.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional obligation of objectivity in investigation
Engineers A and B have no historical relationship
From receipt of Engineer B's allegations through completion of the procurement investigation
Fairness in Professional Competition Raised By Engineer B
Engineer B raised concerns that City D's exclusive contracting practices with Firm X and Firm Z without RFQ processes excluded other qualified engineering firms from competing for public contracts
The RFQ and QBS processes exist precisely to ensure fair competitive access; bypassing them denies qualified firms the opportunity to compete on merit and deprives the public of the benefits of competition
Engineer B correctly identified that convenience cannot justify exclusionary practices that violate both fair competition principles and applicable law
Fairness in Professional Competition Upheld For Firm X
Firm X was originally hired through a compliant RFQ process and continues work within the original contract scope and authorized extension provisions, representing a lawful and fair competitive selection
Firm X's continued engagement is consistent with fairness in professional competition because it was selected through a competitive process and operates within the authorized contract scope; annual extensions within the original contract do not require new RFQ
City D hired Firm X seven years ago through an RFQ process to maintain the citywide traffic model and review traffic studies submitted by private developers.
No tension identified; Firm X's contract complies with procurement requirements and does not implicate fairness concerns
The contract includes an option for annual extensions for up to 10 years.
The work provided by Firm X aligns with the original scope of the RFQ and the resulting contract, with four optional extensions remaining.
Faithful Agent Obligation Engineer A City D
Engineer A serves City D as Assistant City Engineer and investigated contracting irregularities, bearing the duty to serve City D's interests faithfully within the bounds of professional ethics and applicable law.
Engineer A was obligated to act as a faithful agent of City D in conducting the procurement investigation and reporting findings, serving City D's legitimate interests in lawful contracting, while recognizing that faithful agency requires upholding legal compliance rather than ratifying the employer's violations.
Engineer A, a licensed professional engineer, joins City D's engineering department as the Assistant City Engineer, responsible for overseeing department staff, managing capital improvement programs, and supervising private development projects.
Throughout Engineer A's tenure as Assistant City Engineer and during the procurement investigation
Firm X Original RFQ Contract with Optional Extensions
City D — Firm X Traffic Engineering Services Contract (with Annual Extension Options)
Serves as the reference document establishing the legitimate scope and duration of Firm X's engagement; Engineer A uses it to verify that Firm X's ongoing work aligns with the original RFQ scope and that remaining extensions are contractually authorized, distinguishing compliant from non-compliant contracting
{'specialty': 'Traffic engineering, citywide traffic model maintenance, traffic study review', 'contract_status': 'Compliant — original RFQ with optional extensions'}
Awarded traffic engineering contract seven years ago through compliant RFQ process; continues work under annual extensions within original contract scope; no compliance violations identified
{'type': 'contracted_by', 'target': 'City D'}
{'type': 'subject_of_complaint_by', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
Firm X contract award via RFQ before Engineer A joins City D
Firm X contract award via RFQ before Firm Z contract relationship begins
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'employer': 'Firm Z'}
Engineers employed by Firm Z who participated in contracts awarded outside required competitive QBS procurement processes, placing them in violation of procurement law and Code section III.8.a.
{'type': 'contracted_with', 'target': 'City D'}
{'type': 'in_violation_with', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
Firm Z Engineers Procurement Law Conformance Deficiency
Engineers employed by Firm Z demonstrated deficient capability to ensure that contracts they participated in with City D were awarded through compliant QBS procurement processes, resulting in violation of Code section III.8.a
Firm Z engineers' participation in non-compliant contract awards with City D
Participation in two contracts awarded without required RFQ processes despite exceeding dollar thresholds requiring competitive selection
per Code section III.8.a, engineers are ethically obligated to 'conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering' and they must do so in an honorable, responsible, and ethical manner.
{'specialty': 'Civil engineering', 'contract_status': 'Partially non-compliant — two most recent contracts awarded without required RFQ'}
Awarded five civil engineering contracts over six years; first three through compliant competitive RFQ; two most recent awarded without RFQ despite exceeding Council authorization thresholds, constituting the core compliance violation
{'type': 'contracts_approved_by', 'target': 'City D Engineer'}
City D has entered into five separate contracts with Firm Z over the past six years
Firm Z six-year relationship during Firm X seven-year contract period
Graduated Internal Escalation Engineer A Post-City Engineer Refusal
City D Engineer acknowledged non-compliance but refused corrective action; Engineer A must determine next steps within and beyond the organization.
Graduated Internal Escalation Obligation
After the City D Engineer refused to take corrective action on the confirmed Firm Z procurement violations, Engineer A was obligated to pursue graduated internal escalation through approved City channels — including the City Manager and City Attorney — acting advisedly and carefully while verifying all facts, before or alongside any external escalation.
Ideally, Engineer A should proceed within the City's approved channels of communication. Engineer D's authority should be respected, and all facts must be carefully checked and verified.
Following the City D Engineer's refusal to address the Firm Z contract violations
Hire Firm X via RFQ (Action 1) and Award Three Compliant Firm Z Contracts (Action 2) → Procurement Violations Occur (Event 4) — by contrast, establishing the baseline of known compliance
Honesty Invoked By Engineer A Reporting Findings
Engineer A honestly reported the findings of the procurement investigation to the City Engineer, including the determination that the two most recent Firm Z contracts did not comply with contracting requirements, without minimizing or concealing the violations
Honesty required Engineer A to accurately report the full scope of the procurement violations discovered, including the non-compliant contracts, rather than softening findings to avoid conflict with the City Engineer
Honesty prevailed; Engineer A reported findings accurately and recommended corrective action
Honorable Procurement Conduct City D Engineer Violation
City D Engineer approved two Firm Z contracts without required RFQ processes and, upon being informed of non-compliance, refused corrective action on grounds of organizational convenience and established relationships.
Honorable Professional Conduct in Procurement Obligation
The City D Engineer was obligated to conduct procurement activities honorably, responsibly, and fairly — consistent with both the letter and spirit of the ethics code — and failed this obligation by approving non-compliant contracts and refusing corrective action.
At the time of approving non-compliant contracts and upon being informed of violations
Honorable Procurement Conduct Constraint City D Engineer Rationalization
City D's Engineer awarded two Firm Z contracts without required RFQ process and City Council authorization, and subsequently refused to take corrective action when Engineer A identified the violations
City D's Engineer was constrained from rationalizing non-compliant sole-source Firm Z contract awards on the basis of administrative convenience, established relationships, or familiarity, as the obligation to conduct procurement activities honorably, responsibly, and fairly required adherence to both the letter and spirit of competitive QBS procurement requirements.
NSPE Code of Ethics Fundamental Canons; BER Case 08-8; State QBS procurement law
Throughout the award of the two most recent Firm Z contracts and the subsequent refusal to take corrective action
City D's Engineer was obligated to conduct themselves ethically in the administration of public engineering contracts, which precluded rationalizing non-compliant procurement awards.
Such action should proceed advisedly, carefully, and sensitively, with a view to complying with the law.
Internal Compliance Escalation Constraint — Engineer A Post-Investigation
Engineer A completed internal reporting to City D's Engineer and received dismissal of corrective action, placing Engineer A in the Internal Escalation Exhausted State requiring consideration of external reporting obligations
Internal Compliance Reporting Escalation Constraint
Engineer A was procedurally constrained to first report procurement non-compliance findings to City D's Engineer through internal channels before considering external escalation, while simultaneously being ethically constrained from abandoning those findings after City D's Engineer dismissed corrective action without adequate justification.
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections I.4, I.6, III.6; NSPE BER Case 80-1
From completion of investigation through City D's Engineer's dismissal of corrective action recommendations
Licensure Board Reporting City D Engineer Self-Reporting Obligation
City D Engineer acknowledged non-compliance with contracting requirements but refused corrective action; the case text notes that all three engineers must consider licensure board reporting obligations.
Licensure Board Reporting Obligation for Procurement Violations
The City D Engineer, having acknowledged non-compliance with procurement requirements, was obligated to consider the duty to self-report or otherwise address the violations with the state licensure board, rather than refusing all corrective action.
Upon acknowledgment of procurement non-compliance
the City D Engineer and those engineers employed by Firm Z are in violation of the procurement law, and also Code section III.8.a.
Licensure Board Reporting Constraint City D Engineer Self-Reporting
City D's Engineer was directly responsible for the non-compliant Firm Z contract awards and refused to take corrective action after being informed of the violations
City D's Engineer, having acknowledged non-compliance with procurement requirements and refused to take corrective action, was constrained to consider the duty to self-report or otherwise address the confirmed violations of Code Section III.8.a with the state licensure board, as the violations implicated the engineer's own professional conduct.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.8.a; State licensure board reporting requirements
Following Engineer A's notification of confirmed Firm Z procurement violations
City D's Engineer was obligated to conduct themselves ethically in the administration of public engineering contracts.
Licensure Board Reporting Constraint Engineer A Firm Z Violations
Engineer A confirmed that City D's two most recent Firm Z contracts violated procurement law, implicating both City D's Engineer and Firm Z engineers in violations of Code Section III.8.a
Engineer A was constrained to consider and, where warranted, fulfill the obligation to report confirmed Firm Z procurement violations — which also constituted violations of Code Section III.8.a — to the state licensure board, as the confirmed violations involved engineers in violation of both procurement law and professional ethics code provisions.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.f, III.8.a; State licensure board reporting requirements
Following confirmation of Firm Z procurement violations and City D Engineer's refusal to take corrective action
Per Code sections II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.8.a, appropriate action must be taken.
Licensure Board Reporting Engineer A Firm Z Violations
Engineer A confirmed that two Firm Z contracts violated procurement law and NSPE Code III.8.a; the City D Engineer refused corrective action.
Engineer A was obligated to consider and, where warranted, fulfill the duty to report the confirmed Firm Z procurement violations — which also constitute violations of state registration board rules of professional conduct — to the state licensure board.
Following confirmation of violations and the City D Engineer's refusal to act
Licensure Board Reporting Engineer B Firm Z Violations
Engineer B raised concerns about City D's exclusionary contracting practices with Firm Z and reported them to Engineer A; the state licensure board is an additional appropriate reporting authority.
Engineer B, having identified and reported suspected procurement violations, was also obligated to consider reporting those violations to the state licensure board, particularly given that the violations constitute breaches of state registration board rules of professional conduct.
Upon identification of suspected procurement violations and after internal reporting
Lowest-Level Resolution Priority Constraint Engineer A Engineer B Referral
Engineer A served as the initial internal contact for Engineer B's procurement concerns, and was able to resolve some concerns (Firm X, three Firm Z contracts) internally before identifying the two non-compliant Firm Z contracts
Engineer A was constrained to first attempt resolution of Engineer B's procurement concerns at the lowest possible organizational level — within City D's internal channels — before directing Engineer B to external authorities such as the state licensing agency or City Attorney, consistent with the principle that resolving issues at the lowest possible level is often the most effective approach.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER analysis of current case
Resolving issues at the lowest possible level is often an effective way to solve problems.
Upon receipt of Engineer B's complaint and throughout the investigation
City Engineer's decision to dismiss corrective action
Procurement Integrity in Public Engineering
Engineer A faces a tension between loyalty to City D as employer — which might counsel deference to the City Engineer's decision not to pursue corrective action — and the obligation to uphold public welfare and procurement integrity that overrides employer loyalty
Loyalty to City D does not extend to acquiescing in acknowledged procurement law violations; the bounds of legitimate loyalty are defined by legal and ethical obligations
Loyalty must yield to public welfare and legal compliance obligations; Engineer A's duty to City D does not include ratifying or concealing known violations of procurement law
National Society of Professional Engineers
Code section III.8.a, engineers are ethically obligated to 'conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering'
Engineer B has an obligation, per Code section II.1.f, to report 'any alleged violation of this Code'
per Code sections II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.8.a, appropriate action must be taken
with a view to complying with the law and Code sections I.4, I.6, III.6, III.7
Primary normative authority cited throughout the discussion, including sections II.1.e, II.1.f, III.8.a, I.4, I.6, III.6, III.7, and Fundamental Canon 1.6, governing reporting obligations, compliance with registration laws, and honorable conduct in procurement matters
Engineer A brings these findings to City D's Engineer, a licensed professional engineer, recommending improvements to address compliance concerns
Provides the primary normative framework governing Engineer A's obligations to investigate contracting irregularities, report findings, and uphold public trust in professional practice; grounds obligations regarding honest conduct, public welfare, and professional accountability
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States
the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
actions by the US Justice Department, in 1977, that required NSPE and other engineering and professional organizations to remove NSPE Code of Ethics (Code) provisions related to professional selection, compensation, restrictions on competitive bidding, free engineering, supplanting, advertising, and other practices
BER in current case analysis via BER Case 08-8
Establishes the legal boundary that professional society codes cannot restrict competitive bidding or procurement practices, and that federal, state, and local procurement laws remain in full force regardless of professional code provisions
National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Engineer A Investigation
Engineer A investigated Engineer B's allegations and confirmed that two Firm Z contracts were awarded outside required competitive QBS procurement processes; the City D Engineer refused corrective action.
Non-Aiding Unlawful Engineering Practice Obligation
Upon being made aware of potential unlawful procurement practices involving Firm Z contracts, Engineer A was obligated to refrain from aiding or abetting the continuation of those unlawful practices, including by not ratifying or ignoring the violations discovered during the investigation.
Upon confirmation of procurement violations and continuing through the City D Engineer's refusal to act
Non-Deception Constraint — City D Engineer Procurement Rationalization
City D's Engineer acknowledged non-compliance but offered convenience and relationship as justification, which misrepresented the legal and ethical status of the procurement practices to Engineer A and potentially to City D's institutional stakeholders
City D's Engineer was ethically constrained from misrepresenting convenience and relationship longevity as legitimate legal justifications for non-competitive contract awards, as such characterizations created a false impression that the procurement practices were acceptable when they were acknowledged to be non-compliant.
NSPE Code of Ethics Non-Deception provisions; professional ethics obligations
At the time of dismissing Engineer A's corrective action recommendations
Procurement Integrity Invoked By Engineer A Investigation
Engineer A investigated whether City D's contracting practices complied with applicable QBS procurement laws and discovered that two Firm Z contracts were awarded without the required RFQ process despite exceeding Council authorization thresholds
QBS compliance is an ethical obligation for engineers in public roles, not merely an administrative requirement; Engineer A's investigation was ethically required upon receiving credible allegations of non-compliance
Engineer A correctly prioritized procurement integrity by investigating and reporting findings, though the City Engineer's refusal to act left the violation unresolved
Procurement Integrity Violated By City D Engineer Approval
The City Engineer approved two Firm Z contracts without the required RFQ process despite their dollar amounts exceeding the threshold requiring Council authorization, and then refused corrective action when the violation was identified
Approving contracts in violation of mandatory QBS procurement laws and then refusing corrective action constitutes a serious breach of the procurement integrity principle
The City Engineer improperly allowed convenience and relationship to override statutory procurement requirements, compounding the initial violation with a refusal to remedy it
Procurement Investigation Objectivity Engineer A Findings
Engineer A investigated Engineer B's allegations and confirmed violations in two of five Firm Z contracts while clearing Firm X and three Firm Z contracts, reporting findings to the City D Engineer.
Procurement Investigation Objectivity Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to conduct the procurement investigation objectively and thoroughly, reporting findings accurately and completely — including the determination that two Firm Z contracts violated procurement law — regardless of whether those findings were adverse to the City D Engineer or to established contractor relationships.
Engineer A was able to establish there were no issues with Firm X and can also point out other avenues for Engineer B to raise concerns.
During and upon completion of the procurement investigation
Engineer A can in good faith report to Engineer B that there are no issues with Firm X.
Procurement Investigation Objectivity Engineer A Investigation
Engineer A investigated Engineer B's allegations about City D's contracting practices and discovered non-compliant Firm Z contracts, reporting these findings with recommendations to City D's Engineer.
Engineer A was obligated to conduct the investigation into City D's contracting practices objectively and thoroughly, and to report findings accurately and completely to City D's Engineer regardless of whether those findings were adverse to the employer's established contracting relationships.
Procurement Law Compliance City D Engineer Firm Z Contracts
City D awarded two civil engineering contracts to Firm Z without the required RFQ process, despite their dollar amounts exceeding the Council authorization threshold, under QBS procurement laws codified in state professional engineering licensure law.
City D's Engineer was obligated to ensure that the two most recent Firm Z contracts, whose dollar amounts exceeded the threshold requiring City Council authorization and an RFQ process, were awarded only through a compliant QBS/RFQ process with required Council authorization, and was obligated to refrain from approving those contracts unilaterally without such process.
At the time of awarding each of the two most recent Firm Z contracts
Procurement Law Conformance City D Engineer Firm Z Contracts
City D Engineer approved two Firm Z contracts exceeding Council authorization thresholds without conducting required RFQ processes, in violation of applicable procurement law and NSPE Code III.8.a.
The City D Engineer was obligated to ensure that the two most recent Firm Z contracts were awarded through compliant QBS procurement processes with required RFQ and Council authorization, and to conform with state registration board rules of professional conduct requiring such compliance.
At the time of awarding each of the two non-compliant Firm Z contracts
per Code section III.8.a, engineers are ethically obligated to 'conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering'
Procurement Law Conformance Constraint Firm Z Engineers Non-Compliant Contracts
The two most recent Firm Z contracts with City D were awarded without RFQ process and without City Council authorization, violating both procurement law and Code Section III.8.a, implicating Firm Z engineers as well as City D's Engineer
Public Procurement Procedural Compliance Constraint
Engineers employed by Firm Z were constrained by procurement law and Code Section III.8.a to ensure that contracts they participated in with City D were awarded through compliant QBS procurement processes with required City Council authorization, prohibiting participation in contracts awarded through non-compliant sole-source processes.
State QBS procurement law; NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.8.a; BER Case 08-8
Throughout the award and execution of the two most recent Firm Z contracts with City D
Engineers are ethically obligated to 'conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering.'
Federal, state, and local laws governing procedures to procure engineering services are not affected and remain in full force and effect.
Procurement Law Conformance Firm Z Engineers Non-Compliant Contracts
Firm Z's two most recent contracts with City D were awarded without required RFQ processes despite exceeding Council authorization thresholds, placing Firm Z engineers in violation of procurement law and NSPE Code III.8.a.
Engineers employed by Firm Z were obligated to ensure that contracts they participated in with City D were awarded through compliant QBS procurement processes, and to refrain from participating in contracts awarded outside required competitive procurement procedures.
At the time of entering into and performing the two non-compliant contracts
Procurement Protest Ethical Boundary Constraint Engineer B City D Firm Z
Engineer B reported concerns about City D's contracting practices with Firm Z, which Engineer A investigated and confirmed as non-compliant with procurement law
Procurement Protest Ethical Boundary Constraint
Engineer B was ethically permitted to report suspected procurement violations to Engineer A as a legitimate protest grounded in public interest and legal compliance concerns, but was constrained from making public statements about Firm Z's fees or likelihood of project success, as such statements would approach the boundary of unfair competitive conduct.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.f; BER Case 80-1; BER Case 08-8
Throughout Engineer B's reporting of procurement concerns
BER Case 80-1 includes an 'Additional Views' section that provides that while those authors agree with the BER conclusions, 'we feel that Firms B and C are walking a very thin line of ethical practices when they make a public statement' regarding Firm A's fees and likelihood of project success.
Procurement Violation Corrective Action City D Engineer Post-Investigation
City D's Engineer acknowledged the non-compliance of the two most recent Firm Z contracts but refused corrective action, citing convenience and the longstanding relationship with Firm Z.
Procurement Violation Corrective Action Obligation
Upon being informed by Engineer A of the procurement non-compliance findings regarding the two most recent Firm Z contracts, City D's Engineer was obligated to take affirmative corrective action to remedy the violations rather than dismissing the need for corrective action on grounds of convenience and longstanding relationship.
Upon receiving Engineer A's findings and recommendations regarding procurement non-compliance
Procurement Violation Corrective Action City D Engineer Refusal
City D Engineer acknowledged non-compliance with contracting requirements but refused to take corrective action, rationalizing the violation through organizational convenience.
Upon being informed by Engineer A of confirmed procurement violations in the two most recent Firm Z contracts, the City D Engineer was obligated to take affirmative corrective action — including initiating retroactive compliance measures or escalating to appropriate authorities — rather than refusing corrective action on grounds of established relationships or organizational convenience.
Upon receiving Engineer A's investigation findings confirming procurement violations
Professional Accountability Failure By City D Engineer
The City Engineer acknowledged non-compliance with contracting requirements but refused to take corrective action, rationalizing the violation through appeals to convenience and longstanding relationship rather than accepting professional responsibility to remedy the identified failure
Professional accountability requires more than acknowledging a violation; it requires taking corrective action. The City Engineer's acknowledgment without remediation represents a failure of professional accountability
The City Engineer failed to resolve the tension in favor of professional accountability, instead rationalizing inaction through convenience
Protest Non-Compliant Procurement Engineer B Firm Z
Engineer B approached Engineer A to raise concerns about City D's exclusionary contracting practices, alleging contracts were awarded to Firm Z without required RFQ processes.
Protest of Non-Compliant Procurement Obligation
Engineer B was obligated — and ethically permitted — to raise a formal protest of City D's non-compliant procurement practices with Firm Z by reporting the alleged violations to Engineer A as the appropriate internal authority, consistent with the duty under NSPE Code II.1.f to report alleged code violations.
Engineer B has an obligation, per Code section II.1.f, to report 'any alleged violation of this Code,' and B has done so. Engineer B's actions are consistent with the BER's analysis of past cases.
Upon identifying suspected non-compliant procurement practices
Public Procurement Whistleblower Escalation Engineer A External
City D Engineer acknowledged non-compliance but refused corrective action; Engineer A must determine whether and how to escalate beyond the immediate supervisor.
Public Procurement Whistleblower Escalation Obligation
Having confirmed procurement violations and reported them internally to the City D Engineer without corrective response, Engineer A was obligated to escalate the matter to appropriate external authorities — including the state licensing agency, City Attorney, or other oversight bodies — rather than acquiescing to the continuation of unlawful contracting practices.
Following the City D Engineer's refusal to take corrective action on confirmed violations
Engineer A can also point out other avenues for Engineer B to raise concerns, for example, the state licensing agency or the City Attorney.
Public Procurement Whistleblower Escalation Engineer A Post-Dismissal
Engineer A investigated and confirmed procurement violations, reported findings to City D's Engineer with recommendations, and received a dismissal of corrective action justified by convenience and relationship. The violations involve QBS laws codified in state professional engineering licensure law.
Having reported procurement violation findings internally to City D's Engineer and received a dismissal of corrective action, Engineer A bears a prima facie obligation to escalate the matter to appropriate external authorities — such as the City Council, city legal counsel, state licensing board, or other oversight body — rather than acquiescing to the continuation of non-compliant contracting practices.
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked By Engineer A Investigating Procurement
Engineer A recognized that City D's exclusionary and non-compliant contracting practices harmed the public interest in lawful, competitive procurement and committed to investigating the allegations raised by Engineer B
Public welfare in this context encompasses not only physical safety but also the integrity of public procurement processes that protect taxpayers and ensure fair access to public engineering contracts
Engineer A prioritized public welfare by investigating and reporting findings internally, consistent with the obligation to hold public welfare paramount over employer convenience
Public Welfare Paramount Violated By City D Engineer
The City Engineer dismissed corrective action for acknowledged procurement violations, subordinating public welfare and legal compliance to organizational convenience and a longstanding contractor relationship
The City Engineer's refusal to pursue corrective action after acknowledging non-compliance constitutes a failure to uphold public welfare paramount, prioritizing convenience over lawful administration of public resources
The City Engineer improperly resolved the tension by allowing employer convenience to override public welfare and legal compliance obligations
QBS Law Applicable State - City D Jurisdiction
Persistent background state; QBS laws in effect at state and local levels throughout the case
All qualified engineering firms in the jurisdiction
City D's procurement of professional engineering services within its jurisdiction
Not terminated; persistent regulatory context
City D operates within a jurisdiction that has enacted QBS procurement laws codified in professional engineering licensure statutes
Ongoing — state law in force throughout the relevant contracting period
federal, state, and local laws governing procedures to procure engineering services are not affected and remain in full force and effect
City D's procurement of professional engineering services
Not terminated — statutory requirement remains in force
It is in City D's interest – legally, ethically, and politically – to procure its consultant services in accordance with the laws of the state where its engineers are licensed
State and local QBS laws codified within professional engineering licensure statutes applicable to City D
QBS Procurement Law Compliance Constraint — City D Firm Z Recent Contracts
City D's Engineer awarded two Firm Z contracts without RFQ process despite dollar amounts exceeding the threshold requiring both Council authorization and competitive RFQ, in violation of applicable QBS procurement statutes
City D's Engineer was legally constrained from awarding the two most recent Firm Z contracts without conducting an RFQ process and obtaining City Council authorization, as the contract dollar amounts exceeded the statutory threshold triggering these mandatory procedural requirements under City D's jurisdiction's QBS procurement laws.
City D jurisdiction QBS procurement laws codified within state professional engineering licensure laws; City D Council authorization and RFQ threshold requirements
At the time of award of the two most recent Firm Z contracts and continuing through the investigation period
Was it ethical for Engineer B to complain to Engineer A?
Did Engineer B have an obligation to report the suspected procurement violations directly to City D's governing council or a state licensing board before approaching Engineer A, given that Engineer B is a competitor with a potential financial interest in the outcome?
Do the engineers at Firm Z bear any independent ethical or legal obligation under QBS procurement laws, given that they accepted contracts awarded without the required RFQ process and Council authorization?
What is the ethical significance of the City D Engineer being a licensed professional engineer who personally approved the non-compliant Firm Z contracts, and does that licensed status trigger a self-reporting obligation to the state engineering licensure board?
At what point, if any, does Engineer A's continued employment with City D after the City D Engineer's refusal to act constitute aiding or abetting the unlawful procurement practice, and how should Engineer A weigh the risk of personal complicity against the strategic value of remaining in a position to escalate internally?
Were Engineer A’s actions in investigating City D’s contracting practices ethical?
Does Engineer A's obligation as a faithful agent and trustee to City D conflict with the paramount duty to protect public welfare when the City D Engineer, as Engineer A's direct superior, explicitly refuses to correct procurement violations that undermine lawful public contracting?
Does the principle of fairness in professional competition, raised by Engineer B's complaint, conflict with procurement integrity when Engineer B's motivation for reporting may be self-interested pursuit of City D contracts, and how should that potential bias affect the weight given to Engineer B's allegations?
Does the principle of professional accountability, which demands that Engineer A report the City D Engineer's violations, conflict with the principle of honoring the employer-client relationship when escalating beyond the City D Engineer necessarily involves reporting a superior's misconduct to external authorities such as the city council, city manager, or state licensure board?
Does the principle of fairness in professional competition, which is upheld for Firm X because its contract was properly procured through an RFQ with optional extensions, conflict with the principle of public welfare when rigidly applying QBS procurement rules to Firm X's remaining extensions could disrupt ongoing public services that the city depends on, even though no violation exists?
Because City D’s Engineer refuses to change the contract arrangement with Firm Z, what steps must Engineer A take?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer B fulfill a categorical duty to report suspected statutory violations, independent of whether the report would benefit Engineer B's own firm competitively?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's duty as a faithful agent to City D conflict with their duty to the public when the City D Engineer refuses corrective action, and which duty takes categorical precedence under the NSPE Code?
From a consequentialist perspective, does the City D Engineer's justification of convenience and longstanding relationship with Firm Z produce net public benefit sufficient to outweigh the harms of excluding qualified competitors and violating QBS procurement law?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did the City D Engineer demonstrate the professional virtues of integrity and honesty when dismissing Engineer A's documented compliance findings, or did the rationalization of convenience represent a fundamental failure of professional character?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does Engineer A's willingness to investigate Engineer B's concerns—despite having no prior relationship with Engineer B and potential risk to their new employment—reflect the professional courage and integrity expected of a licensed engineer in a public agency role?
From a consequentialist perspective, what are the systemic harms to public trust in government procurement if Engineer A chooses not to escalate beyond the City D Engineer, and do those long-term harms outweigh the short-term professional risks Engineer A faces by escalating externally?
If Engineer B had not reported the contracting concerns to Engineer A—perhaps fearing retaliation or professional awkwardness given the competitive dynamic—would City D's procurement violations with Firm Z have continued undetected, and what does this suggest about the systemic importance of peer reporting obligations in public engineering contexts?
If the City D Engineer had acknowledged the Firm Z non-compliance and initiated corrective action upon Engineer A's recommendation, would Engineer A's obligations under the NSPE Code have been fully satisfied, or would additional reporting to external bodies still have been required?
If the two non-compliant Firm Z contracts had fallen below the Council authorization and RFQ threshold—making them procedurally irregular but not a statutory violation—would Engineer A's ethical obligations have been materially different, and would Engineer B's complaint still have been ethically required?
If Engineer A had been employed at City D for several years before discovering the Firm Z non-compliance—rather than discovering it shortly after joining—would the extended period of unwitting participation in the non-compliant contracting environment have created additional ethical obligations or personal liability concerns for Engineer A under the NSPE Code?
Regulatory Compliance Constraint — Firm X Contract Extensions Within Scope
Engineer A's investigation found Firm X's engagement compliant because it operated within the original RFQ contract scope with contractually authorized extensions, contrasting with Firm Z's non-compliant recent contracts
City D's use of Firm X under optional annual extensions was constrained to remain within the original RFQ scope and contract terms, and was permissible only because the extensions were contractually authorized at the time of the original competitive procurement, distinguishing it from the non-compliant Firm Z awards.
City D jurisdiction QBS procurement laws; original Firm X RFQ contract terms
Throughout the seven-year period of Firm X engagement and remaining four optional extensions
Revolving Door Ethics Constraint Engineer D City AE&R
Engineer D served as City Engineer with procurement and contract authority over AE firms including AE&R, then accepted a position at AE&R which planned to continue submitting proposals to the City
Engineer D was ethically constrained from immediately joining Firm AE&R — which had conducted substantial business with the City during Engineer D's tenure as City Engineer — without observing the spirit of ethics code provisions on purity of enterprise and avoidance of dishonor, even though the City's employment contract contained no explicit revolving door prohibition.
NSPE Code of Ethics Fundamental Canon 1.6; BER Case 23-3; BER Case 58-1
Engineer D had been one of the City's main points of contact for AE firms and contractors in the area, both with respect to contract negotiation and award... Shortly after Engineer D's announcement, Firm AE&R announced Engineer D as a newly hired associate.
Upon Engineer D's departure from City Engineer role and transition to Firm AE&R
The City did not include 'revolving door' provisions in employment contracts for its senior-level employees... But the BER does not hold this perspective.
Stakeholder Interest Balancing Constraint Engineer A Post-Refusal Action
Engineer A faced the tension between loyalty to City D as employer and the obligation to ensure procurement law compliance after the City D Engineer dismissed corrective action recommendations
Stakeholder Interest Balancing Constraint in Compliance Action
Engineer A, in taking compliance action following the City D Engineer's refusal to address Firm Z procurement violations, was constrained to proceed advisedly, carefully, and sensitively — consulting City Manager, City Attorney, and other knowledgeable engineers — while simultaneously fulfilling legal and ethical compliance obligations, prohibiting unnecessarily aggressive unilateral external escalation when measured multi-stakeholder approaches remained available.
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections I.4, I.6, III.6, III.7; BER analysis of current case
Following City D Engineer's refusal to take corrective action on Firm Z contracts
Transportation Engineer B Unlicensed Engineering Reviewer
{'license': 'None', 'title': 'Transportation Engineer', 'employer': 'State Agency'}
State agency staff member holding the title 'Transportation Engineer' who reviewed, approved, commented on, and directed changes to consultant design documents without possessing a professional engineering license or engineering degree, thereby engaging in unlawful practice of engineering.
{'type': 'reviewed_work_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Consulting Engineer BER 22-1'}
'Transportation Engineer' B, who personally reviewed those documents for final approval, made comments, and directed changes
'Transportation Engineer' B was neither a licensed engineer nor even a degreed engineer
Transportation Engineer B Unlicensed Practice
From the time Engineer A submitted sealed documents for review through discovery of unlicensed status
Unlicensed Practice by Third Party State
State Agency 'Transportation Engineer' B reviewing and directing changes to engineering design documents without licensure
BER determination that Engineer A must report the unlicensed practice
'Transportation Engineer' B personally reviewed signed and sealed design documents, made comments, and directed changes — constituting practice of engineering under state law — without holding a professional engineering license
US Justice Department antitrust actions before US Supreme Court ruling in National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers v. United States
Unilaterally Award Contracts Without RFQ
Unilaterally Award Contracts Without RFQ (Action 3) → Procurement Violations Occur (Event 4)
Unlicensed Practice Reporting Constraint Engineer A Firm Z Investigation
Engineer A as Assistant City Engineer was tasked with investigating procurement practices after Engineer B raised concerns about non-compliant Firm Z contract awards
Unlicensed Practice Reporting Constraint
Engineer A, upon being made aware of potential unlawful procurement practices involving Firm Z contracts, was constrained from aiding or abetting unlawful engineering practice and was required to investigate and report findings, consistent with the obligation to not aid unlawful practice.
NSPE Code of Ethics; State procurement law; BER Case 22-1 precedent
Upon Engineer A's receipt of Engineer B's complaint and throughout the investigation
Unlicensed Practice Reporting Constraint Engineer A Transportation Engineer B
Transportation Engineer B personally reviewed signed and sealed design documents, made comments, and directed changes — constituting practice of engineering under state law — without holding licensure or engineering degree
Engineer A was constrained from passively acquiescing in Transportation Engineer B's review and direction of engineering design documents, and was affirmatively required to report Transportation Engineer B's unlicensed practice of engineering to the appropriate authority, as B was neither licensed nor degreed as an engineer.
State engineering licensure statute; NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 22-1
Engineer A learned that 'Transportation Engineer' B was neither a licensed engineer nor even a degreed engineer.
Upon Engineer A's discovery that Transportation Engineer B lacked licensure
Engineer A had an obligation to report 'Transportation Engineer' B for unlicensed practice.
The BER found it was unlawful and therefore not ethical for 'Transportation Engineer' B to engage in the practice of engineering without having fulfilled the requirements for licensure.
annual extensions used by Firm X (approximately six) before four remaining optional extensions
first three compliant Firm Z contracts before two non-compliant Firm Z contracts
non-compliant Firm Z contracts before Engineer A joins City D