In BER Case 18-10, Engineer A was the lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency-prepared project... the Board concluded that, so long as the agency approves and the work complies with applicable state laws and regulations regarding conflicts of interest, it would not be unethical for Engineer A's firm to participate in a design-build joint venture submitting a proposal for the project.
BER in the present case discussion to contextualize peer review ethics
Referenced as precedent addressing peer review issues, specifically whether an engineer who conducted an independent external review may later participate in a design-build joint venture for the same project, concluding it is not unethical provided agency approval and compliance with conflict-of-interest laws
[93-3 discussed a situation in which the Owner refused to advise the engineer of the planned peer review.]
BER in the present case discussion to distinguish the notification obligation scenario
Referenced parenthetically as a prior case addressing the situation where an Owner refused to advise the engineer of a planned peer review, providing contrast to the present case where Owner reluctantly agreed to notify Engineer A
In BER Case 96-8, Engineer A was a peer reviewer serving as part of an organized peer-review program... The BER concluded that Engineer A had an obligation to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in order to seek clarification and resolution... Engineer A had an obligation to first advise Engineer B that Engineer A had an obligation to inform the appropriate authorities, and then to so inform the appropriate authorities.
BER in the present case discussion to establish the hierarchy of obligations when peer review uncovers public safety concerns
Referenced as precedent establishing that a peer reviewer who discovers potential safety code violations has an obligation to discuss concerns with the reviewed engineer, seek resolution, and if unresolved, notify appropriate authorities — even when bound by a confidentiality agreement
BER Case 18-10 Prior Review Participation Conflict
From invitation to participate in design-build RFP through agency approval determination and legal compliance assessment
Engineer A was the lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency-prepared project.
Engineer A's firm's position having conducted prior independent review of project before being invited to join design-build RFP joint venture
Agency approval granted and legal compliance confirmed, or firm declines participation
About a year later, Engineer A's firm is invited to be part of a joint venture responding to a design-build RFP for the project.
so long as the agency approves and the work complies with applicable state laws and regulations regarding conflicts of interest, it would not be unethical for Engineer A's firm to participate
Engineer A's firm invited to join design-build joint venture approximately one year after conducting independent external review of same project
BER Case 96-8 Safety Violation Discovery During Confidential Review
From Engineer A's identification of potential violations through resolution or reporting to authorities
Public affected by potentially non-compliant design
Engineer A determined that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements, placing the public health, safety, and welfare at risk.
Peer Review Safety Violation Discovery State
Engineer A's discovery of potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work during confidential peer review program
Joint resolution, Engineer B's correction of violations, or Engineer A's report to appropriate authorities
Engineer A had an obligation to first advise Engineer B that Engineer A had an obligation to inform the appropriate authorities, and then to so inform the appropriate authorities.
Engineer A had an obligation to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in order to seek clarification and resolution.
Engineer A's determination during peer review that Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety code requirements
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Cases on Peer Review and Engineer Notification
Engineer B objects to conducting the peer review without advising Engineer A
Engineer A objects and refused to consent to the peer review
Ethical analysis of Engineer B's and Engineer A's conduct
Provides analogical reasoning patterns from prior BER decisions addressing the ethics of peer review engagements, notification obligations, and the rights of engineers whose work is under review
CausalLink_Engineer A Creates Flawed Plan
CausalLink_Engineer A Refuses Peer Review
CausalLink_Engineer B Refuses Covert Revi
CausalLink_Owner Consents to Notifying En
CausalLink_Owner Retains Engineer B Cover
CausalLink_Owner Selects Post-Refusal Str
Client Loyalty Invoked As Basis for Engineer A Peer Review Cooperation
Engineer A's obligation to cooperate with Owner-commissioned peer review
Reputational self-interest of Engineer A
Engineer A's obligation to act in the best interests of the Owner client requires cooperation with the peer review that the Owner has commissioned to protect the Owner's interests in the second tower project, particularly given that the Owner discovered design errors in the first tower
Client loyalty includes supporting the client's legitimate quality assurance decisions, including peer review of the engineer's own work, rather than obstructing processes the client has determined are necessary to protect its interests
Engineer A Original Design Engineer Subject to Peer Review
Engineers must take responsibility for their actions, must acknowledge their errors, must act in the best interests of their clients
Client loyalty requires subordinating Engineer A's reputational self-interest to the Owner's legitimate interest in obtaining an effective peer review
Owner reluctantly agreed to advise Engineer A of the planned peer review.
must act in the best interests of their clients
Client Relationship Engineer A Second Tower
From original engagement through the peer review dispute
Owner is developing a site with two mirror-image towers to be built two years apart
Engineer A's ongoing professional relationship with Owner for second tower plans
Several significant design errors are discovered in the plans and design of Engineer A
Owner's original retention of Engineer A for both towers
Client Relationship Engineer B Peer Review
From Owner's retention of Engineer B through completion of peer review
Owner decides to obtain a peer review of the plans and design of Engineer A for the second tower and retains Engineer B
Engineer B's professional relationship with Owner for peer review services
Owner's retention of Engineer B to conduct peer review of second tower plans
Engineer B is ethically required to make certain that Engineer A is advised of the planned peer review.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer B is ethically required to ensure Engineer A is advised of the planned peer review, Engineer B's obligation does not merely require passive reliance on the Owner's promise to notify. Engineer B bears an independent, affirmative duty to verify that notification has actually occurred before commencing any review activity. If the Owner fails to follow through on the agreed notification, Engineer B's continued participation in the review would itself constitute a violation of the peer review notification norm embedded in Code provision III.7.a. The ethical obligation is not discharged by the Owner's mere consent to notify; it is discharged only when Engineer B has reasonable confirmation that Engineer A has in fact been informed. This means Engineer B must treat notification as a precondition to engagement, not merely a procedural courtesy to be delegated entirely to the Owner.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer B must ensure notification implicitly resolves the tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation and the Peer Review Notification Obligation in favor of the latter, but the Board did not articulate the limiting principle. The correct limiting principle is that the Faithful Agent Obligation operates only within ethical limits, as the Code itself specifies in provision I.4. When an Owner's instruction — here, to conduct a covert review — would require Engineer B to violate a professional norm protecting a third-party engineer's dignity and procedural rights under III.7.a. and III.1.f., that instruction falls outside the scope of lawful and ethical client service. Engineer B's refusal of the covert instruction was therefore not a breach of client loyalty but rather the precise conduct that the Code's faithful agent standard demands: serving the client's legitimate interests while refusing to become an instrument of professionally impermissible conduct. The Board should have made this limiting principle explicit to prevent future misreading of the faithful agent duty as an override of peer review procedural norms.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A may not ethically object to the peer review, while sound, rests on a public safety predicate — the known design errors in the first tower — that the Board did not fully develop into an independent affirmative obligation. Engineer A's prior acknowledgment duty under Code provision III.1.a., which requires engineers to admit their errors and not distort or alter the facts, independently compels Engineer A not merely to tolerate the peer review but to actively facilitate it. An engineer who has produced significant design errors and who then refuses to cooperate with a review designed to prevent replication of those errors in a second structure is not simply exercising a procedural objection; that engineer is actively impeding the correction of a known professional failure in a context where public safety is at stake. This conduct simultaneously violates III.1.a. (error acknowledgment), the Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review principle, and the paramount public welfare obligation of Code provision I.1. The Board's answer to Q2 should therefore have been grounded not only in the Owner's right to commission the review but in Engineer A's independent ethical duty to cooperate arising from the prior error.
The Board did not address the perverse incentive created by the Owner's option to terminate Engineer A as an alternative to notification. If termination is treated as an ethically equivalent substitute for notification — effectively allowing the Owner to circumvent the peer review notification norm by simply removing the engineer whose work is being reviewed — the protective purpose of Code provision III.7.a. is gutted. An engineer cannot be notified of a review of their work if they have already been removed from the project. The Board should have clarified that termination used as a mechanism to avoid notification, rather than as a genuine exercise of the Owner's right to select engineers, would itself constitute a procedurally impermissible workaround. Engineer B, upon learning that the Owner was considering termination specifically to avoid the notification obligation, would have an independent duty to decline the engagement under those circumstances, because proceeding would make Engineer B complicit in the circumvention of the very norm Engineer B had previously insisted upon.
The Board's analysis implicitly assumed that the peer review process, once properly initiated with notification, is self-contained and its findings are for the Owner's use alone. However, if Engineer B's peer review of the second tower plans reveals that the same categories of significant design errors present in the first tower have been replicated, Engineer B faces an independent obligation that the Board did not address: the duty to consider escalation to public authorities if the Owner declines to act on the findings. Code provision I.1. places public safety paramount, and Code provision II.1.c. and III.4. protect client confidentiality only to the extent that disclosure is not required to protect the public. A peer review that uncovers structural defects posing genuine public safety risks cannot ethically remain confidential if the Owner suppresses the findings. Engineer B must therefore understand, at the outset of the engagement, that the peer review confidentiality framework is bounded by the same public safety override that the Board recognized in BER Case 96-8, and that Engineer B's obligations do not terminate with delivery of the report to the Owner.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A may not ethically object to the peer review would have been materially more difficult to sustain absent the public safety predicate established by the known design errors in the first tower. In a scenario where no prior errors had been discovered, Engineer A's refusal to consent would have presented a genuine tension between the Owner's right to commission independent review and Engineer A's professional dignity interest in not being subjected to unsolicited scrutiny of competent work. The existence of prior significant design errors is therefore not merely a factual background detail but the essential ethical predicate that converts Engineer A's refusal from a potentially defensible professional position into an ethically impermissible obstruction. This distinction matters for future cases: the Board's reasoning should not be read as establishing that engineers may never object to peer review of their work, but rather that engineers who have produced known errors in related prior work on the same project have forfeited the standing to obstruct review of subsequent work on that project, because the public safety interest has been concretely activated by their own prior professional failure.
In response to Q101: If the Owner had never voluntarily agreed to notify Engineer A, Engineer B would have faced an independent, unconditional obligation to refuse the covert engagement entirely rather than simply object and await resolution. The notification requirement under Code provision III.7.a is not a procedural preference that can be waived by client instruction — it is a structural precondition to the legitimacy of the peer review itself. Engineer B's acceptance of a covert assignment, even provisionally, would have constituted an ethical violation at the moment of acceptance, not merely at the moment of conducting the review. The ethical violation inheres in agreeing to participate in a process designed to circumvent a colleague's right to notice, regardless of whether the review is ultimately conducted. Engineer B's proper course, absent Owner agreement to notify, would have been to decline the engagement entirely and explain that the engagement could only proceed on terms consistent with professional obligations. The fact that the Owner did agree to notify does not retroactively validate Engineer B's initial acceptance under covert terms; it merely cures the procedural defect before the violation was consummated.
In response to Q102: The Owner's legal ability to terminate Engineer A as a workaround to the notification requirement creates a genuine perverse incentive that the Board's conclusion, while correct on its face, fails to fully address. If notification is required but termination is a permissible substitute, then the protective norm is effectively optional for any Owner willing to pay the transactional cost of dismissal. The Board should have addressed whether termination-as-substitution is ethically equivalent to notification. It is not. Termination severs the professional relationship and eliminates Engineer A's opportunity to respond, correct, or participate — outcomes that notification is specifically designed to preserve. A termination motivated primarily by the desire to avoid notification obligations would itself constitute an ethically problematic use of the Owner's contractual power, potentially implicating the Owner's own duty of procedural fairness toward Engineer A. Engineer B, upon learning that termination was being contemplated as a substitute for notification, would have an independent obligation to flag this concern to the Owner, since facilitating a termination-as-evasion strategy would undermine the very professional norm Engineer B is obligated to uphold.
In response to Q103: Engineer A bears affirmative, independent disclosure obligations regarding the known design errors in the first tower that exist entirely apart from and prior to any peer review being commissioned. Code provision III.1.a requires engineers to acknowledge their errors and not distort or alter the facts. This obligation is self-executing — it is triggered by Engineer A's own knowledge of the errors, not by the initiation of external review. Engineer A's duty to disclose the first-tower errors to the Owner arose at the moment Engineer A became aware of those errors, and that duty was not contingent on whether a peer review was ever commissioned, whether the Owner asked, or whether the errors were discovered by a third party. The failure to proactively disclose known design errors to the Owner while simultaneously designing the second tower compounds the ethical violation: Engineer A was not merely passively concealing past errors but was actively continuing professional work for the same client on a related structure while withholding material safety-relevant information. This sequence of conduct implicates not only III.1.a but also the paramount public safety obligation under I.1, since the Owner's ability to make informed decisions about the second tower was directly impaired by Engineer A's non-disclosure.
In response to Q104: Engineer B has an independent obligation to report known design defects in Engineer A's first tower work to public authorities if the Owner declines to act on them, regardless of the outcome of the peer review process. This obligation derives from the paramount public safety duty under I.1, which supersedes both the confidentiality obligations under II.1.c and III.4 and the faithful agent obligation under I.4. The peer review process is a mechanism for identifying and correcting defects — it is not a substitute for public safety reporting when the Owner fails to act. If Engineer B, through the peer review, confirms significant structural defects in the first tower and the Owner declines to remediate or report, Engineer B's obligation to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public independently compels escalation to relevant authorities. The confidentiality protections that ordinarily shield client information do not extend to concealing known public safety hazards. The Board's silence on this point is a significant gap: the peer review framework cannot function as a mechanism that simultaneously uncovers safety defects and then seals them within a confidential client relationship. Engineer B must understand from the outset that accepting this engagement carries the potential obligation to escalate findings over the Owner's objection if public safety demands it.
In response to Q201: The tension between Engineer B's faithful agent obligation under I.4 and the peer review notification obligation under III.7.a is resolved by the Code's own internal hierarchy. The faithful agent duty is explicitly bounded by ethical limits — I.4 requires Engineer B to act as a faithful agent 'within ethical limits,' meaning that client instructions that require Engineer B to violate professional obligations are not instructions Engineer B is ethically permitted to follow. The Owner's instruction to conduct a covert review without notifying Engineer A is precisely the kind of client instruction that falls outside the scope of the faithful agent duty. Engineer B's resolution of this tension — refusing the covert instruction and conditioning engagement on notification — is not a breach of client loyalty but rather the correct application of the Code's hierarchy: faithful agency operates within, not above, professional ethical obligations. Engineer B's refusal to comply with the covert instruction is therefore not a tension requiring compromise but a straightforward application of the principle that client loyalty cannot be used to override professional norms that protect third parties.
In response to Q202: The confidentiality principle does not categorically conflict with the public welfare paramount principle in the peer review context — rather, the peer review framework itself is the mechanism through which these principles are reconciled. Confidentiality under II.1.c and III.4 protects client information from unauthorized third-party disclosure; it does not protect an engineer's design work from legitimate review commissioned by the client who owns that work. The Owner, as the commissioning party for both the original design and the peer review, has not violated Engineer A's confidentiality by authorizing Engineer B to review Engineer A's plans — the Owner is the client whose consent is required, and the Owner has given that consent. Engineer A's confidentiality interest in the design work runs to the Owner, not against the Owner. The public safety predicate — confirmed design errors in the first tower creating risk of replication in the second — does not need to override confidentiality because confidentiality is not properly invoked as a barrier to Owner-authorized peer review. The public welfare paramount principle operates independently to ensure that even if confidentiality were somehow implicated, it would yield to the safety imperative.
In response to Q203: The professional dignity principle protecting Engineer A from covert or disrespectful review under III.1.f does not survive intact once the notification requirement has been satisfied. Engineer A's dignity interest is protected by the notification obligation — the requirement that Engineer A be informed of the review before it proceeds. Once notification has occurred, Engineer A's dignity-based objection to the manner of the review is substantially addressed. The existence of prior design errors does not extinguish Engineer A's dignity interests entirely, but it does significantly constrain the weight those interests can carry against the public safety imperative. An engineer who has produced work containing significant design errors and who is now designing a related structure for the same client has a diminished claim to object to professional scrutiny of that subsequent work on dignity grounds. The dignity principle protects engineers from arbitrary, malicious, or procedurally unfair review — it does not protect engineers from legitimate, Owner-authorized, properly notified review of work that has already demonstrated quality concerns. Engineer A's refusal to consent, framed as a dignity objection, is therefore not ethically sustainable under the Code.
In response to Q204: The conflict between Engineer A's error acknowledgment and corrective disclosure obligation under III.1.a and the client loyalty principle under I.4 is resolved by the same hierarchical logic that resolves Engineer B's faithful agent tension. Client loyalty, like faithful agency, operates within ethical limits. III.1.a imposes an unconditional obligation to acknowledge errors — the provision contains no exception for situations where disclosure might damage the client relationship or expose the engineer to professional consequences. Engineer A's obligation to acknowledge the first-tower design errors to the Owner arose independently of the peer review and was not contingent on the Owner's demand for disclosure. The client loyalty principle cannot be invoked to justify concealing material design errors from the very client whose project is affected by those errors, because doing so would harm rather than serve the client's genuine interests. The Board's failure to address this tension explicitly leaves open the question of whether Engineer A's non-disclosure prior to the peer review was itself an independent ethical violation — and the answer, under a straightforward reading of III.1.a, is that it was.
In response to Q301: From a deontological perspective, Engineer B's duty to notify Engineer A of the peer review is unconditional and derives from both professional courtesy norms and public safety obligations, though the two grounds operate differently. The professional courtesy ground — rooted in III.7.a and III.1.f — establishes notification as a categorical rule of professional conduct that applies regardless of consequences: engineers do not conduct covert reviews of colleagues' work because doing so violates the dignity and procedural rights of the reviewed engineer as a matter of principle. The public safety ground — rooted in I.1 — establishes notification as instrumentally necessary to ensure that the peer review process functions legitimately and that its findings can be acted upon without procedural taint. A deontological analysis does not require Engineer B to calculate whether covert review would produce better outcomes; it requires Engineer B to recognize that covert review is categorically impermissible as a mode of professional conduct. The Owner's instruction to conduct a covert review is therefore not merely inadvisable — it is a request that Engineer B act in a manner inconsistent with categorical professional duties, and Engineer B's refusal is not a matter of prudential judgment but of ethical obligation.
In response to Q302: From a consequentialist perspective, the demonstrated risk of replicating known design errors in the second tower provides a compelling and sufficient justification for proceeding with peer review over Engineer A's refusal to consent. The consequentialist calculus here is not close: the potential harm from unchecked structural defects in a second tower — which could include structural failure, injury, or death — vastly outweighs the harm to Engineer A from undergoing a professionally conducted, properly notified peer review. The harm of coerced professional review, to the extent it constitutes harm at all, is primarily reputational and professional — it is the discomfort of having one's work scrutinized after a prior error has been confirmed. This harm is not trivial, but it is categorically different in kind and magnitude from the public safety risk posed by potentially defective structural design. A consequentialist analysis would also note that the peer review process, properly conducted with confidentiality protections, minimizes the reputational harm to Engineer A while maximizing the safety benefit to the public. The Board's implicit conclusion that Engineer A may not ethically object is therefore well-supported on consequentialist grounds, and the public safety predicate is not merely a rhetorical device but the central consequentialist justification for overriding Engineer A's refusal.
In response to Q303: From a virtue ethics standpoint, Engineer B's refusal to comply with the Owner's covert review instruction and insistence on notification as a precondition to engagement exemplifies the kind of professional integrity and collegial respect that the NSPE Code envisions. The virtuous engineer is not merely one who follows rules when convenient but one who maintains professional standards even when client pressure creates incentives to deviate. Engineer B's conduct — identifying the ethical problem with the covert instruction, refusing to proceed on those terms, and conditioning continued engagement on the Owner's agreement to notify Engineer A — demonstrates practical wisdom, professional courage, and genuine respect for a colleague's procedural rights. This conduct is particularly significant because Engineer B had a financial and professional interest in retaining the engagement: refusing the Owner's instruction carried the risk of losing the assignment entirely. The willingness to accept that risk in order to maintain professional standards is precisely the kind of honorable conduct that I.6 envisions when it requires engineers to 'conduct themselves honorably, responsibly, ethically, and lawfully.' Engineer B's refusal is not merely procedurally correct — it is a model of professional virtue in a situation where the easier path was available.
In response to Q304: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A's prior acknowledgment obligation under III.1.a independently compels cooperation with the peer review, such that refusal constitutes a categorical ethical violation irrespective of outcomes. The reasoning proceeds as follows: Engineer A has already produced work containing significant design errors. III.1.a requires Engineer A to acknowledge those errors. Cooperation with a legitimately commissioned peer review of related subsequent work is the concrete professional mechanism through which that acknowledgment obligation is discharged in the context of ongoing design work for the same client. Refusing to cooperate with the peer review is therefore not merely a separate ethical violation — it is a continuation and compounding of the original failure to acknowledge errors, now extended to obstruct the process by which those errors and their potential replication might be identified and corrected. The deontological force of this conclusion does not depend on whether the peer review will actually find errors in the second tower: the obligation to cooperate derives from the prior error and the acknowledgment duty, not from the anticipated findings. Engineer A's refusal is therefore not merely imprudent or consequentially harmful — it is a categorical violation of the duty to acknowledge errors and not obstruct legitimate professional accountability processes.
In response to Q401: If Engineer B had complied with the Owner's initial instruction and conducted the peer review covertly without notifying Engineer A, the findings would have been ethically compromised and their usability by the Owner would have been seriously impaired. The procedural violation — conducting a review without the required notification — taints the process regardless of the substantive accuracy of the findings. From an ethical standpoint, the Owner could not rely on those findings to take adverse action against Engineer A without exposing both the Owner and Engineer B to legitimate professional and potentially legal challenge based on the procedural defect. Engineer B would have incurred professional liability for the violation of III.7.a independent of whether the review uncovered genuine safety defects. The discovery of real safety defects would not retroactively cure the procedural violation; it would instead create a secondary dilemma in which Engineer B possessed safety-critical information obtained through an ethically impermissible process. In that scenario, Engineer B's public safety obligation under I.1 would likely require disclosure of the safety findings despite the procedural taint, but Engineer B would simultaneously face professional accountability for the manner in which those findings were obtained. The covert review path therefore creates a no-win scenario for Engineer B that the proper notification path entirely avoids.
In response to Q402: Had no design errors been discovered in the first tower, the ethical calculus for overriding Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review would have been materially different, and the Board's conclusion that Engineer A may not ethically object would have required substantially more justification. The public safety predicate — confirmed errors in the first tower creating risk of replication in the second — is doing significant work in the Board's analysis. Without that predicate, Engineer A's refusal to consent would have been a closer ethical question. The Owner's right to commission peer review of work being performed for the Owner's benefit is not contingent on prior errors having been found, but the ethical weight of Engineer A's objection would have been considerably greater in the absence of a demonstrated quality concern. In that scenario, the peer review would have appeared more like an expression of Owner distrust than a response to identified risk, and Engineer A's dignity and professional autonomy interests would have carried more weight against the non-obstruction principle. The Board's conclusion that Engineer A may not ethically object is therefore most defensible as a public-safety-predicated conclusion, and its application to peer reviews lacking that predicate would require independent justification grounded in the Owner's general right to quality assurance rather than in the specific safety imperative present in this case.
In response to Q403: If the Owner had chosen to terminate Engineer A from the project rather than notify them of the peer review, Engineer B's notification obligation would not have been fully discharged by that termination. The notification obligation under III.7.a exists to protect the reviewed engineer's professional interests and dignity — it is not merely a procedural formality that can be satisfied by eliminating the engineer's role in the project. Termination of Engineer A would have changed the factual circumstances of the review but would not have addressed the underlying professional courtesy norm that notification is designed to serve. Moreover, a termination motivated primarily by the desire to avoid the notification obligation would itself raise independent ethical concerns: it would constitute a use of the Owner's contractual power to circumvent a professional norm, and Engineer B's awareness of that motivation would implicate Engineer B's own obligation not to participate in arrangements that undermine professional standards. The termination path would also raise the question of whether Engineer B, now reviewing the work of a terminated engineer who had no opportunity to respond or participate, was conducting a fair and professionally legitimate review — a question that bears directly on the integrity of the peer review process itself and on Engineer B's obligations under I.6.
In response to Q404: If Engineer A had proactively disclosed the first-tower design errors to the Owner before the peer review was commissioned, that voluntary disclosure would have materially improved Engineer A's ethical standing but would not have extinguished the Owner's right to commission peer review of the second tower. The voluntary disclosure would have demonstrated compliance with III.1.a's acknowledgment obligation and would have shown good faith professional accountability — factors that would weigh significantly in Engineer A's favor in any assessment of Engineer A's overall professional conduct. However, the Owner's right to commission peer review of ongoing design work is not contingent on whether the original engineer has acknowledged prior errors; it derives from the Owner's legitimate interest in quality assurance for work being performed on the Owner's behalf. The public safety imperative — the risk that errors might be replicated in the second tower — would have independently sustained the Owner's right to commission the review regardless of Engineer A's prior disclosure. What the voluntary disclosure would have changed is the ethical weight of Engineer A's potential objection to the review: an Engineer A who had proactively acknowledged errors would have had a stronger claim to professional good faith, making any subsequent refusal to cooperate with peer review appear more as a procedural objection than as an attempt to conceal ongoing problems. Even so, that stronger claim would not have been sufficient to override the Owner's right to peer review given the confirmed safety predicate.
The tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation and the Peer Review Notification Obligation was resolved by treating professional courtesy and transparency as threshold conditions that define the outer boundary of legitimate client service, not as competing values to be balanced against client instructions. When the Owner instructed Engineer B to conduct a covert review, Engineer B's refusal was not a breach of client loyalty but rather a recognition that the Faithful Agent Obligation operates only 'within ethical limits.' The case teaches that client instructions which require an engineer to violate a peer professional's right to notification are categorically outside the scope of faithful agency — the obligation to serve the client simply does not extend to procedurally improper conduct. Engineer B's ethical path was therefore not a compromise between two equal duties but a sequential gate: notification compliance was a precondition to any legitimate engagement, not a factor to be weighed against the Owner's preference for secrecy.
The tension between the Public Welfare Paramount principle and the Confidentiality Principle was resolved asymmetrically and conditionally: confidentiality protects the content of peer review proceedings once properly initiated, but it does not shield the existence of a peer review from the engineer whose work is being reviewed. The case establishes a two-stage confidentiality architecture. In the first stage — the decision to commission and conduct a peer review — transparency is mandatory and confidentiality yields entirely to the professional dignity and notification rights of the reviewed engineer. In the second stage — the conduct and findings of the review itself — confidentiality is restored as a mechanism that actually facilitates cooperation, because Engineer A's willingness to engage is conditioned on assurance that findings will not be weaponized beyond the immediate safety purpose. This sequencing reveals that Public Welfare Paramount does not simply override confidentiality; rather, it restructures when and how confidentiality applies, using it instrumentally to achieve the safety outcome rather than treating it as an obstacle. The precedent from BER Case 96-8 reinforces this by showing that even within a confidential peer review framework, safety code violations can trigger escalation obligations, confirming that public welfare sets the ceiling above which no confidentiality norm can reach.
The tension between the Professional Dignity principle protecting Engineer A from covert or disrespectful review and the Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review principle barring Engineer A from blocking the review was resolved by making dignity-protection procedurally contingent rather than substantively absolute. Engineer A's dignity interest was fully honored at the notification stage — the requirement that Engineer A be informed before any review proceeds is precisely the mechanism by which professional respect is operationalized. However, once notification occurred and the public safety predicate was established through the confirmed design errors in the first tower, Engineer A's dignity-based objections to the review itself were extinguished. The case teaches that professional dignity is a procedural entitlement, not a substantive veto. The Error Acknowledgment and Corrective Disclosure Obligation further erodes Engineer A's standing to object: an engineer who has produced significant design errors and has not proactively disclosed them cannot invoke professional dignity to prevent the very review mechanism designed to protect the public from those errors. The prior errors do not merely weaken Engineer A's dignity claim — they affirmatively activate a competing obligation that runs in the opposite direction, requiring facilitation rather than obstruction of the review. This interaction between the dignity principle and the error acknowledgment obligation reveals that professional dignity in the NSPE framework is not a shield against accountability but a guarantee of fair process within an accountability structure.
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation Invoked In BER 96-8 Precedent
Engineer B BER 96-8 Reviewed Firm's potential safety code violations
Contractual obligations of peer reviewer
In BER Case 96-8, Engineer A as peer reviewer discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work despite having contractually agreed to confidentiality, and was required to follow a sequential escalation process: first discuss with Engineer B, then warn of intent to report, then report to appropriate authorities if unresolved
Contractual confidentiality in peer review programs cannot override the public welfare obligation to disclose genuine safety violations, but the disclosure must follow a procedurally appropriate sequence that respects the reviewed engineer's opportunity to respond
Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Program Participant
Confidentiality-Bounded Public Safety Escalation in Peer Review
Engineer A had an obligation to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in order to seek clarification and resolution. That could range from a joint determination that there no violation of code requirements, that the violations were de minimis and did not threaten public health, safety, and welfare, or that there were violations and that the violations did threaten public, health, safety, and welfare but that Engineer B refused to make adjustments.
Public welfare paramount overrides contractual confidentiality when safety violations are confirmed and cannot be resolved through direct engagement; procedural sequence protects reviewed engineer's dignity while ensuring public protection
Engineer A contractually agreed not to disclose confidential information acquired in the review.
if Engineers A and B were unable to successfully resolve Engineer A's concerns, Engineer A had an obligation to first advise Engineer B that Engineer A had an obligation to inform the appropriate authorities, and then to so inform the appropriate authorities.
Confidentiality Principle Invoked As Enabling Mechanism for Peer Review Cooperation
Peer review confidentiality agreement structures in design-build contexts
Peer Review Notification and Consent Obligation
The discussion notes that confidentiality agreements in peer review contexts — requiring the reviewer to keep results confidential or giving the reviewed engineer an opportunity to explain design decisions — encourage the reviewed firm to cooperate fully, build trust, and support a collegial atmosphere, illustrating how confidentiality obligations can serve as an enabling condition for effective peer review rather than an obstacle to it
Confidentiality in peer review is not merely a protection for the reviewer but a mechanism that facilitates the reviewed engineer's cooperation by reducing reputational risk, thereby serving the quality assurance purpose of the review
Such confidentiality agreements encourage the firm being reviewed to cooperate fully, build trust, and support a collegial atmosphere.
Confidentiality and transparency are balanced by requiring notification to the reviewed engineer while protecting review findings from broader disclosure, enabling cooperation without public exposure
Frequently that disclosure is accompanied by an agreement that the client will require the peer reviewer to keep the results of the peer review confidential or, at the very least, the original designer will be provided with an opportunity to explain (and defend) the design decisions.
Covert Peer Review Instruction Resolved by Owner Notification
From Owner's initial covert instruction through Owner's reluctant agreement to notify Engineer A
Engineer B was completely correct in declining an assignment to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's work subject to an instruction not to disclose the peer review to Engineer A.
Owner's initial instruction to Engineer B to conduct peer review without notifying Engineer A
Owner's reluctant agreement to advise Engineer A of the planned peer review
Owner's instruction to Engineer B to conduct peer review without Engineer A's knowledge
Must Engineer B refuse to conduct the peer review without first ensuring Engineer A is notified of the planned review, and must Engineer B decline the engagement entirely if the Owner insists on covert review?
Engineer B is retained by the Owner to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs, but the Owner instructs Engineer B to conduct the review covertly without notifying Engineer A. Engineer B objects to the covert instruction. This decision point addresses whether Engineer B must ensure Engineer A is notified before commencing the review, and whether Engineer B must refuse the engagement entirely if the Owner does not agree to notify Engineer A.
Refuse to conduct the peer review without first notifying Engineer A, condition acceptance of the engagement on the Owner's agreement to notify Engineer A before any review activity commences, and verify that notification has actually occurred before proceeding
Accept the covert peer review assignment as instructed by the Owner and conduct the review of Engineer A's second tower designs without notifying Engineer A
Should Engineer B refuse to conduct a covert peer review and independently ensure that Engineer A is notified of the planned review before any engagement proceeds?
Engineer B's obligation to refuse covert peer review and ensure Engineer A is notified before commencing any review of Engineer A's work on the second tower
Refuse to conduct the peer review covertly, condition engagement on Owner notifying Engineer A, and verify that notification has occurred before commencing any review activity
Accept the Owner's covert review instruction and proceed with the peer review without notifying Engineer A, relying on the Owner's authority to define the engagement scope
Should Engineer A cooperate with and actively facilitate the peer review of the second tower plans rather than refuse consent, given the known design errors in the first tower and the public safety risk of replication?
Engineer A's obligation to cooperate with the peer review of the second tower plans and refrain from obstructing a legitimately commissioned review, given known design errors in the first tower
Refuse to consent to the peer review of the second tower plans and decline to cooperate with Engineer B's review process
Cooperate with and actively facilitate the peer review of the second tower plans, providing Engineer B access to the relevant design documents and refraining from obstructing the review process
Should Engineer A proactively disclose the known design errors in the first tower to the Owner and, where safety code violations are implicated, escalate to relevant authorities, independent of and prior to any peer review process?
Engineer A's independent affirmative obligation to disclose known design errors in the first tower to the Owner and, if safety code violations are confirmed, to escalate to relevant authorities — obligations that exist prior to and independent of any peer review being commissioned
Proactively disclose the known first-tower design errors to the Owner immediately upon awareness, facilitate the peer review of the second tower, and escalate to relevant authorities if safety code violations are confirmed and the Owner fails to act
Withhold disclosure of the first-tower design errors from the Owner, refuse consent to the peer review, and rely on internal corrective redesign without formal notification to the Owner or relevant authorities
Should Engineer A acknowledge the known design errors and cooperate with the peer review of the second tower, or refuse consent and obstruct the review process?
Engineer A's obligation to acknowledge known design errors in the first tower and cooperate with peer review of the second tower, given the public safety predicate established by those prior errors and the independent error acknowledgment duty under III.1.a.
Refuse consent to peer review and withhold cooperation from the review process
Acknowledge the known design errors to the Owner, cooperate with the peer review of the second tower, and actively facilitate the review process
Must Engineer A cooperate with and refrain from obstructing the Owner's legitimately commissioned peer review of the second tower designs, particularly given that significant design errors were already discovered in Engineer A's first tower work?
After being notified that a peer review of the second tower designs has been commissioned — following the discovery of significant design errors in Engineer A's first tower work — Engineer A objects and refuses to consent to the peer review. This decision point addresses whether Engineer A may ethically refuse to cooperate with the legitimately commissioned peer review, and whether Engineer A's prior design errors independently compel facilitation of the review as a matter of professional accountability and public safety.
Refuse to consent to the peer review of the second tower designs and actively obstruct Engineer B's ability to conduct the review
Cooperate fully with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs, provide access to relevant design documents, and refrain from obstructing the Owner's legitimate quality assurance measure
Engineer A Non-Obstruction Peer Review Obligation Instance
Is the Owner obligated to ensure that the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs is conducted through procedurally fair means, including notifying Engineer A before the review commences, rather than instructing Engineer B to conduct the review covertly?
The Owner instructs Engineer B to conduct the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs without letting Engineer A know, thereby directing a covert peer review process. This decision point addresses whether the Owner bears an independent obligation to ensure the peer review is conducted through procedurally fair means — including notifying Engineer A before the review commences — and whether the Owner's instruction to conduct a covert review itself constitutes an ethical violation of the procedural fairness duty owed to Engineer A as a licensed professional whose reputation and livelihood are implicated.
Instruct Engineer B to conduct the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs covertly without notifying Engineer A that the review is being conducted
Notify Engineer A that a peer review of the second tower designs has been commissioned before Engineer B commences any review activity, ensuring the review proceeds through procedurally fair means consistent with III.7.a
Should Engineer B refuse the Owner's instruction to conduct a covert peer review and independently ensure Engineer A is notified as a precondition to engagement?
Engineer B Faithful Agent vs. Peer Review Notification Obligation: Whether Engineer B must refuse the Owner's covert review instruction and independently ensure Engineer A is notified before commencing any peer review activity
Refuse the covert review instruction, condition engagement on Owner's agreement to notify Engineer A, and verify that notification has actually occurred before commencing any peer review activity
Accept the Owner's covert review instruction and proceed with peer review of Engineer A's plans without notifying Engineer A
Should Engineer A cooperate with and actively facilitate the peer review of the second tower plans rather than refuse consent, given the confirmed design errors in the first tower and the public safety implications?
Engineer A Non-Obstruction and Post-Error Peer Review Facilitation: Whether Engineer A must cooperate with and actively facilitate the peer review of the second tower plans given confirmed design errors in the first tower
Refuse consent to the peer review of the second tower plans and decline to cooperate with Engineer B's review process
Cooperate with and actively facilitate the peer review of the second tower plans, providing Engineer B access to the plans and relevant design information
Should Engineer A proactively disclose the known design errors in the first tower to the Owner as an independent, self-executing obligation arising at the moment of awareness, irrespective of whether a peer review has been commissioned or the Owner has demanded disclosure?
Engineer A Error Acknowledgment and Independent Disclosure Obligation: Whether Engineer A must proactively disclose the known first-tower design errors to the Owner independently of and prior to any peer review, and whether that obligation is self-executing upon Engineer A's own awareness
Proactively disclose the known first-tower design errors to the Owner upon awareness, before any peer review is commissioned and without waiting for the Owner to demand disclosure
Withhold disclosure of the first-tower design errors from the Owner and continue designing the second tower without informing the Owner of the known defects
Should Engineer B refuse the Owner's instruction to conduct a covert peer review and independently ensure that Engineer A is notified before commencing any review activity?
Engineer B's obligation to refuse covert peer review and ensure Engineer A is notified before commencing any review activity, resolving the tension between the Faithful Agent Obligation and the Peer Review Notification Obligation.
Refuse the covert review instruction, condition engagement on Owner's agreement to notify Engineer A, and verify that notification has actually occurred before commencing any review activity
Accept the Owner's covert review instruction and proceed with peer review without notifying Engineer A, treating client loyalty as the overriding obligation
Should Engineer A cooperate with and refrain from obstructing the Owner-commissioned peer review of the second tower plans, given the confirmed design errors in the first tower and the public safety risk of replication?
Engineer A's obligation to cooperate with the legitimately commissioned peer review of the second tower plans and to refrain from obstructing that review, given prior design errors in the first tower and the activated public safety imperative.
Refuse to consent to the peer review of the second tower plans and obstruct the review process
Cooperate with and actively facilitate the Owner-commissioned peer review of the second tower plans, consistent with the error acknowledgment obligation and public safety imperative
Should Engineer B treat the peer review confidentiality framework as bounded by an independent public safety escalation obligation, such that Engineer B must report confirmed structural defects to public authorities if the Owner suppresses or declines to act on the findings?
Engineer B's obligation to escalate known design defects to public authorities if the Owner declines to act on peer review findings, resolving the tension between peer review confidentiality and the paramount public safety duty.
Treat the peer review confidentiality obligation as absolute and refrain from escalating findings to public authorities even if the Owner declines to act on confirmed structural defects
Recognize the peer review confidentiality framework as bounded by the public safety paramount obligation and escalate confirmed structural defects to relevant public authorities if the Owner suppresses or fails to act on the findings
Design Errors Discovered (Event 1) → Tower Two Plans Implicated (Event 2)
Engineer A BER 18-10 Post-Review Design-Build Conflict Assessment Instance
Post-Review Design-Build Conflict Assessment Capability
In the BER Case 18-10 precedent, Engineer A's firm demonstrated the capability to assess whether participation in a design-build joint venture following a prior independent review role was ethically permissible, correctly identifying the conditions (agency approval, state law compliance) that resolved the conditional conflict
BER Case 18-10: Engineer A served as lead engineer on independent external review; approximately one year later was invited to participate in design-build joint venture for the same project
Engineer A's firm's assessment that design-build participation was permissible subject to agency approval and compliance with applicable state conflict-of-interest laws
In BER Case 18-10, Engineer A was the lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency-prepared project.
In Case 18-10, the Board concluded that, so long as the agency approves and the work complies with applicable state laws and regulations regarding conflicts of interest, it would not be unethical for Engineer A's firm to participate in a design-build joint venture submitting a proposal for the project.
Engineer A BER 18-10 Post-Review Design-Build Conflict Clearance Instance
BER Case 18-10 referenced as precedent establishing that prior review participation creates a conditional constraint on subsequent design-build participation requiring agency approval and statutory compliance verification
Engineer A's firm (BER Case 18-10 context)
Post-Review Design-Build Participation Conflict Clearance Constraint
Engineer A's firm was constrained from participating in the design-build joint venture for the project without first obtaining agency approval and verifying compliance with applicable state conflict-of-interest laws, given the firm's prior role conducting an independent external review of the agency-prepared project.
BER Case 18-10; applicable state conflict-of-interest statutes; NSPE Code of Ethics
in BER Case 18-10, Engineer A was the lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency-prepared project.
At the time of invitation to join design-build RFP joint venture, approximately one year after prior review
the Board concluded that, so long as the agency approves and the work complies with applicable state laws and regulations regarding conflicts of interest, it would not be unethical for Engineer A's firm to participate in a design-build joint venture submitting a proposal for the project.
Engineer A BER 18-10 Post-Review Design-Build Participant
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Independent external review and subsequent design-build participation', 'ethical_status': 'Not unethical subject to agency approval and conflict-of-interest law compliance', 'case_reference': 'BER Case 18-10'}
In BER Case 18-10 precedent, Engineer A served as lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency project and subsequently participated in a design-build joint venture RFP for the same project; BER concluded participation was not unethical provided agency approval and legal compliance.
{'type': 'joint_venture_proposer_for', 'target': 'Agency Design-Build RFP'}
{'type': 'prior_reviewer_of', 'target': 'Agency Project'}
Engineer A was the lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency-prepared project
Engineer A's firm is invited to be part of a joint venture responding to a design-build RFP for the project
it would not be unethical for Engineer A's firm to participate in a design-build joint venture submitting a proposal for the project
Engineer A BER 18-10 Post-Review Design-Build Participation Conditional
BER Case 18-10 precedent: Engineer A was lead engineer on an independent external review of an agency project; approximately one year later, Engineer A's firm was invited to participate in a design-build joint venture responding to an RFP for the same project.
Post-Review Design-Build Participation Conditional Ethics Obligation
Engineer A's firm was obligated to obtain agency approval and verify compliance with applicable state conflict-of-interest laws before participating in a design-build joint venture for a project Engineer A had previously reviewed as lead engineer on an independent external review.
Before submitting a design-build proposal for the project previously reviewed
Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Confidentiality Framework Navigation Instance
Peer Review Confidentiality Framework Navigation Capability
In the BER Case 96-8 precedent, Engineer A demonstrated the capability to navigate the tension between contractual confidentiality obligations and mandatory safety disclosure requirements, correctly identifying that safety code violations override confidentiality commitments
BER Case 96-8: Engineer A had contractually agreed to confidentiality but correctly determined that safety code violations required escalation beyond the confidentiality boundary
Engineer A's recognition that the contractual confidentiality agreement did not prevent disclosure of safety code violations to appropriate authorities when Engineer B refused to make corrections
Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override Instance
BER Case 96-8 referenced as precedent establishing that confidentiality agreements in peer review programs do not extinguish the reviewer's obligation to report discovered safety code violations threatening public welfare
Engineer A (as peer reviewer in BER Case 96-8 context)
Peer Review Confidentiality Safety Override Constraint
Engineer A, serving as peer reviewer under a confidentiality agreement in an organized peer review program, was constrained from remaining silent about discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work — the confidentiality obligation could not override the paramount duty to protect public health, safety, and welfare, requiring graduated escalation from direct discussion to authority notification.
BER Case 96-8; NSPE Code of Ethics public safety paramount provisions
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during confidential peer review
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Organized peer review program participation', 'ethical_status': 'Obligated to discuss concerns with reviewed engineer and report unresolved safety violations to authorities', 'case_reference': 'BER Case 96-8'}
In BER Case 96-8 precedent, Engineer A served as a peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, contractually agreed to confidentiality, was assigned to review Engineer B's firm work across multiple projects, discovered potential safety code violations, and bore obligations to discuss with Engineer B and report to authorities if unresolved.
{'type': 'confidentiality_agreement_with', 'target': 'Peer Review Program'}
{'type': 'reporting_obligation_to', 'target': 'Appropriate Authorities'}
{'type': 'reviews_work_of', 'target': 'Engineer B BER 96-8 Reviewed Firm'}
Engineer A was a peer reviewer serving as part of an organized peer-review program
Engineer A had an obligation to first advise Engineer B that Engineer A had an obligation to inform the appropriate authorities
Engineer A had an obligation to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in order to seek clarification and resolution
When selected as a reviewer for the program, Engineer A contractually agreed not to disclose confidential information acquired in the review
Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Safety Code Violation Escalation
BER Case 96-8 precedent: Engineer A was a peer reviewer in an organized program who contractually agreed to confidentiality; discovered Engineer B's work may violate state and local safety codes placing public health, safety, and welfare at risk.
Peer Review Safety Code Violation Escalation Obligation
Engineer A, serving as peer reviewer in an organized peer review program, was obligated upon discovering potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work to immediately discuss the concerns with Engineer B to seek clarification and resolution, and if unresolved, to advise Engineer B of the obligation to inform appropriate authorities before doing so, notwithstanding the contractual confidentiality agreement.
Upon discovery of potential safety code violations during the peer review
Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Safety Escalation Sequencing Instance
Peer Review Safety Escalation Sequencing Capability
In the BER Case 96-8 precedent, Engineer A demonstrated the capability to correctly sequence safety escalation steps upon discovering potential safety code violations during a confidential peer review — first discussing with Engineer B, then advising of intent to report, then reporting to authorities
BER Case 96-8 precedent: Engineer A serving as peer reviewer under confidentiality agreement discovered potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work and followed the correct graduated escalation sequence
Engineer A's graduated escalation approach in BER 96-8: collegial discussion first, advance notice of reporting intent, then actual reporting to appropriate authorities
The BER concluded that Engineer A had an obligation to immediately discuss these issues with Engineer B in order to seek clarification and resolution.
Engineer A Client Interest Alignment Peer Review Cooperation Second Tower
Owner commissioned peer review of second tower designs after discovering significant design errors in first tower; Engineer A refused to cooperate, contrary to the client's legitimate quality assurance interest.
Client Interest Alignment Peer Review Cooperation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to cooperate fully with Engineer B's peer review as an expression of the faithful agent duty to act in the best interests of the Owner client, who had a legitimate interest in quality assurance following discovery of design errors in the first tower.
Engineers must take responsibility for their actions, must acknowledge their errors, must act in the best interests of their clients, and must at all times hold paramount the health, welfare, and safety of the public.
Upon notification of the planned peer review and throughout the peer review process
Each of those requirements strongly indicates that Engineer A should participate fully and cooperatively in Engineer B's peer review.
The known design defects in the first tower simply makes each of those requirements more urgent.
Engineer A Consent Refusal Override Constraint Instance
Engineer A refused to consent to peer review after being notified, placing Owner in the position of choosing among difficult options including proceeding over Engineer A's objection
Reviewed Engineer Consent Refusal Override Constraint
Engineer A's refusal to consent to the peer review of the second tower plans did not constitute an absolute veto over the legitimately commissioned review, particularly given the confirmed significant design errors in the first tower plans, and Engineer A was constrained from treating consent refusal as a complete bar to the peer review proceeding.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Public safety paramount obligation; BER case precedent on peer review
When Owner reluctantly consents to notifying Engineer A, Engineer A objects and refused to consent to the peer review.
Following Engineer A's notification of the peer review and through the peer review process
Engineer A Creates Flawed Plans (Action 1) → Design Errors Discovered (Event 1)
Engineer A Design Error Triggering Peer Review Obligation
From discovery of design defects in first tower through completion of peer review and remediation
Design Error Discovered in Completed Work State
Known design defects in Engineer A's first tower work, providing factual predicate for peer review of second tower
Successful peer review, error acknowledgment, and remediation
Identification of significant design defects in Engineer A's completed first tower work
Engineer A Error Acknowledgment Obligation Instance
Significant design errors were discovered in Engineer A's plans and designs during construction of the first tower; Engineer A subsequently refused to consent to peer review of the second tower designs.
Engineer A was obligated to acknowledge the significant design errors discovered in the first tower plans and designs, and to take affirmative steps to address those errors rather than resisting quality assurance measures such as the peer review of the second tower.
As the first tower is built, several significant design errors are discovered in the plans and design of Engineer A.
Upon discovery of significant design errors during construction of the first tower
Engineer A Error Acknowledgment Obligation Recognition Deficit Instance
Error Acknowledgment Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A failed to demonstrate the capability to recognize that the significant design errors discovered in the first tower created an affirmative obligation to acknowledge those errors and facilitate — rather than obstruct — independent review of the second tower designs.
Engineer A's conduct following discovery of first tower design errors demonstrated failure to recognize error acknowledgment and peer review facilitation obligations.
Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review rather than acknowledging errors and supporting quality assurance for the second tower.
several significant design errors are discovered in the plans and design of Engineer A
Engineer A objects and refused to consent to the peer review.
Engineer A Error Acknowledgment Obligation Recognition Peer Review Instance
Engineer A was required to recognize that the significant design errors discovered in the first tower created an affirmative obligation to acknowledge those errors and to cooperate with the peer review process for the second tower, rather than obstructing independent review
Significant design errors were discovered during construction of the first tower; Engineer A was obligated to acknowledge these errors and facilitate rather than obstruct review of the second tower designs
The Board's finding that Engineer A's refusal to cooperate was unethical given the known design defects establishes this as a required capability
Engineer A Error Acknowledgment Responsibility Acceptance Second Tower
Significant design errors were discovered during construction of the first tower; Engineer A's professional accountability obligations required acknowledgment of those errors and cooperation with quality assurance measures for the second tower.
Engineer A was obligated to take responsibility for the design errors discovered in the first tower and to acknowledge those errors as part of the professional accountability that also required cooperation with the peer review of the second tower designs.
Upon discovery of design errors in the first tower and throughout the peer review process for the second tower
Engineer A Non-Cooperation with Peer Review
From Owner's notification to Engineer A of planned peer review through Engineer A's decision to cooperate or refuse
Public affected by potentially defective designs
the Board concludes that it would be unethical for Engineer A to fail to cooperate.
Engineer A's potential refusal to cooperate with Engineer B's peer review of Engineer A's work
Engineer A's agreement to cooperate fully, or Owner's decision to proceed without Engineer A
Engineer A's potential refusal to consent to and cooperate with peer review, compounded by known design defects in first tower
Engineer A Non-Obstruction Peer Review Ethical Constraint Instance
Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review, in the context of confirmed prior design errors, risked creating a false impression that the second tower plans were beyond legitimate professional scrutiny
Engineer A was constrained from using consent refusal as a mechanism to prevent legitimate scrutiny of the second tower plans in a manner that would create a misleading impression of the adequacy of those plans, given the known significant errors in the first tower work.
NSPE Code of Ethics Non-Deception provisions; Ethics code provisions prohibiting deceptive conduct
Following notification of the peer review through the peer review process
Several significant design errors are discovered in the plans and design of Engineer A.
Owner commissioned a peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs after significant errors were found in the first tower; Engineer A refused to consent to the peer review even after being properly notified.
Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from refusing consent to the legitimately commissioned peer review of the second tower designs, particularly given that significant design errors had already been discovered in the first tower, and to cooperate with the Owner's reasonable quality assurance measure.
Upon being notified by the Owner that a peer review of the second tower designs had been commissioned
Engineer A Non-Obstruction Peer Review Precedent Reasoning Deficit Instance
Precedent-Based Ethical Reasoning Capability
Engineer A failed to apply precedent-based ethical reasoning — including BER Case 96-8 and BER Case 18-10 — that would have informed the recognition that refusing consent to a legitimately commissioned peer review following known design errors constitutes an impermissible obstruction of professional quality assurance.
Engineer A's conduct was inconsistent with established BER precedent on peer review ethics, suggesting failure to apply relevant precedent-based reasoning.
Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review, which is inconsistent with established BER precedent on peer review obligations and professional accountability.
Engineer A Non-Obstruction Peer Review Second Tower Refusal
Following discovery of significant design errors in the first tower, Owner commissioned Engineer B to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs; Engineer A refused to consent and cooperate with the peer review.
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from refusing consent to and cooperation with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs, recognizing that the discovery of significant design errors in the first tower created a heightened public safety interest in independent verification and that refusal constituted a failure of professional accountability.
the Board concludes that it would be unethical for Engineer A to fail to cooperate
Upon notification of the planned peer review of the second tower designs
If Engineer A refused to consent and cooperate, Owner would be then face with three options: to move forward with the peer review conducted under difficult and limiting circumstances, to move forward without the peer review . . . or to move forward without Engineer A.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Building structural or architectural design', 'conduct': 'Objected to and refused consent for peer review'}
Prepared original plans and designs for both towers; significant design errors were discovered during construction of the first tower; refused to consent to peer review of second tower designs
{'type': 'original_designer', 'target': 'Tower One and Tower Two designs'}
{'type': 'peer_subject', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
Original Design Engineer Subject to Peer Review
Engineer A Original Designer Peer Review Subject
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Original project design', 'ethical_status': 'Obligated to cooperate; refusal would be unethical'}
Original designer of the project whose work contains known design defects and who is subject to a peer review initiated by the Owner; initially the subject of an instruction to keep the review confidential from them, but ultimately notified; bears ethical obligation to cooperate fully with Engineer B's peer review.
{'type': 'peer_reviewed_by', 'target': 'Engineer B Peer Reviewer'}
{'type': 'subject_of_review', 'target': 'Peer Review Process'}
it would be unethical for Engineer A to fail to cooperate
Engineer A should participate fully and cooperatively in Engineer B's peer review
If Engineer A refused to consent and cooperate, Owner would be then face with three options
The known design defects in the first tower simply makes each of those requirements more urgent
Engineer A Peer Review Consent Refusal Recognition Deficit Instance
Peer Review Consent Refusal Recognition Capability
Engineer A failed to demonstrate the capability to recognize that refusing consent to a legitimately commissioned peer review — particularly in the context of known significant design errors in the first tower — constituted an ethically impermissible obstruction of the Owner's quality assurance process.
After being notified of the peer review, Engineer A refused consent, demonstrating failure to recognize the obligation to facilitate rather than obstruct independent review of deficient work.
Engineer A's refusal to consent to the peer review of the second tower designs despite known significant errors in the first tower designs.
Engineer A Peer Review Cooperation Obligation Recognition Capability Instance
Peer Review Cooperation Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A was required to recognize that multiple independent professional obligations — responsibility for actions, error acknowledgment, client interest, and public safety paramountcy — converged to create an obligation to cooperate fully with Engineer B's peer review, with the known first tower defects making this obligation more urgent
Engineer A refused peer review cooperation despite known design defects in first tower; Board identified four independent obligations each requiring cooperation
Engineer A's failure to exercise this capability is evidenced by the initial refusal to consent; the Board's analysis establishes the capability as the normative standard required
Engineer A Post-Error Peer Review Facilitation Obligation Instance
Significant design errors were discovered in Engineer A's first tower designs during construction; Owner commissioned peer review of second tower designs as a quality assurance measure; Engineer A refused to consent to the peer review.
Post-Error Peer Review Facilitation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to actively facilitate — or at minimum refrain from obstructing — the Owner's legitimately commissioned peer review of the second tower designs, given that significant design errors had already been discovered in Engineer A's work on the first tower, creating a heightened public safety interest in independent verification of the second tower designs.
Upon discovery of significant errors in the first tower and upon notification of the peer review of the second tower
Owner decides to obtain a peer review of the plans and design of Engineer A for the second tower and retains Engineer B.
Engineer A Post-Error Professional Accountability Acceptance Capability Instance
Post-Error Professional Accountability Acceptance Capability
Engineer A was obligated to demonstrate the capability to accept full professional accountability for the significant design errors in the first tower and to cooperate with the peer review of the second tower designs, though the case facts indicate Engineer A initially refused consent
Engineer A refused to consent to and cooperate with the peer review of second tower designs despite known design defects in the first tower; Board concluded this refusal was unethical
Engineer A's initial refusal to consent to peer review represents a failure to exercise this capability; the Board's conclusion that such refusal was unethical establishes the capability as required
Under the facts, the Board concludes that it would be unethical for Engineer A to fail to cooperate.
Engineer A Post-Error Professional Accountability Acceptance Deficit Instance
Engineer A failed to demonstrate the capability to accept full professional accountability for the significant design errors discovered in the first tower, instead refusing to consent to peer review of the second tower designs rather than facilitating independent quality assurance.
Engineer A's response to the peer review commission demonstrated a failure to accept professional accountability and facilitate corrective quality assurance processes.
Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review following discovery of significant design errors in the first tower, representing a failure of professional accountability acceptance.
Engineer A Precedent-Based Ethical Reasoning Peer Review Instance
In the BER Case 96-8 precedent, Engineer A demonstrated the capability to apply established professional ethics precedent to navigate the novel situation of discovering safety violations during a confidential peer review, drawing on the principle that public safety obligations override confidentiality commitments
BER Case 96-8 precedent: Engineer A applied professional ethics reasoning to navigate the tension between confidentiality obligations and safety disclosure requirements
Engineer A's application of professional ethics principles to determine the correct escalation sequence when safety violations were discovered during a confidential review
In BER Case 96-8, Engineer A was a peer reviewer serving as part of an organized peer-review program.
Engineer A Prior Design Error Peer Review Facilitation Instance Second Tower
Known design defects in first tower made Engineer A's cooperation with peer review of second tower an ethical imperative grounded in multiple independent professional obligations
Prior Design Error Peer Review Facilitation Constraint
Engineer A was constrained from refusing or failing to cooperate with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs, given that confirmed significant design errors in the first tower work created heightened professional accountability obligations requiring full and active cooperation with the legitimately commissioned review.
Throughout the peer review process for the second tower designs
Engineer A Prior Error Peer Review Facilitation Constraint Instance
Significant design errors were discovered in Engineer A's first tower plans; the second tower was a mirror image; Owner commissioned peer review to prevent replication of errors; Engineer A refused consent
Engineer A was constrained from refusing to facilitate or cooperate with the peer review of the second tower plans given the confirmed significant design errors in the first tower plans, as those prior errors created a heightened professional accountability obligation that limited Engineer A's ability to assert consent-based objections to quality assurance review of the mirror-image second tower.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Public safety paramount obligation; Professional accountability norms
From the discovery of significant design errors in the first tower through the peer review of the second tower plans
Owner decides to obtain a peer review of the plans and design of Engineer A for the second tower.
Engineer A Professional Accountability Peer Review Context Instance
Significant design errors were discovered in Engineer A's first tower designs; Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review of the second tower represents a failure to accept professional accountability for prior work.
Professional Accountability Acceptance for Directed Work Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to accept full professional accountability for the significant design errors discovered in the first tower plans and designs, including accepting the Owner's legitimate quality assurance response of commissioning a peer review of the second tower designs, rather than refusing to consent to the peer review as a means of avoiding further scrutiny of professional work product.
Upon discovery of significant design errors and upon notification of the commissioned peer review
Engineer A Public Safety Paramount Peer Review Cooperation Constraint Instance
Public safety risk from potential replication of first tower design errors in second tower provided independent and paramount basis for Engineer A's cooperation obligation beyond client fidelity or professional accountability grounds
Engineer A was constrained by the paramount obligation to hold public health, safety, and welfare above personal or professional interests — including the interest in avoiding scrutiny of prior work — from refusing to cooperate with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs, given the known risk that design errors from the first tower might be replicated in the second.
NSPE Code of Ethics fundamental canon; BER Case analysis
must at all times hold paramount the health, welfare, and safety of the public.
Engineer A Public Safety Paramount Peer Review Cooperation Second Tower
Known design defects in the first tower created heightened public safety interest in independent verification of the second tower designs; Engineer A's refusal to cooperate with peer review placed public safety at risk by impeding quality assurance.
Engineer A was obligated to cooperate fully with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs on the basis of the paramount obligation to hold public health, welfare, and safety above personal or reputational interests, particularly given the known design defects in the first tower that heightened the urgency of independent safety verification.
Engineer A Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Peer Review Instance
Public Welfare Paramountcy Recognition Capability
Engineer A was required to recognize that the paramount obligation to hold public health, safety, and welfare above personal or professional self-interest required cooperation with the peer review of the second tower designs, particularly given known defects in the first tower
Engineer A's refusal to cooperate with peer review of second tower designs, despite known first tower defects, was found unethical on public safety grounds
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A's refusal was unethical on public safety grounds establishes this as a required capability that Engineer A failed to exercise
Engineer A Refusal to Consent to Peer Review
From Engineer A's notification of the peer review through resolution of the consent dispute
Engineer A's explicit refusal to consent to peer review of second tower plans following notification
Not resolved in the presented facts — state persists
Engineer A's notification that Owner has retained Engineer B to conduct peer review
Engineer A Refuses Peer Review Consent (Action 5) → Peer Review Process Blocked (Event 6)
Engineer A Reviewed Engineer Consent Refusal Override Instance Second Tower
Engineer A refused to consent to peer review of second tower plans after being notified; BER analysis establishes that such refusal does not constitute an absolute veto over a legitimately ordered peer review
Engineer A's refusal to consent to the peer review of the second tower designs did not extinguish the Owner's right to commission the review or Engineer B's authority to proceed, particularly given the confirmed significant design errors in the first tower work that created independent public safety justification for the review.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case analysis; BER Case 93-3 precedent
While Professional Obligation III.7.a. does not require the consent of the engineer whose work is being reviewed, it will likely be a fruitless exercise to attempt to conduct a peer review without Engineer A's cooperation.
Following Owner's notification to Engineer A of the planned peer review
Engineer A's independent external review (BER Case 18-10) before Engineer A's firm invitation to design-build joint venture (BER Case 18-10)
Engineer A's review of Engineer B's work (BER Case 96-8) before Engineer A's determination of potential safety code violations (BER Case 96-8)
{'entity_type': 'Engineering firm', 'ethical_status': 'Subject of peer review with potential safety code violations identified', 'case_reference': 'BER Case 96-8'}
In BER Case 96-8 precedent, Engineer B's firm was the subject of peer review by Engineer A under an organized program; Engineer A identified potential safety code violations in Engineer B's work, triggering collegial discussion obligations and potential authority reporting.
{'type': 'potential_code_violation', 'target': 'State and Local Safety Code Requirements'}
{'type': 'reviewed_by', 'target': 'Engineer A BER 96-8 Peer Review Program Participant'}
Engineer A was assigned to review the design work of Engineer B's firm on several projects
Engineer A determined that Engineer B's work may be in violation of state and local safety code requirements, placing the public health, safety, and welfare at risk
Engineer B Collegial Concern Response Peer Review Instance
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to approach the peer review engagement with professional respect for Engineer A's interests — insisting on proper notification — while maintaining commitment to the legitimate quality assurance purpose of the review.
Engineer B balanced the Owner's legitimate commission with professional obligations of fairness and transparency toward Engineer A as a fellow licensed professional.
Engineer B's insistence on notifying Engineer A before proceeding, reflecting professional respect for the reviewed engineer's right to know about the review of their work.
Engineer B objects to conducting the peer review without advising Engineer A.
Engineer B Confidentiality-Bound Peer Reviewer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Independent peer review', 'ethical_status': 'Acted correctly in declining assignment without disclosure to original engineer'}
Peer reviewer retained by Owner to review Engineer A's design work; correctly declined the assignment when initially instructed not to disclose the review to Engineer A; proceeded after Owner agreed to notify Engineer A; bears obligations of thoroughness, objectivity, and public safety reporting.
{'type': 'collegial_obligation_toward', 'target': 'Engineer A Original Designer Peer Review Subject'}
{'type': 'reviews_work_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Original Designer Peer Review Subject'}
Engineer B was completely correct in declining an assignment to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's work subject to an instruction not to disclose the peer review to Engineer A
Owner reluctantly agreed to advise Engineer A of the planned peer review
Engineer B Covert Peer Review Prohibition Instance
Owner instructed Engineer B to conduct a covert peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs without Engineer A's knowledge; Engineer B objected on professional grounds
Covert Peer Review Prohibition Constraint
Engineer B was prohibited from proceeding with the peer review of Engineer A's second tower plans without first notifying Engineer A, regardless of Owner's instruction to conduct the review covertly, arising from NSPE Code Section III.7.a and professional courtesy norms.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7.a; Professional peer review conduct norms
Owner instructs Engineer B to conduct the peer review without letting Engineer A know.
From the moment Engineer B was retained by Owner through the initiation of any peer review activity
Engineer B Covert Review Instruction Resistance Capability Instance
Covert Review Instruction Resistance Capability
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to recognize and resist the Owner's instruction to conduct a covert peer review of Engineer A's work without Engineer A's knowledge, correctly identifying this as ethically impermissible.
Owner instructed Engineer B to conduct peer review without notifying Engineer A; Engineer B objected and declined to proceed under those conditions.
Engineer B's refusal to proceed with the peer review under the Owner's initial covert instruction, and insistence on proper notification before commencing.
Engineer B Faithful Agent Boundary Recognition Peer Review Instance
Faithful Agent Boundary Recognition in Peer Review Context Capability
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to recognize that faithful agent obligations to the Owner did not require compliance with the ethically impermissible instruction to conduct a covert review, while remaining willing to proceed with the legitimate peer review engagement once proper notification conditions were met.
Engineer B navigated the tension between faithful agent duties to Owner and professional ethics obligations to Engineer A regarding notification.
Engineer B's objection to the covert instruction while remaining engaged with the Owner's legitimate peer review commission, and willingness to proceed after notification.
When Owner reluctantly consents to notifying Engineer A
Engineer B Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Instance
Engineer B was retained by Owner to conduct peer review; Engineer B balanced the duty to serve the Owner's legitimate quality assurance interest with the collegial obligation to notify Engineer A before proceeding.
Engineer B was obligated to act as a faithful agent to the Owner by accepting and proceeding with the peer review engagement, while recognizing that faithful agency does not extend to conducting the review through procedurally unfair means — specifically, conducting a covert review without Engineer A's knowledge — and that the faithful agent duty is bounded by collegial and ethical obligations to the reviewed engineer.
Throughout the peer review engagement, from initial retention through resolution of the notification dispute
Engineer B Faithful Agent Within Ethical Limits Constraint Instance
Owner's instruction to conduct a covert review placed Engineer B in a position where faithful compliance with client instruction would require violation of professional ethical obligations to Engineer A
Conflict of Interest Avoidance (Constraint)
Engineer B was constrained in fulfilling the faithful agent obligation to Owner by the independent ethical obligation to notify Engineer A before conducting the peer review, establishing that faithful agency to the client does not extend to violating professional ethical obligations owed to third-party engineers whose work is being reviewed.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7.a; Faithful agent provisions bounded by ethical limits
Throughout Engineer B's engagement with Owner for the peer review
Engineer B Notification Obligation Activated
From receipt of Owner's covert instruction through Owner's consent to notify Engineer A
Engineer B's professional position between client instruction and professional courtesy obligation
Owner's reluctant consent to notify Engineer A
Owner's instruction to conduct peer review without notifying Engineer A
Engineer B Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Cooperation Facilitation
The discussion notes that confidentiality agreements in peer review contexts encourage the firm being reviewed to cooperate fully, build trust, and support a collegial atmosphere; Engineer B's peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs was conducted in this context.
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Cooperation Obligation
Engineer B, upon accepting the peer review assignment after Owner agreed to notify Engineer A, was obligated to conduct the review in a manner that honored any confidentiality protections established to encourage Engineer A's cooperation, recognizing that such protections serve the collegial and trust-building functions of the peer review system.
Throughout the conduct of the peer review of the second tower designs
Engineer B Peer Review Confidentiality Cooperation Facilitation Instance
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to operate within the confidentiality framework of the peer review engagement — conducting the review in a manner that respects confidentiality obligations while fulfilling the peer review's technical and safety objectives — once Owner agreed to notify Engineer A
Engineer B accepted the peer review assignment after Owner agreed to notify Engineer A, demonstrating ability to operate within appropriate confidentiality frameworks
Engineer B's acceptance of the peer review engagement after the notification condition was met, proceeding within the confidentiality framework while fulfilling professional obligations
Engineer B Peer Review Consent Refusal Recognition Capability Instance
Engineer A's refusal to consent to the peer review of the second tower designs represents a failure to exercise the capability to recognize that such refusal constitutes ethically impermissible obstruction of a legitimate quality assurance process, particularly given known prior design errors
Engineer A refused consent to peer review of second tower designs; Board concluded this was unethical given known first tower defects and multiple converging professional obligations
Engineer A's initial refusal to consent to and cooperate with Engineer B's peer review, which the Board found to be unethical
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Independent design review', 'conduct': 'Ethically objected to client instruction to conduct review without notifying Engineer A'}
Retained by Owner to conduct peer review of Engineer A's designs for the second tower; objected to conducting the review without notifying Engineer A; upheld professional obligation to notify original engineer despite client instruction to the contrary
{'type': 'peer_reviewer_of', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'reviewing', 'target': 'Tower Two designs'}
Engineer B Peer Review Notification Obligation Instance
Owner retained Engineer B to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs after significant errors were discovered in the first tower; Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct the review without Engineer A's knowledge.
Engineer B was obligated to refrain from conducting the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs without first notifying Engineer A that the peer review was being conducted, and to object to the Owner's instruction to conduct the review covertly.
Upon receiving the peer review assignment and before commencing any review work
Engineer B Peer Review Notification Protocol Capability Instance
Peer Review Notification Protocol Capability
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to recognize that professional ethics required notification of Engineer A before conducting the peer review, and to object to the Owner's instruction to proceed covertly.
Engineer B was retained by Owner to conduct peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs and correctly identified the notification obligation before proceeding.
Engineer B's objection to conducting the peer review without advising Engineer A, despite Owner's instruction to proceed without notification.
Engineer B Peer Review Notification Refusal Covert Assignment
Owner retained Engineer B to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs following discovery of significant design errors in the first tower; Owner initially instructed Engineer B not to disclose the peer review to Engineer A.
Engineer B was obligated to decline the peer review assignment when instructed not to disclose the review to Engineer A, and to condition acceptance of the assignment on prior notification of Engineer A, consistent with NSPE III.7.a.
Professional Obligation III.7.a. is very clear: 'Engineers in private practice shall not review the work of another engineer for the same client, except with the knowledge of such engineer, or unless the connection of such engineer with the work has been terminated.'
Upon receipt of the peer review assignment with the instruction not to disclose to Engineer A
Accordingly, Engineer B was completely correct in declining an assignment to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's work subject to an instruction not to disclose the peer review to Engineer A.
Engineer B Public Safety Peer Review Obligation Capability Instance
Engineer B demonstrated the capability to recognize that proceeding with the peer review — once proper notification conditions were met — was required by public safety obligations, given that the second tower designs may contain errors similar to those found in the first tower.
Engineer B recognized that public safety obligations required proceeding with peer review once procedural conditions were satisfied, despite Engineer A's objection.
Engineer B's willingness to proceed with the peer review after notification, recognizing the public safety imperative of independent review of potentially deficient designs for a structure under development.
Engineer B was obligated to proceed with the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs — once proper notification conditions were met — in recognition of public safety obligations
Owner decides to obtain a peer review of the plans and design of Engineer A for the second tower
Engineer B Public Safety Peer Review Obligation Instance
Significant design errors were discovered in the first tower; the second tower is a mirror-image design; peer review serves a critical public safety function in identifying potential errors before construction of the second tower.
Engineer B was obligated to proceed with the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs — once proper notification conditions were met — in recognition of the public safety interest in independent verification of design work that had already been found to contain significant errors in a related structure, and to ensure that any errors in the second tower designs were identified before construction commenced.
Owner is developing a site with two mirror-image towers to be built two years apart.
Upon resolution of the notification dispute and commencement of the peer review
Engineer B Public Safety Peer Review Proceeding Constraint Instance
Confirmed design errors in first tower created public safety risk of replication in second tower; Engineer B's peer review was the primary quality assurance mechanism available to Owner
Engineer B was constrained by the paramount public safety obligation to proceed with the peer review of Engineer A's second tower plans once proper notification conditions were satisfied, given the confirmed significant design errors in the first tower and the risk of replication in the mirror-image second tower, prohibiting Engineer B from declining the engagement on grounds of professional courtesy alone when public safety provided independent justification for the review.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I; Public safety paramount canon
Once Owner notified Engineer A of the peer review and the notification obligation was satisfied
Engineer B Refuses Covert Review (Action 3) → Owner Forced Into Transparency (Event 4)
Engineer B's objection before owner's reluctant consent to notify Engineer A
NSPE Board of Ethical Review and professional engineering ethics committees
Professional Norms on Engineer's Right to Notice in Peer Review Proceedings
Engineer Notification Right in Review Contexts
Engineer A upon notification of the peer review; Engineer B in evaluating how to proceed after Engineer A's objection
Provides the professional basis for Engineer A's position upon being notified of the peer review, and for evaluating whether Engineer A's refusal to consent is professionally defensible or whether the review may proceed regardless
Error Acknowledgment and Corrective Disclosure Obligation Context Engineer A
Significant design errors in first tower
The discovery of significant design errors in the first tower creates a context in which Engineer A's obligation to acknowledge errors and facilitate correction extends to cooperating with the peer review of the second tower — a directly related project with mirror-image designs — rather than obstructing the quality assurance process
The error acknowledgment obligation, in the context of mirror-image towers with known design defects in the first, requires Engineer A to facilitate rather than obstruct independent review of the second tower's designs as part of the corrective process
Error Acknowledgment and Corrective Disclosure Obligation
The error acknowledgment obligation reinforces the non-obstruction obligation; Engineer A's refusal to consent is inconsistent with both principles
several significant design errors are discovered in the plans and design of Engineer A.
Error Acknowledgment and Corrective Disclosure Obligation Invoked Against Engineer A
Engineer A's known design defects in the first tower create an obligation to acknowledge those errors and cooperate with corrective quality assurance processes — including the peer review of the second tower — rather than refusing to engage with the review process that would identify and address potential deficiencies
The error acknowledgment obligation extends beyond verbal admission to encompass active cooperation with processes designed to identify and correct the consequences of prior errors in related ongoing work
Error acknowledgment obligation overrides reputational self-interest; the obligation is heightened when prior errors create ongoing public safety risk in related work
Engineers must take responsibility for their actions, must acknowledge their errors
significant design errors were discovered during construction of the first tower
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits Invoked By Engineer B
Engineer B acted as a faithful agent to the Owner by accepting the peer review engagement and proceeding once proper notification conditions were met, while retaining the professional authority to object to the covert instruction that conflicted with ethical obligations
The faithful agent obligation required Engineer B to serve the Owner's legitimate interest in quality assurance while refusing to execute the specific instruction that violated professional ethics; the principle was correctly applied by distinguishing between the legitimate engagement and the improper instruction
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
Engineer B correctly identified the boundary between faithful service (accepting the engagement) and ethical limit (refusing the covert instruction), demonstrating the proper application of the faithful agent principle
Professional engineering societies and ethics boards
Professional Norms Governing Independent Engineering Peer Reviews
Engineer B when structuring and conducting the peer review engagement
Establishes the methodological and procedural standards within which Engineer B's peer review of Engineer A's second tower plans must be conducted, including scope, reporting obligations, and independence requirements
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers — Professional Obligation III.7.a
BER in analyzing Engineer B's conduct and Engineer A's obligation to cooperate
Cited as the definitive rule prohibiting an engineer from reviewing another engineer's work for the same client without the knowledge of that engineer, or unless the engineer's connection with the work has been terminated; used to justify Engineer B's refusal and Owner's obligation to notify Engineer A
Engineer B in deliberating whether to accept the peer review engagement under the owner's conditions
Provides the primary normative framework governing Engineer B's obligations when asked to conduct a covert peer review of Engineer A's work, including obligations of fairness to other engineers and duties to the public and client
Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review Violated By Engineer A
Owner's commissioned peer review of second tower designs
Engineer A's refusal to consent to the peer review of the second tower designs — after significant design errors had already been discovered in the first tower — constitutes obstruction of a legitimately commissioned quality assurance process, prioritizing personal or reputational interests over public welfare and professional accountability
Given the prior discovery of significant design errors in related work, Engineer A had a heightened professional obligation to facilitate rather than obstruct independent review; refusal to consent in these circumstances violates the principle of non-obstruction
Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review
While Engineer A had a legitimate interest in procedural fairness (notification), that interest was satisfied when Owner notified Engineer A; the subsequent refusal to consent went beyond legitimate procedural objection into improper obstruction
Non-Obstruction of Peer Review Invoked Against Engineer A Refusal to Cooperate
Engineer A's refusal to cooperate with peer review of second tower designs
Engineer A's refusal to consent to and cooperate with Engineer B's peer review of the second tower designs was unethical, because professional accountability, error acknowledgment, client service, and public welfare obligations all require active cooperation with legitimate peer review, especially given known design defects in the first tower
The obligation not to obstruct peer review is reinforced and made more urgent when the engineer whose work is being reviewed has already demonstrated design deficiencies in related prior work
Public welfare, professional accountability, and client service obligations collectively override any reputational interest Engineer A might have in avoiding scrutiny of prior work
Owner Consents to Notifying Engineer A (Action 4) → Engineer A Notified Of Review (Event 5)
Owner Covert Peer Review Instruction Constraint Instance
Owner's initial instruction to Engineer B to conduct the peer review covertly was the precipitating ethical conflict in the case
Owner was constrained from instructing Engineer B to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's work without notifying Engineer A, as such instruction directed Engineer B to violate professional ethical obligations arising from NSPE Code Section III.7.a.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7.a; Peer Review Conduct Standard
At the time Owner retained Engineer B and issued instructions regarding the peer review
When Owner reluctantly consents to notifying Engineer A...
Owner Covert Peer Review Instruction to Engineer B
From Owner's initial retention of Engineer B through Owner's reluctant consent to notify Engineer A
Owner instructs Engineer B to conduct the peer review without letting Engineer A know
Owner's instruction to Engineer B regarding peer review of Engineer A's second tower plans
Owner's reluctant consent to notify Engineer A following Engineer B's objection
Owner's explicit instruction to Engineer B to conduct peer review without notifying Engineer A
{'entity_type': 'Private development owner', 'project_scope': 'Two mirror-image towers built two years apart', 'conduct': 'Initially sought to exclude Engineer A from knowledge of peer review'}
Developing a two-tower site; discovered design errors in first tower; commissioned peer review of second tower designs; initially instructed Engineer B to conduct review without notifying Engineer A; reluctantly consented to notification after Engineer B's objection
{'type': 'client_of', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'client_of', 'target': 'Engineer B'}
{'type': 'project_owner', 'target': 'Two-tower development site'}
Owner is developing a site with two mirror-image towers
Owner Options After Engineer A Consent Refusal
From Owner's notification to Engineer A through Engineer A's response
Engineer A's potential refusal to consent to peer review, placing Owner in position of choosing among three difficult options
Engineer A agrees to cooperate, Owner proceeds without Engineer A, or Owner abandons peer review
Engineer A's potential explicit refusal to consent to and cooperate with peer review after notification
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Constraint Instance
Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct the review without notifying Engineer A; Engineer B's objection led Owner to reluctantly consent to notification
Owner was constrained to ensure that the peer review of Engineer A's second tower plans was conducted through procedurally fair means — including notifying Engineer A before the review commenced — prohibiting Owner from directing Engineer B to conduct the review covertly even when Owner believed the review was legitimately necessary.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7.a; Peer Review Conduct Standard; Professional courtesy norms
From the decision to commission the peer review through the initiation of the review process
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Design Capability Instance
Peer Review Procedural Fairness Design Capability
Owner initially failed to demonstrate the capability to design a procedurally fair peer review process, instructing Engineer B to conduct the review covertly, but partially corrected this by reluctantly consenting to notification when Engineer B objected.
Owner commissioned peer review of second tower designs but initially directed Engineer B to proceed without notifying Engineer A, demonstrating insufficient understanding of procedural fairness requirements.
Owner's initial instruction to conduct covert review, followed by reluctant consent to notification after Engineer B's objection — demonstrating partial but incomplete capability.
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Notification Constraint Instance
Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct review without notifying Engineer A; Owner reluctantly agreed to provide notification after Engineer B's objection, resolving the covert review instruction state
Owner was constrained from directing Engineer B to conduct a covert peer review of Engineer A's work without Engineer A's knowledge, and was required to notify Engineer A of the planned peer review as a precondition to the review proceeding ethically — a constraint Owner ultimately accepted after Engineer B's objection.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.7.a; BER Case analysis
Prior to commencement of peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs
Professional Obligation III.7.a. is very clear: 'Engineers in private practice shall not review the work of another engineer for the same client, except with the knowledge of such engineer.'
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Notification Engineer A
Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct the peer review without disclosing it to Engineer A; Engineer B declined; Owner reluctantly agreed to advise Engineer A of the planned peer review.
Peer Review Procedural Fairness Client Obligation
Owner was obligated to notify Engineer A of the planned peer review before it commenced, and was correct to ultimately agree to do so after Engineer B declined the covert assignment, recognizing that NSPE III.7.a requires peer review to be conducted with the knowledge of the engineer whose work is under review.
Before commencement of the peer review of the second tower designs
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Notification Instance
Owner demonstrated the capability to recognize and correct a procedurally deficient peer review process design after Engineer B's objection, agreeing to notify Engineer A before the review commenced
Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct the review without notifying Engineer A; corrected this procedural deficiency after Engineer B's refusal
Owner's agreement to notify Engineer A of the planned peer review after Engineer B declined the covert assignment
Owner Peer Review Procedural Fairness Obligation Instance
Owner initially instructed Engineer B to conduct the peer review without Engineer A's knowledge; Owner ultimately consented to notification only after Engineer B objected.
Owner was obligated to ensure that the peer review of Engineer A's second tower designs was conducted through procedurally fair means, including notifying Engineer A before the review commenced, rather than instructing Engineer B to conduct the review covertly.
At the time of commissioning the peer review and issuing instructions to Engineer B
Owner Retains Engineer B Covertly (Action 2) → Engineer B Notification Obligation Activated (Event 3)
Professional practice in design-build contracting
Peer Review Consent and Confidentiality Provisions in Design-Build Bid and Contract Documents
In many cases, the possibility that the client will obtain a peer review is specified in design-build bid or contract documents to the effect that any party who bids or contracts with the client has, by participating, consented to the peer review.
BER in contextualizing the professional norms surrounding peer review consent and confidentiality
Described as an emerging standard practice in design-build procurement whereby participation in a bid or contract constitutes implied consent to peer review, often accompanied by confidentiality obligations on the reviewer and notification rights for the reviewed engineer
Professional Norms Governing Notification of Engineers Subject to Peer Review
Owner reluctantly consents to notifying Engineer A
Engineer B in objecting to the owner's instruction to conduct the review without notifying Engineer A
Grounds Engineer B's objection to conducting a covert peer review, establishing that professional norms require the reviewed engineer to be notified before or during the peer review process
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Collegial Cooperation Constraint Instance
Discussion of how confidentiality agreements in peer review contexts constrain disclosure while encouraging cooperation; noted as absent in the present case, creating a less structured review environment
Where peer review confidentiality agreements are present, the reviewing engineer is constrained to keep review results confidential while simultaneously being required to provide the reviewed engineer an opportunity to explain and defend design decisions — the confidentiality obligation operates as a structural constraint on how findings may be disclosed but does not eliminate the reviewed engineer's participatory rights.
Emerging design-build peer review practice standards; NSPE Code of Ethics
Throughout peer review process where confidentiality agreement is operative
However, that is not always the case and it is not the case here.
Peer Review Independence and Integrity Invoked By Engineer B
Owner's instruction to conduct covert peer review
Engineer B's objection to conducting a covert peer review reflects the principle that peer review integrity requires procedural conditions — including notification of the reviewed engineer — that enable the review to function as genuine independent quality assurance rather than a covert evaluation that could be dismissed or challenged as procedurally deficient
A covert peer review conducted without the reviewed engineer's knowledge would lack the procedural legitimacy necessary for its findings to serve as reliable quality assurance, undermining the very purpose for which the review was commissioned
Engineer B correctly identified that the client's covert instruction would compromise review integrity and objected, ultimately securing the client's reluctant consent to notification
Peer Review Independence and Integrity Invoked By Owner Instruction Conflict
Owner's initial instruction to conduct covert peer review
The Owner's initial instruction to Engineer B to conduct the peer review without disclosing it to Engineer A would have compromised the integrity and effectiveness of the review, as covert review without the original designer's knowledge and cooperation undermines the review's ability to serve its quality assurance function
Peer review integrity requires not only reviewer independence but also procedural conditions — including notification of the reviewed engineer — that enable the review to function effectively as a quality assurance mechanism
it will likely be a fruitless exercise to attempt to conduct a peer review without Engineer A's cooperation
Engineer B correctly declined the compromised assignment; Owner ultimately agreed to notify Engineer A, restoring the conditions for an effective and ethically sound review
Peer Review Notification Obligation Invoked By Engineer B Declining Covert Assignment
Engineer A's design work for the second tower
Engineer B correctly declined to conduct a peer review of Engineer A's work when instructed not to disclose the review to Engineer A, because NSPE Professional Obligation III.7.a. requires that engineers not review another engineer's work for the same client without the knowledge of that engineer
The notification obligation is non-waivable by client instruction; the client cannot direct a peer reviewer to conduct a covert review as a condition of the engagement
Engineer B's refusal to accept the covert assignment was ethically correct; client loyalty does not extend to participating in ethically prohibited covert review arrangements
Peer Review Notification and Consent Obligation Invoked By Engineer B
Engineer A's design work for second tower
Engineer B refused to proceed with the peer review assignment until Engineer A was notified, recognizing that conducting a covert review of a professional peer's work violates the procedural fairness and professional dignity owed to the reviewed engineer
The notification obligation required Engineer B to make notification of Engineer A a precondition of accepting the engagement, and to object when the client attempted to circumvent this requirement
Engineer B correctly treated notification as a non-negotiable precondition, subordinating client preference for covert review to the professional obligation of procedural fairness
Peer Review Without Confidentiality Agreement
From Owner's commissioning of peer review through conclusion of the review process
Frequently that disclosure is accompanied by an agreement that the client will require the peer reviewer to keep the results of the peer review confidential
Peer Review Confidentiality Agreement Absent State
The peer review of Engineer A's work commissioned by Owner
Conclusion of peer review or establishment of confidentiality protections
Owner's decision to commission peer review without establishing a confidentiality agreement protecting Engineer A's design information
Post-Review Conflict of Interest Avoidance Invoked In BER 18-10 Precedent
Design-build RFP for project previously reviewed by Engineer A
Incumbent Advantage Prohibition in Public Procurement
In BER Case 18-10, Engineer A's firm sought to participate in a design-build joint venture for a project Engineer A had previously reviewed as lead engineer on an independent external review; the BER concluded this was permissible only with agency approval and compliance with applicable conflict-of-interest laws
Prior review involvement does not automatically disqualify an engineer from subsequent procurement participation, but the conflict must be cured through agency approval and regulatory compliance rather than simply ignored
Post-Review Conflict of Interest Avoidance in Design-Build Procurement
Agency approval and regulatory compliance are sufficient conditions to permit participation; without them, participation would be ethically impermissible
The review's scope was limited to clarifications and refinements, and there was no confidentiality agreement.
Professional Accountability Invoked Against Engineer A Refusal to Acknowledge Errors
Engineer A's refusal to cooperate with peer review
Engineer A's professional accountability obligation requires acknowledgment of design errors discovered during construction of the first tower and active cooperation with the peer review process designed to identify and address potential deficiencies in the second tower designs
Professional accountability encompasses both backward-looking acknowledgment of errors and forward-looking cooperation with corrective quality assurance processes
Accountability obligation overrides reputational concerns; engineers cannot selectively accept credit for successes while refusing accountability for failures
Professional Accountability Violated By Engineer A Refusal
Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review of the second tower after significant errors were found in the first tower represents a failure of professional accountability — an unwillingness to accept legitimate scrutiny of professional work that had already demonstrated deficiencies
Professional accountability in this context requires acceptance of independent review as a mechanism for quality assurance, particularly when prior work has demonstrated significant errors; refusal to consent is a form of accountability avoidance
Professional accountability obligation outweighs any personal interest in avoiding scrutiny, particularly given the prior error history
Professional Dignity Implicated By Covert Review Instruction
The Owner's instruction to conduct a covert peer review of Engineer A's work — without Engineer A's knowledge — implicates the principle of professional dignity by treating Engineer A as an object of surveillance rather than a professional peer entitled to notice and opportunity to respond
Professional dignity requires that peer review processes be conducted in ways that respect the reviewed engineer's professional standing, including notification and opportunity to respond, even when the review is legitimately commissioned by a dissatisfied client
Professional dignity does not grant Engineer A a veto over the review, but does require notification; Engineer B correctly identified this balance by insisting on notification while accepting the engagement
Professional Norms Governing Engineer Responsibility for Design Errors
Professional Responsibility Acknowledgment Standard
Engineer A in assessing obligations following discovery of design errors; Owner in deciding to commission peer review
Provides normative grounding for evaluating Engineer A's professional obligations in light of the significant design errors discovered in the first tower, including duties to acknowledge errors and cooperate with corrective review processes
From discovery of first tower errors through completion and verification of second tower peer review
Potential replication of significant design errors in second tower plans given confirmed errors in first tower
Successful peer review confirming or correcting second tower plans
Discovery of significant design errors in first tower plans by Engineer A, with second tower plans by same engineer not yet independently reviewed
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked As Basis for Mandatory Peer Review Cooperation
Engineer A's obligation to cooperate with peer review of second tower designs
The paramount obligation to hold public health, welfare, and safety above personal or reputational interests requires Engineer A to cooperate fully with the peer review of the second tower designs, particularly given that known design defects in the first tower create heightened public safety risk
Public welfare paramountcy is not merely a disclosure obligation but also generates affirmative cooperation obligations when quality assurance processes are directed at work affecting public safety
Public welfare obligation overrides reputational concerns; the urgency is heightened by known prior defects
must at all times hold paramount the health, welfare, and safety of the public
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked By Engineer B Peer Review
Decision whether to proceed with covert review
Engineer B's insistence on notifying Engineer A before conducting the peer review reflects recognition that a covert, procedurally deficient peer review could produce unreliable quality assurance for a building project where design errors had already caused harm, thereby placing future occupants and the public at risk
In this context, public welfare requires that the peer review process be conducted with integrity and procedural fairness so that it can genuinely serve its quality assurance function for a project with known prior design errors
Engineer B correctly prioritized the integrity of the peer review process — and thus public welfare — over the client's preference for a covert review, by objecting to the covert instruction
Is Engineer B ethically required to make certain that Engineer A is advised of the planned peer review?
If Owner had never voluntarily agreed to notify Engineer A, what ethical obligation would Engineer B have had to unilaterally refuse the engagement or independently ensure notification, and at what point does Engineer B's acceptance of a covert assignment itself become an ethical violation?
Does the Owner's ability to simply terminate Engineer A as a workaround to the notification requirement create a perverse incentive that undermines the protective purpose of the peer review notification norm, and should the Board have addressed whether termination is an ethically equivalent substitute for notification?
What affirmative obligations, if any, does Engineer A have to proactively disclose the known design errors in the first tower to the Owner and to relevant authorities, independent of and prior to any peer review being commissioned?
Should the Board have addressed whether Engineer B has an independent obligation to report the known design defects in Engineer A's first tower work to public authorities if the Owner declines to act on them, regardless of the outcome of the peer review process?
Is Engineer A ethically required to cooperate with the peer review of Engineer B?
Does the Faithful Agent Obligation requiring Engineer B to serve the Owner's interests conflict with the Peer Review Notification Obligation requiring Engineer B to ensure Engineer A is informed, and how should Engineer B resolve this tension when the Owner explicitly instructs secrecy?
Does the Confidentiality Principle protecting Engineer A's design work and client relationship conflict with the Public Welfare Paramount principle that demands peer review of potentially defective second tower plans, and under what conditions does public safety categorically override confidentiality in the peer review context?
Does the Professional Dignity principle protecting Engineer A from covert or disrespectful review conflict with the Non-Obstruction of Legitimate Peer Review principle that bars Engineer A from blocking the review, and does the existence of prior design errors diminish or extinguish Engineer A's dignity-based objections entirely?
Does the Error Acknowledgment and Corrective Disclosure Obligation imposed on Engineer A conflict with the Client Loyalty principle that might lead Engineer A to minimize or conceal design errors to preserve the client relationship, and how should the Board weigh these competing duties when the client has not yet demanded disclosure?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer B have an unconditional duty to notify Engineer A of the peer review regardless of the Owner's instructions, and does that duty derive from professional courtesy norms, public safety obligations, or both?
From a consequentialist perspective, does the demonstrated risk of replicating known design errors in the second tower sufficiently justify overriding Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review, and how should the Board weigh the harm of coerced professional review against the harm of unchecked structural defects?
From a virtue ethics standpoint, did Engineer B demonstrate professional integrity and collegial respect by refusing the Owner's covert review instruction, and does that refusal itself constitute the kind of honorable conduct that the NSPE Code envisions when engineers navigate conflicts between client loyalty and professional courtesy?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's prior acknowledgment obligation under the Code — requiring engineers to admit their errors — independently compel cooperation with the peer review, such that refusing the review is not merely imprudent but constitutes a categorical ethical violation irrespective of outcomes?
If Engineer B had complied with the Owner's initial instruction and conducted the peer review covertly without notifying Engineer A, would Engineer B's subsequent findings have been ethically usable by the Owner, and would Engineer B have incurred professional liability for the procedural violation even if the review itself uncovered genuine safety defects?
Had no design errors been discovered in the first tower, would the ethical calculus for overriding Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review have been materially different, and would the Board's conclusion that Engineer A 'may not ethically object' still hold absent the public safety predicate?
If the Owner had chosen to terminate Engineer A from the project rather than notify them of the peer review, would Engineer B's notification obligation have been fully discharged, and would that termination path have raised independent ethical concerns about using peer review as a pretext for removing an inconvenient engineer?
If Engineer A had proactively disclosed the first-tower design errors to the Owner before the peer review was commissioned, would that voluntary disclosure have altered Engineer A's ethical standing to object to the peer review of the second tower, or would the public safety imperative have independently sustained the Owner's right to commission the review regardless?
Significant Design Errors in Engineer A First Tower Work
From discovery of errors during first tower construction through remediation and peer review of second tower
Significant design errors discovered in Engineer A's completed plans for the first tower
Successful peer review and remediation of second tower plans
Discovery of several significant design errors in Engineer A's plans during first tower construction
Transparency Principle Invoked In Peer Review Context
Engineer B's insistence on notifying Engineer A reflects the transparency principle — the peer review process should be conducted openly with respect to the engineer whose work is being reviewed, enabling trust in the process and allowing the reviewed engineer to understand and respond to the evaluation of their professional work
Transparency in the peer review context requires that the reviewed engineer be aware that their work is under independent evaluation, so that the process is not conducted as a covert investigation but as a professional quality assurance mechanism
Transparency toward the reviewed engineer was correctly prioritized over the client's preference for covert evaluation
construction of first tower before construction of second tower
design errors in first tower during construction of first tower
discovery of significant design errors in first tower before owner's decision to obtain peer review of second tower plans
owner's consent to notify Engineer A before Engineer A's refusal to consent to peer review
owner's instruction to Engineer B to conduct secret peer review before Engineer B's objection to conducting review without notifying Engineer A
peer review of second tower plans before construction of second tower