Accept Peer Reviewer Role → Confidentiality Agreement Binding
The BER has considered at least one case involving an engineer gaining knowledge of information damaging to a client's interest which involved the public health and safety (see BER Case 76-4).
Board of Ethical Review as analogical precedent
Cited as precedent for an engineer gaining knowledge of information damaging to a client's interest that involved public health and safety, providing analogical reasoning for the present peer-review confidentiality vs. public safety dilemma
CausalLink_Assess Imminence of Public Ris
CausalLink_Conduct Technical Documentatio
CausalLink_Escalate to Proper Authorities
CausalLink_Notify Engineer B of Violation
CausalLink_Sign Confidentiality Agreement
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (derived from Code provisions and prior cases)
Client Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Balancing Framework
Weighing the competing considerations in this case, the Board of Ethical Review is of the opinion that Engineer A will have to exercise appropriate judgment and discretion concerning this matter depending upon all of the facts and circumstances.
While confidentiality is an important ethical value, as a licensed professional engineer, Engineer A's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety.
Board of Ethical Review in structuring its opinion and guidance to Engineer A
The BER explicitly applies a graduated balancing framework: weigh confidentiality against public safety, notify Engineer B first, escalate to authorities only if Engineer B fails to act — directly instantiating this decision tool
Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Balancing Framework
Engineer A agrees not to disclose confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
This decision framework directly applies to Engineer A's dilemma: the signed confidentiality agreement creates a duty of non-disclosure, but the discovery of potential safety code violations endangering public health, safety, and welfare triggers the paramount obligation to protect the public. The framework guides how Engineer A must weigh and resolve these competing obligations.
Code of Ethics Universal Applicability Constraint — Engineer B Business Form Non-Waivability
The BER explicitly notes that business form or type should not negate nor influence conformance of individuals to the Code, addressing the possibility that Engineer B might claim corporate structure as a shield from individual ethical responsibility.
Code of Ethics Universal Applicability Constraint
Engineer B was constrained to recognize that the NSPE Code of Ethics applies to Engineer B as a real person regardless of the business form or corporate structure through which engineering services are delivered — the corporate or business form of Engineer B's firm cannot negate or reduce Engineer B's individual ethical obligations under the Code.
business form or type should not negate nor influence conformance of individuals to the Code
Real persons in turn establish and implement policies within business structures
The Code deals with professional services, which services must be performed by real persons
The Code is clearly written to apply to the Engineer and it is incumbent on a member of NSPE to endeavor to live up to its provisions
This applies to all pertinent sections of the Code
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (derived from Code and professional norms)
Collegial Notification Before Reporting Standard
a more appropriate action would be for Engineer A to expeditiously discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution of this issue.
If Engineer A and Engineer B are unable to resolve the issue, Engineer A must inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, his only alternative is to cooperate with the proper authorities as indicated above.
Board of Ethical Review as a procedural norm guiding Engineer A's conduct
The BER prescribes that Engineer A must first discuss issues with Engineer B and seek early resolution before escalating to authorities, embodying the collegial-notification-first norm
Collegial Notification Priority Before Formal Regulatory Report Constraint — Engineer A to Engineer B Pre-Escalation
The BER prescribes that Engineer A must first discuss issues with Engineer B and seek early resolution before escalating to authorities, consistent with the collegial improvement purpose of the peer review program.
Collegial Notification Priority Before Formal Competitor Regulatory Report Constraint
Before escalating the discovered safety code violations to governmental or regulatory authorities, Engineer A must first discuss the concerns with Engineer B privately and afford Engineer B an opportunity to clarify or correct the violations — prohibiting Engineer A from bypassing collegial notification and proceeding directly to formal external reporting.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; BER Case 96-8; collegial notification norm
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Immediately upon discovery of potential safety code violations, prior to any external escalation
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer as part of an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice.
Competing Duties Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Reporting
From discovery of the safety violation through resolution of the ethical dilemma
This ethical dilemma appears to involve two separate provisions of the NSPE Code of Ethics -- Section III.4. and Section II.1.e
Engineer A's simultaneous obligations under NSPE Code Section III.4 (confidentiality) and Section II.1.e (cooperation with authorities on safety violations)
Engineer A makes a judgment call and takes appropriate action (collegial discussion, authority notification, or both)
On the one hand, the engineer has an obligation not to disclose confidential information... On the other hand, Engineer A, having knowledge of any alleged violation of the Code of Ethics, has an obligation to cooperate with the proper authorities
Weighing the competing considerations in this case
Discovery of potential safety code violation during a confidentiality-agreement-bound peer review
If Engineer A determines that Engineer B’s work is or may be in violation of state and local safety requirements and endangers public health, safety and welfare, the appropriate action is for Engineer A to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution of this issue.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A should immediately discuss the violations with Engineer B, the Board's prescribed sequential escalation pathway carries an implicit but critical temporal limitation: the collegial discussion step is only ethically permissible when the risk is uncertain or non-imminent. Where Engineer A assesses the public safety risk as imminent and severe — rather than merely potential — the sequential model collapses, and Engineer A bears an independent obligation to notify the proper authorities without delay, regardless of whether Engineer B has been consulted first. The 'may be in violation' standard the Board employs does not eliminate this distinction; it simply reflects the facts of this particular case. Engineer A must therefore conduct a documented severity-and-imminence assessment at the moment of discovery, because that assessment determines which escalation pathway is ethically required. Failure to make and record that assessment is itself an ethical shortcoming, since it leaves Engineer A unable to demonstrate that the chosen pathway was calibrated to the actual level of risk.
The Board's conclusion implicitly treats the confidentiality agreement as a legitimate and binding professional commitment while simultaneously holding that it cannot override the public safety reporting obligation. This dual treatment, though practically workable, leaves unresolved a deeper structural problem: the confidentiality agreement as designed creates a foreseeable and recurring conflict that the peer review program itself is institutionally responsible for resolving. Because the Code of Ethics imposes non-waivable individual duties on every engineer regardless of the business or programmatic context in which they operate, any confidentiality agreement that purports — even implicitly — to suppress disclosure of active safety code violations is void to that extent as a matter of professional ethics. The peer review program therefore bears an affirmative institutional obligation to include an explicit carve-out provision stating that safety code violations discovered during peer review must be reported to the appropriate authorities notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement. The absence of such a provision does not merely leave individual engineers in an uncomfortable dilemma; it represents a structural ethical failure of the program's design that foreseeably places peer reviewers in the position of appearing to choose between contractual loyalty and public safety — a choice the Code does not permit them to make in favor of confidentiality.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A should first discuss the violations with Engineer B before escalating to authorities is ethically sound as a general rule, but it carries a latent risk that the Board does not address: the collegial notification step could itself become a vehicle for aiding or abetting unlawful engineering practice if Engineer A, having notified Engineer B, then fails to follow through with regulatory reporting when Engineer B does not take prompt and verifiable corrective action. Engineer A's obligation does not terminate at the moment of collegial notification. Rather, notification of Engineer B triggers a secondary, time-bounded obligation to monitor whether corrective action is actually undertaken. If Engineer B acknowledges the violations but delays correction, disputes Engineer A's findings without credible technical justification, or takes no action, Engineer A's continued silence would cross the threshold from collegial deference into complicity with ongoing unlawful practice. This means Engineer A must establish — at the time of the collegial discussion — a clear and documented understanding of what corrective action is expected, by when, and what Engineer A will do if that action is not taken. The absence of such a follow-through framework renders the collegial discussion step ethically incomplete, regardless of how constructively it is conducted.
A confidentiality agreement that purports to suppress disclosure of active public safety violations has no valid ethical force under the NSPE Code, and its legal enforceability is similarly suspect. The Code's provision that engineers shall not disclose confidential information without consent (Section III.4) is explicitly bounded by the overriding duty to protect public safety. No contractual instrument can extinguish a duty that the Code imposes on every individual engineer as a non-waivable personal obligation. Engineers should therefore be cautious about signing peer review confidentiality agreements that do not contain explicit carve-outs for safety-critical disclosures. A well-drafted agreement would affirmatively state that nothing in it prevents the reviewer from reporting discovered safety code violations to proper authorities. The absence of such a carve-out does not, however, create an enforceable obligation of silence — it merely creates ambiguity that the engineer must resolve in favor of public safety. Peer review programs that present reviewers with agreements lacking this carve-out are themselves operating with a structural ethical deficiency.
Engineer A's continued silence about Engineer B's violations — even during the collegial discussion phase — risks crossing into aiding or abetting unlawful engineering practice under Code Section II.1.e if that silence is prolonged, if Engineer B is unresponsive, or if the risk to the public is ongoing and concrete. The collegial notification step prescribed by the Board is not a license for indefinite delay. It is a first step in a time-bounded sequential escalation, not an open-ended courtesy period. If Engineer A notifies Engineer B and Engineer B fails to acknowledge the problem, disputes the finding without credible technical basis, or commits to corrective action but takes no meaningful steps, Engineer A's continued inaction would shift from collegial patience to complicit silence. The threshold at which silence becomes aiding and abetting is crossed when Engineer A possesses a good-faith belief that a violation exists, has given Engineer B a reasonable opportunity to respond, and yet takes no further action while the public remains exposed. The Code does not permit Engineer A to treat the collegial discussion as a substitute for escalation — it is only a precursor to it.
The peer review program itself bears significant institutional responsibility for the ethical dilemma Engineer A faces. By establishing a confidentiality agreement without an explicit safety-disclosure carve-out, the program placed individual engineers in a foreseeable conflict between two legitimate duties. This is a structural design failure, not merely an individual ethical challenge. A well-governed peer review program should, before any reviewer enters the field, establish written protocols that (1) define the categories of findings that override confidentiality, (2) specify the escalation sequence and its time parameters, (3) clarify the reviewer's reporting obligations to authorities, and (4) indemnify reviewers who make good-faith safety disclosures from retaliation or breach-of-contract claims. The absence of these protocols does not relieve Engineer A of their individual ethical obligations, but it does mean the program has externalized its ethical risk onto individual reviewers rather than managing it institutionally. Programs that fail to resolve the confidentiality-versus-safety tension in their governing documents are, in effect, asking engineers to improvise solutions to a conflict the program itself created.
The standard of 'may be in violation' articulated in the Board's conclusion imposes essentially the same escalation obligations as a confirmed violation, because the Code's public safety duty is triggered by a good-faith belief of risk, not by certainty of harm. Engineer A is not required to conduct a definitive legal or technical adjudication before acting. The appropriate standard is whether a reasonable, competent engineer in Engineer A's position would have a genuine, professionally grounded concern that the work poses a risk to public health, safety, or welfare. If that threshold is met, Engineer A must document the specific findings — the nature of the apparent code discrepancy, the design elements involved, the applicable state and local safety code provisions, and the potential harm pathway — and proceed with the escalation sequence. Documentation serves two purposes: it provides Engineer B with a precise basis for response during the collegial discussion phase, and it creates a record that Engineer A acted in good faith if the matter later requires regulatory reporting. The severity and imminence of the risk should calibrate the pace of escalation, not the decision to escalate.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer A's categorical duty to protect public safety is not diminished by the prior voluntary acceptance of a confidentiality agreement. A Kantian analysis would hold that the maxim 'engineers may contractually suppress disclosure of safety violations' cannot be universalized without destroying the very foundation of public trust in engineering licensure. The confidentiality agreement, to the extent it purports to override the safety reporting duty, is not a morally binding commitment because it asks Engineer A to act on a principle that, if universalized, would be self-defeating and harmful. The prior contractual commitment therefore does not eliminate the categorical duty — it merely creates a competing obligation of lesser moral weight. Engineer A's duty to disclose is not contingent on the absence of a confidentiality agreement; it exists independently of and hierarchically above that agreement. The deontological framework thus supports the conclusion that Engineer A must report, and that the confidentiality agreement provides no moral shelter from that obligation.
From a consequentialist perspective, the Board's sequential escalation pathway — notify Engineer B first, then escalate to authorities — produces better overall outcomes in the typical case but may produce worse outcomes in scenarios involving imminent harm or an uncooperative Engineer B. The collegial first step has genuine consequentialist value: it allows for rapid private correction without the reputational, legal, and programmatic costs of immediate regulatory involvement, and it preserves the peer review program's effectiveness as a voluntary improvement mechanism. However, the consequentialist calculus shifts decisively when the probability of harm is high, the harm is severe and irreversible, or Engineer B's response signals bad faith. In those scenarios, the delay inherent in the collegial step produces a net negative outcome by allowing continued public exposure. A consequentialist framework therefore supports a conditional sequential model: the collegial step is appropriate when the risk is uncertain or moderate and Engineer B appears cooperative, but direct regulatory reporting is required when the risk is imminent, severe, or Engineer B is unresponsive. The Board's conclusion implicitly acknowledges this by framing the obligation as calibrated to the circumstances, but a fully consequentialist analysis would make the conditionality more explicit.
From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A demonstrates the professional virtues of courage and integrity most fully by engaging Engineer B directly and honestly about the discovered violations rather than either remaining silent to preserve the collegial relationship or bypassing Engineer B entirely to report immediately to regulators. Courage is required because confronting a peer about potential professional failures risks damaging the relationship, inviting defensiveness, and creating professional friction. Integrity is demonstrated by refusing to allow the confidentiality agreement to function as a shield for conduct that endangers the public. However, the virtue ethics analysis also recognizes that Engineer A's acceptance of the peer reviewer role and the confidentiality agreement creates a relational obligation of good faith toward the program and toward Engineer B — and that acting with integrity means honoring that obligation by giving Engineer B a genuine opportunity to respond before escalating externally. The virtuous engineer is neither a passive bystander nor a reflexive regulator; they are a professional who exercises practical wisdom to navigate competing obligations in a way that serves both the immediate relationship and the broader public interest. This analysis supports the Board's sequential escalation model as the virtuous pathway in the typical case.
If Engineer A had determined that the safety violations posed an imminent and severe risk of harm, the Board's sequential escalation pathway would not apply in its standard form. The collegial notification step is appropriate when the risk is uncertain, moderate, or capable of being remediated before harm materializes. When harm is imminent — meaning the public is currently exposed to a concrete and serious risk from structures or systems already in use or under construction — the delay inherent in awaiting Engineer B's response is itself an ethical violation. In that scenario, Engineer A would be obligated to report directly and immediately to the proper authorities, potentially concurrent with or even before notifying Engineer B. This conclusion is supported by the constraint that imminent harm triggers an immediate escalation bypass, and by the general principle that the public safety duty is paramount. The Board's conclusion implicitly preserves this distinction by framing the sequential pathway as appropriate to the facts of the case — which involve a potential rather than confirmed imminent risk — but a more explicit articulation of the imminent harm exception would strengthen the ethical framework.
If Engineer A had refused to sign the confidentiality agreement as a precondition of serving as a peer reviewer, Engineer A would have been ethically justified in declining the role on those grounds, particularly if the agreement lacked a safety-disclosure carve-out. An engineer cannot be ethically required to accept a contractual constraint that would, in foreseeable circumstances, prevent them from fulfilling their paramount duty to protect public safety. Refusing to sign would not have been an act of bad faith toward the program — it would have been an act of professional integrity. The absence of a confidentiality agreement would have simplified Engineer A's subsequent obligations considerably: without the agreement, the only competing consideration would be the general professional norm of collegial courtesy, which is far weaker than a formal contractual commitment. Engineer A would still have been well-advised to notify Engineer B before escalating to authorities, as a matter of professional courtesy and to allow for rapid private correction, but the ethical weight of that step would have been advisory rather than obligatory. The confidentiality agreement thus adds ethical complexity without adding ethical legitimacy to the suppression of safety disclosures.
If Engineer B, upon being notified, acknowledged the problem and committed to immediate corrective action, Engineer A's obligation to report to proper authorities would not be fully discharged by that private resolution alone. The public may already have been exposed to risk from non-compliant designs that are in use, under construction, or submitted for permit approval. Engineer A must assess whether the corrective commitment is credible, specific, and timely — and whether the existing exposure to risk requires regulatory notification independent of Engineer B's future remediation. If the non-compliant designs have already been implemented in structures accessible to the public, the regulatory authorities may need to be informed so that they can independently assess whether interim protective measures are required. Engineer A's duty runs to the public, not merely to securing Engineer B's promise of future compliance. A private resolution that leaves the public unaware of a past exposure to risk, and leaves regulators without the information needed to verify remediation, does not fully satisfy Engineer A's ethical obligations under the Code. The appropriate outcome of a successful collegial discussion is not silence but a jointly agreed disclosure to the relevant authorities, or at minimum Engineer A's independent verification that the risk has been fully remediated before concluding that no further action is required.
If the peer review program had included an explicit provision requiring that safety code violations discovered during peer review be reported to authorities regardless of the confidentiality agreement, such a provision would have substantially reduced — though not entirely eliminated — Engineer A's ethical dilemma. It would have eliminated the tension between the confidentiality agreement and the safety reporting duty by making the safety exception part of the agreement itself, giving Engineer A clear contractual and ethical authority to report. However, it would not have eliminated all judgment: Engineer A would still need to assess the severity and imminence of the risk, determine the appropriate escalation sequence, and decide whether to notify Engineer B before or concurrently with reporting to authorities. The absence of such a provision in the program's design does represent a structural ethical failure. The program's designers could reasonably have foreseen that peer reviewers might discover safety violations, and the failure to address this foreseeable scenario in the program's governing documents reflects either an oversight or an implicit — and ethically indefensible — preference for confidentiality over safety. Programs that rely on individual engineers to improvise solutions to conflicts the program itself created are not operating with the institutional integrity that the engineering profession demands.
The tension between the Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation and the Public Welfare Paramount principle was resolved not by eliminating confidentiality but by subordinating it to a threshold condition: once Engineer A discovers work that may violate state and local safety codes and endanger the public, the confidentiality obligation loses its force with respect to that specific finding. The case teaches that confidentiality in professional peer review programs is a conditional, not absolute, duty — it governs ordinary business information and practice observations, but it cannot serve as a legal or ethical shield against the disclosure of active public safety violations. The resolution is not that confidentiality is unimportant, but that it was never intended by the Code to extend to circumstances where silence would make Engineer A complicit in ongoing harm. The practical implication is that engineers entering peer review confidentiality agreements should understand from the outset that those agreements carry an implicit safety-override clause, whether or not the written agreement makes that clause explicit.
The interaction between the Peer Review Program Integrity and Collegial Improvement Purpose and the Engineering Self-Policing Obligation reveals a structural hierarchy in which the program's collegial improvement goal is preserved as the first-step mechanism, but is ultimately subordinate to the profession's self-policing duty when collegial resolution fails or is unavailable. The Board's prescribed sequential escalation pathway — notify Engineer B first, then escalate to authorities if necessary — represents an attempt to honor both principles simultaneously rather than treating them as mutually exclusive. This synthesis teaches that professional program design and individual ethical duty are not inherently in conflict: a well-functioning peer review program can serve both collegial improvement and public safety simultaneously, precisely because the collegial notification step gives Engineer B the opportunity to self-correct before external reporting becomes necessary. However, the synthesis also reveals a limit: when the collegial improvement purpose is used as a reason to delay or avoid mandatory safety reporting indefinitely, it crosses from a legitimate first step into an ethical violation in its own right, effectively converting a program designed to improve practice into a mechanism for suppressing safety disclosures.
The interaction between the Imminent Harm Threshold for Mandatory Peer-Review Safety Escalation and the Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Sequence reveals that the sequential escalation model is not a rigid procedural rule but a risk-calibrated framework. The Board's conclusion prescribes collegial discussion as the appropriate first step under the facts presented — where the violation 'may be' rather than certainly is a safety threat — but this prescription implicitly encodes a variable: as the severity and imminence of harm increases, the permissible delay before bypassing the collegial step and reporting directly to authorities decreases, and at the extreme of imminent catastrophic harm, the sequential model collapses entirely into an immediate reporting obligation. This teaches a broader principle about how the Code resolves tensions between process-oriented duties and outcome-oriented duties: process obligations (notify Engineer B first) are ethically valid when they do not themselves generate harm through delay, but they become ethically impermissible when adherence to the process is itself the mechanism by which harm materializes. The Ethics Code Individual-Person Applicability Non-Waivability principle reinforces this conclusion by establishing that no programmatic structure — including a peer review confidentiality agreement — can contractually override Engineer A's individual duty to protect the public when that duty is triggered by a sufficiently serious risk.
Conduct Technical Documentation Review → Safety Violations Discovered
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Obligation On Engineer A
Engineer B Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings
Engineer B's safety code violations discovered during peer review
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation
Peer Review Program Integrity and Collegial Improvement Purpose
Engineer A must navigate a structured escalation pathway: first engaging Engineer B directly about the discovered safety code violations, then warning of intent to report if violations are not remedied, and finally reporting to appropriate authorities if Engineer B fails to act — all despite the confidentiality agreement
The principle structures Engineer A's response as a graduated escalation: the confidentiality agreement does not prevent disclosure but does shape the process, requiring Engineer B to be engaged first before external authorities are notified
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discovering Engineer
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation in Peer Review
The structured escalation approach honors both the confidentiality agreement's purpose (giving Engineer B an opportunity to self-correct) and the public safety obligation (ensuring violations are ultimately reported if not remedied)
When originally selected as a peer reviewer, Engineer A is asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement' whereby Engineer A agrees not to disclose confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Sequence Invoked in Engineer A Engineer B Peer Review
Engineer B's design work potentially violating state and local safety code requirements
Engineer A must first discuss the safety code concerns with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution; if they cannot resolve the issue, Engineer A must inform Engineer B of the intent to report to proper authorities; and if Engineer B still fails to take corrective action, Engineer A must cooperate with proper authorities — even though this breaches the confidentiality agreement
The escalation sequence is not optional; it is a structured ethical procedure that respects both the confidentiality relationship and the overriding public safety obligation by giving Engineer B the opportunity to self-correct before external disclosure is triggered
The sequential escalation procedure resolves the tension by preserving confidentiality as long as Engineer B cooperates, while ensuring that public safety is not sacrificed if cooperation fails
In the event that Engineer B fails to take appropriate corrective actions, Engineer A may cooperate with proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required.
Confidentiality Non-Applicability To Engineer B Safety Code Violations
Appropriate governmental or regulatory authorities
Engineer A's confidentiality agreement does not bar disclosure of Engineer B's safety code violations to appropriate authorities, because the confidentiality obligation was designed to protect legitimate business and technical information — not to shield conduct that endangers public health, safety, and welfare
The confidentiality agreement's scope does not encompass safety-threatening violations; disclosure of such violations to proper authorities is not a breach of the agreement in the ethically relevant sense because the agreement cannot legitimately extend to protecting public dangers
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure
The confidentiality obligation is reinterpreted as inapplicable to public danger disclosure; Engineer A's disclosure of safety code violations is not a violation of the confidentiality agreement's legitimate purpose
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Invoked Against Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement
The confidentiality agreement Engineer A signed does not bar Engineer A from advising proper authorities of the apparent danger to public health and welfare arising from Engineer B's work that may violate state and local safety codes, because such disclosure serves the public welfare purpose of the ethics code
The confidentiality obligation that supports the peer review program does not extend to shielding public safety hazards from disclosure to authorities; the ethics code's public welfare purpose supersedes the contractual confidentiality arrangement in this respect
Confidentiality does not apply to protect public dangers; therefore disclosure to authorities after failed internal resolution is ethically permissible and required
On the one hand, the engineer has an obligation not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client without their consent.
On the other hand, Engineer A, having knowledge of any alleged violation of the Code of Ethics, has an obligation to cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required.
Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety-Critical Regulatory Disclosure Constraint — Engineer A NSPE Code Section III.4 Limit
Engineer A's signed confidentiality agreement creates a disclosure prohibition that is directly in tension with the obligation to cooperate with authorities regarding safety code violations.
Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety-Critical Regulatory Disclosure Constraint
Engineer A's confidentiality obligation under NSPE Code Section III.4 was constrained from operating as an absolute bar to disclosure of Engineer B's safety code violations to regulatory authorities — the confidentiality obligation is defeasible when public health and safety are at stake, establishing that the signed confidentiality agreement cannot override the paramount duty to protect the public.
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections II.1.e and III.4; BER Case 76-4
While confidentiality is an important ethical value, as a licensed professional engineer, Engineer A's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety
Upon discovery of safety code violations during peer review
the engineer has an obligation not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client without their consent
Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety-Critical Regulatory Disclosure Constraint — Engineer A State and Local Safety Codes
Engineer A discovered potential violations of state and local safety codes during peer review of Engineer B's firm, and the confidentiality agreement cannot serve as an absolute bar to reporting these violations to appropriate authorities.
Engineer A's signed confidentiality agreement does not bar disclosure of discovered safety code violations to appropriate regulatory or governmental authorities when Engineer B's work may endanger public health, safety, and welfare and Engineer B fails to take corrective action.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; NSPE Code Section III.4 (defeasibility); state and local safety codes
Upon discovery of safety code violations and following failure of collegial resolution
Engineer A is asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement' whereby Engineer A agrees not to disclose confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms.
Conflict Resolution Engineer A Confidentiality Safety Tension
Engineer A possessed the capability to manage and resolve the conflict between the signed peer review confidentiality agreement and the paramount duty to report safety code violations endangering public health, safety, and welfare.
Conflict between peer review confidentiality agreement and safety code violation reporting obligation
Navigation of the normative conflict between confidentiality obligations and public safety reporting duties in the peer review context
Engineer A is asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement'
Cooperative Disclosure Pathway — Collegial Discussion with Engineer B
From Engineer A's discovery of the violation through Engineer B's response (corrective action or refusal)
a more appropriate action would be for Engineer A to expeditiously discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution of this issue
Cooperative Disclosure Pathway Available State
The availability of a collegial, private discussion pathway between Engineer A and Engineer B as a first-step resolution mechanism
Engineer B takes corrective action (pathway succeeds) or refuses (pathway exhausted, authority notification required)
If Engineer A and Engineer B are unable to resolve the issue, Engineer A must inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, his only alternative is to cooperate with the proper authorities
BER determination that Engineer A should first discuss issues with Engineer B before escalating to authorities
Should Engineer A honor the peer review confidentiality agreement and refrain from external disclosure, first discuss the violations privately with Engineer B as a time-bounded collegial step before escalating to authorities, or immediately report the discovered safety code violations directly to the proper authorities without first consulting Engineer B?
Engineer A, having discovered during a peer review that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes, must decide how to respond given a signed confidentiality agreement. The core tension is between honoring the confidentiality commitment made to the peer review program and fulfilling the paramount professional duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare.
Immediately and expeditiously raise the discovered safety code violations directly with Engineer B in a collegial discussion, seeking clarification and early resolution, while documenting the findings and establishing a clear expectation of corrective action — then escalate to proper authorities if Engineer B fails to respond adequately within a reasonable time.
Bypass the collegial notification step and report the discovered safety code violations immediately to the appropriate governmental authorities, on the grounds that the public safety duty is paramount and any delay — including the time required for collegial discussion — risks ongoing public exposure to harm from non-compliant designs.
Treat the signed confidentiality agreement as a binding professional commitment that precludes external disclosure, and refrain from reporting the discovered violations to authorities — relying on the peer review program's internal processes and Engineer B's own professional obligations to address any safety concerns identified during the review.
Should Engineer A apply the standard sequential escalation pathway — giving Engineer B a reasonable opportunity to respond and self-correct before reporting to authorities — or, upon assessing the severity and imminence of the risk, bypass the collegial step and report immediately to proper authorities without awaiting Engineer B's response?
After notifying Engineer B of the discovered safety code violations, Engineer A must assess the severity and imminence of the public safety risk and determine whether the standard sequential escalation pathway applies or whether the circumstances require immediate bypass of the collegial step and direct reporting to authorities. This decision turns on whether the 'may be in violation' standard triggers the same escalation obligations as a confirmed violation, and how Engineer A should document the professional judgment underlying the chosen pathway.
Conduct and document a professional severity-and-imminence assessment, determine that the risk is potential rather than confirmed imminent, and proceed with the sequential escalation pathway — notifying Engineer B, establishing a clear corrective action expectation with a defined timeframe, and committing to escalate to proper authorities if Engineer B fails to respond adequately.
Upon assessing that the severity and imminence of the public safety risk is sufficient to trigger the imminent harm exception, bypass the collegial notification step and report the discovered violations directly and immediately to the proper governmental authorities — potentially notifying Engineer B concurrently but not awaiting Engineer B's response before contacting regulators.
Before initiating either the collegial discussion or external reporting, engage an independent technical expert to verify whether the identified discrepancies constitute actual safety code violations — on the grounds that the 'may be in violation' standard does not yet meet the good-faith threshold for mandatory escalation and that premature reporting could damage the peer review program and Engineer B's reputation without sufficient basis.
If Engineer B acknowledges the violations and commits to corrective action, should Engineer A treat that private resolution as fully discharging the reporting obligation, continue to monitor and verify corrective action before concluding no further steps are required, or independently notify proper authorities regardless of Engineer B's corrective commitment given the public's prior exposure to risk?
Engineer A, having notified Engineer B of the discovered safety code violations and given Engineer B an opportunity to respond, must now determine whether Engineer B's response — or failure to respond — discharges Engineer A's escalation obligation or triggers a duty to report to proper authorities. This decision also implicates the structural question of whether the peer review program's confidentiality framework, as designed, adequately supports both collegial improvement and public safety reporting obligations.
Accept Engineer B's corrective commitment as a good-faith first step, but establish a documented framework specifying what corrective action is expected, by when, and what Engineer A will do if that action is not taken — then independently verify that the risk has been fully remediated before concluding no further action is required, and escalate to proper authorities if Engineer B's response is inadequate, delayed, or the public's prior exposure to risk warrants regulatory notification.
Accept Engineer B's acknowledgment and corrective commitment as fully discharging Engineer A's escalation obligation under the peer review program's confidentiality framework — on the grounds that the collegial resolution pathway achieved its intended purpose, that further external reporting would undermine the peer review program's effectiveness as a voluntary improvement mechanism, and that Engineer B's professional obligations now govern the remediation process.
Independently notify the appropriate governmental authorities of the discovered safety code violations notwithstanding Engineer B's corrective commitment — on the grounds that the public may already have been exposed to risk from non-compliant designs, that regulators need the information to independently assess whether interim protective measures are required, and that Engineer A's duty runs to the public rather than to securing private promises of future compliance.
When Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes during a confidential peer review, should Engineer A treat the confidentiality agreement as binding and remain silent, notify Engineer B privately as a first step before any external disclosure, or report directly to the proper authorities without waiting for Engineer B's response?
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery: Confidentiality Agreement Scope vs. Safety Reporting Obligation — whether Engineer A must report discovered safety code violations to Engineer B and/or authorities despite having signed a peer review confidentiality agreement lacking an explicit safety-disclosure carve-out.
Immediately discuss the discovered violations with Engineer B to seek clarification and allow for early private resolution, while documenting findings and establishing a clear timeline for corrective action — escalating to proper authorities if Engineer B fails to respond credibly or take prompt corrective steps.
Treat the signed confidentiality agreement as binding and refrain from disclosing the discovered violations to Engineer B or to authorities, on the grounds that the agreement was voluntarily accepted and the violation is characterized only as potential rather than confirmed.
Bypass the collegial notification step and report the discovered safety code violations directly to the relevant regulatory authorities without first notifying Engineer B, on the grounds that the public safety duty is paramount and any delay — including the time required for collegial discussion — risks ongoing public exposure to harm.
After notifying Engineer B of the discovered safety code violations, should Engineer A treat the collegial discussion as fulfilling the reporting obligation and await Engineer B's response indefinitely, establish a documented corrective-action deadline and escalate to authorities if that deadline is not met, or report to proper authorities concurrently with or immediately following the notification to Engineer B regardless of Engineer B's response?
Engineer A Post-Notification Follow-Through Obligation: After notifying Engineer B of discovered safety violations, whether Engineer A's ethical duty is discharged by the collegial discussion alone or requires active monitoring, a documented corrective-action framework, and independent escalation to authorities if Engineer B fails to act promptly.
At the time of notifying Engineer B, establish a documented corrective-action framework specifying what remediation is expected, by what deadline, and what escalation steps Engineer A will take if Engineer B fails to act — then follow through with regulatory reporting if Engineer B does not take prompt and verifiable corrective action within that timeframe.
Treat the collegial notification as fulfilling the immediate reporting obligation and allow Engineer B a reasonable, open-ended period to assess and correct the violations before taking any further action, on the grounds that the peer review program's collegial improvement purpose is best served by giving Engineer B a genuine opportunity to self-correct without the pressure of a concurrent regulatory referral.
Notify Engineer B of the violations and simultaneously — or immediately thereafter — report the findings to the proper regulatory authorities, on the grounds that the public may already be exposed to risk from implemented non-compliant designs and that Engineer A's duty runs to the public rather than to securing Engineer B's private promise of future compliance.
Upon discovering potential safety code violations during the peer review, should Engineer A proceed directly to notifying Engineer B under the standard sequential escalation model without a formal documented risk assessment, conduct and document a severity-and-imminence assessment first to determine which escalation pathway applies, or apply a uniform immediate-reporting standard to all discovered violations regardless of assessed severity?
Engineer A Severity and Imminence Assessment Obligation: Whether Engineer A must conduct and document a formal severity-and-imminence assessment of the discovered safety risk at the moment of discovery, and how that assessment determines which escalation pathway — sequential collegial notification or immediate regulatory reporting — is ethically required.
Before taking any escalation action, conduct and document a formal severity-and-imminence assessment identifying the specific code discrepancies, the design elements involved, the applicable safety code provisions, and the potential harm pathway — then select the escalation pathway (sequential collegial notification or immediate regulatory reporting) calibrated to the assessed level of risk.
Proceed directly to notifying Engineer B under the standard sequential escalation model without conducting a separate documented risk assessment, on the grounds that the 'may be in violation' standard uniformly triggers the collegial-first pathway and that a formal assessment introduces delay that is itself potentially harmful when a violation has already been identified.
Report all discovered potential safety code violations directly to proper authorities without a severity-and-imminence assessment, on the grounds that any violation of state and local safety codes constitutes a sufficient public safety risk to trigger the paramount reporting duty, and that calibrating the response to assessed severity introduces subjective judgment that could be used to rationalize inaction.
Should Engineer A first discuss the discovered safety code violations directly with Engineer B before reporting to authorities, report immediately to the proper authorities without collegial notification, or pursue both simultaneously?
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations during a peer review and must decide how to initiate the escalation process — whether to first engage Engineer B collegially, report immediately to authorities, or pursue a concurrent dual-track approach.
Immediately discuss the discovered violations with Engineer B in a documented collegial meeting, establish a clear corrective action timeline, and commit to reporting to the proper authorities if Engineer B does not take prompt and verifiable corrective action within that timeframe.
Bypass the collegial notification step and report the discovered safety code violations immediately to the proper regulatory authorities, treating the 'may be in violation' finding as sufficient to trigger the public safety reporting duty regardless of whether Engineer B has been consulted.
Simultaneously notify Engineer B of the discovered violations and report to the proper authorities, reasoning that the public safety duty and the collegial improvement purpose are not mutually exclusive and that concurrent notification eliminates the risk of harmful delay while still giving Engineer B the opportunity to respond.
Should Engineer A treat the peer review confidentiality agreement as ethically binding and limit disclosure of the discovered safety violations, or treat the public safety reporting obligation as overriding the confidentiality agreement and proceed with disclosure regardless of its terms?
Engineer A must determine whether the confidentiality agreement signed as a precondition of the peer review role has any binding ethical force that limits disclosure of the discovered safety violations, or whether the public safety reporting obligation overrides that agreement entirely — and whether the imminence of the risk alters that determination.
Treat the public safety reporting obligation as hierarchically superior to the confidentiality agreement and proceed with disclosure of the discovered safety violations to Engineer B and, if necessary, to the proper authorities, on the grounds that the Code's non-waivable individual duty cannot be extinguished by any contractual instrument.
Treat the confidentiality agreement as binding pending clarification of its scope, and seek guidance from the peer review program administrators about whether the discovered violations fall within or outside the agreement's coverage before making any disclosure — reasoning that the agreement was voluntarily signed and deserves good-faith interpretation before being overridden.
Treat the confidentiality agreement as limiting external disclosure but not internal collegial notification, and disclose the violations exclusively to Engineer B as the party whose work is at issue — reasoning that the agreement's collegial improvement purpose contemplates exactly this kind of internal disclosure and that external reporting remains available if Engineer B fails to act.
Should Engineer A apply the standard sequential escalation pathway — notify Engineer B first, then escalate to authorities if necessary — or bypass the collegial step and report immediately to the proper authorities based on an assessment that the public safety risk is imminent and severe?
Engineer A must assess whether the severity and imminence of the discovered safety risk requires immediate bypass of the sequential escalation pathway and direct reporting to authorities, or whether the standard collegial-first escalation sequence remains appropriate — and must document that assessment as a non-optional professional duty.
Conduct and document a formal severity-and-imminence assessment concluding that the risk is uncertain or non-imminent, then proceed with the standard sequential pathway — notify Engineer B first with a documented corrective action deadline, and commit to escalating to the proper authorities if Engineer B fails to take prompt and verifiable corrective action.
Conduct and document a severity-and-imminence assessment concluding that the public faces a concrete and serious current risk, then bypass the collegial notification step and report the discovered violations directly and immediately to the proper regulatory authorities — potentially notifying Engineer B concurrently but not as a precondition of regulatory reporting.
Proceed directly to the collegial notification step without conducting a formal documented severity-and-imminence assessment, treating the sequential pathway as the default applicable procedure for all peer review safety discoveries regardless of the specific risk profile — relying on the collegial discussion itself to surface information about severity and imminence.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (derived from NSPE Code Section II.1.e and professional norms)
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard
If Engineer A determines that there is an imminent risk of harm to the public health and safety such as loss of life, serious risk of injury to persons or property, Engineer A must immediately take appropriate steps by notifying Engineer B.
Board of Ethical Review in determining Engineer A's ultimate obligation
Applied to establish that when Engineer B fails to take corrective action, Engineer A's paramount duty to protect public health and safety requires escalation to proper authorities, overriding the confidentiality obligation
This standard governs Engineer A's duty to escalate the discovered safety code violations beyond the confidential peer review context, given that Engineer B's work could endanger public health, safety, and welfare. It defines the conditions under which the public safety obligation overrides the confidentiality agreement.
Engineer A Competing Duties — Confidentiality vs. Safety Reporting
From the moment of safety violation discovery, persisting until Engineer A resolves the conflict through a prioritized course of action
Engineer A's simultaneous obligation to honor the signed confidentiality agreement and the paramount professional duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare through disclosure
Engineer A's decision to act — either by disclosing to appropriate authorities (prioritizing safety) or by seeking program-level guidance on reconciling the conflict
Discovery of potential safety code violations during a peer review conducted under a binding confidentiality agreement
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Override Safety Code Violation Reporting
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes and endanger public health and welfare, creating a tension between the confidentiality agreement and the duty to protect public safety.
Peer Review Confidentiality Non-Override of Safety Code Violation Reporting Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the confidentiality agreement signed as a condition of the peer review engagement does not and cannot override the paramount obligation to report Engineer B's discovered safety code violations to appropriate governmental authorities after exhausting the structured escalation pathway.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations and after exhausting direct discussion with Engineer B
Engineer A, having knowledge of any alleged violation of the Code of Ethics, has an obligation to cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required.
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Override Safety Code Violation Reporting Recognition
Peer Review Confidentiality Non-Override Safety Reporting Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the signed peer review confidentiality agreement does not and cannot override the paramount professional and ethical duty to report discovered safety code violations to appropriate governmental authorities when public health, safety, and welfare are endangered.
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement but discovered safety code violations that endanger public health and welfare
Recognition that despite the confidentiality agreement, Engineer A's paramount responsibility as a licensed professional engineer is to protect public health and safety, enabling the decision to cooperate with proper authorities when Engineer B fails to take corrective action
Engineer A Confidentiality Scope Limitation Public Danger Disclosure
Engineer A's confidentiality agreement with Engineer B's firm is in tension with the duty to report safety code violations; Engineer A must recognize the scope limitation of the confidentiality obligation.
Confidentiality Scope Limitation for Public Danger Disclosure Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the confidentiality agreement's scope does not extend to bar disclosure of Engineer B's safety code violations to appropriate authorities, because the confidentiality obligation protects business affairs and technical processes but does not cover public danger disclosures required by the paramount duty to protect public health and safety.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations that endanger public health and welfare
Engineer A Dual NSPE Code Provision Simultaneous Obligation Recognition
Dual NSPE Code Provision Simultaneous Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the peer review scenario simultaneously triggered NSPE Code Section III.4 (confidentiality) and Section II.1.e (cooperation with authorities on ethics violations), framing the dilemma as involving two operative competing obligations rather than a single rule.
Engineer A serving as peer reviewer discovers potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work while bound by a signed confidentiality agreement
Identification of the dual-provision conflict as the central ethical dilemma requiring principled resolution through judgment and discretion
This ethical dilemma appears to involve two separate provisions of the NSPE Code of Ethics -- Section III.4. and Section II.1.e.
Engineer A Peer Review Collegial Improvement Purpose Fidelity
Peer Review Collegial Improvement Purpose Fidelity Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to participate in the organized peer review program in good faith and for its intended collegial improvement purpose — proactively assisting Engineer B in improving professional practice — rather than for competitive, punitive, or self-serving purposes, while simultaneously maintaining readiness to fulfill safety reporting duties when violations are discovered.
Engineer A serves as peer reviewer in a voluntary program designed to improve professional practice through collegial feedback
Approaching the peer review as a collegial improvement mechanism and pursuing expeditious discussion with Engineer B before escalating to authorities
These voluntary programs have been immensely successful in creating a mechanism whereby professionals in a collegial atmosphere can work with one another in an effort to understand and improve professional practice.
Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Bound
From the moment Engineer A signed the confidentiality agreement through the duration of the peer review engagement
Engineer A is asked to sign a 'confidentiality agreement' whereby Engineer A agrees not to disclose confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Bound State
Engineer A's formal commitment to confidentiality upon appointment as peer reviewer
Not yet terminated — remains active and in direct tension with safety discovery obligation
Engineer A signs the confidentiality agreement as a condition of appointment to the organized peer review program
Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Scope Interpretation
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Scope Interpretation Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to correctly interpret the scope and limits of the signed peer review confidentiality agreement, recognizing that it encourages maximum disclosure and builds trust but does not override the paramount duty to report safety code violations endangering public health, safety, and welfare.
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer and subsequently discovered potential safety code violations
Recognition that the confidentiality agreement must yield to mandatory safety reporting obligations when Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes
One of the hallmarks of engineering peer review programs has been the fact that such programs are built on a foundation of confidentiality, whereby an individual agreeing to serve as a peer reviewer must sign a 'confidentiality agreement'
Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Maximum Disclosure Facilitation
Engineer A serves as peer reviewer in an organized peer review program and signs a confidentiality agreement before visiting Engineer B's firm and reviewing technical documentation.
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Signing Obligation
Engineer A, having signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer for Engineer B's firm, was obligated to honor that agreement in a manner that facilitated maximum disclosure by Engineer B's firm, building trust and enabling a thorough evaluation.
an individual agreeing to serve as a peer reviewer must sign a 'confidentiality agreement' in which the peer reviewer agrees not to disclose information that is revealed to the peer reviewer about the firm being reviewed during the course of the peer review process.
confidentiality helps to assure that the maximum amount of disclosure will occur.
Engineer A Peer Review Confidentiality Trust-Building Rationale Articulation
Peer Review Confidentiality Trust-Building Rationale Articulation Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to understand that the confidentiality agreement serves instrumental purposes — maximizing disclosure and building trust — rather than constituting an absolute bar to safety reporting, enabling correct weighing of confidentiality against paramount public safety duties.
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer for Engineer B's firm
Recognition that confidentiality's instrumental rationale does not override the paramount duty to protect public health and safety when safety code violations are discovered
confidentiality helps to assure that the maximum amount of disclosure will occur
While the merits of confidentiality are clear, the Board of Ethical Review is faced with a situation in the present case where Engineer A... discovers that the work of the engineer being peer reviewed, Engineer B, may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements
confidentiality helps build trust between the parties involved in the peer review process
Engineer A Peer Review Imminent Harm Immediate Notification
Engineer A must assess whether Engineer B's safety code violations rise to the level of imminent risk of harm, which triggers an immediate rather than sequential escalation obligation.
Peer Review Imminent Harm Immediate Notification Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, upon determining that Engineer B's safety code violations create an imminent risk of harm to public health and safety — such as loss of life or serious risk of injury — to immediately take appropriate steps by notifying Engineer B, and if Engineer B fails to take corrective action, to cooperate with proper authorities without delay.
Upon determination that Engineer B's work creates an imminent risk of harm to public health and safety
Engineer A Peer Review Imminent Harm Threshold Discrimination and Response Calibration
Peer Review Imminent Harm Threshold Discrimination and Response Calibration Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to assess whether discovered safety code violations in Engineer B's work created imminent risk of harm (loss of life, serious injury) requiring immediate notification and escalation, versus non-imminent risk requiring expeditious collegial discussion and sequential escalation.
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations during peer review of Engineer B's technical documentation from recent design projects
Application of judgment and discretion to determine the appropriate urgency and pathway of response based on the nature and imminence of the safety risk discovered during peer review
In the event that Engineer B fails to take appropriate corrective actions, Engineer A may cooperate with proper authorities
the Board of Ethical Review is of the opinion that Engineer A will have to exercise appropriate judgment and discretion concerning this matter depending upon all of the facts and circumstances
Engineer A Peer Review Judgment Discretion Contextual Safety Assessment
Engineer A faces competing ethical obligations — confidentiality and public safety — and must exercise judgment to determine the appropriate escalation pathway based on all facts and circumstances.
Peer Review Judgment and Discretion Contextual Safety Assessment Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to exercise appropriate professional judgment and discretion in assessing all facts and circumstances surrounding Engineer B's potential safety code violations before determining the appropriate course of action, calibrating the response to the severity and imminence of the risk.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during the peer review
Engineer A Peer Review Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning Delivery
Peer Review Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning Delivery Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to advise Engineer B, before notifying appropriate governmental authorities about discovered safety code violations, that such notification was forthcoming as Engineer A's only professional alternative, thereby providing Engineer B an opportunity to take corrective action.
Engineer A and Engineer B are unable to resolve discovered safety code violations through collegial discussion during peer review
Informing Engineer B that cooperation with proper authorities is the only remaining alternative if collegial resolution fails, before proceeding to external notification
Engineer A must inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, his only alternative is to cooperate with the proper authorities as indicated above.
Engineer A Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Participation
Engineer A participates in a voluntary peer review program designed to help engineers understand and improve professional practice through collegial evaluation.
Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Participation Obligation
Engineer A, serving as peer reviewer, was obligated to participate in good faith in the peer review program as a legitimate mechanism for collegial professional improvement, providing constructive and critical feedback to Engineer B in a collegial atmosphere.
This can be accomplished by analyzing and evaluating the actions, decisions, and techniques of the professional and offering constructive and, at times, critical feedback.
Engineer A Peer Review Program Public Benefit Recognition
Peer Review Program Public Benefit Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize the professional and public benefits of organized peer review programs — including their role in creating collegial mechanisms for improving professional practice through constructive feedback — and to apply this understanding when evaluating the ethical obligations arising from participation as a peer reviewer.
Engineer A serves as peer reviewer in a voluntary peer review program built on a foundation of confidentiality
Participation in the organized peer review program as a mechanism for collegial improvement while simultaneously maintaining readiness to fulfill safety reporting duties
Peer review enhances professional practice.
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Code Violation Detection
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Detection Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to identify, through systematic review of technical documentation from Engineer B's recent design projects, work that may violate applicable state and local safety codes and thereby endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Engineer A reviews technical documentation from Engineer B's recent design projects during a peer review visit
Detection of potential safety code violations in Engineer B's technical documentation during the peer review visit
Engineer A, the engineer performing the peer review, discovers that the work of the engineer being peer reviewed, Engineer B, may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare.
Assuming from the facts that Engineer A determines that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Code Violation Sequential Escalation
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare during a peer review conducted under a confidentiality agreement.
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Sequential Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to follow a sequential escalation pathway upon discovering Engineer B's potential safety code violations: first discussing the concerns with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution, then warning Engineer B of the intent to notify authorities if resolution is not achieved, and finally notifying proper authorities — notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations through the peer review process
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'program_role': 'Peer reviewer in organized peer review program', 'confidentiality_obligation': 'Signed confidentiality agreement as condition of participation', 'safety_finding': 'Potential violation of state and local safety code requirements'}
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, signs a confidentiality agreement, visits Engineer B's firm, reviews technical documentation, and discovers that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements endangering public health, safety, and welfare.
{'type': 'peer_reviewer_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings'}
{'type': 'program_participant', 'target': 'Organized Peer Review Program'}
Peer Review Safety Violation Discovering Engineer
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer as part of an organized peer review program
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery
From the moment Engineer A discovers the potential violation through resolution (corrective action by Engineer B or authority notification)
Engineer A, the engineer performing the peer review, discovers that the work of the engineer being peer reviewed, Engineer B, may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare
Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery State
Engineer A's discovery of potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work during peer review
Engineer B takes corrective action, or Engineer A notifies proper authorities
Engineer A discovers during peer review that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare
Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning
After Engineer A and Engineer B are unable to resolve the safety code violation concerns through direct discussion, Engineer A must warn Engineer B before proceeding to external authority notification.
Peer Review Safety Violation Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, before notifying proper authorities of Engineer B's safety code violations, to inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, Engineer A's only remaining alternative is to cooperate with proper authorities, thereby giving Engineer B a final opportunity to self-correct or self-report.
After direct discussion with Engineer B fails to resolve the safety code violation concerns, before notifying proper authorities
Engineer A Peer Review Sequential Escalation Pathway Execution
Peer Review Sequential Escalation Pathway Execution Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to execute a structured sequential escalation pathway upon discovering safety violations during peer review: first engaging collegially with Engineer B, then advising Engineer B of intent to notify authorities if unresolved, and finally cooperating with proper governmental authorities.
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work during peer review and must navigate the appropriate escalation pathway
Following the BER-prescribed sequential pathway of collegial discussion, advisory warning, and authority notification in response to discovered safety code violations
Engineer A Self-Policing Profession Peer Misconduct Reporting Foundational Duty
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations by Engineer B during a peer review and must balance the collegial peer review relationship against the foundational self-policing duty of the engineering profession.
Self-Policing Profession Peer Misconduct Reporting Foundational Duty Obligation
Engineer A, as a licensed professional engineer, was obligated to recognize and act upon the foundational duty that engineering is a self-policing profession — meaning that Engineer A bears a basic ethical obligation to cooperate with proper authorities in furnishing information about Engineer B's safety code violations, regardless of the confidentiality agreement and regardless of the collegial peer review relationship.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations and after exhausting direct resolution with Engineer B
Engineer A's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety.
Engineer B Ethics Code Business-Form Non-Waivability Self-Application
Ethics Code Business-Form Non-Waivability Individual Engineer Self-Application Capability
Engineer B was required to possess the capability to recognize that operating through a business firm does not exempt individual engineers from personal compliance with the NSPE Code of Ethics, and that as the real person establishing and implementing policies within the firm, the Code's obligations apply directly to Engineer B regardless of business form.
Engineer B's firm is the subject of peer review; the BER addresses whether corporate form affects individual ethics code applicability
The BER's note that business form or type should not negate individual conformance obligations, applied to Engineer B's firm context
The Code deals with professional services, which services must be performed by real persons. Real persons in turn establish and implement policies within business structures.
The Code is clearly written to apply to the Engineer and it is incumbent on a member of NSPE to endeavor to live up to its provisions.
Engineer B Ethics Code Business Form Non-Waivability Individual Compliance
The BER affirms that the ethics code applies to Engineer B as a real person who establishes and implements policies within the business structure of Engineer B's firm, and that business form cannot be used to shield individual engineers from ethics code obligations.
Ethics Code Business-Form Non-Waivability Individual Engineer Compliance Obligation
Engineer B, as a real person who establishes and implements policies within a business structure, was obligated to recognize that the corporate or business form of Engineer B's firm does not negate or diminish Engineer B's personal obligation to conform to all pertinent sections of the NSPE ethics code, including the obligation to ensure that design work complies with safety code requirements.
In regard to the question of application of the Code to corporations vis-a-vis real persons, business form or type should not negate nor influence conformance of individuals to the Code.
Ongoing throughout professional practice
The Code is clearly written to apply to the Engineer and it is incumbent on a member of NSPE to endeavor to live up to its provisions. This applies to all pertinent sections of the Code.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'firm_role': 'Principal or responsible engineer at reviewed firm', 'finding': 'Work potentially in violation of state and local safety code requirements'}
Engineer B's firm is visited by peer reviewer Engineer A; review of technical documentation from recent design projects reveals work that may violate state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
{'type': 'reviewed_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Peer Review Safety Violation Discovering Engineer'}
Peer-Reviewed Engineer Subject to Safety Code Findings
Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
following a review of the technical documentation in connection with a series of recent design projects involving Engineer B's firm
Engineer B Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Cooperation
Engineer B's firm is visited by peer reviewer Engineer A; the confidentiality agreement is designed to encourage Engineer B's firm to provide full disclosure to enable thorough evaluation.
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Cooperation Obligation
Engineer B, as the engineer whose firm is being peer reviewed under a confidentiality agreement, was obligated to cooperate fully with the peer review process by providing maximum pertinent detailed information to Engineer A, recognizing that the confidentiality protections were specifically designed to encourage such cooperation.
Firms being peer reviewed should be encouraged to provide as much pertinent detailed information to the peer reviewer to allow the peer reviewer the opportunity to perform a thorough evaluation of the firm.
confidentiality helps build trust between the parties involved in the peer review process and promotes an atmosphere that will improve the likelihood that the peer review process will be mutually productive and ultimately successful.
Engineer B Peer Review Cooperation and Confidentiality Acceptance
Peer Review Cooperation and Confidentiality Acceptance Capability
Engineer B possessed the capability to cooperate fully with the peer review process conducted by Engineer A, including accepting and honoring the confidentiality protections afforded by the program, recognizing that such cooperation serves the collegial improvement purpose of the program.
Engineer B's firm is visited by peer reviewer Engineer A under a confidentiality agreement framework
Engineer B's firm accepting the peer review visit and providing technical documentation from recent design projects for Engineer A's review
One of the hallmarks of engineering peer review programs has been the fact that such programs are built on a foundation of confidentiality
Firms being peer reviewed should be encouraged to provide as much pertinent detailed information to the peer reviewer to allow the peer reviewer the opportunity to perform a thorough evaluation of the firm
Engineer B Safety Code Violation Discovery During Peer Review
From the moment Engineer A reviews the technical documentation and identifies potential safety code violations, persisting until appropriate action is taken
Public affected by the potentially non-compliant designs
Engineer A's discovery, during the peer review visit, that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes
Not yet terminated — the discovery is current and unresolved
Review of technical documentation from Engineer B's recent design projects reveals potential violations of state and local safety code requirements
Engineer B's failure to take corrective action before Engineer A cooperating with proper authorities
Engineering Peer Review Program Confidentiality Foundation
From establishment of the peer review program through the duration of any peer review engagement
Peer Review Program Confidentiality Foundation State
The voluntary engineering peer review program described in the case
Not terminated — persists as the structural foundation of the program
Firms being peer reviewed should be encouraged to provide as much pertinent detailed information to the peer reviewer
Establishment of voluntary peer review programs within the engineering profession built on confidentiality agreements
Engineering Self-Policing Obligation Invoked in Peer Review Safety Reporting Context
Engineer B's potential safety code violations discovered during peer review
Engineer A, as a licensed professional engineer, has an obligation to cooperate with proper authorities in furnishing information or assistance as may be required when Engineer A has knowledge of an alleged violation of the Code of Ethics — reflecting engineering's character as a self-policing profession
The self-policing obligation is not suspended by the peer review context or the confidentiality agreement; it persists and must be fulfilled through the appropriate sequenced escalation procedure
Self-policing obligation is fulfilled through the sequenced escalation: first engage Engineer B, then warn of intent to report, then report to authorities if necessary
Escalate to Proper Authorities → Confidentiality Obligation Overridden
Ethical Perception Engineer A Safety Code Violation Recognition
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize the ethically salient features of the peer review situation — specifically, that discovered safety code violations create a paramount public safety obligation that supersedes the confidentiality agreement.
Peer review visit revealing potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design projects
Recognition that Engineer B's work potentially violating state and local safety codes constitutes an ethically salient situation requiring action beyond ordinary confidentiality constraints
Ethical Perception Engineer B Safety Code Violation Self-Recognition
Engineer B possessed (or was required to possess) the capability to recognize the ethically salient features of the peer review findings — specifically, that work potentially violating state and local safety codes creates an obligation to take corrective action when advised by the peer reviewer.
Engineer B's work is found by peer reviewer Engineer A to potentially violate state and local safety code requirements
Obligation to respond appropriately when Engineer A identifies potential safety code violations in Engineer B's design projects during the peer review
Ethics Code Individual-Person Applicability Non-Waivability Through Business Form Affirmed by BER
Engineer B's firm and its design work potentially violating state and local safety code requirements
The BER affirms that the ethics code applies to Engineer B as a real person who establishes and implements policies within the business structure of the reviewed firm, and that the firm's business form or type does not negate or influence Engineer B's individual conformance obligations under the code
Engineer B cannot claim that the code does not apply because the work was performed through a firm rather than by Engineer B personally; the individual professional obligation persists regardless of organizational form
Ethics Code Individual-Person Applicability Non-Waivability Through Business Form
No tension; the principle is applied as a clarifying rule that forecloses a potential defense based on business form
Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold Invoked for Engineer A Reporting Obligation
Engineer A's professional determination that Engineer B's work 'may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health and welfare' — even framed in probabilistic terms — is sufficient to trigger the obligation to engage Engineer B and, if necessary, report to proper authorities; certainty of violation is not required
The 'may be in violation' and 'could endanger' language in the case facts confirms that a good faith professional judgment of potential safety risk — not a confirmed violation — is sufficient to trigger escalation obligations
Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold for External Reporting
Good faith belief of safety risk is sufficient to override confidentiality and require engagement and potential reporting, even without confirmed violations
Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold Triggered For Engineer A By Engineer B Violations
Engineer B's potentially non-compliant design projects
Epistemic Humility Constraint on Escalation Urgency
Engineer A's professional assessment that Engineer B's work 'may be in violation' of safety codes — even without confirmed harm — constitutes a sufficient good faith basis to trigger reporting obligations; certainty of violation is not required before Engineer A must act
The 'may be in violation' language signals that Engineer A's professional judgment has identified a credible safety concern; this good faith assessment is sufficient to trigger the obligation to engage Engineer B and, if necessary, report to appropriate authorities
Good faith professional judgment that safety codes may be violated and public welfare may be endangered is sufficient to trigger action; Engineer A need not wait for confirmed violations or actual harm before engaging Engineer B and considering external reporting
Graduated Escalation Calibrated to Danger Imminence Constraint — Engineer A Peer Review Safety Discovery
Engineer A discovered potential safety code violations during peer review; the appropriate escalation response must be calibrated to the severity and imminence of the risk, not treated as requiring immediate full-bore multi-authority notification.
Graduated Escalation Calibrated to Danger Imminence and Employment Context Constraint
Engineer A must calibrate the scope and urgency of escalation response to the severity and imminence of the safety risk posed by Engineer B's potential code violations — beginning with collegial discussion with Engineer B, proceeding to advisory warning of intent to report, and escalating to appropriate authorities only if Engineer B fails to take corrective action, with the breadth of multi-authority notification proportionate to the danger's imminence and severity.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; BER graduated escalation framework; BER Case 96-8
From discovery of safety code violations through resolution
Graduated Escalation Obligation — Peer Review Safety Discovery
From Engineer A's severity determination through completion of appropriate escalation steps
If Engineer A determines that there is an imminent risk of harm to the public health and safety such as loss of life, serious risk of injury to persons or property, Engineer A must immediately take appropriate steps by notifying Engineer B
Graduated Escalation Obligation Calibrated to Danger Severity State
Engineer A's obligation to calibrate escalation response to the severity of the discovered safety risk
Appropriate escalation action completed (Engineer B corrects issue, or authorities notified)
a more appropriate action would be for Engineer A to expeditiously discuss these issues with Engineer B in an effort to seek clarification and early resolution
Engineer A must determine whether the violation warrants immediate authority notification or collegial discussion first
Imminent Harm Threshold for Mandatory Peer-Review Safety Escalation Invoked by Engineer A
Engineer A must assess whether Engineer B's safety code violations rise to the level of imminent risk of harm — loss of life or serious risk of injury to persons or property — because that determination controls whether escalation is mandatory and immediate versus subject to discretionary judgment calibrated to all facts and circumstances
The case explicitly bifurcates the escalation obligation: imminent harm triggers mandatory immediate action; lesser concerns trigger discretionary judgment. Engineer A must make this threshold determination as the first step in the ethical analysis
Imminent Harm Threshold for Mandatory Peer-Review Safety Escalation
When imminent harm is found, the mandatory character of the escalation obligation resolves the tension in favor of immediate action; when harm is not imminent, the tension is resolved through discretionary judgment weighing all facts
Engineer A will have to exercise appropriate judgment and discretion concerning this matter depending upon all of the facts and circumstances.
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Section II.1.e
Board of Ethical Review in analyzing Engineer A's disclosure obligation
Cited as the provision obligating Engineer A to cooperate with proper authorities when aware of alleged Code violations that implicate public health and safety
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Section III.4
the engineer has an obligation not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client without their consent.
Board of Ethical Review in analyzing Engineer A's confidentiality obligation
Cited as the provision obligating Engineer A not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical processes of any present or former client without consent
The NSPE Code of Ethics is the primary normative authority governing Engineer A's obligations when a confidentiality agreement conflicts with the paramount duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare. It grounds the tension between loyalty/confidentiality obligations and public safety escalation duties.
Norm Competence Engineer A Peer Review Safety Reporting Hierarchy
Engineer A possessed the capability to store, recognize, and apply the relevant ethical norms governing peer review — including confidentiality obligations, public safety reporting duties, and the normative hierarchy placing public safety paramount — and to resolve the contradiction between them.
Peer review program with confidentiality agreement and discovered safety code violations requiring normative hierarchy resolution
Application of the normative hierarchy that places public safety above peer review confidentiality when safety code violations are discovered
Notify Engineer B of Violations → Corrective Action Deadline Triggered
Out-of-Scope Safety Finding Reporting Standard
Although Engineer A's peer review role is scoped to assist in professional improvement, the discovery of safety code violations that endanger the public goes beyond the ordinary scope of a peer review program. This standard governs whether and how Engineer A must report such findings despite the confidentiality agreement and the program's intended purpose.
Engineering professional societies and peer review program administrators
Engineering Peer Review Program Conduct Standard
Engineer A and Engineer B as participants in a voluntary peer review program
The case describes the established norms of voluntary engineering peer review programs — built on confidentiality, collegial atmosphere, constructive feedback — as the professional conduct framework within which Engineer A operates
Engineering peer review program administrators
Engineering Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement
Engineer A (peer reviewer) upon agreeing to conduct the peer review
The signed confidentiality agreement is the contractual instrument that creates the confidentiality obligation Engineer A must weigh against the public safety duty; it is the foundational document structuring the ethical tension in the case
Peer Review Program Professional Conduct Norms
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer as part of an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice
Following a review of the technical documentation in connection with a series of recent design projects involving Engineer B's firm
The organized peer review program establishes procedural and professional norms governing how Engineer A conducts the review of Engineer B's firm, including the scope of technical documentation review and the obligations arising from findings made during the visit.
Peer Review Program Confidentiality Agreement
Engineer A is required to sign a confidentiality agreement upon selection as a peer reviewer, obligating non-disclosure of confidential information involving peer-reviewed firms. This agreement creates a direct tension with Engineer A's public safety obligations when safety violations are discovered.
Peer Review Collegial Improvement Purpose Fidelity Capability Engineer A Peer Review Program
Engineer A possessed the capability to participate in the organized peer review program in good faith and for its intended collegial improvement purpose, avoiding competitive or punitive motivations while remaining ready to fulfill safety reporting duties.
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice
Participation in the organized peer review program as a peer reviewer with the stated purpose of assisting engineers in improving their professional practice
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Binding Constraint — Engineer A Peer Review Program
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, then discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work.
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Binding Constraint
Engineer A is bound by the signed confidentiality agreement not to disclose confidential information about Engineer B's firm obtained during the peer review — but this obligation is defeasible upon discovery of safety code violations, requiring first discussion with Engineer B before any external notification.
Signed peer review confidentiality agreement; NSPE Code Section III.4
Duration of peer review engagement and thereafter
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Cooperation Obligation Engineer B Peer Review Program
Engineer B's firm is subject to a peer review visit by Engineer A under an organized peer review program with a confidentiality agreement, creating a duty for Engineer B to cooperate fully with the review of technical documentation from recent design projects.
Engineer B was obligated to cooperate fully with the peer review process conducted by Engineer A, recognizing that the confidentiality protections in the signed agreement were specifically designed to encourage cooperation, build trust, and support a collegial professional atmosphere for mutual improvement.
As part of a peer review visit, Engineer A visits Engineer B's firm
Throughout the peer review visit and review of technical documentation
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation Binding Engineer A
Confidential information about Engineer B's firm discovered during peer review
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer, creating a relational obligation to protect confidential information about Engineer B's firm — an obligation that must be balanced against the public safety findings made during the review
The confidentiality agreement binds Engineer A with respect to general business and technical information about Engineer B's firm, but this obligation does not extend to protecting conduct that violates safety codes and endangers public welfare
The confidentiality obligation yields to public safety when safety code violations are discovered; the agreement's purpose of encouraging candor in peer review cannot be extended to shielding public safety threats
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
Technical documentation and design project information reviewed at Engineer B's firm
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer for Engineer B's firm, obligating Engineer A not to disclose information revealed about the firm during the peer review process, in order to encourage maximum disclosure and build trust between the parties
The confidentiality agreement is a legitimate and important relational obligation that supports the peer review program's purpose; it is not a mere formality but a substantive ethical commitment that must be weighed seriously against competing obligations
an individual agreeing to serve as a peer reviewer must sign a 'confidentiality agreement' in which the peer reviewer agrees not to disclose information that is revealed to the peer reviewer about the firm being reviewed during the course of the peer review process
The confidentiality obligation is real and weighty but is not absolute; it yields when Engineer A discovers imminent public safety risks that cannot be resolved through direct engagement with Engineer B
Firms being peer reviewed should be encouraged to provide as much pertinent detailed information to the peer reviewer to allow the peer reviewer the opportunity to perform a thorough evaluation of the firm, and confidentiality helps to assure that the maximum amount of disclosure will occur.
confidentiality helps build trust between the parties involved in the peer review process and promotes an atmosphere that will improve the likelihood that the peer review process will be mutually productive and ultimately successful
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Scope Interpretation Capability Engineer A Peer Review Program
Engineer A possessed the capability to correctly interpret the scope and limits of the peer review confidentiality agreement, recognizing that it governs collegial improvement information but cannot override the duty to report safety code violations.
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as peer reviewer, then discovered potential safety code violations requiring reporting
Navigating the tension between the signed confidentiality agreement and the discovered safety code violations in Engineer B's design projects
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Signing Obligation Engineer A Peer Review Program
Engineer A was selected as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program and was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement before visiting Engineer B's firm and reviewing technical documentation.
Engineer A was obligated to sign and honor the confidentiality agreement as a condition of serving as a peer reviewer in the organized peer review program, refraining from disclosing confidential information about Engineer B's firm obtained during the review, except where public safety overrides that duty.
From the moment of selection as peer reviewer through the duration of the peer review engagement
Peer Review Confidentiality Non-Override Safety Reporting Recognition Capability Engineer A Confidentiality Agreement Limit
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the signed peer review confidentiality agreement does not and cannot override the paramount duty to report Engineer B's safety code violations to appropriate governmental authorities.
Tension between signed confidentiality agreement and discovered safety code violations requiring governmental notification
Recognition that confidentiality obligations are subordinate to public safety reporting duties when safety code violations endangering public health, safety, and welfare are discovered
Peer Review Confidentiality Non-Override of Safety Code Violation Reporting Obligation Engineer A Confidentiality Agreement Limit
Engineer A signed a confidentiality agreement as a condition of peer review participation, but discovered safety code violations that endanger public health, safety, and welfare — creating a direct tension between the contractual confidentiality duty and the paramount public safety reporting duty.
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the signed confidentiality agreement does not and cannot override the paramount duty to report Engineer B's safety code violations to appropriate authorities once the structured escalation pathway with Engineer B is exhausted without resolution.
Upon discovery of safety code violations and throughout the escalation process
Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override Constraint — Engineer A Safety Code Violation Discovery
Engineer A discovered during peer review that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes and endanger public health, safety, and welfare — creating a direct conflict between the signed confidentiality agreement and the paramount duty to protect public safety.
Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override Constraint
Engineer A cannot remain silent about Engineer B's potential safety code violations on the basis of the confidentiality agreement alone; Engineer A must first discuss concerns with Engineer B, advise Engineer B of intent to report if unresolved, and then notify appropriate authorities if Engineer B fails to take corrective action.
NSPE Code Section II.1.e; BER Case 96-8; public safety paramount principle
From the moment of safety violation discovery through resolution
Peer Review Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Override Threshold — Engineer A
From discovery of the potential violation through Engineer A's severity determination and action decision
Engineer A will have to exercise appropriate judgment and discretion concerning this matter depending upon all of the facts and circumstances
Peer Review Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Override Threshold State
Engineer A's active deliberation about whether the severity of Engineer B's violation crosses the threshold overriding confidentiality
Engineer A determines severity level and takes calibrated action
If Engineer A determines that there is an imminent risk of harm to the public health and safety... Engineer A must immediately take appropriate steps
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations while bound by a peer review confidentiality agreement
Peer Review Cooperation and Confidentiality Acceptance Capability Engineer B Peer Review Program
Engineer B possessed the capability to cooperate fully with the peer review process conducted by Engineer A, accepting the confidentiality protections afforded by the program and facilitating honest professional assessment.
Engineer B's firm is visited by peer reviewer Engineer A as part of an organized peer review program
Obligation to cooperate with Engineer A's peer review visit and review of technical documentation, recognizing that confidentiality protections exist to facilitate honest professional assessment
Peer Review Imminent Harm Immediate Escalation Bypass Constraint — Engineer A Imminent Risk Scenario
The BER identifies imminent risk of harm as a threshold condition that modifies the normal sequential escalation pathway, requiring immediate action.
Peer Review Imminent Harm Immediate Escalation Bypass Constraint
If Engineer A determines that Engineer B's safety code violations create an imminent risk of harm to public health and safety — such as loss of life or serious risk of injury to persons or property — Engineer A is constrained to immediately take appropriate steps by notifying Engineer B and, if Engineer B fails to act, cooperating with proper authorities without delay, bypassing or compressing the normal sequential escalation process.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case 76-4
Upon determination of imminent risk of harm during or after peer review
Engineer A's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety
In the event that Engineer B fails to take appropriate corrective actions, Engineer A may cooperate with proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required
Peer Review Judgment and Discretion Fact-Specific Safety Assessment Constraint — Engineer A Competing Duties
Engineer A faces competing duties under NSPE Code Sections III.4 and II.1.e and must exercise professional judgment to determine the appropriate response calibrated to the severity and imminence of the discovered violations.
Peer Review Judgment and Discretion Fact-Specific Safety Assessment Constraint
Engineer A was constrained to exercise appropriate professional judgment and discretion in assessing all facts and circumstances surrounding the discovered safety code violations before determining the appropriate escalation response — prohibited from reflexive immediate external reporting without contextual assessment and from passive inaction in the face of genuine safety risk.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during peer review
Weighing the competing considerations in this case, the Board of Ethical Review is of the opinion that Engineer A will have to exercise appropriate judgment and discretion
Peer Review Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning Delivery Capability Engineer A To Engineer B
Engineer A possessed the capability to advise Engineer B, before notifying governmental authorities, that such notification was forthcoming, providing Engineer B a final opportunity to address the discovered safety code violations.
Sequential escalation pathway requiring advisory warning to Engineer B before governmental authority notification
Obligation to deliver a pre-reporting advisory warning to Engineer B as part of the sequential escalation pathway before external governmental notification
Engineer A was obligated, before notifying appropriate governmental authorities about Engineer B's safety code violations, to advise Engineer B that such notification is forthcoming
Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Non-Exploitation Constraint — Engineer A Peer Review Engagement
Engineer A participates in a voluntary peer review program designed for collegial professional improvement, gaining access to non-public information about Engineer B's firm.
Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Non-Exploitation Constraint
Engineer A was constrained to participate in the peer review program solely for its intended collegial improvement purpose — prohibited from exploiting information gained during the review for competitive advantage, and required to treat the review as a good-faith mechanism for professional improvement rather than intelligence gathering.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Peer review program norms
These voluntary programs have been immensely successful in creating a mechanism whereby professionals in a collegial atmosphere can work with one another in an effort to understand and improve professional practice
This can be accomplished by analyzing and evaluating the actions, decisions, and techniques of the professional and offering constructive and, at times, critical feedback
Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Non-Exploitation Constraint — Engineer A Peer Review Visit
Engineer A was selected as a peer reviewer in a program designed to assist engineers in improving professional practice, not to gain competitive intelligence about Engineer B's firm.
Engineer A must participate in the peer review of Engineer B's firm in good faith for the purpose of collegial professional improvement, and is prohibited from exploiting information gained during the review for competitive advantage or any purpose other than the program's intended improvement objectives.
Organized peer review program purpose; NSPE Code professional ethics provisions
Throughout and following the peer review engagement
Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements.
Peer Review Program Collegial Improvement Participation Obligation Engineer A Engineer B Program
Engineer A serves as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice, establishing a collegial improvement purpose that frames how Engineer A must conduct the review and respond to discovered deficiencies.
Engineer A was obligated to participate in the organized peer review program in good faith and for its intended collegial improvement purpose — providing constructive and critical feedback to Engineer B — and to refrain from using the peer review role as a vehicle for competitive advantage or punitive action beyond what public safety requires.
Peer Review Program Confidentiality Foundation Active
From the establishment of the organized peer review program through the current review engagement
The organized peer review program's systemic reliance on confidentiality as the basis for professional trust and participation
Not terminated — persists as the structural backdrop of the program
Creation of an organized peer review program premised on confidentiality agreements to encourage candid disclosure by reviewed firms
Peer Review Program Integrity Confidentiality Foundation Constraint — Organized Peer Review Program
The peer review program was developed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice and relies on confidentiality as a structural foundation for candid participation.
Engineer A (as peer reviewer); the organized peer review program
Peer Review Program Integrity Confidentiality Foundation Constraint
The effectiveness and integrity of the organized peer review program depends on Engineer A honoring confidentiality commitments to enable Engineer B's firm to provide maximum disclosure and build trust — prohibiting Engineer A from treating confidentiality as optional, while recognizing it is defeasible when public safety is at stake.
Organized peer review program norms; NSPE Code Section III.4
Peer Review Program Integrity Purpose Invoked In Engineer A Engineer B Review
The organized peer review program in which both Engineer A and Engineer B participate was designed to assist engineers in improving their professional practice; Engineer A's honest and complete review — including identifying safety code violations — serves this improvement purpose even when findings are serious
The collegial improvement purpose of the peer review program supports Engineer A conducting a thorough and honest review and engaging Engineer B constructively about the violations before resorting to external reporting — consistent with the program's spirit of professional improvement
The collegial improvement purpose is best served by first engaging Engineer B directly, giving Engineer B the opportunity to acknowledge and remedy the violations; external reporting becomes necessary only if Engineer B fails to respond appropriately
Peer Review Program Integrity and Collegial Improvement Purpose Affirmed in Case Discussion
The organized peer review program in which both engineers participate
The BER affirms that engineering peer review programs serve a legitimate and important professional purpose — creating a mechanism for professionals in a collegial atmosphere to work together to understand and improve professional practice through analysis, evaluation, and constructive feedback — and that the confidentiality framework is designed to support this purpose by maximizing disclosure and building trust
The collegial improvement purpose of peer review is the foundational justification for the confidentiality obligation; understanding this purpose is essential to correctly calibrating when that obligation must yield to competing duties
The peer review program's integrity is best served by a sequenced escalation approach that preserves the collegial resolution opportunity before triggering external disclosure
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Detection Capability Engineer A Engineer B Design Projects
Engineer A possessed the technical and professional capability to detect, through systematic review of technical documentation, that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements and endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Peer review visit to Engineer B's firm involving review of technical documentation from recent design projects
Review of technical documentation from a series of recent design projects at Engineer B's firm, resulting in identification of potential safety code violations
Following a review of the technical documentation in connection with a series of recent design projects involving Engineer B's firm, Engineer A discovers that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements and could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Escalation Obligation Engineer A Engineer B Safety Codes
Following review of technical documentation from Engineer B's recent design projects, Engineer A discovered potential violations of state and local safety code requirements that could endanger public health, safety, and welfare.
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, upon discovering that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes and endanger public health, safety, and welfare, to first discuss the concerns directly with Engineer B to seek clarification and resolution, and if unresolved, to advise Engineer B of the intent to notify appropriate authorities, and then to notify those authorities — notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement.
Upon discovery of the potential safety code violations during the peer review visit
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Sequential Escalation Obligation Engineer A Structured Pathway
The organized peer review program context, combined with the signed confidentiality agreement and the discovered safety code violations, creates a structured sequential duty for Engineer A that balances collegial process with paramount public safety obligations.
Engineer A was obligated to follow a sequential escalation pathway: first discussing the discovered safety code violations with Engineer B, then — if unresolved — informing Engineer B that notifying proper authorities is the only remaining alternative, and finally proceeding with that notification, notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement.
Sequentially from discovery of violations through resolution or external reporting
Peer Review Safety Violation Pre-Reporting Advisory Warning Obligation Engineer A To Engineer B
As part of the structured escalation pathway within the peer review program, Engineer A must provide Engineer B with a collegial advisory warning before proceeding to external authority notification, consistent with the program's purpose of collegial professional improvement.
Engineer A was obligated, before notifying appropriate governmental authorities about Engineer B's safety code violations, to advise Engineer B that such notification was the only remaining course of action if the violations were not addressed, thereby affording Engineer B a final opportunity to self-correct or self-report.
After direct discussion with Engineer B fails to resolve the safety code violation concerns, and before any external authority is notified
Peer Review Safety Violation Sequential Escalation Constraint — Engineer A Safety Code Violation Response
Engineer A discovers potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work and must determine the appropriate escalation pathway balancing confidentiality and public safety obligations.
Peer Review Safety Violation Sequential Escalation Constraint
Engineer A was procedurally constrained to follow a specific sequential escalation pathway upon discovering Engineer B's potential safety code violations: (1) first discuss the issues with Engineer B to seek clarification and early resolution; (2) if unresolved, inform Engineer B that the only professional alternative is to cooperate with proper authorities; (3) only then notify appropriate governmental authorities — unless imminent harm required immediate action.
Upon discovery of safety code violations during peer review, prior to any external authority notification
If Engineer A and Engineer B are unable to resolve the issue, Engineer A must inform Engineer B that as a professional engineer, his only alternative is to cooperate with the proper authorities as indicated above
Peer Review Sequential Escalation Pathway Execution Capability Engineer A Structured Pathway
Engineer A possessed the capability to execute a structured sequential escalation pathway: first discussing violations with Engineer B, then advising Engineer B of intent to notify authorities, and finally notifying appropriate governmental authorities if violations remain unaddressed.
Discovery of potential safety code violations during peer review requiring structured escalation balancing collegial improvement and public safety duties
Obligation to follow a sequential escalation pathway upon discovering safety code violations during the peer review of Engineer B's firm
Engineer A was obligated to follow a sequential escalation pathway: first discussing the discovered safety code violations with Engineer B, then — if unresolved — advising Engineer B that notification of authorities is forthcoming
Potential Safety Risk Without Confirmed Imminent Harm — Engineer B Work
From initial discovery through Engineer A's severity determination
discovers that the work of the engineer being peer reviewed, Engineer B, may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements
Potential Safety Risk Without Confirmed Imminent Harm State
The uncertain severity and imminence of the safety risk posed by Engineer B's potentially non-compliant work
Engineer A determines severity level and calibrates response accordingly
Engineer A discovers work 'may be' in violation — language indicating potential but not confirmed imminent harm
Public Safety Paramount Over Confidentiality Constraint — Engineer A Engineer B Safety Code Violations
Engineer A discovered that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes and endanger public health, safety, and welfare, creating a direct tension with the signed confidentiality agreement.
Public Safety Paramount Over Confidentiality Constraint
Engineer A's obligation to protect public health, safety, and welfare pre-empts the confidentiality duty arising from the signed peer review agreement — prohibiting Engineer A from remaining silent about Engineer B's potential safety code violations solely on the basis of the confidentiality agreement.
NSPE Code Section II.1 (public safety paramount); BER Cases 76-4, 96-8
From discovery of potential safety code violations onward
Public Safety at Risk from Engineer B Design Work
From the point of discovery through any corrective action or remediation of the deficient designs
Occupants or users of structures designed by Engineer B
The potential endangerment of public health, safety, and welfare arising from Engineer B's potentially non-compliant design work
Remediation of the deficient designs or confirmed compliance with safety codes
Engineer A's review reveals that Engineer B's work could endanger public health, safety, and welfare
Public Safety at Risk from Engineer B Work
From Engineer A's discovery of the potential violation through corrective action or authority notification
could endanger public health and welfare
The public health and welfare potentially endangered by Engineer B's work
Engineer B takes corrective action or proper authorities intervene
If Engineer A determines that there is an imminent risk of harm to the public health and safety such as loss of life, serious risk of injury to persons or property
Engineer B's work found potentially in violation of state and local safety code requirements
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked By Engineer A In Peer Review Safety Discovery
Engineer B's design projects potentially violating state and local safety code requirements
Engineer A, having discovered that Engineer B's design work may violate state and local safety codes and endanger public health, safety, and welfare, faces the paramount obligation to protect the public even though doing so requires acting against the confidentiality agreement signed as part of the peer review program
In this peer review context, the public welfare paramount principle requires Engineer A to prioritize public safety over contractual confidentiality obligations, engaging Engineer B first and escalating to appropriate authorities if Engineer B fails to remedy the violations
Public welfare paramount overrides the confidentiality agreement when safety code violations endangering public health, safety, and welfare are discovered; the confidentiality agreement cannot shield conduct creating public danger
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Peer Review Safety Disclosure Decision
Engineer A's paramount responsibility as a licensed professional engineer is to protect the public health and safety, which overrides the confidentiality agreement signed as part of the peer review program when Engineer B's work may violate safety codes and endanger public health and welfare
In the peer review context, public welfare paramount means that no contractual confidentiality arrangement can suppress disclosure of discovered safety code violations that could endanger public health and welfare; the paramount obligation is non-negotiable and overrides relational obligations
as a licensed professional engineer, Engineer A's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety
Public welfare paramount is held to override confidentiality when Engineer A determines that Engineer B's work could endanger public health and welfare; the confidentiality agreement yields to the paramount duty
What are Engineer A’s ethical responsibilities under the circumstances?
Does the confidentiality agreement Engineer A signed have any legal or ethical validity to the extent it purports to suppress disclosure of active public safety violations, and should engineers be permitted to sign such agreements in the first place?
At what point does Engineer A's continued silence about Engineer B's violations — even during the collegial discussion phase — constitute aiding or abetting unlawful engineering practice under the Code?
Should the peer review program itself bear any institutional responsibility for establishing clear protocols that resolve the confidentiality-versus-safety tension before reviewers encounter it in the field, rather than leaving individual engineers to navigate this conflict alone?
How should Engineer A assess and document the severity and imminence of the public safety risk discovered during the peer review, and does the standard of 'may be in violation' impose the same escalation obligations as a confirmed violation?
Does the Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle, and if so, which should prevail and under what threshold of risk?
Does the Peer Review Program Integrity and Collegial Improvement Purpose conflict with the Engineering Self-Policing Obligation when the collegial improvement goal requires confidentiality that would delay or prevent mandatory safety reporting?
Does the Imminent Harm Threshold for Mandatory Peer-Review Safety Escalation conflict with the Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Sequence, in that the sequential escalation model may be inappropriate when harm is imminent and delay itself becomes an ethical violation?
Does the Ethics Code Individual-Person Applicability Non-Waivability principle conflict with the Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Obligation, in that Engineer A cannot contractually waive a duty to report safety violations that the Code imposes on every individual engineer regardless of the business or programmatic context in which they operate?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill their categorical duty to protect public safety by prioritizing the reporting obligation over the confidentiality agreement they voluntarily signed, and does the existence of a prior contractual commitment to confidentiality diminish or eliminate that categorical duty?
From a consequentialist perspective, does the Board's prescribed sequential escalation pathway — first notifying Engineer B before reporting to authorities — produce the best overall outcomes for public safety, given that the delay inherent in collegial discussion could allow harm to materialize if Engineer B is uncooperative or the risk is more imminent than initially assessed?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer A demonstrate the professional virtues of courage and integrity by being willing to confront Engineer B directly about the safety violations rather than either remaining silent to preserve the collegial peer review relationship or immediately escalating without giving Engineer B an opportunity to respond?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does Engineer A's voluntary acceptance of the peer reviewer role and the accompanying confidentiality agreement create a special relational obligation of good faith toward the peer review program and Engineer B's firm — and if so, does acting with integrity require Engineer A to exhaust every internal resolution pathway before resorting to external reporting, or does genuine professional integrity demand immediate transparency with regulators when public safety is at stake?
What if Engineer A had determined that the safety violations posed an imminent and severe risk of harm — rather than a potential or uncertain risk — would the Board's prescribed sequential escalation pathway still apply, or would Engineer A be obligated to bypass the collegial notification step and report directly and immediately to the proper authorities?
What if Engineer A had refused to sign the confidentiality agreement as a precondition of serving as a peer reviewer — would Engineer A have been ethically justified in declining the role, and would the absence of a confidentiality agreement have simplified or complicated Engineer A's subsequent obligation to report Engineer B's safety violations to the authorities?
What if Engineer B, upon being notified by Engineer A of the potential safety code violations, had acknowledged the problem and committed to immediate corrective action — would Engineer A's obligation to report to the proper authorities be fully discharged by that private resolution, or would Engineer A still bear an independent duty to notify regulators given that the public was potentially already exposed to risk from the non-compliant designs?
What if the peer review program itself had included an explicit provision in its governing rules stating that safety code violations discovered during peer review must be reported to authorities regardless of the confidentiality agreement — would such a provision have eliminated Engineer A's ethical dilemma entirely, and does the absence of such a provision in the program's design represent a structural ethical failure of the program itself?
Safety Violations Discovered → Ethical Dilemma Instantiated
Self-Policing Profession Peer Misconduct Reporting Foundational Duty Constraint — Engineer A Safety Code Violation
Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's potential safety code violations triggers the foundational professional duty to report, which cannot be waived by the confidentiality agreement.
Self-Policing Profession Peer Misconduct Reporting Foundational Duty Constraint
Engineer A was constrained by the foundational duty of engineering as a self-policing profession to report Engineer B's safety code violations to appropriate public authorities — prohibited from treating this reporting duty as optional or subordinate to the confidentiality agreement when genuine safety code violations are discovered.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.e; Self-policing profession principle
Engineer A, having knowledge of any alleged violation of the Code of Ethics, has an obligation to cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required
Upon discovery of safety code violations and failure of collegial resolution
State and Local Safety Code Requirements
Engineer A (as evaluative benchmark during peer review)
The state and local safety codes are the specific legal and regulatory standards against which Engineer B's design work is evaluated. Engineer A's review of technical documentation reveals potential violations of these codes, which forms the factual basis for the public safety concern.
discovery of potential safety code violations before notification of Engineer B
discussion between Engineer A and Engineer B before informing Engineer B of intent to contact authorities
notification of Engineer B before escalation to proper authorities
peer review program development before peer review visit
peer review visit / examination of technical documentation before discovery of potential safety code violations
selection as peer reviewer meets signing of confidentiality agreement
signing of confidentiality agreement before conducting any reviews
signing of confidentiality agreement before peer review visit to Engineer B's firm