In BER Case 17-7, the BER determined that an Engineer had an obligation to further report the situation to the appropriate the local, state, and/or federal authorities to ensure that relevant engineering standards were consistent with the public health, safety, and welfare.
BER in evaluating Engineer A's reporting obligations
Cited as precedent establishing that engineers have an obligation to report violations to local, state, and/or federal authorities to ensure engineering standards are consistent with public health, safety, and welfare, even when the violation involves a proposed ordinance change
CausalLink_Continue Practice Post-Stroke
CausalLink_Cooperate With Improper Arrang
CausalLink_Delegate Design Beyond Supervi
CausalLink_Privately Confront Engineer B
CausalLink_Retain Engineer R to Redesign
Civil Engineering Firm Owner Client Instance
{'context': 'Office facility construction project with structural failure', 'relationship': 'Client who retained structural engineering services ultimately reviewed by Engineer R'}
The owner of the civil engineering and surveying firm (Engineer B's firm context) whose project triggered the structural failure review and whose interests are implicated in the impaired-practice arrangement, bearing authority over project decisions and obligations to respond appropriately when design failures occur.
{'type': 'involved_party', 'target': 'Engineer R'}
{'type': 'retained', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
Engineer B's design and construction documents
Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint - Engineer A Friendship vs. Reporting
Engineer A explicitly chose personal friendship and compassion over the public safety reporting obligation, declining to report Engineer B to the State Board despite knowing of the impaired practice and resulting structural failure.
Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
When Engineer A's personal loyalty and friendship to Engineer B conflicted with his obligation to protect public safety by reporting Engineer B's impaired practice to the State Board, the public safety obligation took precedence, constraining Engineer A from allowing friendship to prevent the required report.
Because of their long friendship and consideration of Engineer B's impairment, Engineer A did not report Engineer B to the State Board.
From Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's impaired practice and the structural failure
Compassionate Reporting Pathway - Engineer A Private Confrontation Without Reporting
Engineer A met privately with Engineer B as a professional courtesy and confronted him with the faulty design, but then chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board, treating the private confrontation as sufficient discharge of any reporting obligation.
Compassionate Reporting Pathway Constraint
Engineer A's private confrontation with Engineer B — while consistent with professional courtesy — did not discharge Engineer A's mandatory reporting obligation to the State Board; the compassionate pathway of private discussion was permissible as a supplement to, but not a substitute for, formal reporting, and Engineer A was prohibited from using friendship and compassion as justification for indefinite non-reporting.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard
As a professional courtesy, and because he considered Engineer B a personal friend, Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design, including Engineer R's report.
From the time of Engineer A's private meeting with Engineer B onward
Compassionate Reporting Pathway Constraint - Engineer A Cooperative Disclosure
Engineer A had access to a cooperative, private disclosure pathway — including a confidential discussion with the State Board involving Engineer B's knowledge and approval — that would have fulfilled the reporting obligation while respecting the friendship, but Engineer A did not pursue this pathway.
Engineer A was permitted to fulfill the mandatory reporting obligation through a compassionate pathway — including privately discussing the matter with the State Board with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, and cooperating with the Board to identify qualified temporary substitutes such as Engineer R — provided that such compassionate framing resulted in actual Board notification and did not suppress or indefinitely defer the required report.
NSPE Code Sections III.7, II.1.f; NSPE Code Section III.7 (non-malicious injury provision)
By this view and with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, Engineer A could have privately discussed the matter with proper authorities at the State Board.
From the time Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice through the reporting decision
Further, under such a scenario, the Board might exercise discretion relative to formal sanction (or not) of Engineer B.
Working together, the parties might cooperatively identify a practice alternative consistent with ethical and legal engineering consulting work, say, hiring a qualified temporary engineer – possibly Engineer R – until Engineer B was able to return to full duty.
Compassionate Reporting Pathway Constraint - Engineer A Cooperative Disclosure Option
Engineer A had access to a cooperative, private disclosure pathway involving Engineer B's knowledge and potential cooperation with the State Board, which could have honored the friendship while still fulfilling the mandatory reporting obligation — but Engineer A chose non-reporting entirely rather than pursuing this pathway.
While Engineer A was obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board, the manner of reporting could be shaped by compassion — including privately discussing the matter with Engineer B and cooperating with the Board to identify practice alternatives such as temporary qualified substitution — provided that such compassionate framing did not delay, suppress, or substitute for the required report.
From discovery of Engineer B's impaired practice through the reporting process
Being the only licensed professional engineer in his firm, for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office.
Competence Constraint - Engineer B Post-Stroke Structural Design Capacity
Engineer B's stroke materially impaired his professional capacity, yet he continued to seal structural engineering documents produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review.
Engineer B's post-stroke cognitive impairment constituted a competence constraint that limited his ability to exercise genuine responsible charge over structural engineering work, prohibiting him from continuing to practice structural engineering and seal documents until his competence was restored to the level required for independent professional practice.
Professional Competence Standard - Engineer B Post-Stroke Practice; NSPE Code of Ethics; State Engineering Practice Act
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior.
From the time of Engineer B's stroke through the period of continued practice
Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review.
Engineer R's review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details
Competence Constraint - Engineer B Post-Stroke Structural Practice
Engineer B suffered a stroke that materially impaired his cognitive and professional functioning, yet continued to operate his structural engineering firm and affix his seal to drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review.
Engineer B's post-stroke cognitive impairment constituted a competence boundary that prohibited him from continuing to practice structural engineering, as his impairment rendered him unable to adequately direct and review engineering designs and drawings being prepared under his signature and seal.
NSPE Code Section II.2; Professional Competence Standard; State Engineering Practice Act
Engineer B suffered a stroke and was unable to adequately direct and review engineering designs and drawings being prepared under his signature and seal.
The BER has not previously examined competence as it relates to mental health; however, the facts in this case make the determination of [non]competence straightforward.
It was unethical for Engineer A to not report Engineer B, in spite of the fact that Engineer A and Engineer B were friends.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A's failure to report was unethical, Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B — while compassionate in intent — itself carried an ethically problematic dimension. By alerting Engineer B to the findings of Engineer R's review without simultaneously triggering any formal corrective mechanism, Engineer A effectively gave Engineer B advance notice of potential regulatory scrutiny while allowing the impaired practice to continue unabated. This private confrontation did not suspend Engineer B's ability to seal additional drawings, did not protect future clients or the public from Engineer B's ongoing impaired practice, and did not initiate any supervised practice management alternative. The compassionate impulse underlying the private meeting, though understandable, cannot substitute for the formal reporting obligation, and in practical effect it extended the window of public risk rather than closing it. Friendship-based deference, however sincere, does not satisfy the paramount duty to protect public safety.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted unethically by not reporting Engineer B should be extended to recognize that Engineer A bore an independent, antecedent ethical responsibility arising from the retention decision itself. Engineer A retained Engineer B on the basis of personal friendship rather than on the basis of a rigorous, contemporaneous assessment of Engineer B's current professional competence and firm capacity. Had Engineer A conducted even a basic pre-retention due diligence inquiry — such as verifying Engineer B's recent project history, current professional standing, and the staffing capacity of his firm — there is a reasonable probability that warning signs of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment would have surfaced before any design work began. The failure to perform such an assessment is not merely a missed opportunity; it reflects a lapse in the professional judgment expected of an engineer who is also a client retaining a structural engineer for a significant construction project. The ethical obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public applies not only after a failure has occurred but prospectively, at the point of engagement.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer B acted unethically by continuing impaired practice should be extended to address the structural role played by Engineer B's wife in enabling that continuation. By assuming management of the firm with full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and his resulting incapacity to exercise responsible charge, Engineer B's wife became an active participant in a scheme that allowed impaired, effectively unsupervised engineering practice to persist. While Engineer B's wife is not a licensed engineer and therefore cannot be held to the same professional code obligations, her conduct raises a distinct ethical concern: she provided the organizational infrastructure — business management, client-facing continuity, and operational cover — that made it possible for Engineer B to continue sealing drawings he could not meaningfully review. This enabling role materially extended the duration and scope of the public safety risk. The Board's analysis, focused on Engineer B's individual ethical violations, does not fully account for the systemic nature of the arrangement, in which multiple actors each contributed an essential element to the continuation of impaired practice.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer B's continued practice was unethical should be further extended to address the sign-and-seal conduct specifically. Engineer B's act of affixing his professional seal to drawings he had not meaningfully reviewed is not merely a procedural irregularity — it is a substantive ethical violation independent of his post-stroke impairment. The professional seal is a representation to the public, to building officials, and to contractors that the licensed engineer has exercised responsible charge over the work. By sealing Engineer Intern C's drawings with little to no review, Engineer B converted his seal from a mark of professional accountability into an instrument of deception. This conduct violated the sign-and-seal standard not only technically but in its fundamental purpose. Financial pressure, however genuine, does not constitute a mitigating factor that modifies this obligation, because the harm that flows from falsely sealed documents — as demonstrated by the actual structural failure — falls on third parties who had no role in and no knowledge of Engineer B's financial circumstances.
The Board's implicit conclusion that Engineer A was obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board should be extended to clarify that this obligation was not contingent on the severity of the harm already realized. The reporting obligation under the Code arises upon acquiring knowledge of a violation, not upon confirmation that harm has already materialized. Engineer A possessed sufficient knowledge to trigger the reporting obligation at the moment he observed the 'odd' structural bracing and retained Engineer R — and certainly no later than the moment Engineer B disclosed his stroke and the nature of the firm's operating arrangement at their private meeting. The fact that a structural failure had already occurred does not transform the reporting obligation into a retrospective one; rather, it underscores that the obligation existed earlier and that its non-fulfillment contributed to the continuation of a practice arrangement that posed ongoing risk to future occupants of the unbuilt portions of the structure. Reporting at the earliest point of knowledge, rather than after private confrontation, would have been the ethically correct course.
The Board's implicit conclusion that Engineer R was independently obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board should be extended to address the nature and basis of that obligation. Engineer R's reporting duty is not derivative of Engineer A's duty, nor is it contingent on Engineer A's failure to act. Engineer R acquired direct, first-hand professional knowledge of serious structural design errors and omissions through a formal independent engineering review — knowledge that, standing alone, was sufficient to trigger the reporting obligation under the Code. Moreover, Engineer R's status as an independent third-party reviewer, retained precisely because of his professional expertise and standing, reinforces rather than diminishes this obligation: Engineer R's professional judgment was the instrument by which the violations were formally identified and documented. The concern that reporting might injure Engineer B's professional reputation does not constitute a valid countervailing consideration in this context, because the reporting obligation is compelled by direct professional knowledge of actual violations, not by malice or competitive interest. Engineer R's duty to report is therefore non-delegable and independent.
The Board's conclusions, taken together, do not fully address the ethical position of Engineer Intern C, whose conduct warrants independent analysis. Engineer Intern C was not a passive participant in the arrangement: with full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and resulting incapacity, Intern C actively performed substantive structural design work, produced construction drawings, and allowed those drawings to be sealed by an engineer who was providing little to no review. This conduct implicates at least two independent ethical concerns. First, Intern C was performing structural engineering design work beyond the scope of competence reasonably attributable to a graduate engineer with approximately two years of experience and no licensure, which raises questions about whether Intern C's participation itself constituted a form of unlicensed engineering practice. Second, Intern C's knowing cooperation with an arrangement designed to circumvent the responsible charge requirement — an arrangement Intern C understood was producing drawings that would be falsely sealed — placed Intern C in the position of aiding and abetting a violation of the engineering practice act. The fact that Intern C was directed to perform this work by a nominally supervising licensed engineer does not extinguish Intern C's independent ethical culpability, because the Code's obligations are not suspended by employment hierarchy when the intern possesses actual knowledge that the supervisory arrangement is fraudulent.
Across all of the Board's conclusions, a systemic pattern emerges that the Board's case-by-case analysis does not fully capture: the structural failure was not the product of a single actor's lapse but of a coordinated, multi-party arrangement in which each participant contributed an essential enabling element. Engineer B provided the seal and the licensed identity; Engineer B's wife provided the operational and managerial infrastructure; Engineer Intern C provided the technical labor; and Engineer A, by choosing private confrontation over formal reporting, provided the continued absence of regulatory scrutiny. Each actor's individual ethical failure was a necessary condition for the continuation of the arrangement, and the harm that resulted — an actual structural failure and ongoing risk to future occupants — was the foreseeable consequence of the arrangement as a whole. This systemic dimension suggests that the ethical analysis should not be confined to assessing each actor's individual culpability in isolation, but should also recognize that the Code's provisions — particularly the obligations to hold paramount public safety, to report known violations, and not to aid unlicensed practice — function as a coordinated system of safeguards, any one of which, if honored, would have been sufficient to interrupt the chain of events leading to the failure.
The role of Engineer B's wife as non-engineer firm manager represents an ethical and legal dimension the Board acknowledged but did not fully develop. By assuming management of the firm with full knowledge of her husband's impairment and the delegation arrangement with Engineer Intern C, Engineer B's wife became an active participant in a structure designed to perpetuate the appearance of licensed engineering practice. While she is not subject to the NSPE Code of Ethics as a non-engineer, her conduct implicates state engineering practice act provisions that prohibit non-engineers from managing or controlling the practice of engineering in ways that circumvent licensure requirements. More significantly, her assumption of management did not merely accommodate Engineer B's medical condition — it enabled the continuation of the unlawful delegation arrangement. The ethical analysis of Engineer B's violations is incomplete without recognizing that the concealment architecture he constructed required her active cooperation to function. This raises the question of whether Engineer B's wife bears independent civil or regulatory liability under state law, even if she falls outside the scope of professional ethics codes.
A consequentialist analysis of the entire fact pattern reveals that the harm produced in this case was not merely the result of Engineer B's individual impairment, but of a systemic failure in which every actor who had knowledge of the improper arrangement — Engineer B, Engineer Intern C, and Engineer B's wife — chose concealment over disclosure, and the one external actor with knowledge — Engineer A — chose private confrontation over formal reporting. The structural failure was therefore not an unforeseeable accident but a predictable outcome of compounding ethical failures across multiple parties. This systemic dimension has practical implications for how the Board's conclusions should be read: the obligation to report is not merely a rule-following exercise but a structural safeguard that exists precisely because individual actors with conflicting interests — financial survival, personal loyalty, power asymmetry — cannot be relied upon to self-correct. Engineer A's reporting obligation was the last external check available in a system where all internal checks had already failed, which is why the Board correctly treated it as non-negotiable despite the sympathetic circumstances.
It was unethical for Engineer B to continue work in an impaired state in which he could not competently perform engineering design, could not guide and direct his subordinates, or properly review their designs or drawings.
In response to Q101: Engineer A bore a partial but real ethical responsibility for the structural failure by retaining Engineer B on the basis of personal friendship without conducting any independent verification of Engineer B's current competence, professional standing, or firm capacity before the project began. The NSPE Code requires engineers to perform services only in areas of their competence, and by extension, a client-engineer who retains a structural consultant carries an implicit due diligence obligation to confirm that the retained engineer is presently capable of performing the contracted work. Had Engineer A verified Engineer B's recent project history, current firm staffing, or professional standing with the State Board, warning signs of post-stroke impairment or reduced capacity might have surfaced before any design work was produced. The failure to perform even a minimal pre-retention competence check — substituting friendship for professional judgment — contributed to the conditions that made the structural failure possible. This does not transfer Engineer B's primary ethical culpability to Engineer A, but it does establish that Engineer A's own professional obligations were implicated from the moment of retention, not merely after the failure was discovered.
In response to Q102: Engineer B's wife incurred a meaningful, if not formally codified, ethical obligation by assuming management of the firm with full knowledge of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment. Although she is not a licensed engineer and therefore not directly bound by the NSPE Code of Ethics, she functioned as the operational enabler of a practice arrangement that posed a direct and ongoing risk to public safety. By actively managing the business — coordinating work flow, client relationships, and firm operations — while knowing that Engineer B could not competently review designs and that Engineer Intern C was performing unsupervised structural work, she became a material participant in the continuation of impaired practice. Her conduct is most accurately characterized as aiding and facilitating the unlawful practice of engineering, even if she herself was not practicing engineering. The ethical framework that prohibits engineers from aiding or abetting unlawful practice reflects a broader public safety norm that applies with moral force to any person who knowingly enables such practice, regardless of licensure status. Her actions extended the period of public risk and contributed directly to the conditions that produced the structural failure.
In response to Q103: Engineer Intern C's ethical obligation shifted from deference to affirmative refusal at the point when the intern acquired actual knowledge that Engineer B's stroke had materially impaired his capacity to provide meaningful review of structural design work — which, based on the facts, was before the construction drawings for Engineer A's building were completed and sealed. An intern's deference to a supervising licensed engineer is ethically grounded in the presumption that the licensed engineer is competent and is actually exercising responsible charge. Once that presumption was destroyed by direct knowledge of Engineer B's incapacity and the absence of any substantive review, continued participation in the arrangement was no longer defensible as professional deference. It became complicity. At that threshold, Engineer Intern C was obligated either to refuse to produce structural designs that would be sealed without review, or to report the arrangement to the State Board. The intern's two years of experience and unlicensed status did not relieve this obligation — they reinforced it, because the intern lacked the independent competence to ensure the safety of the work being produced. Continued cooperation, motivated by employment security and career advancement, placed Engineer Intern C in direct ethical violation of the obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
In response to Q104: Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B, while reflecting genuine personal compassion, functionally operated as a form of advance warning that allowed the impaired practice to continue without triggering any formal corrective mechanism. By disclosing Engineer R's findings to Engineer B privately and then declining to report to the State Board, Engineer A created a situation in which Engineer B had full knowledge that his design failures had been discovered, yet faced no formal accountability. This arrangement did not protect the public — it protected Engineer B from consequences while leaving open the possibility that Engineer B's firm would continue to produce deficient work for other clients. The private confrontation approach, absent any follow-through with the State Board, extended rather than curtailed the period of public risk. While the Code does not prohibit private professional dialogue, it cannot substitute for the reporting obligation that Code provision II.1.f. imposes when an engineer has knowledge of a violation. Engineer A's choice to treat private confrontation as a sufficient response reflects a rationalization in which personal loyalty was permitted to override the paramount obligation to public safety — a substitution the Board correctly identified as unethical.
In response to Q201: The tension between holding paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public and the prohibition against maliciously injuring a colleague's professional reputation resolves clearly in favor of the public safety obligation when the reporting engineer possesses direct, verified knowledge of a violation that has already caused actual harm. Code provision III.7. prohibits malicious or false injury to a colleague's reputation — it does not prohibit truthful, good-faith reporting of known violations to the appropriate authority. The qualifier 'maliciously or falsely' is dispositive: a report grounded in direct professional knowledge of design failures that produced a structural collapse is neither malicious nor false. Engineer A's reluctance to report Engineer B conflated the act of reporting with the act of injuring, when in fact the injury to Engineer B's reputation would flow from Engineer B's own conduct, not from Engineer A's disclosure. The Code's hierarchy is unambiguous — public safety is paramount and appears as the first obligation in Section I. Reputational protection for a colleague is a secondary consideration that cannot override a primary duty, particularly when the colleague's conduct has already materialized into physical harm and ongoing risk to future occupants of unbuilt portions of the structure.
In response to Q202: Financial hardship does not constitute a legitimate mitigating factor that modifies or suspends the ethical duty to cease impaired practice. The Code's obligation to perform services only in areas of competence and to conform with state registration laws is not conditioned on the financial consequences of compliance. Engineer B's situation — being the sole licensed engineer in a small firm, facing loss of income, and having family financial obligations — is genuinely sympathetic, but the Code does not recognize financial survival as a defense to practicing beyond one's competence or to sealing documents without meaningful review. The reason this standard must be absolute is structural: if financial pressure were accepted as a mitigating factor, the public safety protections embedded in licensure requirements would be systematically eroded in precisely the circumstances — small firms, sole practitioners, economic downturns — where impaired or incompetent practice is most likely to occur and least likely to be detected. Engineer B's ethical obligation upon suffering a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity was to suspend practice, seek a formal practice management arrangement, or refer his clients to competent practitioners — not to continue operating while delegating substantive design work to an unlicensed intern.
In response to Q203: Engineer R's reporting obligation to the State Board does not conflict with the prohibition against maliciously injuring a colleague's reputation, because Engineer R's knowledge was acquired through a formal, arms-length professional engagement rather than through rumor, inference, or competitive animus. Engineer R was retained as an independent structural reviewer, produced a documented technical assessment of serious design errors and omissions, and subsequently redesigned the structure — all of which constitutes direct professional knowledge of violations within the meaning of Code provision II.1.f. The reporting obligation that provision imposes is triggered by knowledge, not by intent, and it applies independently to each engineer who possesses that knowledge. Engineer R therefore carried an independent, non-delegable duty to report Engineer B's violations to the State Board, regardless of what Engineer A chose to do. The fact that reporting would cause reputational and financial harm to Engineer B does not transform a good-faith, knowledge-based report into a malicious act. Engineer R's obligation was further reinforced by the discovery that the design errors extended beyond the failed basement to unbuilt portions of the structure, meaning that future public safety remained at risk absent formal intervention.
In response to Q301: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A failed to fulfill his categorical duty to protect public safety. Deontological ethics — particularly in the Kantian tradition — holds that duties are binding regardless of consequences and regardless of the personal costs of compliance. The duty to report a known violation to the appropriate authority, as codified in Code provision II.1.f., is not a discretionary guideline that yields to personal loyalty or compassionate circumstance. It is a categorical obligation grounded in the engineer's role as a trustee of public safety. Engineer A's decision to substitute private confrontation for formal reporting cannot be justified deontologically, because the maxim underlying that decision — 'I will protect a friend from professional consequences even when his conduct poses ongoing risk to the public' — cannot be universalized without destroying the entire system of professional accountability that licensure is designed to create. The compassionate circumstances surrounding Engineer B's stroke are morally relevant to how Engineer A might have supported Engineer B through the reporting process, but they are not morally relevant to whether the reporting obligation existed or whether it was binding.
In response to Q302: From a consequentialist perspective, Engineer B's decision to continue practice after his stroke produced net harm that substantially outweighed any benefit to his firm, his employees, or his clients. The benefits of continuation were primarily private — preservation of Engineer B's income, maintenance of his firm's client relationships, and continued employment for Engineer Intern C and other staff. The harms were public and material: an actual structural failure during construction of Engineer A's building, serious design errors in unbuilt portions of the same structure that posed ongoing risk to future occupants, and the broader systemic harm of demonstrating that a licensed engineer could continue to seal documents without review while impaired, undermining public confidence in the licensure system. A rigorous consequentialist analysis would also account for the foreseeable downstream harms: the financial and legal exposure Engineer A faced as a result of the failure, the risk to construction workers and future building occupants, and the professional harm to Engineer Intern C from participation in an arrangement that exposed the intern to ethical and legal liability. The financial survival rationale Engineer B employed was a form of motivated reasoning that weighted private benefits to himself and his firm against diffuse public harms — precisely the kind of calculation that professional ethics codes are designed to override.
In response to Q303: From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer Intern C failed to demonstrate the professional integrity and moral courage expected of an emerging engineer. Virtue ethics evaluates conduct by reference to the character traits — honesty, courage, prudence, integrity — that a person of good professional character would exhibit. An emerging engineer of good character, upon discovering that the licensed engineer nominally supervising his work was incapable of providing meaningful review, would have recognized that continuing to produce structural designs under those conditions was not a morally neutral act of professional compliance but an active contribution to a deceptive and dangerous arrangement. The virtuous response would have been to refuse participation, to seek guidance from the State Board or a professional ethics resource, or at minimum to document objections formally. Engineer Intern C's choice to cooperate — with full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and the absence of substantive review — reflects a prioritization of employment security and career continuity over the foundational professional virtue of integrity. The fact that the intern lacked the power to compel Engineer B to cease practice does not eliminate the intern's own ethical agency. Moral courage, as a professional virtue, requires acting rightly even when the personal cost is significant.
In response to Q304: From a deontological perspective, Engineer R's status as an independent third-party reviewer created a distinct, non-delegable duty to report Engineer B's violations to the State Board, independent of whatever action Engineer A chose to take. The reporting obligation in Code provision II.1.f. is personal and non-transferable — it attaches to each engineer who acquires knowledge of a violation through their professional activities, and it cannot be discharged by relying on another engineer to report. Engineer R acquired direct, documented, professional knowledge of serious violations through a formal engagement: multiple structural design errors and omissions, evidence of drawings sealed without competent review, and a pattern of conduct consistent with impaired practice. That knowledge created an independent obligation that was not contingent on Engineer A's decision. The deontological force of this obligation is reinforced by Engineer R's role: as an independent reviewer retained precisely to assess the integrity of the structural design, Engineer R occupied a position of heightened professional responsibility. To complete the technical review, redesign the structure, and then remain silent about the systemic violations that caused the failure would be to treat the reporting obligation as optional — a characterization the Code does not support.
In response to Q401: Had Engineer A immediately reported Engineer B to the State Board upon discovering the structural failure and the anomalous bracing — before the private confrontation — the Board's formal intervention would likely have created a faster and more reliable pathway to a supervised practice management alternative than the private confrontation approach actually produced. State boards typically have mechanisms to address impaired practitioners that include supervised practice arrangements, temporary license restrictions, and referrals to professional assistance programs. These mechanisms are designed precisely for situations where a licensed engineer's capacity is compromised but where an abrupt firm closure would cause disproportionate harm. By choosing private confrontation first, Engineer A allowed Engineer B to retain control of the narrative, gave Engineer B the opportunity to continue operating without formal oversight, and produced no binding corrective outcome. The private confrontation approach was not merely less effective than formal reporting — it was structurally incapable of producing the kind of enforceable, supervised practice arrangement that could have protected both the public and Engineer B's firm. The counterfactual strongly suggests that immediate reporting, potentially accompanied by Engineer A's offer to assist Engineer B in navigating the Board process, would have been both more ethical and more practically beneficial.
In response to Q402: Had Engineer Intern C refused to perform unsupervised structural design work, or independently reported Engineer B's impaired condition to the State Board, the structural failure of Engineer A's building basement would very likely have been prevented, because the deficient design that caused the failure was produced by Engineer Intern C under conditions of no meaningful supervision. The causal chain runs directly from the intern's cooperation with the impaired practice arrangement to the production of deficient drawings to the structural failure. Refusal or reporting by the intern would have broken that chain at its earliest point. Additionally, Engineer Intern C's own professional trajectory would have been substantially protected: by cooperating with the arrangement, the intern became complicit in unlicensed practice, exposed himself or herself to disciplinary action by the State Board, and accumulated professional experience under conditions that could not be credited toward licensure in any jurisdiction that requires supervised experience. The counterfactual also illustrates a broader principle: interns and junior engineers are not ethically or legally insulated from the consequences of participating in arrangements they know to be improper simply because they lack the power to compel compliance from a superior. The intern's ethical agency was real, and the failure to exercise it carried real consequences.
In response to Q403: Had Engineer B voluntarily disclosed his stroke to the State Board immediately after suffering it, sought a formal temporary practice management arrangement, and placed Engineer Intern C's work under the supervision of a qualified licensed structural engineer, it is plausible that Engineer B could have preserved his firm's viability while remaining in compliance with his ethical and legal obligations. Many state boards have provisions for supervised practice arrangements that allow impaired or temporarily incapacitated licensees to continue operating under defined conditions, including third-party technical oversight. Such an arrangement would have addressed the core public safety problem — the absence of competent review of structural designs — while allowing the firm to continue generating revenue and maintaining client relationships. The structural failure of Engineer A's building, the reputational and financial harm to Engineer B's firm, the legal exposure for all parties, and the professional harm to Engineer Intern C were all foreseeable consequences of the concealment strategy Engineer B chose. Voluntary disclosure, while carrying short-term costs, would have been both ethically required and practically superior to the concealment approach. This counterfactual underscores that the ethical path and the strategically rational path were aligned — Engineer B's choice to conceal was not only wrong but also self-defeating.
In response to Q404: Engineer A's failure to conduct a meaningful pre-retention competence assessment of Engineer B carries an independent ethical dimension that the Board did not explicitly address. The obligation to perform services only in areas of competence — and the corollary obligation to retain consultants who are competent to perform the work assigned — implies that a retaining engineer exercises some degree of professional judgment in selecting consultants, not merely administrative convenience or personal familiarity. Engineer A's retention of Engineer B was driven primarily by friendship rather than by any documented assessment of Engineer B's current capacity, recent project history, or firm staffing. A more rigorous pre-retention inquiry — such as verifying Engineer B's professional standing with the State Board, reviewing recent comparable projects, or assessing the firm's current staffing and supervision arrangements — might have surfaced warning signs of post-stroke impairment before any design work was produced. While the primary ethical culpability for the structural failure rests with Engineer B and Engineer Intern C, Engineer A's substitution of personal trust for professional due diligence represents a failure of the professional judgment that the Code expects of a licensed engineer acting in a client capacity. This conclusion does not diminish Engineer A's victimhood in the structural failure, but it does establish that Engineer A's ethical obligations were implicated at the point of retention, not merely after the failure occurred.
In response to Q404: Each engineer with direct knowledge of Engineer B's violations bears a non-transferable, independent reporting obligation that cannot be satisfied by another party's report. The Code provision requiring engineers with knowledge of violations to report to appropriate authorities is framed in terms of individual knowledge and individual obligation — it does not contain a first-reporter exception or a coordination requirement that would allow one engineer's report to discharge another's duty. Engineer R's independent reporting obligation therefore exists in parallel with Engineer A's, not in sequence behind it. Furthermore, the value of multiple independent reports to the State Board is not merely additive — it is qualitatively significant: corroborating reports from independent sources strengthen the evidentiary basis for regulatory action, reduce the risk that a single report will be dismissed or minimized, and signal to the Board that the violations are serious and widely recognized within the professional community. The Board's conclusion that both Engineer A and Engineer R were independently obligated to report is therefore not only correct as a matter of code interpretation but also sound as a matter of regulatory effectiveness.
In response to Q204: Delegating firm management to a non-engineer spouse cannot be construed as a permissible administrative accommodation that supports cessation of engineering practice — it inevitably enables continued unlawful practice regardless of intent. The distinction between administrative management and engineering practice management is critical but was obliterated in this case. A non-engineer spouse managing billing, scheduling, and client communications would raise no ethical concern. But Engineer B's wife assumed management of the firm in a context where the firm's sole licensed engineer was incapacitated, where an unlicensed intern was performing all substantive design work, and where the firm was continuing to accept and execute structural engineering commissions. In that context, her management role was not administrative — it was operational enablement of unlicensed engineering practice. The Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition exists precisely to prevent this outcome: non-engineers lack the professional judgment to recognize when engineering work exceeds the competence of those performing it, and their management of engineering firms therefore removes the last internal check on quality and safety. Engineer B's delegation to his wife, far from being a compassionate accommodation, was a structural mechanism for perpetuating the violations.
In response to Q404: If Engineer R had reported Engineer B to the State Board upon completing his independent structural review — without waiting for Engineer A to act — that action would have been ethically required and would not have eliminated Engineer A's own independent reporting obligation. Engineer R's reporting obligation arises from his direct expert knowledge of Engineer B's design failures and is non-delegable: it runs to the public and the profession, not to Engineer A as the client who retained him. Had Engineer R reported independently, Engineer A's obligation to report would have remained in force because Engineer A possessed independent knowledge of the situation — including Engineer B's disclosure of his stroke and the practice arrangement with Engineer Intern C — that Engineer R did not have. The two reporting obligations are parallel and cumulative, not sequential or substitutable. Engineer R's independent reporting would have protected the public more quickly and would have modeled the profession's expectation that engineers with direct knowledge of violations act without waiting for others to take the lead. It would not, however, have absolved Engineer A of his own obligation, because the code's reporting requirement is personal and cannot be discharged by another engineer's action.
The most fundamental tension in this case — between holding paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public and the prohibition against maliciously injuring a colleague's professional reputation — was resolved by the Board in favor of public safety without qualification. The Board treated these two principles not as genuinely competing equals but as occupying different tiers of ethical priority: the duty to report an impaired engineer to the State Board is compelled by direct professional knowledge of ongoing public risk, not by malice, and therefore the reputational harm that flows from a good-faith report to a regulatory authority cannot be characterized as the kind of injurious conduct that Code provision III.7 was designed to prohibit. This case teaches that III.7 functions as a constraint on gratuitous or bad-faith attacks on a colleague's standing, not as a shield that insulates an impaired licensee from mandatory reporting obligations triggered by Code provision II.1.f. When the two provisions are read together, the duty to report under II.1.f. is the operative rule in circumstances of known public risk, and III.7 recedes to its proper role of prohibiting only malicious or false injury. Engineer A's invocation of friendship and compassion as reasons not to report did not transform the reporting obligation into a malicious act; it simply deferred a mandatory duty at the continued expense of public safety.
The principle that engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence, read in conjunction with the sign-and-seal requirement and the paramount duty to protect public safety, creates a cascading hierarchy of obligations that this case demonstrates cannot be suspended by financial hardship. Engineer B's post-stroke impairment did not merely create a personal incapacity; it triggered an affirmative legal and ethical duty to suspend practice or arrange qualified supervision, because the competence standard under Code provision II.2 is not a sliding scale modulated by economic circumstance. The case makes explicit that financial pressure — however genuine and sympathetic — is not a recognized mitigating factor that modifies the duty to suspend impaired practice. This is a significant doctrinal clarification: the Code's competence obligation is categorical, not contextual. The corollary is equally important: Code provision II.2.b., which prohibits affixing a seal to documents dealing with subject matter in which the engineer is not competent, was violated not merely because Engineer B lacked post-stroke capacity, but because the seal affixed without meaningful review transformed a nominal compliance gesture into an active misrepresentation to the public and to regulatory authorities that competent engineering oversight had occurred. Financial survival cannot convert a prohibited act into a permissible one.
This case reveals that the principle prohibiting engineers from aiding or abetting unlawful practice — Code provision II.1.e. — operates simultaneously at multiple levels of the professional hierarchy and cannot be discharged by any single actor's compliance alone. Engineer Intern C's active cooperation with an arrangement the intern knew to be improper constitutes aiding unlawful practice regardless of the intern's unlicensed status, because the prohibition attaches to the conduct of assisting, not to the licensure status of the assistant. Engineer B's wife's assumption of non-engineering firm management, with full knowledge of Engineer B's impairment, similarly enabled the continuation of a practice that posed public risk, even though she bore no engineering license herself. Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B, while not itself a violation, functioned in practice as a form of passive enablement by substituting a collegial warning for the formal regulatory intervention that Code provision II.1.f. required. Taken together, these overlapping failures demonstrate that the ethical architecture of the Code is designed to create redundant reporting and refusal obligations precisely because any single actor's silence or inaction can be compensated for by another's compliance — but in this case, every actor with knowledge chose accommodation over obligation, and the structural failure was the result. The case therefore teaches that the principle of public safety paramountcy is not self-executing; it depends on each informed actor independently discharging their own non-delegable duty.
The interaction between Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition and Impaired Practice Cessation Obligation reveals that the two principles, when applied simultaneously, produce a structural paradox that Engineer B's arrangement failed to resolve ethically. Engineer B faced a genuine dilemma: ceasing practice entirely would satisfy the Impaired Practice Cessation Obligation but would financially devastate his firm and family, while delegating management to his wife and design to Engineer Intern C appeared to offer a middle path. However, the Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition forecloses the middle path because it prohibits precisely the arrangement Engineer B constructed — a non-engineer managing a firm whose engineering work is being performed by an unlicensed intern under a licensed engineer's seal without adequate review. The case teaches that these two principles do not conflict in a way that permits compromise: the Impaired Practice Cessation Obligation demands cessation of engineering practice, not merely cessation of personal design work, when the licensed engineer cannot exercise responsible charge. Delegating firm management to a non-engineer spouse does not satisfy the cessation obligation — it merely redistributes the administrative burden while leaving the engineering liability and public safety risk intact. The only ethically compliant resolution would have been either genuine cessation of the firm's engineering practice or retention of a qualified licensed engineer to assume responsible charge in Engineer B's place.
The case establishes a principle of non-transferable, concurrent reporting obligations that applies independently to each engineer who acquires direct knowledge of an ethical violation, regardless of whether another engineer with the same knowledge has already reported or intends to report. Engineer A and Engineer R each acquired direct, independent knowledge of Engineer B's impaired practice and deficient work — Engineer A through private confrontation and disclosure, Engineer R through independent structural review. The Board's conclusion that both were obligated to report reflects the principle that the public safety rationale for reporting is not diminished by the existence of another potential reporter. This principle has a deeper implication: the reporting obligation is not merely instrumental (aimed at achieving the outcome of a State Board investigation) but is also expressive of each engineer's individual professional accountability to the public. An engineer who relies on another engineer's anticipated report to justify personal silence is not merely taking a calculated risk that the report will be made — that engineer is abdicating a personal professional duty that exists independently of what others do. The case thus teaches that the duty to report impaired practice is non-delegable, non-transferable, and not discharged by another party's action or anticipated action.
Engineer A was obligated to report Engineer B to the proper authority, in this case the State Board.
Given his direct knowledge of the situation, Engineer R, like Engineer A, was obligated to report Engineer B to the proper authority, in this case the State Board.
Concurrent Discovering Engineer Coordinated Reporting Constraint - Engineer R Concurrence
Engineer R discovered Engineer B's incompetent design documents and was informed of the circumstances of Engineer B's impaired practice; Engineer A, who retained Engineer R, was in a position to take the lead in reporting, potentially allowing Engineer R to concur in that report.
Concurrent Discovering Engineer Coordinated Reporting Constraint
Engineer R's independent obligation to report Engineer B's violations to the State Board could be discharged through formal concurrence in Engineer A's report if Engineer A took the lead in reporting — with the report styled to note Engineer R's concurrence — but Engineer R was prohibited from treating Engineer A's anticipated report as a complete substitute for independent action, and was required to independently report if Engineer A failed to do so.
Since Engineer A was the person who got Engineer R involved in the first place, if Engineer A took the lead in reporting the matter, the report could be styled to note Engineer R's concurrence.
From the time of Engineer R's discovery of Engineer B's violations through the reporting decision
Otherwise, Engineer R would be obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board (Section II.1.f).
Potential legal and disciplinary liability for Engineer B and his estate
Public safety would be placed at risk by structurally deficient designs bearing a licensed engineer's seal
Signed and sealed drawings would misrepresent Engineer B's actual review and professional responsibility
Structural designs would be produced by an unsupervised intern beyond his competence level
Competence is a prerequisite for ethical practice, not optional
Honesty and transparency with clients regarding material limitations
Public safety obligations are non-negotiable and supersede personal financial interests
The engineer's seal is a professional representation of personal review and responsibility
Maintain business continuity, preserve income, and avoid disclosure of medical impairment to clients and the State Board
Ability to exercise independent engineering judgment on structural adequacy
Capacity to supervise and direct Engineer Intern C's work to a professional standard
Full cognitive and professional capacity to review and approve structural engineering calculations and drawings
Post-stroke, several months before structural failure
NSPE Code Section II.1. Engineers shall hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount
NSPE Code Section II.2. Engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence
NSPE Code Section II.2.a, Engineers shall undertake assignments only when qualified by education or experience
NSPE Code Section III.2. Engineers shall not complete, sign, or seal plans not conforming to accepted engineering standards
NSPE Code Section III.2.b. Engineers shall not affix their signatures to plans not prepared under their responsible charge
Obligation to disclose impairment to clients and the State Board
State licensure laws requiring engineers to personally review and be responsible for work they seal
Following a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity, Engineer B made the deliberate decision to continue operating his engineering business and accepting structural engineering commissions rather than ceasing practice or disclosing his impairment to clients. This decision placed his financial and business interests above his ethical obligation to practice only within his competence.
Continue Practice Post-Stroke (Action 2) → Drawings Sealed Without Review (Event 3)
Engineer B made the deliberate decision to continue practice following a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity, resulting in drawings being signed and sealed with little meaningful review
Continue Practice Post-Stroke (Action 2)
Had Engineer B ceased practice or disclosed impairment after stroke, drawings would not have been sealed without competent review; the structural failure chain would have been interrupted at its origin
Drawings Sealed Without Review (Event 3)
Absence of adequate oversight or quality control mechanism
Engineer B's decision to continue practicing despite material impairment
Stroke-induced reduction in professional judgment and capacity
Wife's assumption of business control without engineering credentials
Combination of impaired capacity + deliberate continuation of practice + absence of qualified supervisory review
Engineer Intern C would bear personal ethical and potentially legal liability for complicity in the arrangement
Errors in his work would not be caught through adequate supervisory review
Structural designs would be produced without the licensed engineering oversight required by law and professional standards
The public, including the building's future occupants, would be exposed to safety risks from his unreviewed structural designs
An intern's subordinate status does not eliminate personal ethical responsibility
Complicity in known ethical violations is itself an ethical violation
Engineers at all levels share responsibility for public safety regardless of employment hierarchy
Whistleblowing or refusal to participate is required when participation would harm the public
Retain employment and maintain the business operations of Engineer B's firm, while performing design work that exceeded his authorized scope of practice
Authority under state law to practice structural engineering independently
Independent professional judgment to evaluate structural adequacy without supervisory review
Licensed structural engineering competence to independently perform and be responsible for structural design
Post-stroke, ongoing through construction phase
Duty to report or escalate knowledge of an engineer's incapacity to practice safely
NSPE Code Section II.1. Obligation to hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount
NSPE Code Section III.2. Obligation not to complete plans that do not conform to accepted engineering standards
Obligation not to practice engineering beyond the scope authorized for an unlicensed intern under supervision
Professional obligation to refuse participation in arrangements known to be improper and unsafe
Engineer Intern C, with full knowledge of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment and the absence of adequate supervision, chose to continue performing independent structural design work and delivering drawings for Engineer B to seal without substantive review. This decision made Engineer Intern C an active participant in an arrangement he knew was professionally improper and potentially dangerous.
Cooperate With Improper Arrangement (Action 4) → Serious Design Errors Revealed (Event 5)
Engineer Intern C, with full knowledge of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment and the absence of adequate supervision, cooperated with the improper arrangement, producing structural drawings containing numerous serious design errors subsequently uncovered by Engineer R's independent review
Cooperate With Improper Arrangement (Action 4)
Had Intern C refused to participate in the arrangement and reported the improper delegation, design errors would not have been introduced; alternatively, had Intern C sought independent technical guidance, errors may have been reduced or eliminated
Serious Design Errors Revealed (Event 5)
Absence of any independent check on Intern C's design work prior to sealing
Complexity of structural design task relative to intern's experience level
Full knowledge of Engineer B's impairment and absence of qualified supervision
Intern C's acceptance of design responsibility beyond his licensure and competence
Unqualified practitioner performing complex licensed engineering work + knowledge of impropriety + absence of corrective oversight
Cooperative Disclosure Pathway Available - Engineer A State Board Reporting
The case facts indicate that Engineer A had a cooperative disclosure pathway available through the State Board that could have accommodated compassionate considerations while still fulfilling the reporting obligation.
Engineer A had access to a cooperative, compassionate reporting pathway — including privately discussing the matter with Engineer B and cooperating with the State Board to identify practice alternatives — that could have honored both the mandatory reporting obligation and Engineer A's compassion for Engineer B's circumstances, but this pathway did not relieve Engineer A of the underlying obligation to report.
As a professional courtesy, and because he considered Engineer B a personal friend, Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design
From the time of Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's impaired practice
Should Engineer A formally report Engineer B to the State Board, or limit his response to a private confrontation out of friendship and compassion for Engineer B's post-stroke condition?
Following the basement structural failure, Engineer A discovers through Engineer R's independent review that Engineer B's design work contains serious errors not only in the failed portion but also in unbuilt portions of the structure. Engineer A must decide how to respond to this confirmed evidence of impaired practice by his long-time friend and structural consultant.
Report Engineer B to the State Board immediately upon confirmation of serious design errors, disclosing Engineer R's findings and the materialized structural failure to the proper authority
Meet privately with Engineer B to confront him with the faulty design and Engineer R's report, relying on personal intervention without filing a formal report to the State Board
Retain Engineer R to redesign the unbuilt portions and proceed with corrected construction without reporting Engineer B to any authority, treating remediation as sufficient response
Engineer A — Client/Retaining Engineer with Knowledge of Impaired Practice
Is Engineer R obligated to report Engineer B's deficient design work to the State Board independently of Engineer A's actions, or is his obligation satisfied by delivering his findings to Engineer A as the retaining client?
Engineer R, retained first to investigate the basement failure and then to redesign the unbuilt portions, discovers through independent review a surprising number of serious structural design errors and omissions in both the failed and unbuilt portions of the structure. As a licensed professional engineer with direct knowledge of these deficiencies, Engineer R must decide what obligations his findings trigger beyond his contractual role.
Report Engineer B's serious design errors and omissions directly to the State Board as an independent professional obligation arising from the third-party discovery of public safety risk
Deliver findings exclusively to Engineer A as the retaining client and proceed with redesign work, treating the client relationship as the boundary of reporting responsibility
Notify Engineer A of the findings, recommend that Engineer A report to the State Board, and condition continued engagement on confirmation that proper reporting has occurred
Engineer R — Independent Third-Party Reviewer with Direct Knowledge of Design Deficiencies
Should Engineer B cease structural engineering practice upon recognizing that his post-stroke condition prevents him from competently performing engineering design and providing responsible charge supervision, or continue practice by delegating to Engineer Intern C and sealing the resulting work?
Engineer B suffers a stroke that materially impairs his cognitive capacity. Despite this impairment, financial pressures drive him to continue practicing structural engineering. He delegates substantive structural design work to Engineer Intern C with little to no meaningful review, then affixes his professional seal to drawings he has not competently reviewed, effectively certifying work he cannot verify.
Cease structural engineering practice upon recognizing cognitive impairment, wind down active projects responsibly, and disclose the impairment to clients and the State Board
Continue practice by delegating substantive design to Engineer Intern C and sealing drawings without competent review, relying on the intern's work to sustain the firm financially
Reduce scope of practice to work within demonstrated post-stroke capacity, seek formal competency evaluation, and decline projects requiring cognitive demands beyond current capability
Engineer B — Licensed Structural Engineer with Post-Stroke Cognitive Impairment
Upon noticing questionable structural details in Engineer B's work and knowing of Engineer B's post-stroke condition, should Engineer A independently verify Engineer B's current competence before the structural failure occurs, or defer to the friendship relationship and Engineer B's continued licensure as sufficient assurance of competence?
Engineer A, as the retaining client who selected Engineer B as structural consultant, had prior awareness that Engineer B had suffered a stroke and noticed 'odd' structural bracing and other questionable structural details in Engineer B's work before the basement failure occurred. Engineer A must decide whether his pre-failure observations trigger an independent obligation to verify Engineer B's current competence.
Independently verify Engineer B's current competence and capacity by commissioning a review of structural work upon noticing questionable details, before any structural failure occurs
Retain Engineer B without independent competence verification, relying on longstanding friendship and continued licensure as sufficient basis for confidence in Engineer B's work
Raise concerns about the questionable structural details directly with Engineer B and require written confirmation of design rationale before allowing construction to proceed
Engineer A — Retaining Client Engineer with Pre-Failure Knowledge of Questionable Details
Should Engineer Intern C refuse to perform substantive structural design work under an arrangement where the supervising licensed engineer cannot provide meaningful review due to cognitive impairment, or cooperate with the arrangement in deference to Engineer B's licensed authority?
Engineer Intern C, an unlicensed engineering intern, is asked by Engineer B to perform substantive structural design work with full knowledge that Engineer B's post-stroke impairment prevents meaningful supervision or review. Engineer Intern C must decide whether to cooperate with this arrangement or refuse participation and potentially report the situation.
Refuse to perform substantive structural design work under the impaired supervision arrangement and report the situation to the State Board or another responsible authority
Cooperate with the arrangement by performing substantive structural design with full knowledge that Engineer B cannot competently review or verify the work before sealing it
Perform only clearly defined, limited technical tasks within demonstrably supervised scope while refusing to accept responsibility for substantive design decisions that require licensed judgment
Engineer Intern C — Unlicensed Engineering Intern with Knowledge of Supervising Engineer's Incapacity
Upon completing his independent structural review and discovering serious design errors attributable to Engineer B's impaired practice, did Engineer R bear a distinct and non-delegable obligation to report Engineer B to the State Board independently of whatever action Engineer A chose to take?
Engineer R's independent reporting obligation upon discovering serious design errors through formal structural review
Report Engineer B's impaired practice and the documented design errors to the State Board independently upon completing the structural review, without conditioning that report on Engineer A's prior action or consent
Notify Engineer A of the obligation to report and allow Engineer A a defined period to initiate reporting to the State Board before Engineer R files an independent report, treating coordinated disclosure as the preferred pathway while preserving the independent reporting option as a backstop
Limit Engineer R's professional response to completing the technical redesign and documenting the findings in the project record, treating the reporting decision as Engineer A's responsibility as the retaining client and primary party with knowledge of Engineer B's impairment
Drawings bearing Engineer B's seal would not reflect his actual professional judgment
Engineer Intern C would be placed in an ethically and legally untenable position
Engineer Intern C would perform structural design without adequate supervision or the competence required for independent structural work
Structural errors resulting from unsupervised intern work would go undetected
Responsible charge requires actual, substantive review, not merely nominal signature authority
Supervision of engineering interns is a professional obligation, not a discretionary courtesy
The engineer's seal is a legal and ethical representation of personal professional accountability
Keep the business operational and deliverables flowing to clients by using Engineer Intern C as a surrogate designer while Engineer B's seal provided the required legal authorization
Ability to identify errors, omissions, and deviations from accepted structural engineering standards
Competence to direct and correct Engineer Intern C's work to a professional standard
Sufficient cognitive capacity to perform substantive technical review of structural calculations and drawings
Duty of honest dealing with the client (Engineer A)
NSPE Code Section II.2. Practice only within competence
NSPE Code Section III.2.b. Engineers shall not affix signatures/seals to plans not prepared under their responsible charge
NSPE Code Section III.9.b. Engineers shall not affix signatures to documents not conforming to accepted engineering standards
State law requirement that a licensed engineer exercise responsible charge over sealed work
Supervisory obligation to ensure intern work meets professional standards before sealing
Engineer B made the deliberate decision to delegate all structural design work to Engineer Intern C while signing and sealing the resulting drawings with little to no substantive review. This converted Engineer Intern C into an unsupervised de facto structural engineer of record while maintaining the false appearance of licensed professional oversight.
Delegate Design Beyond Supervision (Action 3) → Structural Failure Occurs (Event 4)
Engineer B made the deliberate decision to delegate all structural design work to Engineer Intern C without adequate supervision, directly enabling the introduction of serious design errors that physically manifested as structural failure during basement construction
Delegate Design Beyond Supervision (Action 3)
Had Engineer B retained a qualified licensed engineer to supervise or perform the structural design, or had adequate review checkpoints been established, the design errors would likely have been identified before construction commenced
Absence of meaningful technical supervision or review checkpoints
Delegation of all structural design to an intern without licensed engineer status
Engineer B's impaired capacity preventing effective oversight
Intern C's limited experience relative to the complexity of the structural design task
Engineer B (primary); Engineer Intern C (secondary)
Total delegation to unqualified intern + complete absence of competent supervisory review + complex structural design requirements
Fraudulently sealed drawings enter the permitting and construction system; errors embedded in design are given false professional certification; downstream reliance on those drawings becomes unsafe
During and after Engineer B's stroke, throughout design completion phase
Engineer B signed and sealed construction drawings produced entirely by Engineer Intern C with little to no substantive review, lending his professional license to work he had not meaningfully evaluated. This constitutes professional misconduct regardless of his medical condition.
Education-Experience Competence Threshold - Engineer Intern C Structural Design
Engineer Intern C, with only about two years of experience and no licensure, performed all structural design and construction drawings for Engineer A's office building without meaningful supervision, resulting in serious design errors and structural failure.
Education-Experience Competence Threshold Constraint
Engineer Intern C, as a graduate engineer with approximately two years of experience and no professional licensure, lacked the education-experience competence threshold required to independently perform structural design and produce construction drawings without meaningful supervision from a licensed professional engineer, and was prohibited from accepting sole design responsibility for structural work of the complexity involved in Engineer A's office building.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard; Professional Competence Standard
Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer employee with about two years' experience.
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's independent structural design work
Engineer Intern C would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review.
Education-Experience Competence Threshold Constraint - Engineer Intern C Structural Design
Engineer B delegated practically all structural design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer with only about two years of experience, without meaningful review or supervision, resulting in serious structural design errors and actual structural failure.
Engineer Intern C, with approximately two years of experience and no professional licensure, lacked the competence threshold required to independently perform substantive structural design and produce construction drawings without meaningful licensed supervision — the assignment of sole design responsibility to Engineer Intern C exceeded the competence boundary established by professional norms for unlicensed graduate engineers.
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's unsupervised structural design work
Engineer R's review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details.
Engineer A Client Relationship with Engineer B
From Engineer A's retention of Engineer B through the structural failure and termination of the engagement
Engineer A retained Engineer B, his friend and a structural engineer consultant, to perform the structural design
Engineer A's professional relationship with Engineer B as a retained structural engineering consultant for the office building project
Structural failure and Engineer A's retention of Engineer R to completely redesign the structure
Engineer A's retention of Engineer B to perform structural design for the new office building
Engineer A exercised collegial concern response capability by retaining Engineer R to independently review the structural drawings and failed construction, taking the concern seriously and initiating a professional investigative response
Engineer A commissioned an independent structural review upon discovering problems with Engineer B's work, demonstrating appropriate collegial concern response
Retained Engineer R, a well-respected structural engineer, to independently review the structural drawings and failed construction upon discovering potential problems with Engineer B's work
Engineer A Compassionate Peer Reporting Engineer
Engineer R, described as a well-respected structural engineer, was retained by Engineer A to independently review the structural drawings and failed construction
Since Engineer A was the person who got Engineer R involved in the first place
Engineer A Collegial Concern Response Structural Failure
Engineer A demonstrated partial collegial concern response capability by privately confronting Engineer B with the faulty design and Engineer R's report, but failed to complete the full professional response by reporting to the State Board
Engineer A responded to the structural failure by privately confronting Engineer B but did not fulfill the full professional reporting obligation
Meeting privately with Engineer B as a professional courtesy to confront him with the faulty design and Engineer R's findings, while stopping short of formal reporting
As a professional courtesy, and because he considered Engineer B a personal friend, Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design, including Engineer R's report
Engineer A Compassionate Peer Reporting Obligation Recognition
Compassionate Peer Reporting Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A lacked the capability to recognize that his professional obligation to report Engineer B's impaired practice to the State Board persisted despite their personal friendship and his compassionate private confrontation, allowing personal loyalty to substitute for mandatory professional reporting
Engineer A privately confronted Engineer B but did not report him to the State Board due to personal friendship and compassion
Choosing not to report Engineer B to the State Board because of their long friendship and consideration of Engineer B's impairment, despite having confirmed evidence of serious structural design failures
Because of their long friendship and consideration of Engineer B's impairment, Engineer A did not report Engineer B to the State Board
Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design, including Engineer R's report
Engineer A Ethical Perception Structural Anomaly
Engineer A demonstrated ethical perception capability by noticing what he believed was odd structural bracing and other questionable structural details during observation of the failed system, triggering his decision to obtain an independent review
Engineer A's observation of the failed structure and recognition of anomalous details led him to retain Engineer R for independent review
Observing the failed basement structure and recognizing ethically and technically salient features — odd structural bracing and questionable structural details — that warranted independent expert review
Engineer A Civil Engineering Firm Owner Client
Engineer A noticed what he believed was 'odd' structural bracing and other questionable structural details
To obtain a second opinion about the failure, Engineer A retained a well-respected structural engineer, Engineer R, to perform an independent review
Engineer A Friendship Constrained Reporting Pathway Navigation
Friendship-Constrained Reporting Pathway Navigation Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to identify reporting pathways that simultaneously fulfill mandatory reporting obligations and respect the professional relationship with Engineer B — including cooperative, non-malicious approaches involving private discussion with state board authorities with Engineer B's knowledge and approval
The case identifies a cooperative reporting pathway that would have fulfilled Engineer A's mandatory obligations while respecting the friendship with Engineer B
Case analysis identifies that Engineer A could have privately discussed the matter with state board authorities with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, potentially identifying practice alternatives while fulfilling mandatory reporting obligations
By this view and with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, Engineer A could have privately discussed the matter with proper authorities at the State Board
Working together, the parties might cooperatively identify a practice alternative consistent with ethical and legal engineering consulting work, say, hiring a qualified temporary engineer – possibly Engineer R – until Engineer B was able to return to full duty
any of them must begin with the conviction that the ethics code does not permit engineers to turn a blind eye to the unethical practice of engineering
Engineer A Practice Continuity Alternative Identification
Practice Continuity Alternative Identification Capability
Engineer A had the capability to identify viable practice continuity alternatives for Engineer B — including engaging Engineer R as a qualified temporary engineer — that would maintain ethical and legal compliance while preserving the firm's ability to serve clients during Engineer B's recovery
Engineer A's knowledge of Engineer R's qualifications and the situation positioned him to identify practice continuity alternatives as part of a cooperative reporting approach
Case analysis identifies that Engineer A could have proposed hiring a qualified temporary engineer such as Engineer R as a practice continuity alternative, potentially enabling cooperative resolution with the state board
Further, under such a scenario, the Board might exercise discretion relative to formal sanction (or not) of Engineer B
Engineer A Pre-Acceptance Competence Assessment Structural Retention
Pre-Acceptance Competence Self-Assessment Capability
Engineer A demonstrated the capability to recognize that structural engineering design was outside his own firm's competence and to retain a qualified structural engineer consultant, though he did not adequately verify Engineer B's ongoing competence given the impairment
Engineer A correctly identified the need for a structural engineering specialist and retained Engineer B for that purpose
Retaining Engineer B as a structural engineer consultant for the structural design of his new office building, recognizing that structural engineering was outside his civil engineering and surveying firm's competence
Engineer A purchased land for a new office building, he retained an architect, and he retained Engineer B, his friend and a structural engineer consultant, to perform the structural design
Engineer A was obligated to exercise the capability to recognize that the identified risks to public health and safety from Engineer B's impaired practice required escalation to the state licensure board, beyond the private confrontation initially chosen
Engineer A's discovery of structural failures resulting from Engineer B's impaired practice triggered mandatory public safety escalation obligations
The BER determined Engineer A had an obligation to report to the state board under NSPE Code Sections I.1, II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.7, regardless of personal friendship with Engineer B
engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
Code Section III.7, engineers who believe others are guilty of unethical or illegal practice shall present such information to the proper authority for action
The BER has almost always taken the position that whenever any violation of the Code or issues of public health, safety, and welfare are uncovered, the proper authorities should be notified
Engineer A Public Safety Escalation Impaired Peer
Engineer A lacked the capability to recognize that the confirmed structural failures and serious design deficiencies caused by Engineer B's impaired practice required escalation to the State Board as a public safety matter, allowing personal considerations to override public safety obligations
Engineer A had confirmed evidence of public safety risk from impaired engineering practice but did not escalate to regulatory authorities
Failing to report Engineer B to the State Board despite confirmed evidence of structural failure, serious design errors, and ongoing impaired practice posing public safety risks
Engineer B Design Error Discovered in Completed Work
From Engineer R's technical review revealing incompetent documents through remediation and reporting
it was Engineer R who technically uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents
Design Error Discovered in Completed Work State
Engineer R's discovery of incompetent design and construction documents produced under Engineer B's seal
Reporting to State Board and remediation of deficient documents
Engineer R conducted a technical review and uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents
Engineer B Financial Pressure Resistance Failure
Financial Pressure Resistance in Impaired Practice Capability
Engineer B failed to exercise the capability to resist financial pressures driving continuation of impaired practice, choosing instead to continue operating his firm for financial reasons despite his stroke
Engineer B continued operating his firm for financial reasons following his stroke, enabling the impaired practice arrangement with Engineer Intern C
Continued to operate his structural engineering firm and sign sealed documents for financial reasons despite being unable to provide adequate direction and review
Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer
Engineer B, a structural engineer and personal friend of Engineer A, suffered a stroke, continued operating his firm for financial reasons
Engineer B chose to sign and seal design drawings without proper review while impaired by this stroke was a problem
Engineer B Financial Pressure Resistance Impaired Practice
Engineer B lacked the capability to resist financial pressures motivating continuation of impaired practice, allowing financial considerations to override professional obligations to public safety and competent practice
Engineer B continued operating his firm for financial reasons despite stroke-induced impairment
Explicit acknowledgment that financial reasons prevented suspension of practice despite known medical impairment
Engineer B Impaired Engineer Delegating Unsealed Work
for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office
Being the only licensed professional engineer in his firm, for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office
Engineer B Impaired Practice Continuation Resistance
Medical Impairment Practice Cessation Capability
Engineer B lacked or failed to exercise the capability to recognize that his stroke-induced impairment precluded adequate direction and control of engineering work, and to cease signing and sealing documents accordingly
Engineer B suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive and professional capacity yet continued operating his structural engineering firm and signing sealed documents
Continued to sign and seal design drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C without adequate review or direction, in violation of NSPE Code Section II.2 and responsible charge requirements
Engineer B violated Section II. 2. of the code because he affixed his signature and seal to documents prepared without his direction or control
Engineer B's actions were in violation of NSPE's Position Statement No. 10-1778: Responsible Charge
Engineer B Medical Impairment Practice Cessation
Engineer B lacked the capability to recognize and act on his obligation to cease or suspend professional practice following his stroke, instead continuing to sign and seal drawings with little to no review
Engineer B suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive and professional capacity yet continued operating his firm for financial reasons
Failure to suspend practice or close office after stroke, instead delegating all design work to an unsupervised intern while continuing to affix professional seal
Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office
Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review
Engineer B Professional Seal Affixation Competence
Professional Seal Affixation Competence Verification Capability
Engineer B lacked the capability to verify genuine domain competence before affixing his professional seal, signing and sealing drawings prepared by an unsupervised intern with little to no substantive review
Engineer B affixed his professional seal to drawings he had not substantively reviewed, resulting in structural failure
Signing and sealing construction drawings for a building that contained a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details
Engineer B Responsible Charge Active Engagement
Responsible Charge Active Engagement Capability
Engineer B lacked the capability to maintain active, substantive engagement in the engineering process when bearing responsible charge, instead delegating all design work to an intern and providing only pro forma seal affixation without genuine direction or review
Engineer B's impaired condition prevented genuine responsible charge engagement, reducing his role to nominal seal affixation
Delegating practically all design work to Engineer Intern C and signing sealed drawings with little to no review, resulting in serious structural design errors
Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C
Engineer B Responsible Charge Active Engagement Failure
Engineer B lacked the capacity to maintain active, substantive engagement in the engineering process from conception to completion, instead signing and sealing documents prepared entirely by Engineer Intern C without his direction or control
Engineer B's stroke-induced impairment rendered him unable to fulfill responsible charge obligations yet he continued to affix his seal to documents
Signed and sealed structural design drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C without involvement in design and development process, in direct violation of NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778
Reviewing drawings or documents after preparation without involvement in the design and development process does not satisfy the definition of Responsible Charge
The professional engineer in Responsible Charge is actively engaged in the engineering process, from conception to completion
Engineer B Structural Engineering Design Competence Impaired
Structural Engineering Design Competence
Engineer B's structural engineering design competence was substantially diminished by his stroke, rendering him unable to adequately direct and review engineering designs and drawings, resulting in incompetent design and construction documents
Engineer B's stroke-induced impairment substantially diminished his structural engineering competence, yet he continued to sign and seal documents
Structural drawings and construction documents prepared under his seal were found by Engineer R to be incompetent, with structural failures resulting from the deficient designs
Engineer B was unable to adequately direct and review engineering designs and drawings being prepared under his signature and seal
Engineer R who technically uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents
Engineer B Structural Failure Harm Materialized
From the moment of structural failure through the redesign and remediation process
Early during the process of constructing the basement there was a significant structural failure
Structural Failure Harm Materialized State
Physical structural failure of Engineer A's office building basement during construction, confirming that design errors caused actual harm
Engineer R's complete redesign of the structure
Significant structural failure during basement construction, attributed to Engineer B's deficient design
Engineer B transitions from competent licensed practitioner to incapacitated signatory; firm operations shift to wife and intern without proper disclosure; professional accountability gap opens
Before or during early construction phase (exact timing unclear)
Engineer B experienced a stroke that significantly impaired his capacity to practice engineering, rendering him unable to adequately review or supervise design work. This medical event fundamentally altered the professional dynamics of his firm.
Engineer B Unlicensed Practice Non-Aiding Boundary Failure
Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Boundary Maintenance Capability
Engineer B lacked the capability to maintain the boundary between permissible delegation and impermissible aiding of unlicensed practice, effectively enabling Engineer Intern C to perform licensed structural engineering work without adequate supervision and then certifying that work through seal affixation
Engineer B's delegation arrangement with Engineer Intern C crossed the boundary from permissible delegation to impermissible enablement of unlicensed practice
Delegating all structural design work to an unsupervised intern and signing and sealing the resulting drawings with little to no review, effectively enabling unlicensed practice under the cover of his professional seal
Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer employee with about two years' experience
Engineer B Wife Non-Engineer Firm Management Boundary
Non-Engineer Firm Management Boundary Capability
Engineer B's wife lacked the capability to recognize the professional and legal boundaries constraining a non-engineer manager of a licensed engineering firm, enabling the firm to continue performing engineering services without adequate licensed professional supervision
Engineer B's wife assumed firm management following his stroke, enabling continued operations that resulted in structural failure
Assuming operational management of Engineer B's structural engineering firm following his stroke and enabling continued firm operations despite the absence of adequate licensed professional oversight
Engineer B Wife Non-Engineer Firm Manager
Engineer B's wife took over management of the business
Engineer B Wife Non-Engineer Firm Management Boundary Failure
Engineer B's wife lacked or failed to exercise the capability to recognize the professional and legal boundaries constraining a non-licensed individual who assumes operational management of a licensed professional engineering firm, enabling the firm to continue operating engineering practice without adequate licensed supervision
Engineer B's wife assumed operational management of the firm following his stroke, enabling the continuation of impaired practice
Assumed operational management of Engineer B's structural engineering firm following his stroke, enabling the firm to continue operating and delivering engineering services without adequate licensed professional oversight
Engineer B's wife assumed operational management of Engineer B's structural engineering firm following his stroke, enabling the firm to continue operating
a non-engineer manager may not authorize, direct, or enable the performance of engineering services that require licensed professional oversight
Engineer A transitions from uninformed client to informed engineer with full knowledge of misconduct; the decision not to report becomes a conscious ethical choice rather than an oversight; moral responsibility shifts
During private confrontation between Engineer A and Engineer B
During Engineer A's private confrontation, Engineer B disclosed that he had suffered a stroke, revealing for the first time to Engineer A the medical reason behind the firm's compromised operations. This disclosure reframed the professional failure within a human tragedy.
Engineer B's stroke before Engineer B signing and sealing drawings without adequate review
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior... Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C... Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review.
Engineer B signing and sealing drawings without adequate review
Engineer B's stroke before Engineer B's wife taking over management of the business
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior... Engineer B's wife took over management of the business.
Engineer B's wife taking over management of the business
Engineer B's stroke before Engineer Intern C performing all design work under Engineer B's seal
Engineer Intern C performing all design work under Engineer B's seal
Engineer B's stroke before significant structural failure during basement construction
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior [to the meeting]... this process led to the failure of Engineer A's building.
significant structural failure during basement construction
Engineer Incapacity and Delegation Standard - Post-Stroke Practice
Professional engineering societies and state licensing boards
Professional Norms Governing Engineer Incapacity and Delegation of Design Responsibilities
Engineer Incapacity and Delegation Standard
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior
Establishes that Engineer B's decision to continue practice after a stroke, delegating all design work to an intern with minimal review, violated professional obligations to suspend or close practice when competence is compromised
Engineer Intern C Cooperative Complicity Recognition Failure
Cooperative Impaired Practice Complicity Recognition Capability
Engineer Intern C failed to recognize that cooperating in the arrangement with impaired Engineer B constituted ethical complicity in inadequately supervised practice, despite being legally shielded from censure under the state engineering practice act
Engineer Intern C's legal immunity from censure under the state engineering practice act did not absolve ethical responsibility for cooperative complicity in impaired practice
Actively cooperated with Engineer B's arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services despite knowing Engineer B could not provide adequate guidance, direct supervision, or review — constituting violation of NSPE Code II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.8.a
Engineer Intern C Unsupervised Engineer Intern Performing Licensed Work
While this might keep Engineer Intern C from legal censure per the State Engineering Practice Act, it does not absolve Engineer Intern C of ethical responsibility
Engineer Intern C cooperated with Engineer B in their arrangement to continue to deliver engineering design services as soon as it was realized Engineer B was unable to provide guidance, direct supervision or review
Engineer Intern C is ethically culpable through violation of Section II.1.e, Section II.1.f, and Section III.8.a of the Code of Ethics
Engineer Intern C Dissent Calibration Impaired Supervision
Engineer Intern Dissent Calibration Capability
Engineer Intern C lacked the capability to correctly calibrate the form and intensity of professional dissent from performing licensed engineering work under an impaired supervisor, failing to recognize that the situation required mandatory dissent rather than acquiescence
Engineer Intern C performed licensed engineering work under nominal supervision without dissenting or escalating despite awareness of impairment
Continuing to perform all structural design work despite full awareness of Engineer B's impaired condition, without raising formal objection or escalating to appropriate authorities
Engineer Intern C (who was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition) would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review
Engineer Intern C Impaired Supervision Recognition Failure
Impaired Supervision Recognition and Refusal Capability
Engineer Intern C recognized Engineer B's impaired condition but failed to exercise the capability to refuse to perform licensed engineering work under such inadequate supervision, instead cooperating in the arrangement
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition and cooperated with the arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services
Performed all substantive structural design and prepared construction drawings under the direction of a medically impaired licensed engineer who could not provide adequate guidance, direct supervision, or review
Engineer Intern C, a subordinate of Engineer B, was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition
Engineer Intern C Impaired Supervision Recognition Refusal
Engineer Intern C lacked the capability to refuse to perform licensed structural engineering work under the inadequate supervision of a medically impaired licensed engineer, proceeding with design work despite full awareness of Engineer B's impaired condition
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition yet continued to perform licensed engineering work under his nominal supervision
Performing all substantive structural design and preparing construction drawings while fully aware of Engineer B's stroke-induced impairment and the nominal nature of his review
Engineer Intern C (who was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition) would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings
Engineer Intern C Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Failure
Engineer Intern C failed to maintain the boundary between permissible professional work and impermissible aiding of inadequately supervised engineering practice, cooperating in an arrangement that violated NSPE Code Section II.1.e
Engineer Intern C's cooperation in the arrangement with impaired Engineer B constituted aiding unlawful practice under NSPE Code II.1.e
Performed substantive structural engineering design and prepared construction drawings under an arrangement with a medically impaired engineer who could not provide adequate supervision, thereby aiding the unlawful practice of engineering
Engineer Intern C cooperated with Engineer B in their arrangement to continue to deliver engineering design services
engineers shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering by a person or firm
Engineer Intern C Structural Engineering Design Competence
Engineer Intern C lacked sufficient structural engineering design competence to independently produce construction drawings free from serious errors, omissions, and faulty details, as evidenced by the structural failure and the numerous design deficiencies identified by Engineer R
Engineer Intern C with approximately two years of experience performed all substantive structural design without adequate supervision, resulting in serious design deficiencies
Preparation of structural construction drawings containing a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details that led to basement structural failure
Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer employee with about two years' experience
Engineer R's review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details, not only for the failed basement, but also for the portions of the structure that had not been built yet
Engineer Intern C performing design work overlaps basement construction phase
Engineer Intern C would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings... early during the process of constructing the basement there was a significant structural failure.
Engineer Intern C performing design work
Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
Engineer Intern C performing design work under Engineer B's seal before structural failure of Engineer A's building
Engineer Intern C would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review. Ultimately, this process led to the failure of Engineer A's building.
Engineer Intern C performing design work under Engineer B's seal
structural failure of Engineer A's building
Engineer R Design Deficiency Causal Attribution
Design Deficiency Causal Attribution Capability
Engineer R demonstrated advanced capability to identify, analyze, and accurately attribute the root causes of structural design deficiencies — including determining that deficiencies arose from inadequate competence and lack of substantive supervisory review — and to communicate this causal attribution through a formal independent review report
Engineer R's independent review revealed the scope and nature of design deficiencies enabling Engineer A to understand the full extent of the problem
Producing an independent review report identifying serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details across both the failed basement and unbuilt portions of the structure
Engineer R Independent Structural Failure Reviewer
Engineer R Independent Reviewer Reporting Obligation Assessment
Independent Reviewer Reporting Obligation Assessment Capability
Engineer R possessed the capability to assess whether his independent discovery of incompetent practice triggered an independent reporting obligation to the state licensure board, and to correctly determine that this obligation would require independent action if Engineer A failed to take the lead in reporting
Engineer R technically uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents and was subsequently informed of Engineer B's impairment and the series of actions that followed
Case analysis establishes that Engineer R was obligated to report Engineer B to the state board under NSPE Code Section II.1.f if Engineer A did not take the lead in reporting, with Engineer R's concurrence noted in a joint report if Engineer A led
if Engineer A took the lead in reporting the matter, the report could be styled to note Engineer R's concurrence. Otherwise, Engineer R would be obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board (Section II.1.f)
in the aftermath of Engineer R's discovery, it is reasonable to think Engineer R was informed of Engineer B's impairment due to a stroke
Engineer R Independent Structural Failure Review
Engineer R demonstrated expert structural engineering design competence enabling independent identification of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details in Engineer B's construction drawings, and complete redesign of the structure
Engineer R, described as a well-respected structural engineer, was retained to independently review the structural drawings and failed basement structure
Conducting an independent review that revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details, and subsequently completely redesigning the structure
Engineer A retained a well-respected structural engineer, Engineer R, to perform an independent review of the structural drawings and the failed basement structure
Engineer A retained Engineer R to completely redesign the structure
Engineer R Public Safety Escalation Obligation
Engineer R possessed the capability to recognize that his discovery of incompetent engineering practice and structural failures required escalation to the state licensure board under NSPE Code Section II.1.f, independently of whether the commissioning client Engineer A took the lead in reporting
Engineer R's independent discovery of incompetent practice triggered reporting obligations under NSPE Code Section II.1.f
Case analysis establishes Engineer R's independent obligation to report to the state board if Engineer A did not take the lead, based on Engineer R's discovery of incompetent practice
Engineer R would be obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board (Section II.1.f)
engineers having knowledge of any alleged violation of this Code shall report thereon to appropriate professional bodies and, when relevant, also to public authorities, and cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required
Engineer R Structural Engineering Design Competence
Engineer R possessed advanced structural engineering design competence enabling him to independently identify the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents and the structural failures resulting therefrom
Engineer R was described as a well-respected structural engineer retained to independently review structural drawings and failed construction
Retained as a well-respected structural engineer to independently review structural drawings and failed construction, successfully identifying incompetent design and construction documents
Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board - Engineer A's Decision Not to Report
NSPE and state engineering licensing authorities
Professional Norms Governing Engineer Duty to Report Violations to State Licensing Board
Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard
Establishes the professional and ethical obligation of Engineer A to report Engineer B's conduct to the State Board, and frames the ethical tension created by Engineer A's decision not to report due to personal friendship and sympathy for Engineer B's impairment
Engineer R's independent review before Engineer A retaining Engineer R to redesign the structure
Engineer R's review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors... Engineer A retained Engineer R to completely redesign the structure.
Engineer A retaining Engineer R to redesign the structure
Engineer R's independent review before private meeting between Engineer A and Engineer B
Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design, including Engineer R's report.
private meeting between Engineer A and Engineer B
Engineer R's redesign of the structure after significant structural failure
Engineer A retained Engineer R to completely redesign the structure... early during the process of constructing the basement there was a significant structural failure.
Engineering Intern Supervision Standard - Sign and Seal Without Review
State engineering licensing boards and professional engineering societies
Professional Norms Governing Supervision of Engineering Interns and Sign-and-Seal Obligations
Establishes that Engineer B's practice of signing and sealing drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C with little to no review violated the professional obligation to adequately supervise subordinate engineering work
Engineering Intern Supervision Standard Constraint - Engineer B Sealing Without Review
Engineer B's practice of signing and sealing drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C with little to no review violated the professional standard requiring active supervisory direction and control over intern work product.
Engineer B was required by professional norms and state licensure law to provide genuine supervisory direction and control over Engineer Intern C's structural design work before affixing his seal, prohibiting the practice of signing and sealing drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C with little to no review, as established by the Engineering Intern Supervision Standard and NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778.
NSPE Code Section II.2; NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778; State Engineering Licensure Law - Sign and Seal Requirements
Engineer B violated Section II. 2. of the code because he affixed his signature and seal to documents prepared without his direction or control.
Throughout the period of Engineer B's post-stroke firm operation
Engineering decisions must be personally made by the professional engineer or by others over which the professional engineer provides supervisory direction and control authority.
This also shows Engineer B was practicing in violation of the state licensure law (Section III.8.a).
Financial Pressure Practice Continuation Prohibition - Engineer B
Engineer B explicitly cited financial reasons as the basis for not suspending practice after his stroke, delegating all design work to an intern while continuing to seal documents.
Financial Pressure Practice Continuation Prohibition Constraint
Engineer B was prohibited from continuing to practice, seal documents, or hold himself out as providing competent engineering services when the primary motivation for continuation was financial necessity — avoidance of business closure or income loss — given that he lacked the cognitive capacity to exercise genuine responsible charge following his stroke.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional Competence Standard
for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office.
Rather, Engineer B's wife took over management of the business, and Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C
Financial Pressure Practice Continuation Prohibition Constraint - Engineer B Post-Stroke
Engineer B explicitly cited financial reasons as the basis for not suspending practice after his stroke, delegating all substantive design work to an intern while continuing to seal documents.
Engineer B was prohibited from continuing to practice, seal documents, or hold himself out as providing competent engineering services when the primary motivation for continuation was financial necessity — avoidance of business closure and income loss — when his post-stroke condition rendered him incapable of exercising genuine responsible charge.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional Competence Standard; State Engineering Practice Act
From Engineer B's stroke through the period of continued practice
Impaired Licensee Practice Suspension - Engineer B Post-Stroke Continuation
Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office for financial reasons following his stroke, and instead delegated all design work to an intern while continuing to seal documents.
Impaired Licensee Practice Suspension Constraint
Engineer B, having suffered a stroke that materially impaired his cognitive and professional functioning, was required to suspend practice, close his office, or otherwise cease sealing engineering documents until competence was restored, and was prohibited from continuing professional practice under the fiction of responsible charge when he lacked the cognitive capacity to exercise genuine review, direction, and control over work product bearing his seal.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional Competence Standard - Engineer B Post-Stroke Practice; State Engineering Practice Act
From the time of Engineer B's stroke onward until competence was restored
Impaired Licensee Practice Suspension Constraint - Engineer B Financial Pressure Continuation
Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office for financial and other reasons following his stroke, and instead delegated all design work to Engineer Intern C while continuing to seal documents with little to no review.
Engineer B was required to suspend practice, close his office, or otherwise cease sealing engineering documents following his stroke, and was prohibited from continuing professional practice under the fiction of responsible charge when he lacked the cognitive capacity to exercise genuine review, direction, and control — financial necessity and business continuity concerns did not constitute justification for continued practice.
Rather, Engineer B's wife took over management of the business, and Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C.
Impaired Peer Reporting Obligation - Engineer A Non-Reporting of Engineer B
Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failure but chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board due to their long friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical circumstances.
Impaired Peer Reporting Obligation Constraint
Engineer A, having direct personal knowledge that Engineer B was practicing while medically impaired following a stroke — and whose impaired practice caused actual structural failure and ongoing public safety risk — was required to report Engineer B to the State Board of Engineering, and was prohibited from rationalizing non-reporting on the basis of personal friendship, sympathy for Engineer B's financial circumstances, or private confrontation as a substitute for formal regulatory notification.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard; BER Case 17-7
From the time Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failure
Impaired Peer Reporting Obligation Constraint - Engineer A Knowledge of Engineer B
Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failure of the office building basement but chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board, citing personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical circumstances.
Engineer A, having direct personal knowledge that Engineer B was practicing while medically impaired following a stroke — and whose impaired practice had caused actual structural failure and ongoing public safety risk — was required to report Engineer B to the State Board of Engineering, prohibiting non-reporting rationalized by personal friendship, sympathy for Engineer B's financial circumstances, or private confrontation as a substitute for formal regulatory notification.
NSPE Code Sections I.1, II.1.e, II.1.f, III.7; BER Case 17-7
Even though Engineer A was a friend of Engineer B, their friendship was not an ethical justification for Engineer A to ignore or conceal Engineer B's violations.
Code Section III.7, engineers who believe others are guilty of unethical or illegal practice shall present such information to the proper authority for action, unambiguously requires that such violations be reported to the appropriate professional body, in this case the State Board.
This determination is also strengthened by Section III.8.a, engineers shall conform with state licensure law.
Impaired Peer Reporting Obligation Constraint - Engineer A Non-Reporting of Engineer B
Engineer A privately confronted Engineer B with Engineer R's report of serious design errors and learned of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment, but chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board out of personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical and financial circumstances.
Engineer A, having direct personal knowledge that Engineer B was practicing while medically impaired following a stroke — and that this impaired practice caused actual structural failure — was obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board and was prohibited from substituting private confrontation and personal friendship for that mandatory formal reporting obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 17-7; Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard
From the moment Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failure
At this meeting, Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior.
Independent Engineering Review - Engineer R's Structural Assessment
Engineer R (well-respected structural engineer retained by Engineer A)
Independent Review of Structural Drawings and Failed Basement Structure by Engineer R
Engineer R's independent review provided the evidentiary basis for identifying the scope of Engineer B's design errors and formed the foundation for Engineer A's confrontation of Engineer B with the faulty design
Intern Ethical Culpability Constraint - Engineer Intern C Complicity
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition following his stroke and cooperated with the arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services, performing substantive structural design and producing construction drawings under Engineer B's seal with little to no review.
Intern Ethical Culpability Despite Unlicensed Status Constraint
Engineer Intern C bore independent ethical culpability under the NSPE Code of Ethics for knowingly cooperating with Engineer B's impaired practice — performing substantive structural design work to be sealed by Engineer B without adequate review — despite full awareness of Engineer B's stroke and incapacity, even though the intern's unlicensed status may shield them from legal censure under the State Engineering Practice Act.
NSPE Code Sections II.1.e, II.1.f, III.8.a; BER Case 15-2
While this might keep Engineer Intern C from legal censure per the State Engineering Practice Act, it does not absolve Engineer Intern C of ethical responsibility.
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's cooperation with Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement
In summary, Engineer Intern C is ethically culpable through violation of Section II.1.e, Section II.1.f, and Section III.8.a of the Code of Ethics.
The facts suggest Engineer Intern C, a subordinate of Engineer B, was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition.
Intern Ethical Culpability Despite Unlicensed Status - Engineer Intern C
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's stroke and impaired condition yet continued to perform all structural design work under Engineer B's seal without adequate supervision.
Engineer Intern C, despite being unlicensed and therefore potentially shielded from legal censure under the State Engineering Practice Act, bore independent ethical culpability under the professional code of ethics for knowingly cooperating with Engineer B's impaired practice and continuing to deliver engineering services with full awareness of Engineer B's incapacity.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 15-2; State Engineering Practice Act
Engineer Intern C (who was fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition) would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review.
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's knowing participation in the arrangement
Intern Ethical Culpability Despite Unlicensed Status Constraint - Engineer Intern C
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's stroke and incapacity but continued to perform all substantive engineering design work under the fiction of Engineer B's supervision and seal.
Engineer Intern C, despite being unlicensed and potentially shielded from legal censure under the State Engineering Practice Act, bore independent ethical culpability under the professional code of ethics for knowingly cooperating with Engineer B's impaired and non-supervising practice, and could not treat the absence of licensure as an absence of ethical obligation.
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's knowing participation in the impaired practice arrangement
Intern Knowing Circumvention Refusal - Engineer Intern C Impaired Supervision
Engineer Intern C, with full knowledge of Engineer B's impaired condition, performed all structural design and construction drawings that Engineer B then sealed with little to no review, ultimately contributing to the structural failure.
Intern Knowing Circumvention Refusal Constraint
Engineer Intern C, being fully aware of Engineer B's stroke and resulting incapacity, was required to refuse participation in the arrangement whereby Intern C performed substantive structural design work that would be sealed by Engineer B without adequate review, and was prohibited from knowingly serving as the de facto unlicensed engineer of record under the fiction of licensed supervision.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 15-2; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's participation in the arrangement with Engineer B
Ultimately, this process led to the failure of Engineer A's building.
Intern Knowing Circumvention Refusal Constraint - Engineer Intern C Complicity
Engineer Intern C was fully aware of Engineer B's stroke and impaired condition, yet continued to perform all substantive structural design work and produce construction drawings that Engineer B would seal with little to no review, ultimately contributing to the structural failure of Engineer A's office building.
Engineer Intern C, being fully aware of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment and incapacity to exercise genuine responsible charge, was required to refuse participation in the arrangement whereby Intern C performed substantive structural design work that would be sealed by Engineer B without adequate review, and was required to seek correction through appropriate authorities.
BER Case 15-2; NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard - Sign and Seal Without Review
Throughout the period of Engineer Intern C's participation in the impaired practice arrangement
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer B violated Section II.2. of the code because he affixed his signature and seal to documents prepared without his direction or control.
Section I.1 of the Code, engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
Section II.1.e, engineers shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering by a person or firm
Section II.1.f, engineers having knowledge of any alleged violation of this Code shall report thereon to appropriate professional bodies
Section III.7, engineers who believe others are guilty of unethical or illegal practice shall present such information to the proper authority for action
Section III.8.a, engineers shall conform with state licensure law
BER in analyzing obligations of all engineers in the case
Primary normative authority governing Engineer B's sealing obligations, Engineer Intern C's complicity, Engineer A's reporting duty, and Engineer R's obligations; multiple sections cited throughout the discussion
NSPE Code of Ethics - Engineer Competence and Public Safety Obligations
Engineer A, Engineer B, Engineer Intern C
Grounds the obligation of Engineer B to practice only within competence, the obligation to supervise Engineer Intern C adequately, and the obligation of Engineer A to report Engineer B's conduct to the State Board
Non-Aiding Unlicensed Engineering Practice - Engineer B Delegation to Intern C
Engineer B effectively transferred all substantive engineering design authority to unlicensed Engineer Intern C while affixing his seal to the resulting work without meaningful review, constituting facilitation of unlicensed engineering practice.
Non-Aiding Unlicensed Engineering Practice Constraint
Engineer B was absolutely prohibited from taking actions — including delegating all structural design authority to Engineer Intern C and sealing the resulting drawings without meaningful review — that aided, abetted, or facilitated the effective unlawful practice of engineering by an unlicensed individual, regardless of financial pressures or medical circumstances.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.e; State Engineering Practice Act; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard
Throughout the period of Engineer B's post-stroke delegation arrangement with Engineer Intern C
Non-Aiding Unlicensed Engineering Practice Constraint - Engineer Intern C
Engineer Intern C actively cooperated with Engineer B's arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services despite full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and incapacity, thereby aiding the unlawful practice of engineering.
Engineer Intern C was prohibited from taking actions that aided or facilitated Engineer B's unlawful practice of engineering — including producing substantive structural design work to be sealed by an engineer incapable of exercising responsible charge — arising from NSPE Code Section II.1.e and the principle that the obligation to refuse facilitation of unlicensed or improperly supervised practice is non-negotiable regardless of employment hierarchy.
Section II.1.e, engineers shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering by a person or firm.
Engineer Intern C cooperated with Engineer B in their arrangement to continue to deliver engineering design services as soon as it was realized Engineer B was unable to provide guidance, direct supervision or review.
Peer Review Absence Compensation - Engineer B No Alternative Quality Controls
Engineer B's stroke eliminated his capacity for meaningful supervisory review, yet no alternative quality assurance mechanism was established; instead, Engineer Intern C performed all design work without any qualified oversight.
Peer Review Absence Compensation Constraint
Engineer B, having lost the capacity to exercise meaningful supervisory review following his stroke, was required to establish alternative verification arrangements — such as retaining a qualified licensed engineer to provide genuine oversight — before continuing to seal structural engineering work of the complexity involved in Engineer A's office building, and was prohibited from continuing practice at the same scope without compensating quality controls.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional Competence Standard; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard
Peer Review Cooperation Under Prior Error Accountability Constraint - Engineer B and Engineer R Review
Engineer A confronted Engineer B with Engineer R's report of serious design errors, and Engineer B's obligations of professional accountability required cooperation with the review process rather than resistance.
Peer Review Cooperation Under Prior Error Accountability Constraint
Engineer B, whose prior work was found to contain significant structural design errors confirmed by Engineer R's independent review, was required to cooperate fully with Engineer R's legitimately commissioned review and any subsequent peer review of related work, and was prohibited from obstructing or refusing cooperation on the basis of consent-based objection when confirmed prior errors created heightened accountability obligations.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case Precedent; Independent Engineering Review Standard
From the time Engineer R's review findings were presented to Engineer B
Post-Accident Hindsight Non-Retroactive Error Imposition Constraint - Engineer B Design Standard of Care
Engineer R's independent review confirmed serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details in Engineer B's sealed drawings — these were not merely hindsight observations but contemporaneous professional deficiencies arising from the absence of competent engineering judgment in the design process.
Post-Accident Hindsight Non-Retroactive Error Imposition Constraint
While Engineer B's design errors were confirmed by independent review rather than merely identified in hindsight, the professional standard-of-care determination must be grounded in what a competent structural engineer exercising genuine responsible charge would have produced — the errors here arose not from hindsight but from the absence of competent review at the time of design due to Engineer B's impaired condition.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional Competence Standard; BER Case Precedent
Engineer R's review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details, not only for the failed basement, but also for the portions of the structure that had not been built yet.
At the time of structural design and drawing production
Post-Stroke Impaired Engineer Private Confrontation Insufficiency - Engineer A
Engineer A treated private confrontation as a sufficient response to discovering Engineer B's impaired practice and resulting structural failure, without reporting to the State Board.
Post-Stroke Impaired Engineer Private Confrontation Insufficiency Constraint
Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B with the faulty design and Engineer R's report — while professionally courteous — was insufficient to discharge Engineer A's mandatory reporting obligation to the State Board, given that the impaired practice had caused actual harm and ongoing public safety risk from Engineer B's continued practice remained unmitigated.
Post-Stroke Impaired Engineer Private Confrontation Insufficiency Constraint - Engineer A and Engineer B
Engineer A privately confronted Engineer B but treated that private confrontation as a sufficient discharge of his professional obligations, declining to escalate to the State Board despite ongoing public safety risk from unbuilt portions of the defective structure.
Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B with the faulty design and Engineer R's report did not discharge Engineer A's mandatory reporting obligation to the State Board, because Engineer B's impaired practice had caused actual structural harm and ongoing public safety risk from unbuilt defective design remained unmitigated.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 17-7; BER Case 15-2
From the private meeting between Engineer A and Engineer B through the period of non-reporting
Post-Stroke Responsible Charge Prohibition - Engineer B Structural Design
Engineer B suffered a stroke and continued to seal structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review, resulting in a structural failure of Engineer A's office building basement.
Post-Stroke Responsible Charge Prohibition Constraint
Engineer B, having suffered a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity, was absolutely prohibited from affixing his professional signature and seal to structural engineering drawings produced by Engineer Intern C without meaningful review, as his post-stroke condition precluded genuine responsible charge over the work product.
NSPE Code of Ethics; State Engineering Licensure Law - Sign and Seal Requirements; State Engineering Practice Act
From the time of Engineer B's stroke through the period of sealing Engineer Intern C's drawings
Engineer B might use the private confrontation as an opportunity to appeal to Engineer A's friendship to avoid reporting
Learning of the stroke might increase Engineer A's compassion and further reduce the likelihood of reporting
The private confrontation might delay or substitute for the formal reporting that Engineer A's professional obligations required
Basic professional courtesy of informing Engineer B of the findings before taking formal action
NSPE Code Section III.7. Engineers shall not maliciously injure the professional reputation of others; private confrontation before reporting reflects a non-malicious approach
Compassion for a colleague's circumstances does not eliminate the reporting obligation
Engineers shall not maliciously injure the professional reputation of colleagues
Engineers shall report known violations to appropriate bodies
Private resolution of public safety violations is insufficient when the violations implicate public welfare
Confront Engineer B with the evidence of design deficiencies in a private, compassionate manner before taking any formal action, allowing Engineer B to explain or respond and preserving the friendship to the extent possible
Ability to communicate difficult professional findings to a colleague in a constructive manner
Capacity to separate personal compassion from professional reporting obligations
Understanding of the ethical obligations triggered by knowledge of professional violations
Post-review, before or during the decision not to report
NSPE Code Section II.1.f. Engineers shall report known violations to appropriate authorities (private confrontation is not a substitute for reporting)
NSPE Code Section III.7. Engineers who have knowledge of violations shall report them to professional or governmental bodies (private confrontation delays this obligation)
Rather than immediately reporting Engineer B's deficient work to the State Board, Engineer A chose to first privately confront Engineer B with Engineer R's findings as a professional courtesy, during which he learned of Engineer B's stroke. This decision reflected Engineer A's attempt to balance personal compassion with professional obligation by giving Engineer B the opportunity to respond before formal action.
Privately Confront Engineer B (Action 7) → Engineer B's Stroke Disclosed (Event 6)
Rather than immediately reporting Engineer B's deficient work to the State Board, Engineer A chose to privately confront Engineer B, during which Engineer B disclosed that he had suffered a stroke, revealing the underlying cause of the professional failures
Privately Confront Engineer B (Action 7)
Had Engineer A immediately reported to the State Board without private confrontation, the stroke disclosure may have emerged through regulatory investigation rather than voluntary disclosure; the ethical concern is whether private confrontation delayed mandatory reporting obligations
Engineer A's decision to pursue private confrontation rather than immediate regulatory reporting
Engineer B's willingness to disclose the stroke during private confrontation
Prior concealment of stroke from Engineer A and the State Board
Structural failure and Engineer R's review creating undeniable evidence of deficiency
Engineer A (for choosing private confrontation over immediate reporting); Engineer B (for prior concealment)
Private confrontation with documented evidence of failure + Engineer B's disclosure of stroke = revelation of root cause
Professional Competence Standard - Engineer B Post-Stroke Practice
NSPE and professional engineering societies
Professional Norms Governing Engineer Competence and Scope of Practice
Establishes the benchmark against which Engineer B's post-stroke continuation of structural engineering practice is evaluated, including the obligation to disclose limitations and refrain from practice when competence is compromised
Public Safety Paramount - Engineer A Non-Reporting Despite Ongoing Risk
Engineer A chose not to report Engineer B despite discovering impaired practice that caused actual structural failure and posed ongoing risk to public safety from Engineer B's continued practice with other clients.
Engineer A's obligation to hold public safety paramount — given the discovered structural deficiencies in unbuilt portions of the structure and Engineer B's ongoing impaired practice — constrained Engineer A from allowing personal friendship and compassion to override the duty to report Engineer B to the State Board, as non-reporting permitted ongoing public safety risk from Engineer B's continued impaired practice.
Engineer A noticed what he believed was 'odd' structural bracing and other questionable structural details.
From the time Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the structural failure
Was it ethical for Engineer A to not report Engineer B?
Did Engineer A bear any responsibility for the structural failure by retaining a friend as a structural engineer without independently verifying Engineer B's current competence and capacity to perform the work before the project began?
What ethical obligations, if any, did Engineer B's wife incur by assuming management of the firm with full knowledge of Engineer B's impaired condition, effectively enabling the continuation of a practice that posed a public safety risk?
At what point did Engineer Intern C's ethical obligation shift from deference to a supervising licensed engineer to an affirmative duty to refuse participation or report the arrangement to the State Board, given that Intern C had full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and the absence of meaningful review?
Does Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B, while well-intentioned, itself constitute a form of aiding or abetting the continuation of impaired practice by giving Engineer B advance warning without triggering any formal corrective mechanism, and did it thereby extend the period of public risk?
How should the obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public be weighed against the principle that engineers shall not attempt to injure the professional reputation of a colleague, when reporting an impaired engineer to the State Board may cause lasting reputational and financial harm to that engineer?
Does the obligation of engineers to conform with state registration laws and sign-and-seal requirements conflict with the practical reality of financial pressure on a sole-practitioner firm, and if so, does financial hardship ever constitute a legitimate mitigating factor that modifies the ethical duty to suspend impaired practice?
When Engineer R, retained as an independent reviewer, discovers evidence of ongoing impaired practice that extends beyond the immediate project, does the duty to report that violation to the State Board conflict with the duty not to maliciously injure a fellow engineer's reputation, and how should Engineer R navigate this tension given that reporting is compelled by direct professional knowledge rather than malice?
Does the principle that engineers shall perform services only in areas of their competence create an independent ethical obligation for Engineer Intern C to refuse to perform structural design work beyond the intern's two years of experience and unlicensed status, even when directed to do so by a nominally supervising licensed engineer, and does compliance with a superior's directive relieve the intern of ethical culpability?
Were Engineer Intern C’s actions ethical?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill his categorical duty to protect public safety when he chose personal loyalty to Engineer B over his obligation to report a known violation to the State Board, regardless of the compassionate circumstances surrounding Engineer B's stroke?
From a consequentialist perspective, did Engineer B's decision to continue practice after his stroke — motivated by financial survival — produce net harm that outweighed any benefit to his firm, his employees, or his clients, given that the foreseeable consequence was an actual structural failure and ongoing risk to future occupants of unbuilt portions of the structure?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer Intern C demonstrate the professional integrity and moral courage expected of an emerging engineer when, with full knowledge of Engineer B's incapacitated condition, he chose to cooperate with an arrangement that placed his own career advancement and employment security above the safety of the public and the ethical standards of the profession?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer R's status as an independent third-party reviewer — retained solely to assess the structural failure and redesign the building — create a distinct and non-delegable duty to report Engineer B's violations to the State Board, independent of whatever action Engineer A chooses to take, given that Engineer R acquired direct professional knowledge of serious code violations through his formal review?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer B act with professional integrity and honesty when he concealed his post-stroke impairment from clients, regulators, and the public, and does the existence of financial hardship mitigate or merely explain — but not excuse — the character failure that his continued practice represented?
From a consequentialist perspective, would Engineer A's private confrontation of Engineer B — without formal reporting — have been ethically sufficient if no structural failure had yet occurred and no further harm materialized, or does the public safety obligation to report exist independently of whether harm has already been realized?
What are Engineer A’s further ethical obligations under these circumstances?
If Engineer A had immediately reported Engineer B to the State Board upon discovering the structural failure and the 'odd' bracing — before privately confronting Engineer B — would the Board's intervention have created a faster pathway to a supervised practice management alternative that protected both the public and Engineer B's firm, compared to the private confrontation approach Engineer A actually chose?
If Engineer Intern C had refused to perform unsupervised structural design work — or had independently reported Engineer B's impaired condition to the State Board — would the structural failure of Engineer A's building basement have been prevented, and would Engineer Intern C's own professional trajectory have been protected from the ethical and legal consequences of complicity in unlicensed practice?
If Engineer B had voluntarily disclosed his stroke to the State Board immediately after suffering it, sought a formal temporary practice management arrangement, and placed Engineer Intern C's work under the supervision of a qualified licensed structural engineer, would Engineer B have been able to preserve his firm's viability while remaining in compliance with his ethical and legal obligations — thereby avoiding the harm that ultimately resulted?
If Engineer A had conducted a more rigorous pre-retention competence assessment of Engineer B before awarding him the structural design contract — for example, by verifying Engineer B's current professional standing, recent project history, and firm capacity — would Engineer A have discovered warning signs of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment early enough to prevent the engagement entirely, and does the failure to perform such due diligence itself carry an ethical dimension?
What are Engineer R’s ethical obligations?
Resource Constraint - Engineer B Financial Inability to Suspend Practice
Engineer B explicitly cited financial reasons as the basis for not suspending practice, but this resource constraint does not override the ethical and regulatory prohibition on impaired practice.
Engineer B faced a resource constraint arising from his financial inability to suspend practice or close his office following his stroke, as he was the only licensed professional engineer in his firm and could not afford the economic consequences of practice suspension — creating tension between financial necessity and the ethical and regulatory obligation to cease practice when competence is impaired.
Responsible Charge Active Engagement Constraint - Engineer B Post-Stroke Sealing
Engineer B suffered a stroke that materially impaired his cognitive and professional functioning, yet continued to operate his firm and affix his seal to structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review, resulting in structurally deficient design and actual structural failure of Engineer A's office building basement.
Engineer B was prohibited from affixing his professional signature and seal to structural engineering drawings produced by Engineer Intern C without his active direction, control, and meaningful review, as his post-stroke cognitive impairment rendered him incapable of exercising genuine responsible charge as defined by NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778 and state licensure law.
NSPE Code Section II.2; NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778: Responsible Charge; State Engineering Practice Act (Section III.8.a)
From the time of Engineer B's stroke through the period of continued practice and sealing of documents
Engineer B chose to sign and seal design drawings without proper review while impaired by this stroke was a problem.
Reviewing drawings or documents after preparation without involvement in the design and development process does not satisfy the definition of Responsible Charge.
Responsible Charge Verification Constraint - Engineer B Sealing Intern C Drawings
Engineer B's practice of signing and sealing drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C with little to no review violated the professional and legal standard requiring genuine responsible charge as a prerequisite to sealing engineering documents.
Responsible Charge Verification Constraint
Engineer B was required to have exercised active, substantive review and direction over structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C sufficient to establish genuine responsible charge before affixing his seal, and was prohibited from sealing documents reviewed only cursorily or not at all.
State Engineering Licensure Law - Sign and Seal Requirements; NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard
Each instance of Engineer B affixing his seal to drawings produced by Engineer Intern C following the stroke
Findings could trigger reporting obligations toward Engineer B
Review findings might implicate Engineer B in serious professional misconduct
The review might reveal that the entire design needed to be replaced, creating significant cost and delay
NSPE Code Section II.1. Acting to protect public safety by investigating a known structural failure
Obligation to obtain competent professional assessment of a safety-critical situation
Owner's duty of care to ensure the structural integrity of the building before proceeding
Responsible stewardship of the construction project
Engineers shall hold public safety, health, and welfare paramount
Objective professional judgment requires independent review when conflicts of interest or competence are suspected
When safety is in doubt, independent verification is required before proceeding
Obtain an objective, independent assessment of the structural design's adequacy and identify the cause and scope of the failure before proceeding further with construction
Ability to recognize structural failure and questionable design details as warranting independent review
Authority as project owner to commission additional engineering services
Knowledge to select a competent and independent structural engineer for the review
Early construction phase, immediately following structural failure
After observing the structural failure and noticing questionable structural details in the drawings, Engineer A made the deliberate decision to retain Engineer R to conduct an independent structural review of Engineer B's design. This was a proactive professional response to identified safety concerns that ultimately uncovered the full scope of Engineer B's design deficiencies.
Engineer B would effectively be removed from the project, with reputational and financial consequences for him
Significant additional cost and schedule delay for the project
The decision would formalize the finding that Engineer B's work was inadequate, strengthening the case for a reporting obligation
NSPE Code Section II.1. Protecting public safety by replacing a demonstrably deficient structural design
Owner's duty of care to ensure structural integrity before proceeding with construction
Responsible professional judgment in responding to identified safety-critical deficiencies
Competent engineering oversight is non-negotiable on safety-critical structures
Engineers shall not allow personal interests to compromise their professional judgment on safety matters
Public safety is paramount and requires replacing known deficient designs regardless of personal cost or relationship consequences
Ensure the building is designed to a safe and professionally acceptable standard by replacing the deficient design with a competent redesign, protecting public safety and Engineer A's investment
Ability to evaluate Engineer R's review findings and make an informed decision about the design's viability
Authority as project owner to retain a new structural engineer and direct the redesign
Understanding of the safety implications of proceeding with a deficient structural design
Post-review, prior to or concurrent with confronting Engineer B
Following Engineer R's independent review, which revealed numerous serious design errors throughout Engineer B's drawings, Engineer A made the deliberate decision to retain Engineer R to completely redesign the structure rather than attempting to remediate or continue with Engineer B's flawed design. This decision effectively terminated Engineer B's role as structural engineer of record on the project.
Conflict of interest if performance issues arise
Potential difficulty objectively evaluating Engineer B's work quality due to friendship bias
Reduced likelihood of rigorous vetting of Engineer B's current competence and health status
Engineer A retained a licensed structural engineer for structural design work, satisfying the basic requirement to engage qualified professionals
Engineers shall act in such a manner as to uphold and enhance the honor, integrity, and dignity of the engineering profession
Engineers shall be objective and truthful in professional reports and decisions
Engineers shall not be influenced by conflict of interest in their professional duties
Secure a trusted, familiar structural engineer for the project at presumably favorable terms, leveraging an existing personal relationship
Due diligence obligation to verify the retained engineer's current fitness and capacity to perform the work
Objective professional judgment, personal friendship may have displaced rigorous competence evaluation
Ability to evaluate and select qualified engineering consultants
Capacity to conduct or commission due diligence on consultant fitness
Understanding of structural engineering scope and project requirements
Pre-construction, project initiation phase
Engineer A selected his personal friend Engineer B as the structural engineer consultant for his new office building project, mixing personal and professional relationships. This decision prioritized familiarity and friendship over an objective evaluation of competence and fitness for the project.
Retain Friend as Engineer (Action 1) → Structural Failure Occurs (Event 4)
Engineer A selected his personal friend Engineer B as the structural engineer consultant, prioritizing personal relationship over objective professional qualification assessment, creating the foundational condition enabling the subsequent chain of failures
Had Engineer A selected a consultant through objective merit-based evaluation with verified current competency, or had he established independent review requirements, the impaired Engineer B would not have been positioned to initiate the failure chain
Absence of due diligence into Engineer B's current professional capacity
Failure to establish contractual quality assurance requirements with the consulting firm
Implicit trust substituting for professional verification
Selection of consultant based on personal relationship rather than objective competency assessment
Friendship-based selection + absence of competency verification + no independent quality oversight mechanisms
Scope of problem expands from isolated failure to systemic design deficiency; Engineer B's professional misconduct is now documented by independent expert; Engineer R acquires knowledge that triggers reporting obligations; entire drawing set is invalidated
During independent review by Engineer R, after structural failure
Engineer R's independent review uncovered numerous serious design errors throughout the construction drawings, confirming that the structural failure was not isolated but symptomatic of systemic deficiencies in the design produced under Engineer B's firm. This finding expanded the scope of the crisis.
State Engineering Licensure Law - Sign and Seal Requirements
State legislature and engineering licensing board
State Engineering Licensure Statute - Sign and Seal and Supervision Requirements
Engineer A did not report Engineer B to the State Board
Provides the legal framework governing Engineer B's obligation to personally review and take responsibility for engineering drawings before affixing his professional seal, and establishes the legal basis for potential State Board action
State Engineering Practice Act (generic reference)
BER in evaluating legal dimensions of Engineer B's and Engineer Intern C's conduct
Referenced as the legal framework establishing licensure requirements and defining lawful engineering practice; cited in relation to Engineer B's unlawful sealing of documents and Engineer Intern C's protection from legal censure as an unlicensed intern
Project enters emergency status; construction halted; independent review triggered; Engineer A becomes aware of potential design deficiency; all parties' obligations escalate to critical level
A significant structural failure occurred early in basement construction, physically manifesting the consequences of the defective design produced under Engineer B's compromised supervision. This event made the design errors undeniable and halted the project.
Structural Failure Public Safety Escalation Constraint - Engineer R Unbuilt Portions
Engineer R's review revealed serious design errors not only in the failed basement but also in portions of the structure not yet built, creating ongoing public safety risk if construction were to proceed on those portions without redesign.
Structural Failure Public Safety Escalation Constraint
Engineer R, having discovered through independent review that unbuilt portions of Engineer A's office building contained serious structural design errors in addition to the failed basement, was required to immediately escalate those findings to all relevant parties — including Engineer A, Engineer B, and if necessary the State Board — prohibiting limitation of response to the failed basement alone.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Independent Engineering Review Standard; Public Safety Paramount Constraint
From completion of Engineer R's independent review
Engineer A retained Engineer R to completely redesign the structure.
Structural Failure Unbuilt Portion Escalation Constraint - Engineer R Discovery
Engineer R was retained to conduct an independent structural assessment after the failure of Engineer A's office building basement and discovered incompetent design and construction documents produced under Engineer B's seal, with knowledge of the circumstances of Engineer B's impaired practice.
Structural Failure Unbuilt Portion Escalation Constraint
Engineer R, having discovered through independent review that Engineer B's design and construction documents were incompetent and that the structural failure was caused by design errors, was required to escalate findings regarding unbuilt portions of the structure containing serious design errors to all relevant parties — including the client, Engineer B, and if necessary the State Board — prohibiting limitation of response to the failed portion alone.
NSPE Code Sections II.1.f, III.7; BER Case 17-7
The facts reveal it was Engineer R who technically uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents.
From the time of Engineer R's discovery of incompetent design documents and the structural failure
Further, in the aftermath of Engineer R's discovery, it is reasonable to think Engineer R was informed of Engineer B's impairment due to a stroke, and also the series of actions by Engineer B and Engineer Intern C that followed.
Third-Party Discovery Independent Reporting - Engineer R Structural Review Findings
Engineer R's independent review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors under Engineer B's seal, and Engineer R learned of the circumstances of Engineer B's post-stroke impaired practice, creating an independent reporting obligation.
Third-Party Discovery Independent Reporting Constraint
Engineer R, having been retained by Engineer A to conduct an independent structural review and having discovered serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details under Engineer B's seal — along with the circumstances of Engineer B's post-stroke impaired practice — was independently obligated to report those findings to the State Board, regardless of whether Engineer A chose to report.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Independent Engineering Review Standard; Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard; BER Case 17-7
From the time Engineer R completed the independent review and discovered the scope of Engineer B's violations
Third-Party Discovery Independent Reporting Constraint - Engineer R Structural Assessment
Engineer R's independent review revealed a surprising number of serious structural design errors for both the failed basement and unbuilt portions of the structure, and Engineer R learned of Engineer B's post-stroke impaired practice arrangement with Engineer Intern C.
Engineer R, having been retained by Engineer A to conduct an independent review and having discovered serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details — as well as the circumstances of Engineer B's post-stroke impaired practice — was independently obligated to report those findings to the State Board, regardless of whether Engineer A chose to report.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 17-7; Engineer Reporting Obligation to State Board Standard; Independent Engineering Review - Engineer R's Structural Assessment
From the completion of Engineer R's independent review through the period of non-reporting by Engineer A
Engineering firm now effectively operated by an unlicensed individual; design work delegated entirely to an intern; professional accountability structure collapses
Following Engineer B's stroke, his wife took over management of the engineering business without holding an engineering license, effectively directing a licensed engineering practice as a non-engineer. This created an unauthorized practice structure.
completion of construction drawings and permit issuance before contractor beginning construction
Construction drawings were completed, permits were issued, a contract was let, and the contractor began construction of the new office building.
completion of construction drawings and permit issuance
contractor beginning construction before significant structural failure during basement construction
the contractor began construction of the new office building – which included a basement. However, early during the process of constructing the basement there was a significant structural failure.
Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
Reporting obligation is mandatory; friendship affects the manner of fulfillment (cooperative, compassionate approach with State Board) but not the existence of the obligation
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.83
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.92
Public welfare obligation overrides friendship loyalty; friendship may inform the manner of reporting (cooperative, compassionate) but cannot justify non-reporting
Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.88
Engineer A was prohibited from rationalizing non-reporting of Engineer B's impaired practice on the basis of personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical and financial circumstances, as the public safety obligation arising from Engineer B's demonstrated design failures and ongoing impaired practice superseded personal loyalty considerations.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.91
Engineer A was prohibited from substituting personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B for the mandatory obligation to report Engineer B's violations — including impaired practice, inadequate supervision of Engineer Intern C, and the resulting public safety risk — to the State Board, as the strength of personal friendship does not diminish the reporting obligation established by NSPE Code Sections I.1, II.1.e, II.1.f, and III.7.
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.9
Engineer A's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including the risk posed by Engineer B's deficient structural design for unbuilt portions of the structure — constrained Engineer A from remaining silent about Engineer B's violations, establishing that the public safety obligation superseded Engineer A's personal loyalty to Engineer B.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.93
Engineer A's obligation to hold public safety paramount required him to report Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting ongoing risk from unbuilt defective structural design to the State Board, prohibiting Engineer A from allowing client loyalty, personal friendship, and compassion for Engineer B's circumstances to override the paramount public safety obligation.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.82
Impaired practice cessation obligation is not overridden by financial considerations; Engineer B was required to suspend practice or arrange qualified substitute supervision
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.8
Responsible charge cannot be satisfied by nominal review; Engineer B's arrangement violated the standard regardless of financial pressures
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.89
Engineer B was prohibited from continuing to practice, seal documents, or operate his firm on the basis of financial necessity following his stroke, as his post-stroke cognitive impairment rendered him incapable of exercising genuine responsible charge, and financial hardship does not constitute a justification for practicing beyond one's current competence or capacity.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
Competence principle requires self-assessment and cessation when capacity is insufficient; financial pressures do not override this obligation
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.87
Engineer B was absolutely prohibited from delegating substantive structural engineering design authority to Engineer Intern C — an unlicensed individual — and then affixing his seal to the resulting work without meaningful review, as this arrangement constituted aiding and facilitating the unlawful practice of engineering by an unlicensed individual.
Engineer B was absolutely prohibited from affixing his professional signature and seal to structural engineering drawings following his stroke, which materially impaired his ability to actively direct, review, and control engineering work, because signing and sealing drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review did not satisfy the definition of Responsible Charge.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.86
Engineer B was required to have exercised active, substantive review and direction over structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C sufficient to establish genuine responsible charge before affixing his professional seal, and was prohibited from sealing documents reviewed only cursorily or not at all following his stroke.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
Non-engineer management that enables circumvention of licensure oversight is prohibited regardless of family relationship or financial necessity
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.78
Ethical culpability attaches to knowing participation in impaired supervisory arrangement regardless of subordinate status; intern must refuse and report
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.85
Engineer Intern C was required to refuse participation in the arrangement whereby Engineer Intern C performed substantive structural engineering design work that would be sealed by Engineer B without adequate review, and was required to seek immediate correction by contacting appropriate authorities including the state engineering licensure board, as established by BER Case 15-2 precedent.
Engineer R, having been retained by Engineer A to conduct an independent structural review and having discovered evidence of serious professional misconduct and impaired practice by Engineer B, was independently obligated to report those findings to the State Board regardless of whether Engineer A chose to report, establishing that Engineer R's independent professional obligations were not discharged by Engineer A's private confrontation with or compassionate non-reporting of Engineer B.
private meeting between Engineer A and Engineer B before Engineer A's decision not to report Engineer B to the State Board
Engineer A's decision not to report Engineer B to the State Board
Engineer B's arrangement — signing and sealing drawings prepared by an unsupervised intern without genuine review — constituted practice in violation of state licensure law, undermining the licensure system's function of protecting the publ
Engineer B's wife assumed operational management of the structural engineering firm following his stroke, enabling the firm to continue delivering engineering services under conditions where the licensed engineer of record could not provide
Engineer A, as Engineer B's personal friend, had both the obligation to report Engineer B's impaired practice to the State Board and the legitimate option to do so in a compassionate, cooperative manner that respected their friendship — but
Engineer B signed and sealed structural drawings prepared entirely by Engineer Intern C without involvement in design development and with little to no review, failing to satisfy the responsible charge standard requiring active engagement f
Engineer B, having suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive capacity, continued to sign and seal structural engineering drawings with little to no review rather than suspending practice or arranging qualified substitute
Engineer A's decision not to report Engineer B to the State Board, despite knowing of impaired practice that caused structural failure, violated the paramount obligation to protect public welfare over personal friendship
Engineer Intern C, fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition, cooperated in an arrangement to perform all substantive structural engineering design under the nominal seal of an engineer who could not provide genuine direction, review,
Engineer Intern C was obligated to refrain from cooperating in an arrangement whereby the impaired Engineer B signed and sealed structural drawings that Engineer Intern C had prepared without adequate supervision, and was obligated to repor
Engineer A was obligated to report Engineer B's impaired and unlawful engineering practice to the State Board notwithstanding their personal friendship, and his failure to do so constituted an ethical violation under NSPE II.1.f and III.7.
Engineer B's firm and its principals were obligated to refrain from permitting Engineer B's wife — a non-licensed, non-engineer individual — to assume operational management of the structural engineering firm in a manner that enabled the co
Engineer R was obligated to report Engineer B's impaired and unlawful engineering practice to the State Board upon discovering the serious structural design errors and learning of Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement, unless Engineer
Engineer A was obligated to report Engineer B's impaired practice to the State Board upon gaining knowledge of the violation through Engineer R's independent review findings.
Engineer B was obligated to be actively engaged in the engineering process from conception to completion and to personally make or directly supervise all engineering decisions, and was prohibited from signing and sealing drawings prepared e
Engineer B was obligated to immediately cease practicing engineering in responsible charge upon suffering a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive capacity, and to suspend or close his practice or arrange for qualified licensed
Engineer A, as Engineer B's personal friend and with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, was permitted — and encouraged — to cooperatively identify a temporary practice management alternative (such as engaging Engineer R as a temporary lic
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from aiding or abetting the continuation of Engineer B's unlawful engineering practice by declining to report it to the State Board, recognizing that non-reporting of known unlawful practice constitutes a
Engineer B was obligated to refrain from affixing his signature and professional seal to structural engineering drawings that were not prepared under his direction and control and that he could not competently review due to his stroke-induc
Engineer Intern C was obligated to refrain from aiding and abetting Engineer B's unlawful practice of engineering — specifically, the arrangement whereby Engineer B signed and sealed drawings prepared without his genuine direction, supervis
significant structural failure before Engineer A retaining Engineer R for independent review
To obtain a second opinion about the failure, Engineer A retained a well-respected structural engineer, Engineer R, to perform an independent review of the structural drawings and the failed basement structure.
Engineer A retaining Engineer R for independent review
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Structural engineering', 'reputation': 'Well-respected', 'independence': 'No prior involvement with original design'}
Engineer R, described as a well-respected structural engineer, was retained by Engineer A to independently review the structural drawings and failed basement structure, identified numerous serious design errors and omissions in both failed and unbuilt portions, and was subsequently retained to completely redesign the structure.
{'type': 'retained_by', 'target': 'Engineer A Civil Engineering Firm Owner Client'}
{'type': 'reviewer_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
not only for the failed basement, but also for the portions of the structure that had not been built yet
Friendship Non-Reporting Prohibition Constraint - Engineer A Non-Reporting
Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failure but chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board, rationalizing the non-reporting through personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical circumstances.
Friendship Non-Reporting Prohibition Constraint
From the time Engineer A discovered Engineer B's impaired practice and the structural failure through the period of non-reporting
But any of them must begin with the conviction that the ethics code does not permit engineers to turn a blind eye to the unethical practice of engineering.
Impaired Licensee Practice Suspension Constraint - Engineer B Financial Pressure
Engineer B's financial inability or unwillingness to suspend practice following his stroke drove the decision to continue operations through an arrangement with Engineer Intern C, resulting in structurally deficient design and actual structural failure.
NSPE Code Section II.2; NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778; State Engineering Practice Act
From the time of Engineer B's stroke through the period of continued firm operation
Engineer B's financial inability or unwillingness to suspend practice following his stroke, driving the decision to continue operations through an arrangement with Engineer Intern C.
Intern Knowing Circumvention Refusal Constraint - Engineer Intern C Arrangement
Engineer Intern C cooperated with Engineer B in their arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services as soon as it was realized Engineer B was unable to provide guidance, direct supervision, or review, rather than refusing to participate and seeking correction through appropriate authorities.
From the time Engineer Intern C became aware of Engineer B's incapacity and the nature of the arrangement
A similar ethical violation is discussed in BER Case 15-2, in which an engineering report was revised after the report was signed and sealed inappropriately. The BER determined that the Engineer had an obligation to seek an immediate correction by contacting appropriate authorities, including the state engineering licensure board and other enforcement officials as appropriate.
Non-Aiding Unlicensed Engineering Practice Constraint - Engineer B Delegation to Intern C
Engineer B, following his stroke, delegated practically all structural design work to Engineer Intern C and sealed the resulting drawings with little to no review, effectively enabling Engineer Intern C to practice engineering without a license.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1.e; State Engineering Practice Act; Engineering Intern Supervision Standard - Sign and Seal Without Review
Post-Stroke Responsible Charge Prohibition Constraint - Engineer B Post-Stroke Sealing
Engineer B suffered a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity but continued to affix his seal to structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review, resulting in serious structural design errors and actual structural failure of Engineer A's office building basement.
State Engineering Licensure Law - Sign and Seal Requirements; NSPE Code of Ethics; Engineer Incapacity and Delegation Standard - Post-Stroke Practice
Professional Competence Violated By Engineer B Structural Design
Engineer B's sealing of structural drawings with serious errors
Engineer B, impaired by stroke, affixed his signature and seal to structural engineering documents he could not competently review or that were not prepared under his genuine direction and control, resulting in serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details
Post-stroke impairment reduced Engineer B's competence below the threshold required for structural engineering practice; sealing documents he could not competently review constituted a violation of the competence principle
Engineers shall not affix their signatures to any plans or documents dealing with subject matter in which they lack competence, nor to any plan or document not prepared under their direction and control.
Public Safety Paramount Constraint - Engineer A Non-Reporting Despite Known Risk
Engineer A discovered that Engineer B's impaired practice had caused actual structural failure and that unbuilt portions of the structure contained serious design errors, yet chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board out of personal friendship and compassion.
Engineer A's Public Safety at Risk from Structural Failure: The risk to public safety posed by Engineer B's deficient structural design, including portions of the structure not yet built at the time of the failure.
From Engineer A's discovery of the structural failure and Engineer B's impaired practice
Public Safety Paramount Constraint - Engineer A Reporting Obligation
Engineer A was aware of the public safety risk posed by Engineer B's deficient structural design, including portions of the structure not yet built at the time of the failure, yet chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board.
NSPE Code Section I.1; NSPE Code Sections II.1.e, II.1.f
Reference is made to Section I.1 of the Code, engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
From the time Engineer A became aware of the structural failure and Engineer B's impaired practice
Section II.1.f, engineers having knowledge of any alleged violation of this Code shall report thereon to appropriate professional bodies and, when relevant, also to public authorities, and cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing such information or assistance as may be required.
Responsible Charge Verification - Engineer B Sealing Intern C Drawings
Engineer B affixed his seal to structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C with little to no review, in violation of the responsible charge requirement, resulting in structurally deficient design and actual failure.
Throughout the period of Engineer B sealing Engineer Intern C's drawings post-stroke
Third-Party Discovery Independent Reporting Constraint - Engineer R State Board
Engineer R was retained by Engineer A to conduct an independent review after the structural failure and discovered incompetent design documents produced under Engineer B's seal, with knowledge of the circumstances of Engineer B's impaired practice and Engineer Intern C's complicity.
From the time of Engineer R's discovery of Engineer B's violations
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Civil engineering and surveying', 'firm_ownership': True, 'relationship_to_engineer_b': 'Personal friend and professional acquaintance'}
Engineer A owns a civil engineering and surveying firm, commissioned construction of a new office building, retained Engineer B for structural design, observed the structural failure, retained Engineer R for independent review and redesign, confronted Engineer B privately, and ultimately chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board.
{'type': 'client_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
{'type': 'client_of', 'target': 'Engineer R Independent Structural Failure Reviewer'}
{'type': 'peer_friend', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
Engineer A owns a consulting engineering firm specializing in civil engineering and surveying services
Engineer A met privately with Engineer B and confronted him with the faulty design
Engineer A purchased land for a new office building, he retained an architect, and he retained Engineer B
Engineer A retained a well-respected structural engineer, Engineer R, to perform an independent review
Engineer A Cooperative Disclosure Pathway Available
From the time Engineer A became aware of Engineer B's violations through the conclusion of the case
Cooperative Disclosure Pathway Available State
Engineer A's access to a cooperative, private disclosure pathway — such as a confidential discussion with the State Board involving Engineer B's knowledge — that could satisfy the reporting obligation while minimizing harm to Engineer B's professional standing
Not utilized — Engineer A elected not to report at all
Engineer A's private confrontation with Engineer B and Engineer B's acknowledgment of his impairment and delegation practices, opening the possibility of a cooperative reporting pathway
Engineer A Friendship-Based Non-Reporting Rationalization
From Engineer A's private confrontation with Engineer B onward
Friendship-Based Non-Reporting Rationalization State
Engineer A's use of personal friendship and compassion for Engineer B's medical circumstances as justification for not reporting Engineer B's violations to the State Board
Not terminated — Engineer A elected not to report
As a professional courtesy, and because he considered Engineer B a personal friend, Engineer A met privately with Engineer B
Engineer A's decision to treat personal friendship and Engineer B's post-stroke circumstances as ethical justification for non-reporting
Engineer A Impaired Licensee Friendship Non-Reporting
From Engineer A's private confrontation with Engineer B through the conclusion of the case (no report filed)
Impaired Licensee Friendship Non-Reporting State
Engineer A's decision not to report Engineer B to the State Board despite discovering Engineer B's impaired practice, deficient design, and the resulting structural failure
Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's post-stroke impairment, delegation to Engineer Intern C, and resulting structural failure — followed by Engineer A's decision not to report based on long friendship and compassion
Engineer A Public Safety at Risk from Structural Failure
From the structural failure through Engineer R's complete redesign of the structure
The risk to public safety posed by Engineer B's deficient structural design, including portions of the structure not yet built at the time of the failure
Structural failure during basement construction and Engineer R's discovery of serious design errors in unbuilt portions of the structure
Engineer B Insufficient Responsible Charge
From Engineer B's post-stroke delegation of design work to Engineer Intern C through the structural failure
Engineer B's affixing of his seal to structural drawings produced by Engineer Intern C without meaningful review, engagement, or supervisory direction over the design development process
Structural failure and discovery of design errors
Engineer B's decision to sign and seal drawings with little to no review following his stroke, while delegating substantive design authority to Engineer Intern C
Engineer B Public Safety at Risk from Impaired Practice
From the onset of Engineer B's impaired practice through discovery and remediation of deficient documents
The risk to public safety arising from engineering design documents produced without adequate direction, supervision, or review due to Engineer B's impairment
Discovery, reporting, and remediation of deficient documents
Engineer Intern C is ethically culpable through violation of Section II.1.e, Section II.1.f, and Section III.8.a
Engineer B continued to seal engineering documents while cognitively impaired, with design work effectively performed by an unsupervised intern
Engineer B Structural Design Error - Deficient Design Harm Materialized
From the commencement of construction through the structural failure and Engineer R's independent review
Deficient Design Harm Materialized State
Engineer B's structurally deficient design for Engineer A's office building basement and overall structure, resulting in actual structural failure during construction
Engineer A's retention of Engineer R to completely redesign the structure
Structural failure during basement construction, confirmed by Engineer R's independent review revealing serious design errors, omissions, and faulty details
Engineer B Unlicensed Intern Responsible Charge Delegation
From the point Engineer B became unable to provide guidance and supervision through the discovery of the deficient documents
Engineer Intern C is working within the safety net of Engineer B's guidance and direct supervision
Unlicensed Intern Responsible Charge Delegation State
Engineer B's effective transfer of substantive engineering design authority to Engineer Intern C without meaningful review, while affixing his seal to the resulting work
Engineer B affixed his signature and seal to documents prepared without his direction or control
Engineer B became cognitively impaired and unable to provide guidance, direct supervision, or review, effectively delegating design authority to Engineer Intern C
{'license': 'None (non-engineer)', 'relationship_to_firm_owner': 'Spouse', 'management_role': 'Business operations management post-impairment'}
Engineer B's wife assumed operational management of Engineer B's structural engineering firm following his stroke, enabling the firm to continue operations with Engineer Intern C performing design work and Engineer B nominally signing and sealing drawings, without possessing engineering licensure or qualifications.
{'type': 'enables_work_of', 'target': 'Engineer Intern C Unsupervised Intern'}
{'type': 'manages_firm_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
Engineer Intern C Complicity in Impaired Licensee Practice
From the time Engineer Intern C became aware of Engineer B's stroke through the structural failure
Intern Complicity in Impaired Licensee Practice State
Engineer Intern C's active cooperation with Engineer B's impaired practice, with full knowledge of Engineer B's stroke and incapacity
Engineer Intern C's continued performance of structural design work under Engineer B's seal with full knowledge of Engineer B's impaired condition
Engineer Intern C Unlicensed Responsible Charge Delegation
From the time Engineer B delegated design authority to Engineer Intern C following his stroke through the structural failure
Engineer Intern C performing substantive structural design and producing construction drawings under Engineer B's seal with little to no review
Structural failure and Engineer A's retention of Engineer R for independent review
Engineer Intern C would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review
Ultimately, this process led to the failure of Engineer A's building
Engineer B's decision to delegate practically all design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer with approximately two years of experience, while affixing his seal with minimal review
Engineer R Third-Party Discovery Reporting Obligation
From Engineer R's discovery of incompetent documents and subsequent awareness of Engineer B's impairment through the reporting decision
Third-Party Discovery Reporting Obligation State
Engineer R's obligation to report Engineer B's violations to the State Board after discovering incompetent design documents and learning of the circumstances producing them
Engineer A's lead reporting (with Engineer R's concurrence noted) or Engineer R's independent report to the State Board
Engineer R was informed of Engineer B's impairment due to a stroke, and also the series of actions by Engineer B and Engineer Intern C that followed
Engineer R technically uncovered the incompetent nature of Engineer B's design and construction documents and was informed of Engineer B's impairment and the actions of Engineer B and Engineer Intern C
Friendship-Based Non-Reporting Rationalization - Engineer A Reporting Constraint
Engineer A explicitly cited long friendship and consideration of Engineer B's impairment as the reasons for not reporting to the State Board, constituting a friendship-based rationalization for non-compliance with the mandatory reporting obligation.
From the time of Engineer A's private meeting with Engineer B through the period of non-reporting
{'license': 'Engineer Intern (not yet licensed PE)', 'awareness': "Fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition", 'violation': 'Violated Section II.1.e, Section II.1.f, and Section III.8.a of the NSPE Code of Ethics'}
Engineer Intern C performed substantive engineering design work and prepared construction drawings under the direction of a medically impaired licensed engineer who provided little to no actual supervisory review, while being fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition and cooperating in the arrangement to continue delivering engineering design services.
{'type': 'complicit_with', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
{'type': 'subordinate_to', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
Unsupervised Engineer Intern Performing Licensed Work
{'license': 'Engineer Intern (not licensed PE)', 'experience': 'Approximately two years', 'awareness_of_impairment': True, 'scope_of_work': 'All structural design and construction drawing preparation'}
Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer with approximately two years of experience, performed all substantive structural design and prepared construction drawings for Engineer A's building while fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition, with Engineer B signing and sealing the drawings with little to no review.
{'type': 'aware_of_impairment_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
{'type': 'supervised_by_nominally', 'target': 'Engineer B Impaired Structural Design Engineer'}
Engineer R Independent Reviewer Impaired Practice Reporting Obligation Instance
Engineer R, retained by Engineer A to independently review the structural drawings and failed basement structure, discovered a surprising number of serious structural design errors, omissions, and faulty details attributable to Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement. Engineer R was subsequently informed of Engineer B's stroke and the arrangement with Engineer Intern C.
Independent Reviewer Reporting Obligation
Engineer R was obligated to report Engineer B's impaired and unlawful engineering practice to the State Board upon discovering the serious structural design errors and learning of Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement, unless Engineer A's report to the Board was styled to note Engineer R's concurrence.
Since Engineer A was the person who got Engineer R involved in the first place, if Engineer A took the lead in reporting the matter, the report could be styled to note Engineer R's concurrence. Otherwise, Engineer R would be obligated to report Engineer B to the State Board (Section II.1.f).
Upon completion of Engineer R's independent review and upon learning of Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement
Engineer B Financial Pressure Driving Scope Overreach
From Engineer B's stroke through the structural failure
Financial Pressure Driving Scope Overreach State
Engineer B's financial inability or unwillingness to suspend practice following his stroke, driving the decision to continue operations through an impaired and non-compliant practice structure
Structural failure and Engineer A's confrontation
Engineer B's wife took over management of the business, and Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C
Engineer B's determination that he could not afford to suspend work or close his office following his stroke, leading to delegation of design authority to Engineer Intern C
Engineer B Post-Stroke Cognitive Impairment Concealment
From the time of Engineer B's stroke through the structural failure and Engineer A's private confrontation
Post-Stroke Cognitive Impairment Concealment State
Engineer B's continued operation of his firm and sealing of documents following a stroke that materially impaired his professional capacity
Engineer A's private confrontation with Engineer B presenting Engineer R's report (though no formal reporting or cessation of practice is documented)
Engineer B suffered a stroke that materially impaired his cognitive and professional capacity, yet continued to operate his firm and affix his seal to engineering documents
Engineer B Wife Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition Instance
Following Engineer B's stroke, his wife assumed operational management of the structural engineering firm, enabling the firm to continue operating with Engineer Intern C performing all substantive design work and Engineer B signing and sealing drawings with little to no review — an arrangement that circumvented licensure requirements protecting the public.
Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition Compliance Obligation
Engineer B's firm and its principals were obligated to refrain from permitting Engineer B's wife — a non-licensed, non-engineer individual — to assume operational management of the structural engineering firm in a manner that enabled the continued delivery of engineering services without genuine licensed professional oversight, following Engineer B's incapacitation by stroke.
Engineer B's wife took over management of the business, and Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C.
From the time Engineer B's wife assumed management of the firm following his stroke
Being the only licensed professional engineer in his firm, for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office. Rather, Engineer B's wife took over management of the business.
Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition Implicated By Engineer B Wife
Engineer B's wife's management of structural engineering firm post-stroke
Engineer B's wife assumed operational management of the structural engineering firm following his stroke, enabling the firm to continue delivering engineering services under conditions where the licensed engineer of record could not provide genuine supervision — thereby facilitating circumvention of the licensure system's protective function
The wife's assumption of management enabled continuation of engineering practice that the licensed engineer could not genuinely supervise; this arrangement undermined the public protection rationale of licensure
Non-Engineer Firm Management Prohibition
Engineer B's wife took over management of the business, and Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer employee with about two years' experience.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'relationship_to_impaired_engineer': 'Long-time personal friend', 'action_taken': 'Private confrontation only; no board report filed'}
Engineer A, upon discovering Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failures, chose to confront Engineer B privately as a professional courtesy and personal friend, but ultimately did not report Engineer B to the State Board, raising questions about whether this satisfies his professional obligations.
{'type': 'reporting_obligation_toward', 'target': 'State Licensing Board'}
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'impairment': 'Stroke-induced cognitive impairment', 'violation': 'Signed and sealed documents without direction or control; violated NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778'}
Engineer B suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive and professional capacity, yet continued to sign and seal design drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C without adequate direction, control, or review, thereby violating responsible charge obligations and state licensure law.
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'subject_of_review', 'target': 'Engineer R'}
{'type': 'supervisor', 'target': 'Engineer Intern C'}
Impaired Engineer Delegating Unsealed Work
Engineer B suffered a stroke and was unable to adequately direct and review engineering designs and drawings being prepared under his signature and seal
Engineer B chose to sign and seal design drawings without proper review while impaired by this stroke
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Structural engineering', 'medical_condition': 'Stroke causing cognitive/professional impairment', 'firm_role': 'Sole licensed PE and owner', 'financial_motivation': 'Could not afford to suspend or close practice'}
Engineer B, a structural engineer and personal friend of Engineer A, suffered a stroke, continued operating his firm for financial reasons, delegated all design work to Engineer Intern C, and signed and sealed drawings with little to no review, resulting in serious structural design errors and the failure of Engineer A's building basement.
{'type': 'employer_of', 'target': 'Engineer B Wife Non-Engineer Firm Manager'}
{'type': 'peer_friend', 'target': 'Engineer A Civil Engineering Firm Owner Client'}
{'type': 'provider_to', 'target': 'Engineer A Civil Engineering Firm Owner Client'}
{'type': 'supervisor_of', 'target': 'Engineer Intern C Unsupervised Intern'}
Engineer A Cooperative Practice Alternative Identification Instance
The NSPE BER noted that Engineer A's friendship with Engineer B, while not justifying non-reporting, warranted consideration in how the reporting was carried out — specifically, that Engineer A could have worked with Engineer B to identify a compliant practice alternative and presented that to the Board, potentially influencing the Board's exercise of discretion regarding formal sanction.
Cooperative Practice Alternative Identification Obligation
Engineer A, as Engineer B's personal friend and with Engineer B's knowledge and approval, was permitted — and encouraged — to cooperatively identify a temporary practice management alternative (such as engaging Engineer R as a temporary licensed engineer) when reporting Engineer B to the State Board, so that the reporting obligation was fulfilled without unnecessarily destroying Engineer B's practice.
As Engineer B's friend and with Engineer B's approval, once the matter was reported to the Board, it would have been permissible for Engineer A to help cooperatively identify a temporary practice management alternative that supported the professional and ethical practice of engineering work in Engineer B's business, until Engineer B returned to full duty.
Contemporaneous with or immediately following the required report to the State Board
Licensure Integrity Violated By Engineer B Practice Arrangement
Engineer B's violation of state licensure law through impaired practice arrangement
Engineer B's arrangement — signing and sealing drawings prepared by an unsupervised intern without genuine review — constituted practice in violation of state licensure law, undermining the licensure system's function of protecting the public from incompetent engineering
State licensure laws require that sealed documents reflect genuine professional oversight; Engineer B's arrangement converted the seal into a fraudulent representation, violating the protective purpose of licensure
Licensure Integrity and Public Protection Principle
Engineer B was practicing in violation of the state licensure law (Section III.8.a).
Licensure integrity obligations are not overridden by financial necessity; the licensure system's public protection function requires compliance regardless of personal circumstances
Engineer Intern C is ethically culpable through violation of Section II.1.e, Section II.1.f, and Section III.8.a of the Code of Ethics.
Engineers shall conform with state registration laws in the practice of engineering.
Engineer A Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Post-Discovery Obligation Instance
Engineer A, upon learning of Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement through Engineer R's report and Engineer B's own disclosure, chose not to report the violations to the State Board out of personal friendship — thereby permitting the continuation of unlawful engineering practice.
Non-Aiding Unlawful Engineering Practice Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from aiding or abetting the continuation of Engineer B's unlawful engineering practice by declining to report it to the State Board, recognizing that non-reporting of known unlawful practice constitutes a form of facilitation of that practice.
From the time Engineer A gained knowledge of Engineer B's impaired practice arrangement
Engineers shall not aid or abet the unlawful practice of engineering by a person or firm.
Responsible Charge Engagement Violated By Engineer B
Engineer B's signing and sealing of drawings prepared by Engineer Intern C
Engineer B signed and sealed structural drawings prepared entirely by Engineer Intern C without involvement in design development and with little to no review, failing to satisfy the responsible charge standard requiring active engagement from conception to completion
Responsible charge requires genuine involvement in design development, not merely post-hoc review; Engineer B's arrangement with Engineer Intern C constituted a complete abdication of responsible charge
The professional engineer in Responsible Charge is actively engaged in the engineering process, from conception to completion.
Engineer B Professional Seal Affixation Competence Violation Instance
Engineer B, impaired by stroke, signed and sealed structural drawings prepared entirely by Engineer Intern C without adequate direction, supervision, or review, resulting in serious structural design errors and a structural failure.
Professional Seal Affixation Competence Obligation
Engineer B was obligated to refrain from affixing his signature and professional seal to structural engineering drawings that were not prepared under his direction and control and that he could not competently review due to his stroke-induced impairment.
Throughout the period following Engineer B's stroke during which he continued to sign and seal structural drawings
Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review. Ultimately, this process led to the failure of Engineer A's building.
Engineer Intern C Non-Aiding Unlawful Practice Violation Instance
Engineer Intern C, fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition, cooperated in the arrangement that constituted unlawful engineering practice under state registration law, in violation of NSPE Code II.1.e.
Engineer Intern C was obligated to refrain from aiding and abetting Engineer B's unlawful practice of engineering — specifically, the arrangement whereby Engineer B signed and sealed drawings prepared without his genuine direction, supervision, or competent review — and to take affirmative steps to address the unlawful practice rather than cooperating in its continuation.
From the time Engineer Intern C became aware of Engineer B's impairment and the nature of their working arrangement
Impaired Practice Cessation Obligation Violated By Engineer B
Engineer B's continued practice after stroke
Engineer B, having suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive capacity, continued to sign and seal structural engineering drawings with little to no review rather than suspending practice or arranging qualified substitute supervision
The stroke created a medical impairment that triggered the cessation obligation; financial reasons do not constitute an ethical justification for continuing impaired practice
Engineer B divulged he had suffered a stroke a few months prior. Being the only licensed professional engineer in his firm, for financial and other reasons, Engineer B felt he could not afford to suspend work or close his office.
Compassionate Peer Reporting Obligation Invoked For Engineer A
Engineer A's decision regarding reporting Engineer B to State Board
Engineer A, as Engineer B's personal friend, had both the obligation to report Engineer B's impaired practice to the State Board and the legitimate option to do so in a compassionate, cooperative manner that respected their friendship — but the friendship did not exempt Engineer A from the reporting obligation itself
The friendship created space for compassionate engagement (private confrontation, cooperative reporting, advocacy for alternative solutions) but did not create an exemption from the mandatory reporting obligation
Engineer A could have privately discussed the matter with proper authorities at the State Board. Working together, the parties might cooperatively identify a practice alternative
Engineer Intern C Subordinate Complicity Prohibition Violation Instance
Engineer Intern C, fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition following his stroke, cooperated in an arrangement to perform all substantive structural engineering design and prepare construction drawings, which Engineer B then signed and sealed with little to no review. This arrangement resulted in serious structural failures.
Subordinate Complicity Prohibition in Impaired Supervision
Engineer Intern C was obligated to refrain from cooperating in an arrangement whereby the impaired Engineer B signed and sealed structural drawings that Engineer Intern C had prepared without adequate supervision, and was obligated to report the arrangement to appropriate authorities including the state engineering licensure board.
Throughout the period during which Engineer Intern C performed unsupervised structural design work under Engineer B's impaired oversight
Engineer Intern C's complicity in helping Engineer B to continue work was unethical.
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked Against Engineer A Non-Reporting
Engineer A's decision not to report Engineer B to State Board
Public welfare paramount requires reporting known violations regardless of personal friendship; the friendship relationship affects the manner of reporting but not the obligation to report
the ethics code does not permit engineers to turn a blind eye to the unethical practice of engineering
Subordinate Complicity Prohibition Violated By Engineer Intern C
Engineer Intern C's performance of structural design under Engineer B's nominal seal
Financial dependence on continued employment
Engineer Intern C, fully aware of Engineer B's impaired condition, cooperated in an arrangement to perform all substantive structural engineering design under the nominal seal of an engineer who could not provide genuine direction, review, or supervision
Awareness of Engineer B's impairment created an independent ethical obligation for Engineer Intern C to refuse cooperation and report the arrangement; the intern status did not eliminate ethical culpability
Subordinate Complicity Prohibition in Unlicensed or Incapacitated Supervision
Engineer A Impaired Practice State Board Reporting Obligation Instance
Engineer A, as a licensed professional engineer with direct knowledge of Engineer B's impaired practice and the resulting structural failures, was required under NSPE II.1.f and III.7 to report the violations to the State Board.
Impaired Engineer State Board Reporting Obligation
Upon receipt of Engineer R's report confirming serious structural design errors and Engineer B's disclosure of his stroke and impaired practice arrangement
Engineer B Impaired Practice Cessation Violation Instance
Engineer B suffered a stroke that substantially diminished his capacity to perform structural engineering design and review. For financial reasons, he chose to continue operating his firm by delegating all design work to Engineer Intern C and signing and sealing drawings with little to no review, resulting in serious structural failures.
Engineer B was obligated to immediately cease practicing engineering in responsible charge upon suffering a stroke that substantially diminished his cognitive capacity, and to suspend or close his practice or arrange for qualified licensed supervision, rather than continuing to sign and seal structural drawings he could not competently review.
From the time of Engineer B's stroke onward
Engineer B Responsible Charge Active Supervision Violation Instance
Engineer B, impaired by stroke, delegated all substantive structural design work to Engineer Intern C and signed and sealed the resulting drawings with little to no review, in direct violation of NSPE's Responsible Charge position statement and NSPE Code II.2.b.
Responsible Charge Active Supervision Obligation
Engineer B was obligated to be actively engaged in the engineering process from conception to completion and to personally make or directly supervise all engineering decisions, and was prohibited from signing and sealing drawings prepared entirely by Engineer Intern C without genuine involvement in design development and with little to no review.
Engineer B delegated practically all design work to Engineer Intern C, a graduate engineer employee with about two years' experience. The way they operated was, Engineer Intern C would perform the structural design and develop the construction drawings, and Engineer B would sign and seal the drawings with little to no review.
Engineer B's actions were in violation of NSPE's Position Statement No. 10-1778: Responsible Charge which states: 'Reviewing drawings or documents after preparation without involvement in the design and development process does not satisfy the definition of Responsible Charge.'
Engineer A Friendship Non-Justification Non-Reporting Violation
Engineer A discovered through Engineer R's independent review that Engineer B had been signing and sealing structural drawings without competent review while impaired by a stroke, resulting in serious structural failures. Despite this knowledge, Engineer A chose not to report Engineer B to the State Board out of personal friendship and compassion.
Upon Engineer A's discovery of Engineer B's impaired practice and Engineer R's findings