1990 Clean Air Act enactment before Engineer A's permit review
Abrogation Principle Invoked Against Supervisor Pressure on Engineer A
Superior's directive to expedite permit and avoid technical hang-ups
Engineer Pressure Resistance and Ethical Non-Subordination to Organizational Demands
Engineer A's superior directed him to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups; had Engineer A complied despite his good-faith belief that the plans violated the Clean Air Act, he would have committed an abrogation of his fundamental professional responsibility.
The Board's determination that it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw (i.e., he had to maintain his refusal) reflects the principle that yielding safety determinations to supervisory pressure is an abrogation of fundamental responsibility.
Engineer A Permit-Refusing Subordinate Regulatory Engineer
Abrogation of Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Through Pressure Yielding
Engineers have an essential role as technically-qualified professionals to 'stick to their guns' and represent the public interest under the circumstances where they believe the public health and safety is at stake.
The paramount public safety obligation cannot be overridden by supervisory pressure; Engineer A was required to maintain his refusal regardless of employment consequences.
the Board determined that as long as the engineers held to that view, they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question. The Board recognized that such action by the engineers would likely lead to loss of employment.
Abrogation of Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Through Pressure Yielding — Pressure Applied by Superior
Power plant construction permit issuance decision
Superior Department Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor
Honest Disagreement Among Qualified Engineers Permissibility Principle
Engineer A's superior framed legitimate safety concerns as mere 'technical hang-ups' and directed Engineer A to move expeditiously, creating institutional pressure that — had Engineer A yielded — would have constituted an abrogation of his fundamental professional responsibility.
The framing of safety concerns as 'hang-ups' is a paradigm instance of institutional pressure designed to cause the engineer to subordinate professional judgment to organizational convenience. The principle establishes that yielding to such pressure — when the engineer believes public health is at stake — would be an abrogation of fundamental professional responsibility.
He is told by a superior to move expeditiously on the permit and 'avoid any hang-ups' with respect to technical issues.
The principle applies where the engineer has a good-faith professional belief that public health is at risk; the superior's disagreement does not eliminate that belief or discharge the engineer's responsibility.
Engineer A refused to issue the permit and submitted his findings to his superior.
The department authorized the issuance of the permit.
Federal and state regulatory authorities
Federal and State Air Pollution Emissions Permit Regulatory Requirements
Engineer A affirmatively sought the opinion of the state as to whether his approval of the permit could violate the state engineering registration law.
we believe it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project because Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare and refuse to issue the permit.
Engineer A in assessing whether to issue the permit; state licensing board in advising Engineer A
The regulatory framework governing whether the permit could lawfully be issued forms the technical and legal backdrop against which Engineer A's refusal to sign off is evaluated; Engineer A's concern that approval would violate applicable regulations is the core ethical trigger
Air Pollution Regulatory Non-Compliance Risk from Permit
From Engineer A's assessment through department's authorization of permit and ongoing investigation
Engineer A believes the plans as drafted are inadequate to meet the regulation requirements and that outside scrubbers to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions are necessary and without them the issuance of the permit would violate certain air pollution standards as mandated under the 1990 Clear Air Act.
Proposed construction permit for power plant at manufacturing facility relative to 1990 Clean Air Act SO2 standards
Not resolved within case facts; under investigation by state authorities
Engineer A's professional determination that the permit as drafted violates air pollution standards under the 1990 Clean Air Act
As early as case BER 65-12, the Board dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe. The Board then determined that as long as the engineers held to that view, they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question.
Board of Ethical Review for analogical reasoning about Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit
Cited as early precedent establishing that engineers are ethically justified in refusing to participate in production of a product they believe to be unsafe, even at risk of loss of employment
In BER Case 82-5, where an engineer employed by a large defense industry firm documented and reported to his employer excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors, the Board ruled that the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue his efforts to secure a change in the policy after his employer rejected his reports, or to report his concerns to proper authority, but has an ethical right to do so as a matter of personal conscience.
This, unlike BER Case 82-5 did not involve a matter of personal conscience, but rather a matter which had a direct impact upon the public health and safety.
Board of Ethical Review to contrast with the present case and BER 88-6
Cited to distinguish cases involving personal conscience from those involving direct public health and safety impact; established that engineers have an ethical right (but not always a duty) to blow the whistle on employer misconduct, potentially at the cost of employment
More recently, in BER Case 88-6, an engineer was employed as the city engineer/director of public works…
The reason for our position in BER Case 88-6 was that the engineer's failure to bring the problems to the attention of the 'proper authorities' made it more probable that danger would ultimately result to the public health, safety and welfare.
Turning to the facts of this case, we believe the situation involved in this case is in many ways similar to the situation involved in BER Case 88-6.
Board of Ethical Review as primary analogical basis for evaluating Engineer A's conduct
Cited as the closest analogical precedent: a city engineer who failed to escalate water pollution violations to state authorities was found to have failed her ethical obligations; used to frame Engineer A's duty to escalate and the limits of that duty when proper authorities are already aware
BER 65-12 Engineers Unsafe Product Refusal
BER 65-12 involved a group of engineers who believed a product was unsafe; the Board found they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in its processing or production.
The BER 65-12 engineers were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of a product they believed to be unsafe, even knowing that such refusal would likely lead to loss of employment.
Upon forming and maintaining the professional belief that the product was unsafe
The Board recognized that such action by the engineers would likely lead to loss of employment.
BER 65-12 Engineers Unsafe Product Refusal Capability
Public Interest Technical Position Persistence Under Institutional Override Capability
The BER 65-12 engineers demonstrated the capability to maintain their professional position that a product was unsafe and to refuse to participate in its processing or production, even knowing this would likely lead to loss of employment
BER 65-12 referenced case involving engineers who believed a product was unsafe and refused to participate in its processing or production
The BER's determination that the engineers were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product they believed to be unsafe, as long as they held to that view
BER 65-12 Unsafe Product Refusing Engineers
As early as case BER 65-12, the Board dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe. The Board then determined that as long as the engineers held to that view, they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question. The Board recognized that such action by the engineers would likely lead to loss of employment.
BER 65-12 Engineers Unsafe Product Refusal Non-Withdrawal
A group of engineers believed a product was unsafe; the Board determined they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in its processing or production as long as they held that view, recognizing the likely employment consequences
Safety-Implicated Permit Refusal Engagement Non-Withdrawal Constraint
The BER Case 65-12 engineers who believed a product was unsafe were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product — and were constrained to maintain that refusal as long as they held the view that the product was unsafe — even though such action would likely lead to loss of employment.
the Board dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe.
Throughout the period during which the engineers held the view that the product was unsafe
The Board then determined that as long as the engineers held to that view, they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question.
{'action_taken': 'Refused to participate in processing or production of product believed unsafe', 'outcome': 'Ethically justified in refusal; risk of employment loss acknowledged'}
Referenced group of engineers who believed a product was unsafe and were found ethically justified in refusing to participate in its processing or production, even at risk of loss of employment.
a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe
The Board recognized that such action by the engineers would likely lead to loss of employment
the engineers were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question
BER 82-5 Defense Engineer Non-Public-Safety Whistleblowing Personal Conscience Right
Non-Public-Safety Whistleblowing Personal Conscience Right Recognition Capability
The BER 82-5 engineer correctly recognized that his concern about excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors — not involving public health or safety danger — gave him an ethical right but not a mandatory duty to continue escalation after employer rejection, and that exercising this right was a matter of personal conscience
BER 82-5 referenced case involving a defense industry engineer who documented excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors and reported to his employer, which rejected his reports
The BER's ruling that the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue efforts to secure a change in policy after employer rejection, but had an ethical right to do so as a matter of personal conscience, with the Board noting the case did not involve danger to public health or safety
BER 82-5 Defense Industry Whistleblower Engineer
The Board noted that the case did not involve a danger to the public health or safety, but related to a claim of unsatisfactory plans and the unjustified expenditure of public funds.
BER 82-5 Defense Engineer Non-Safety Personal Conscience Whistleblowing
Defense industry engineer documented and reported excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors to employer; employer rejected reports; Board ruled no mandatory obligation to continue or escalate because no public health or safety danger was involved
Non-Safety Concern Mandatory Escalation Non-Compulsion Constraint
The BER Case 82-5 defense industry engineer who documented excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors was not ethically obligated to continue internal advocacy or report to proper authorities after his employer rejected his reports — because the case did not involve public health or safety danger — but retained a personal conscience right to do so, accepting the risk of employment consequences.
the Board ruled that the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue his efforts to secure a change in the policy after his employer rejected his reports, or to report his concerns to proper authority, but has an ethical right to do so as a matter of personal conscience.
After employer rejected engineer's reports on excessive costs and time delays
the Board was unwilling to make a blanket statement that there is an ethical duty in these kinds of situations for the engineer to continue the campaign within the company, and make the issue one for public discussion.
BER 82-5 Defense Engineer Personal Conscience Whistleblowing Right
BER 82-5 involved an engineer who documented and reported excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors to his employer; the Board found no mandatory duty to continue advocacy after employer rejection.
Whistleblowing Personal Conscience Right Non-Mandatory Duty Recognition Obligation
The BER 82-5 engineer did not bear a mandatory ethical obligation to continue internal advocacy or report to external authorities after his employer rejected his reports about excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors, because the matter did not involve direct public health or safety danger; any continued action was a matter of personal conscience and ethical right.
After employer rejected engineer's reports
{'employer': 'Large defense industry firm', 'action_taken': 'Documented and reported excessive costs and time delays internally', 'outcome': 'No ethical obligation to continue campaign or report externally; ethical right to do so as personal conscience'}
Referenced engineer employed by a large defense industry firm who documented and reported to his employer excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors; the Board ruled he had an ethical right but not an absolute duty to escalate externally after employer rejection, treating further action as a matter of personal conscience.
{'type': 'employed_by', 'target': 'Defense Industry Employer (BER 82-5)'}
an engineer employed by a large defense industry firm documented and reported to his employer excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors
has an ethical right to do so as a matter of personal conscience
the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue his efforts to secure a change in the policy after his employer rejected his reports
BER 88-6 City Engineer Director of Public Works
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'employer': 'Municipal government', 'responsibility': 'Disposal plants and beds', 'outcome': 'Found to have failed ethical obligations by not escalating to state authorities'}
Referenced city engineer/director of public works who discovered unreported sewage overflow capacity problems, attempted internal reporting to city administrator and council members, was warned and had responsibilities stripped, but failed to escalate to state water pollution control authorities — thereby becoming an accessory to ongoing regulatory violations.
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'City Council (BER 88-6)'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'City Administrator (BER 88-6)'}
City Engineer Public Welfare Escalation Obligated Engineer
an engineer was employed as the city engineer/director of public works with responsibility for disposal plants and beds and reported to a city administrator
noticing problems with overflow capacity which are required to be reported to the state water pollution control authorities
the engineer failed to fulfill her ethical obligations
the engineer's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and made the engineer an 'accessory'
BER 88-6 City Engineer Inaction Accessory Liability Proper Authority Non-Identification
City engineer noticed sewage overflow capacity problems required to be reported to state water pollution control authorities; discussed with city council; was warned by city administrator to report only to him; was relieved of responsibility; continued working without escalating to state authorities
BER Case 88-6 City Engineer/Director of Public Works
Inaction Accessory Liability Proper Authority Non-Identification Constraint
The BER 88-6 city engineer was constrained to recognize that after several unsuccessful attempts to modify the views of local officials regarding sewage overflow reporting obligations, the 'proper authorities' were not the city officials but state water pollution control authorities — and that continued inaction after this recognition made the engineer an accessory to the ongoing legal violation.
the engineer was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate supervisor as well as by members of the city council.
After multiple unsuccessful internal escalation attempts to city officials
After several attempts to modify the views of her superiors, the engineer knew or should have known that 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials.
Said the Board, the engineer's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and made the engineer an 'accessory' to the actions of the city administrator and others.
BER 88-6 City Engineer Proper Authority Escalation Failure
BER 88-6 city engineer discovered unreported sewage overflow capacity problems, attempted internal reporting, was warned by city administrator, and continued working without escalating to state authorities; Board found ethical obligation failure.
BER 88-6 city engineer/director of public works
Public Safety Paramount Vociferousness Obligation
The BER 88-6 city engineer was obligated to escalate the sewage overflow capacity problem to state water pollution control authorities — the 'proper authorities' — after recognizing that city officials were engaged in an ongoing pattern of disregard for the law, rather than limiting escalation to informal discussions with city council members and the city administrator.
In ruling that the engineer failed to fulfill her ethical obligations by informing the city administrator and certain members of the city council of her concern, the Board found that the engineer was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate supervisor as well as by members of the city council.
After recognizing that city officials were not the proper authorities and were engaged in ongoing legal violations
the engineer's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and made the engineer an 'accessory' to the actions of the city administrator and others
BER 88-6 City Engineer Proper External Authority Identification Failure
Proper External Authority Identification After Internal Escalation Failure Capability
The BER 88-6 city engineer failed to correctly identify that after multiple failed internal escalation attempts, the 'proper authorities' were not the unresponsive city officials but rather state water pollution control authorities, and failed to escalate accordingly — making her an accessory to the ongoing violation
BER 88-6 referenced case involving a city engineer who discovered sewage overflow capacity problems, attempted multiple internal escalation steps, but failed to escalate to state water pollution control authorities
The BER's finding that the engineer knew or should have known that 'proper authorities' were not the city officials but more probably state officials, and that her inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue
the engineer's inaction permitted a serious violation of the law to continue and made the engineer an 'accessory' to the actions of the city administrator and others.
BER 88-6 City Engineer Public Interest Technical Position Persistence Failure
The BER 88-6 city engineer failed to adequately exercise the capability to persist in representing the public interest after multiple failed internal escalation attempts, continuing to work as city engineer without escalating to state water pollution control authorities — the proper authorities — thereby becoming an accessory to the ongoing violation
BER 88-6 referenced case involving a city engineer who discovered sewage overflow capacity problems and failed to escalate to state water pollution control authorities after local officials were unresponsive
The BER's finding that the city engineer's inaction after being relieved of responsibility for disposal plants permitted a serious violation of law to continue, making the engineer an accessory to the city administrator's actions
BER 88-6 vs Engineer A Media Coverage Factual Distinction
The Board found Engineer A's situation similar to BER 88-6 in involving direct public health and safety impact, but distinguished it on the ground that BER 88-6 involved hidden issues while Engineer A's case involved publicly known and investigated facts
BER Precedent Public Safety vs Non-Safety Factual Threshold Distinguishing Constraint
The BER was constrained to distinguish Engineer A's case from BER Case 88-6 on the factual ground that BER 88-6 involved issues hidden from public note requiring mandatory escalation to state authorities, while Engineer A's case involved facts already receiving media coverage and under active state investigation — making the mandatory external escalation obligation discharged in Engineer A's case but not in BER 88-6.
NSPE BER Case 88-6; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
Yet unlike the circumstances involved in BER Case 88-6 where the issues were hidden from public note, here, the case involves facts which have received coverage in the media.
Throughout the BER analysis of Engineer A's case
BER Board BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation
BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation Capability
The BER demonstrated the capability to triangulate among three precedent cases to identify the public-health-danger threshold as the critical variable determining whether escalation is mandatory or merely a personal conscience right
BER analysis of Engineer A's ethical obligations as a state regulatory engineer who refused to issue a construction permit on Clean Air Act compliance grounds
The Board's systematic comparison of BER 65-12, BER 82-5, and BER 88-6, identifying the factual variable (presence or absence of direct public health danger) that determines the normative category, and applying that framework to Engineer A's case
Board of Ethical Review (Ethics Reviewing Body)
The Board of Ethical Review has examined this issue over the years in differing contexts.
Turning to the facts of this case, we believe the situation involved in this case is in many ways similar to the situation involved in BER Case 88-6. This, unlike BER Case 82-5 did not involve a matter of personal conscience, but rather a matter which had a direct impact upon the public health and safety.
BER Board Media-Coverage-Conditioned Mandatory Escalation Discharge Assessment
Media-Coverage-Conditioned Mandatory Escalation Discharge Assessment Capability
The BER demonstrated the capability to assess that media coverage and an active state investigation discharged Engineer A's mandatory escalation obligation, distinguishing this from BER 88-6 where the issues were hidden from public note
BER analysis of whether Engineer A retained a mandatory duty to report to proper authorities after the permit dispute became publicly known through media coverage
The Board's factual distinction between BER 88-6 (issues hidden from public) and Engineer A's case (media coverage, active investigation), and its conclusion that further reporting would be a useless act
The reason for our position in BER Case 88-6 was that the engineer's failure to bring the problems to the attention of the 'proper authorities' made it more probable that danger would ultimately result to the public health, safety and welfare. Here, the circumstances are presumably already known to appropriate public officials.
BER Case 88-6 before Current Engineer A case
BER Ethics Body Honest Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition
Honest Technical Disagreement Between Qualified Engineers Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition Capability
The BER ethics reviewing body demonstrated the capability to recognize that Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process met Clean Air Act standards — and that this constituted an honest technical disagreement between qualified engineers rather than an ethical violation by either party.
Applied in the BER's ethical analysis of the case, distinguishing technical disagreement from professional misconduct
Ethics analysis finding that the superior's different technical conclusion did not constitute unethical conduct, and that Engineer A's refusal was ethically justified without implying the superior acted unethically
His superior believes that plans which involve limestone mixed with coal in a fluidized boiler process would remove 90% of the sulphur dioxide will meet the regulatory requirements
Engineer A believes the plans as drafted are inadequate to meet the regulation requirements
CausalLink_Department Authorizes Permit O
CausalLink_Engineer Assesses Plan Inadequ
CausalLink_Engineer Consults Registration
CausalLink_Engineer Refuses to Issue Perm
CausalLink_Superior Endorses Fluidized Bo
CausalLink_Superior Orders Expedited Perm
City Engineer Accessory Through Inaction on Overflow Violations (BER 88-6 Precedent)
From the city engineer's awareness of overflow capacity violations through continued employment without external escalation
State water pollution control authorities
the engineer was aware of a pattern of ongoing disregard for the law by her immediate supervisor as well as by members of the city council
Accessory Liability Through Inaction on Known Regulatory Violation State
City engineer/director of public works in BER Case 88-6 precedent
Board's determination that engineer failed ethical obligations by not escalating to state officials
the engineer knew or should have known that 'proper authorities' were not the city officials, but more probably state officials
City administrator's suppression of required state water pollution control authority reporting
City administrator warning engineer (BER 88-6) before Engineer discussing problem again informally with city council (BER 88-6)
City engineer noticing overflow problems (BER 88-6) before City engineer discussing problem with city council (BER 88-6)
Clean Air Act 1990 Air Pollution Standards
U.S. Congress; implemented by EPA and state environmental agencies
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 — Air Pollution Standards (Sulphur Dioxide Emissions)
issuance of the permit would violate certain air pollution standards as mandated under the 1990 Clear Air Act
Engineer A (state environmental protection division)
Engineer A invokes these standards as the binding regulatory basis for his conclusion that the permit as drafted cannot lawfully be issued without outside scrubbers to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions
Clean Air Act Regulatory Compliance Context
Throughout the permit issuance process and beyond
without them the issuance of the permit would violate certain air pollution standards as mandated under the 1990 Clear Air Act.
Legal compliance framework governing SO2 emissions from the proposed power plant under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Application for construction permit for power plant subject to 1990 Clean Air Act air pollution standards
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing Applied by BER Board
Present case ethical obligation determination
Cross-Case Precedent Consistency in Public Safety Obligation
The Board systematically compared the present case to BER 82-5 and BER 88-6, identifying the material factual differences — direct public health impact (distinguishing from BER 82-5) and media coverage/authority awareness (distinguishing from BER 88-6) — to determine the precise scope of Engineer A's obligations.
The Board's ethical reasoning required careful identification of which precedents were materially analogous and which were distinguishable, and explanation of how the distinguishing facts altered the applicable obligations.
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing Obligation
The Board maintained consistency in the underlying public safety principle while distinguishing the specific obligations based on material factual differences between the cases.
Turning to the facts of this case, we believe the situation involved in this case is in many ways similar to the situation involved in BER Case 88-6 .
It would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project.
Beyond the Board's finding that it was ethical for Engineer A to refuse to issue the permit, Engineer A's prior consultation with the state engineering registration board before refusing represents a model of professional prudence that itself carries independent ethical weight. By proactively seeking guidance on the license implications of issuing a potentially non-compliant permit, Engineer A demonstrated that his refusal was grounded in both public welfare and informed professional judgment rather than mere personal preference or institutional insubordination. This sequence — assess, consult, document, refuse — establishes a procedural standard for regulatory engineers facing superior pressure to approve questionable permits. The Board's analysis implicitly endorses this sequence but does not articulate it as a replicable framework, leaving a gap in guidance for similarly situated engineers. The ethical force of Engineer A's refusal is strengthened, not weakened, by the fact that the registration board's advisory about license revocation risk confirmed rather than originated his professional duty; the duty to refuse was grounded in the Clean Air Act compliance obligation and the NSPE Code's requirement to approve only documents conforming to applicable standards, and the board consultation merely validated what Engineer A's own technical assessment had already indicated.
The Board's conclusion that it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project reveals an important but underexplored distinction between permissible disassociation and impermissible abandonment. While the NSPE Code permits engineers to disassociate from professionally compromising situations, withdrawal in this context would have functioned as a form of passive acquiescence: it would have removed the only technically qualified internal voice opposing a permit that Engineer A had affirmatively determined to be non-compliant with Clean Air Act SO2 standards. The ethical prohibition on withdrawal is therefore not absolute — it is context-dependent and turns on whether the engineer's continued presence constitutes the sole or primary mechanism by which public safety concerns remain formally on the record within the regulatory process. In this case, Engineer A's documented refusal and formal submission of findings to his superior created a record that ultimately contributed to state investigation and media scrutiny. Had Engineer A withdrawn instead, that record would not have existed, and the department's override would have faced no documented internal dissent. This analysis extends the Board's reasoning by clarifying that the ethical duty to remain engaged is proportional to the degree to which the engineer's continued participation is necessary to preserve public accountability mechanisms, and that withdrawal becomes ethically impermissible precisely when it would eliminate the only internal check on a potentially dangerous regulatory decision.
The Board's conclusion that it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to issue the permit under superior pressure raises a nuance the Board does not fully resolve: the ethical analysis of the permit refusal cannot be entirely separated from the question of what Engineer A was obligated to do after the department overrode his refusal. The Board treats the refusal as the terminal ethical act, but the case facts — state investigation, media coverage, and active regulatory scrutiny — suggest that Engineer A's ethical obligations did not end with his documented refusal and submission of findings to his superior. Drawing on the distinction established in BER Case 82-5 versus BER Case 88-6, the Board implicitly acknowledges that whistleblowing to external authorities is a matter of personal conscience when the underlying concern is non-safety-related, but becomes closer to an affirmative obligation when public health and safety are directly at stake. The SO2 emissions issue here falls squarely in the public health domain, which means that Engineer A's post-override obligations were not merely permissive but potentially mandatory — at least to the extent of notifying authorities with jurisdiction over the matter. The fact that media coverage and state investigation had already emerged may have discharged this obligation through the known-authority awareness principle, but the Board's silence on this point leaves engineers in analogous situations without clear guidance on when post-override escalation transitions from a personal conscience right to a professional duty.
The Board's analysis implicitly treats the technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior as resolved in Engineer A's favor by virtue of the ethical outcome — that is, because refusing the permit was ethical, Engineer A's technical assessment must have been correct or at least sufficiently credible to justify refusal. However, this conflation of ethical correctness with technical correctness obscures an important analytical question: the ethical obligation to refuse a permit does not require certainty that the superior's technical position is wrong, only that Engineer A's own professional judgment, exercised in good faith, identifies a genuine risk of non-compliance with applicable standards. The threshold for ethical refusal is therefore lower than the threshold for technical certainty. An engineer who holds a reasonable, professionally defensible belief that a permit would violate Clean Air Act standards is ethically obligated to refuse even if a technically competent superior holds a contrary view, because the engineer's professional certification of the permit constitutes a personal attestation of compliance that cannot be delegated to or overridden by supervisory authority. This principle — that permit certification is a non-delegable professional act — is the deepest structural reason why it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to issue the permit, and it applies regardless of whether Engineer A's technical assessment ultimately proves correct upon independent review.
It would not have been ethical for Engineer A to issue the permit.
In response to Q101: The threshold at which an honest technical disagreement becomes an ethical violation requiring refusal rather than deference to supervisory judgment is crossed when the engineer's professional assessment concludes — with reasonable engineering certainty — that the proposed action would violate a specific, enforceable legal standard protective of public health. In this case, Engineer A's belief that the fluidized boiler process would fail to meet Clean Air Act SO2 requirements was not merely a stylistic or methodological preference but a substantive regulatory compliance judgment. The NSPE Code provision requiring engineers to approve only documents conforming to applicable standards (II.1.b) does not permit deference to a superior's differing technical view when the engineer's own professional judgment identifies a legal violation. The disagreement between Engineer A and his superior may have been honest on both sides, but honesty of disagreement does not dissolve Engineer A's independent certification obligation. Once Engineer A concluded — as a matter of professional engineering judgment — that the permit would violate the Clean Air Act, the ethical obligation to refuse crystallized regardless of whether the superior's contrary view was also professionally defensible. The ethical violation would have occurred at the moment of signature, not at the moment of disagreement.
In response to Q102: After the department overrode Engineer A's refusal, Engineer A did not bear an affirmative mandatory ethical obligation to escalate externally to the EPA or state environmental regulators, but such escalation was ethically permissible as a matter of personal conscience. The Board's analysis, consistent with BER Case 82-5, treats whistleblowing beyond internal channels as a personal conscience right rather than a categorical duty when the matter has already received public media scrutiny and is under active state investigation. The critical distinction is that Engineer A's mandatory obligations — refusing to sign the non-compliant permit, formally documenting and submitting his findings to his superior, and consulting the state registration board — were fully discharged through his internal actions. The subsequent media coverage and state investigation effectively transferred the accountability mechanism to external authorities without requiring Engineer A to personally initiate that escalation. Had the matter remained entirely internal and suppressed, the ethical calculus might have shifted toward a stronger affirmative duty to escalate. The existing public scrutiny and state investigation served as a functional substitute for Engineer A's personal external disclosure, discharging the public welfare obligation through institutional channels already activated.
In response to Q103: The state engineering registration board's advisory that Engineer A's license could be suspended or revoked for issuing a non-compliant permit reinforces but does not independently create the ethical obligation to refuse. The pre-existing ethical duty grounded in public safety and regulatory compliance integrity — as codified in NSPE Code Sections I.1 and II.1.b — already required refusal before Engineer A consulted the board. The board's advisory is best understood as a convergent signal that confirms the ethical and legal weight of Engineer A's professional judgment, rather than as the source of that obligation. Importantly, the advisory also demonstrates that Engineer A's consultation was a professionally responsible act of proactive self-governance rather than mere self-interest. Even if the board had issued no advisory — or had advised that no license risk existed — Engineer A's ethical obligation to refuse the non-compliant permit would have remained intact. The license revocation risk is a consequence of the underlying ethical violation, not its definitional trigger. Engineer A's refusal was ethically required because issuing the permit would have endangered public health and violated applicable law, not because his license was at risk.
In response to Q104: The NSPE Code of Ethics does not directly address the obligations of non-engineer supervisors, as its jurisdiction extends only to licensed engineers. However, the Code does address the obligations of engineers who are subject to institutional overrides by non-engineer authorities. Engineer A's superior, as a non-engineer supervisor, operated outside the scope of professional engineering licensure obligations, but this does not diminish the ethical weight of the override — it amplifies it. When a non-engineer supervisor overrides a licensed engineer's professional judgment on a matter of regulatory compliance and public health, the engineer's independent certification obligation becomes more critical, not less, because no licensed professional accountability attaches to the supervisor's decision. The ethical responsibility of the superior is a matter of administrative and potentially legal accountability rather than engineering ethics. For Engineer A, the non-engineer status of his superior reinforces the non-subordination principle: deference to a supervisor's technical judgment is most defensible when that supervisor shares the engineer's professional accountability framework. When the supervisor lacks engineering licensure, the engineer cannot ethically shelter behind supervisory authority as a justification for issuing a document the engineer believes violates applicable standards.
In response to Q201: The principle of honest disagreement among qualified engineers does not neutralize the public welfare paramount principle when the subject of disagreement is regulatory compliance with a specific legal standard protective of public health. The threshold at which public welfare overrides deference to a superior's honest technical judgment is reached when the engineer's own professional assessment concludes that a legal violation — not merely a suboptimal engineering choice — would result from the proposed action. In this case, the disagreement was not about which of two equally compliant approaches was preferable, but about whether one approach met the minimum legal threshold at all. Engineer A's position was that the fluidized boiler process failed to satisfy Clean Air Act SO2 requirements; his superior's position was that it did. This is not a symmetrical technical disagreement where both views are equally defensible from a compliance standpoint — it is a disagreement about whether a legal floor is met. When an engineer concludes that a legal floor is not met, the public welfare paramount principle requires refusal regardless of the superior's contrary view, because the engineer's certification is a personal professional act that cannot be delegated to supervisory authority.
In response to Q204: The ethical weight of Engineer A's refusal is not diminished by the possibility that self-protection of his engineering license was a motivating factor alongside public safety concerns. Ethical obligations do not require pure altruistic motivation to be valid; they require that the action taken be the correct one under the applicable ethical framework. Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit was ethically required under NSPE Code Sections I.1 and II.1.b regardless of whether his consultation with the state registration board was primarily motivated by license preservation or public welfare advocacy. The convergence of self-interest and public interest in this case is not a corruption of the ethical obligation — it is a feature of a well-designed professional accountability system in which personal consequences for engineers who violate public safety standards align with the public interest in having those standards enforced. The license revocation risk exists precisely because the regulatory system intends for engineers to refuse non-compliant permits. Engineer A's consultation with the registration board, whatever his motivating mix, produced the professionally correct outcome: documented awareness of his obligations, formal refusal, and submission of findings. The ethical analysis focuses on the action taken and its conformity with professional duty, not on the purity of the actor's motivational hierarchy.
In response to Q301: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A fulfilled a categorical duty to refuse the permit. The NSPE Code provision requiring engineers to approve only documents conforming to applicable standards (II.1.b) functions as a deontological rule that admits no exception based on consequences, supervisory pressure, or institutional convenience. Engineer A's refusal was not contingent on whether it would produce a better outcome — the department ultimately authorized the permit anyway — but on whether issuing it would have constituted a direct violation of his professional certification obligation. The deontological analysis is further supported by Code Section II.1.a, which requires engineers whose judgment is overruled under circumstances endangering life or property to notify proper authorities. The categorical nature of these obligations means that Engineer A's duty to refuse existed independently of any consequentialist calculation about whether his refusal would actually prevent the permit from being issued. The fact that the department overrode his refusal does not retroactively diminish the ethical correctness of the refusal itself — it confirms that Engineer A correctly identified the limits of his personal professional obligation and discharged it fully.
In response to Q302: From a consequentialist perspective, Engineer A's refusal and formal submission of findings to his superior produced the best achievable outcome within Engineer A's sphere of professional action, even though the department authorized the permit anyway. The consequentialist evaluation must be assessed at the level of actions available to Engineer A, not at the level of ultimate systemic outcomes. Engineer A's documented refusal created a formal record of professional dissent that directly contributed to the public media scrutiny and state investigation that followed — outcomes that represent the most robust available mechanism for public accountability in this context. Had Engineer A issued the permit or withdrawn without documenting his findings, the permit's non-compliance would likely have proceeded without triggering the same external accountability mechanisms. The consequentialist case for Engineer A's refusal is therefore strong: his action maximized the probability of public welfare protection by activating external oversight, even when internal channels failed. The department's override does not negate this consequentialist justification — it confirms that Engineer A correctly identified that internal channels were insufficient and that his documented dissent was the necessary predicate for external accountability.
In response to Q303: From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A demonstrated all three cardinal professional virtues — courage, integrity, and prudence — through his conduct in this case. Courage was demonstrated by his refusal to issue the permit under direct supervisory pressure and in the face of employment jeopardy, maintaining his professional position despite the institutional power differential between himself and his superior. Integrity was demonstrated by his formal documentation and submission of findings to his superior, ensuring that his dissent was recorded rather than merely expressed verbally, and by his refusal to allow organizational loyalty to override his professional certification obligation. Prudence was demonstrated by his proactive consultation with the state engineering registration board before refusing, which reflected careful professional judgment about the scope and consequences of his obligations rather than impulsive or uninformed action. The combination of these three virtues — acting courageously, with integrity, and after prudent deliberation — represents the paradigmatic expression of professional engineering character under institutional pressure. Engineer A's conduct in this case serves as a model for how a virtuous engineer navigates the conflict between organizational loyalty and public safety obligation.
In response to Q304: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A's withdrawal option would have violated a duty of non-abandonment toward the public. The precedent established in BER Case 88-6 is directly applicable: an engineer who withdraws from a situation involving public safety risk without ensuring that proper authorities are notified becomes effectively complicit through inaction. In Engineer A's case, withdrawal without formally documenting his findings and submitting them to his superior would have left no licensed engineering voice opposing the non-compliant permit within the regulatory process. The deontological duty here is not merely to avoid personally issuing the non-compliant permit — it is to actively ensure that the public safety concern is formally registered within the institutional process before disengagement. Engineer A's obligation was to refuse and document, not merely to refuse and exit. The distinction between ethical withdrawal (after discharging notification obligations) and abandonment (withdrawal without notification) is critical: the former is permissible once mandatory obligations are discharged, while the latter constitutes a breach of the public safety duty that the engineer's professional role uniquely positions him to fulfill. Engineer A correctly chose refusal with documentation over withdrawal, satisfying the non-abandonment duty.
In response to Q401: Had Engineer A issued the permit under superior pressure while privately disagreeing with its adequacy, that act of compliance would have constituted a clear abrogation of fundamental engineering responsibility under the NSPE Code. Code Section II.1.b requires engineers to approve only documents conforming to applicable standards — this obligation is personal and non-delegable. The fact that a superior directed the issuance would not have provided ethical shelter, because the engineer's signature on a permit constitutes a professional certification that the document meets applicable standards, regardless of the organizational context in which it was produced. The state engineering registration board's advisory about license revocation risk, while not the source of the ethical obligation, accurately identified the likely regulatory consequence of such compliance. Whether actual disciplinary proceedings would have materialized is a factual question beyond the Board's analytical scope, but the ethical violation would have been complete at the moment of signature. The case of BER Case 65-12 confirms that engineers who refuse to approve unsafe or non-compliant work are acting ethically, and by negative implication, those who approve such work under pressure are acting unethically regardless of the institutional pressure applied.
In response to Q402: Had Engineer A withdrawn from the case entirely rather than refusing and submitting formal findings, the department's permit override would almost certainly have faced diminished public scrutiny and the state investigation may not have been triggered at all. Engineer A's documented dissent — his formal submission of findings to his superior — created the institutional paper trail that made the department's override visible as a deliberate decision to proceed over a licensed engineer's professional objection. Without that documented record, the permit's issuance would have appeared as a routine administrative action rather than a contested regulatory decision. The absence of Engineer A's formal dissent would have deprived external accountability mechanisms — media, state investigators, and the public — of the specific factual basis needed to identify and scrutinize the compliance failure. This counterfactual analysis confirms that Engineer A's choice to refuse and document, rather than withdraw, was not merely personally ethical but instrumentally critical to the public accountability outcome that followed. It also reinforces the Board's implicit conclusion that withdrawal would have been ethically impermissible precisely because it would have functionally enabled the non-compliant permit to proceed without triggering the external oversight that Engineer A's documented refusal made possible.
In response to Q403: Had Engineer A escalated his technical concerns directly to state environmental authorities or the media before exhausting internal channels with his superior, that premature external disclosure would not have been ethically justified under the NSPE Code framework applied by the Board. The bounded loyalty principle requires engineers to exhaust internal channels before resorting to external disclosure, except in cases of imminent danger to life where delay itself constitutes a public safety failure. In this case, Engineer A had not yet formally submitted his findings to his superior or received a departmental override when the question of external escalation would have arisen. Premature external disclosure — bypassing the internal process — would have constituted a breach of the employer loyalty obligation that the NSPE Code preserves within ethical limits, and would have been inconsistent with the professional accountability framework that requires engineers to give their employing institutions the opportunity to correct compliance failures before external authorities are engaged. The Board's analysis implicitly preserves this sequencing: Engineer A's ethical conduct consisted of internal refusal and documentation first, with external escalation remaining a personal conscience right after internal channels were exhausted. The fact that external scrutiny ultimately emerged through media coverage and state investigation — rather than through Engineer A's personal disclosure — is consistent with this framework.
In response to Q404: If an independent third-party engineering review had confirmed the superior's position that the fluidized boiler process adequately removes sulphur dioxide to meet Clean Air Act requirements, Engineer A would have been ethically obligated to issue the permit, and the Board's analysis of honest disagreement among qualified engineers would have been reframed significantly. The ethical obligation to refuse is grounded in Engineer A's professional judgment that the permit would violate applicable standards — not in the mere existence of a disagreement. If authoritative independent review resolved that disagreement in favor of compliance, Engineer A's basis for refusal would have been eliminated. The NSPE Code does not require engineers to refuse permits that comply with applicable standards; it requires them to refuse permits that do not. A confirmed third-party finding of compliance would have transformed the situation from one of regulatory non-compliance to one of honest technical disagreement resolved in favor of the superior's view. In that scenario, Engineer A's continued refusal would itself have become ethically problematic — an assertion of personal technical preference over a professionally validated compliance determination. This counterfactual clarifies that Engineer A's ethical obligation to refuse was contingent on the substantive correctness of his compliance assessment, not on the mere fact of his disagreement with his superior.
It was ethical for Engineer A to refuse to issue the permit.
The central principle tension in this case — between Honest Disagreement Among Qualified Engineers and Public Welfare Paramount — was resolved by the Board in favor of public welfare, but not by dismissing the legitimacy of the superior's technical position. Rather, the Board implicitly held that when a genuine technical disagreement involves potential violation of a federal environmental statute and creates measurable public health risk from SO2 emissions, the threshold for deference to a superior's honest judgment is crossed. The resolution was not that the superior was necessarily wrong about the fluidized boiler process, but that Engineer A, as the licensed certifying engineer, bore independent professional responsibility for the permit's regulatory conformity under NSPE Code Section II.1.b. This means the principle of honest disagreement functions as a shield against bad-faith accusations of insubordination, not as a license to subordinate one's own professional certification judgment to a supervisor's competing view when public safety is at stake. The case teaches that honest disagreement among qualified engineers is ethically significant precisely because it justifies refusal without requiring proof that the superior is acting in bad faith — the uncertainty itself, when it touches Clean Air Act compliance, triggers the public welfare paramount principle.
The principle of Loyalty Bounded by Ethics was resolved in this case to permit — but not require — external escalation after internal channels were exhausted, while the principle of Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation was resolved to require at minimum formal documented refusal and submission of findings to the superior. The Board drew a careful distinction, informed by BER Case 82-5 and BER Case 88-6, between situations where whistleblowing is a matter of personal conscience (non-safety fund waste, as in BER 82-5) and situations where public health is directly at stake (as here and in BER 88-6). Because media coverage had already emerged and state authorities were actively investigating, the Board found that Engineer A's mandatory escalation obligation was effectively discharged by the public scrutiny already in motion — meaning the bounded loyalty principle was not violated by Engineer A's decision not to personally contact external regulators, since the external accountability mechanism had already been triggered. This resolution teaches that the boundary between permissible loyalty and required whistleblowing is not fixed but is sensitive to whether external accountability mechanisms are already operative: when they are, the engineer's affirmative duty to escalate beyond the employer is satisfied by documented internal dissent, and further external disclosure becomes a matter of personal conscience rather than ethical mandate.
The potential conflict between License Self-Protection Consultation Obligation and Non-Subordination of Public Safety to Institutional Bargaining — specifically the concern that Engineer A's consultation with the state engineering registration board was primarily self-interested rather than public-welfare-motivated — was resolved by the Board implicitly treating the two motivations as ethically convergent rather than competing. The Board's analysis does not diminish the ethical weight of Engineer A's refusal because his consultation with the registration board was partly self-protective; rather, it treats the license protection framework and the public safety framework as mutually reinforcing. This resolution reflects a deeper principle: the engineering licensure system is itself a public safety instrument, and an engineer who protects his license from revocation by refusing to certify a non-compliant permit is simultaneously protecting the public from the harms that licensure law was designed to prevent. The case therefore teaches that mixed motives — self-protection and public welfare — do not undermine the ethical validity of a refusal when the action required by self-protection is identical to the action required by public welfare. The Professional Accountability principle further reinforces this: Engineer A's willingness to accept employment jeopardy as a consequence of his refusal demonstrates that self-protection was not the dominant or overriding motivation, since a purely self-interested actor would have sought a path that preserved both license and employment.
Should Engineer A proactively consult the state engineering registration board about license jeopardy before deciding whether to issue or refuse the permit, or should he act on his own professional judgment without seeking board guidance?
Engineer A faces a directive from his superior to expedite a construction permit he believes violates Clean Air Act SO2 standards. Before deciding whether to issue or refuse the permit, Engineer A must determine whether to consult the state engineering registration board about the license implications of issuing a potentially non-compliant permit.
Proactively contact the state engineering registration board to obtain guidance on whether issuing the permit would jeopardize Engineer A's professional license, documenting the advisory received before making a final decision on the permit.
Proceed directly to refuse or issue the permit based on Engineer A's own professional assessment of Clean Air Act compliance, without seeking external board guidance, on the grounds that his technical determination is itself sufficient basis for the decision.
Before consulting the registration board or refusing the permit, seek a second technical opinion from a qualified peer engineer on whether the fluidized boiler process meets SO2 standards, using that review to either confirm or resolve the technical disagreement with the superior before escalating.
Should Engineer A issue the construction permit in deference to his superior's professionally defensible technical judgment that the fluidized boiler process meets Clean Air Act standards, or refuse to issue the permit based on his own professional assessment that it does not?
Engineer A has determined that the plans, without outside scrubbers, will violate Clean Air Act SO2 emission standards. His superior — also technically qualified — holds the contrary view that the fluidized boiler process adequately meets those standards. Engineer A must decide whether to issue the permit in deference to his superior's honest technical judgment or refuse on the basis of his own professional assessment.
Decline to issue the construction permit on the grounds that Engineer A's professional assessment concludes the plans fail to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards, formally documenting the technical basis for refusal and submitting findings to the superior, regardless of the superior's contrary technical view.
Issue the permit in recognition that the superior — also technically qualified — holds a professionally defensible contrary view that the fluidized boiler process meets SO2 standards, treating the disagreement as a legitimate technical dispute in which supervisory judgment appropriately governs the institutional decision.
Neither issue nor formally refuse the permit at this stage, but instead formally request that the department commission an independent third-party engineering review of the fluidized boiler process's SO2 compliance before Engineer A makes a final certification decision, preserving both the public safety concern and the possibility of resolution through authoritative technical consensus.
After the department overrides Engineer A's permit refusal and authorizes the permit, should Engineer A withdraw from further work on the project or remain engaged and continue to formally represent his professional position within the regulatory process?
After Engineer A refuses to issue the permit and formally submits his findings to his superior, the department overrides his refusal and authorizes the permit. Engineer A must now decide whether to withdraw from further work on the project or remain engaged — standing by his documented professional position within the regulatory process.
Continue working on the project while formally maintaining the documented professional position opposing the permit, ensuring that Engineer A's dissent remains on the institutional record and that no further professional certifications are made that Engineer A believes violate applicable standards.
Disassociate from further work on the project on the grounds that mandatory obligations — refusal, formal submission of findings, and board consultation — have been fully discharged, and that continued involvement in a project whose permit Engineer A believes is non-compliant places him in a professionally compromising situation.
Remain engaged in the project while simultaneously escalating concerns to external authorities — such as the EPA or state environmental regulators — on the grounds that the department override of a licensed engineer's professional objection on a Clean Air Act compliance matter constitutes a public health concern requiring external notification.
After the department overrides Engineer A's refusal and the matter becomes subject to media coverage and state investigation, does Engineer A have an affirmative ethical obligation to personally escalate to external authorities such as the EPA, or is such escalation merely a permissible personal conscience decision given that external accountability mechanisms are already operative?
After the department overrides Engineer A's refusal and authorizes the permit, media coverage emerges and a state investigation is initiated. Engineer A must decide whether to engage in further public advocacy or external reporting beyond what he has already done internally, or to treat his mandatory obligations as fully discharged and any further escalation as a matter of personal conscience only.
Recognize that mandatory internal obligations have been fully discharged through refusal, formal documentation, and board consultation, and that the existing state investigation and media coverage have activated external accountability mechanisms — treating any further personal external disclosure as a permissible but not required matter of individual conscience.
Affirmatively contact the EPA and state environmental regulatory authorities to formally report the department's override of a licensed engineer's Clean Air Act compliance objection, on the grounds that the public health stakes of SO2 emissions create a mandatory escalation obligation that is not discharged merely by the existence of independent media coverage or investigation.
Refrain from personally initiating external disclosure to regulators or media, but fully cooperate with the ongoing state investigation by providing all documented findings, technical assessments, and records of the permit refusal and department override if requested by investigators — allowing the external accountability process to proceed through institutional channels without Engineer A personally driving the escalation.
Should ethics reviewing bodies treat the technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior about Clean Air Act SO2 compliance as a symmetrical honest professional dispute in which neither engineer's position is inherently unethical, or should they hold that Engineer A's independent permit certification obligation required refusal regardless of whether the superior's contrary technical view was professionally defensible?
The board must determine whether the technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior — both presumably technically qualified — about whether the fluidized boiler process meets Clean Air Act SO2 standards constitutes a symmetrical honest professional dispute in which neither position is inherently unethical, or whether Engineer A's independent certification obligation requires refusal regardless of the legitimacy of the superior's contrary view.
Hold that the honest disagreement principle protects Engineer A from bad-faith insubordination accusations by acknowledging the legitimacy of the superior's contrary view, while simultaneously holding that Engineer A's independent certification obligation required refusal once his own professional assessment identified a legal violation — treating the two principles as operating on different analytical levels rather than in direct conflict.
Hold that because both engineers are technically qualified and reached different conclusions from the same facts, the disagreement is fully symmetrical — meaning Engineer A's refusal was ethically permissible but not required, and that issuing the permit in deference to the superior's equally defensible technical judgment would also have been ethically permissible.
Hold that the ethical analysis cannot be completed without first resolving the underlying technical dispute through independent expert review, and that the ethical obligation to refuse or issue the permit is contingent on the outcome of that technical resolution rather than on Engineer A's unilateral professional assessment.
Department Override Occurs (Event 4) + Media Coverage Emerges (Event 5) → State Investigation Initiated (Event 6)
Department authorizes issuance of the permit before Widespread media coverage
Employment Pressure on Engineer A to Issue Non-Compliant Permit
From superior's directive to expedite the permit through Engineer A's disassociation
Engineers have a fundamental obligation to hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties
Employment Pressure Abrogation of Safety Obligation State
Engineer A's employment relationship with regulatory agency superior
Engineer A's disassociation from the project
he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment
Superior's override of Engineer A's compliance determination and directive to issue the permit
State Engineering Registration Board Advisory on Permit Approval and Licensure Consequences
Engineer License Revocation Risk Advisory
We believe Engineer A's actions in this regard constitute appropriate conduct and actions are consistent with Section II.1.a. of the Code.
Engineer A in deciding whether to issue the air pollution emissions permit
Engineer A affirmatively sought the opinion of the state licensing board as to whether approving the permit could violate the state engineering registration law; the Board found this conduct appropriate and consistent with the Code
Engineer A Air Pollution Regulatory Standard Technical Assessment
Air Pollution Regulatory Standard Technical Assessment Capability
Engineer A possessed advanced technical capability to assess whether the proposed power plant's fluidized boiler process would meet Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, concluding that outside scrubbers were necessary and that the plans as drafted were inadequate.
Applied during review of manufacturing facility power plant construction permit application at the state environmental protection division
Technical determination that limestone-coal fluidized boiler process was insufficient to meet SO2 emission limits and that external scrubbers were required for Clean Air Act compliance
Engineer A believes the plans as drafted are inadequate to meet the regulation requirements and that outside scrubbers to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions are necessary
without them the issuance of the permit would violate certain air pollution standards as mandated under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Engineer A BER 82-5 Versus BER 88-6 Precedent Distinction
The Board compared the present case to BER 82-5 (defense industry cost reporting) and BER 88-6 (city engineer sewage overflow) to determine the applicable ethical obligations for Engineer A.
Comparative Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Distinguishing Obligation
The Board was obligated to systematically distinguish Engineer A's case from BER 82-5 (personal conscience, no direct public health danger) and align it with BER 88-6 (direct public health and safety impact), while further distinguishing from BER 88-6 on the basis that the facts here were already known to authorities through media coverage, to calibrate Engineer A's obligations correctly.
At the time of ethical review and opinion issuance
Engineer A BER Three-Precedent Public Health Safety Threshold Triangulation
Engineer A's case required the BER to triangulate among BER 65-12, BER 82-5, and BER 88-6 to determine that Engineer A's situation — involving direct public health and safety danger from Clean Air Act violations — fell in the mandatory-duty category analogous to BER 88-6, not the personal-conscience category of BER 82-5
Ethics review of Engineer A's refusal to issue a construction permit for a power plant whose plans Engineer A believed violated Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards
The Board's analysis distinguishing Engineer A's case from BER 82-5 (no public health danger, personal conscience only) and aligning it with BER 88-6 (direct public health danger, mandatory duty) while referencing BER 65-12 as foundational precedent for unsafe product refusal
Engineer A (Permit-Refusing Subordinate Regulatory Engineer)
As early as case BER 65-12, the Board dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe.
In BER Case 82-5... the Board ruled that the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue his efforts... The Board noted that the case did not involve a danger to the public health or safety
More recently, in BER Case 88-6... the Board found that the engineer failed to fulfill her ethical obligations
Turning to the facts of this case... This, unlike BER Case 82-5 did not involve a matter of personal conscience, but rather a matter which had a direct impact upon the public health and safety.
Engineer A Clean Air Act SO2 Permit Compliance Legal Constraint
Engineer A, employed by the state environmental protection division, was ordered to issue a construction permit for a power plant at a manufacturing facility. He determined the plans were inadequate to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards without outside scrubbers.
Clean Air Act SO2 Emission Standard Permit Compliance Constraint
Engineer A could not lawfully issue the construction permit because he held a professionally grounded belief that the plans, without outside scrubbers, would violate the SO2 emission control standards mandated by the 1990 Clean Air Act.
1990 Clean Air Act; applicable SO2 emission control regulations
At the time of permit review and throughout the permit issuance process
Engineer A Disassociation from Professionally Compromising Situation
Engineer A's superior overrode his permit refusal; Engineer A had discharged mandatory obligations and the Board found his disassociation from further project work to be appropriate and consistent with Section II.1.a.
Engineer A (state environmental protection division engineer)
Disassociation from Professionally Compromising Regulatory Situation Permissibility Obligation
After discharging mandatory obligations by refusing to issue the permit, formally submitting findings, and consulting the state licensing board, Engineer A was ethically permitted to disassociate himself from further work on the project to avoid being placed in a professionally compromising situation.
Engineer A's decision to disassociate himself from further work on this project avoids having Engineer A being placed in a professionally compromising situation.
After mandatory obligations were discharged and superior's override decision was made
Engineer A Employer Loyalty Boundary Environmental Law
Engineer A's superior directed him to issue the permit; Engineer A's loyalty to his employer was bounded by his professional obligation not to issue a non-compliant permit.
Engineer A was obligated to serve the state environmental protection division's legitimate interests faithfully, while recognizing that loyalty to his employer did not extend to issuing a permit he believed would violate the Clean Air Act and endanger public health, and that his paramount duty to uphold public welfare and legal compliance bounded his loyalty obligation.
Upon receiving the superior's directive and throughout the permit review process
Engineer A Employer Loyalty Bounded by Public Safety
Engineer A's superior directed him to issue the permit; Engineer A's loyalty to his employer was bounded by his professional obligation to refuse a permit he believed violated environmental law.
Engineer A owed loyalty to his state agency employer and superior, but that loyalty was bounded by his paramount public safety obligation — his duty to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — and did not extend to issuing a permit he believed would violate Clean Air Act standards and endanger public health.
Engineers have a fundamental obligation to hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties (Code Section I.1.)
Throughout the permit review and refusal process
we believe it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project because Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare
Engineer A Employment Jeopardy from Safety Refusal
From Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit through the disassociation decision
Engineer A's professional position following permit refusal
if an engineer feels strongly that an employer's course of conduct is improper when related to public concerns... he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment
Engineer A's refusal to issue the non-compliant permit against superior's directive
Engineer A Employment Pressure Non-Subordination Public Safety
Superior's directive created institutional pressure to issue the permit despite Engineer A's belief that it would violate environmental law and endanger public health through excessive sulphur dioxide emissions.
Employment Pressure Non-Subordination of Public Safety Determination Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to subordinate his professional safety determination — that the permit would violate Clean Air Act standards and endanger public health — to the employment pressure created by his superior's directive to expedite and avoid hang-ups, recognizing that yielding would constitute an abrogation of his most fundamental professional responsibility.
Throughout the permit review process and upon receiving the superior's directive
Engineer A Employment Pressure Non-Subordination Safety Determination
Employment Pressure Non-Subordination of Safety Determination Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to refuse to subordinate his professional safety determination — that the permit would violate Clean Air Act standards — to the employment pressure created by his superior's directive to expedite and avoid technical issues, recognizing that bowing to such pressure would constitute an abrogation of his most fundamental professional responsibility.
Sustained throughout the permit review process and the superior's override
Refusing to issue the permit despite the superior's expediting directive and the implicit risk of adverse employment consequences
Engineer A refused to issue the permit and submitted his findings to his superior
He is told by a superior to move expeditiously on the permit and 'avoid any hang-ups' with respect to technical issues
Engineer A Employment Pressure Safety Abrogation Prohibition
Engineer A faced direct employment pressure from his superior to issue the permit despite his professional determination that it would violate environmental regulations and endanger public health.
Employment Situation Safety Abrogation Prohibition Constraint
Engineer A was absolutely prohibited from bowing to his superior's institutional pressure — framed as avoiding 'technical hang-ups' — that would have caused him to issue a permit he believed violated Clean Air Act SO2 standards and posed a public health risk.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER Case 88-6; BER Case 65-12
Throughout the permit review and issuance process
Engineer A Employment Pressure to Issue Non-Compliant Permit
From superior's directive through Engineer A's refusal and department's override authorization
Engineer A's professional position under organizational hierarchy directing non-compliant permit issuance
Engineer A's refusal and submission of findings; department's authorization of permit over Engineer A's objection
Superior's directive to expedite permit and avoid technical issues, combined with Engineer A's belief that the permit violates the Clean Air Act
Engineer A Environmental Permit Issuing Regulatory Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (state-licensed)', 'employer': 'State environmental protection division', 'specialty': 'Environmental engineering, air pollution regulation', 'regulatory_concern': 'Sulphur dioxide emissions non-compliance under 1990 Clean Air Act'}
State environmental engineer ordered to issue a construction permit for a power plant who believes the plans violate Clean Air Act air pollution standards, refuses to issue the permit, submits findings to his superior, and consults the state engineering registration board about potential license jeopardy
{'type': 'consulted', 'target': 'State Engineering Registration Board'}
{'type': 'regulatory_reviewer_of', 'target': 'Manufacturing Facility Power Plant Construction Permit Applicant'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'Superior/Department Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor'}
Environmental Permit Issuing Regulatory Engineer
Engineer A, an environmental engineer employed by the state environmental protection division, is ordered to draw up a construction permit
Engineer A contacts the state engineering registration board
outside scrubbers to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions are necessary and without them the issuance of the permit would violate certain air pollution standards
Engineer A Environmental Regulatory Compliance Permit Issuance Constraint
The Clean Air Act SO2 standards formed the binding regulatory framework within which Engineer A's permit issuance decision had to be made, and his belief that the plans failed to meet those standards was the foundation of his refusal.
Environmental Regulatory Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was bound by the environmental regulatory compliance constraint arising from the 1990 Clean Air Act SO2 emission standards, which prohibited him from issuing a construction permit for a power plant whose plans he believed were inadequate to meet those standards.
1990 Clean Air Act; applicable state environmental regulations; Environmental Regulatory Compliance Constraint
Engineer A Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Pressure-Abrogation Recognition and Resistance
Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Pressure-Abrogation Recognition and Resistance Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that complying with his superior's directive to issue the permit — despite his belief that it would violate Clean Air Act standards — would constitute an abrogation of his most fundamental professional responsibility, and to actively resist that abrogation by refusing the permit and submitting his findings.
Applied in the context of a state regulatory agency employment relationship with a superior who disagreed with Engineer A's technical conclusion
Maintaining permit refusal and formal upward submission of findings despite institutional pressure, recognizing that the superior's framing of technical concerns as 'hang-ups' was an attempt to induce professional responsibility abrogation
Engineer A Government Regulatory Employment Relationship
Engineer A, an environmental engineer employed by the state environmental protection division, is ordered to draw up a construction permit for construction of a power plant at a manufacturing facility.
Engineer A's employment relationship with the state environmental protection division
Engineer A's employment by the state environmental protection division with permit issuance authority
Engineer A Honest Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition
Honest Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition Capability
Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process plans met Clean Air Act standards based on the same facts, constituting an honest technical disagreement between qualified engineers rather than an ethical violation by either party
The technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior regarding whether the power plant's proposed fluidized boiler process would meet Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards
The BER's recognition that Engineer A and his superior's differing technical conclusions about the fluidized boiler process did not constitute ethical misconduct by either engineer, reflecting the inherent subjectivity of complex environmental engineering assessments
Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act standards, based on the same set of facts, this constitutes an honest technical disagreement rather than an ethical violation by either party
Engineer A Internal Escalation Failure External Authority Re-Identification
With internal escalation exhausted after the department override, Engineer A needed to identify state environmental regulatory authorities as the appropriate external escalation target, consistent with BER Case 88-6 precedent.
Internal Escalation Failure Proper External Authority Re-Identification Constraint
After the department authorized the permit over Engineer A's objection — exhausting internal escalation — Engineer A was required to re-identify who constituted 'proper authorities' for external escalation, recognizing that the department itself was the source of the override and that proper authorities were state regulatory bodies with jurisdiction over Clean Air Act compliance.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6; Internal Escalation Failure Proper External Authority Re-Identification Constraint
After the department authorized the permit over Engineer A's objection
The case had received widespread publicity in the news media and is currently being investigated by state authorities.
Engineer A License Board Consultation Self-Protection
Engineer A faced a directive from his superior to issue a permit he believed violated environmental law; he consulted the state engineering registration board regarding potential license implications.
License Jeopardy Self-Protection Board Consultation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to proactively consult the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing a permit he believed violated Clean Air Act standards would jeopardize his professional license, so that he could make an informed decision about whether to comply with his superior's directive or refuse.
Before making the final decision on permit issuance
Engineer A License Jeopardy Board Consultation
Engineer A faced a superior's directive to issue a permit he believed was non-compliant; he was uncertain about the license implications of either complying or refusing.
Engineer A was obligated to consult the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing a permit he believed violated environmental regulations would jeopardize his professional license, before making a final decision on the permit.
Engineer A contacts the state engineering registration board and is informed, based upon the limited information provided to the board that suspension or revocation of his engineering license was a possibility if he prepared a permit that violated environmental regulations.
Before issuing or formally refusing to issue the permit
Engineer A License Jeopardy Proactive Board Consultation
License Jeopardy Proactive Board Consultation Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to proactively contact the state engineering registration board to assess the licensure consequences of issuing a permit he believed violated environmental regulations, obtaining guidance that suspension or revocation was a possibility.
Undertaken before finalizing the decision to refuse the permit, as a self-protective and professionally responsible step
Contacting the state engineering registration board and receiving information that license suspension or revocation was possible if he prepared a permit violating environmental regulations
Engineer A contacts the state engineering registration board and is informed, based upon the limited information provided to the board that suspension or revocation of his engineering license was a possibility if he prepared a permit that violated environmental regulations
Engineer A License Revocation Threat from Registration Board
From Engineer A's contact with the registration board through resolution of the permit dispute
Engineer License Revocation Threat for Regulatory Compliance Refusal State
Engineer A's professional license status in light of registration board's advisory
State engineering registration board's informal advisory that issuing a non-compliant permit could result in license suspension or revocation
Engineer A License Revocation Threat from State Board
From Engineer A's consultation with the state engineering registration board through the disassociation decision
Engineer A affirmatively sought the opinion of the state as to whether his approval of the permit could violate the state engineering registration law
Engineer A's professional license status following state board consultation
Engineer A's actions in this regard constitute appropriate conduct and actions are consistent with Section II.1.a. of the Code
Engineer A's affirmative inquiry to the state board about whether approving the permit could violate the state engineering registration law
Engineer A Media-Coverage-Conditioned Mandatory Escalation Discharge Assessment
Engineer A's situation required assessment of whether widespread media coverage and the commencement of a state investigation discharged the remaining mandatory obligation to bring the Clean Air Act compliance dispute to the attention of proper authorities beyond internal reporting
Post-department-override assessment of Engineer A's remaining escalation obligations after the permit dispute received media coverage and triggered a state investigation
The BER's determination that Engineer A was not obligated to further report to proper authorities because media coverage had already made officials aware and an investigation had begun, making further reporting a useless act
In view of this fact, we do not believe it is incumbent upon Engineer A to bring this issue to the attention of the 'proper authorities'. As we see it, such officials are already aware of the situation and have begun an investigation.
To bring the matter to their attention is a useless act.
Engineer A Media Coverage External Escalation Discharge
Engineer A refused to issue a construction permit for a power plant he believed violated Clean Air Act SO2 standards; the department overrode his refusal; the matter received media coverage and state investigation commenced
Media Coverage Public Authority Awareness External Escalation Discharge Constraint
Engineer A was not required to bring the Clean Air Act SO2 permit compliance dispute to the attention of proper external authorities because the facts had already received media coverage and the relevant public authorities had already begun an investigation, making further escalation a useless act that could not further protect public health and safety.
NSPE BER Case Analysis — BER Case 92-4 Discussion
In view of this fact, we do not believe it is incumbent upon Engineer A to bring this issue to the attention of the 'proper authorities'.
After media coverage and state investigation commenced
As we see it, such officials are already aware of the situation and have begun an investigation.
Engineer A Media Coverage External Reporting Discharge
After Engineer A refused to issue the permit and submitted findings to his superior, the matter received media coverage and officials began an investigation; the Board found no mandatory duty for Engineer A to further escalate externally.
Media-Coverage-Conditioned External Reporting Discharge Obligation
Engineer A was not obligated to bring the Clean Air Act compliance dispute to the attention of proper authorities beyond his internal refusal and formal submission, because the matter had already received media coverage and appropriate public officials had already begun an investigation, making further external reporting a useless act.
After internal mandatory obligations were discharged and media coverage/official investigation confirmed
Engineer A Multi-Engineer Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition
Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process met Clean Air Act SO2 requirements. The ethics analysis turns on conduct, not on which technical view was correct.
Multi-Engineer Public Policy Disagreement Mutual Ethical Legitimacy Constraint
The technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior about whether the fluidized boiler limestone process meets Clean Air Act SO2 standards does not render either engineer's position inherently unethical — both engineers held professionally grounded views, and the ethics analysis must focus on conduct (issuing vs. refusing the permit) rather than on which technical conclusion was correct.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case Nos. 63-6, 65-9, 79-2; Multi-Engineer Public Policy Disagreement Mutual Ethical Legitimacy Constraint
Engineer A believes the plans as drafted are inadequate to meet the regulation requirements and that outside scrubbers to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions are necessary.
His superior believes that plans which involve limestone mixed with coal in a fluidized boiler process would remove 90% of the sulphur dioxide will meet the regulatory requirements.
Engineer A Non-Engineer Superior Safety Override Resistance
After Engineer A submitted his findings, the department (through his superior) authorized the permit anyway, constituting a non-engineer override of Engineer A's professional safety determination.
Non-Engineer Authority Safety Override Resistance Constraint
Engineer A was ethically required to resist his superior's override of his professionally grounded determination that the permit would violate Clean Air Act SO2 standards, by escalating his findings formally rather than acquiescing to the department's authorization.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 00-5; Non-Engineer Authority Safety Override Resistance Constraint
Engineer A Passive Safety Acquiescence Prohibition
Engineer A correctly refused to passively comply with the directive to issue the permit, instead actively refusing and formally submitting his technical findings to his superior.
Passive Safety Acquiescence Independent Ethical Violation Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from passively acquiescing to his superior's directive to issue the permit without dissent — going along silently would have constituted an independent ethical violation distinct from any failure to report externally, requiring instead active refusal and formal submission of findings.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Passive Safety Acquiescence Independent Ethical Violation Constraint
At the time of the superior's expedite directive
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (state-licensed)', 'employer': 'State environmental/regulatory agency', 'action_taken': 'Refused to issue permit; sought state licensing board opinion; withdrew from project'}
Engineer A is the subordinate state regulatory engineer who refused to issue a construction permit he believed violated environmental/public health regulations, sought guidance from the state licensing board regarding whether approving the permit would violate the state engineering registration law, and ultimately disassociated himself from further work on the project.
{'type': 'regulatory_reviewer_of', 'target': 'Power Plant Construction Permit Applicant'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor'}
Permit-Refusing Subordinate Regulatory Engineer
Engineer A's decision to disassociate himself from further work on this project avoids having Engineer A being placed in a professionally compromising situation
Engineers have an essential role as technically-qualified professionals to 'stick to their guns' and represent the public interest
it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project because Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare and refuse to issue the permit
Engineer A Permit Issuance Professional Certification Non-Compromise
Engineer A was assigned to review and issue a construction permit for a power plant; he believed the proposed fluidized boiler process would not adequately reduce sulphur dioxide emissions to meet Clean Air Act standards.
Regulatory Engineer Permit Issuance Professional Certification Non-Compromise Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to treat the act of issuing the construction permit as a professional certification that the power plant plans met Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, and to refuse to issue the permit when he held a professionally grounded belief that the fluidized boiler process plans failed to meet those standards.
At the point of permit issuance decision
Engineer A Permit Issuance Professional Certification Scope Self-Recognition
Permit Issuance Professional Certification Scope Self-Recognition Capability
Engineer A recognized that issuing the construction permit would constitute a professional certification that the power plant plans met Clean Air Act standards — a certification he could not make in good conscience — and therefore refused to issue the permit and consulted the state licensing board regarding potential license jeopardy
Engineer A's recognition that issuing the construction permit for the power plant would constitute a false professional certification of Clean Air Act compliance
Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit, his formal submission of findings to his superior, and his proactive consultation of the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing the permit could violate the state engineering registration law
Sometimes engineers are asked by employers or clients to sign off on documents in which they may have reservations or concerns.
Engineer A Permit Refusal with Disassociation Permissibility
From Engineer A's formal refusal to issue the permit through the disassociation decision
it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project because Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position
Engineer Permit Refusal Obligation with Disassociation Permissibility State
Engineer A's ethical position following permit refusal and superior override
Engineer A's disassociation from further work on the project
Engineers have an essential role as technically-qualified professionals to 'stick to their guns'
Superior's issuance of the permit over Engineer A's objection, combined with Engineer A's continued project involvement
Engineer A Post-Department-Override Whistleblowing Permissibility
The department authorized the permit over Engineer A's objection; the case received widespread media publicity and is under state investigation.
Post-Superior-Override Public Safety Whistleblowing Permissibility Obligation
After the department overrode Engineer A's refusal and authorized the permit, Engineer A retained the ethical right — as a matter of personal conscience — to engage in further public advocacy or external reporting, and this post-override conduct was ethically permissible and not constrained by employer loyalty obligations, even though it was not itself a mandatory professional duty at that stage.
After the department authorized issuance of the permit
Engineer A Post-Department-Override Whistleblowing Permissibility Self-Assessment
Post-Department-Override Whistleblowing Permissibility Self-Assessment Capability
After the department overrode his refusal and authorized the permit, Engineer A retained and could exercise the capability to assess whether further escalation — including to state investigative authorities or the public — was ethically permissible as a matter of personal conscience, distinguishing this right from a mandatory duty.
Post-department-override phase, after the permit was authorized despite Engineer A's refusal and formal submission of findings
The case's receipt of widespread media publicity and state investigation, consistent with Engineer A having exercised or permitted the exercise of his post-override escalation right
The department authorized the issuance of the permit
The case had received widespread publicity in the news media and is currently being investigated by state authorities
Engineer A Post-Department-Override Whistleblowing Personal Conscience Right
Engineer A refused to issue the permit, submitted findings to his superior, the department authorized the permit over his objection, the matter received media coverage, and state investigation commenced; the Board found external escalation was not mandatory but remained permissible as a matter of personal conscience
Post-Department-Override Personal Conscience Whistleblowing Permissibility Constraint
After the department overrode Engineer A's refusal and authorized the permit, Engineer A retained the ethical right — as a matter of personal conscience — to escalate concerns to appropriate external authorities or the public, while recognizing that such escalation was permissible but not mandated as a professional obligation given that the matter was already under public and regulatory scrutiny.
NSPE BER Case 82-5; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
After the department authorized the permit over Engineer A's objection and after media coverage and state investigation commenced
if an engineer feels strongly that an employer's course of conduct is improper when related to public concerns, and if the engineer feels compelled to blow the whistle to expose facts as he sees them, he may well have to pay the price of loss of employment.
Engineer A Post-Dismissal Safety Escalation to State Authorities
The department's authorization of the permit over Engineer A's documented objection triggered the post-dismissal escalation obligation, with state authorities as the appropriate escalation target.
Post-Dismissal Safety Escalation Constraint
After the department dismissed Engineer A's refusal and authorized the permit, Engineer A was required to consider escalating his documented technical findings to state environmental regulatory authorities, as passive acceptance of the department's override did not discharge his public safety obligation given the gravity of the identified Clean Air Act compliance risk.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER Case 88-6; Post-Dismissal Safety Escalation Constraint
Engineer A Post-Mandatory-Obligation-Discharge Regulatory Disassociation Permissibility Assessment
Post-Mandatory-Obligation-Discharge Regulatory Disassociation Permissibility Assessment Capability
After discharging mandatory obligations by refusing to issue the permit, formally submitting findings to his superior, and consulting the state licensing board, Engineer A possessed the capability to correctly assess that disassociating from further work on the project was ethically permissible and avoided a professionally compromising situation
Engineer A's post-override decision to disassociate from further work on the power plant construction permit project after the department overrode his refusal
Engineer A's decision to disassociate from further work on the project after fulfilling mandatory professional obligations, which the BER found to be ethically appropriate conduct consistent with Code Section II.1.a.
This case involves a question of public health and welfare and Engineer A's decision to disassociate himself from further work on this project avoids having Engineer A being placed in a professionally compromising situation.
Engineer A Pressure Yielding Abrogation Prohibition
Superior's directive framed Engineer A's legitimate safety concerns as mere 'hang-ups'; Engineer A resisted this framing and refused to issue the permit.
Pressure-Yielding Abrogation of Fundamental Engineering Responsibility Prohibition Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from bowing to his superior's institutional pressure — framed as avoiding 'technical hang-ups' — that would have caused him to abandon his professional safety determination that the permit would violate Clean Air Act standards, recognizing that yielding would constitute an abrogation of his most fundamental professional responsibility.
Upon receiving the superior's expediting directive
Engineer A Proactive Registration Board Guidance Seeking
Engineer A consulted the state registration board and received an advisory that issuing a non-compliant permit could result in license suspension or revocation, confirming the appropriateness of his refusal.
Proactive Regulatory Guidance Seeking Constraint
Engineer A was required — and did — proactively seek guidance from the state engineering registration board before concluding on the scope of his professional obligations regarding the permit, consistent with the constraint that engineers facing novel or ambiguous regulatory compliance situations should seek board guidance rather than acting unilaterally.
NSPE Code Section II.1.a; Proactive Regulatory Guidance Seeking Constraint
Engineer A Professionally Compromising Situation Disassociation Permissibility
Engineer A refused to issue the permit, submitted findings to his superior, the department authorized the permit over his objection, and Engineer A consulted the state licensing board; the Board found his decision to disassociate from further work was appropriate
Professionally Compromising Regulatory Situation Disassociation Permissibility Constraint
After discharging mandatory obligations by refusing to issue the permit, formally submitting findings to his superior, and consulting the state licensing board, Engineer A was ethically permitted to disassociate himself from further work on the project to avoid being placed in a professionally compromising situation.
NSPE Code Section II.1.a; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
After mandatory obligations (permit refusal, findings submission, board consultation) were discharged
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Safety Escalation Duty
Engineer A's dual role as a public employee with specific permit-issuance responsibility and as a licensed professional engineer imposed a heightened escalation obligation when he identified a regulatory compliance failure.
Public Employee Heightened Safety Escalation Constraint
As a licensed professional engineer employed by the state environmental protection division with specific assigned responsibility to review and issue construction permits, Engineer A bore a heightened escalation obligation — beyond that of a private engineer — requiring formal documentation and submission of findings to his superior and, after department override, consideration of further escalation to state regulatory authorities.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER Case 88-6; Public Employee Heightened Safety Escalation Constraint
Throughout the permit review process and after department override
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Safety Obligation Recognition
Public Employee Heightened Safety Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that his role as a licensed professional engineer employed by the state environmental protection division with specific assigned responsibility to review and issue construction permits created a heightened ethical obligation to refuse permits that violated environmental law, beyond that of a private engineer.
Throughout the permit review process, grounded in Engineer A's specific institutional role and assigned responsibility
Refusing the permit and submitting findings in his capacity as a state environmental protection division engineer with specific permit-issuing responsibility
Engineer A, an environmental engineer employed by the state environmental protection division, is ordered to draw up a construction permit for construction of a power plant at a manufacturing facility
Engineer A Public Employee Heightened Safety Responsibility
Engineer A was specifically assigned to review and issue the construction permit; his public agency role gave him both the authority and the heightened responsibility to ensure regulatory compliance.
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Institutional Safety Responsibility Obligation
As a licensed professional engineer employed by the state environmental protection division with specific assigned responsibility to review and issue construction permits, Engineer A bore a heightened institutional safety obligation — compelled both by professional engineering ethics and by his public employee status — requiring more assertive action than would be required of a private engineer encountering the same regulatory compliance concern incidentally.
Engineer A Public Health Safety Mandatory vs Personal Conscience Distinction
The Board distinguished BER Case 82-5 (personal conscience, no public safety) from Engineer A's case (direct public health and safety impact from SO2 emissions) to determine the applicable ethical standard
Public Health Safety Threshold Mandatory vs Personal Conscience Whistleblowing Distinction Constraint
The BER was constrained to distinguish Engineer A's case — involving direct public health and safety danger from Clean Air Act SO2 violations — from BER Case 82-5, which involved only financial impropriety without public health and safety impact, establishing that Engineer A's situation triggered mandatory escalation obligations rather than merely a personal conscience right.
NSPE BER Case 82-5; BER Case 88-6; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
In this type of situation, the Board felt that the ethical duty or right of the engineer becomes a matter of personal conscience.
Engineer A Public Health Safety Whistleblowing Mandatory vs Personal Conscience Distinction
The Board compared Engineer A's situation to BER 82-5 and BER 88-6 to determine whether Engineer A's obligations were mandatory professional duties or personal conscience matters.
Public Health Safety Whistleblowing Mandatory Duty Versus Personal Conscience Distinction Obligation
The Board was obligated to distinguish Engineer A's case — involving direct public health and safety danger from Clean Air Act violations — from BER 82-5's personal conscience category, correctly classifying Engineer A's obligations as mandatory professional duties rather than discretionary personal conscience matters.
the ethical duty or right of the engineer becomes a matter of personal conscience, but the Board was unwilling to make a blanket statement that there is an ethical duty in these kinds of situations for the engineer to continue the campaign within the company
Engineer A Public Interest Technical Position Persistence Under Institutional Override
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to maintain his professional position — refusing to issue the permit — and stand by that position under institutional pressure from his superior's directive to expedite and avoid technical hang-ups, representing the public interest as a technically-qualified professional when public health and safety was at stake
Engineer A's maintenance of his professional position that the power plant plans violated Clean Air Act standards, despite supervisory pressure to issue the permit
Engineer A's sustained refusal to issue the construction permit despite his superior's directive to move expeditiously and avoid technical hang-ups, and his formal submission of findings supporting his refusal
Engineer A Public Safety Paramount Permit Refusal
Engineer A was assigned to review and issue a construction permit for a power plant at a manufacturing facility; he determined the plans were inadequate to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards; his superior directed him to move expeditiously; he refused to issue the permit
Engineer A was constrained by the paramount public safety obligation to refuse to issue the construction permit for the power plant because he held a professionally grounded belief that the fluidized boiler limestone process was inadequate to achieve the required SO2 reduction under the Clean Air Act, and that issuing the permit would endanger public health and welfare.
Engineers have a fundamental obligation to hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties (Code Section I.1.).
Throughout the permit review and dispute
Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare and refuse to issue the permit.
Engineer A Public Safety Permit Refusal Non-Withdrawal
Engineer A's superior directed him to move expeditiously on the permit; Engineer A refused; the department authorized the permit over his objection; the Board found it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work
Engineer A was prohibited from withdrawing from further work on the permit project because he had an obligation to stand by his professional safety position — that the fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act SO2 standards — and to represent the public interest by refusing to issue the permit, even after the department overrode his refusal.
NSPE Code Section I.1; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
Throughout the permit dispute and after department override
Engineer A Public Safety Permit Refusal State
From the point Engineer A identified the regulatory compliance deficiency through the permit refusal and subsequent disassociation decision
Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare and refuse to issue the permit
Public Sector Engineer Ordered to Expedite Permit Despite Compliance Concern State
Engineer A's employment situation in regulatory capacity
Engineer A's decision to disassociate from further work on the project
Superior's directive to issue the permit despite Engineer A's documented compliance concerns
Engineer A Regulatory Agency Employer Loyalty Boundary Recognition
Regulatory Agency Engineer Employer Loyalty Boundary Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that his loyalty to the state environmental protection division did not extend to issuing a permit that violated the Clean Air Act — the very law the division was mandated to enforce — and that refusing the permit was consistent with, not contrary to, faithful service to the agency's legitimate mission.
Applied throughout the permit review and refusal process within the state environmental protection division
Refusing the permit while remaining employed and submitting findings through institutional channels, rather than either complying with the unlawful directive or abandoning the agency
Engineer A Regulatory Agency Permit Issuance Non-Deception
Engineer A was assigned to issue a construction permit; he determined the plans were inadequate to meet Clean Air Act standards; his superior directed him to issue the permit; the Board found that issuing the permit under these circumstances would constitute a deceptive representation of regulatory compliance
Regulatory Agency Engineer Permit Issuance Certification Non-Deception Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from issuing the construction permit for the power plant when he held a professionally grounded belief that the plans failed to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards, because permit issuance would have constituted a deceptive implicit certification of regulatory compliance to the public and to the regulated entity.
NSPE Code Non-Deception provisions; BER Case 92-4
Engineer A Regulatory Compliance Verification Environmental Permit
Regulatory Compliance Verification Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to verify that the proposed power plant construction plans did not comply with applicable Clean Air Act air pollution standards, identifying the specific technical deficiency (absence of outside scrubbers for SO2 reduction) that rendered the plans non-compliant.
Applied during the technical review of the manufacturing facility's power plant construction permit application
Determining that the plans as drafted were inadequate to meet regulation requirements and that issuance of the permit would violate Clean Air Act air pollution standards
Engineer A Regulatory Findings Formal Upward Submission
After refusing to issue the permit, Engineer A submitted his findings to his superior; the department then authorized issuance of the permit.
Regulatory Findings Formal Upward Submission Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to formally document and submit his technical findings — supporting his refusal to issue the permit — to his superior, so that the department had the full technical basis for any override decision and Engineer A's professional position was on record.
Concurrent with or immediately following the refusal to issue the permit
Engineer A Regulatory Permit Environmental Law Compliance Refusal
State environmental protection division permit review for a power plant at a manufacturing facility; Engineer A believed the fluidized boiler process was insufficient to meet Clean Air Act standards.
Regulatory Permit Issuance Environmental Law Compliance Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to issue the construction permit because he had a professionally grounded belief that the plans, without outside scrubbers, would violate Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, and issuing the permit would constitute a professional certification of regulatory compliance he could not honestly make.
Upon completing technical review of the permit application and forming a professional judgment that the plans were non-compliant
Engineer A Regulatory Permit Environmental Law Non-Compliance Refusal
Regulatory Permit Issuance Environmental Law Non-Compliance Refusal Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to refuse to issue the construction permit on the grounds that it would violate Clean Air Act standards, maintaining that refusal despite his superior's directive to expedite and avoid technical hang-ups, and formally submitting his findings upward.
Core professional action taken in response to the superior's expediting directive and the engineer's own technical assessment of Clean Air Act non-compliance
Refusing to issue the permit and submitting technical findings to superior, notwithstanding the directive to move expeditiously and avoid technical issues
Engineer A Regulatory Permit Issuance Environmental Law Non-Compliance Refusal
Engineer A refused to issue the construction permit for the power plant based on his professionally grounded belief that the plans violated Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, maintaining that refusal under supervisory pressure to expedite and avoid technical hang-ups
Engineer A's refusal to issue a state construction permit for a manufacturing facility's power plant whose proposed fluidized boiler process he believed would not meet Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards
Engineer A's sustained refusal to issue the construction permit despite his superior's directive to move expeditiously, and his formal documentation and submission of findings supporting his refusal to his superior
the Board dealt with a situation in which a group of engineers believed that a product was unsafe. The Board then determined that as long as the engineers held to that view, they were ethically justified in refusing to participate in the processing or production of the product in question.
Engineer A Regulatory Permit Non-Deception Certification Constraint
Issuing the permit would have implicitly represented to the public and the regulated entity that the plans met applicable regulatory requirements, which Engineer A believed to be false.
Engineer A was prohibited from issuing the construction permit because doing so would have constituted a deceptive implicit certification of regulatory compliance when he held a professionally grounded belief that the plans failed to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards.
NSPE Code of Ethics Non-Deception provisions; NSPE Code Section II.2.b; Compliance Certification Guarantee Deception Constraint
At the time of the permit issuance decision
Engineer A Regulatory Permit Refusal Non-Withdrawal
Engineer A, a state environmental engineer, refused to issue a construction permit for a power plant believing the plans violated Clean Air Act air pollution standards; his superior directed him to move expeditiously and avoid technical hang-ups.
Engineer Permit Refusal Non-Withdrawal Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to remain engaged in the permit matter — standing by his professional position that the fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards — and to refuse to issue the permit, rather than withdrawing from further work on the project after his superior directed him to expedite.
we believe it would not have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work on the project because Engineer A had an obligation to stand by his position consistent with his obligation to protect the public, health, safety and welfare and refuse to issue the permit
From the point of permit refusal through the superior's override decision
Engineers have an essential role as technically-qualified professionals to 'stick to their guns' and represent the public interest under the circumstances where they believe the public health and safety is at stake
Engineer A State Board License Revocation Risk Regulatory Constraint
Engineer A consulted the state registration board and received an advisory that issuing a non-compliant permit could jeopardize his license, reinforcing his refusal to issue the permit.
Regulatory Permit Non-Compliant Issuance License Revocation Risk Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from issuing the permit by the state engineering registration board's advisory that preparing a permit violating environmental regulations could result in suspension or revocation of his engineering license.
State Engineering Registration Board advisory; state engineering licensure law
From the time of the board consultation through the permit decision
Engineer A State Licensing Board Permit Compliance Consultation
Engineer A faced a directive from his superior to move expeditiously on the permit; he believed the plans violated Clean Air Act SO2 standards; he consulted the state registration board and received an advisory that issuing a non-compliant permit could result in license revocation
State Licensing Board Permit Compliance Consultation Appropriateness Constraint
Engineer A's affirmative consultation of the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing the permit could violate the state engineering registration law constituted appropriate professional conduct consistent with NSPE Code Section II.1.a, establishing that such consultation is not merely permissible but appropriate when facing a directive to issue a potentially non-compliant permit.
During the permit dispute, before and after the department override
We would also note that this case also raises another dimension which involves the role of the state licensing board in determining the ethical conduct of licensees.
Engineer A Stick to Guns Public Safety Representation
Engineer A's superior directed him to move expeditiously and avoid 'technical hang-ups'; Engineer A maintained his professional determination that the plans violated Clean Air Act standards and refused to issue the permit
Engineer A was prohibited from capitulating to his superior's institutional pressure — framed as avoiding 'technical hang-ups' — and was required to maintain his professionally grounded determination that the fluidized boiler process plans were inadequate to meet Clean Air Act SO2 standards, even at the risk of employment consequences.
NSPE Code Section I.1; BER Case 65-12; BER Case 92-4 Discussion
Engineer A Superior Environmental Reporting Suppression Non-Compliance
Engineer A's superior directed him to avoid technical issues and move expeditiously, which functioned as a suppression directive. Engineer A correctly refused and submitted his findings formally.
Superior Authority Environmental Regulatory Reporting Suppression Non-Compliance Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from complying with his superior's implicit directive to suppress his technical findings and issue the permit, and was required to formally document and submit those findings — and, after department override, to consider escalation to state regulatory authorities — rather than treating the superior's directive as a discharge of his environmental reporting obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 88-6; Superior Authority Environmental Regulatory Reporting Suppression Non-Compliance Constraint
From the time of the superior's expedite directive through the department's authorization of the permit
Engineer A Superior Expedite Directive Technical Suppression Prohibition
Engineer A's superior directed him to process the permit quickly and avoid technical issues, which Engineer A recognized as a directive to suppress his finding that the plans violated Clean Air Act standards.
Superior Expedite Directive Technical Hang-Up Suppression Prohibition Constraint
Engineer A was ethically prohibited from complying with his superior's directive to move expeditiously and avoid 'technical hang-ups,' as that directive functioned to suppress his professionally grounded regulatory compliance review.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; NSPE Code Section II.1; Employment Situation Safety Abrogation Prohibition
At the time the superior issued the expedite directive
Engineer A Superior Expediting Directive Implicit Pressure Recognition
Superior Expediting Directive Implicit Pressure Recognition Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that the superior's directive to 'avoid any hang-ups' with respect to technical issues constituted implicit institutional pressure to suppress his professional engineering judgment about Clean Air Act compliance.
Recognition triggered by the superior's directive framing before Engineer A's decision to refuse the permit
Recognizing the 'avoid technical hang-ups' framing as an attempt to characterize legitimate safety concerns as procedural obstacles, and responding by maintaining professional independence rather than complying
Engineer A Superior Expediting Directive Non-Subordination
Superior directed Engineer A to expedite the permit and avoid 'hang-ups'; Engineer A believed the plans were non-compliant with sulphur dioxide emission standards.
Superior Expediting Directive Safety Non-Subordination Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refuse to subordinate his professional technical determination — that the plans were inadequate to meet Clean Air Act standards — to his superior's directive to move expeditiously and avoid technical hang-ups.
Upon receiving the superior's expediting directive and throughout the permit review process
Engineer A Superior Expediting Directive Resistance
Engineer A's superior directed him to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups; Engineer A maintained his professional position that the plans violated environmental law.
Institutional Pressure Framing Non-Legitimization of Safety Override Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to resist his superior's directive to 'move expeditiously' and 'avoid any hang-ups,' recognizing that framing his legitimate Clean Air Act compliance concerns as mere technical obstacles did not diminish their substantive validity, and that compliance with the directive would have constituted an abrogation of his fundamental professional responsibility.
Upon receipt of superior's expediting directive
Engineer A Superior Honest Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation
Engineer A believed outside scrubbers were necessary; his superior believed the fluidized boiler process removing 90% of sulphur dioxide was sufficient. Both positions were professionally grounded.
Ethics reviewing bodies; State engineering registration board
Honest Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation Recognition Obligation
Ethics reviewing bodies were obligated to recognize that Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process met Clean Air Act standards, and that neither engineer's position was inherently unethical — the ethical question turned on whether each acted with integrity and fulfilled professional obligations, not on which technical conclusion was correct.
In any ethics review or adjudication of the case
Engineer A Superior Technical Disagreement Non-Ethical-Violation
Engineer A believed the fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act standards; his superior disagreed and directed issuance of the permit; the Board addressed the ethical dimensions of this technical disagreement.
The Board was obligated to recognize that Engineer A and his superior reached different technical conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process adequately met Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, and that neither engineer's position was inherently unethical — the ethical question turning on whether each acted with integrity and fulfilled professional obligations, not on which technical position was correct.
This case also raises another dimension which involves the role of the state licensing board in determining the ethical conduct of licensees.
Engineer A contacts state engineering registration board before Engineer A refuses to issue the permit
Engineer A ordered to draw up construction permit before Engineer A identifies inadequacies in the plans
Engineer A refuses to issue the permit and submits findings before Department authorizes issuance of the permit
Engineer A's consultation with registration board before Engineer A's refusal to issue permit
Engineer Assesses Plan Inadequacy (Action 2) + Registration Board Warning Issued (Event 3) → Engineer Refuses to Issue Permit (Action 5)
Engineer Dissent Framework — Conscientious Refusal
Professional ethics framework for engineer conscientious refusal of assigned tasks on ethical grounds
Provides the decision framework for Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit on grounds that it would violate regulatory requirements and public safety, distinguishing permissible from obligatory dissent
Engineer Pressure Resistance Applied to Engineer A Against Superior Directive
Employment consequences of ethical refusal
Engineer A resisted his superior's directive to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups, maintaining his professional position that the plans violated Clean Air Act standards — demonstrating that organizational pressure does not constitute ethical justification for non-compliant conduct.
The existence of supervisory pressure to expedite the permit does not constitute ethical justification for issuing a permit the engineer believes in good faith would violate applicable law; the engineer must resist such pressure.
Professional ethics obligations are not subordinated by organizational pressure; Engineer A's resistance was ethically required.
Superior Department Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor -- State environmental protection division superior who directs Engineer A to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups, disagrees with Engineer A's assessment.
Engineer Pressure Resistance Invoked by Engineer A Against Expediting Directive
Engineer A resisted his superior's directive to 'avoid any hang-ups' and move expeditiously, recognizing that the framing of safety concerns as bureaucratic obstacles did not resolve the underlying technical question of whether the permit would violate Clean Air Act standards.
Organizational urgency framing ('move expeditiously,' 'avoid hang-ups') is a form of institutional pressure that engineers must recognize and resist when it is being used to suppress legitimate safety concerns.
The engineer's professional obligation to resist organizational pressure overrides the duty to follow supervisory direction when the direction would require the engineer to certify a permit believed to violate applicable law.
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard — Permit Refusal Context
Professional norms governing engineer duty to escalate public safety concerns and refuse non-compliant certifications
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard
Governs Engineer A's obligation to refuse issuance of the permit and escalate his findings to his superior when he determines the permit would violate air pollution standards, and potentially to notify regulatory or public authorities if the department proceeds
Engineer Refuses to Issue Permit (Action 5) → Department Override Occurs (Event 4) + Department Authorizes Permit Override (Action 6)
Engineer Regulatory Compliance Certification Standard — Air Permit Context
Professional norms governing engineer's obligation not to certify regulatory compliance when technical requirements are not met
Engineer Regulatory Compliance Certification Standard
Establishes that Engineer A cannot ethically issue a construction permit certifying regulatory compliance when he has determined the plans do not meet air pollution standards; issuing the permit would constitute a false certification
Engineer relieved of responsibility for disposal plants (BER 88-6) meets Engineer continuing to work as city engineer/director of public works (BER 88-6)
Engineering Licensure Law — State Registration Requirements
State Engineering Licensure Statute — Scope of Practice and License Revocation Provisions
State engineering registration board; Engineer A
Provides the legal basis under which the state engineering registration board advises Engineer A that preparing a non-compliant permit could result in suspension or revocation of his engineering license
State-specific statute current at time of case
Environmental Law Violation Reporting Obligation Applied to Engineer A
Clean Air Act air pollution standard compliance
Fluidized boiler process technical review
Power plant construction permit application
Regulatory Permit Issuance Integrity Obligation
Engineer A's good-faith belief that the power plant's fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act air pollution standards triggered his obligation to refuse to issue the permit and to report the concern to appropriate authorities — an obligation the Board found he discharged by refusing issuance and consulting the state engineering registration board.
The engineer's domain-specific obligation to refuse to certify activities believed to violate federal environmental law was directly triggered by his good-faith assessment of the power plant plans.
Environmental Law Violation Reporting Obligation
Engineer A is a state environmental engineer ordered to issue a construction permit for a power plant who believes the plans violate Clean Air Act air pollution standards.
The environmental law violation reporting obligation reinforces the permit issuance integrity obligation; both required Engineer A to refuse the permit.
Environmental Law Violation Reporting Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
Manufacturing Facility Power Plant Construction Permit Applicant
Power plant fluidized boiler process permit application
Engineer A refused to issue a permit he believed would violate Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards and submitted his findings formally to his superior, fulfilling the obligation to refuse participation in and report discovered environmental law violations.
In the regulatory permit context, the environmental law violation reporting obligation requires the engineer to refuse to issue the permit and to formally document and report the basis for the refusal — not merely to note concerns informally.
The engineer's good-faith professional judgment that the permit would violate applicable law triggers the reporting obligation regardless of the superior's different technical view.
Environmental Stewardship Invoked by Engineer A in Sulphur Dioxide Emission Assessment
Fluidized boiler process technical design
Engineer A's insistence that outside scrubbers are necessary to adequately reduce sulphur dioxide emissions reflects the environmental stewardship obligation to protect air quality resources that the proposed fluidized boiler process would inadequately protect.
Environmental stewardship in the regulatory permit context requires the engineer to assess whether the proposed technical solution adequately protects air quality, not merely whether it nominally addresses the pollutant of concern.
Environmental Stewardship in Engineering Practice
The engineer's professional judgment that the fluidized boiler process is technically inadequate to meet Clean Air Act standards triggers the environmental stewardship obligation to refuse to certify the permit.
Honest Disagreement Among Qualified Engineers — Engineer A vs. Superior on Fluidized Boiler Process
Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standard compliance
Fluidized boiler process technical adequacy determination
Engineer A and his superior reached different conclusions about whether the fluidized boiler process adequately meets Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide standards — Engineer A believing outside scrubbers are necessary, his superior believing the process removes sufficient sulphur dioxide. This is a legitimate technical disagreement between qualified professionals.
The existence of honest technical disagreement does not resolve the ethical question of whose judgment should prevail in the permit issuance decision; it contextualizes the disagreement as a legitimate professional dispute rather than a case of one party acting in bad faith.
Even where honest technical disagreement exists, the engineer assigned to issue the permit must act on their own professional judgment; the superior's disagreement does not discharge the engineer's professional obligation or license liability.
Honest Disagreement Permissibility Applied to Engineer A vs Superior Technical Dispute
Fluidized boiler process technical assessment
Technical disagreement between regulatory engineer and supervisor
Engineer A and his superior reached different conclusions about whether the power plant's fluidized boiler process plans violated Clean Air Act air pollution standards — a genuine technical disagreement between qualified engineers that the Board treated as a legitimate professional dispute, not an ethical violation by either party.
The existence of a genuine technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior does not make either party's position unethical per se; what matters is that each engineer maintains their honest professional judgment.
The honest disagreement principle legitimizes Engineer A's position as a good-faith professional judgment, while the pressure resistance principle requires him to maintain that judgment against supervisory pressure.
Internal Escalation Exhausted After Department Override
From department's authorization of permit through case publicity and state investigation
Engineer A's exhaustion of internal channels after submitting findings to superior and department authorizing permit anyway
State investigation initiated (external escalation pathway activated)
Department's authorization of permit over Engineer A's documented objection, exhausting the internal escalation pathway
Known-Authority Awareness Discharge Applied to Engineer A External Reporting
Media coverage of Clean Air Act compliance dispute
Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation for Unresolved Public Safety Threats
Because the Clean Air Act compliance dispute had received media coverage and appropriate officials had already begun an investigation, the Board held that Engineer A was not obligated to separately bring the matter to the attention of 'proper authorities' — that obligation was discharged by the existing authority awareness.
The purpose of external reporting is to ensure appropriate authorities can act to protect the public; when confirmed authority awareness already serves that purpose, the formal reporting obligation is discharged and further notification would be a useless act.
Known-Authority Awareness Discharge of External Reporting Obligation
The Board distinguished the present case from BER 88-6 precisely because the issues were publicly known and under investigation, discharging the external reporting obligation that would otherwise have been mandatory.
The reason for our position in BER Case 88-6 was that the engineer's failure to bring the problems to the attention of the 'proper authorities' made it more probable that danger would ultimately result to the public health, safety and welfare. Here, the circumstances are presumably already known to appropriate public officials. To bring the matter to their attention is a useless act.
License Self-Protection Consultation Obligation Applied by Engineer A
Permit issuance decision under supervisory pressure
State engineering registration board consultation
Engineer A proactively consulted the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing a permit he believed violated the Clean Air Act could jeopardize his engineering license — an action the Board found to constitute appropriate conduct consistent with the Code.
When facing a directive that may require violation of professional ethics or applicable law, engineers have an obligation to consult appropriate regulatory bodies to understand the license implications before deciding how to proceed.
State Engineering Registration Board Regulatory Authority
License Self-Protection Consultation Obligation
The consultation was found to be appropriate conduct; it informed Engineer A's decision to refuse the permit and disassociate from further work on the project.
License Self-Protection Consultation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
Engineer A contacted the state engineering registration board to determine whether issuing a permit he believed violated environmental regulations could result in license suspension or revocation — fulfilling the obligation to consult appropriate professional bodies before deciding how to respond to a directive that may require violation of applicable law.
The consultation with the registration board served two functions: it provided Engineer A with information about the professional consequences of compliance with the directive, and it confirmed that the permit issuance function carries personal professional liability that cannot be transferred to the superior through supervisory direction.
The obligation to consult the registration board when facing potential license jeopardy overrides any concern about disclosing employer information, because the engineer's professional standing is at stake.
Loyalty Bounded by Ethics — Engineer A's Obligation to Superior Within Ethical Limits
Engineer A owed loyalty to his employer (the state environmental protection division) and his superior, but that loyalty was bounded by his professional ethics and public welfare obligations — he could not comply with the directive to issue a permit he believed would violate applicable law.
Loyalty in the public agency engineering context does not extend to compliance with directives that would require the engineer to certify regulatory compliance he does not believe exists; the bounds of loyalty are defined by professional ethics and applicable law.
Public welfare paramount and environmental law violation reporting obligations override the duty of loyalty when compliance with supervisory direction would require the engineer to certify a permit believed to violate applicable law.
Loyalty Bounded by Public Safety Applied to Engineer A
Engineer A owed loyalty to his state agency employer and superior, but that loyalty was bounded by his paramount public safety obligation and his good-faith belief that the permit would violate the Clean Air Act — requiring him to refuse the directive rather than comply.
Loyalty to employer is a legitimate professional value but is subordinate to the paramount public safety obligation; when the two conflict, the public safety obligation prevails.
State environmental protection division superior who directs Engineer A to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups.
The bounded character of loyalty means Engineer A's refusal of his superior's directive was not a breach of loyalty but rather a proper exercise of bounded loyalty.
{'facility_type': 'Manufacturing facility with proposed power plant', 'proposed_compliance_method': 'Limestone mixed with coal in fluidized boiler process', 'regulatory_context': '1990 Clean Air Act, state air pollution standards'}
Manufacturing facility seeking a state construction permit for a power plant whose proposed technical plans (fluidized boiler process) are the subject of Engineer A's regulatory compliance objection regarding sulphur dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act
{'type': 'permit_applicant_reviewed_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Environmental Permit Issuing Regulatory Engineer'}
{'type': 'permit_granted_by', 'target': 'Superior Department Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor'}
Power Plant Construction Permit Applicant
construction of a power plant at a manufacturing facility
plans which involve limestone mixed with coal in a fluidized boiler process would remove 90% of the sulphur dioxide
Media coverage and state investigation before BER Discussion/Analysis
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Fundamental Canon I.1
Board of Ethical Review in evaluating Engineer A's conduct
Cited as the foundational obligation requiring engineers to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Rule of Practice II.1.a
Board of Ethical Review in affirming Engineer A's conduct
Cited as the provision with which Engineer A's consultation of the state licensing board is consistent, affirming the appropriateness of seeking guidance on whether permit approval would violate the state engineering registration law
Engineer A; ethics reviewers analyzing the case
Provides the primary normative framework governing Engineer A's obligation to hold public safety paramount, refuse to issue a non-compliant permit, and escalate findings to his superior — particularly Fundamental Canon I (public safety, health, and welfare) and Rules of Practice governing regulatory compliance
Non-Engineer Supervisor Authority Limitation Standard — Regulatory Permit Context
Professional norms limiting superior authority to override licensed engineer's technical and regulatory compliance judgments
Non-Engineer Supervisor Authority Limitation Standard
Governs the limits of Engineer A's superior's authority to order expeditious permit issuance and override Engineer A's technical finding that the permit violates air pollution standards; the superior's directive to 'avoid any hang-ups' does not override the engineer's professional obligation
Non-Safety Fund Waste Reporting Discretion (BER 82-5 Precedent)
From engineer's documentation of excessive costs through employer rejection of reports
Non-Safety Public Fund Waste Reporting Discretion State
Defense industry engineer in BER Case 82-5 precedent
Engineer's decision on whether to pursue public disclosure
The Board noted that the case did not involve a danger to the public health or safety, but related to a claim of unsatisfactory plans and the unjustified expenditure of public funds
the ethical duty or right of the engineer becomes a matter of personal conscience
Employer's rejection of engineer's reports on excessive contractor costs and time delays
Non-Subordination of Public Safety to Institutional Bargaining Applied to Engineer A's Superior
State environmental protection division permit issuance process
Supervisory override of subordinate engineer's professional judgment
Engineer A's superior's directive to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups constituted an attempt to use institutional authority to override Engineer A's public safety determination — a form of institutional bargaining that the principle prohibits.
Public safety standards in the permit-issuance context cannot be treated as negotiable in response to institutional pressure for expedience; the superior's directive was ethically impermissible.
Non-Subordination of Public Safety Obligation to Political or Budgetary Bargaining
The public safety obligation cannot be subordinated to institutional pressure for expedience; Engineer A's refusal was correct and the superior's directive was impermissible.
Non-Subordination of Public Safety to Political or Budgetary Bargaining — Applied to Superior's Expediting Directive
The superior's directive to 'move expeditiously' and 'avoid any hang-ups' in a regulatory permit context reflects the type of institutional pressure — likely driven by economic or political considerations related to the manufacturing facility — that engineers in public agency roles must not allow to compromise public safety standards.
In a regulatory permit context, expediting pressure that causes engineers to overlook genuine safety concerns is functionally equivalent to allowing political or economic considerations to compromise public safety standards, regardless of how the pressure is framed.
Public safety standards are non-negotiable constraints; the engineer's obligation to apply them cannot be overridden by institutional expediting pressure.
Professional Accountability Applied to Engineer A Accepting Employment Consequences
Disassociation from further project work
Engineer A accepted the professional and employment consequences of refusing to issue the permit and disassociating from further work on the project, demonstrating professional accountability by taking responsibility for his ethical decision rather than rationalizing compliance with his superior's directive.
Professional accountability requires engineers to own the consequences of their ethical choices; Engineer A's willingness to accept the professional consequences of his refusal is itself an expression of professional accountability.
Professional accountability requires accepting employment consequences rather than rationalizing ethical violations; Engineer A's conduct exemplified this principle.
Professional Accountability Invoked by Engineer A Through Board Consultation and Formal Refusal
Engineer A demonstrated professional accountability by consulting the state engineering registration board to understand the license implications of issuing a potentially non-compliant permit, and by formally submitting his findings to his superior upon refusal — taking responsibility for his professional judgment and its consequences.
Professional accountability in this context requires not merely making the right decision but ensuring that the decision is informed (through board consultation), documented (through formal submission of findings), and owned (by accepting the professional and employment consequences).
Professional accountability requires accepting the consequences of ethical decisions; the possibility of license jeopardy or employment consequences does not excuse the engineer from making the professionally correct decision.
Public Authorities Already Investigating the Permit Concern
From the point media coverage began and officials initiated investigation through resolution
the case involves facts which have received coverage in the media
Public Authority Already Investigating Safety Concern State
State of regulatory investigation into the permit dispute
Conclusion of the regulatory investigation
To bring the matter to their attention is a useless act
such officials are already aware of the situation and have begun an investigation
we do not believe it is incumbent upon Engineer A to bring this issue to the attention of the 'proper authorities'
Media coverage of the permit dispute prompting official investigation
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
State environmental protection division permit review function
Engineer A, as a state environmental protection division engineer with specific assigned responsibility to review and issue construction permits, bore a heightened ethical obligation — beyond that of a private consulting engineer — to pursue his public safety concerns through all available institutional channels, including formal refusal and submission of findings to his superior.
The public agency regulatory context amplifies the baseline public safety obligation: Engineer A was not merely a professional with safety concerns but the public's designated technical representative in the permit review process, making his refusal both a professional and a public trust obligation.
Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation
The heightened public trust obligation reinforces rather than conflicts with the professional obligation to refuse non-compliant permits; both point in the same direction.
Public Employee Heightened Obligation Applied via BER 88-6 Precedent
City engineer/director of public works role
Escalation to appropriate state authorities
Whistleblowing as Personal Conscience Right Without Mandatory Duty Principle
The Board analogized Engineer A's situation to BER 88-6, where the city engineer's public employment role created a heightened obligation to escalate sewage overflow concerns to state authorities — establishing that Engineer A's role as a state regulatory permit engineer similarly creates a heightened obligation to maintain his refusal and pursue proper channels.
Public agency engineers with specific regulatory responsibility bear a heightened obligation to pursue safety concerns through all available channels; inaction constitutes accessory liability to ongoing violations.
we believe the situation involved in this case is in many ways similar to the situation involved in BER Case 88-6.
The heightened public employment obligation overrides the personal conscience characterization; both BER 88-6 and the present case involve mandatory duties, not mere personal conscience rights.
In BER Case 88-6 , an engineer was employed as the city engineer/director of public works with responsibility for disposal plants and beds and reported to a city administrator.
we believe the situation involved in this case is in many ways similar to the situation involved in BER Case 88-6 . This, unlike BER Case 82-5 did not involve a matter of personal conscience, but rather a matter which had a direct impact upon the public health and safety.
Public Media Scrutiny and State Investigation Active
From case receiving widespread publicity through ongoing state investigation
Active state investigation and public media scrutiny of the permit issuance decision
Widespread news media publicity and initiation of state investigation into the permit issuance
Public Safety Risk from SO2 Emissions Without Adequate Scrubbing
From Engineer A's identification of inadequacy through ongoing state investigation
Air quality and public health risk from potential issuance of permit without adequate SO2 emission controls
Engineer A's determination that plans without outside scrubbers would violate Clean Air Act SO2 standards
Public Safety at Risk from Non-Compliant Permit
From identification of the compliance deficiency through resolution of the regulatory investigation
Engineers have a fundamental obligation to hold paramount the safety, health and welfare of the public
General public affected by the permit under dispute
Regulatory investigation conclusion and corrective action
this case also involves a question of public health and welfare
Engineer A's determination that the permit does not meet applicable regulatory requirements
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked by Engineer A in Permit Refusal
Power plant construction permit for fluidized boiler process
Engineer A refused to issue a construction permit he believed would violate Clean Air Act sulphur dioxide emission standards, placing public health above his superior's directive to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups.
In the regulatory permit context, public welfare paramount requires the engineer to refuse to certify regulatory compliance when the engineer's professional judgment concludes that the proposed technical solution is inadequate to protect public health from air pollution.
Public welfare paramount overrides the duty to follow supervisory direction when compliance would require the engineer to certify a permit he believes violates applicable environmental law protecting public health.
Would it have been ethical for Engineer A to withdraw from further work in this case?
Given that the technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior involves a genuine dispute about whether the fluidized boiler process meets Clean Air Act standards, at what point does an honest technical disagreement become an ethical violation requiring refusal rather than deference to supervisory judgment?
After the department overrode Engineer A's refusal and authorized the permit, did Engineer A have an affirmative ethical obligation to escalate his concerns to external authorities such as the EPA or state environmental regulators, or was such escalation merely a permissible personal conscience decision?
Does the state engineering registration board's advisory that Engineer A's license could be suspended or revoked for issuing a non-compliant permit create an independent ethical obligation to refuse, or does it merely reinforce a pre-existing professional duty grounded in public safety?
What ethical responsibility, if any, does Engineer A's superior bear as a non-engineer supervisor who overrode a licensed engineer's professional judgment on a matter of regulatory compliance and public health, and does the NSPE Code of Ethics address the obligations of engineers who witness such institutional overrides by non-engineer authorities?
Would it have been ethical for Engineer A to issue the permit?
Does the principle of Honest Disagreement Among Qualified Engineers conflict with the principle of Public Welfare Paramount when Engineer A's superior — also presumably technically qualified — holds a different but professionally defensible view about whether the fluidized boiler process satisfies Clean Air Act SO2 requirements? At what threshold of uncertainty does public welfare override deference to a superior's honest technical judgment?
Does the principle of Loyalty Bounded by Ethics — Engineer A's Obligation to Superior Within Ethical Limits conflict with the principle of Whistleblowing as Personal Conscience Right when Engineer A considers escalating beyond his department after the permit override? Specifically, does bounded loyalty prohibit active external disclosure, or does it merely permit it as a matter of personal conscience once internal channels are exhausted?
Does the principle of Professional Accountability — requiring Engineer A to accept employment consequences for his refusal — conflict with the principle of Public Employee Engineer Heightened Public Safety Obligation, which may demand continued active engagement rather than withdrawal, when Engineer A faces potential termination or retaliation for refusing to issue the permit?
Does the principle of License Self-Protection Consultation Obligation conflict with the principle of Non-Subordination of Public Safety to Institutional Bargaining when Engineer A's primary motivation for consulting the state registration board could be interpreted as self-interested license preservation rather than public welfare advocacy — and does the ethical weight of his refusal diminish if self-protection rather than public safety was the dominant motivating principle?
Was it ethical for Engineer A to refuse to issue the permit?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill a categorical duty to refuse the permit regardless of personal consequences, given that issuing it would have constituted a direct violation of the 1990 Clean Air Act and NSPE Code Section II.1.b requiring approval only of documents conforming to applicable standards?
From a consequentialist perspective, did Engineer A's refusal to issue the permit and formal submission of findings to his superior produce the best achievable outcome for public welfare, given that the department ultimately authorized the permit anyway and the matter escalated to state investigation and media scrutiny?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer A demonstrate the professional virtues of courage, integrity, and prudence by consulting the state engineering registration board, formally documenting his findings, and refusing to issue the permit under superior pressure, even at risk of employment jeopardy and license scrutiny?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A's withdrawal option violate a duty of non-abandonment toward the public, given that withdrawal would have left no qualified engineering voice opposing the non-compliant permit within the regulatory process, effectively making Engineer A complicit through inaction in the manner condemned in BER Case 88-6?
If Engineer A had issued the permit under superior pressure while privately disagreeing with its adequacy, would that act of compliance have constituted an abrogation of fundamental engineering responsibility under the NSPE Code, and would the state engineering registration board's advisory about license revocation risk have materialized into actual disciplinary proceedings?
If Engineer A had withdrawn from the case entirely rather than refusing to issue the permit and submitting formal findings, would the department's override of the permit decision have faced the same public scrutiny and state investigation, or would the absence of Engineer A's documented dissent have allowed the non-compliant permit to proceed without triggering external accountability mechanisms?
If Engineer A had escalated his technical concerns directly to state environmental authorities or the media before exhausting internal channels with his superior, would that premature external disclosure have been ethically justified under the NSPE Code, or would it have constituted a breach of the bounded loyalty obligation to his employer that the Board's analysis implicitly preserves?
If the technical disagreement between Engineer A and his superior about whether the fluidized boiler process adequately removes sulphur dioxide had been resolved by an independent third-party engineering review confirming the superior's position, would Engineer A have been ethically obligated to issue the permit, and how would that outcome reframe the Board's analysis of honest disagreement among qualified engineers?
Regulatory Permit Issuance Integrity Obligation Applied to Engineer A
Clean Air Act air pollution standard compliance determination
Engineer A, as the state environmental engineer assigned to issue the construction permit, bore a non-delegable obligation to certify only that the power plant plans met Clean Air Act requirements as determined by his own professional judgment — and was required to refuse to issue the permit he believed in good faith would violate those standards, regardless of his superior's directive.
The permit-issuing engineer's professional certification is the public's primary protection against regulatory violations; supervisory override of that certification is impermissible when the engineer holds a good-faith belief of non-compliance.
The non-delegable permit certification obligation overrides supervisory direction; Engineer A was required to refuse issuance and was ethically correct to do so.
Superior Department Permit-Overriding Government Supervisor -- State environmental protection division superior who directs Engineer A to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups.
Regulatory Permit Issuance Integrity Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
Engineer A's refusal to issue the construction permit reflects the principle that the permit issuance function is a professional certification act — not a ministerial administrative act — that cannot be overridden by non-technical supervisory direction, because the engineer's professional judgment about regulatory compliance is the substantive content of the certification.
The state engineering registration board's confirmation that issuing a non-compliant permit could result in license suspension or revocation confirms that permit issuance is a professional certification act carrying personal professional liability — not a ministerial act that can be delegated to supervisory authority.
The non-delegable character of the professional certification function means that the superior's disagreement does not discharge the engineer's professional obligation or eliminate the engineer's personal license liability for issuing a permit believed to be non-compliant.
State Engineering Registration Board Advisory on Permit Compliance
State Engineering Registration Board Informal Advisory — Licensure Risk from Non-Compliant Permit Issuance
Engineer A consults the state registration board and receives an advisory that issuing a permit violating environmental regulations could result in suspension or revocation of his engineering license, reinforcing his ethical and professional obligation to refuse
Informal oral/written advisory (case-specific)
{'authority_type': 'Professional licensure regulatory body', 'advisory_function': 'Provided guidance on license risk based on limited information'}
State engineering registration board consulted by Engineer A regarding potential license jeopardy if he prepares a permit that violates environmental regulations; informs Engineer A that suspension or revocation of his license is a possibility
{'type': 'consulted_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Environmental Permit Issuing Regulatory Engineer'}
{'employer': 'State environmental protection division', 'authority': 'Supervisory authority over permit issuance', 'technical_position': 'Believes fluidized boiler process meets regulatory requirements'}
State environmental protection division superior who directs Engineer A to expedite the permit and avoid technical hang-ups, disagrees with Engineer A's technical assessment, and ultimately authorizes the department to issue the permit despite Engineer A's documented objections
{'type': 'authorized_permit_for', 'target': 'Manufacturing Facility Power Plant Construction Permit Applicant'}
{'type': 'supervisor_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Environmental Permit Issuing Regulatory Engineer'}
Superior Department Permit-Overriding Supervisor Air Pollution Technical Assessment
The superior possessed technical capability to assess the fluidized boiler limestone process against Clean Air Act SO2 standards, reaching the different — though honest — professional conclusion that the process would remove 90% of sulphur dioxide and meet regulatory requirements.
Applied in the superior's review of the manufacturing facility's power plant construction permit application
Reaching the technical conclusion that the fluidized boiler process was adequate for Clean Air Act compliance, disagreeing with Engineer A's assessment that external scrubbers were required
Superior Endorses Fluidized Boiler Process
Superior Endorses Fluidized Boiler Process (Action 3) → Engineer Consults Registration Board (Action 4)
Superior Expedite Directive Suppressing Technical Review
From issuance of superior's directive through Engineer A's refusal to issue permit
Engineer A's relationship with superior regarding permit processing
Engineer A's documented refusal and submission of findings to superior
Superior's instruction to move expeditiously and avoid technical 'hang-ups'
Superior Orders Expedited Permit (Action 1) → Plan Inadequacy Discovered (Event 2)
Superior's instruction to move expeditiously before Engineer A's identification of inadequacies
Supervisor-Directed Non-Compliant Permit Authorization Over Engineer Objection
From department's authorization of permit through ongoing state investigation
Supervisor-Directed Regulatory Permit Non-Compliance Issuance State
Department's authorization of permit after Engineer A's documented refusal and submission of findings
Not resolved within case facts; under state investigation
Department's decision to authorize permit issuance despite Engineer A's documented compliance findings and refusal
Technical Disagreement on SO2 Emission Control Regulatory Adequacy
From Engineer A's assessment of the plans through department's authorization of the permit
Technical Dispute Between Engineer and Superior on Regulatory Compliance Method State
Disagreement between Engineer A and superior on whether fluidized boiler process meets Clean Air Act SO2 requirements
Department's authorization of permit (resolving administratively but not technically)
Engineer A's determination that outside scrubbers are necessary; superior's contrary view that fluidized boiler process is sufficient
Whistleblower Employment Jeopardy for Engineer A
From Engineer A's refusal to issue permit through ongoing state investigation
Engineer A's employment security following refusal to issue permit and submission of findings
Engineer A's documented refusal to issue permit and submission of findings to superior, contrary to organizational directive
Whistleblowing Personal Conscience Principle Applied to BER 82-5 Precedent
Defense industry sub-contractor cost and delay reporting
Distinction between personal conscience matters and mandatory public safety duties
In BER 82-5, the engineer's concern about excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors did not involve direct public health/safety danger, so the Board held that further advocacy after employer rejection was a matter of personal conscience, not mandatory ethical duty — distinguishing it from the present case.
The BER 82-5 precedent establishes that the mandatory/permissive distinction in whistleblowing is calibrated by whether the concern involves direct public health/safety; the present Engineer A case crosses into mandatory territory because it directly affects public health.
The Board distinguished BER 82-5 from the present case precisely because the present case involves direct public health and safety impact, converting the personal conscience right into a mandatory obligation.
In BER Case 82-5 , where an engineer employed by a large defense industry firm documented and reported to his employer excessive costs and time delays by sub-contractors, the Board ruled that the engineer did not have an ethical obligation to continue his efforts to secure a change in the policy after his employer rejected his reports, or to report his concerns to proper authority, but has an ethical right to do so as a matter of personal conscience.
Whistleblowing as Personal Conscience Right — Engineer A's Post-Refusal Advocacy Decision
State authorities investigating the case
Having discharged his mandatory obligation by refusing to issue the permit and submitting his findings to his superior, Engineer A's decision about whether to engage in further external public advocacy — including participation in media coverage or state authority investigation — became a matter of personal conscience rather than mandatory professional duty.
The mandatory floor of Engineer A's obligation was met by internal refusal and formal reporting; the case's receipt of widespread media publicity and state authority investigation represents the discretionary ceiling of further public advocacy, which the principle permits but does not require.
The principle distinguishes between the mandatory minimum (refusal and internal reporting, which Engineer A discharged) and the discretionary maximum (external public advocacy), leaving the latter to personal conscience.
Widespread media coverage before State authorities investigation