ProEthica Case 165 Ontology
type: Ontology
created: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.910362
imports: cases
imports: intermediate

Actively Participate in Risk Assessment
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Consultant to Automobile Manufacturer, present case
foreseen unintended effects: Active participation may surface difficult ethical tradeoffs that complicate or delay development
foreseen unintended effects: Raising concerns may create friction with team members or manufacturer management prioritizing development speed
fulfills obligation text: Contribute technical expertise to inform employer decision-making on public safety matters
fulfills obligation text: Fulfill professional responsibility as a member of a safety-critical engineering team
guided by principle text: Do no harm
guided by principle text: Professional responsibility and engagement
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical integrity
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Contribute meaningfully to the team's evaluation of safety and ethical scenarios so that the autonomous vehicle operating system, if developed, adequately addresses public safety concerns
raises obligation text: Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
raises obligation text: Strive to do no harm in the performance of professional services
requires capability text: Autonomous vehicle technology knowledge
requires capability text: Collaborative technical team participation
requires capability text: Ethical analysis of algorithmic decision-making
requires capability text: Risk assessment methodology
requires capability text: Software systems engineering
temporal marker: Present case, pre-development/assessment phase of autonomous vehicle operating system
temporal sequence: 8
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A chose to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk assessment team evaluating ethical and safety scenarios for the autonomous vehicle operating system, rather than adopting a passive or deferential role within the team.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928225
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Algorithmic Ethics Gap Recognized
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Duty_To_Seek_Expert_Consultation
activates constraint: Precautionary_Principle_Constraint
activates constraint: PublicSafety_Paramount
causes state change: Engineering team cannot resolve ethical dilemma through technical means alone; problem must be escalated beyond engineering domain; deployment timeline potentially affected
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Document_Gap_For_Standards_Bodies
creates obligation: Propose_Deployment_Deferral_Until_Resolved
creates obligation: Recommend_Multidisciplinary_Ethics_Review
emergency status: high
event type: outcome
temporal marker: Present case, during risk assessment phase
temporal sequence: 10
urgency level: high
comment: The risk assessment process reveals that existing engineering ethics frameworks, professional codes, and technical standards do not provide clear, actionable guidance for encoding moral priority orderings in autonomous vehicle software, creating a normative vacuum at the precise moment design decisions must be made.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928602
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Algorithmic Ethics Gap Recognized (Event 7) → Propose Further Study Before Deployment (Action 6)
type: CausalChain
type: NamedIndividual
causal language: The recognition that existing engineering ethics frameworks do not adequately address algorithmic decision-making in unavoidable crash scenarios directly necessitates Engineer A's choice to propose that further study be undertaken by the manufacturer before deployment
cause: Algorithmic Ethics Gap Recognized (Event 7)
counterfactual: If the algorithmic ethics gap had not been recognized, or if existing frameworks had been deemed adequate, Engineer A would likely not have proposed further study specifically on this dimension; standard risk mitigation would have been considered sufficient
effect: Propose Further Study Before Deployment (Action 6)
necessary factors: Engineer A's authority and standing within the risk assessment process to make such a proposal
necessary factors: Engineer A's professional obligation to not deploy systems with unresolved safety-critical ethical deficiencies
necessary factors: Recognition of the algorithmic ethics gap as a genuine unresolved problem
necessary factors: The unavoidable crash scenario establishing that the gap has real-world life-or-death consequences
responsibility type: direct
responsible agent: Engineer A
sufficient factors: Algorithmic ethics gap + unavoidable crash scenario with real harm potential + Engineer A's professional duty = sufficient to require proposal for further study
sufficient factors: The combination of identified gap and deployment risk created an ethical obligation that could not be discharged by existing frameworks alone
within agent control: true
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928702
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer
type: AutomobileManufacturerAutonomousVehicleDeveloperClient
type: NamedIndividual
attributes: {'entity_type': 'Private automobile manufacturing company', 'product': 'Driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system', 'decision_authority': 'Product development scope and deployment decisions'}
caseinvolvement: The automobile manufacturer retains Engineer A as a consultant and has assembled an engineering risk assessment team to evaluate scenarios for a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system under development, including crash outcome decision logic with direct public safety implications for third parties.
concept category: Role
confidence: 0.85
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:35.036389+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:35.036389+00:00
importance: medium
relationships: {'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer'}
relationships: {'type': 'subject_to_public_safety_obligations_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer'}
rolecategory: provider_client
roleclass: Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.912330
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client (Present Case)
type: AutomobileManufacturerAutonomousVehicleDeveloperClient
type: NamedIndividual
attributes: {'type': 'Automobile manufacturer', 'product': 'Autonomous vehicle operating system', 'decision_authority': 'Deployment of autonomous vehicle system'}
caseinvolvement: The automobile manufacturer in the present case that employs or retains Engineer A as part of an engineering risk management team to evaluate the autonomous vehicle operating system, bearing authority over deployment decisions and subject to Engineer A's paramount public safety obligations.
concept category: Role
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
importance: medium
relationships: {'type': 'employs_or_retains', 'target': 'Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer'}
rolecategory: provider_client
roleclass: Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client
sourcetext: Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized
textreferences: Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized
textreferences: explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.914559
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Autonomous Vehicle AV OS Development Initiated
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Prospective_Risk_Assessment_Obligation
activates constraint: PublicSafety_Paramount
activates constraint: SafetyCritical_Classification_Constraint
causes state change: New safety-critical project initiated; ethical obligations arise at design stage rather than post-design; Engineer A's role shifts to prospective risk assessment
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Conduct_Comprehensive_Risk_Assessment
creates obligation: Engage_Multidisciplinary_Review
creates obligation: Identify_Ethical_Dilemmas_In_Design
emergency status: high
event type: exogenous
temporal marker: Present case, early development/assessment phase
temporal sequence: 6
urgency level: medium
comment: An automobile manufacturer begins early development and assessment of an autonomous vehicle operating system, creating a new safety-critical engineering context that requires prospective ethical analysis before deployment.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928492
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Autonomous Vehicle Operating System Safety Standard
type: AutonomousVehicleSafetyStandard
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.8
createdby: SAE International, ISO, NHTSA, and automotive engineering professional bodies
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
documenttitle: Technical and Regulatory Standards Governing Autonomous Vehicle Operating System Design and Safety
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: Autonomous Vehicle Safety Standard
sourcetext: automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
usedby: Engineer A and the engineering risk assessment team in evaluating design options
usedincontext: Technical standards and professional norms governing the design of autonomous vehicle operating systems, including acceptable risk thresholds, software decision logic requirements, and safety benchmarks applicable to the automobile manufacturer's development project
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911997
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER_Case_96-4
type: BERCasePrecedent
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.98
createdby: NSPE Board of Ethical Review
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
documenttitle: NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case 96-4: Software Design Testing and Public Safety
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: BER Case Precedent
sourcetext: One example of this was BER Case 96-4, which involved software design testing.
textreferences: According to the Board of Ethical Review, Engineer A's ethical obligations in Case 96-4 involved balancing a variety of ethical and other business considerations and making a recommendation based solely on technical finding (and not business considerations) to permit the company to make an informed decision about the need for additional testing in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
textreferences: Although the facts in the present case are somewhat different than those in Case 96-4, the Board of Ethical Review believes that several points discussed in the previous case are pertinent to the case at hand.
textreferences: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical concerns in the case were not related directly to the safety of the software, but instead to the availability of a new draft safety testing standard that might require additional scrutiny of the software.
textreferences: One example of this was BER Case 96-4, which involved software design testing.
usedby: NSPE Board of Ethical Review in reasoning about Engineer A's obligations in the autonomous vehicle context
usedincontext: Cited as the primary analogical precedent for the present autonomous vehicle case, establishing the principle that engineers must recommend additional testing when new draft safety standards may not be met, and must balance technical findings separately from business considerations to enable informed employer decision-making in furtherance of public health, safety, and welfare
version: 1996
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.913518
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER Case 96-4 (precedent case) before present autonomous vehicle case
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: Although the facts in the present case are somewhat different than those in Case 96-4, the Board of Ethical Review believes that several points discussed in the previous case are pertinent to the case at hand.
from entity text: BER Case 96-4 (precedent case)
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: present autonomous vehicle case
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: present autonomous vehicle case
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929360
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Case 165 Timeline
type: NamedIndividual
type: TemporalEntity
action count: 6
event count: 7
total elements: 13
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929684
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Actively Participate in Risk A
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508263
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Explore Additional Technical M
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511875
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Prepare Transparent Technical
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508223
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Propose Further Study Before D
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511918
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Recommend Additional Safety Te
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508150
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

CausalLink_Unambiguously Express Safety C
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511832
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_101
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 3 b
answers question1: 101
answers question2: 304
cited provision1: III.1.b.
cited provision2: II.3.b.
conclusion number: 101
conclusion text: Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons, Engineer A bears an additional obligation to explicitly disclose to the automobile manufacturer that this recommendation is grounded in a utilitarian ethical framework rather than in any established regulatory or industry standard. Because no applicable national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic currently exist, Engineer A cannot represent the harm-minimization recommendation as a technically mandated or universally accepted engineering norm. Presenting it as such would violate the completeness and non-selectivity obligation that governs Engineer A's advisory role. Engineer A must therefore clearly communicate to the automobile manufacturer that the recommendation reflects a specific moral philosophy — one that reasonable engineers and ethicists might contest — so that the manufacturer can make a genuinely informed deployment decision. This disclosure obligation is heightened, not relieved, by the regulatory standards vacuum, because the absence of external standards places the full burden of ethical transparency on Engineer A as the professional advisor.
conclusion type: analytical_extension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510400
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_102
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 103
answers question2: 104
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 102
conclusion text: The Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend harm minimization for the least number of persons does not fully resolve what Engineer A's obligations become if the automobile manufacturer overrides that recommendation and elects to program the vehicle to prioritize passenger safety above third-party welfare. In that scenario, Engineer A's ethical obligations do not terminate upon delivery of the initial recommendation. Engineer A must first pursue graduated internal escalation within the risk assessment team and up the manufacturer's organizational hierarchy, clearly documenting the safety concern and its basis in the public welfare paramount principle. If internal escalation fails to produce a design that Engineer A can professionally certify as consistent with the obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists who are third parties to the client relationship — Engineer A must consider whether continued participation in the project constitutes implicit endorsement of a harm-allocation algorithm that foreseeably causes fatal injury to third parties. At that threshold, refusal to certify the system or withdrawal from the engagement may be required. The consultant relationship does not diminish this obligation; the NSPE Code's public welfare paramount duty applies equally to consultants and employees, and the absence of a direct employment relationship does not reduce the enforceability of Engineer A's professional ethical duties.
conclusion type: analytical_extension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510484
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_103
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 404
answers question2: 403
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: II.1.b.
conclusion number: 103
conclusion text: The Board's harm-minimization conclusion, while sound as a first-order ethical directive, does not adequately account for the possibility that a technically superior mitigation option — such as a sensor-based dynamic crash evaluation system capable of real-time scenario assessment rather than pre-committed algorithmic harm-allocation logic — could dissolve or substantially reduce the binary ethical dilemma between passenger safety and third-party harm minimization. Engineer A's obligation to explore additional technical mitigation options before accepting the dilemma as irreducible is itself an ethical duty, not merely a technical preference. Analogous to the reasoning in BER Case 96-4, where Engineer A was obligated to recommend further study and additional testing before deployment of safety-critical software, Engineer A in the present case must recommend that the risk assessment team investigate whether the harm-allocation decision can be made dynamically rather than pre-committed, thereby potentially achieving better outcomes for all parties across a wider range of crash scenarios. Recommending harm minimization without first exhausting technically feasible alternatives that could reduce the need for any pre-committed harm allocation would itself be an incomplete discharge of Engineer A's professional competence and public welfare obligations. If such alternatives are found to be technically infeasible, Engineer A must document that finding transparently so that the manufacturer's deployment decision is fully informed.
conclusion type: analytical_extension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510568
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_201
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 3 b
answers question1: 101
answers question2: 102
cited provision1: II.1.
cited provision2: III.1.b.
cited provision3: II.3.b.
conclusion number: 201
conclusion text: The Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons implicitly adopts a utilitarian ethical framework — specifically, an aggregate harm-minimization calculus — without acknowledging that this represents one among several defensible moral philosophies rather than a universally accepted engineering standard. A deontological framework, for instance, might prohibit the vehicle from actively redirecting harm toward any third party regardless of aggregate outcome, treating each person's life as inviolable rather than as a unit in a welfare sum. Because Engineer A is advising an automobile manufacturer on a design decision that will be embedded in a consumer product affecting the public, Engineer A has an affirmative obligation under the principle of Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Advisory Opinions to disclose to the manufacturer that the harm-minimization recommendation reflects a specific moral philosophy, that alternative frameworks exist and yield different algorithmic outcomes, and that the selection among them is not a purely technical determination. Failure to make this disclosure would present the manufacturer with an incomplete picture of the decision it is actually making, impairing its ability to give informed consent to the embedded ethical framework and potentially exposing it to legal and reputational consequences it did not knowingly accept.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510650
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_202
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 102
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: II.1.b.
conclusion number: 202
conclusion text: In the absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic, Engineer A has an affirmative obligation to recommend that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose the ethical framework embedded in the vehicle's operating system to prospective consumers before deployment. This obligation arises from the convergence of three independent sources: first, the Public Welfare Paramount principle, which requires that the public be protected not only from physical harm but from material deception about the nature of products that affect their safety; second, the Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation, which recognizes that when an algorithm pre-commits to a harm-allocation outcome on behalf of a user who cannot intervene in real time, that user and affected third parties have a legitimate interest in knowing the decision logic governing their fate; and third, the regulatory standards vacuum itself, which — as the Board recognized analogously in BER Case 96-4 — heightens rather than relieves Engineer A's disclosure obligations precisely because no external regulatory body has yet stepped in to mandate transparency. The absence of a legal requirement to disclose does not extinguish the professional ethical duty to recommend disclosure. Engineer A's recommendation should therefore include not only the harm-minimization algorithm design but also a specific advisory that the manufacturer implement pre-sale consumer disclosure of the vehicle's decision logic as a condition of ethically responsible deployment.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510755
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_203
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 103
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: II.1.b.
cited provision4: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 203
conclusion text: If the automobile manufacturer, after receiving Engineer A's recommendation to minimize aggregate harm, decides to override that recommendation and program the vehicle to prioritize passenger safety above all others, Engineer A's ethical obligations do not terminate at the point of initial recommendation. Engineer A retains at minimum three residual obligations. First, under the principle of Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting, Engineer A must formally document the disagreement and communicate to the manufacturer's decision-makers — in writing — that the passenger-priority algorithm creates a foreseeable risk of fatal harm to third parties that Engineer A regards as ethically unjustifiable, ensuring that the override decision is made with full awareness of its consequences rather than by default or inattention. Second, Engineer A must assess whether the resulting system design crosses the threshold from a debatable design choice into a design that Engineer A cannot in good conscience certify as safe for public deployment; if it does, Engineer A must decline to approve or certify the system under Code provision II.1.b., which prohibits approval of engineering documents not in conformity with sound engineering principles protective of public safety. Third, if internal escalation fails and Engineer A concludes that deployment of the passenger-priority algorithm poses an unreasonable risk of fatal harm to identifiable third-party classes — pedestrians, cyclists, motorcycle riders — Engineer A must evaluate whether external reporting obligations are triggered, recognizing that the NSPE Code's public welfare paramount obligation is not discharged merely by voicing concern internally when that concern is overridden and the harmful design proceeds.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510843
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_204
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 3 b
answers question1: 104
cited provision1: II.1.
cited provision2: III.1.b.
cited provision3: II.3.b.
conclusion number: 204
conclusion text: Engineer A's role as a consultant rather than a direct employee does not diminish the substantive scope of his ethical obligations under the NSPE Code, but it does affect the procedural mechanisms available to discharge them. The Code's public welfare paramount obligation applies with equal force to consultants and employees; Engineer A cannot invoke the consultant relationship as a basis for providing a narrower or more deferential safety assessment than an employee engineer would be required to provide. However, the consultant relationship does affect how far Engineer A must press concerns before his professional duty is satisfied in one specific respect: a consultant who has formally documented a safety concern, communicated it clearly to the client's responsible decision-makers, and been overruled has discharged the internal escalation component of his obligation more rapidly than an employee embedded in a hierarchical organization with multiple escalation tiers. The consultant's professional independence — which is itself a resource that the client engaged — means that Engineer A's obligation to provide an honest, complete, and unvarnished assessment of third-party harm risks is if anything stronger than that of an employee who might face internal organizational pressure to soften findings. Accordingly, Engineer A's consultant status heightens the independence and completeness obligations while compressing the internal escalation sequence, and does not create any basis for a reduced or qualified duty of care toward third-party public safety.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510956
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_205
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 201
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 205
conclusion text: The tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation — requiring Engineer A to serve the automobile manufacturer's interests — and the Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration is real but resolvable within the NSPE Code's hierarchy of obligations. The Code does not treat these duties as co-equal: the public welfare paramount obligation is explicitly primary, and the faithful agent duty operates only within the ethical limits that the paramount obligation defines. This means that when the manufacturer's commercial interest in a passenger-protective algorithm conflicts with the safety of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders, Engineer A is not required to balance these interests as if they were of equal weight. Instead, Engineer A must first satisfy the third-party safety obligation — by recommending the harm-minimization approach — and may then, within that constraint, seek to serve the manufacturer's interests by identifying technical solutions that minimize passenger harm within the harm-minimization framework. The faithful agent obligation does not authorize Engineer A to recommend a design that foreseeably causes fatal harm to third parties in order to protect the manufacturer's commercial position. What it does require is that Engineer A present the harm-minimization recommendation in a manner that is constructive, professionally grounded, and attentive to the manufacturer's legitimate interests in developing a commercially viable and legally defensible product — not that Engineer A suppress or soften the recommendation to accommodate those interests.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511037
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_206
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 301
answers question2: 202
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
conclusion number: 206
conclusion text: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A has an obligation that is stronger than — and not fully captured by — the Board's utilitarian harm-minimization conclusion. The categorical imperative, applied to the autonomous vehicle harm-allocation problem, yields a distinct constraint: Engineer A must not recommend a design that treats any class of persons — whether passengers or third parties — as mere instruments for the benefit of another class. A passenger-priority algorithm that systematically redirects lethal force toward pedestrians treats pedestrians as means to passenger safety ends, which a Kantian analysis would prohibit regardless of aggregate welfare outcomes. Conversely, a pure harm-minimization algorithm that in specific scenarios sacrifices a single passenger to save multiple pedestrians may itself treat the passenger as a means to aggregate welfare ends. The deontological implication for Engineer A is not simply to recommend harm minimization, but to recommend that the design team explore whether any algorithm can be constructed that avoids pre-committing to the instrumental use of any person's life — for example, by designing for crash avoidance rather than crash outcome optimization, or by ensuring that the system's decision logic does not systematically disadvantage any identifiable class. Engineer A's obligation under this framework includes flagging to the manufacturer that the entire framing of the harm-allocation problem as a binary choice between passenger priority and aggregate minimization may itself embed morally problematic assumptions that warrant further study before deployment.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511117
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_207
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 3 b
answers question1: 303
cited provision1: II.1.
cited provision2: II.3.b.
cited provision3: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 207
conclusion text: From a virtue ethics standpoint, Engineer A demonstrates the professional integrity and moral courage required of a virtuous engineer precisely by actively and unambiguously expressing concerns about harm-allocation algorithms within the risk assessment team, even when facing commercial pressure to prioritize passenger safety. Virtue ethics evaluates not only the content of Engineer A's recommendation but the manner and disposition with which it is made. A virtuous engineer in Engineer A's position would not merely file a technically correct recommendation and withdraw; he would engage substantively with the team's deliberations, articulate the moral stakes of the design decision in terms accessible to non-engineer stakeholders, and persist in raising concerns through appropriate channels if the initial recommendation is dismissed. The virtue of practical wisdom — phronesis — is particularly relevant here: it requires Engineer A to recognize that the harm-allocation problem is not purely technical, that the risk assessment team's composition and mandate may not be adequate to resolve the embedded ethical questions, and that recommending further interdisciplinary study before deployment is itself an expression of professional integrity rather than a failure to provide a definitive answer. A virtuous engineer does not manufacture false certainty about genuinely contested moral questions in order to satisfy a client's desire for a clean recommendation.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511200
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_208
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 401
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 208
conclusion text: If Engineer A had remained silent or provided only a partial assessment of third-party harm risks within the risk assessment team, the automobile manufacturer would not have had sufficient information to make an ethically informed deployment decision, and Engineer A's silence would have constituted a violation of both the faithful agent obligation and the public welfare paramount obligation. The faithful agent obligation requires Engineer A to provide the manufacturer with complete, accurate, and professionally grounded information relevant to the design decision — including information that is commercially inconvenient. Partial disclosure that omits the third-party harm implications of a passenger-priority algorithm would deprive the manufacturer of the ability to make an informed choice about the ethical and legal risks it is assuming. Simultaneously, Engineer A's silence would violate the public welfare paramount obligation by allowing a design to proceed toward deployment without the safety concerns having been formally raised, documented, and considered. The Code provision at III.1.b. — requiring engineers to advise clients when a project will not be successful — applies by analogy: a harm-allocation algorithm that foreseeably causes fatal harm to third parties in a predictable class of scenarios is not a successful engineering outcome, and Engineer A is obligated to say so. Silence in the face of a known, foreseeable, and serious public safety risk is not a neutral act under the NSPE Code; it is a breach of the engineer's professional duty.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511280
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_209
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 402
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: II.1.b.
cited provision4: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 209
conclusion text: If the automobile manufacturer had already established a firm design policy prioritizing passenger safety above all third-party considerations before Engineer A joined the risk assessment team, Engineer A's ethical obligations would shift materially — from recommendation toward escalation and, if necessary, refusal to certify. Under these circumstances, Engineer A's initial obligation to recommend the harm-minimization approach would remain, but its character would change: rather than being a prospective design input, it would function as a formal objection to an existing policy. Engineer A would be required to document that objection in writing, communicate it to the manufacturer's responsible decision-makers, and make clear that the existing passenger-priority policy creates foreseeable fatal risks to third parties that Engineer A regards as inconsistent with the public welfare paramount obligation. If the manufacturer declined to reconsider the policy after receiving this formal objection, Engineer A would face the question of whether to continue participating in the project. Continued participation in the design and certification of a system that Engineer A has formally identified as posing an unreasonable risk of fatal harm to third parties would be difficult to reconcile with the Code's prohibition on approving engineering documents not in conformity with sound engineering principles. Engineer A would therefore be obligated to decline to certify or approve the system, and to evaluate whether the severity and foreseeability of the third-party harm risk triggers any external reporting obligation under the public welfare paramount principle.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511365
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_210
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
answers question1: 403
cited provision1: II.1.
cited provision2: II.1.b.
conclusion number: 210
conclusion text: Had established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic existed at the time of Engineer A's assessment — analogous to the draft standards emerging in BER Case 96-4 — Engineer A's obligation to recommend further study before deployment would have been qualitatively different in character, though not necessarily stronger in absolute terms. The existence of applicable standards would have provided Engineer A with an external, professionally validated benchmark against which to evaluate the manufacturer's proposed algorithm, reducing the degree to which Engineer A's recommendation rested on Engineer A's individual ethical judgment. This would have made the recommendation more defensible, more actionable, and more likely to be accepted by the manufacturer. However, the absence of such standards does not weaken Engineer A's substantive obligation; it merely changes its epistemic basis. In the regulatory vacuum that actually exists, Engineer A's obligation to recommend further study is grounded in the recognition — itself drawn from the BER Case 96-4 analogy — that the absence of applicable standards is itself a safety-relevant fact that the manufacturer must be made aware of before deployment. The regulatory gap heightens the disclosure obligation and strengthens the case for recommending further interdisciplinary study, because it means that no external body has yet validated any harm-allocation approach as meeting a minimum standard of public safety. Engineer A's recommendation in the absence of standards must therefore be more explicitly provisional, more clearly flagged as reflecting one among several defensible approaches, and more strongly oriented toward recommending that deployment await the development of at least preliminary industry consensus.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511437
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_211
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 404
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
cited provision3: II.1.b.
conclusion number: 211
conclusion text: If Engineer A had proposed and the team had successfully identified a technical mitigation option — such as a sensor-based system capable of dynamically evaluating crash scenarios in real time rather than relying on pre-committed algorithmic harm-allocation logic — the core ethical dilemma between passenger safety and third-party harm minimization would be substantially but not fully dissolved. A dynamic real-time evaluation system would eliminate the most ethically troubling feature of pre-committed harm-allocation logic: the systematic, categorical pre-assignment of fatal risk to identifiable classes of persons based on their mode of transportation rather than on the actual circumstances of a specific crash. However, Engineer A would retain significant residual ethical obligations even if such a system were technically feasible. First, Engineer A would be obligated to assess and disclose the reliability limitations of the dynamic evaluation system — including sensor failure modes, edge cases where real-time evaluation is impossible, and the possibility that the system's dynamic decisions might themselves embed implicit harm-allocation biases through the weighting of its input variables. Second, Engineer A would be obligated to recommend that the dynamic system's decision logic be made transparent to consumers and regulators, since the ethical concerns about algorithmic opacity do not disappear merely because the algorithm operates in real time rather than through pre-commitment. Third, Engineer A would be obligated to recommend that the dynamic system undergo further study and testing before deployment, since the novelty of the technology means that its real-world performance across the full range of crash scenarios cannot be validated through design analysis alone. The identification of a technical mitigation option reduces but does not eliminate Engineer A's public safety obligations.
conclusion type: question_response
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511516
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_3
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
answers question1: 1
conclusion number: 3
conclusion text: That being said, to address the specific question posed in the case, Engineer A has an obligation to state that the prime ethical obligation of the vehicle operation is to minimize harm to affect the least number of persons.
conclusion type: board_explicit
extraction reasoning: Parsed from imported case text (no LLM)
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510317
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_301
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 201
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
conclusion number: 301
conclusion text: The tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits and the Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration is resolved in this case by treating the automobile manufacturer's commercial interest in a passenger-protective algorithm as categorically subordinate to the welfare of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists who bear the fatal risk of the vehicle's pre-committed harm-allocation logic. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons effectively establishes a lexical ordering: Public Welfare Paramount operates as a side-constraint on the faithful agent role, not merely as one factor to be weighed against client interest. This means Engineer A's duty to serve the automobile manufacturer does not extend to endorsing an algorithm that systematically transfers lethal risk onto non-consenting third parties in order to protect paying passengers. The case teaches that when client interest and third-party safety are genuinely zero-sum — as they are in a pre-committed harm-allocation algorithm — the NSPE Code resolves the tension by collapsing the faithful agent role at the boundary where client service would require engineering complicity in foreseeable third-party fatalities.
conclusion type: principle_synthesis
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511590
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_302
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: II 1
cites provision: I 1
answers question1: 202
answers question2: 302
cited provision1: I.1.
cited provision2: II.1.
conclusion number: 302
conclusion text: The Competing Public Goods Balancing principle — which acknowledges that vehicle passengers hold legitimate safety interests — does not neutralize the Public Welfare Paramount principle in this case; rather, the two principles interact to produce a qualified rather than absolute harm-minimization mandate. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons implicitly acknowledges that passenger safety is a genuine public good, not merely a commercial preference, but treats aggregate harm reduction across all affected parties as the governing metric when those goods conflict. This resolution carries an important teaching: the Competing Public Goods Balancing principle functions as a corrective against naive utilitarian aggregation that would ignore passenger welfare entirely, while Public Welfare Paramount prevents that corrective from being weaponized to justify algorithms that predictably sacrifice a greater number of third-party lives to protect a smaller number of passengers. The net effect is that Engineer A's recommendation must be grounded in a harm-minimization calculus that counts all lives equally, resisting both pure passenger-priority logic and any framing that treats third-party lives as infinitely more valuable than passenger lives.
conclusion type: principle_synthesis
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511670
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Conclusion_303
type: EthicalConclusion
type: NamedIndividual
cites provision: III 1 b
cites provision: II 1 b
cites provision: II 3 b
answers question1: 203
answers question2: 204
answers question3: 101
answers question4: 102
cited provision1: II.1.b.
cited provision2: II.3.b.
cited provision3: III.1.b.
conclusion number: 303
conclusion text: The interaction between the Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation and the Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation — both activated by the absence of established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics — produces a compounded disclosure duty that is stronger than either principle would generate in isolation. In the software testing context of BER Case 96-4, the regulatory gap triggered an obligation to flag the absence of standards as itself a safety concern and to recommend further study before deployment. Transposed to the autonomous vehicle harm-allocation context, that same gap-triggered escalation obligation combines with the transparency obligation to require Engineer A not only to recommend further study but also to affirmatively disclose to the automobile manufacturer that the harm-allocation recommendation rests on a specific moral framework — utilitarian harm minimization — rather than on a settled engineering standard. The Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Advisory Opinions principle reinforces this synthesis: because any recommendation Engineer A makes in a regulatory vacuum will necessarily reflect contestable ethical assumptions, selective silence about those assumptions would itself be a form of incomplete and potentially misleading professional advice. The case therefore teaches that regulatory vacuums do not relieve disclosure obligations; they intensify them, because the engineer's judgment substitutes for the absent standard and must therefore be rendered fully transparent.
conclusion type: principle_synthesis
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511779
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Consumer Product Safety Testing Standard for Autonomous Vehicles
type: ConsumerProductSafetyTestingStandard
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.72
createdby: Consumer product safety standards bodies and automotive regulatory agencies
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
documenttitle: Consumer Product Safety Testing Policies and Standards Applicable to Autonomous Vehicle Systems
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
importance: medium
resourceclass: Consumer Product Safety Testing Standard
sourcetext: automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
usedby: Engineer A and the engineering risk assessment team
usedincontext: General product safety testing standards and policies governing the safety evaluation of autonomous vehicle systems as consumer products prior to market release, providing a baseline professional benchmark for the risk assessment team's deliberations
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.912165
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP1
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP1
decision question: How should Engineer A discharge his obligations as a member of the automobile manufacturer's risk assessment team when the crash-avoidance algorithm's harm-distribution logic raises unresolved ethical and safety questions — specifically, whether to actively express concerns and recommend further study before deployment, or to defer to the team's commercial orientation and provide a narrower assessment?
focus: Engineer A's core obligation to actively participate in the risk assessment team, unambiguously express safety concerns about the harm-allocation algorithm, and recommend further study before deployment of the autonomous vehicle operating system
option1: Actively participate in all risk assessment team deliberations, formally document and unambiguously express concerns about the harm-allocation algorithm's third-party safety implications in writing, recommend that the manufacturer commission further interdisciplinary study — including ethical framework analysis and technical mitigation investigation — before deploying the operating system
option2: Participate in the risk assessment team's technical evaluation, raise third-party harm concerns verbally during team deliberations, and provide a written recommendation that identifies the harm-minimization approach as preferable — without separately recommending that deployment be delayed for further study, on the ground that the team's collective judgment and the manufacturer's business timeline should govern the deployment decision once the technical recommendation has been delivered
option3: Participate in the risk assessment team's evaluation, recommend harm minimization as the preferred algorithm design, and separately recommend that the manufacturer explore technical mitigation options — such as dynamic real-time crash evaluation systems — as a means of reducing the need for pre-committed harm-allocation logic, framing further study as a technical improvement opportunity rather than a deployment prerequisite
role label: Engineer A — Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Member
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513497
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP2
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP2
decision question: Given that no applicable national or industry standards govern autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic, must Engineer A affirmatively disclose to the automobile manufacturer that the harm-minimization recommendation is grounded in a utilitarian ethical framework rather than a technically mandated norm — and must Engineer A further recommend that the manufacturer publicly disclose the algorithm's embedded moral framework to prospective consumers before deployment?
focus: Engineer A's obligation to disclose to the automobile manufacturer that the harm-minimization recommendation reflects a specific moral framework rather than a universally accepted engineering standard, and to recommend public disclosure of the embedded ethical framework to prospective consumers before deployment — particularly in the absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards
option1: Explicitly identify in the written risk assessment report that the harm-minimization recommendation is grounded in a utilitarian ethical framework, present the deontological alternative framework and its different algorithmic implications with equal completeness, and include a specific advisory that the manufacturer implement pre-sale public disclosure of the vehicle's harm-allocation decision logic before deployment
option2: Present both the passenger-priority and harm-minimization frameworks objectively in the risk assessment report — including their respective advantages and disadvantages — without characterizing either as utilitarian or deontological, and recommend that the manufacturer consult legal counsel and ethics advisors regarding consumer disclosure obligations, treating the philosophical labeling and public disclosure questions as outside the scope of the engineering risk assessment mandate
option3: Identify the philosophical basis of the harm-minimization recommendation in the internal risk assessment report delivered to the manufacturer, recommend that the manufacturer seek interdisciplinary ethics review before finalizing the algorithm design, but decline to recommend specific consumer-facing public disclosure on the ground that disclosure strategy is a legal and business decision within the manufacturer's exclusive authority as client
role label: Engineer A — Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Member and Consultant
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513586
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP3
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP3
decision question: If the automobile manufacturer overrides Engineer A's harm-minimization recommendation and proceeds with a passenger-priority algorithm that foreseeably creates fatal risk for pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders, what actions must Engineer A take — and does Engineer A's consultant status affect the scope or sequence of those obligations?
focus: Engineer A's residual obligations when the automobile manufacturer overrides the harm-minimization recommendation and elects to program the vehicle to prioritize passenger safety — including whether Engineer A must pursue graduated internal escalation, decline to certify the system, or evaluate external reporting obligations
option1: Formally document the safety disagreement in writing addressed to the manufacturer's responsible decision-makers, clearly stating that the passenger-priority algorithm creates foreseeable fatal risk to third parties inconsistent with the public welfare paramount obligation; assess whether the system crosses the certification threshold under Code II.1.b and decline to certify if it does; and evaluate whether the severity and foreseeability of third-party harm triggers external reporting obligations if internal escalation fails
option2: Formally document the safety disagreement in writing, deliver it to the manufacturer's project lead, and — upon being overruled — treat the internal escalation obligation as discharged given the compressed escalation sequence available in a consultant relationship; continue participating in the project in an advisory capacity without certifying the system, on the ground that declining to certify without an applicable regulatory standard to anchor the refusal would exceed the scope of the consultant's professional mandate
option3: Document the safety disagreement in the final risk assessment report, recommend that the manufacturer obtain an independent ethics and safety review of the passenger-priority algorithm before deployment, and withdraw from the consulting engagement if the manufacturer proceeds without that review — treating withdrawal as the appropriate professional response that preserves Engineer A's integrity without triggering external reporting obligations that the NSPE Code reserves for more severe and imminent public safety threats
role label: Engineer A — Consultant to Automobile Manufacturer
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513679
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP4
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP4
decision question: Should Engineer A recommend that the autonomous vehicle's operating system minimize harm to the least number of persons, and actively express that concern within the risk assessment team even under commercial pressure to prioritize passenger safety?
focus: Engineer A's core obligation to recommend harm minimization for the least number of persons and to actively participate in the risk assessment team by unambiguously expressing safety concerns about the harm-allocation algorithm
option1: Formally recommend that the harm-allocation algorithm minimize harm to the least number of persons, actively express this position within the risk assessment team, document the recommendation in writing, and propose further interdisciplinary study and exploration of dynamic real-time mitigation alternatives before deployment
option2: Present the harm-minimization approach as one among several technically defensible design options, defer to the risk assessment team's collective judgment on which framework to adopt, and limit Engineer A's formal output to a balanced technical summary of competing approaches without a personal recommendation
option3: Recommend harm minimization internally within the risk assessment team but accept the manufacturer's passenger-priority preference as a legitimate design policy choice within the manufacturer's authority, confining Engineer A's role to optimizing the passenger-priority algorithm's technical implementation rather than contesting the underlying policy
role label: Engineer A
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513755
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP5
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP5
decision question: Must Engineer A affirmatively disclose to the automobile manufacturer that the harm-minimization recommendation is grounded in a utilitarian ethical framework rather than an established regulatory or industry standard, and must Engineer A further recommend that the manufacturer publicly disclose the vehicle's embedded ethical decision logic to consumers before deployment?
focus: Engineer A's obligation to disclose to the automobile manufacturer that the harm-minimization recommendation reflects a specific moral philosophy rather than a universally accepted engineering standard, and to recommend pre-sale public disclosure of the embedded ethical framework to prospective consumers
option1: Explicitly disclose to the automobile manufacturer in the technical report that the harm-minimization recommendation reflects a utilitarian moral philosophy rather than an established engineering standard, identify deontological and other alternative frameworks that yield different outcomes, and affirmatively recommend that the manufacturer implement pre-sale consumer disclosure of the vehicle's harm-allocation decision logic as a condition of ethically responsible deployment
option2: Disclose the philosophical basis of the harm-minimization recommendation to the manufacturer's engineering and legal teams as part of the confidential consulting deliverable, but limit the consumer disclosure recommendation to a general advisory that the manufacturer consult legal counsel about disclosure obligations, leaving the public transparency decision to the manufacturer's business judgment
option3: Present the harm-minimization recommendation as Engineer A's professional judgment grounded in the NSPE Code's public welfare paramount obligation without characterizing it as utilitarian or labeling its philosophical foundations, on the basis that the Code itself — rather than a contested moral philosophy — provides the normative authority for the recommendation, and defer consumer disclosure questions to the manufacturer and its regulatory counsel
role label: Engineer A
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513828
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

DP6
type: DecisionPoint
type: NamedIndividual
decision point id: DP6
decision question: If the automobile manufacturer overrides Engineer A's harm-minimization recommendation and programs the vehicle to prioritize passenger safety above third-party welfare, what actions must Engineer A take — and does Engineer A's consultant status alter the scope or sequence of those obligations?
focus: Engineer A's residual obligations when the automobile manufacturer overrides the harm-minimization recommendation — including graduated internal escalation, assessment of whether to certify the system, and evaluation of whether external reporting is triggered — and how the consultant relationship affects the scope and sequence of those obligations
option1: Formally document the safety disagreement in writing to the manufacturer's responsible decision-makers, decline to certify or approve the passenger-priority system if it cannot be reconciled with the public welfare paramount obligation, and evaluate whether the foreseeability and severity of third-party fatal harm triggers an external reporting obligation beyond the consulting engagement
option2: Document the safety concern in the consulting deliverable, communicate the disagreement verbally to the manufacturer's project lead, and continue participating in the technical optimization of the passenger-priority system while treating the manufacturer's policy override as a legitimate business decision within the client's authority — on the basis that Engineer A's professional duty is satisfied by having raised the concern and that the manufacturer bears ultimate design responsibility
option3: Withdraw from the consulting engagement upon the manufacturer's override without formal written documentation of the specific certification threshold crossed, on the basis that the consultant relationship does not obligate Engineer A to pursue multi-tier internal escalation through an organization in which Engineer A holds no employment standing, and that withdrawal itself constitutes a sufficient professional signal of non-endorsement
role label: Engineer A
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513916
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Draft_AV_Safety_Testing_Standard
type: AutonomousVehicleSafetyStandard
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.78
createdby: Unnamed standard-setting organization
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
documenttitle: Draft Safety Testing Standard for Autonomous Vehicle Operating Systems (referenced but unnamed)
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
importance: medium
resourceclass: Autonomous Vehicle Safety Standard
sourcetext: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
usedby: Engineer A and the engineering risk management team in evaluating autonomous vehicle system safety
usedincontext: Represents the emerging technical standard that the autonomous vehicle operating system may not meet, triggering Engineer A's obligation to recommend further study and risk assessment before deployment; analogous to the new draft standards in BER Case 96-4
version: Draft at time of case
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.913713
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Draft Safety Standards Emerge
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Emerging_Standards_Awareness_Constraint
activates constraint: Professional_Competence_Obligation
causes state change: Regulatory ambiguity introduced; Engineer A must exercise professional judgment in absence of finalized guidance; employer's financial calculations complicated by uncertain compliance requirements
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Apply_Best_Available_Knowledge
creates obligation: Disclose_Standards_Uncertainty_To_Employer
creates obligation: Monitor_Evolving_Standards
emergency status: high
event type: exogenous
temporal marker: Circa 1996, concurrent with BER Case 96-4 development phase
temporal sequence: 2
urgency level: medium
comment: Relevant draft standards for safety-critical software are published or circulated during the period of development, creating an evolving regulatory and professional context that Engineer A must navigate without the clarity of finalized rules.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928418
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Active Participation Concern Expression Constraint
type: AutonomousVehicleRiskManagementActiveParticipationConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A was a consultant to an automobile manufacturer serving on an engineering risk assessment team. The autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-allocation decision logic raised unresolved safety concerns regarding third-party harm to pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.93
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Autonomous Vehicle Risk Management Active Participation Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from passive participation or silence about identified safety concerns in the autonomous vehicle risk management process, and was required to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously expressing all concerns regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 16-5; present BER case
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's participation on the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.927324
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Client Interest Third-Party Safety Priority Constraint
type: ClientLoyaltyvs.PublicSafetyPriorityConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The automobile manufacturer has a commercial interest in a passenger-protective algorithm, while Engineer A's paramount obligation to public safety requires consideration of the fatal harm that such an algorithm may cause to third parties.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.93
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the priority rule establishing that when obligations to the automobile manufacturer client — including the client's commercial interest in a passenger-protective algorithm — conflict with obligations to public safety, including the safety of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders who may be fatally harmed by a passenger-priority algorithm, the public safety obligation takes precedence, prohibiting Engineer A from fulfilling client directives that would compromise public welfare.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's consulting engagement with the automobile manufacturer
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921131
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Crash Scenario Technical Safety Analysis Capability
type: UnavoidableCrashScenarioTechnicalSafetyAnalysisCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Unavoidable Crash Scenario Technical Safety Analysis Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the technical capability to analyze the specific unavoidable crash scenarios presented to the risk assessment team — including estimating injury probability and severity for passengers and third parties under alternative crash trajectories — and to produce a technically grounded comparative safety analysis informing the harm minimization algorithm design recommendation.
casecontext: The risk assessment team scenario required technical analysis of crash outcome probabilities and injury severity comparisons to inform the harm minimization algorithm design recommendation.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.85
demonstratedthrough: Analysis of the specific scenario involving a vehicle choosing between crashing into a stationary object (causing serious but non-life-threatening passenger injuries) versus striking a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider (potentially causing fatal injury), requiring technical assessment of outcome probabilities and severity distributions.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: expert
sourcetext: In the event of an unavoidable crash, does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers
textreferences: In the event of an unavoidable crash, does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919501
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Do No Harm Design Obligation Safety Constraint
type: SafetyConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-allocation algorithm pre-commits to causing harm to either passengers or third parties in unavoidable crash scenarios, requiring Engineer A to apply the 'do no harm' principle in formulating the recommendation.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.9
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Safety Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the 'do no harm' principle in autonomous system design — requiring that the harm-allocation algorithm recommendation minimize foreseeable harm to all persons who may be affected by the autonomous vehicle system, including third parties such as pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — prohibiting Engineer A from recommending a system design that foreseeably maximizes harm to identifiable third-party classes as a pre-committed algorithmic outcome.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case 16-5; ISO 26262 Automotive Functional Safety Standard
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
temporalscope: During Engineer A's evaluation and recommendation of harm-allocation decision logic
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921633
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Ethical Framework Selection Capability
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmMinimizationAlgorithmEthicalFrameworkSelectionCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Minimization Algorithm Ethical Framework Selection Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A, as a professional engineer and consultant to the automobile manufacturer assigned to the engineering risk assessment team, possessed the capability to identify and evaluate competing ethical frameworks for encoding harm minimization decisions into the autonomous vehicle operating system — including the passenger-priority approach versus the least-harm-to-all approach — and to recommend a defensible ethical framework to the manufacturer.
casecontext: Engineer A was assigned to evaluate the specific scenario of unavoidable crash decision logic for an autonomous vehicle operating system, requiring selection among competing ethical frameworks for algorithm design.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.87
demonstratedthrough: Assignment to and participation in the engineering risk assessment team evaluating the unavoidable crash scenario, including deliberation about whether the vehicle system should prioritize passenger safety or minimize total harm to all parties including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: expert
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919002
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Further Study Recommendation Capability
type: FurtherStudyRecommendationBeforeUnreliableEnergySystemDeploymentCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Further Study Recommendation Before Unreliable Energy System Deployment Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize when unresolved safety concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's harm minimization algorithm — including unresolved questions about the ethical framework for crash decision logic — warranted a recommendation that further study be conducted before the operating system is deployed, and to communicate this recommendation clearly and unambiguously to the automobile manufacturer as a professional obligation.
casecontext: Engineer A's obligation to recommend further study before deployment when safety concerns remain unresolved is directly analogous to the existing capability class, which was itself derived from BER 16-5 — the same case type as the present case.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.82
demonstratedthrough: Obligation to recommend further study before deployment of the autonomous vehicle operating system when safety concerns about the harm minimization algorithm remain unresolved, by analogy to the BER 16-5 autonomous vehicle precedent.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926109
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Further Study Recommendation Constraint
type: FurtherStudyRecommendationBeforeUnreliableSystemDeploymentConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A identified unresolved safety concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-allocation decision logic. The system operated in a regulatory standards vacuum. The 'do no harm' principle required that further study be recommended if concerns could not be resolved through available mitigation options.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.94
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Further Study Recommendation Before Unreliable System Deployment Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from remaining silent about the need for further study when identified safety concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system had not been adequately resolved, and was required to propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 16-5; BER Case 96-4; present BER case
sourcetext: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
temporalscope: If, after active participation and expression of concerns and exploration of mitigation options, safety concerns remained unresolved prior to deployment
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk. The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
textreferences: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.927481
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Good Faith Safety Concern Objective Testimony Constraint
type: GoodFaithSafetyConcernWithoutDemonstrableViolationEscalationBoundaryConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: No established standards exist governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, meaning Engineer A's concerns — while professionally grounded — cannot be characterized as violations of non-existent standards.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.84
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Good Faith Safety Concern Without Demonstrable Violation Escalation Boundary Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained, in the absence of established regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, to distinguish between a confirmed safety violation (which would trigger mandatory external reporting) and a good-faith professional concern about the moral and safety implications of the harm-allocation algorithm (which permits but does not mandate external regulatory testimony), and was prohibited from overstating the certainty or severity of unconfirmed concerns in any public or regulatory forum.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.3; BER Case 96-4; Good Faith Safety Concern Without Demonstrable Violation Escalation Boundary Constraint
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's participation in the risk assessment team and any subsequent regulatory engagement
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921470
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Harm Allocation Algorithm Completeness Disclosure Constraint
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmAllocationAlgorithmicPre-CommitmentEthicalConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A must recommend between two morally distinct algorithmic approaches — passenger-priority and harm-minimization — each of which pre-commits the autonomous vehicle to causing harm to an identifiable class of persons in unavoidable crash scenarios.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.86
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Allocation Algorithmic Pre-Commitment Ethical Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from recommending a harm-allocation algorithm for the autonomous vehicle operating system without ensuring that the risk assessment team's report fully discloses the moral framework embedded in the algorithm — including the trade-offs between passenger safety and third-party harm minimization — prohibiting Engineer A from treating the harm-allocation decision as a purely technical matter and requiring that the ethical premises of the recommended algorithm be surfaced, disclosed, and subjected to public and regulatory scrutiny.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Sections II.1, II.4, III.6.b, II.4.a; BER Case 16-5; Autonomous Vehicle Harm Allocation Algorithmic Pre-Commitment Ethical Constraint
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
temporalscope: During Engineer A's formulation and submission of recommendations to the risk assessment team and the automobile manufacturer
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921316
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Harm Minimization Risk Management Participation
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmMinimizationRiskManagementParticipationCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Minimization Risk Management Participation Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, possessed the capability to fully and actively participate in the engineering risk management process for harm minimization — including clearly and unambiguously expressing concerns regarding the safety of the operating system, contributing to deliberation about harm minimization outcomes in unavoidable crash scenarios, and recommending further study before the operating system is deployed when safety concerns remain unresolved.
casecontext: Engineer A was assigned to the engineering risk assessment team and obligated to participate fully in deliberations about harm minimization in unavoidable crash scenarios for the autonomous vehicle operating system.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.95
demonstratedthrough: Active participation in the risk assessment team's evaluation of unavoidable crash scenarios and formulation of recommendations to the automobile manufacturer regarding harm minimization algorithm design.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: The following scenario is among the situations that are being considered by the engineering risk assessment team
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919672
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Informed Employer Decision Enablement Constraint
type: Safety-CriticalSoftwareInformedEmployerDecisionEnablementObligation
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A was a consultant to an automobile manufacturer. The manufacturer needed complete information about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety concerns and available mitigation options to make an informed decision about deployment. Engineer A's role as faithful agent required enabling that informed decision.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.87
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Safety-Critical Software Informed Employer Decision Enablement Obligation
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from withholding or obscuring material safety information from the automobile manufacturer, and was required to ensure that the manufacturer had complete, clear, accurate, and direct information about identified safety concerns and available mitigation options to enable an informed deployment decision.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Sections III.6.b and II.4.a; BER Case 96-4 (analogical precedent); present BER case
sourcetext: Engineer A was in a strong position to assist his employer, and ultimately his employer's client, in carefully evaluating all of the appropriate facts and circumstances in order to take a course of action.
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's participation on the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team
textreferences: Engineer A was in a strong position to assist his employer, and ultimately his employer's client, in carefully evaluating all of the appropriate facts and circumstances in order to take a course of action.
textreferences: the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on the public health, safety, and welfare.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928093
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Passenger Priority Algorithm Third-Party Fatal Harm Non-Subordination Constraint
type: AutonomousVehicleThird-PartyFatalHarmPassengerPriorityNon-SubordinationConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The risk assessment team scenario explicitly presents the binary choice between a passenger-protective algorithm and a harm-minimization algorithm, with the harm-minimization option potentially causing serious but non-life-threatening injuries to passengers while avoiding fatal injury to pedestrians, cyclists, or motorcycle riders.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.88
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Fatal Harm Passenger Priority Non-Subordination Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from recommending or acquiescing in a harm-allocation algorithm that categorically prioritizes passenger safety over the safety of third parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — when the foreseeable consequence of that prioritization is fatal or serious injury to those third parties, requiring Engineer A to at minimum recommend further study, public disclosure of the moral framework, and regulatory engagement before any such algorithm is deployed.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1 (paramount public safety); BER Case 16-5; Autonomous Vehicle Risk Management Active Participation Constraint
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
temporalscope: During Engineer A's evaluation and recommendation of harm-allocation decision logic for the autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.920055
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Public Transparency Advocacy Capability
type: AutonomousVehicleMoralAlgorithmPublicTransparencyAdvocacyCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Autonomous Vehicle Moral Algorithm Public Transparency Advocacy Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the moral framework encoded in the autonomous vehicle's harm minimization algorithm constitutes information of significant public interest, and to recommend that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose the ethical framework and decision logic embedded in the operating system to enable informed consumer and regulatory decision-making.
casecontext: Engineer A's role on the risk assessment team included the obligation to recommend that the manufacturer publicly disclose the ethical framework embedded in the AV operating system, consistent with professional transparency obligations.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.85
demonstratedthrough: Obligation to recommend public disclosure of the moral framework underlying the harm minimization algorithm as part of the risk assessment team's recommendations to the automobile manufacturer.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919306
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Regulatory Standards Vacuum Escalation Permissibility Constraint
type: RegulatoryStandardsVacuumHeightenedEscalationPermissibilityConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: No established national or industry standards govern autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic ethics, creating a regulatory standards vacuum that shapes the permissible form and content of Engineer A's escalation.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.87
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Regulatory Standards Vacuum Heightened Escalation Permissibility Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the absence of applicable governmental or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics — a regulatory standards vacuum — which did not eliminate Engineer A's ability to escalate safety concerns to regulatory authorities, but simultaneously constrained the form of that escalation by requiring that Engineer A clearly communicate the absence of applicable standards, the basis for the professional concern, and the distinction between the absence of standards and the identified residual ethical and safety risk.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case 96-4; Regulatory Standards Vacuum Heightened Escalation Permissibility Constraint
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's assignment to the risk assessment team and any subsequent escalation actions
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.920970
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Active Participation Capability
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmMinimizationRiskManagementParticipationCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Minimization Risk Management Participation Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to fully and actively participate in the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express concerns regarding the safety of the autonomous vehicle operating system, and contribute to deliberation about harm minimization outcomes in unavoidable crash scenarios.
casecontext: Engineer A served as a consultant on the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team evaluating scenarios for a driverless vehicle operating system
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.92
demonstratedthrough: Active participation in the engineering risk assessment team evaluating harm minimization scenarios for the driverless vehicle operating system, including expressing concerns and exploring additional technical options to mitigate identified risks
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A (Autonomous Vehicle Case)
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.925782
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Active Participation Constraint
type: AutonomousVehicleRiskManagementActiveParticipationConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team evaluating harm-allocation decision logic for an autonomous vehicle operating system, including the scenario of unavoidable crash outcomes affecting passengers versus third parties.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.92
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Autonomous Vehicle Risk Management Active Participation Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was constrained to fully and actively participate in the risk management process — including expressing clearly and unambiguously any concerns regarding the safety of the autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-allocation decision logic — and was prohibited from passive participation or silence about identified safety concerns, including concerns about the moral and safety implications of a passenger-priority versus harm-minimization algorithm.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 16-5; NSPE Code Section II.1 (paramount public safety obligation)
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's assignment to the engineering risk assessment team
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.910729
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Risk Mitigation Option Exploration Constraint
type: RiskMitigationOptionExplorationBeforeDeploymentRecommendationConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A identified safety concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-allocation decision logic, including risks to third parties such as pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders. The system operated in a regulatory standards vacuum with no established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.88
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Risk Mitigation Option Exploration Before Deployment Recommendation Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from recommending deployment of the autonomous vehicle operating system without first exploring all additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed system, and was required to present those options to the risk management team as part of his active participation.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-4 (analogical precedent); present BER case
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
temporalscope: During Engineer A's participation on the autonomous vehicle engineering risk management team, prior to any deployment recommendation
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.927147
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Third-Party Harm Weighting Capability
type: Third-PartyStakeholderHarmWeightinginSafety-CriticalAlgorithmDesignCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Third-Party Stakeholder Harm Weighting in Safety-Critical Algorithm Design Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to explicitly identify, assess, and present the welfare interests of third parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — as distinct and morally significant considerations in the autonomous vehicle harm minimization algorithm design deliberations, ensuring that third-party harm was not systematically subordinated to passenger interests without ethical justification.
casecontext: The risk assessment scenario explicitly required Engineer A to consider the interests of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders as distinct from passenger interests in the harm minimization algorithm design.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.86
demonstratedthrough: Participation in risk assessment team deliberations that explicitly considered the scenario of a vehicle striking a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider versus crashing into a stationary object, requiring explicit weighing of third-party harm against passenger harm.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
textreferences: does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919157
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Novel Technology Application Capability
type: DoNoHarmPrincipleApplicationinNovelTechnologyRiskAssessmentCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Do No Harm Principle Application in Novel Technology Risk Assessment Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize and apply the do-no-harm principle to the autonomous vehicle operating system risk assessment, including the ability to identify when unresolved safety concerns about harm minimization algorithms required recommending further study before deployment.
casecontext: Engineer A served as a consultant on an automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team evaluating harm minimization scenarios for a driverless vehicle operating system
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.86
demonstratedthrough: Fully and actively participating in the engineering risk management team, clearly expressing concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety, and proposing further study before deployment if necessary
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A (Autonomous Vehicle Case)
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
textreferences: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
textreferences: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.925425
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Business Pressure Technical Separation Constraint
type: BusinessPressureTechnicalRecommendationSeparationConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A was employed by a software company designing safety-critical software for nuclear, air quality, and water quality facilities. Testing was extremely costly, clients were eager to proceed, and delay would cause competitive disadvantage and utility rate increases. Engineer A was asked to recommend whether additional testing was needed.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.91
constrainedentity: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4 context)
constraintclass: Business Pressure Technical Recommendation Separation Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from incorporating financial pressures — including costs to the software company, its clients, competitive disadvantage, job losses, and utility rate increases — into his technical recommendation about additional testing, and was required to formulate his recommendation based solely on technical findings, leaving business considerations to be weighed separately by the employer.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Sections III.6.b and II.4.a; BER Case 96-4
sourcetext: it would seem that these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A.
temporalscope: At the time Engineer A was asked to make his recommendation about additional testing
textreferences: The financial pressures that existed, including the financial impact on his company, the client, and the public, as well as the potential loss of jobs and delays if additional testing were to be pursued, were clearly important factors and needed to be addressed in some manner.
textreferences: it would seem that these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A.
textreferences: making a recommendation based solely on technical finding (and not business considerations) to permit the company to make an informed decision about the need for additional testing in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926625
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Emerging Standard Technical Report Disclosure Constraint
type: EmergingStandardAwarenessTechnicalReportDisclosureConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards about to be released by a standard-setting organization that the newly designed software might not meet, even though existing testing demonstrated the software was safe under current standards.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.9
constrainedentity: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4 context)
constraintclass: Emerging Standard Awareness Technical Report Disclosure Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from remaining silent about the new draft testing standards recently reported in professional literature that the designed software might not meet, and was required to reference those forthcoming standards in a technical report to his employer so that the employer could make an informed decision about additional testing.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Sections III.6.b and II.4.a; BER Case 96-4
sourcetext: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
temporalscope: At the time Engineer A prepared his recommendation and technical report
textreferences: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: the Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing (see Code Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.).
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926789
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Public Safety Paramount Safety-Critical Software Constraint
type: PublicSafetyParamountConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The software was designed for facilities with enormous impact on public health, safety, and welfare — nuclear, air quality control, and water quality control. Engineer A was aware of forthcoming standards the software might not meet, creating a potential public safety risk if deployed without additional testing.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.95
constrainedentity: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4 context)
constraintclass: Public Safety Paramount Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the paramount public safety obligation from proceeding with a recommendation that prioritized business considerations — including client eagerness, competitive disadvantage, and utility rate increases — over the safety implications of deploying software that might not meet forthcoming standards in nuclear, air quality, and water quality facilities.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-4
sourcetext: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
temporalscope: At the time Engineer A formulated his recommendation about additional testing
textreferences: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.927712
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Cross-Case Analogical Transfer BER 96-4 to AV Case Capability
type: Cross-CaseEthicalPrecedentAnalogicalTransferCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Cross-Case Ethical Precedent Analogical Transfer Capability
capabilitystatement: The NSPE Board of Ethical Review demonstrated the capability to recognize that the ethical principles established in BER Case 96-4 (safety-critical software, new draft standards) were analogically transferable to the autonomous vehicle harm minimization case, identifying the shared normative structure — new technology uncertainty, public welfare paramountcy, do-no-harm obligation, and informed employer decision-making — and applying those transferable principles to reach justified conclusions in the novel autonomous vehicle context.
casecontext: The Board applied BER Case 96-4 software testing principles to the autonomous vehicle harm minimization scenario, recognizing shared ethical structure across different technology domains
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.85
demonstratedthrough: Explicitly identifying BER Case 96-4 as pertinent to the autonomous vehicle case despite different technology domains, and applying its principles to determine Engineer A's obligations in the AV risk assessment context
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A / NSPE Board of Ethical Review
proficiencylevel: expert
sourcetext: Although the facts in the present case are somewhat different than those in Case 96-4, the Board of Ethical Review believes that several points discussed in the previous case are pertinent to the case at hand.
textreferences: Although the facts in the present case are somewhat different than those in Case 96-4, the Board of Ethical Review believes that several points discussed in the previous case are pertinent to the case at hand.
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk. The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
textreferences: Similarly, in the present case, Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team...
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.925588
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Capability
type: InformedDecision-MakingProcessFacilitationCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Informed Decision-Making Process Facilitation Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, possessed the capability to structure and present professional analysis of the harm minimization algorithm scenarios in a manner that facilitated an informed decision-making process by the manufacturer — including presenting complete comparative information about all ethical framework options, identifying non-obvious consequences of each option (such as third-party harm and public transparency implications), and ensuring that the manufacturer had all material information needed to make a genuinely informed choice about the autonomous vehicle operating system design.
casecontext: Engineer A's faithful agent obligation to the automobile manufacturer required facilitating an informed decision-making process about the harm minimization algorithm design, including presenting all material considerations about competing ethical frameworks and their public welfare implications.
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.88
demonstratedthrough: Obligation to act as a faithful agent by providing the manufacturer with a diligent, complete, and objective analysis of the harm minimization scenarios, enabling the manufacturer to make an informed decision about the operating system design.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:26.193578+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system.
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system.
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.919865
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Public Welfare Paramountcy Safety-Critical Software Capability
type: PublicWelfareParamountcyRecognitionCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the industries using the safety-critical software — water, air, and nuclear — had an enormous impact on public health, safety, and welfare, and that this paramountcy required ensuring that information imparted to his employer and clients was clear, accurate, and direct, overriding business and financial considerations in the technical recommendation.
casecontext: Engineer A recognized that safety-critical software for nuclear, air quality, and water quality facilities created heightened public welfare obligations that could not be subordinated to business considerations
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.91
demonstratedthrough: Holding paramount public health, safety, and welfare in making his recommendation about additional software testing, despite significant financial pressures on the company, its clients, and the public
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
textreferences: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926297
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Software Standards Capability
type: RegulatoryGapSafetyEscalationRecognitionCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Recognition Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that the existence of a new draft testing standard — not yet formally adopted — heightened rather than diminished his professional obligation to recommend additional testing, understanding that the gap between existing standards compliance and emerging standard requirements amplified the duty to report concerns and enable informed employer decision-making.
casecontext: Engineer A's software passed existing standards but he became aware of new draft standards that the software might not meet, creating a regulatory gap situation
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.88
demonstratedthrough: Recognizing that compliance with existing standards did not discharge the obligation to address the implications of the new draft standard, and recommending additional testing accordingly
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: Engineer A generally believed that the software designed by his company was safe, but he had become aware of a new testing procedure that was likely to demonstrate results that might cast a cloud over the software's viability.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926455
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Informed Employer Decision Enablement Capability
type: Safety-CriticalSoftwareNewDraftStandardEthicalBalancingCapability
type: NamedIndividual
capabilityclass: Safety-Critical Software New Draft Standard Ethical Balancing Capability
capabilitystatement: Engineer A possessed the capability to prepare a technical report explaining current testing analysis and results, referencing the new draft testing procedure reported in professional literature, so that his employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing and its effects on public health, safety, and welfare.
casecontext: Engineer A needed to communicate the significance of new draft standards to his employer in a manner that separated technical findings from business considerations and enabled informed decision-making
concept category: Capability
confidence: 0.88
demonstratedthrough: Preparing a technical report that clearly communicated both existing test results and the implications of the new draft standard, enabling the software company to make an informed decision
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:15.641109+00:00
importance: high
possessedby: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
proficiencylevel: advanced
sourcetext: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing.
textreferences: Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
textreferences: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.925264
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A's risk assessment team participation (present case) before autonomous vehicle operating system deployment
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
from entity text: Engineer A's risk assessment team participation (present case)
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: autonomous vehicle operating system deployment
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: autonomous vehicle operating system deployment
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929532
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Explore Additional Technical Mitigation Options
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Consultant to Automobile Manufacturer, present case
foreseen unintended effects: Alternative technical options may raise new ethical or safety concerns not previously identified
foreseen unintended effects: Exploration of alternatives may reveal that no technically adequate mitigation exists, strengthening the case for further study or halting development
foreseen unintended effects: Proposed mitigations may add complexity and cost to the system
fulfills obligation text: Contribute technical expertise constructively to employer decision-making
fulfills obligation text: Fulfill professional responsibility as a risk assessment team member
guided by principle text: Constructive professional contribution
guided by principle text: Do no harm
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical innovation in service of safety
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Identify technical design alternatives or safeguards that could reduce the ethical and safety risks inherent in the autonomous vehicle operating system's harm-prioritization algorithms, potentially enabling development to proceed on a safer basis
raises obligation text: Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
raises obligation text: Strive to do no harm in performance of professional services
requires capability text: Algorithmic safety design
requires capability text: Autonomous vehicle systems engineering
requires capability text: Ethical analysis of technical design choices
requires capability text: Knowledge of safety-by-design principles for autonomous systems
requires capability text: Risk mitigation analysis
temporal marker: Present case, during risk assessment team deliberations, pre-development phase
temporal sequence: 12
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A chose to actively explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system, going beyond simply identifying problems to proactively seeking engineering solutions.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928302
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Financial Pressure on Testing
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Conflict_Of_Interest_Constraint
activates constraint: Employer_Loyalty_vs_Safety_Tension
activates constraint: PublicSafety_Paramount
causes state change: Ethical conflict crystallized between professional safety duties and employer financial interests; Engineer A's independence and integrity placed under institutional pressure
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Clearly_Communicate_Safety_Risks_To_Management
creates obligation: Document_Safety_Concerns_Formally
creates obligation: Refuse_To_Endorse_Unsafe_Shortcuts
emergency status: high
event type: exogenous
temporal marker: Circa 1996, during BER Case 96-4, prior to Engineer A's recommendation
temporal sequence: 3
urgency level: high
comment: Business and financial pressures within the software company create institutional resistance to additional safety testing, placing Engineer A in direct conflict between employer interests and professional safety obligations.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928454
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Financial Pressure on Testing (Event 3) → Unambiguously Express Safety Concerns (Action 4)
type: CausalChain
type: NamedIndividual
causal language: Business and financial pressures within the software company create institutional resistance to additional testing, this resistance makes it necessary for Engineer A to clearly and unambiguously express safety concerns, as ambiguity would allow financial interests to override safety considerations
cause: Financial Pressure on Testing (Event 3)
counterfactual: In the absence of financial pressure, safety concerns might have been expressed through normal technical channels without requiring the deliberate choice to be unambiguous; the institutional resistance is what elevates expression from routine to ethically significant action
effect: Unambiguously Express Safety Concerns (Action 4)
necessary factors: Engineer A's professional duty under engineering ethics codes to hold public safety paramount
necessary factors: Engineer A's recognition that ambiguous or soft expression of concerns would be insufficient against financial resistance
necessary factors: Existence of institutional financial pressure creating a competing interest to safety
necessary factors: The safety-critical nature of the software making silence or ambiguity professionally and ethically impermissible
responsibility type: direct
responsible agent: Engineer A (for the action); Company Leadership (shared, for creating financial pressure context)
sufficient factors: Financial pressure creating resistance + safety-critical stakes + professional duty = sufficient to require unambiguous expression
sufficient factors: The combination of institutional resistance and high-stakes safety context made clear expression not merely advisable but ethically obligatory
within agent control: true
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928734
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

I.1.
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509225
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

II.1.
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509276
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

II.1.b.
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509312
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

II.3.b.
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509344
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

III.1.b.
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509377
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ISO 26262 Automotive Functional Safety Standard
type: TechnicalStandard
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.8
createdby: International Organization for Standardization
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
documenttitle: ISO 26262: Road Vehicles — Functional Safety
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: Technical Standard
sourcetext: engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
usedby: Engineering risk assessment team evaluating autonomous vehicle operating system design
usedincontext: Technical standard governing functional safety requirements for automotive electrical and electronic systems, including autonomous vehicle operating systems, providing a professional benchmark against which the risk assessment team's recommendations must be evaluated
version: Current edition
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911725
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

NSPE Code of Ethics
type: ProfessionalCode
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.95
createdby: National Society of Professional Engineers
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
documenttitle: NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: Professional Code
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer
usedby: Engineer A in deliberating ethical obligations during autonomous vehicle risk assessment
usedincontext: Primary normative authority governing Engineer A's professional obligations as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer conducting risk assessment on autonomous vehicle systems, including obligations to hold public safety paramount and to act with objectivity and integrity
version: Current at time of case
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911582
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

NSPE_Code_of_Ethics_Sections_III6b_II4a
type: ProfessionalCode
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.97
createdby: National Society of Professional Engineers
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
documenttitle: NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers, Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: Professional Code
sourcetext: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing (see Code Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.).
textreferences: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing (see Code Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.).
usedby: NSPE Board of Ethical Review in analyzing Engineer A's obligations
usedincontext: Cited by the Board of Ethical Review as the basis for Engineer A's obligation to prepare a technical report explaining testing analysis and results, and to provide clear, accurate, and direct information to employer and clients regarding public health, safety, and welfare implications
version: Current at time of case
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.913360
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Precedent Case Principles Activated
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Consistency_Of_Ethical_Standards_Constraint
activates constraint: Precedent_Informed_Professional_Judgment
causes state change: Engineer A's professional conduct in the present case is now normatively constrained by the precedent established in BER Case 96-4; deviation from those principles would constitute ethical inconsistency
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Apply_BER_96_4_Principles_To_Present_Case
creates obligation: Maintain_Consistency_Between_Past_And_Present_Ethical_Positions
emergency status: high
event type: automatic_trigger
temporal marker: Present case, at the point when Engineer A's role in AV risk assessment begins
temporal sequence: 7
urgency level: medium
comment: The ethical principles established in BER Case 96-4, specifically regarding the primacy of public safety over financial considerations and the obligation to recommend additional scrutiny when safety is uncertain, become directly applicable to the present AV case, creating a normative bridge between the two scenarios.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928565
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Precedent Case Principles Activated (Event 6) → Actively Participate in Risk Assessment (Action 3) + Prepare Transparent Technical Report (Action 2)
type: CausalChain
type: NamedIndividual
causal language: The ethical principles established in BER Case 96-4, specifically regarding the primacy of public safety in engineering decision-making, are activated, providing the normative foundation that supports and directs Engineer A's active participation in risk assessment and preparation of transparent technical documentation
cause: Precedent Case Principles Activated (Event 6)
counterfactual: Without the normative grounding of BER Case 96-4 principles, Engineer A might still have participated in risk assessment, but the depth of engagement and the deliberate choice of transparency in reporting might have been less pronounced; the precedent case transforms routine professional activity into ethically directed action
effect: Actively Participate in Risk Assessment (Action 3) + Prepare Transparent Technical Report (Action 2)
necessary factors: Engineer A's knowledge of and commitment to BER Case 96-4 principles
necessary factors: Engineer A's professional standing to participate meaningfully in the risk assessment
necessary factors: The principles' applicability to the AV OS safety-critical context
necessary factors: The risk assessment process providing a formal mechanism through which principles can be operationalized
responsibility type: direct
responsible agent: Engineer A
sufficient factors: Activated precedent principles + safety-critical context + formal risk assessment process = sufficient to direct Engineer A's professional conduct toward active participation and transparent documentation
sufficient factors: The precedent case provided both the ethical mandate (public safety primacy) and the professional model (transparent reporting) that shaped Engineer A's specific actions
within agent control: true
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928798
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Prepare Transparent Technical Report
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Software Company Consultant, BER Case 96-4
foreseen unintended effects: Report could create a formal record obligating the company to act on the findings
foreseen unintended effects: Report could trigger employer decision to pursue costly testing
foreseen unintended effects: Transparent documentation of safety uncertainty could expose company to regulatory or legal scrutiny
fulfills obligation text: Act in such a manner as to uphold and enhance the honor, integrity, and dignity of the engineering profession (NSPE Code Section II.4.a.)
fulfills obligation text: Enable informed decision-making in furtherance of public health, safety, and welfare
fulfills obligation text: Issue public statements in an objective and truthful manner (NSPE Code Section III.6.b.)
fulfills obligation text: Provide clear, accurate, and direct information to employer and client
fulfills obligation text: Strive to do no harm in performance of professional services
guided by principle text: Professional integrity
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical objectivity independent of business pressures
guided by principle text: Transparency and honesty in professional communication
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Provide employer with clear, accurate, and direct information necessary to make an informed decision about additional testing and its implications for public health, safety, and welfare
requires capability text: Ability to communicate complex technical findings clearly to non-technical decision-makers
requires capability text: Knowledge of current and draft safety standards
requires capability text: Software safety testing analysis
requires capability text: Technical writing and documentation
temporal marker: BER Case 96-4, circa 1996, concurrent with or following recommendation for additional testing
temporal sequence: 5
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A prepared a technical report clearly documenting current testing analysis, results, and the new testing procedure reported in professional literature, so that his employer could make a fully informed decision regarding additional testing.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928183
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Propose Further Study Before Deployment
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Consultant to Automobile Manufacturer, present case
foreseen unintended effects: Delay may cede competitive advantage to other autonomous vehicle developers
foreseen unintended effects: Further study may ultimately confirm that certain ethical tradeoffs cannot be resolved technically, requiring policy or regulatory resolution rather than engineering solutions
foreseen unintended effects: Further study will delay development and increase costs for the manufacturer
foreseen unintended effects: Recommendation may be resisted or overridden by manufacturer management prioritizing time-to-market
fulfills obligation text: Fulfill obligation to recommend technically sound safety measures independent of business considerations
fulfills obligation text: Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
fulfills obligation text: Provide honest and complete professional judgment to employer even when financially inconvenient
fulfills obligation text: Strive to do no harm in performance of professional services
guided by principle text: Do no harm
guided by principle text: Precautionary principle in safety-critical system deployment
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical integrity independent of business pressures
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Prevent premature deployment of an autonomous vehicle operating system with unresolved safety risks, ensuring that the public is not exposed to foreseeable harm from inadequately validated algorithmic harm-prioritization decisions
requires capability text: Ability to communicate safety concerns and recommendations clearly to employer
requires capability text: Knowledge of autonomous vehicle safety standards and regulatory landscape
requires capability text: Professional independence and courage to recommend unpopular but necessary safety measures
requires capability text: Professional judgment about adequacy of safety validation
requires capability text: Safety risk assessment for autonomous systems
temporal marker: Present case, prospective: to be undertaken if risk assessment reveals unresolved safety concerns, pre-deployment phase
temporal sequence: 13
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A chose, where necessary, to propose that further study be undertaken by the manufacturer before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized, prioritizing thoroughness of safety validation over development speed.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928342
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Qualitative Risk Assessment Methodology for Autonomous Vehicle Crash Scenarios
type: QualitativeRiskAssessment
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.85
createdby: Engineering risk assessment team / automobile manufacturer
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
documenttitle: Risk Assessment Framework for Unavoidable Crash Scenarios in Autonomous Vehicle Systems
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:34.682925+00:00
importance: high
resourceclass: Qualitative Risk Assessment
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
usedby: Engineer A and the engineering risk assessment team
usedincontext: Structured professional methodology for estimating and communicating the likelihood and magnitude of potential harm to passengers, pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists in unavoidable crash scenarios, used by the engineering risk assessment team to evaluate competing design options for the vehicle's decision logic
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911865
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_1
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511957
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_10
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512239
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_11
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512268
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_12
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512296
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_13
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512325
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_14
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512356
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_15
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512388
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_16
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512417
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_17
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512447
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_2
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.511991
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_3
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512020
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_4
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512055
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_5
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512088
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_6
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512121
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_7
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512151
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_8
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512180
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

QuestionEmergence_9
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512209
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_1
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 1
question text: What are Engineer A’s ethical obligations?
question type: board_explicit
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508332
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_101
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 101
question text: Does the Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons implicitly adopt a utilitarian ethical framework, and if so, is Engineer A obligated to disclose to the automobile manufacturer that this recommendation reflects a specific moral philosophy rather than a universally accepted engineering standard?
question type: implicit
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508413
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_102
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 102
question text: In the absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic, does Engineer A have an affirmative obligation to recommend that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose the ethical framework embedded in the vehicle's operating system to prospective consumers before deployment?
question type: implicit
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.508471
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_103
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 103
question text: If the automobile manufacturer, after receiving Engineer A's recommendation to minimize aggregate harm, decides to override that recommendation and program the vehicle to prioritize passenger safety above all others, what are Engineer A's remaining ethical obligations — including whether Engineer A must refuse to continue consulting on the project or escalate concerns externally?
question type: implicit
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509438
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_104
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 104
question text: Does Engineer A's role as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer — rather than a direct employee — alter the scope or enforceability of his ethical obligations under the NSPE Code, particularly with respect to how far he must press concerns about harm-allocation design before his professional duty is satisfied?
question type: implicit
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509497
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_201
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 201
question text: Does the Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits — which requires Engineer A to serve the automobile manufacturer's interests — conflict with the Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration, which demands that Engineer A weight the safety of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists equally or above the client's commercial interest in a passenger-protective algorithm?
question type: principle_tension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509552
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_202
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 202
question text: Does the Competing Public Goods Balancing principle — which acknowledges legitimate safety interests of vehicle passengers — conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle when the algorithm that best protects passengers is the same algorithm most likely to cause fatal harm to third parties, and if so, which principle should govern Engineer A's recommendation?
question type: principle_tension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509605
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_203
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 203
question text: Does the Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation — requiring Engineer A to disclose the ethical assumptions embedded in the harm-allocation algorithm — conflict with the Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation owed to the automobile manufacturer client, insofar as full public transparency about the algorithm's moral logic could expose the manufacturer to legal liability or competitive disadvantage that the client has not consented to accept?
question type: principle_tension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509658
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_204
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 204
question text: Does the Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation — which in the software testing case required Engineer A to flag the absence of applicable standards as itself a safety concern warranting further study — conflict with the Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Advisory Opinions principle when the regulatory vacuum surrounding autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics means that any recommendation Engineer A makes will necessarily be incomplete, potentially leading to selective or premature guidance that could itself cause harm?
question type: principle_tension
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509713
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_301
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 301
question text: From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A have an absolute duty to recommend harm minimization for third parties regardless of the automobile manufacturer's commercial interests, and does this duty derive from the categorical imperative that engineers must never treat third-party lives as mere means to passenger safety ends?
question type: theoretical
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509772
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_302
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 302
question text: From a consequentialist perspective, does the Board's conclusion that Engineer A must recommend minimizing harm to the least number of persons adequately account for the aggregate welfare calculus across all possible crash scenarios, including cases where passenger sacrifice might produce net societal harm through reduced adoption of safer autonomous vehicles overall?
question type: theoretical
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509860
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_303
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 303
question text: From a virtue ethics standpoint, does Engineer A demonstrate the professional integrity and moral courage required of a virtuous engineer when actively expressing concerns about harm-allocation algorithms within a risk assessment team that may face significant commercial pressure to prioritize passenger safety over third-party welfare?
question type: theoretical
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509917
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_304
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 304
question text: From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's obligation to disclose the moral framework embedded in the autonomous vehicle's harm-allocation algorithm to the public constitute a perfect duty under professional ethics codes, and does the absence of applicable regulatory standards heighten rather than relieve that disclosure duty?
question type: theoretical
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.509974
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_401
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 401
question text: If Engineer A had remained silent or provided only a partial assessment of the third-party harm risks within the risk assessment team, would the automobile manufacturer have had sufficient information to make an ethically informed deployment decision, and would Engineer A's silence have constituted a violation of the faithful agent obligation?
question type: counterfactual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510081
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_402
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 402
question text: What if the automobile manufacturer had already established a firm design policy prioritizing passenger safety above all third-party considerations before Engineer A joined the risk assessment team — would Engineer A's ethical obligations shift from recommendation to escalation or refusal to certify the system?
question type: counterfactual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510139
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_403
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 403
question text: Had established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic existed at the time of Engineer A's assessment — analogous to the draft standards emerging in BER Case 96-4 — would Engineer A's obligation to recommend further study before deployment have been stronger, weaker, or qualitatively different in character?
question type: counterfactual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510192
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Question_404
type: EthicalQuestion
type: NamedIndividual
question number: 404
question text: If Engineer A had proposed and the team had successfully identified a technical mitigation option — such as a sensor-based system capable of dynamically evaluating crash scenarios in real time rather than relying on pre-committed algorithmic harm-allocation logic — would the core ethical dilemma between passenger safety and third-party harm minimization have been dissolved, and what residual ethical obligations would Engineer A retain regarding transparency about the system's remaining limitations?
question type: counterfactual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.510245
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Recommend Additional Safety Testing
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Software Company Consultant, BER Case 96-4
foreseen unintended effects: Potential job losses associated with delayed implementation
foreseen unintended effects: Rising public utility rates during delay period
foreseen unintended effects: Significant financial cost to software company and client
foreseen unintended effects: Six-month deployment delay causing competitive disadvantage to client
fulfills obligation text: Base safety recommendations solely on technical findings, not business considerations
fulfills obligation text: Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public (NSPE Code Section II.4.a.)
fulfills obligation text: Provide technically honest and accurate information to employer (NSPE Code Section III.6.b.)
fulfills obligation text: Strive to do no harm in the performance of professional services
guided by principle text: Informed decision-making by employer
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical integrity independent of financial pressures
guided by principle text: Transparency in professional reporting
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Ensure software safety compliance with emerging draft standards and enable informed decision-making by employer regarding public health, safety, and welfare
requires capability text: Knowledge of existing and emerging safety standards
requires capability text: Professional judgment in balancing safety and business factors
requires capability text: Risk assessment for safety-critical systems
requires capability text: Software safety analysis
requires capability text: Technical report preparation
temporal marker: BER Case 96-4, circa 1996, post-design pre-release phase
temporal sequence: 4
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A chose to recommend costly additional software testing to his company despite significant financial and competitive pressures, fulfilling his professional obligation to prioritize public safety over business convenience.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928143
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_1
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512479
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_10
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513177
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_11
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513211
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_12
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513243
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_13
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513274
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_14
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513304
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_15
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513332
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_16
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513361
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_17
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513391
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_18
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513419
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_2
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512509
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_3
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512553
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_4
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512583
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_5
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512613
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_6
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512643
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_7
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.512672
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_8
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513102
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

ResolutionPattern_9
type: NamedIndividual
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:54:23.513146
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Safety-Critical Software Identified
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Professional_Competence_Obligation
activates constraint: SafetyCritical_Classification_Constraint
causes state change: Software project re-categorized as safety-critical; professional obligations of Engineer A escalate; financial and schedule pressures now in tension with safety duties
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Conduct_Adequate_Safety_Testing
creates obligation: Disclose_Risks_To_Employer
creates obligation: Engage_Applicable_Standards
emergency status: high
event type: exogenous
temporal marker: Circa 1996, early in BER Case 96-4 timeline, prior to Engineer A's recommendation
temporal sequence: 1
urgency level: high
comment: The software under development at Engineer A's company is recognized as safety-critical, meaning defects could directly cause harm or loss of life. This classification triggers heightened professional and ethical obligations.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928381
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Safety-Critical Software Identified (Event 1) → Recommend Additional Safety Testing (Action 1)
type: CausalChain
type: NamedIndividual
causal language: The software under development is recognized as safety-critical, meaning defects could cause serious harm, this recognition directly motivates Engineer A to recommend costly additional software testing despite institutional resistance
cause: Safety-Critical Software Identified (Event 1)
counterfactual: Without the safety-critical classification, additional testing would likely not have been recommended: standard testing protocols would have been deemed sufficient, and financial pressure would have prevailed
effect: Recommend Additional Safety Testing (Action 1)
necessary factors: Engineer A's awareness of the safety-critical classification
necessary factors: Engineer A's professional obligation to prioritize public safety
necessary factors: Existence of financial pressure creating a context requiring deliberate ethical choice
necessary factors: Recognition that software failures could cause serious harm or death
responsibility type: direct
responsible agent: Engineer A
sufficient factors: Safety-critical classification + Engineer A's professional ethics awareness + financial pressure context = sufficient to trigger recommendation for additional testing
sufficient factors: The combination of known risk severity and professional duty created an ethical imperative that overrode institutional resistance
within agent control: true
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928637
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Software Company Employer
type: Safety-RejectingManufacturingEmployer
type: NamedIndividual
attributes: {'type': 'Private software company', 'domain': 'Safety-critical software for public infrastructure', 'pressure': 'Client eagerness, competitive disadvantage, financial cost of delay'}
caseinvolvement: A software company that employs Engineer A to design safety-critical software, faces financial and client pressure to avoid additional testing, but also wants to ensure software safety, and ultimately requests Engineer A's recommendation on additional testing.
concept category: Role
confidence: 0.78
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
importance: medium
relationships: {'type': 'employer_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)'}
relationships: {'type': 'serves', 'target': 'Software Company Client'}
rolecategory: employer_relationship
roleclass: Safety-Rejecting Manufacturing Employer
sourcetext: The software company was eager to satisfy its clients; but, at the same time, management wanted to be sure that the software was safe to use
textreferences: The software company requested Engineer A's recommendation on the need for additional testing
textreferences: The software company was eager to satisfy its clients; but, at the same time, management wanted to be sure that the software was safe to use
textreferences: the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on the public health, safety, and welfare
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.914420
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Software_Safety_Testing_Standard_BER96-4_Context
type: TechnicalStandard
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Resource
confidence: 0.82
createdby: Unnamed standard-setting organization
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
documenttitle: New Draft Safety Testing Standard for Safety-Critical Software (nuclear, air quality, water quality) referenced in BER Case 96-4
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:32.373585+00:00
importance: medium
resourceclass: Technical Standard
sourcetext: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature
usedby: Engineer A in BER Case 96-4; cited analogically by the Board in the present case
usedincontext: The existence of a new draft standard that existing software might not meet was the triggering condition for Engineer A's ethical obligation to recommend additional testing in BER Case 96-4, providing the analogical basis for the autonomous vehicle case
version: Draft at time of BER Case 96-4
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.913895
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Unambiguously Express Safety Concerns
type: Action
type: NamedIndividual
concept category: Action
event role context: Professional Engineer / Consultant to Automobile Manufacturer, present case
foreseen unintended effects: Documented concerns could expose the manufacturer to liability if concerns are not addressed and harm later occurs
foreseen unintended effects: Expressing concerns may slow or complicate the development timeline
foreseen unintended effects: Unambiguous expression of concerns may create professional tension with team members or manufacturer management
fulfills obligation text: Act in such a manner as to uphold and enhance the honor, integrity, and dignity of the engineering profession
fulfills obligation text: Provide honest and complete professional judgment to employer
guided by principle text: Do no harm
guided by principle text: Honesty and transparency in professional communication
guided by principle text: Public safety paramount
guided by principle text: Technical integrity independent of business pressures
has agent: Engineer A
has mental state: deliberate
intended outcome: Ensure that all safety concerns are formally on record within the team's deliberations, enabling the manufacturer to make fully informed decisions about the autonomous vehicle operating system before development proceeds
raises obligation text: Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
raises obligation text: Strive to do no harm in performance of professional services
requires capability text: Courage and professional independence in expressing dissenting safety views
requires capability text: Ethical analysis of algorithmic decision systems
requires capability text: Professional communication of technical concerns to non-technical stakeholders
requires capability text: Safety risk identification and articulation
temporal marker: Present case, during risk assessment team deliberations, pre-development phase
temporal sequence: 11
within competence: true
comment: Engineer A chose to clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system within the risk assessment team, rather than moderating or suppressing concerns due to business or team pressures.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928263
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Unavoidable Crash Scenario Identified
type: Event
type: NamedIndividual
activates constraint: Algorithmic_Ethics_Constraint
activates constraint: Informed_Consent_Consideration
activates constraint: PublicSafety_Paramount
activates constraint: Transparency_In_Design_Constraint
causes state change: Risk assessment moves from technical to ethical domain; design decisions now carry explicit moral weight; Engineer A's role expands beyond technical risk to ethical advocacy
concept category: Event
creates obligation: Disclose_Dilemma_To_Manufacturer_Leadership
creates obligation: Formally_Document_Ethical_Dilemma
creates obligation: Propose_Deferral_If_Unresolved
creates obligation: Seek_Multidisciplinary_Input
emergency status: critical
event type: automatic_trigger
temporal marker: Present case, during risk assessment phase, prior to deployment
temporal sequence: 9
urgency level: critical
comment: During risk assessment, the team identifies that the AV operating system will inevitably encounter crash scenarios where harm to some party is unavoidable, requiring the software to encode a priority ordering of harm outcomes, a fundamentally ethical decision embedded in code.
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928529
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Unavoidable Crash Scenario Identified (Event 5) → Algorithmic Ethics Gap Recognized (Event 7)
type: CausalChain
type: NamedIndividual
causal language: During risk assessment, the team identifies that the AV operating system will inevitably encounter crash scenarios, this discovery reveals that existing engineering ethics frameworks and professional codes do not adequately address the algorithmic decision-making required in life-or-death situations
cause: Unavoidable Crash Scenario Identified (Event 5)
counterfactual: Without identification of the unavoidable crash scenario, the ethics gap might have remained unrecognized during this development cycle; alternatively, without Engineer A's active participation, the gap might have been identified but not escalated as an ethical concern
effect: Algorithmic Ethics Gap Recognized (Event 7)
necessary factors: Active participation in risk assessment revealing the unavoidable crash scenario
necessary factors: Engineer A's engagement deep enough to recognize the gap between existing codes and new requirements
necessary factors: Existing ethics frameworks predating autonomous vehicle technology
necessary factors: The genuine novelty of autonomous algorithmic decision-making in life-or-death contexts
responsibility type: shared
responsible agent: Engineer A (primary); Risk Assessment Team (shared)
sufficient factors: Identification of unavoidable crash scenario + existing framework inadequacy + active ethical reflection by Engineer A = sufficient to surface the algorithmic ethics gap
sufficient factors: The scenario's moral complexity (choosing between harm outcomes) exposed the limits of traditional engineering ethics codes
within agent control: true
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.928670
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

additional proposed testing (BER Case 96-4) before software deployment/use
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: The tests were expensive and would delay the use of the software for at least six months.
from entity text: additional proposed testing (BER Case 96-4)
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: software deployment/use
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: software deployment use
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929438
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

additional proposed testing (BER Case 96-4) meets six-month delay period
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: meets
evidence: A series of tests proposed by Engineer A would likely result in a decision whether to move forward with the use of the software. The tests were expensive and would delay the use of the software for at least six months.
from entity text: additional proposed testing (BER Case 96-4)
owl time property: time:intervalMeets
to entity text: six-month delay period
comment: Entity1 ends exactly when Entity2 begins
interval meets: six-month delay period
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929469
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.593772+00:00
value: Public welfare paramount overrides business and schedule considerations in determining whether Engineer A must recommend further study — the Board affirms that the overriding ethical responsibility is public welfare

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.593581+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.593297+00:00
value: The faithful agent obligation is satisfied by providing a complete, objective, and technically competent risk assessment that presents both frameworks and their implications — not by advocating for the commercially preferred framework at the expense of public welfare analysis

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599386+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595766+00:00
value: The faithful agent obligation is satisfied by providing a complete, objective, and technically competent risk assessment that presents both frameworks and their implications — not by advocating for the commercially preferred framework at the expense of public welfare analysis

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.84
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.596399+00:00
value: The completeness obligation requires full presentation of both frameworks; the faithful agent obligation is satisfied by presenting the complete analysis and then deferring to the client's ultimate decision within ethical limits

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.596020+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.85
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.596265+00:00
value: Engineer A was constrained by the absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic from treating regulatory silence as permission to proceed without further study, and was required to apply heightened professional judgment and recommend further study when the regulatory standards vacuum left unresolved safety concerns without an external benchmark for adequacy.

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595894+00:00
value: Public welfare paramount overrides business and schedule considerations in determining whether Engineer A must recommend further study — the Board affirms that the overriding ethical responsibility is public welfare

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599162+00:00
value: Public welfare paramount overrides business and schedule considerations in determining whether Engineer A must recommend further study — the Board affirms that the overriding ethical responsibility is public welfare

Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598446+00:00
value: Engineer A was constrained to recommend that further study be conducted before the autonomous vehicle operating system — including its harm-allocation decision logic — is deployed, given the absence of established regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, the unresolved moral and safety trade-offs between passenger-priority and harm-minimization algorithms, and the foreseeable risk of fatal harm to third parties.

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598539+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595077+00:00
value: Public welfare paramount overrides business and schedule considerations in determining whether Engineer A must recommend further study — the Board affirms that the overriding ethical responsibility is public welfare

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599087+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.8
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.594499+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598627+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598718+00:00
value: Engineer A was constrained from permitting the autonomous vehicle operating system to be deployed with an undisclosed moral framework embedded in its harm-allocation decision logic — whether passenger-priority or harm-minimization — without recommending that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose that moral framework to consumers and regulators, prohibiting Engineer A from treating the moral pre-commitment as a proprietary design detail exempt from public disclosure obligations.

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.594922+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.8
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599463+00:00
value: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.82
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599238+00:00
value: The principle requires that the recommendation not resolve the conflict unilaterally but instead present both frameworks with their ethical, legal, and public welfare implications, leaving the ultimate policy choice to appropriate decision-making authorities

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.8
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597232+00:00
value: Regulatory gap heightens rather than diminishes the obligation to recommend additional scrutiny

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.83
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597101+00:00
value: The principle requires that the recommendation not resolve the conflict unilaterally but instead present both frameworks with their ethical, legal, and public welfare implications, leaving the ultimate policy choice to appropriate decision-making authorities

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598993+00:00
value: The faithful agent obligation is satisfied by providing a complete, objective, and technically competent risk assessment that presents both frameworks and their implications — not by advocating for the commercially preferred framework at the expense of public welfare analysis

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.82
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.593949+00:00
value: The principle requires that the recommendation not resolve the conflict unilaterally but instead present both frameworks with their ethical, legal, and public welfare implications, leaving the ultimate policy choice to appropriate decision-making authorities

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598804+00:00
value: Third-party welfare must be given explicit and affirmative consideration in the risk assessment, not treated as secondary to client or passenger interests

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598919+00:00
value: The principle requires that third-party welfare be an explicit and weighted parameter in the recommendation, not merely an afterthought to passenger-protective design

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.594669+00:00
value: Third-party welfare must be given explicit and affirmative consideration in the risk assessment, not treated as secondary to client or passenger interests

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.83
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595635+00:00
value: The principle requires that third-party welfare be an explicit and weighted parameter in the recommendation, not merely an afterthought to passenger-protective design

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.594286+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598234+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.89
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598353+00:00
value: Engineer A was constrained by the 'do no harm' principle from recommending deployment of the autonomous vehicle operating system without first exploring all available technical options to mitigate identified risks and, if necessary, recommending further study before the system is utilized.

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597874+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597994+00:00
value: Engineer A was constrained to recommend that further study be conducted before the autonomous vehicle operating system — including its harm-allocation decision logic — is deployed, given the absence of established regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, the unresolved moral and safety trade-offs between passenger-priority and harm-minimization algorithms, and the foreseeable risk of fatal harm to third parties.

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595479+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.598110+00:00
value: Individual professional obligation to express concerns clearly and explore mitigation options is not subordinated by team membership or employer pressure

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.599312+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation required the testing recommendation to be made on technical grounds, with business considerations addressed separately by the employer

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597664+00:00
value: Good faith professional concern based on awareness of draft standards triggers the recommendation obligation even without confirmed non-compliance

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.91
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597562+00:00
value: Good faith professional concern based on awareness of draft standards triggers the recommendation obligation even without confirmed non-compliance

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.91
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.595259+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation required the testing recommendation to be made on technical grounds, with business considerations addressed separately by the employer

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.594115+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation required the testing recommendation to be made on technical grounds, with business considerations addressed separately by the employer

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597344+00:00
value: Business considerations are not inputs to the technical recommendation but are addressed separately in the employer's decision-making process after receiving the technical recommendation

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597453+00:00
value: Do no harm obligation required the testing recommendation to be made on technical grounds, with business considerations addressed separately by the employer

Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
type: Derivation
comment: source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
generated at time: 2026-05-02T03:58:43.597766+00:00
value: Regulatory gap heightens rather than diminishes the obligation to recommend additional scrutiny

existing software testing (BER Case 96-4) before new draft standards release
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization, standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
from entity text: existing software testing (BER Case 96-4)
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: new draft standards release
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: new draft standards release
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929404
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

financial pressure considerations (BER Case 96-4) during Engineer A's recommendation process (BER Case 96-4)
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: during
evidence: The financial pressures that existed, including the financial impact on his company, the client, and the public...were clearly important factors and needed to be addressed in some manner.
from entity text: financial pressure considerations (BER Case 96-4)
owl time property: time:intervalDuring
to entity text: Engineer A's recommendation process (BER Case 96-4)
comment: Entity1 occurs entirely within the duration of Entity2
interval during: Engineer A s recommendation process BER Case 96-4
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929624
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

further study (present case) before autonomous vehicle operating system utilization
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
from entity text: further study (present case)
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: autonomous vehicle operating system utilization
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: autonomous vehicle operating system utilization
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929562
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

new draft standards awareness (BER Case 96-4) overlaps Engineer A's recommendation process (BER Case 96-4)
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: overlaps
evidence: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released...The software company requested Engineer A's recommendation on the need for additional testing.
from entity text: new draft standards awareness (BER Case 96-4)
owl time property: time:intervalOverlaps
to entity text: Engineer A's recommendation process (BER Case 96-4)
comment: Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
interval overlaps: Engineer A s recommendation process BER Case 96-4
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929593
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

new engineering breakthroughs before new ethical uncertainties/risks
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
from entity text: new engineering breakthroughs
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: new ethical uncertainties/risks
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: new ethical uncertainties risks
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929654
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's participation in the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team requires explicit analysis of how the autonomous vehicle operating system allocates harm among affected parties — pedestrians, passengers, and bystanders — when harm

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team must ensure that the automobile manufacturer — as the non-engineer decision-making body that will ultimately determine the algorithm's design — receives all information relevant and pertinent to the harm-di

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team must apply specialized professional competence to identify, assess, and characterize the risks associated with each harm-distribution framework — including the probability and magnitude of harm to passenger

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team must evaluate whether the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm should prioritize passenger safety or minimize total harm to all involved parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclist

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A must fully and actively participate in the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety, and explore additional

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team must present both harm-distribution frameworks — passenger-protective and total-harm-minimizing — completely and objectively to the automobile manufacturer client, rather than selectively presenting only th

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment obligations extend to the welfare of pedestrians, bystanders, and other third parties who are not clients or passengers of the autonomous vehicle but who are foreseeably exposed to risk from the system's harm-di

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: The risk assessment scenario explicitly juxtaposes passenger welfare against the welfare of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — third parties who are not clients, not passengers, and have no contractual relationship with the manu

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team faces a genuine conflict between two legitimate public goods — passenger safety (protecting vehicle occupants) and third-party safety (protecting pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists) — requiring the te

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, bears a faithful agent obligation to provide the manufacturer with a diligent, competent risk assessment recommendation — but this obligation is bounded by the ethical limits impos

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's overriding ethical responsibility as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including third parties who may be harmed by the autonomous vehic

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's obligation to propose further study of the autonomous vehicle operating system before deployment is grounded in the do no harm principle — the uncertainties and risks identified in the system's harm-distribution algorithms crea

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team bears an obligation to ensure that the moral framework embedded in the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm — whichever framework the manufacturer ultimately adopts — is transparently disclosed to

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation was to first exhaust internal escalation — recommending additional testing to the employer and preparing a technical report — before any consideration of external reporting, recognizing that

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's obligation in BER Case 96-4 was to prepare a technical report explaining current testing results and referencing new testing procedures so that the employer could make an informed decision about additional testing — the enginee

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's recommendation about additional software testing was required to be based solely on technical findings — the financial pressures on the company, client competitive disadvantage, and public utility rate impacts

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — even without confirmed failures — was sufficient to trigger a professional obligation to recommend additional testing, establishing that a go

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — standards not yet in force — created an obligation to escalate the concern through internal channels (recommending additional testing) rather

R->P->O edge: adheresToPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation to recommend additional software testing was grounded in the principle that engineers must strive to do no harm — the possibility that the software might not meet new draft standards created

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A must fully and actively participate in the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety, and explore additional

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's obligation to propose further study of the autonomous vehicle operating system before deployment is grounded in the do no harm principle — the uncertainties and risks identified in the system's harm-distribution algorithms crea

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's overriding ethical responsibility as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including third parties who may be harmed by the autonomous vehic

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A is obligated, in seeking to fulfill his ethical obligations as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team, to strive to do no harm in the performance of his professional services — including by ensuring that the auto

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's obligation to propose further study of the autonomous vehicle operating system before deployment is grounded in the do no harm principle — the uncertainties and risks identified in the system's harm-distribution algorithms crea

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's overriding ethical responsibility as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including third parties who may be harmed by the autonomous vehic

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team bears an obligation to ensure that the moral framework embedded in the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm — whichever framework the manufacturer ultimately adopts — is transparently disclosed to

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A must fully and actively participate in the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety, and explore additional

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's participation in the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team requires explicit analysis of how the autonomous vehicle operating system allocates harm among affected parties — pedestrians, passengers, and bystanders — when harm

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment obligations extend to the welfare of pedestrians, bystanders, and other third parties who are not clients or passengers of the autonomous vehicle but who are foreseeably exposed to risk from the system's harm-di

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: The risk assessment scenario explicitly juxtaposes passenger welfare against the welfare of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — third parties who are not clients, not passengers, and have no contractual relationship with the manu

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, bears a faithful agent obligation to provide the manufacturer with a diligent, competent risk assessment recommendation — but this obligation is bounded by the ethical limits impos

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's risk assessment team must ensure that the automobile manufacturer — as the non-engineer decision-making body that will ultimately determine the algorithm's design — receives all information relevant and pertinent to the harm-di

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation to recommend additional software testing was grounded in the principle that engineers must strive to do no harm — the possibility that the software might not meet new draft standards created

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A's obligation in BER Case 96-4 was to prepare a technical report explaining current testing results and referencing new testing procedures so that the employer could make an informed decision about additional testing — the enginee

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — even without confirmed failures — was sufficient to trigger a professional obligation to recommend additional testing, establishing that a go

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — standards not yet in force — created an obligation to escalate the concern through internal channels (recommending additional testing) rather

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation was to first exhaust internal escalation — recommending additional testing to the employer and preparing a technical report — before any consideration of external reporting, recognizing that

R->P->O edge: derivedFromPrinciple
type: Derivation
value: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's recommendation about additional software testing was required to be based solely on technical findings — the financial pressures on the company, client competitive disadvantage, and public utility rate impacts

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A is obligated to fully and actively participate as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A is obligated, if necessary after active participation and expression of concerns, to propose that further study be undertaken by the automobile manufacturer before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized, so that all

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A was obligated to recommend to the software company that additional testing be undertaken, explaining why such testing was required, so that the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A was obligated to make his recommendation about additional testing based solely on technical findings, keeping the financial pressures — including financial impact on the company, the client, the public, potential job loss, and co

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A is obligated, in seeking to fulfill his ethical obligations as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team, to strive to do no harm in the performance of his professional services — including by ensuring that the auto

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to recommend that further study be conducted before the autonomous vehicle operating system is deployed for public use, if material eth

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to recommend that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose the moral framework embedded in the crash-avoidance algorithm — includi

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to fully and actively participate in the evaluation of the crash-avoidance algorithm's harm-distribution logic, to express clearly and

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to explicitly identify, assess, and present the welfare of third parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — as

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, was obligated to act as a faithful agent by providing the manufacturer with a diligent, competent, and complete risk assessment — including all material findings about both harm-di

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A was obligated to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in making his recommendation about additional software testing, recognizing that the industries using the software — water, air, and nuclear — have an

R->P->O edge: hasObligation
type: Derivation
value: Engineer A was obligated to prepare a technical report explaining current testing analysis and results, and referencing the new testing procedure reported in professional literature, so that the software company employer could make an infor

six-month delay period before software deployment/use
type: TemporalRelation
type: NamedIndividual
allen relation: before
evidence: would delay the use of the software for at least six months, which would put the client company at a competitive disadvantage
from entity text: six-month delay period
owl time property: time:intervalBefore
to entity text: software deployment/use
comment: Entity1 is before Entity2
interval before: software deployment use
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.929500
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Do No Harm Deployment Constraint
type: DoNoHarmProfessionalServicesConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A was a consultant to an automobile manufacturer serving on an engineering risk assessment team evaluating an autonomous vehicle operating system whose harm-allocation decision logic pre-commits to outcomes affecting passengers and third parties including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.89
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Do No Harm Professional Services Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the 'do no harm' principle from recommending deployment of the autonomous vehicle operating system without first exploring all available technical options to mitigate identified risks and, if necessary, recommending further study before the system is utilized.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 96-4 (analogical precedent); present BER case
sourcetext: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's participation on the autonomous vehicle engineering risk management team
textreferences: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
textreferences: in light of the fact that engineers should strive to seek to do no harm in the performance of their professional services, if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.926981
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Harm Allocation Moral Framework Non-Deception Public Disclosure Constraint
type: AutonomousVehicleMoralFrameworkUndisclosedPre-CommitmentNon-DeceptionConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The harm-allocation algorithm pre-commits the autonomous vehicle to a moral choice — either prioritizing passenger safety or minimizing aggregate harm — that will affect third parties who have no knowledge of or consent to the embedded moral framework.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.85
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Autonomous Vehicle Moral Framework Undisclosed Pre-Commitment Non-Deception Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained from permitting the autonomous vehicle operating system to be deployed with an undisclosed moral framework embedded in its harm-allocation decision logic — whether passenger-priority or harm-minimization — without recommending that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose that moral framework to consumers and regulators, prohibiting Engineer A from treating the moral pre-commitment as a proprietary design detail exempt from public disclosure obligations.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.4 (non-deception); NSPE Code Section II.1 (paramount public safety); BER Case 16-5
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
temporalscope: During Engineer A's formulation of recommendations to the risk assessment team and the automobile manufacturer
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.920559
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Regulatory Standards Vacuum Heightened Disclosure Constraint
type: RegulatoryStandardsVacuumHeightenedEscalationPermissibilityConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: No established national or industry standards governed autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics at the time of Engineer A's engagement. The regulatory standards vacuum meant that Engineer A could not rely on external standards compliance as a proxy for safety adequacy, heightening the obligation to apply independent professional judgment.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.84
constrainedentity: Engineer A (autonomous vehicle case)
constraintclass: Regulatory Standards Vacuum Heightened Escalation Permissibility Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained by the absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic from treating regulatory silence as permission to proceed without further study, and was required to apply heightened professional judgment and recommend further study when the regulatory standards vacuum left unresolved safety concerns without an external benchmark for adequacy.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:33:24.798342+00:00
importance: high
severity: high
source: NSPE Code of Ethics; present BER case
sourcetext: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
temporalscope: Throughout Engineer A's participation on the autonomous vehicle engineering risk management team
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.927902
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Autonomous Vehicle Harm Allocation Design Assignment
type: AutonomousSystemHarmAllocationDesignState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From Engineer A's assignment to the risk assessment team through submission of the team's recommendation to the automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer client
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Future vehicle passengers
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Motorcycle riders
affectedparties: Pedestrians
concept category: State
confidence: 0.93
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
stateclass: Autonomous System Harm Allocation Design State
subject: Engineer A's assignment to evaluate and recommend harm-allocation decision logic for autonomous vehicle operating system
terminatedby: Formal submission of risk assessment team recommendation to automobile manufacturer client
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
triggeringevent: Engineer A assigned to engineering risk assessment team tasked with recommending decision logic for unavoidable crash scenarios in driverless vehicles
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.910930
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER Case 96-4 Completed Safety Testing with Residual Concern
type: CompletedSafetyTestingwithResidualConcernState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From completion of testing confirming compliance with existing standards through employer's informed decision on additional testing
affectedparties: Client companies
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Public
affectedparties: Software company
concept category: State
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet
stateclass: Completed Safety Testing with Residual Concern State
subject: Engineer A's residual concern about forthcoming standards after software passed existing standard testing
terminatedby: Employer's informed decision after receiving Engineer A's technical report on current results and forthcoming standards
textreferences: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet
textreferences: Engineer A generally believed that the software designed by his company was safe, but he had become aware of a new testing procedure that was likely to demonstrate results that might cast a cloud over the software's viability
triggeringevent: Testing demonstrated software safe under existing standards, but Engineer A became aware of forthcoming standards the software might not meet
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.916330
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER Case 96-4 Multi-Factor Business-Safety Balancing
type: Multi-FactorBusiness-SafetyBalancingObligationState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From software company's request for Engineer A's recommendation through delivery of technical report
affectedparties: Client companies
affectedparties: Employees at risk of job loss
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Public utility ratepayers
affectedparties: Software company management
concept category: State
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A needed to balance a variety of factors
stateclass: Multi-Factor Business-Safety Balancing Obligation State
subject: Engineer A's obligation to formulate a technical recommendation amid significant financial pressures
terminatedby: Engineer A's delivery of technical report separating technical findings from business considerations
textreferences: Engineer A needed to balance a variety of factors
textreferences: The financial pressures that existed, including the financial impact on his company, the client, and the public, as well as the potential loss of jobs and delays if additional testing were to be pursued, were clearly important factors
textreferences: delaying implementation would mean the state's public service commission utility rates would rise significantly
textreferences: these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A
triggeringevent: Software company requested Engineer A's recommendation on the need for additional testing while multiple financial pressures were present
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.915422
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER Case 96-4 Public Safety at Risk from Safety-Critical Software
type: PublicSafetyatRisk
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From Engineer A's awareness of forthcoming standards through employer's informed decision on additional testing
affectedparties: Client companies
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Facility operators
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Software company
concept category: State
confidence: 0.92
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare
stateclass: Public Safety at Risk
subject: Public health and safety risk from potential deployment of software not meeting forthcoming standards in nuclear, air quality, and water quality facilities
terminatedby: Additional testing confirming compliance, redesign, or informed employer decision to defer deployment
textreferences: Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct
textreferences: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare
triggeringevent: Software designed for safety-critical public facilities (nuclear, air quality, water quality) may not meet forthcoming draft standards
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.916538
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Client Relationship — Engineer A and Automobile Manufacturer
type: ClientRelationshipEstablished
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From commencement of consulting engagement through conclusion of risk assessment assignment
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Engineer A
concept category: State
confidence: 0.97
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: medium
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
stateclass: Client Relationship Established
subject: Active consulting relationship between Engineer A and automobile manufacturer, with associated obligations of faithful agency, competent service, and paramount public safety duty
terminatedby: Conclusion of consulting engagement or Engineer A's withdrawal
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
triggeringevent: Engineer A retained as consultant to automobile manufacturer for autonomous vehicle operating system development
urgencylevel: medium
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.913205
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Competing Duties — Passenger Safety vs. Aggregate Harm Minimization
type: CompetingDutiesState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From assignment to risk assessment team through submission of recommendation
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Motorcycle riders
affectedparties: Pedestrians
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.93
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
stateclass: Competing Duties State
subject: Engineer A's competing professional duties: duty as consultant to client (automobile manufacturer seeking passenger-protective system) vs. paramount duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare (including third-party road users)
terminatedby: Recommendation submitted; Engineer A withdraws; or client adopts harm-minimizing standard
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
triggeringevent: Engineer A asked to recommend between passenger-protective and harm-minimizing algorithms, creating direct tension between client service obligations and public welfare obligations
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.912973
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Further Study Before Deployment Constraint
type: FurtherStudyRecommendationBeforeUnreliableSystemDeploymentConstraint
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: The risk assessment team is evaluating harm-allocation decision logic in the absence of established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, creating a regulatory standards vacuum that heightens the obligation to recommend further study.
concept category: Constraint
confidence: 0.91
constrainedentity: Engineer A
constraintclass: Further Study Recommendation Before Unreliable System Deployment Constraint
constraintstatement: Engineer A was constrained to recommend that further study be conducted before the autonomous vehicle operating system — including its harm-allocation decision logic — is deployed, given the absence of established regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation ethics, the unresolved moral and safety trade-offs between passenger-priority and harm-minimization algorithms, and the foreseeable risk of fatal harm to third parties.
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:28:41.645012+00:00
importance: critical
severity: critical
source: NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case 16-5; BER Case 20-4; Further Study Recommendation Before Unreliable System Deployment Constraint
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: Prior to any deployment recommendation for the autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.920790
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Present Case Autonomous System Harm Allocation Design
type: AutonomousSystemHarmAllocationDesignState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From Engineer A's engagement on autonomous vehicle operating system through deployment decision
affectedparties: Autonomous vehicle company
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Pedestrians
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team
stateclass: Autonomous System Harm Allocation Design State
subject: Engineer A's design of autonomous vehicle operating system decision logic pre-committing harm allocation
terminatedby: Company's informed deployment decision after Engineer A's complete technical assessment and risk management participation
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team
textreferences: clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
textreferences: explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
triggeringevent: Engineer A engaged to design autonomous vehicle operating system requiring pre-programmed harm allocation decisions
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.915962
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Present Case Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Design Obligation
type: DoNoHarmAutonomousSystemDesignObligationState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From Engineer A's engagement on the autonomous vehicle operating system through resolution of identified safety concerns or pre-deployment study recommendation
affectedparties: Autonomous vehicle company
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Pedestrians
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.91
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
stateclass: Do No Harm Autonomous System Design Obligation State
subject: Engineer A's obligation to apply 'do no harm' principle in autonomous vehicle operating system design
terminatedby: Engineer A's complete expression of safety concerns, exploration of mitigation options, and recommendation of further study if needed; followed by company's informed deployment decision
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system
textreferences: engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
textreferences: explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized
triggeringevent: Engineer A engaged to design or evaluate autonomous vehicle operating system with pre-committed harm allocation logic and identified residual safety risks
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.915627
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Present Case Client-Interest vs Third-Party Safety Algorithmic Pre-Commitment
type: Client-Interestvs.Third-PartySafetyAlgorithmicPre-CommitmentState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: Throughout Engineer A's design and evaluation of the autonomous vehicle operating system
affectedparties: Autonomous vehicle company
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Pedestrians
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.87
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
stateclass: Client-Interest vs. Third-Party Safety Algorithmic Pre-Commitment State
subject: Engineer A's obligation to recommend autonomous vehicle decision logic balancing passenger and third-party safety
terminatedby: Engineer A's complete technical recommendation after exploring all mitigation options and expressing all safety concerns
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
textreferences: engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
textreferences: explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
triggeringevent: Engineer A required to recommend algorithmic decision rules permanently pre-committing autonomous vehicle harm allocation between passengers and third parties
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.916171
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Professional Competence in Risk Assessment Invoked for Autonomous Vehicle Scenario
type: ProfessionalCompetenceinRiskAssessment
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle crash-avoidance algorithm risk assessment
balancingwith: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
balancingwith: Public Welfare Paramount
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team must apply specialized professional competence to identify, assess, and characterize the risks associated with each harm-distribution framework — including the probability and magnitude of harm to passengers versus third parties under each scenario — providing the automobile manufacturer with a technically grounded risk analysis rather than a purely philosophical opinion
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: Professional competence in risk assessment requires Engineer A to quantify — to the extent possible — the probability and severity of harm under each algorithmic framework, including the likelihood of unavoidable crash scenarios, the distribution of injury severity between passengers and third parties, and the systemic public safety implications of each approach
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Professional Competence in Risk Assessment
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
tensionresolution: Technical risk assessment competence and ethical analysis are complementary obligations — the risk assessment must be both technically rigorous and ethically complete
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.917833
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Crash Algorithm Design
type: PublicWelfareParamount
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle crash-avoidance algorithm design recommendation
balancingwith: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team must evaluate whether the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm should prioritize passenger safety or minimize total harm to all involved parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists — with the public welfare obligation requiring that the welfare of all affected persons, not merely vehicle occupants, be held paramount in the recommendation
confidence: 0.95
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: In this context, public welfare paramount requires Engineer A to advocate for a harm-minimization framework that gives weight to the lives and safety of third-party non-passengers, not merely to the commercial interests of the automobile manufacturer or the preferences of vehicle purchasers who might prefer passenger-protective algorithms
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Public Welfare Paramount
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
tensionresolution: Public welfare paramount does not resolve the trolley-problem dilemma definitively, but it requires that the recommendation not categorically subordinate third-party welfare to passenger welfare without explicit ethical justification and stakeholder deliberation
textreferences: does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.916771
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Advisory Opinions Invoked by Engineer A Risk Assessment Team
type: CompletenessandNon-SelectivityinProfessionalAdvisoryOpinions
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Risk assessment recommendation to Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client (Present Case)
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team must present both harm-distribution frameworks — passenger-protective and total-harm-minimizing — completely and objectively to the automobile manufacturer client, rather than selectively presenting only the framework that aligns with the manufacturer's commercial interests in selling vehicles to consumers who may prefer passenger-protective systems
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The client is a non-engineer decision-maker who lacks independent capacity to evaluate the completeness of the ethical analysis — Engineer A's obligation is to present both moral frameworks and their full implications, including the legal, reputational, and public welfare implications of each choice, rather than filtering the analysis to favor the commercially preferred option
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Professional Advisory Opinions
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
tensionresolution: The completeness obligation requires full presentation of both frameworks; the faithful agent obligation is satisfied by presenting the complete analysis and then deferring to the client's ultimate decision within ethical limits
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.917135
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Public Welfare Paramount Safety-Critical Software Obligation
type: SafetyObligation
type: NamedIndividual
casecontext: Engineer A's software was designed for use in nuclear, air quality control, and water quality control facilities. The Board emphasized that these industries have an enormous impact on public health, safety, and welfare, heightening the engineer's obligation to ensure complete and accurate information.
compliancestatus: met
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.93
derived from principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Software Testing Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
obligationclass: Safety Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A was obligated to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in making his recommendation about additional software testing, recognizing that the industries using the software — water, air, and nuclear — have an enormous impact on public health, safety, and welfare, and that the information imparted to the employer and clients must be clear, accurate, and direct.
sourcetext: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct
temporalscope: Throughout the design, testing, and recommendation process
textreferences: The industries using the software—water, air, and nuclear—clearly have an enormous impact on the public health, safety, and welfare, and therefore, Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.925109
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
type: AlgorithmicHarmDistributionEthicsinAutonomousSystems
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle operating system harm-distribution algorithm
appliedto: Risk assessment team evaluation
balancingwith: Automobile manufacturer's commercial interests
balancingwith: Schedule pressures for deployment
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's participation in the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team requires explicit analysis of how the autonomous vehicle operating system allocates harm among affected parties — pedestrians, passengers, and bystanders — when harm is unavoidable, recognizing that these harm-distribution choices embed moral values requiring professional ethical scrutiny
confidence: 0.85
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The risk assessment team's evaluation of autonomous vehicle scenarios is not merely a technical exercise but an ethical one — the choice of harm-distribution framework must be subjected to professional ethical scrutiny and clearly expressed concerns must be raised when the framework is inadequate
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
sourcetext: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
tensionresolution: Ethical scrutiny of harm-distribution algorithms is a professional obligation that cannot be subordinated to deployment schedule or commercial interests
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.923215
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Autonomous Vehicle Ethics Regulatory Standards Vacuum
type: RegulatoryStandardsVacuumforNovelProductState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: Ongoing at time of Engineer A's assignment; persists until applicable standards are enacted
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Future vehicle passengers
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Risk assessment team
affectedparties: Third-party road users
concept category: State
confidence: 0.87
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
stateclass: Regulatory Standards Vacuum for Novel Product State
subject: Absence of applicable regulatory or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm-allocation decision logic
terminatedby: Enactment of applicable national, governmental, or industry standards for autonomous vehicle ethical decision algorithms
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
triggeringevent: Risk assessment team tasked with recommending harm-allocation logic in the absence of governing standards
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911173
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

BER Case 96-4 Emerging Software Standard Pre-Adoption Gap
type: EmergingStandardPre-AdoptionSafetyGapState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards through employer's informed decision on additional testing
affectedparties: Client companies
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Public (nuclear, air quality, water quality facility users)
affectedparties: Software company
concept category: State
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet
stateclass: Emerging Standard Pre-Adoption Safety Gap State
subject: Engineer A's awareness of forthcoming draft testing standards for safety-critical software
terminatedby: Employer's informed decision regarding additional testing after receiving Engineer A's technical report
textreferences: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards
textreferences: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet
triggeringevent: Engineer A became aware of new draft standards about to be released by a standard-setting organization that the newly designed software might not meet
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.914758
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Active Participation Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleRiskAssessmentActiveParticipationandConcernExpressionObligation
type: NamedIndividual
defeasible under: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Allocation Design Assignment
casecontext: Engineer A serves as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer and is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team evaluating crash-avoidance algorithm scenarios for a driverless vehicle operating system, including scenarios involving unavoidable harm to passengers or third parties.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.94
derived from principle: Active Risk Assessment Team Participation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (Present Case — Autonomous Vehicle)
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Active Participation and Concern Expression Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A is obligated to fully and actively participate as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system, and explore additional technical options that could mitigate the identified risks.
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
temporalscope: Throughout the risk assessment team's deliberations and before any deployment recommendation is finalized
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924562
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Technical Report Preparation Obligation
type: NamedIndividual
defeasible under: BER Case 96-4 Emerging Software Standard Pre-Adoption Gap
casecontext: Engineer A designed specialized software for nuclear, air quality, and water quality facilities. The software passed existing standards but Engineer A became aware of new draft standards it might not meet. Testing was costly and clients were eager to proceed.
compliancestatus: met
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.92
derived from principle: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
obligationclass: Safety-Critical Software Informed Employer Decision Enablement Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A was obligated to prepare a technical report explaining current testing analysis and results, and referencing the new testing procedure reported in professional literature, so that the software company employer could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing in furtherance of public health, safety, and welfare.
sourcetext: Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing (see Code Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.)
temporalscope: Upon becoming aware of the new draft standards and before the employer's deployment decision
textreferences: Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing (see Code Sections III.6.b. and II.4.a.)
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924025
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Ethical Dilemma — Harm Allocation Recommendation
type: EthicalDilemma
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From assignment to risk assessment team through submission of recommendation
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Risk assessment team members
affectedparties: Third-party road users
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.95
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
stateclass: Ethical Dilemma
subject: Engineer A's obligation to recommend between two morally distinct algorithmic approaches, each of which causes harm to an identifiable class of persons
terminatedby: Recommendation submitted to automobile manufacturer
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
triggeringevent: Risk assessment team asked to recommend harm-allocation logic for unavoidable autonomous vehicle crash scenarios
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.912509
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Invoked in Software Testing Case
type: GraduatedInternalEscalationBeforeExternalReportingObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Internal technical recommendation
appliedto: Software company employer's decision-making process
balancingwith: Public welfare paramount
balancingwith: Urgency of safety concerns
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation was to first exhaust internal escalation — recommending additional testing to the employer and preparing a technical report — before any consideration of external reporting, recognizing that the employer deserved the opportunity to make an informed decision about additional testing before external regulatory consequences were triggered
confidence: 0.8
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: medium
interpretation: The graduated escalation principle required Engineer A to provide the employer with complete technical information and a clear recommendation before escalating further — the employer's informed decision was the appropriate first step in the escalation sequence
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Obligation
sourcetext: In deciding that Engineer A had a professional obligation under the Code of Ethics to explain why additional testing was required and to recommend to his company that it be undertaken, the Board noted that if he did so, the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on the public health, safety, and welfare.
tensionresolution: Internal escalation through technical recommendation and report was the appropriate first step; further escalation would be required only if the employer failed to act on adequate information
textreferences: In deciding that Engineer A had a professional obligation under the Code of Ethics to explain why additional testing was required and to recommend to his company that it be undertaken, the Board noted that if he did so, the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on the public health, safety, and welfare.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.923607
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked for Automobile Manufacturer Client
type: InformedDecision-MakingEnablementObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client (Present Case)
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team must ensure that the automobile manufacturer — as the non-engineer decision-making body that will ultimately determine the algorithm's design — receives all information relevant and pertinent to the harm-distribution decision, including the ethical, legal, reputational, and public welfare implications of each framework, so that the manufacturer can exercise genuinely informed judgment
confidence: 0.87
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The manufacturer is a non-engineer decision-maker who may not independently recognize the full ethical and public welfare implications of the algorithmic choice — Engineer A's obligation is to ensure that the recommendation enables genuinely informed decision-making by presenting all material considerations, not merely the technical optimization analysis
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
tensionresolution: The informed decision-making enablement obligation reinforces rather than conflicts with the faithful agent obligation — serving the client well requires ensuring the client has complete information
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918000
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
type: InformedDecision-MakingEnablementObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Software company employer's decision about additional testing
appliedto: Technical report preparation
balancingwith: Client schedule pressures
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's obligation in BER Case 96-4 was to prepare a technical report explaining current testing results and referencing new testing procedures so that the employer could make an informed decision about additional testing — the engineer's role was to enable informed organizational decision-making, not to make the business decision itself
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The informed decision-making enablement obligation required Engineer A to provide complete, accurate, and direct technical information — including reference to new draft standards — so that the employer could evaluate all relevant facts before deciding whether to proceed
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation
sourcetext: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing.
tensionresolution: The engineer's obligation is to enable informed decision-making by providing complete technical information; the employer then makes the business decision with full knowledge of the technical landscape
textreferences: Engineer A needed to be certain that the information imparted to his employer and to the employer's clients was clear, accurate, and direct.
textreferences: The Board noted that Engineer A would be well advised to prepare a technical report explaining the current testing analysis and results, as well as referencing the new testing procedure that had been recently reported in the professional literature, so that the engineer's employer could make an informed decision regarding additional testing.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.922852
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Present Case Regulatory Standards Vacuum for Autonomous Vehicle Ethics
type: RegulatoryStandardsVacuumforAutonomousVehicleEthicsState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: Throughout Engineer A's engagement on the autonomous vehicle operating system design
affectedparties: Autonomous vehicle company
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Standard-setting organizations
concept category: State
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:24:36.099142+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk
stateclass: Regulatory Standards Vacuum for Autonomous Vehicle Ethics State
subject: Absence of established national or industry standards governing autonomous vehicle harm allocation ethics
terminatedby: Adoption of applicable national, governmental, or industry-specific standards governing autonomous vehicle harm allocation
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public
triggeringevent: Engineer A tasked with making recommendations about autonomous vehicle ethical decision logic in absence of established standards
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.915793
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Competing Public Goods Balancing Invoked in Passenger vs. Third-Party Safety Trade-Off
type: CompetingPublicGoodsBalancinginEngineeringAdvisoryRoles
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle crash-avoidance algorithm recommendation
balancingwith: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Public Welfare Paramount
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team faces a genuine conflict between two legitimate public goods — passenger safety (protecting vehicle occupants) and third-party safety (protecting pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists) — requiring the team to present both goods and their trade-offs fully and objectively to the automobile manufacturer rather than resolving the conflict unilaterally in favor of one value
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: Both passenger safety and third-party safety are legitimate public welfare values; the engineering risk assessment team's role is to present the trade-offs between them objectively and completely, enabling the manufacturer and ultimately regulators and the public to make an informed policy determination about which framework should govern autonomous vehicle design
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Competing Public Goods Balancing in Engineering Advisory Roles
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
tensionresolution: The principle requires that the recommendation not resolve the conflict unilaterally but instead present both frameworks with their ethical, legal, and public welfare implications, leaving the ultimate policy choice to appropriate decision-making authorities
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.917294
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Technical Recommendation Independence from Business Considerations Invoked in Software Testing Case
type: TechnicalRecommendationIndependencefromBusinessConsiderations
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Employer informed decision-making process
appliedto: Software safety testing recommendation
balancingwith: Client competitive pressures
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
balancingwith: Public utility rate considerations
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's recommendation about additional software testing was required to be based solely on technical findings — the financial pressures on the company, client competitive disadvantage, and public utility rate impacts were factors to be addressed separately by the employer in making its business decision, not inputs to Engineer A's technical recommendation
confidence: 0.88
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The principle requires strict methodological separation: Engineer A provides an uncontaminated technical recommendation; the employer then applies business judgment to that recommendation in deciding whether to proceed with testing
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Technical Recommendation Independence from Business Considerations
sourcetext: Engineer A's ethical obligations in Case 96-4 involved balancing a variety of ethical and other business considerations and making a recommendation based solely on technical finding (and not business considerations) to permit the company to make an informed decision about the need for additional testing in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
tensionresolution: Business considerations are not inputs to the technical recommendation but are addressed separately in the employer's decision-making process after receiving the technical recommendation
textreferences: Engineer A's ethical obligations in Case 96-4 involved balancing a variety of ethical and other business considerations and making a recommendation based solely on technical finding (and not business considerations) to permit the company to make an informed decision about the need for additional testing in furtherance of the public health, safety, and welfare.
textreferences: The financial pressures that existed, including the financial impact on his company, the client, and the public, as well as the potential loss of jobs and delays if additional testing were to be pursued, were clearly important factors and needed to be addressed in some manner. However, said the Board of Ethical Review, it would seem that these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.922682
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold Invoked in Software Testing Case
type: GoodFaithSafetyConcernThresholdforExternalReporting
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Internal escalation to employer
appliedto: Software safety testing recommendation
balancingwith: Client competitive pressures
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — even without confirmed failures — was sufficient to trigger a professional obligation to recommend additional testing, establishing that a good faith professional concern grounded in awareness of emerging standards is sufficient to generate a reporting and recommendation obligation
confidence: 0.83
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The good faith threshold for triggering a safety recommendation obligation does not require confirmed failures or demonstrated non-compliance — awareness of emerging standards that the system might not meet is sufficient
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold for External Reporting
sourcetext: Engineer A generally believed that the software designed by his company was safe, but he had become aware of a new testing procedure that was likely to demonstrate results that might cast a cloud over the software's viability.
tensionresolution: Good faith professional concern based on awareness of draft standards triggers the recommendation obligation even without confirmed non-compliance
textreferences: A series of tests proposed by Engineer A would likely result in a decision whether to move forward with the use of the software.
textreferences: Engineer A generally believed that the software designed by his company was safe, but he had become aware of a new testing procedure that was likely to demonstrate results that might cast a cloud over the software's viability.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.923416
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Passenger Safety vs. Third-Party Harm Minimization Algorithm Conflict
type: Client-Interestvs.Third-PartySafetyAlgorithmicPre-CommitmentState
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From identification of the binary algorithm choice through submission of the risk assessment recommendation
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: Motorcycle riders
affectedparties: Pedestrians
affectedparties: Vehicle passengers
concept category: State
confidence: 0.91
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
stateclass: Client-Interest vs. Third-Party Safety Algorithmic Pre-Commitment State
subject: Structural conflict between automobile manufacturer's commercial interest in passenger-protective algorithms and Engineer A's obligation to minimize aggregate public harm
terminatedby: Recommendation submitted; client adopts a harm-allocation standard; or Engineer A withdraws from engagement
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
triggeringevent: Risk assessment team presented with binary choice between passenger-protective algorithm and harm-minimizing algorithm for unavoidable crash scenarios
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.911375
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Public Safety at Risk — Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Harm
type: PublicSafetyatRisk
type: NamedIndividual
activeperiod: From identification of the crash scenario through deployment of autonomous vehicles with the recommended algorithm
affectedparties: Automobile manufacturer
affectedparties: Cyclists
affectedparties: Engineer A
affectedparties: General public
affectedparties: Motorcycle riders
affectedparties: Pedestrians
concept category: State
confidence: 0.96
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:14.080776+00:00
importance: high
sourcetext: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
stateclass: Public Safety at Risk
subject: Risk of fatal or serious injury to pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders arising from autonomous vehicle harm-allocation algorithm design choices
terminatedby: Adoption of harm-minimizing algorithm; regulatory prohibition of passenger-only protective algorithms; or abandonment of autonomous vehicle development
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
triggeringevent: Risk assessment team identifies that one algorithmic option results in potential fatal injury to pedestrians, cyclists, or motorcycle riders
urgencylevel: high
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.912753
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
type: RegulatoryGapSafetyEscalationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Additional testing recommendation
appliedto: Draft safety standards for public-safety-critical software
balancingwith: Client competitive pressures
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's awareness of new draft standards that the software might not meet — standards not yet in force — created an obligation to escalate the concern through internal channels (recommending additional testing) rather than treating the absence of currently applicable standards as justification for proceeding without further scrutiny
confidence: 0.85
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The existence of draft standards not yet in force created a regulatory gap that heightened rather than diminished Engineer A's professional responsibility to recommend testing — the gap between current standards and emerging standards is itself a risk factor requiring professional attention
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation
sourcetext: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
tensionresolution: Regulatory gap heightens rather than diminishes the obligation to recommend additional scrutiny
textreferences: Although the tests demonstrated that the software was safe to use under existing standards, Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
textreferences: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released by a standard setting organization—standards that the newly designed software might not meet.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.923044
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
type: Third-PartyNon-ClientWelfareConsiderationinAutonomousSystemDesign
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle operating system risk assessment
appliedto: Harm-distribution scenario evaluation
balancingwith: Client commercial interests
balancingwith: Passenger safety preferences
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment obligations extend to the welfare of pedestrians, bystanders, and other third parties who are not clients or passengers of the autonomous vehicle but who are foreseeably exposed to risk from the system's harm-distribution decisions — these third parties' welfare must be explicitly considered in the risk assessment
confidence: 0.85
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The public welfare obligation in the autonomous vehicle context specifically encompasses non-client third parties who bear the risk of harm from the system's decisions — their welfare is not subordinate to the interests of the automobile manufacturer or vehicle passengers
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration in Autonomous System Design
sourcetext: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
tensionresolution: Third-party welfare must be given explicit and affirmative consideration in the risk assessment, not treated as secondary to client or passenger interests
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system.
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.923820
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Design
type: Third-PartyNon-ClientWelfareConsiderationinAutonomousSystemDesign
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle crash-avoidance algorithm design
appliedto: Pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders as affected third parties
balancingwith: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Public Welfare Paramount
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: The risk assessment scenario explicitly juxtaposes passenger welfare against the welfare of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — third parties who are not clients, not passengers, and have no contractual relationship with the manufacturer — requiring Engineer A to give affirmative and explicit consideration to these third parties' welfare in formulating the recommendation
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: Pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists who may be struck by an autonomous vehicle are paradigmatic examples of third parties who have no voice in the system's design but are foreseeably exposed to potentially fatal risk from its algorithmic decisions — Engineer A's public welfare obligation is strongest precisely with respect to these voiceless affected parties
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration in Autonomous System Design
sourcetext: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
tensionresolution: The principle requires that third-party welfare be an explicit and weighted parameter in the recommendation, not merely an afterthought to passenger-protective design
textreferences: does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
textreferences: striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.916960
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Active Risk Assessment Team Participation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
type: ActiveRiskAssessmentTeamParticipationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle operating system safety evaluation
appliedto: Engineering risk management team deliberations
balancingwith: Employer commercial interests
balancingwith: Team consensus dynamics
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A must fully and actively participate in the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express all concerns about the autonomous vehicle operating system's safety, and explore additional technical options that could mitigate identified risks — passive or hedged participation is insufficient
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: Full and active participation requires Engineer A to articulate concerns about harm-distribution algorithms with specificity and clarity, not merely note them in passing, and to actively propose technical alternatives rather than deferring to team consensus
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Active Risk Assessment Team Participation Obligation
sourcetext: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
tensionresolution: Individual professional obligation to express concerns clearly and explore mitigation options is not subordinated by team membership or employer pressure
textreferences: Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team, clearly and unambiguously express any and all concerns he has regarding the safety of the proposed autonomous vehicle operation system, and explore additional potential technical options that could mitigate the risks identified in the proposed autonomous vehicle operating system.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.922514
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Further Study Recommendation Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleFurtherStudyRecommendationBeforeDeploymentObligation
type: NamedIndividual
defeasible under: Present Case Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Design Obligation
defeasible under: Present Case Regulatory Standards Vacuum for Autonomous Vehicle Ethics
prevails over: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
casecontext: Engineer A's risk assessment team has identified unresolved questions about the crash-avoidance algorithm's harm-distribution logic, including whether the system should prioritize passenger safety or total-harm minimization. The do-no-harm principle requires that unresolved safety concerns be addressed before deployment.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.95
derived from principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Autonomous Vehicle Case
derived from principle: Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (Present Case — Autonomous Vehicle)
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Further Study Recommendation Before Deployment Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A is obligated, if necessary after active participation and expression of concerns, to propose that further study be undertaken by the automobile manufacturer before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized, so that all foreseeable safety and ethical risks are identified and addressed before the system is released for public use.
sourcetext: in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
temporalscope: If unresolved safety or ethical concerns remain after active team participation and concern expression, before deployment recommendation is finalized
textreferences: if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized
textreferences: in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924773
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Invoked for Engineer A Consultant Role
type: FaithfulAgentObligationWithinEthicalLimits
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client (Present Case)
balancingwith: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics in Autonomous Systems
balancingwith: Public Welfare Paramount
balancingwith: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration in Autonomous System Design
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, bears a faithful agent obligation to provide the manufacturer with a diligent, competent risk assessment recommendation — but this obligation is bounded by the ethical limits imposed by public welfare paramount and the obligation to consider third-party welfare, such that Engineer A cannot recommend a purely passenger-protective algorithm without disclosing its implications for third-party safety
confidence: 0.87
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The faithful agent obligation requires diligent service to the manufacturer's legitimate interests in developing a commercially viable autonomous vehicle system, but does not authorize Engineer A to suppress or minimize the public welfare implications of the harm-distribution choice in order to favor the manufacturer's commercial interests
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
tensionresolution: The faithful agent obligation is satisfied by providing a complete, objective, and technically competent risk assessment that presents both frameworks and their implications — not by advocating for the commercially preferred framework at the expense of public welfare analysis
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.917651
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Software Testing Case
type: DoNoHarmObligationinProfessionalEngineeringServices
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Public-safety-critical facility software deployment
appliedto: Software safety testing recommendation
balancingwith: Client competitive disadvantage
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
balancingwith: Public utility rate impacts
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: In BER Case 96-4, Engineer A's ethical obligation to recommend additional software testing was grounded in the principle that engineers must strive to do no harm — the possibility that the software might not meet new draft standards created a harm-avoidance obligation to recommend testing even at significant financial cost
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The do no harm principle required Engineer A to recommend additional testing despite financial pressures, because proceeding without testing created a foreseeable risk of harm to public-safety-critical facilities
invokedby: Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
principleclass: Do No Harm Obligation in Professional Engineering Services
sourcetext: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
tensionresolution: Do no harm obligation required the testing recommendation to be made on technical grounds, with business considerations addressed separately by the employer
textreferences: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921998
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmMinimizationRiskManagementParticipationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
defeasible under: Present Case Autonomous System Harm Allocation Design
defeasible under: Public Safety at Risk — Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Harm
casecontext: The do-no-harm principle, identified as implicit in BER Case 96-4, is applied by the Board to the autonomous vehicle case to ground Engineer A's obligation to propose further study before deployment of an operating system with unresolved harm-distribution questions.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.9
derived from principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Autonomous Vehicle Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (Present Case — Autonomous Vehicle)
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Minimization Risk Management Participation Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A is obligated, in seeking to fulfill his ethical obligations as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team, to strive to do no harm in the performance of his professional services — including by ensuring that the autonomous vehicle operating system does not create foreseeable harm to passengers, pedestrians, or third parties that could be avoided through further study or technical mitigation.
sourcetext: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
temporalscope: Throughout the risk assessment process and before any deployment recommendation
textreferences: Implicit in Case 96-4 is the notion that in seeking to fulfill one's ethical obligations, engineers should strive to do no harm in the performance of their professional services
textreferences: Similarly, in the present case, Engineer A has a responsibility to fully and actively participate as a member of the engineering risk management team
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924927
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Further Study Recommendation Before Deployment Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleFurtherStudyRecommendationBeforeDeploymentObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
defeasible under: Autonomous Vehicle Ethics Regulatory Standards Vacuum
defeasible under: Engineer A Ethical Dilemma — Harm Allocation Recommendation
prevails over: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
casecontext: The risk assessment team is evaluating a scenario involving unavoidable crashes where the algorithm must choose between passenger safety and third-party harm minimization — a question with unresolved ethical dimensions that may require further study before deployment.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.88
derived from principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Autonomous Vehicle Case
derived from principle: Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Further Study Recommendation Before Deployment Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to recommend that further study be conducted before the autonomous vehicle operating system is deployed for public use, if material ethical, safety, or technical questions regarding the crash-avoidance algorithm's harm-distribution logic remained unresolved at the time of the team's recommendation.
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: At the time of preparing and delivering the risk assessment team's recommendation to the automobile manufacturer, if unresolved questions remain
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
textreferences: In the event of an unavoidable crash, does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918661
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Business Pressure Non-Subordination Obligation
type: TechnicalRecommendationBusinessPressureNon-SubordinationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A BER 96-4 Additional Testing Recommendation Obligation
defeasible under: BER Case 96-4 Multi-Factor Business-Safety Balancing
defeasible under: BER Case 96-4 Public Safety at Risk from Safety-Critical Software
casecontext: The software company faced significant financial pressure from clients eager to proceed, competitive disadvantage from delay, and potential public utility rate increases. Engineer A needed to balance these nontechnical factors without allowing them to distort his technical recommendation.
compliancestatus: met
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.91
derived from principle: Technical Recommendation Independence from Business Considerations Invoked in Software Testing Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
obligationclass: Technical Recommendation Business Pressure Non-Subordination Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A was obligated to make his recommendation about additional testing based solely on technical findings, keeping the financial pressures — including financial impact on the company, the client, the public, potential job loss, and competitive disadvantage — separate and apart from the technical determination of whether additional testing was required.
sourcetext: these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A
temporalscope: At the time of formulating and delivering the technical recommendation to the employer
textreferences: Engineer A's ethical obligations in Case 96-4 involved balancing a variety of ethical and other business considerations and making a recommendation based solely on technical finding (and not business considerations) to permit the company to make an informed decision
textreferences: these nontechnical considerations were factors that needed to be given weight separate and apart from the decision as to whether the additional testing should be recommended by Engineer A
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924384
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer (Case 96-4)
type: Safety-CriticalSoftwareDesignEngineer
type: NamedIndividual
adheres to principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Software Testing Case
adheres to principle: Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold Invoked in Software Testing Case
adheres to principle: Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Invoked in Software Testing Case
adheres to principle: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
adheres to principle: Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
adheres to principle: Technical Recommendation Independence from Business Considerations Invoked in Software Testing Case
has obligation: Engineer A BER 96-4 Additional Testing Recommendation Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A BER 96-4 Business Pressure Non-Subordination Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A BER 96-4 Public Welfare Paramount Safety-Critical Software Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A BER 96-4 Technical Report Preparation Obligation
attributes: {'license': 'Professional Engineer (implied)', 'specialty': 'Safety-critical software design and testing', 'domain': 'Nuclear, air quality control, water quality control facilities'}
caseinvolvement: Designed specialized software for public-safety-critical facilities, conducted extensive testing, became aware of new draft standards the software might not meet, and was asked by the company to recommend whether additional costly testing was required.
concept category: Role
confidence: 0.9
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:23:48.439360+00:00
importance: high
relationships: {'type': 'employee_of', 'target': 'Software Company Employer'}
relationships: {'type': 'serves_clients_of', 'target': 'Software Company Client'}
rolecategory: employer_relationship
roleclass: Safety-Critical Software Design Engineer
sourcetext: Engineer A was employed by a software company and was involved in the design of specialized software in connection with the operations of facilities affecting the public health and safety
textreferences: Engineer A conducted extensive testing
textreferences: Engineer A needed to balance a variety of factors
textreferences: Engineer A was aware of new draft standards that were about to be released
textreferences: Engineer A was employed by a software company and was involved in the design of specialized software in connection with the operations of facilities affecting the public health and safety
textreferences: The software company requested Engineer A's recommendation on the need for additional testing
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.914077
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment
type: PublicWelfareParamount
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle operating system deployment decision
appliedto: Harm distribution algorithm evaluation
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Employer financial interests
balancingwith: Schedule pressures
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's overriding ethical responsibility as a member of the autonomous vehicle risk assessment team is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public — including third parties who may be harmed by the autonomous vehicle's harm-distribution decisions — above the automobile manufacturer's commercial interests in deploying the system
confidence: 0.97
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: In the autonomous vehicle context, holding public welfare paramount requires Engineer A to fully express safety concerns, explore technical mitigation options, and propose further study before deployment — the public welfare obligation is not discharged by passive team participation or acquiescence to business pressure
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Public Welfare Paramount
sourcetext: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
tensionresolution: Public welfare paramount overrides business and schedule considerations in determining whether Engineer A must recommend further study — the Board affirms that the overriding ethical responsibility is public welfare
textreferences: New technologies often introduce new uncertainties and sometimes significant risk.
textreferences: The overriding ethical responsibility of a professional engineer is to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.921828
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation Invoked in AV Design
type: AutonomousSystemMoralFrameworkTransparencyObligation
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client (Present Case)
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle crash-avoidance algorithm
balancingwith: Client Loyalty
balancingwith: Confidentiality
balancingwith: Public Welfare Paramount
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's risk assessment team bears an obligation to ensure that the moral framework embedded in the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm — whichever framework the manufacturer ultimately adopts — is transparently disclosed to regulators, the public, and prospective vehicle purchasers, rather than being obscured within the technical specifications of the software system
confidence: 0.85
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:26:19.084798+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: The choice between passenger-protective and harm-minimizing algorithms is a moral choice that affects the public — prospective vehicle purchasers, pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists all have a legitimate interest in knowing which framework governs the vehicle's behavior in unavoidable crash scenarios; professional integrity requires that this choice be made visible
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
tensionresolution: Client confidentiality interests in proprietary algorithm design must yield to the public's interest in knowing the moral framework governing autonomous systems that operate in shared public spaces
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
textreferences: does the vehicle's system choose the outcome that will likely result in the greatest potential for safety for the vehicle's passengers or does the vehicle's software system instead choose an option in which the least amount of potential harm is done to any of those involved in an accident
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.917488
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A BER 96-4 Additional Testing Recommendation Obligation
type: NewDraftStandardAwarenessAdditionalTestingRecommendationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A BER 96-4 Business Pressure Non-Subordination Obligation
defeasible under: BER Case 96-4 Completed Safety Testing with Residual Concern
defeasible under: BER Case 96-4 Emerging Software Standard Pre-Adoption Gap
prevails over: Engineer A BER 96-4 Business Pressure Non-Subordination Obligation
casecontext: Engineer A's software passed existing standards but new draft standards were about to be released that the software might not meet. Testing was expensive and would delay implementation by at least six months, causing competitive disadvantage and significant financial cost.
compliancestatus: met
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.93
derived from principle: Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold Invoked in Software Testing Case
derived from principle: Graduated Internal Escalation Before External Reporting Invoked in Software Testing Case
derived from principle: Regulatory Gap Safety Escalation Obligation Invoked in Software Testing Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:31:57.925931+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A (BER Case 96-4)
obligationclass: New Draft Standard Awareness Additional Testing Recommendation Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A was obligated to recommend to the software company that additional testing be undertaken, explaining why such testing was required, so that the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on public health, safety, and welfare — notwithstanding the financial costs, competitive delay, and client pressure to proceed.
sourcetext: Engineer A had a professional obligation under the Code of Ethics to explain why additional testing was required and to recommend to his company that it be undertaken
temporalscope: Upon becoming aware of the new draft standards, before the employer's deployment decision
textreferences: Engineer A generally believed that the software designed by his company was safe, but he had become aware of a new testing procedure that was likely to demonstrate results that might cast a cloud over the software's viability
textreferences: Engineer A had a professional obligation under the Code of Ethics to explain why additional testing was required and to recommend to his company that it be undertaken
textreferences: the company could make an informed decision about the need for additional testing and its effects on the public health, safety, and welfare
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.924229
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Moral Framework Public Transparency Recommendation Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleMoralFrameworkPublicTransparencyDisclosureObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
competes with: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Team Harm Minimization Participation Obligation
defeasible under: Client Relationship — Engineer A and Automobile Manufacturer
defeasible under: Present Case Client-Interest vs Third-Party Safety Algorithmic Pre-Commitment
prevails over: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
casecontext: The risk assessment team is evaluating the ethical framework to be embedded in the autonomous vehicle's crash-avoidance algorithm, a decision with significant public welfare implications that the public has a legitimate interest in understanding.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.85
derived from principle: Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation Invoked in AV Design
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Moral Framework Public Transparency Disclosure Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to recommend that the automobile manufacturer publicly disclose the moral framework embedded in the crash-avoidance algorithm — including whether the system prioritizes passenger safety or total-harm minimization — so that the public, regulators, and prospective purchasers can make informed decisions about the autonomous vehicle system.
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: At the time of preparing and delivering the risk assessment team's recommendation to the automobile manufacturer, and before public deployment of the operating system
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918478
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Autonomous Vehicle Case
type: DoNoHarmObligationinProfessionalEngineeringServices
type: NamedIndividual
appliedto: Autonomous vehicle operating system deployment recommendation
appliedto: Further study proposal
balancingwith: Automobile manufacturer's commercial deployment interests
balancingwith: Schedule pressures
concept category: Principle
concreteexpression: Engineer A's obligation to propose further study of the autonomous vehicle operating system before deployment is grounded in the do no harm principle — the uncertainties and risks identified in the system's harm-distribution algorithms create a harm-avoidance obligation to recommend additional study rather than proceeding with deployment
confidence: 0.92
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: discussion
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:30:37.781391+00:00
importance: high
interpretation: In the autonomous vehicle context, do no harm requires Engineer A to propose further study when the risk assessment reveals unresolved uncertainties about how the system will distribute harm among affected parties
invokedby: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
principleclass: Do No Harm Obligation in Professional Engineering Services
sourcetext: In light of the fact that engineers should strive to seek to do no harm in the performance of their professional services, if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
tensionresolution: Do no harm obligation requires proposing further study as a precondition to deployment when risks are not adequately resolved
textreferences: In light of the fact that engineers should strive to seek to do no harm in the performance of their professional services, if necessary, Engineer A should propose that further study be undertaken by the company before the autonomous vehicle operating system is utilized.
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.922294
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Team Harm Minimization Participation Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleHarmMinimizationRiskManagementParticipationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Moral Framework Public Transparency Recommendation Obligation
competes with: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Third-Party Safety Consideration Obligation
defeasible under: Autonomous Vehicle Ethics Regulatory Standards Vacuum
defeasible under: Passenger Safety vs. Third-Party Harm Minimization Algorithm Conflict
casecontext: Engineer A is a professional engineer serving as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer and assigned to an engineering risk assessment team evaluating scenarios for a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system, including the scenario of how the system should handle unavoidable crashes involving passengers versus third parties.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.92
derived from principle: Active Risk Assessment Team Participation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
derived from principle: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Harm Minimization Risk Management Participation Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to fully and actively participate in the evaluation of the crash-avoidance algorithm's harm-distribution logic, to express clearly and unambiguously any concerns regarding the safety of the operating system's harm-minimization framework, and if necessary to recommend further study before the operating system is deployed for public use.
sourcetext: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
temporalscope: During the risk assessment process, before any recommendation is finalized and before the operating system is deployed
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918153
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Third-Party Safety Consideration Obligation
type: AutonomousVehicleThird-PartyHarmMinimizationSafetyConsiderationObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
competes with: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Team Harm Minimization Participation Obligation
defeasible under: Passenger Safety vs. Third-Party Harm Minimization Algorithm Conflict
defeasible under: Public Safety at Risk — Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Harm
prevails over: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
prevails over: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Team Harm Minimization Participation Obligation
casecontext: The risk assessment scenario explicitly juxtaposes passenger welfare against the welfare of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders who could be fatally injured if the algorithm prioritizes passenger safety over total-harm minimization.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.91
derived from principle: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
derived from principle: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Design
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A
obligationclass: Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Harm Minimization Safety Consideration Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A, as a member of the automobile manufacturer's engineering risk assessment team, was obligated to explicitly identify, assess, and present the welfare of third parties — including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcycle riders — as a material safety consideration in the team's recommendation, recognizing that the paramount duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare extends beyond the vehicle's passengers to all persons foreseeably affected by the autonomous system's operation in unavoidable crash scenarios.
sourcetext: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
temporalscope: At the time of preparing and delivering the risk assessment team's recommendation to the automobile manufacturer
textreferences: having the car crash into a stationary object (e.g., telephone pole, etc.) with the probability of causing some passengers serious but non-life-threatening injuries instead of striking and potentially causing a fatal injury to a pedestrian, cyclist, or motorcycle rider
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918326
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
type: AutonomousVehicleRiskAssessmentTeamEngineer
type: NamedIndividual
adheres to principle: Active Risk Assessment Team Participation Obligation Invoked by Engineer A
adheres to principle: Algorithmic Harm Distribution Ethics Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
adheres to principle: Autonomous System Moral Framework Transparency Obligation Invoked in AV Design
adheres to principle: Competing Public Goods Balancing Invoked in Passenger vs. Third-Party Safety Trade-Off
adheres to principle: Completeness and Non-Selectivity in Advisory Opinions Invoked by Engineer A Risk Assessment Team
adheres to principle: Do No Harm Obligation Invoked by Engineer A in Autonomous Vehicle Case
adheres to principle: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Invoked for Engineer A Consultant Role
adheres to principle: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked for Automobile Manufacturer Client
adheres to principle: Professional Competence in Risk Assessment Invoked for Autonomous Vehicle Scenario
adheres to principle: Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Crash Algorithm Design
adheres to principle: Public Welfare Paramount Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment
adheres to principle: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Case
adheres to principle: Third-Party Non-Client Welfare Consideration Invoked in Autonomous Vehicle Design
has obligation: Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A AV Further Study Recommendation Before Deployment Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A AV Moral Framework Public Transparency Recommendation Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Team Harm Minimization Participation Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Third-Party Safety Consideration Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Further Study Recommendation Obligation
has obligation: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Active Participation Obligation
attributes: {'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'employment_type': 'Consultant to automobile manufacturer', 'team_role': 'Risk assessment team member', 'specialty': 'Autonomous vehicle systems risk assessment'}
caseinvolvement: Engineer A is a professional engineer serving as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer and assigned to an engineering risk assessment team evaluating scenarios for autonomous vehicle operating systems, including algorithmic crash outcome decision logic that implicates trade-offs between passenger safety and third-party (pedestrian, cyclist, motorcyclist) safety.
concept category: Role
confidence: 0.92
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 1
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:22:35.036389+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:22:35.036389+00:00
importance: high
relationships: {'type': 'consultant_to', 'target': 'Automobile Manufacturer Autonomous Vehicle Developer Client'}
relationships: {'type': 'public_responsibility', 'target': 'General Public including pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists'}
relationships: {'type': 'team_member', 'target': 'Engineering Risk Assessment Team'}
rolecategory: employer_relationship
roleclass: Autonomous Vehicle Risk Assessment Team Engineer
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer
textreferences: Engineer A is assigned to an engineering risk assessment team whose members are being asked to make a recommendation relating to potential situations that could arise in connection with the operation of driverless/autonomous vehicles
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.914271
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction

Engineer A AV Faithful Agent Informed Decision Enablement Obligation
type: FaithfulAgentObligation
type: NamedIndividual
competes with: Engineer A AV Further Study Recommendation Before Deployment Obligation
competes with: Engineer A AV Moral Framework Public Transparency Recommendation Obligation
competes with: Engineer A AV Risk Assessment Third-Party Safety Consideration Obligation
competes with: Engineer A Autonomous Vehicle Do No Harm Obligation
defeasible under: Competing Duties — Passenger Safety vs. Aggregate Harm Minimization
defeasible under: Engineer A Ethical Dilemma — Harm Allocation Recommendation
defeasible under: Passenger Safety vs. Third-Party Harm Minimization Algorithm Conflict
defeasible under: Present Case Regulatory Standards Vacuum for Autonomous Vehicle Ethics
defeasible under: Public Safety at Risk — Autonomous Vehicle Third-Party Harm
casecontext: Engineer A serves as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer and is assigned to the engineering risk assessment team, creating a faithful agent relationship in which the engineer owes the manufacturer complete and honest advisory services within the bounds of professional ethics.
compliancestatus: unclear
concept category: Obligation
confidence: 0.9
derived from principle: Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Invoked for Engineer A Consultant Role
derived from principle: Informed Decision-Making Enablement Obligation Invoked for Automobile Manufacturer Client
discoveredincase: 165
discoveredinpass: 2
discoveredinsection: facts
firstdiscoveredat: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
firstdiscoveredincase: 165
generatedattime: 2026-02-27T23:27:21.726838+00:00
importance: high
obligatedparty: Engineer A
obligationclass: Faithful Agent Obligation
obligationstatement: Engineer A, as a consultant to the automobile manufacturer, was obligated to act as a faithful agent by providing the manufacturer with a diligent, competent, and complete risk assessment — including all material findings about both harm-distribution frameworks — so that the manufacturer could make a fully informed decision about the crash-avoidance algorithm's design, while remaining bound by the paramount obligation to protect public health, safety, and welfare.
sourcetext: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
temporalscope: Throughout the risk assessment engagement
textreferences: Engineer A is a professional engineer working as a consultant to an automobile manufacturer that is considering the development of a driverless/autonomous vehicle operating system
wasattributedto: Case 165 Extraction
generated at time: 2026-02-27T23:40:57.918839
was generated by: ProEthica Case 165 Extraction