County Engineer / Planning Board Member / Consulting Engineer
Divided loyalties across three distinct professional roles
Exposure to ethical violations whenever private consulting work intersected with public responsibilities
Structural conflict of interest between private financial interests and public duties
Fulfillment of professional employment obligations to county government
Fulfillment of professional obligations to private consulting clients
Impartiality in public service decision-making
Public trust in governmental engineering roles
Undivided loyalty to employer and client
Maintain multiple income streams and professional roles simultaneously, leveraging public positions alongside private consulting work
Section 8(b): Absolute prohibition on participating in considerations or actions regarding services provided in private practice while serving in public capacity
Judgment to recognize structural incompatibility of roles
Knowledge of conflict-of-interest rules governing public servants
Understanding of professional ethics obligations
Prior to and concurrent with all subsequent actions; background condition established before Step 1
Axiomatic professional duty not to take actions that divide loyalties between employer/client and personal interests (per Case No. 60-5)
Section 8: Duty to endeavor to avoid conflicts of interest with employer or client
Doe chose to simultaneously hold the positions of county engineer and county planning board member while also maintaining a private consulting practice, creating the structural conditions for all subsequent conflicts of interest.
Accepting Dual Public Roles (Action 1) → Conflict of Interest Materialized (Event 3)
Upon John Doe preparing private consulting plans and then occupying the roles of county engineer and county planning board member, a conflict of interest materialized
Had Doe declined either the county engineer or planning board role, or had he recused himself from matters involving his private clients, the conflict of interest would not have materialized in its full form
Conflict of Interest Materialized (Event 3)
Absence of recusal or disclosure mechanisms
Existence of private consulting work intersecting with public duties
Simultaneous holding of county engineer position
Simultaneous holding of county planning board member position
Combination of dual public authority roles + private financial interest in subdivision plans = structural conflict of interest
No single role alone would have created the full conflict; overlap of all three roles was sufficient
The subdivision plans are now officially approved through a fully compromised process. The conflict of interest has produced a concrete governmental outcome, a land use approval, that affects third parties and the public, and that may be legally and professionally challengeable.
After official recommendation issued; final stage of approval process
As a direct outcome of John Doe voting in his planning board capacity, an official vote approving the subdivision plans, plans he personally created and officially recommended, was recorded, completing the tripartite self-dealing cycle.
Axiomatic Loyalty Non-Division Canons Principle Engineer Doe Foundational Basis
BER citation of the axiomatic loyalty principle from Case 60-5 as the foundational basis underlying the more explicit Section 8(b) prohibition
Even under the prior Canons of Ethics — which did not explicitly reference 'conflict of interest' — Engineer Doe was constrained by the axiomatic principle that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client, a foundational principle that the new Code of Ethics made explicit through Section 8(b).
BER Case 60-5; former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client. (Case No. 60-5)
Throughout the professional relationship
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 60-5
Our previous decisions in cases of this type (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
'it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client.' (Case No. 60-5)
Board of Ethical Review for analogical reasoning on conflict-of-interest doctrine
Cited as precedent establishing the axiomatic principle that a professional may not divide loyalties between employer/client and personal interests; quoted directly for the loyalty-division formulation
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 62-21
Cited as one of a series of precedent cases on conflict-of-interest decided under the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 62-7
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 63-5
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case Precedents on Dual-Role Conflict of Interest
John Doe, a professional engineer, is a county engineer and a member of the county planning board
He also engages in part-time consulting practice
Ethics reviewers conducting analogical analysis
Prior BER cases addressing analogous situations where engineers held simultaneous public and private roles and reviewed or approved their own work provide analogical reasoning patterns for evaluating Doe's conduct
CausalLink_Preparing Private Consulting P
CausalLink_Recommending Own Plans Officia
Engineer Doe's activities, as described, are in conflict with the Code of Ethics, and are therefore unethical.
Beyond the Board's finding that Doe's activities conflict with the Code of Ethics, the violation was not a single discrete act but a cumulative structural arrangement that became irremediable at the earliest stage — the acceptance of the private consulting commission while simultaneously holding both public roles. Each subsequent act (preparing the plans, recommending them as county engineer, and voting on them as a planning board member) compounded the original violation, but the ethical breach was already complete the moment Doe accepted a private commission in the same substantive domain as his dual public authority. This means that even if Doe had recused himself from the planning board vote, or even from the county engineer recommendation, the foundational conflict would have persisted. The Code's prohibition is not satisfied by downstream abstention when the upstream structural arrangement is itself impermissible. Engineers in analogous dual public roles must therefore evaluate the permissibility of private commissions before acceptance, not after the conflict has already materialized.
The Board's conclusion implicitly establishes that holding even one of Doe's two public roles — either county engineer or planning board member — would independently have been sufficient to trigger an absolute conflict prohibition under Section 8(b) when combined with private consulting work in the same domain. This is a critical nuance the Board did not articulate explicitly: the triple-role arrangement is not uniquely prohibited because all three roles coexist, but because each public role, standing alone, creates a structural self-review problem that disclosure cannot cure. As county engineer, Doe possessed official submission authority over plans he privately prepared — a self-review conflict complete in itself. As a planning board member, Doe held adjudicatory authority over those same plans — a second, independently sufficient conflict. The Board's reasoning therefore supports the conclusion that the ethical violation would have existed in any two-role combination involving one public role and the private consulting commission. This has significant implications for engineers who believe that recusing from one public function while retaining another preserves ethical compliance: it does not, because each public role independently activates the absolute prohibition.
The Board's conclusion, while focused on Engineer Doe's individual conduct, leaves unaddressed a significant institutional dimension: the county government and planning board that permitted — or failed to prevent — this triple-role arrangement bear a structural responsibility that the Code of Ethics, as applied to individual engineers, cannot fully remedy. The Code obligates Doe personally to refuse the conflicting arrangement, but it does not reach the institutional actors who created or tolerated the conditions enabling it. This gap suggests that the ethical analysis, while complete as to Doe, is incomplete as a systemic matter. Public bodies employing engineers in official capacities should implement structural safeguards — including mandatory disclosure protocols at the time of appointment, standing recusal registers, and prohibitions on engineers in advisory or submission roles from simultaneously holding adjudicatory authority over the same class of submissions. The absence of such safeguards does not diminish Doe's personal ethical responsibility, but it does mean that the Board's conclusion, standing alone, addresses only the symptom rather than the institutional architecture that made the violation possible.
The Board's reliance on prior cases decided under the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct — while applying the new NSPE Code of Ethics as the controlling standard — raises an important methodological question the Board did not resolve: whether the transition to the new Code represents a stricter, more permissive, or merely differently articulated standard for public-service conflict of interest. Analysis of the prior cases cited (BER Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5) alongside the new Code's Section 8(b) suggests that the substantive prohibition on self-review conflicts in public engineering roles is materially continuous across both frameworks, grounded in the axiomatic principle of undivided professional loyalty that predates the Code's formal articulation. The new Code does not relax the categorical bar; if anything, Section 8(b)'s explicit structural framing makes the prohibition more precisely articulated and therefore more readily applicable to complex multi-role arrangements like Doe's. The practical implication is that the prior cases retain persuasive authority as illustrations of the underlying principle, even though they are no longer controlling precedent, and that engineers cannot invoke the transition period as a basis for arguing that the standard was ambiguous at the time of Doe's conduct.
From a deontological perspective, Engineer Doe's conduct fails not merely because of its consequences but because the structural obligations attached to each of his three roles are logically incompatible at the level of categorical duty. The duty of undivided loyalty owed to the county as employer, the duty of impartial advisory judgment owed to the public as county engineer, and the duty of independent adjudicatory review owed to the public as a planning board member cannot simultaneously be fulfilled when the subject matter of all three duties is identical — Doe's own privately prepared subdivision plans. No act of disclosure, recusal, or good-faith intention can resolve this logical incompatibility, because the incompatibility is structural rather than motivational. This deontological analysis reinforces the Board's conclusion by demonstrating that the violation is not contingent on whether Doe acted in bad faith or whether the plans were technically sound: the categorical prohibition applies regardless of outcome or intent. Virtue ethics reaches the same conclusion from a different direction — an engineer of genuine professional integrity would have recognized, at the role-acceptance stage, that the arrangement made authentic impartiality impossible and would have declined either the private commission or one of the public roles before the conflict materialized.
In response to Q101, Engineer Doe's ethical violation became irremediable at the earliest possible moment — when he accepted the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans while simultaneously holding both the county engineer and planning board member roles. The violation was not merely consummated by the later acts of recommending or voting; those acts were the inevitable downstream consequences of a structurally corrupt arrangement that was locked in at the moment of commission acceptance. Once Doe agreed to design plans that his own official roles would require him to evaluate and approve, no subsequent act of recusal or disclosure could undo the foundational conflict. The recommendation and the vote were not independent ethical failures layered on top of an otherwise curable problem — they were the predictable and inescapable expression of a conflict that was absolute from its inception.
In response to Q102, Engineer Doe's conduct would not have been ethically permissible even if he had recused himself from the planning board vote, because holding the county engineer role alone — with its authority to recommend approval of plans to the planning board — is independently and categorically sufficient to trigger the conflict prohibition under Section 8(b). The Board's reasoning makes clear that the county engineer's advisory and recommendatory function over his own privately prepared plans constitutes a standalone violation, entirely apart from the planning board vote. The county engineer role places Doe in the position of officially endorsing his own private work to a public body, which is precisely the self-serving advisory conduct the Code prohibits. Recusal from the vote would have cured only the most visible layer of the conflict while leaving the deeper structural violation — the official recommendation — fully intact. Holding either public role while performing private consulting work in the same substantive domain therefore constitutes a standalone violation, and the combination of both roles makes the conflict not merely additive but geometrically more severe.
In response to Q103, while the Board's analysis appropriately focuses on Engineer Doe's individual ethical obligations, the institutional dimension of this case deserves serious attention. The county government and planning board bear a meaningful structural responsibility for permitting — or failing to prevent — a triple-role arrangement that made ethical compliance virtually impossible for any engineer placed in that position. Public bodies that employ engineers in official capacities while failing to enact clear conflict-of-interest policies, mandatory disclosure requirements, and automatic recusal protocols create the very conditions in which violations like Doe's become likely. Structural safeguards that public bodies should implement include: explicit prohibitions on county engineers or planning board members accepting private consulting commissions within the same jurisdictional domain; mandatory disclosure of all private engineering engagements at the time of appointment and on a continuing basis; automatic recusal triggers that remove an official from any proceeding involving their private work; and independent review mechanisms that substitute for the conflicted official's advisory or voting function. The absence of such safeguards does not diminish Doe's personal ethical responsibility, but it does indicate that the prevention of such conflicts is a shared institutional obligation.
Former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
In response to Q104, the transition from the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct to the new NSPE Code of Ethics does not materially alter the outcome in Engineer Doe's case, because the foundational prohibition on public-service conflicts of interest was firmly established under both regimes. The prior Board of Ethical Review cases — including BER Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5 — consistently held that dual public-private role conflicts were impermissible, and the new Code's Section 8(b) carries forward and codifies that prohibition in explicit terms. The new Code does not represent a stricter standard so much as a more precisely articulated one: the underlying ethical norm of undivided loyalty and non-self-serving public service was axiomatic under the Canons and remains so under the Code. Prior precedents retain persuasive value as expressions of the same foundational principle, even though the new Code supersedes the Canons as the controlling textual authority. The transition therefore reinforces rather than disrupts the analysis, and any suggestion that the change in governing text creates interpretive ambiguity favorable to Doe must be rejected.
In response to Q201, the tension between the absolute conflict prohibition and the disclosure-as-cure principle is resolved decisively in favor of the absolute prohibition in cases involving structural public-service conflicts. Disclosure under Section 8(a) serves a residual but important function even where it cannot cure the underlying violation: it creates a record of the conflict, enables the public body and affected parties to seek independent review or challenge the official action, and preserves the integrity of the institutional process by ensuring that the conflict is not concealed. However, disclosure's function in Doe's situation is purely procedural and remedial — it does not transform an impermissible structural arrangement into a permissible one. The categorical nature of Section 8(b)'s prohibition reflects the judgment that some conflicts are so fundamental to the public trust that no amount of transparency can substitute for actual non-participation. Disclosure without withdrawal from the conflicted roles is therefore a necessary but wholly insufficient response to the kind of structural self-review conflict that Doe's triple-role arrangement created.
In response to Q202, Engineer Doe's simultaneous loyalty obligations to his private client (the subdivision developer), to the county as his employer, and to the public whose welfare the planning board is charged with protecting are structurally irreconcilable. The axiomatic principle of undivided loyalty — foundational under both the former Canons and the new Code — presupposes that an engineer can identify a single primary beneficiary of his professional judgment. Doe's triple-role arrangement makes this impossible: maximizing value for the subdivision developer (his private client) creates pressure to design plans that may not fully serve the county's regulatory interests; recommending approval as county engineer requires him to evaluate those plans against public standards he has a financial interest in seeing satisfied; and voting as a planning board member requires him to exercise independent public judgment over work he has already been paid to produce and officially endorsed. Each loyalty obligation, if taken seriously, actively undermines the others. This is not a case where competing loyalties can be managed through careful compartmentalization — the roles are substantively and procedurally intertwined in a way that makes genuine fidelity to any one of them incompatible with genuine fidelity to the others.
In response to Q203, the principle that inescapable ethical violations must be recognized and avoided at the role-acceptance stage takes clear precedence over any principle permitting public-service engineers to engage in private practice under abstention-conditioned circumstances. The abstention-conditioned permission for private practice is premised on the assumption that genuine abstention is actually possible — that the engineer can step aside from specific matters in which a conflict arises without compromising either the public role or the private engagement. In Doe's case, that assumption fails entirely: his county engineer role requires him to process and recommend on subdivision plans as a core official function, and his planning board role requires him to vote on those same plans. There is no version of abstention available to him that does not either leave his official duties unperformed or his private client unserved. When the structural arrangement makes genuine abstention impossible, the engineer's obligation is not to attempt partial abstention but to decline the private commission at the outset — or, if already holding the private commission, to resign from the conflicting public roles. The precedence of the role-acceptance-stage obligation is therefore not merely a matter of timing but of logical necessity: it is the only point at which the conflict can be avoided rather than merely managed.
In response to Q204, the public welfare paramount principle functions as a permanent constitutional constraint on the Code's capacity for adaptive evolution with respect to categorical self-review prohibitions in public engineering roles. While the Code is properly understood as a living document capable of refinement in response to changing professional circumstances, the absolute prohibition on engineers exercising official public authority over their own private work is not a contingent policy choice subject to revision — it is a structural expression of the foundational commitment to public welfare that gives the entire Code its normative authority. Any future evolution of the Code that purported to relax the categorical bar on self-review in public engineering roles would be self-undermining: it would sacrifice the very principle that justifies the Code's claim on engineers' professional conscience. The distinction between adaptive evolution (permissible) and erosion of foundational public welfare commitments (impermissible) is therefore not merely a matter of degree but of kind. The categorical prohibition on public-service self-review is among the provisions that the public welfare paramount principle permanently forecloses from relaxation, regardless of how the Code's language or structure may otherwise evolve.
In response to Q301, from a deontological perspective, Engineer Doe categorically failed his duty of undivided loyalty to the public. Kantian ethics requires that a moral agent act only on maxims that could be universalized without contradiction. The maxim implicit in Doe's conduct — that a public engineer may simultaneously design, officially recommend, and vote to approve his own private work — cannot be universalized without destroying the very institutional integrity that public engineering roles exist to protect. Moreover, the categorical duty of undivided loyalty is not merely aspirational under the Code; it is treated as axiomatic and non-negotiable. Doe's three roles imposed logically incompatible categorical obligations: the duty to serve his private client's interests, the duty to exercise independent professional judgment as county engineer, and the duty to exercise independent public judgment as a planning board member. A deontological framework does not permit the satisfaction of one categorical duty through the violation of another. Doe's structural arrangement therefore constituted a categorical moral failure from the moment it was established, independent of any assessment of the actual quality of his engineering work or the substantive merits of the subdivision plans.
In response to Q302, from a consequentialist perspective, the harm to public trust in county planning processes produced by Engineer Doe's self-recommendation and self-approval of his own subdivision plans substantially outweighs any efficiency or expertise benefits that might be claimed for the arrangement. The consequentialist case for Doe's triple-role arrangement rests on the premise that having the same expert engineer serve all three functions produces better-designed plans, more informed official recommendations, and more technically competent planning board decisions. Even granting these efficiency claims their maximum plausible weight, they are decisively outweighed by the systemic harms: the erosion of public confidence in the impartiality of county planning decisions; the creation of a precedent that normalizes self-review in public engineering roles; the chilling effect on legitimate public objections to subdivision plans when the objector knows the reviewing official is also the designer; and the long-term institutional damage to the credibility of county engineering and planning functions. Consequentialist analysis also requires accounting for the risk of harm, not merely actual harm: even if Doe's plans were technically sound, the structural arrangement created an unacceptable risk that private financial interests would distort official judgment, and that risk itself constitutes a consequentialist harm to the integrity of the public planning process.
In response to Q303, from a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer Doe failed to demonstrate the professional integrity and impartiality that the role of a public-service engineer demands. Virtue ethics evaluates conduct not merely by reference to rules or outcomes but by asking whether the agent's actions reflect the character traits — honesty, integrity, impartiality, practical wisdom — that constitute professional excellence. A virtuous public-service engineer, confronted with the opportunity to accept a private commission in the same domain as his official duties, would recognize immediately that accepting the commission would compromise the impartiality that his public roles require and would decline it. The practically wise engineer understands that the appearance of impartiality is itself a professional virtue in public roles, because public confidence in engineering decisions depends on the public's reasonable belief that those decisions are made without private financial motivation. Doe's acceptance of the private commission, his official recommendation of his own plans, and his vote to approve them collectively demonstrate not merely a lapse in judgment but a failure of the professional character that public engineering roles demand. The virtue ethics analysis is particularly damning because Doe's conduct was not a momentary failure under pressure but a sustained pattern of choices — accepting the commission, preparing the plans, issuing the recommendation, casting the vote — each of which a virtuous engineer would have recognized and avoided.
In response to Q304, from a deontological perspective, the mere act of disclosing a structural conflict of interest does not satisfy — and cannot substitute for — the categorical prohibition imposed by Section 8(b). Disclosure under Section 8(a) is a separate and independently obligatory duty, but it operates on a different normative plane than the non-participation duty imposed by Section 8(b). The deontological structure of the Code treats these as distinct obligations: Section 8(a) requires disclosure as a matter of transparency and respect for the autonomy of the employer or client to make informed decisions; Section 8(b) imposes a categorical prohibition on participation in conflicted official roles that is not conditioned on whether disclosure has or has not occurred. A deontological reading of Section 8(b) therefore treats it as a side-constraint — a categorical 'thou shalt not' — rather than as a factor to be weighed against the benefits of disclosure. Doe's disclosure of the conflict, had he made it, would have satisfied his Section 8(a) obligation while leaving his Section 8(b) violation fully intact. The two provisions are not alternatives; they are cumulative requirements, and satisfying one does not discharge the other.
In response to Q401, Engineer Doe's conduct would not have been ethically permissible even if he had recused himself from both the county engineer recommendation and the planning board vote on his own subdivision plans, while retaining all three roles. Recusal from specific proceedings does not cure the underlying structural conflict created by simultaneously holding public roles that are institutionally responsible for evaluating private work that Doe was paid to produce. The structural conflict exists at the level of role-holding, not merely at the level of individual official acts. Even with full recusal from both proceedings, Doe would have remained in a position where his private financial interest in the success of the subdivision plans was structurally entangled with the official functions of the county engineering office and the planning board — offices in which he continued to hold authority and influence. Furthermore, recusal from official proceedings does not eliminate the informal influence that a county engineer or planning board member exercises over colleagues and staff who must act in his absence. The only ethically permissible resolution, once the commission was accepted, was to resign from one or both public roles — not to attempt partial recusal while retaining the structural conflict.
In response to Q402, if Engineer Doe had declined the private consulting commission for the subdivision development at the outset, his simultaneous service as county engineer and planning board member would not necessarily have been ethically impermissible under the Code, provided that appropriate structural safeguards were in place to prevent conflicts from arising in the exercise of those dual public roles. The Code does not categorically prohibit an engineer from holding multiple public roles simultaneously; what it prohibits is the exploitation of those roles to advance private financial interests or to exercise official authority over one's own private work. Dual public service roles can create their own conflicts — for example, if the county engineer's recommendations systematically favor outcomes that benefit the planning board's institutional interests — but absent a specific private financial interest entangling the two roles, the dual public service arrangement is not per se impermissible. The ethical problem in Doe's case was not the combination of public roles but the introduction of a private financial interest that made those roles instruments of self-dealing. Declining the private commission would have preserved the integrity of both public roles and avoided the structural conflict that made the entire arrangement impermissible.
In response to Q403, the ethical analysis would have been somewhat less severe — but not categorically different — if Engineer Doe had held only one of the two public roles rather than both simultaneously. If Doe had held only the county engineer role, he would still have violated Section 8(b) by officially recommending approval of his own privately prepared plans to the planning board, because the county engineer's advisory function over his own private work constitutes a standalone conflict. If Doe had held only the planning board member role, he would have violated Section 8(b) by voting to approve plans he had privately prepared and had a financial interest in seeing approved. In either single-role scenario, the conflict is real and the violation is established. However, the triple-role arrangement is qualitatively more serious than either single-role scenario because it eliminates every institutional check that might otherwise have provided some corrective: the county engineer's recommendation and the planning board's vote are the two primary safeguards in the subdivision approval process, and Doe's control of both — in addition to his role as designer — meant that no independent official review of his private work occurred at any stage of the process. The single-role scenarios are violations; the triple-role scenario is a systematic capture of the entire approval process.
In response to Q404, if the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct had remained the controlling standard, the outcome of Engineer Doe's case would not have been materially different. The prior Board of Ethical Review cases — BER Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5 — consistently applied the axiomatic principle of undivided loyalty and the prohibition on self-serving advisory conduct in public roles to fact patterns closely analogous to Doe's. The foundational ethical norm against public-service conflicts of interest was firmly established under the Canons, and the new Code's Section 8(b) represents a codification and clarification of that norm rather than a substantive departure from it. The transition to the new Code does not represent a stricter standard in the sense of imposing new obligations that did not previously exist; rather, it represents a more explicit and systematically organized articulation of obligations that were already axiomatic under the Canons. The practical effect of the transition is therefore to make the prohibition more legible and harder to contest on textual grounds, without changing the underlying ethical judgment that Doe's conduct was impermissible. Engineers who might have argued under the Canons that the prohibition was implicit or ambiguous cannot make that argument under the new Code's explicit Section 8(b) language.
The tension between the disclosure-as-cure principle and the absolute structural conflict prohibition was resolved categorically in favor of the latter. In Engineer Doe's case, the Board implicitly determined that Section 8(b)'s prohibition on public-service conflicts is not a disclosure-conditioned rule but an absolute bar. Disclosure — the mechanism that can sometimes rehabilitate private-sector conflicts of interest — is structurally incapable of curing a situation where the same engineer designs plans, officially recommends them in a public capacity, and then votes to approve them on a public board. The disclosure obligation under Section 8(a) retains a residual function even in absolute-prohibition cases: it signals to the public and to institutional actors that a conflict exists, thereby triggering institutional duties to reassign or disqualify the conflicted engineer. But disclosure does not itself satisfy, reduce, or waive the substantive prohibition. This case teaches that disclosure and prohibition are not alternative remedies on a spectrum — they operate on different normative planes, and where structural self-review is present, prohibition is non-negotiable regardless of transparency.
The principle of axiomatic undivided loyalty — which demands that an engineer's professional allegiance be singular and uncompromised — collides irreconcilably with the structural reality of Engineer Doe's triple-role arrangement. Doe simultaneously owed loyalty to his private client (the subdivision developer), to the county as his public employer, and to the general public whose welfare the planning board is constitutionally charged with protecting. These three loyalty obligations are not merely in tension; they are logically incompatible in the specific transactional context where the same plans are the object of all three relationships. The Board's conclusion resolves this tension by establishing a clear hierarchy: public welfare paramount supersedes both employer loyalty and client loyalty when an engineer holds public authority over the very work product generated for a private client. This case teaches that the principle of undivided loyalty is not simply about avoiding favoritism — it is about the structural impossibility of rendering impartial professional judgment when one's private financial interest and one's public decisional authority converge on the same object. No degree of subjective good faith can substitute for the objective structural separation that the Code demands.
The principle that inescapable ethical violations must be recognized and avoided at the role-acceptance stage takes clear precedence over the principle that public-service engineers may engage in private practice under abstention-conditioned circumstances. The case establishes that abstention-conditioned private practice is a legitimate arrangement only when genuine abstention remains structurally possible — that is, when the engineer can actually step aside from official duties without those duties themselves being the mechanism of approval for the private work. In Engineer Doe's situation, both of his public roles (county engineer and planning board member) independently required him to act on his own private plans, making genuine abstention impossible without abandoning the public roles entirely. The ethical violation therefore became irremediable not at the moment of the vote, nor at the moment of the official recommendation, but at the earlier moment when Doe accepted the private consulting commission knowing that both public roles would require him to exercise official authority over that same work. This case teaches that the ethics code's living-document adaptability — its capacity to evolve — does not extend to relaxing the categorical bar on structural self-review in public engineering roles, because that bar is itself an expression of the non-waivable public welfare paramount principle, which anchors the entire Code and cannot be traded away through incremental doctrinal evolution.
Conflict of Interest Disqualification Standard
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer, then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board
As a member of the county planning board he later voted to approve these plans
Establishes the recusal/disqualification obligation triggered when a public official or reviewing engineer has a direct financial or professional interest in the work under review — applicable to both Doe's recommendation as county engineer and his vote as planning board member
Conflict of Interest Avoidance Doe Triple Role Public Service
Doe's triple-role structure created a textbook conflict of interest between his private financial interest in plan approval and his public duties as county engineer and planning board member.
John Doe was required to avoid the conflict of interest created by simultaneously serving as private designer, county engineer recommending approval, and planning board member voting on the same subdivision plans.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); General conflict of interest avoidance principles
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer, then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board.
Throughout the period Doe held all three roles simultaneously
As a member of the county planning board he later voted to approve these plans.
The situation transitions from a latent structural risk (holding multiple roles) to an active, concrete conflict of interest with direct financial and professional self-interest implications for John Doe across all three of his simultaneous capacities.
Upon completion of consulting plan preparation and exercise of official roles
Upon John Doe preparing private consulting plans and then occupying the roles of county engineer and planning board member simultaneously, a concrete, tripartite conflict of interest came into existence: the same individual stood as creator, official recommender, and approving voter of the same plans.
Conflict of Interest Materialized (Event 3) → Ethics Case Submitted to NSPE (Event 6)
The conduct of John Doe became the subject of an NSPE ethics case review, triggering formal analysis of whether his simultaneous private and public roles violated the Code of Ethics
Had the conflict of interest not materialized, for example, had Doe recused himself at any stage, there would be no documented conflicted conduct to submit for ethics review; the case would lack a factual predicate
A triggering submission by a complainant or reviewing body
Doe's actual conflicted conduct across three roles
NSPE's jurisdiction and the new Code's applicability
The conflict being of sufficient severity and documentation to warrant formal review
Materialized conflict of interest + official actions taken under conflict + NSPE Code applicability = sufficient basis for formal ethics case
The combination of all three conflicted actions (private authorship, official recommendation, planning board vote) created an undeniable and documented pattern sufficient to compel review
County Engineer Own-Plans Recommendation Prohibition Doe Subdivision Plans
Doe used his county engineer role to formally recommend approval of plans he had privately prepared and for which he had a direct financial interest.
County Engineer Own-Plans Recommendation Prohibition Constraint
John Doe, as county engineer, was prohibited from recommending approval of the subdivision plans he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, because his governmental recommendation authority created an irresolvable conflict of interest with his private financial interest in approval.
then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board
At the time Doe, as county engineer, submitted and recommended the subdivision plans to the planning board
Should Engineer Doe accept the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans when he simultaneously holds the roles of county engineer and planning board member, knowing that the plans will foreseeably be submitted for his own recommendation and vote?
Engineer Doe simultaneously holds two public governmental roles — county engineer (with authority to recommend subdivision plans to the planning board) and planning board member (with authority to vote on those same plans) — while also maintaining an active private consulting practice. A subdivision developer approaches Doe and offers him a private commission to prepare subdivision plans that will foreseeably be submitted through the exact governmental channels Doe controls. At this foundational moment, before any plans are drawn or submitted, Doe must decide whether to accept the private commission.
Refuse the subdivision developer's offer to prepare the plans, recognizing that accepting it while holding both public roles creates an irreconcilable structural conflict of interest in which self-approval is a foreseeable and inescapable outcome — thereby preserving the integrity of both public roles.
Withdraw from the county engineer position, the planning board membership, or both before accepting the private commission, thereby eliminating the structural conflict at its source and ensuring that no self-approval pathway exists when the plans are submitted.
Accept the developer's commission and proceed to prepare the subdivision plans while continuing to serve as county engineer and planning board member, relying on anticipated disclosure to cure the resulting conflicts — the path Engineer Doe actually took, which created the triple-role self-approval structure.
County Engineer and Planning Board Member in Private Practice
Should Engineer Doe issue an official county engineer recommendation regarding subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, and if so, what form should that recommendation take?
Having accepted the private commission and prepared the subdivision plans, Engineer Doe must now fulfill his duties as county engineer, which include reviewing subdivision plans submitted to the county and issuing a recommendation to the planning board. The plans he privately prepared for the developer are now before him in his official capacity. Doe must decide how to handle his county engineer recommendation function with respect to plans he personally designed and has a direct financial interest in seeing approved.
Formally withdraw from the county engineer recommendation role with respect to these specific plans, arrange for an independent engineer to conduct the technical review and issue the recommendation to the planning board, and disclose the conflict of interest to the county — thereby preserving the independent review function the county engineer role is designed to provide.
Proceed to recommend approval of the subdivision plans in the official county engineer capacity, as Engineer Doe actually did — a structurally self-serving act that eliminates independent technical review, divides loyalty between the county and the private client, and activates the absolute Section 8(b) prohibition regardless of any disclosure made.
Recommend rejection or modification of the plans in the county engineer capacity, ostensibly to avoid the appearance of self-approval — but this option itself constitutes a conflict, as Doe would be using his public authority to harm his private client's interests, equally violating the undivided loyalty obligation from the opposite direction.
County Engineer Reviewing Self-Designed Plans
Should Engineer Doe participate in the planning board's deliberation and vote on subdivision plans that he personally designed in his private consulting capacity and for which he has already issued a favorable recommendation as county engineer?
The subdivision plans that Engineer Doe privately prepared have been submitted to the county planning board — the body on which Doe sits as a member — and are now scheduled for deliberation and vote. Doe has already issued a favorable recommendation in his county engineer capacity. As a planning board member, he must now decide how to participate in the board's consideration of plans in which he holds a direct private financial interest as their designer.
Formally abstain from all planning board activity related to the subdivision plans — including discussion, deliberation, recommendation, and vote — disclosing the private financial interest to the board and withdrawing from the room during consideration, thereby satisfying the abstention condition that is the minimum prerequisite for any permissibility of private services by commission members.
Disclose the private consulting relationship to the board and then cast an affirmative vote to approve the plans — the path Engineer Doe actually took — treating disclosure as a cure for the conflict and proceeding to participate fully in the approval of plans in which he holds a direct financial interest, in violation of the absolute recusal obligation.
Engage in board discussion and deliberation about the plans while abstaining only from the formal vote — a partial recusal that fails to satisfy the full abstention obligation, as the prohibition extends to all participation including discussion and recommendation, not merely the formal voting act.
Planning Board Member Voting on Self-Designed Plans
Can Engineer Doe rely on disclosure of his conflicts of interest under the general ethics code provisions to cure or excuse his participation in governmental decisions about plans he privately prepared, or does the absolute public-service prohibition foreclose disclosure as a remedy?
Engineer Doe, aware of the potential conflict created by his triple-role arrangement, considers whether to invoke the disclosure provisions of the ethics code — specifically the general conflict disclosure requirements — as a mechanism to render his conduct permissible. He must decide whether disclosure to the relevant parties (the county, the planning board, or the developer) is sufficient to cure the structural conflicts arising from his simultaneous roles as private designer, county engineer recommender, and planning board voter.
Disclose the private consulting relationship to the county and planning board under the general conflict-of-interest provisions, then proceed to recommend and vote on the plans on the theory that disclosure satisfies all ethical obligations — the approach Engineer Doe took, which the Board found to be categorically insufficient because the absolute Section 8(b) prohibition is not subject to a disclosure exception for public service engineers.
Acknowledge that the absolute prohibition applicable to public service engineers cannot be cured by disclosure, and respond by withdrawing from one or both public roles — county engineer or planning board member — before the plans are submitted, thereby eliminating the governmental authority that makes the conflict irremediable.
Claim that the conflict is unavoidable given the small-jurisdiction context where qualified engineers are scarce, invoke the unavoidable-conflict exception available to private-practice engineers, make full disclosure, and proceed — an approach that fails because the unavoidable-conflict exception does not apply to public service engineers, for whom the Section 8(b) prohibition is absolute and admits no exception based on necessity or unavoidability.
Public Service Engineer Assessing Disclosure as Conflict Cure
At what stage could Engineer Doe have taken remedial action to restore ethical compliance, and what would that remedial action have required — and does partial remediation (such as recusing only from the board vote) satisfy the ethical obligations implicated by the triple-role structure?
Looking retrospectively at the full sequence of Engineer Doe's conduct — accepting dual public roles while in private practice, accepting the private commission, recommending his own plans as county engineer, and voting to approve them as a planning board member — the question arises whether any single remedial action taken at any intermediate stage could have rendered his overall conduct ethically permissible, or whether the violation was irremediable from the moment the triple-role structure was created.
At the earliest decision point — before accepting the developer's commission — decline the engagement entirely, recognizing that the triple-role structure makes ethical compliance impossible; this is the only action that prevents the structural conflict from arising and preserves the integrity of both public roles without requiring resignation from either.
After preparing the plans and issuing the county engineer recommendation, recuse only from the planning board vote while allowing the recommendation to stand — a partial remediation that the Board found insufficient, because the county engineer recommendation itself independently violated the absolute prohibition, and recusal from the vote alone does not cure the prior self-serving recommendation.
Upon recognizing — at any stage after accepting the private commission but before issuing the recommendation or casting the vote — that the structural conflict is irremediable, resign from both the county engineer position and the planning board membership, thereby eliminating the governmental authority that makes self-approval possible, even though this remediation comes too late to cure the initial violation of accepting the commission.
Engineer in Triple-Role Structural Conflict Seeking Remediation
Disclosure-Insufficient Self-Review Conflict Irresolvability Doe Structural Position
The case involves a structural self-review conflict where Doe's governmental authority over his own private work product cannot be neutralized by transparency measures alone.
Disclosure-Insufficient Self-Review Conflict Irresolvability Constraint
John Doe's structural conflict — requiring him to recommend and vote on his own engineering work — could not be cured by mere disclosure to the developer, the county, or the planning board; complete withdrawal from one or more of the conflicting roles was required.
Doe preparing subdivision plans (as consulting engineer) before Doe recommending approval of plans (as county engineer)
Doe preparing subdivision plans (as consulting engineer)
Doe recommending approval of plans (as county engineer)
Doe preparing subdivision plans (as consulting engineer) before Doe voting to approve plans (as planning board member)
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer... As a member of the county planning board he later voted to approve these plans
Doe voting to approve plans (as planning board member)
Doe recommending approval of plans (as county engineer) before Doe voting to approve plans (as planning board member)
then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board. As a member of the county planning board he later voted to approve these plans
Doe's part-time consulting practice overlaps Doe's role as county engineer
John Doe, a professional engineer, is a county engineer and a member of the county planning board. He also engages in part-time consulting practice.
Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
Doe's part-time consulting practice overlaps Doe's role as planning board member
Doe's role as county engineer overlaps Doe's role as planning board member
Dual Public-Private Employment Ethics Standard
John Doe, a professional engineer, is a county engineer
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer
Governs Doe's simultaneous role as county engineer (public employment) and private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans — directly implicated when the two roles intersect on the same project
Dual Public-Private Role Interrelated Domain Conflict Non-Participation Doe Consulting Practice
Doe's private consulting work (preparing subdivision plans) was in the exact same domain as his public roles (county engineer reviewing and planning board member approving subdivision plans).
Dual Public-Private Role Interrelated Domain Conflict Non-Participation Constraint
John Doe was prohibited from accepting private consulting commissions in the same substantive domain (subdivision plan preparation subject to county planning board approval) as his governmental roles (county engineer and planning board member), because the interrelationship created a foreseeable and actual conflict of interest.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); BER Cases 67-1, 02-8
John Doe, a professional engineer, is a county engineer and a member of the county planning board.
From the time Doe accepted the private consulting commission while holding both public roles
He also engages in part-time consulting practice.
Dual Role Self-Review Conflict Prohibition Doe County Engineer Planning Board
Doe's governmental roles required independent objective review of engineering plans, while his private consulting role made him the designer of those same plans — a paradigmatic self-review conflict.
Dual Role Self-Review Conflict Prohibition Constraint
John Doe was prohibited from simultaneously serving in roles requiring independent objective review (county engineer recommendation + planning board vote) and as designer/consultant for the same work (private preparation of subdivision plans), as the structural conflict of self-review rendered both roles ethically impermissible to hold concurrently.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); BER Case 94-5
Engineer Doe Axiomatic Professional Loyalty Non-Division Self-Application
Axiomatic Professional Loyalty Non-Division Principle Self-Application Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize and self-apply the axiomatic principle from BER Case 60-5 that a professional may not take action or make decisions that divide loyalties — identifying that simultaneously designing plans, recommending their approval, and voting on them constitutes a paradigmatic loyalty division
The BER cited the axiomatic loyalty principle from Case 60-5 as foundational to its analysis, indicating that Engineer Doe should have recognized this principle and declined the conflicted engagement
Failure to self-apply this axiomatic principle — Engineer Doe accepted the private commission and proceeded with the triple-role arrangement despite the foundational axiomatic prohibition on loyalty division established in BER Case 60-5
Engineer Doe Disclosure Insufficiency Self-Review Conflict Recognition
Disclosure Insufficiency Recognition for Self-Review Conflict Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that disclosure of his conflict under Sections 8 and 8(a) was insufficient to cure the Section 8(b) violation — understanding that in public service self-review conflicts, disclosure does not remedy the structural impossibility of ethical compliance
The BER explicitly stated that the broader disclosure provisions of Section 8 and 8(a) do not condone the violation and do not excuse compliance
Failure to recognize disclosure insufficiency — Engineer Doe apparently relied on or could have relied on disclosure provisions that are inapplicable to the absolute public service prohibition
The broader language of Section 8 and Section 8(a), which requires that the Engineer will inform his client or employer of any possible conflict of interest, does not condone the violation in this case.
Section 8(b) is specific in prohibiting the type of conflict of interest here involved.
Engineer Doe Dual Role Planning Board Self-Recusal
Dual Role Planning Board Engineer Self-Recusal Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that plans he prepared in private practice would come before the planning board on which he served, and to recuse from all review, recommendation, and voting functions with respect to those plans
Engineer Doe served as a planning board member and voted on or participated in the approval of subdivision plans he personally prepared as a private consultant
Failure to recuse — Engineer Doe participated in the governmental approval process for plans he personally prepared in private practice, rather than recusing from all such participation
In his capacity as an engineer in private practice he prepared plans for approval by a governmental body on which he served as a member.
Engineer Doe Inescapable Ethical Violation Acceptance Prohibition Self-Application
Inescapable Ethical Violation Acceptance Prohibition Self-Application Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that accepting the private consulting commission while simultaneously holding the county engineer and planning board roles created a situation in which every available course of action resulted in an ethical violation, and that the only permissible response was to decline the commission at inception
The BER's analysis implies that Engineer Doe should have recognized the structural impossibility of ethical compliance before accepting the private commission, making declination the only permissible option
Failure to apply this capability — Engineer Doe accepted the commission despite the structural impossibility of ethical compliance, proceeding through all three conflicted roles
It is abundantly clear that Engineer Doe's operations were in direct conflict with Section 8(b) of the Code.
The prohibition is absolute and mandatory.
Engineer Doe Public Service Absolute Prohibition Non-Disclosure-Cure Recognition
Public Service Engineer Absolute Conflict Prohibition Non-Disclosure-Cure Recognition Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that his disclosure of the conflict under Sections 8 and 8(a) did not cure or excuse the Section 8(b) violation, and that the public service prohibition is absolute and mandatory with no disclosure-based exception
Engineer Doe simultaneously served as county engineer and planning board member while preparing subdivision plans in private practice, apparently relying on disclosure provisions that do not apply to public service engineers
Failure to recognize this capability — Engineer Doe apparently believed that informing his client or employer of the conflict under Section 8/8(a) would suffice, when in fact Section 8(b)'s absolute prohibition for public service engineers admits no such exception
Neither does it excuse compliance on the condition that the Engineer inform his client or employer of all the pertinent circumstances.
Engineer Doe Section 8b Public Service Non-Participation Scope Assessment
Section 8(b) Public Service Non-Participation Provision Scope and Applicability Assessment Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to correctly assess the scope and applicability of Section 8(b) — recognizing that as county engineer and planning board member, he was 'in public service as a member, advisor, or employee of a governmental body' and therefore prohibited from participating in considerations with respect to his own private engineering services
The BER found it 'abundantly clear' that Engineer Doe's operations were in direct conflict with Section 8(b), indicating he failed to correctly assess the provision's applicability to his situation
Failure to correctly apply Section 8(b) — Engineer Doe proceeded with the private commission and participated in the governmental approval process despite the clear applicability of Section 8(b)'s prohibition
Engineer Doe Single-Public-Role County Engineer Conflict Sufficiency Recognition
Single-Public-Role Conflict Prohibition Sufficiency Recognition Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that his county engineer role alone — with responsibility to submit plans to the planning board with recommendation — was independently sufficient to trigger the Section 8(b) prohibition, even without his additional planning board membership
The BER found that Engineer Doe would have violated Section 8(b) even if he had not been a planning board member, by virtue of his county engineer role and its plan submission responsibility
Failure to recognize this capability — Engineer Doe did not appreciate that the county engineer recommendation responsibility alone prohibited him from preparing the subdivision plans in private practice, independent of his planning board membership
He would be in violation of Section 8(b) even if he had not been a member of the county planning board by virtue of his employment as the county engineer and the responsibility of the county engineer to submit the plans to the county planning board with recommendation.
Engineer Doe Triple-Role Structural Conflict Recognition
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Recognition Capability
Engineer Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that simultaneously serving as private designer, county engineer with recommendation authority, and planning board voting member for the same subdivision plans created a structural conflict so severe that no procedural remedy could cure it
The BER found Engineer Doe's operations in direct conflict with Section 8(b), with the triple-role structure being the paradigmatic case of prohibited public service conflict
Failure to recognize the triple-role structural conflict — Engineer Doe accepted the private commission and proceeded through all three roles without recognizing the irreconcilable structural conflict
John Doe's conduct transitions from a completed private ethical failure to a matter of formal professional institutional scrutiny, with potential consequences for his license, reputation, and the broader normative guidance issued to the profession.
After approval vote recorded; during Discussion/analysis phase
The conduct of John Doe became the subject of an NSPE ethics case review, triggering formal analysis of his tripartite role conflict against the new Code of Ethics and prior precedents.
Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Irresolvable Conflict Recognition Doe Triple Role
Doe's private consulting work was in the exact same subject matter domain as both of his public roles, making the conflict more extreme than adjacent-domain cases and irresolvable by ordinary mitigation.
Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Irresolvable Conflict Recognition Constraint
John Doe was required to recognize that his simultaneous roles as county engineer, planning board member, and private consultant preparing plans subject to both roles constituted an extreme same-domain conflict that was virtually impossible to resolve through disclosure or consent alone.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); BER Case 07-12
From the moment Doe contemplated accepting the private consulting commission
John Doe Abstention-Conditioned Commission Permissibility Self-Assessment
Abstention-Conditioned Commission Member Private Services Permissibility Self-Assessment Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to assess whether providing private engineering services to a subdivision developer whose plans would come before the planning board was permissible — recognizing that even if abstention-conditioned permissibility applied, it required complete abstention from discussion and vote, and that his additional role as county engineer recommender made even abstention-conditioned permissibility unavailable
John Doe served as a planning board member while providing private engineering services to a subdivision developer whose plans came before the board, and also served as county engineer with recommendation authority over those same plans
Failure to correctly assess that the abstention-conditioned permissibility exception was unavailable given his county engineer recommendation role — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe BER Five-Precedent Dual-Role Synthesis Application
BER Five-Precedent Dual-Role Municipal Engineer Conflict Spectrum Synthesis Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to retrieve and synthesize the BER precedent corpus on dual-role municipal engineer conflicts — including BER 62-7, 74-2, 82-4, 75-7, and 67-12 — and to correctly apply the synthesized framework to recognize that his triple-role structure fell at the most severe end of the conflict spectrum, where no permissibility exception was available
John Doe's triple-role conflict is the paradigmatic case addressed by the BER dual-role municipal engineer precedent corpus, particularly BER 67-12 (county engineer self-approval prohibition)
The capability was required for correct ethical self-assessment but was not exercised, as evidenced by John Doe's acceptance and execution of all three conflicting roles
John Doe County Engineer Self-Designed Plan Recommendation Non-Issuance
Part-Time Municipal Engineer Private Plan Approval Recommendation Non-Issuance Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that recommending approval of subdivision plans he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity was ethically prohibited in his county engineer role
As county engineer, John Doe recommended approval of the very subdivision plans he had prepared as a private consulting engineer
Failure to refrain from recommending approval of self-designed plans — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Disclosure Insufficiency Self-Review Conflict Recognition
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that in a triple-role self-approval conflict, disclosure of the conflict to the planning board or county authorities was insufficient to cure the ethical violation, and that the only permissible resolution was declining the private consulting commission or one of the public roles
John Doe's simultaneous roles as designer, recommender, and voter on the same plans created a self-review conflict that disclosure alone could not cure
The case facts imply no disclosure was made and no role was declined — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Heightened Scrutiny
Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Conflict Heightened Scrutiny Self-Application Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that his triple-role conflict — involving exact same-domain overlap between his private design work and his public approval authority — required heightened ethical scrutiny beyond ordinary conflict-of-interest analysis, and that the overlap was so complete as to be virtually impossible to manage through disclosure or procedural safeguards
John Doe's private consulting work (subdivision design) was in the exact same domain as his public roles (county engineer reviewing subdivision plans, planning board member approving subdivision plans)
Failure to apply heightened scrutiny to the same-domain triple-role structure — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Multi-Hat Adequate Representation Impossibility Recognition
Multi-Hat Dual-Client Adequate Representation Impossibility Self-Recognition Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that simultaneously wearing three professional hats — private designer for the developer, county engineer for the county, and planning board member for the public — made it structurally impossible to adequately represent the separate and sometimes differing interests of all parties
John Doe simultaneously owed duties to the private developer client (as designer), to the county (as county engineer), and to the public (as planning board member) — interests that were structurally incompatible on the same project
Failure to recognize the impossibility of adequate multi-party representation — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Planning Board Self-Designed Plan Voting Recusal
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that voting on subdivision plans he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity required mandatory recusal from the planning board vote
As a planning board member, John Doe voted to approve the subdivision plans he had personally prepared as a private consulting engineer
Failure to recuse from the planning board vote on self-designed plans — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Same-Domain Government-Private Dual Role Conflict Abstention
Same-Domain Government-Private Dual Role Conflict Abstention Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that his private consulting practice in subdivision design — the exact same domain as his county engineer and planning board roles — created an irreconcilable conflict requiring abstention from one or more roles, not merely disclosure
John Doe's private subdivision design work was in the exact same domain as his public county engineer and planning board roles, creating a same-domain conflict of maximum severity
Failure to abstain from the conflicting private consulting commission or from the public approval roles — the capability was required but not exercised
John Doe Structurally Impossible Compliance Commission Declination
Structurally Impossible Compliance Ethical Declination Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize at the moment of accepting the private consulting commission that his simultaneous roles as county engineer and planning board member made ethical compliance with all obligations structurally impossible, and that the only permissible response was to decline the commission
John Doe accepted a private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans while simultaneously serving as county engineer (with plan recommendation authority) and planning board member (with voting authority)
Failure to decline the private commission at inception — the capability was required but not exercised, leading to the triple-role conflict
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Subdivision design and planning', 'engagement_type': 'Part-time private consulting'}
Prepared subdivision development plans in a private consulting capacity, which were subsequently submitted for governmental approval through the very county bodies on which Doe himself sits — creating a direct conflict between private design obligations and public approval authority.
{'type': 'conflict_with', 'target': 'John Doe County Engineer Planning Board Member'}
{'type': 'provider', 'target': 'Subdivision Development Client'}
John Doe Triple-Role Irreconcilable Conflict Recognition
Dual-Role Irreconcilable Conflict Identification Capability
John Doe was required to possess the capability to recognize that simultaneously serving as private designer, county engineer recommender, and planning board voter on the same subdivision plans created an irreconcilable triple-role conflict that could not be managed through disclosure alone
John Doe simultaneously prepared subdivision plans in private practice, recommended their approval as county engineer, and voted to approve them as a planning board member
Recognition that the three roles — designer, recommender, and voter — are mutually reinforcing and structurally incompatible on the same project
Municipal Engineer Dual Role Ethics Standard
as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board
John Doe (PE) in his role as county engineer recommending approval of his own plans
Directly governs the prohibition on a municipal/county engineer reviewing or recommending approval of their own privately-prepared design work in a public advisory capacity
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct (pre-Code)
although neither the Canons nor Rules referred specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' we observed that, 'it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client.'
Board of Ethical Review in tracing the evolution of conflict-of-interest doctrine
Referenced as the prior governing framework under which cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5 were decided; noted as not explicitly mentioning 'conflict of interest' but implying loyalty obligations
Pre-Code of Ethics version, prevailing through at least 1963
John Doe (PE) and ethics reviewers evaluating his conduct
Primary normative authority governing Doe's obligations as a professional engineer holding simultaneous public and private roles, including conflict of interest and impartiality requirements
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers – Section 8 (Conflict of Interest)
Since those cases were decided the Code of Ethics has been promulgated as the controlling document, and it is now more explicit on the point raised by this case.
Board of Ethical Review in evaluating Engineer Doe's conduct
Cited as the controlling document establishing the absolute prohibition on engineers in public service participating in decisions regarding their own private practice work; Sections 8, 8(a), and 8(b) are each individually analyzed
Post-1963 promulgation (superseding Canons of Ethics)
NSPE BER Canons-to-Code Transition Multi-Precedent Synthesis Engineer Doe Case
BER Multi-Precedent Canons-to-Code Transition Conflict Standard Evolution Synthesis Capability
The NSPE BER demonstrated the capability to retrieve and synthesize cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5 decided under prior Canons, recognize the Canons-to-Code transition, and apply the current Code as the more explicit and controlling document
The BER used this synthesis capability to establish that while prior cases established foundational principles, the current Code is now more explicit and controlling on the conflict-of-interest prohibition for public service engineers
The BER's discussion explicitly cited the four prior cases, noted they were decided under the then-prevailing Canons, acknowledged the axiomatic loyalty principle from Case 60-5, and then applied the current Code of Ethics as the controlling and more explicit document
Our previous decisions in cases of this type (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct.
NSPE decisions on cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5 under old Canons before promulgation of new Code of Ethics
Our previous decisions in cases of this type (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics... Since those cases were decided the Code of Ethics has been promulgated as the controlling document
NSPE decisions on cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5 under old Canons
The operative normative framework governing John Doe's subsequent conduct shifts from the older Canons to the new Code of Ethics; the standards against which his actions will be judged are now more explicit and evolved.
After prior cases decided; before John Doe's conduct
Following the prior ethics case decisions, NSPE promulgated a new Code of Ethics that superseded the older Canons, establishing a revised and more explicit normative framework governing conflicts of interest and dual-role conduct.
New Code of Ethics Promulgated (Event 2) → Ethics Case Submitted to NSPE (Event 6)
Following the prior ethics case decisions, NSPE promulgated a new Code of Ethics that superseded the older Canons, establishing the normative framework under which Doe's conduct became the subject of an NSPE ethics case review
New Code of Ethics Promulgated (Event 2)
Had the new Code of Ethics not been promulgated, or had Doe's conduct not violated its provisions, the formal ethics case submission would lack a normative foundation; the case might still have been submitted under older canons but would be evaluated under a superseded framework
A complainant or reviewing body with standing to submit the case
Doe's conduct falling within the scope of the Code's prohibitions
Existence of an applicable NSPE Code of Ethics with conflict-of-interest provisions
Prior precedent cases (Event 1) establishing interpretive context
John Doe (primary); NSPE (institutional framework)
Promulgated Code of Ethics + Doe's documented conflicted conduct + NSPE review jurisdiction = sufficient basis for ethics case submission
Without the Code, Doe's conduct would lack a formal normative standard against which to be judged
An official county engineering recommendation, tainted by undisclosed conflict of interest, now exists in the public record and will foreseeably influence the planning board's deliberation and vote.
After private consulting plans were prepared; before planning board vote
As a direct outcome of John Doe's act of recommending his own plans in his capacity as county engineer, an official county recommendation in favor of the subdivision plans entered the formal record, carrying the institutional weight of the county engineer's professional endorsement.
Part-Time Public Advisory Engineer Scrupulous Impartiality Doe County Engineer Consulting
Doe's recommendation as county engineer directly served his private financial interest in having the subdivision plans approved, violating the scrupulous impartiality required of part-time public engineers.
Part-Time Public Advisory Engineer Scrupulous Impartiality Constraint
John Doe, as a part-time county engineer maintaining a private consulting practice, was required to be scrupulously careful that his advisory and recommendation functions in the public role were not influenced by his private commercial interest in the approval of his own plans — a standard he violated by recommending approval of his own privately-prepared subdivision plans.
Throughout Doe's simultaneous service as county engineer and private consultant
Planning Board Member Own-Plans Voting Prohibition Doe Planning Board Vote
Doe cast a vote as a planning board member to approve plans he had personally prepared and financially benefited from as a private consultant.
Planning Board Member Own-Plans Voting Prohibition Constraint
John Doe, as a member of the county planning board, was absolutely prohibited from voting to approve the subdivision plans he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); BER Case 67-1
At the time the county planning board voted on the subdivision plans Doe privately prepared
Post-Code-Amendment BER Precedent Supersession Doe Prior Canons Cases
The BER notes that prior cases were decided under the former Canons which did not explicitly mention 'conflict of interest,' and that the new Code Section 8(b) definitively resolves the question previously left open.
Post-Code-Amendment BER Precedent Supersession Constraint
Prior BER cases decided under the former Canons of Ethics (Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) — which did not contain an explicit conflict-of-interest provision — are not controlling authority for Doe's obligations under the new NSPE Code Section 8(b), which definitively resolves the previously ambiguous question.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8(b); BER Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5
From the effective date of the new NSPE Code of Ethics containing Section 8(b)
Creation of a personal financial stake in the governmental approval of those plans
Foreseeable requirement that he, in his public roles, would need to evaluate and act upon his own privately prepared work
Placement of himself in a position where his public duties as county engineer and planning board member would directly intersect with his private financial interest
Contractual obligation to private consulting client to prepare competent engineering plans
Public trust in governmental engineering oversight
Separation of private financial interests from public regulatory duties
Fulfill private consulting contract obligations, earn consulting fees, and produce approvable subdivision development plans for his private client
Section 8(b): Prohibition on providing private engineering services that will foreseeably require participation in governmental consideration or action in one's public capacity
Knowledge of applicable engineering standards and local planning requirements
Professional judgment to recognize conflict-of-interest implications of accepting the engagement
Subdivision development engineering and plan preparation
Step 1, first in the sequence of events; prior to any recommendation or vote
Axiomatic duty not to divide loyalties between private client and public employer (per Case No. 60-5)
Duty of impartiality owed to the public as planning board member
Duty of loyalty and impartiality owed to county government as county engineer
Section 8: Duty to endeavor to avoid conflicts of interest with employer (county government) or client
Doe, acting in his capacity as a private consulting engineer, prepared the engineering plans for a subdivision development, thereby creating a direct personal and financial interest in the approval of those plans by the very governmental body on which he served.
Preparing Private Consulting Plans (Action 2) → Recommending Own Plans Officially (Action 3)
Doe, acting in his official capacity as county engineer, formally recommended approval of the subdivision plans that he himself had prepared in his private consulting capacity
Preparing Private Consulting Plans (Action 2)
Had Doe not prepared the private plans, there would have been no self-recommendation; had he recused himself as county engineer, a different official would have issued the recommendation
Recommending Own Plans Officially (Action 3)
Absence of a substitute reviewer or recusal mechanism
Doe's occupancy of the county engineer role with authority to issue formal recommendations
Existence of privately prepared plans requiring official county engineer review
Plans reaching the stage of formal county review
Any one factor absent (e.g., recusal) would have broken the causal link
Private authorship of plans + official review authority over those same plans + no recusal = self-recommendation outcome
Prior Canons Cases Superseded by New Code Engineer Doe Analysis
BER acknowledgment that prior cases were decided under different governing documents and that the new Code is now the controlling document with more explicit conflict-of-interest provisions
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (analysis of Engineer Doe case)
The prior BER decisions in Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, and 63-5 — decided under the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct, which did not explicitly reference 'conflict of interest' — were not controlling authority for the Engineer Doe case, which was governed by the new Code of Ethics and its explicit Section 8(b) provision, representing a more explicit and stricter standard that superseded the prior Canons-based framework.
NSPE Code of Ethics (new); former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct (superseded)
From the promulgation of the new Code of Ethics onward
A body of precedent on dual-role conflicts is established under the old Canons, creating a reference baseline against which future conduct and the new Code will be measured.
Prior to main events (1960s, before new Code promulgation)
NSPE adjudicated related ethics cases (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) under the older Canons of Ethics, establishing precedent for conflict-of-interest analysis in dual-role engineering scenarios.
Professional engineering ethics bodies and regulatory frameworks
Public Official Conflict of Interest Standard
John Doe (PE) in his role as county planning board member
Governs Doe's obligation as a planning board member to recuse himself from voting on plans he personally prepared and financially benefited from as a private consultant
Public Official Private Plan Approval Participation Prohibition Doe County Engineer
Doe held simultaneous public roles (county engineer + planning board member) and a private consulting role, and exercised governmental authority over his own privately-prepared plans.
Public Official Private Plan Approval Participation Prohibition Constraint
John Doe, as a public official (county engineer and planning board member), was absolutely prohibited from participating in the review, recommendation, or approval of the subdivision plans he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity.
Throughout the approval process for the subdivision plans Doe privately prepared
Are Doe's activities as described above in conflict with the Code of Ethics?
At what point did Engineer Doe's ethical violation become irremediable — when he accepted the private consulting commission knowing he held both public roles, when he submitted the plans as county engineer, or when he cast his vote as a planning board member?
Would Engineer Doe's conduct have been ethically permissible if he had recused himself from the planning board vote but still recommended his own plans in his capacity as county engineer — and does holding even one of the two public roles while performing private consulting work constitute a standalone violation?
Does the county government or planning board bear any institutional responsibility for permitting or failing to prevent Engineer Doe's triple-role arrangement, and what structural safeguards should public bodies implement to prevent engineers in official capacities from simultaneously engaging in private consulting work within the same substantive domain?
How should the transition from the former Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct to the new NSPE Code of Ethics affect the weight given to prior Board of Ethical Review precedents in this case, and does the new Code impose a stricter or merely differently articulated standard on public-service conflict of interest?
Does the principle that a single public role as county engineer is sufficient to trigger an absolute conflict prohibition tension with the principle that disclosure can sometimes cure conflicts of interest — and if disclosure is categorically insufficient for structural public-service conflicts, what residual function does the disclosure obligation serve in Engineer Doe's situation?
How does the principle of axiomatic undivided loyalty to one's employer or client conflict with the dual-role public-private conflict prohibition when Engineer Doe owes simultaneous loyalty obligations to his private client (the subdivision developer), to the county as his employer, and to the public whose welfare the planning board is charged with protecting?
Does the principle that inescapable ethical violations must be recognized and avoided at the role-acceptance stage conflict with the principle that public service engineers should be permitted to engage in private practice under abstention-conditioned circumstances — and if so, which principle takes precedence when the structural arrangement makes genuine abstention impossible?
Does the principle that the ethics code is a living document capable of adaptation tension with the principle that the absolute prohibition on public-service conflicts is non-waivable — specifically, could future evolution of the Code ever legitimately relax the categorical bar on self-review in public engineering roles, or does the public welfare paramount principle permanently foreclose such adaptation?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer Doe fulfill his categorical duty of undivided loyalty to the public by simultaneously holding the roles of subdivision design engineer, county engineer, and planning board member — roles whose structural obligations are logically incompatible with one another?
From a consequentialist perspective, did the harm to public trust in county planning processes — produced by Engineer Doe's self-recommendation and self-approval of his own subdivision plans — outweigh any efficiency or expertise benefits gained by having the same engineer serve all three roles?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer Doe demonstrate the professional integrity and impartiality expected of a public-service engineer when he accepted private consulting commissions in the same substantive domain as his public duties, and then exercised official authority over his own private work?
From a deontological perspective, does the mere act of disclosing a structural conflict of interest — where Engineer Doe's official roles require him to review and approve his own private engineering work — satisfy the duty imposed by Section 8(b), or does that duty categorically prohibit participation regardless of disclosure?
Would Engineer Doe's conduct have been ethically permissible if he had recused himself from both the county engineer recommendation and the planning board vote on his own subdivision plans, while retaining all three roles?
What if Engineer Doe had declined the private consulting commission for the subdivision development at the outset — would his simultaneous service as county engineer and planning board member have remained ethically unproblematic under the Code?
Would the ethical analysis have differed if Engineer Doe had held only one of the two public roles — either county engineer or planning board member — rather than both simultaneously, when he prepared and submitted the subdivision plans?
If the prior Board of Ethical Review cases decided under the former Canons of Ethics had remained the controlling standard — rather than being superseded by the new Code of Ethics — would the outcome of Engineer Doe's case have been materially different, and does the transition to the new Code represent a stricter or more permissive standard for public-service conflict of interest?
Placement of the planning board in a position of receiving a recommendation from a conflicted official
Progression of the conflict of interest to a second, more direct stage of ethical violation
Undermining of the objectivity and impartiality expected of the county engineer role
Use of public authority to benefit private consulting client and personal financial interest
Procedural obligation of county engineer to submit plans with recommendation to planning board (fulfilled in form but not in substance due to conflict)
Objectivity in professional engineering recommendations
Public trust and accountability in governmental roles
Separation of private financial interest from public regulatory authority
Fulfill official county engineer duty to submit and recommend plans to the planning board, while simultaneously advancing the approval of plans in which he had a private financial interest
Engineering review and evaluation of subdivision development plans
Knowledge of ethical obligations requiring recusal in conflicted matters
Official recommendation authority as county engineer
Step 2, after preparing plans in private capacity; prior to planning board vote
Axiomatic duty not to divide loyalties between private financial interests and public employer obligations (per Case No. 60-5)
Duty of impartiality and objectivity in official county engineer recommendations
Public trust reposed in the county engineer to provide unbiased professional recommendations
Section 8(b): Explicit prohibition on participating in considerations or actions with respect to services provided by the engineer in private engineering practice while serving in public capacity
Section 8: Duty to avoid conflicts of interest with public employer
Doe, acting in his official capacity as county engineer, formally recommended approval of the subdivision development plans he had personally prepared as a private consulting engineer, thereby using his public authority to advance his own private financial interests.
Section 8(b) Absolute Prohibition Engineer Doe Triple Role Public Service
Engineer Doe served as county engineer, planning board member, and private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans submitted to the planning board for approval
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Absolute Prohibition Constraint
Engineer Doe was absolutely prohibited by NSPE Code Section 8(b) from simultaneously serving as private designer of subdivision plans, county engineer with authority to submit those plans with a recommendation, and planning board member with a vote on those plans — the triple-role structure constituting a direct and irresolvable violation of Section 8(b)'s prohibition on public service engineers participating in considerations or actions with respect to their own private engineering services.
Throughout the period of simultaneous private plan preparation and public role occupancy
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Absolute Prohibition Doe County Engineer Planning Board Designer
Doe prepared subdivision plans privately, then as county engineer recommended their approval, then as planning board member voted to approve them — occupying all three roles simultaneously.
John Doe was absolutely prohibited from simultaneously serving as private designer of the subdivision plans, county engineer recommending approval of those plans, and planning board member voting to approve those plans — the triple-role structure being irresolvable by any partial mitigation measure.
From the moment Doe accepted the private consulting commission while holding both public roles
Completion of a full conflict-of-interest cycle in which Doe created, recommended, and approved his own work across three distinct roles
Corruption of the planning board's impartial decision-making process
Direct use of public voting authority to benefit private financial interests
Undermining of public confidence in county planning and engineering oversight
Procedural obligation to participate in planning board votes (fulfilled in form but fundamentally corrupted by conflict of interest)
Absolute separation of private financial interest from public voting authority
Non-participation in matters where personal interest exists
Public trust and accountability in governmental bodies
Exercise planning board voting authority to approve the subdivision development plans, thereby securing the approval his private consulting client required and completing his official board duties
Engineering judgment to evaluate subdivision development plans
Knowledge of ethical obligations requiring recusal when voting on matters involving personal financial interest
Planning board deliberation and voting authority
Step 3, final action in the sequence; after preparing plans and recommending them officially
Axiomatic duty not to divide loyalties between private interests and public employer (per Case No. 60-5)
Duty of impartiality as a planning board member to the public
Public trust reposed in planning board members to vote without personal financial stake in outcomes
Section 8(a): Duty to inform employer or client of business connections influencing judgment (though the discussion notes disclosure does not excuse the Section 8(b) violation)
Section 8(b): Explicit and absolute prohibition on participating in considerations or actions with respect to services provided by the engineer in private practice while serving on a governmental body
Doe, acting in his capacity as a county planning board member, cast a vote to approve the subdivision development plans he had personally prepared as a consulting engineer and had officially recommended in his capacity as county engineer, completing a full cycle of self-interested decision-making across all three of his roles.
Voting to Approve Own Plans (Action 4) → Approval Vote Recorded (Event 5)
As a direct outcome of John Doe voting in his planning board capacity, an official vote approving the subdivision plans was recorded
Had Doe abstained or recused himself from the planning board vote, his personal influence on the approval outcome would have been eliminated; the vote may still have passed, but without Doe's ethically compromised participation
Doe casting his vote rather than abstaining or recusing himself
Doe's membership on the county planning board with voting authority
The subdivision plans reaching the planning board for a vote
The vote count being sufficient for approval (Doe's vote being material to the outcome)
If Doe's vote was the deciding vote, his participation alone was sufficient to determine the outcome; even if not decisive, his participation contributed to the sufficient set
Planning board member status + vote cast on own plans + no abstention = recorded approval vote attributable to Doe
Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.92
Any civic duty to participate in planning board deliberations is overridden by the specific recusal obligation when the engineer has a direct personal interest in the outcome of the vote
Defeasibility edge from constraintstatement
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.93
Even if Doe's dual role as planning board member and private consultant might have been conditionally permissible upon full abstention from discussion and vote, Doe violated this constraint by actually voting to approve the plans he privately prepared, thereby failing the abstention condition that is a necessary prerequisite for any permissibility.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.75
The self-review prohibition is categorical and cannot be balanced against competitive disadvantage concerns; the structural conflict is irreconcilable by disclosure alone per Disclosure Insufficiency for Structural Conflict of Interest
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.72
Loyalty to the public role is deemed paramount and irreconcilable with private consulting interest in the same matter; no balancing is permitted — the prohibition is absolute
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.86
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.82
Transparency through disclosure, while generally a mitigating mechanism for conflicts of interest, is explicitly held insufficient for public-service conflicts — the prohibition is categorical and disclosure-immune
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.85
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.91
Engineer Doe could not cure or excuse his Section 8(b) violation by invoking the general disclosure obligations of Section 8 and Section 8(a) — which require informing the client or employer of possible conflicts of interest — because Section 8(b) is specific in prohibiting the type of conflict involved and does not condition compliance on disclosure of pertinent circumstances.
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.9
Engineer Doe could not invoke the 'unavoidable conflict' exception recognized in Section 8 for private-practice engineers, because no such exception is made for an engineer engaged in public service — the prohibition under Section 8(b) being absolute and mandatory with no exception pathway available regardless of the circumstances.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.78
The two-role scenario (private designer + public recommender) is independently sufficient; the three-role scenario (adding board membership) is an aggravated form of the same violation, not a necessary condition for it
source_field=constraintstatement; confidence=0.85
Engineer Doe was prohibited by NSPE Code Section 8(b) from preparing subdivision plans in private practice by virtue of his county engineer role alone — with its institutional responsibility to submit plans to the county planning board with a recommendation — even setting aside his planning board membership, because the submission-and-recommendation function constitutes participation in considerations with respect to his own private engineering services.
The structural impossibility of objective review at any stage means no balancing is available; categorical prohibition applies regardless of the quality of the engineering work or the absence of demonstrated harm
The structural incompatibility is irreconcilable; the Code resolves the tension by prohibiting the dual role categorically rather than requiring case-by-case balancing
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.87
Client autonomy to select Doe as designer cannot override the structural prohibition on accepting engagements that foreseeably require the engineer to exercise public authority over his own private work
The more explicit Code provision applies to the current case; prior cases under the Canons are cited for their underlying value continuity, not as controlling authority
Disclosure is a necessary but categorically insufficient remedy for structural conflicts; the principle establishes that categorical prohibition — not disclosure — is the required response when objectivity is structurally impossible
promulgation of new Code of Ethics before analysis of Doe's conduct under new Code
Since those cases were decided the Code of Ethics has been promulgated as the controlling document, and it is now more explicit on the point raised by this case
analysis of Doe's conduct under new Code
invokedby: John Doe County Engineer Planning Board Member
invokedby: Engineer Doe Absolute Conflict Prohibition Public Service Engineer
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that the 'unavoidable conflict' exception available to private-practice engineers under Section 8 did not apply to him as a public service engineer; the Section 8(b) prohibition was absolute and admit
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that his disclosure of the conflict under the general provisions of Section 8 and Section 8(a) did not excuse or cure his violation of Section 8(b); the absolute prohibition on public service engineer
The conflict arising from Doe's simultaneous roles as designer, recommender, and voting approver is structural and irreconcilable — no disclosure to the planning board or county could restore the objectivity that each role independently dem
Doe designed subdivision plans as private consultant, then used his county engineer authority to recommend those same plans, then used his planning board membership to vote their approval — exercising personal control over all three stages
Engineer Doe's simultaneous role as private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans and as a governmental body member (county planning board) with authority over those same plans constitutes the paradigmatic dual-role public-private
Doe simultaneously served as a public county engineer (with authority over subdivision plan recommendations) and as a private consulting engineer (designing the very subdivision plans subject to that authority), creating an actual and appar
The case reaffirms the axiomatic principle that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide their loyalties or interests from those of their employer or client, tracing this obligation through prior cases
The Board explicitly stated that Engineer Doe would have been in violation of Section 8(b) even if he had not been a member of the county planning board, solely by virtue of his county engineer role carrying responsibility to submit the pla
As a member of the planning board, Doe was obligated to recuse himself from voting on subdivision plans in which he held a direct financial and professional interest as the designing engineer
Doe, as county engineer, recommended approval of subdivision plans that he himself had prepared in his private consulting capacity — placing himself in the structurally impossible position of objectively reviewing his own professional work
Doe's recommendation as county engineer to approve the subdivision plans was structurally self-serving, as approval advanced his private commercial interest in the success of his consulting design work — making objective, client-interest-fi
The Board held that Engineer Doe's simultaneous service as private consulting designer, county engineer with recommendation authority, and planning board member created a violation that was absolute and mandatory — not subject to any except
By accepting the private design commission for a subdivision project subject to approval through channels he controlled as county engineer and planning board member, Doe entered a structurally impossible compliance scenario where every subs
The absolute prohibition on public-service engineers participating in decisions about their own private work ultimately serves the public welfare by ensuring that governmental engineering review processes are free from private financial int
The public interest in the integrity of governmental subdivision approval processes — ensuring that plans are independently reviewed and approved on their technical merits for public safety and community welfare — was directly undermined by
The Board noted that prior cases (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct, and that since those cases the Code of Ethics has been promulgated as the controlling docu
Engineer Doe, as county engineer, was obligated to refrain from issuing any recommendation for approval of subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as such a recommendation was structurally self-serv
John Doe, as a member of the county planning board, was obligated to recuse himself from voting on the subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as his direct financial interest in approval was irreco
John Doe was obligated to refrain from accepting the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans when, as county engineer and planning board member, he held authority over the very approval channels through which those plans
John Doe was obligated to refrain from simultaneously occupying the roles of private designer of the subdivision plans, county engineer recommending approval of those plans, and planning board member voting to approve those plans — the trip
John Doe, as county engineer, was obligated to refrain from recommending approval of the subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as such a recommendation was structurally self-serving, divided his l
John Doe, as a planning board member providing private engineering services to a subdivision developer whose plans came before the board, was obligated to abstain from all board action — including discussion, recommendation, and vote — on t
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that his role as county engineer — with responsibility to submit subdivision plans to the planning board with recommendation — was alone sufficient to trigger the absolute Section 8(b) conflict prohib
Engineer Doe, as a member of the county planning board, was obligated to recuse himself from voting on or participating in the approval of subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity.
Engineer Doe was obligated, under the axiomatic principle of professional loyalty, to refrain from taking actions or making decisions that divided his loyalties between his private consulting client (the subdivision developer) and his publi
Engineer Doe was obligated to refrain from accepting the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans that would foreseeably be submitted for review and approval through the governmental channels he controlled as county engine
Engineer Doe was obligated to refrain from simultaneously occupying the roles of private designer of subdivision plans, county engineer recommending those plans, and planning board member voting to approve those plans — a triple-role struct
John Doe was obligated to recognize that his simultaneous roles as county engineer (with plan recommendation authority), planning board member (with voting authority), and private consulting engineer (preparing plans for approval) constitut
John Doe was obligated to recognize that accepting the private consulting commission while simultaneously serving as county engineer and planning board member created a structurally impossible compliance scenario — every available path (rec
Abstention-Conditioned Commission Member Private Services Permissibility Doe Planning Board Non-Abstention
Doe did not abstain — he voted to approve his own plans — which eliminates any possible defense based on the conditional permissibility of dual roles where abstention is maintained.
Abstention-Conditioned Commission Member Private Services Permissibility Constraint
At the time of the planning board vote on the subdivision plans
Section 8 8(a) Disclosure Non-Cure Engineer Doe Section 8(b) Violation
BER analysis rejecting the argument that compliance with the broader disclosure provisions of Section 8 and 8(a) could excuse the Section 8(b) violation
Public Service Engineer Section 8(b) Disclosure Non-Cure Constraint
NSPE Code of Ethics Sections 8, 8(a), and 8(b)
At the time of accepting the private commission and throughout the approval process
Section 8(b) County Engineer Submission Authority Alone Sufficient Engineer Doe
BER analysis establishing that planning board membership was not a prerequisite for the Section 8(b) violation; the county engineer role alone was sufficient
Single Public Role Section 8(b) Conflict Prohibition Activation Constraint
Throughout the period of simultaneous private plan preparation and county engineer role occupancy
Unavoidable Conflict Exception Non-Applicability Engineer Doe Public Service Role
BER analysis distinguishing the unavoidable-conflict exception available to private engineers from the absolute prohibition applicable to public service engineers
Public Service Engineer Unavoidable Conflict Exception Non-Applicability Constraint
NSPE Code of Ethics Section 8 and Section 8(b)
Section 8 and Section 8(a) recognize that a conflict of interest may be unavoidable in some circumstances, but no such exception is made for an Engineer engaged in public service.
At the time of accepting the private commission while serving in public roles
Doe Prior Cases Precedent Evolution State
From the time prior cases were decided under the Canons through the promulgation of the Code of Ethics and the present case
Previously Reserved Ethical Question Definitively Resolved State
The evolution from prior Canons-based decisions (Cases 60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) to the definitive resolution under the new Code of Ethics Section 8(b)
Present case definitively resolving the conflict-of-interest standard for public service engineers under the new Code
Promulgation of the Code of Ethics with explicit Section 8(b) prohibition, superseding the less explicit Canons and Rules of Professional Conduct
Doe Self-Review Prohibition Irresolvable by Disclosure
From the point Doe accepted the consulting engagement to prepare subdivision plans through his governmental approval actions
Self-Review Prohibition Irresolvable by Disclosure State
Doe's structural position requiring him to recommend and vote on his own engineering work, a conflict that cannot be cured by mere disclosure
Not resolved; the vote was cast without recusal
Doe accepting a private consulting engagement to prepare plans for a project subject to his own governmental review and approval authority
NSPE BER Ethics Code Supersession Prior Canons Current Standard Application Engineer Doe Case
The Board noted that prior cases (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics, but that the Code of Ethics had since been promulgated as the controlling document and was more explicit on the conflict of interest point at issue.
Ethics Code Supersession of Prior Canons Current Standard Application Obligation
The NSPE Board of Ethical Review was obligated to apply the current Code of Ethics as the controlling document in evaluating Engineer Doe's conduct, recognizing that the Code superseded the prior Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct under which earlier similar cases were decided, and that the current Code's more explicit provisions governed the analysis.
At the time of the ethics review determination
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked Through Public Service Conflict Prohibition in Engineer Doe Case
The integrity of the county planning board's review and approval of subdivision plans
Engineer Professional Autonomy and Independence Preservation Principle
The absolute prohibition on public-service engineers participating in decisions about their own private work ultimately serves the public welfare by ensuring that governmental engineering review processes are free from private financial interests, protecting the public's reliance on the integrity of governmental engineering oversight
Public welfare is served not only by direct safety obligations but also by structural integrity requirements that prevent private interests from corrupting public engineering oversight processes
Public welfare through structural integrity of governmental processes is held paramount; no private interest or disclosure mechanism can override it for public-service engineers
When in public service as a member, advisor, or employee of a governmental body or department, an Engineer shall not participate in considerations or actions with respect to services provided by him or his organization in private engineering practice.
no such exception is made for an Engineer engaged in public service.
Ethics Code Living Document Adaptation Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
The transition from Canons of Ethics to the Code of Ethics as the controlling professional ethics document
Progressive Ethics Code Restriction Retroactive Inapplicability Principle
The Board noted that prior cases (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct, and that since those cases the Code of Ethics has been promulgated as the controlling document and is now more explicit on the conflict-of-interest point — demonstrating the Code's evolution toward greater specificity in response to accumulated case experience
The evolution from the axiomatic principle articulated in Case 60-5 to the explicit prohibition in Section 8(b) illustrates how ethical codes develop greater precision over time in response to recurring fact patterns, while maintaining continuity with underlying values
Ethics Code Living Document Adaptation Principle
Doe Dual Public-Private Employment Structural Conflict
Ongoing throughout the described facts; pre-exists the specific subdivision project
Dual Public-Private Employment Conflict State
John Doe's simultaneous holding of county engineer (public) and part-time private consulting practice roles in the same substantive domain
Doe maintaining a part-time consulting practice while serving as county engineer
Engineer Doe Public Service Unavoidable Conflict Exception Non-Applicability
The NSPE Board of Ethical Review held that while Section 8 recognizes that conflicts may be unavoidable in some circumstances for private engineers, no such exception exists for engineers engaged in public service, making the prohibition absolute and mandatory.
Public Service Engineer Unavoidable Conflict Exception Non-Applicability Obligation
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that the 'unavoidable conflict' exception available to private-practice engineers under Section 8 did not apply to him as a public service engineer; the Section 8(b) prohibition was absolute and admitted no exception based on unavoidability.
At the time of accepting and performing the dual private-public roles
Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Conflict Heightened Ethical Scrutiny John Doe County Engineer Consulting
Doe's dual public-private roles involved exact same-domain overlap — subdivision plan preparation and subdivision plan approval — making the conflict 'virtually impossible' to manage through disclosure alone and requiring complete non-engagement.
Extreme Same-Domain Dual-Role Conflict Heightened Ethical Scrutiny Recognition Obligation
John Doe was obligated to recognize that his simultaneous roles as county engineer (with plan recommendation authority), planning board member (with voting authority), and private consulting engineer (preparing plans for approval) constituted an extreme same-domain dual-role conflict requiring complete non-engagement in private consulting for subdivision work subject to his governmental approval authority.
Throughout the period of simultaneous public and private service
Inescapable Ethical Violation Acceptance Prohibition John Doe Triple Role Structure
By accepting the private commission, Doe placed himself in a position where: recommending approval was self-serving; recommending rejection harmed his private client; abstaining from recommendation while voting was still conflicted; and voting to approve was a direct financial conflict — making ethical compliance structurally impossible.
Inescapable Ethical Violation Acceptance Prohibition Upon Structurally Impossible Compliance Obligation
John Doe was obligated to recognize that accepting the private consulting commission while simultaneously serving as county engineer and planning board member created a structurally impossible compliance scenario — every available path (recommending approval, recommending rejection, abstaining, voting) resulted in an ethical violation — and was therefore obligated to decline the private commission or withdraw from one or more of his public roles before accepting it.
At the time of accepting the private consulting commission
Non-Self-Serving Advisory Obligation Violated By John Doe County Engineer
County engineer recommendation to planning board on privately-designed subdivision plans
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
Doe's recommendation as county engineer to approve the subdivision plans was structurally self-serving, as approval advanced his private commercial interest in the success of his consulting design work — making objective, client-interest-first advisory performance impossible
The county engineer's advisory recommendation must serve the county's public interest; when the recommending engineer financially benefits from a favorable recommendation, the advisory function is corrupted regardless of whether the recommendation was technically sound
John Doe County Engineer Planning Board Member
The faithful agent obligation to the county as public client required Doe to provide objective advice; his private financial interest in the design commission made such objectivity structurally unattainable, establishing the non-self-serving advisory violation
Planning Board Member Self-Designed Plan Voting Recusal John Doe Planning Board Member
Doe voted as a planning board member to approve subdivision plans he had personally designed as a private consulting engineer, creating a direct financial conflict of interest and eliminating the independent review the board role requires.
Planning Board Member Self-Designed Plan Voting Recusal Obligation
John Doe, as a member of the county planning board, was obligated to recuse himself from voting on the subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as his direct financial interest in approval was irreconcilable with the independent judgment required of a board member.
Public Service Engineer Absolute Conflict Prohibition Non-Waivability Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
Engineer Doe's county engineer recommendation authority over those plans
Engineer Doe's planning board membership and voting authority over those plans
Engineer Doe's private preparation of subdivision plans
The Board held that Engineer Doe's simultaneous service as private consulting designer, county engineer with recommendation authority, and planning board member created a violation that was absolute and mandatory — not subject to any exception, disclosure cure, or client consent — because the Code explicitly withholds from public-service engineers the conditional escape route available to private-practice engineers under the general conflict provisions
The absolute nature of the prohibition reflects a policy judgment that public trust in governmental engineering processes cannot be maintained if engineers in public roles are permitted to retain private financial interests in the outcomes of their public decisions, even with full transparency
Public Service Engineer Absolute Conflict Prohibition Non-Waivability Principle
No balancing is performed — the prohibition is described as absolute and mandatory, foreclosing any weighing of competing interests
Public Welfare Paramount Implicated By John Doe Triple-Role Conflict
Integrity of county subdivision approval process
Public reliance on independent governmental review of development plans
Part-Time Municipal Engineer Competitive Disadvantage Acknowledgment and Ethical Constraint
The public interest in the integrity of governmental subdivision approval processes — ensuring that plans are independently reviewed and approved on their technical merits for public safety and community welfare — was directly undermined by Doe's self-interested control of every stage of the approval process
Public welfare in this context encompasses not only physical safety from poorly-designed infrastructure but also the public's legitimate interest in governmental processes free from self-dealing by public officials, which is itself a welfare interest of the community
Engineer Doe Absolute Conflict Prohibition Public Service Engineer
Public welfare paramount overrides both the engineer's private economic interest in consulting income and any loyalty to the subdivision developer client when the engineer's public roles are being exploited to advance private interests
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Non-Acceptance John Doe County Engineer Planning Board Designer
Doe prepared subdivision development plans as a private consulting engineer, then used his county engineer authority to recommend those same plans for approval, and then voted as a planning board member to approve them — occupying all three roles in the same approval chain for the same plans.
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Non-Acceptance Obligation
John Doe was obligated to refrain from simultaneously occupying the roles of private designer of the subdivision plans, county engineer recommending approval of those plans, and planning board member voting to approve those plans — the triple-role structure constituting an irreconcilable structural conflict of interest that violated NSPE Code Sections II.4 and III.2.
From the moment of accepting the private consulting commission through the planning board vote
Disclosure Insufficiency for Structural Conflict Invoked By John Doe
Structural conflict across all three roles in subdivision approval process
Conflict of Interest Disclosure in Advisory Engagements
The conflict arising from Doe's simultaneous roles as designer, recommender, and voting approver is structural and irreconcilable — no disclosure to the planning board or county could restore the objectivity that each role independently demands
Because the conflict arises from Doe's institutional positions rather than merely a financial interest, disclosure cannot cure it; the only ethical remedy was to decline either the private design commission or the public roles before the conflict arose
Disclosure Insufficiency for Structural Conflict of Interest
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer, then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board. As a member of the county planning board he later voted to approve these plans.
Inescapable Ethical Violation Recognition Invoked In John Doe Role Acceptance
Acceptance of private subdivision design commission while holding county engineer and planning board roles
Client Autonomy in Engineering Service Provider Selection
By accepting the private design commission for a subdivision project subject to approval through channels he controlled as county engineer and planning board member, Doe entered a structurally impossible compliance scenario where every subsequent action — recommending, abstaining, or voting — would constitute an ethical violation; the ethical failure was in accepting the commission, not merely in the subsequent recommendation and vote
The principle establishes that the moment of ethical failure was Doe's acceptance of the private design engagement, because the foreseeable consequence was that he would be required to exercise public authority over his own work; no subsequent conduct could cure this foundational violation
Inescapable Ethical Violation Recognition in Structurally Impossible Compliance Scenarios
He also engages in part-time consulting practice. Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer, then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans to the county planning board.
Public-Private Dual Role Structural Conflict Non-Engagement John Doe Initial Commission Acceptance
Doe, simultaneously serving as county engineer and planning board member, accepted a private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans that would foreseeably be submitted for approval through the governmental channels he controlled.
Public-Private Dual Role Structural Conflict Non-Engagement Obligation
John Doe was obligated to refrain from accepting the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans when, as county engineer and planning board member, he held authority over the very approval channels through which those plans would foreseeably be submitted — the structural conflict being irreconcilable from the moment of engagement.
At the time of accepting the private consulting commission for the subdivision development
Single-Role Public Authority Sufficiency Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
Engineer Doe's county engineer role with plan submission and recommendation authority
The analytical question of whether planning board membership was a necessary element of the violation
Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Prohibition
The Board explicitly stated that Engineer Doe would have been in violation of Section 8(b) even if he had not been a member of the county planning board, solely by virtue of his county engineer role carrying responsibility to submit the plans with recommendation — establishing that the recommendation authority alone was independently sufficient to trigger the absolute prohibition
The Board used this point to foreclose any argument that the violation was contingent on the most egregious form of the conflict (voting on one's own work); the recommendation stage alone is sufficient because it corrupts the governmental review process at the advisory level
Single-Role Public Authority Sufficiency for Conflict Prohibition Activation Principle
Axiomatic Undivided Loyalty Obligation Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
Engineer Doe's simultaneous private consulting and public governmental roles
The case reaffirms the axiomatic principle that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide their loyalties or interests from those of their employer or client, tracing this obligation through prior cases decided under the Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
In this context, loyalty requires that the engineer's public governmental role be exercised with undivided fidelity to the public interest, which is structurally incompatible with simultaneously holding a private financial interest in the outcome of the public decision
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client.
our previous decisions in cases of this type (60-5, 62-7, 62-21, 63-5) were decided under the then-prevailing Canons of Ethics and Rules of Professional Conduct
Disclosure Insufficiency for Public Service Structural Conflict Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
Engineer Doe's potential reliance on disclosure provisions to justify participation in governmental approval of his own private plans
The Board explicitly rejected the argument that Engineer Doe's compliance with the general disclosure provisions of Section 8 and Section 8(a) — requiring notification of conflicts to employer or client — could cure or excuse the structural conflict of interest prohibited by Section 8(b) for public-service engineers
Disclosure to the client or employer cannot restore the structural integrity of the governmental review process once it has been compromised by the engineer's dual role; the public trust dimension of the conflict makes it incurable by transparency alone
Doe Board Member Private Plan Submission Conflict
Throughout the period Engineer Doe served on the county planning board while also preparing plans in private practice that were submitted to that board for approval
Private clients whose plans were prepared
Public relying on impartial governmental review
Government Role Self-Approval of Private Work State
Engineer Doe's simultaneous membership on the county planning board and private preparation of plans submitted to that board
Not described in the case text; presumably would terminate upon resignation from board or cessation of private plan preparation
Engineer Doe prepared engineering plans in private practice that were submitted to the county planning board on which he served as a member
Doe County Engineer Submission Authority Over Own Private Plans
Throughout the period Engineer Doe held the county engineer position with plan submission authority while simultaneously engaged in private plan preparation
County Engineer Submission Authority Over Own Private Plans State
Engineer Doe's role as county engineer with responsibility to submit plans to the county planning board, while also privately preparing those plans
Not described; would terminate upon structural role separation
Engineer Doe's dual status as county engineer (with submission/recommendation authority) and private plan preparer for the same plans
Doe Disclosure-Insufficient Absolute Public Service Conflict
Coextensive with the dual-role conflict; the absolute prohibition character is a persistent attribute of the conflict state
Public interest in impartial governmental engineering review
Disclosure-Insufficient Absolute Public Service Conflict State
The categorical nature of Engineer Doe's conflict under Section 8(b) — not curable by disclosure to employer or client
Structural resolution of the conflict (role separation), not disclosure
Application of Section 8(b)'s absolute prohibition to Engineer Doe's dual public-private role, foreclosing the disclosure-based mitigation available under Sections 8 and 8(a)
From the moment Doe prepared the subdivision plans in his consulting capacity through his recommendation as county engineer and his affirmative vote as planning board member
John Doe's exercise of governmental authority (county engineer recommendation + planning board vote) over subdivision plans he personally prepared as a private consulting engineer
Not resolved within the described facts; persists through the planning board vote
Doe preparing subdivision plans as a private consulting engineer while simultaneously holding county engineer and planning board positions
Dual-Role Conflict of Interest Prohibition Invoked By John Doe
Simultaneous county engineer and private consulting roles on the same subdivision project
Dual Capacity Without Divided Loyalty Permissibility Principle
Doe simultaneously served as a public county engineer (with authority over subdivision plan recommendations) and as a private consulting engineer (designing the very subdivision plans subject to that authority), creating an actual and apparent conflict of interest in both roles
The governmental role and private consulting role directly intersected on the same project, making independent judgment in either role structurally impossible
Dual-Role Conflict of Interest Prohibition in Public-Private Engineering
The Dual Capacity Without Divided Loyalty Permissibility Principle cannot apply here because the engineer's advisory role and design role were not for the same client — the county and the subdivision developer are distinct parties with potentially divergent interests, and the engineer's financial interest in the design commission materially compromised his advisory independence
Doe prepared the plans for a subdivision development in his capacity as a consulting engineer, then as county engineer recommended approval of his plans
County Engineer Self-Designed Plan Approval Recommendation Non-Issuance John Doe County Engineer
Doe, acting as county engineer, recommended approval of subdivision plans he had personally designed as a private consulting engineer — using his public authority to advance his private commercial interest.
County Engineer Self-Designed Plan Approval Recommendation Non-Issuance Obligation
John Doe, as county engineer, was obligated to refrain from recommending approval of the subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as such a recommendation was structurally self-serving, divided his loyalty between the county and his private client, and eliminated the independent technical review the county engineer recommendation function requires.
At the time of issuing the county engineer recommendation to the planning board
Dual-Role Public-Private Conflict Prohibition Invoked in Engineer Doe Case
Engineer Doe's county planning board membership with authority to consider and act on those plans
Engineer Doe's private consulting preparation of subdivision development plans
Engineer Doe's simultaneous role as private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans and as a governmental body member (county planning board) with authority over those same plans constitutes the paradigmatic dual-role public-private conflict that the Code explicitly prohibits
The governmental role and private consulting role are structurally incompatible because the engineer cannot exercise independent governmental judgment over work in which they have a private financial interest
Engineer Doe Single-Public-Role County Engineer Recommendation Sufficiency Conflict Prohibition Activation
The Board explicitly held that Engineer Doe would have been in violation of Section 8(b) even if he had not been a member of the county planning board, by virtue of his employment as county engineer and the county engineer's responsibility to submit plans to the planning board with recommendation.
Single-Public-Role Sufficiency Conflict Prohibition Activation Obligation
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that his role as county engineer — with responsibility to submit subdivision plans to the planning board with recommendation — was alone sufficient to trigger the absolute Section 8(b) conflict prohibition with respect to plans he prepared in private practice, even without his additional role as a planning board member.
From the moment of accepting the county engineer role while simultaneously preparing private subdivision plans
Engineer Doe County Engineer Self-Designed Plan Approval Recommendation Non-Issuance
Engineer Doe used his county engineer authority to submit and recommend approval of subdivision plans he had personally designed as a private consultant, dividing his loyalty between the county (requiring objective review) and the private developer client.
Engineer Doe, as county engineer, was obligated to refrain from issuing any recommendation for approval of subdivision plans that he personally prepared in his private consulting capacity, as such a recommendation was structurally self-serving and eliminated the independent technical review the county engineer recommendation function was designed to provide.
At the time of submitting and recommending the subdivision plans in the county engineer capacity
Engineer Doe Planning Board Member Self-Designed Plan Voting Recusal
Engineer Doe served as a county planning board member and voted on subdivision plans he had personally designed as a private consultant, creating a direct financial conflict of interest that eliminated the independent judgment the board role required.
At the time of planning board deliberation and vote on the subdivision plans
Municipal Advisory Role Self-Review Prohibition Invoked By John Doe County Engineer
County engineer recommendation of privately-prepared subdivision plans
Doe, as county engineer, recommended approval of subdivision plans that he himself had prepared in his private consulting capacity — placing himself in the structurally impossible position of objectively reviewing his own professional work in his advisory capacity
The county engineer role carries a public advisory obligation to provide independent technical review; that independence is wholly destroyed when the engineer is recommending approval of plans for which he received private compensation
Municipal Advisory Role Self-Review Prohibition
Triple-Role Self-Approval Conflict Invoked By John Doe County Engineer Planning Board Member
County engineer recommendation to planning board
Planning board vote to approve subdivision plans
Doe designed subdivision plans as private consultant, then used his county engineer authority to recommend those same plans, then used his planning board membership to vote their approval — exercising personal control over all three stages of the approval process for his own commercial work
The simultaneous occupation of designer, recommender, and voting approver roles for the same project represents the most severe form of self-review conflict, as no independent check on the engineer's work existed at any stage of the approval chain
Abstention-Conditioned Commission Member Private Services Permissibility John Doe Planning Board
Doe simultaneously provided private consulting services (plan preparation) to a subdivision developer and served on the planning board that voted on those same plans, without abstaining from the vote.
Abstention-Conditioned Commission Member Private Services Permissibility Obligation
John Doe, as a planning board member providing private engineering services to a subdivision developer whose plans came before the board, was obligated to abstain from all board action — including discussion, recommendation, and vote — on those plans; his failure to abstain and his affirmative vote to approve his own plans violated this obligation.
Throughout the period of dual service as private consultant and planning board member on the same matter
Engineer Doe Axiomatic Professional Loyalty Non-Division
The Board cited Case No. 60-5 for the axiomatic principle that a professional person may not take action or make decisions dividing loyalties or interests from those of the employer or client, establishing that this principle predates and underlies the explicit Code provisions.
Axiomatic Professional Loyalty Non-Division Obligation
Engineer Doe was obligated, under the axiomatic principle of professional loyalty, to refrain from taking actions or making decisions that divided his loyalties between his private consulting client (the subdivision developer) and his public employer (the county), a principle that applied even before the current Code of Ethics was promulgated.
Throughout the period of simultaneous private design and public governmental service roles
Engineer Doe Public-Private Dual Role Structural Conflict Non-Engagement
Engineer Doe accepted a private commission to design subdivision plans while simultaneously holding public roles that gave him authority over the recommendation and approval of those very plans, creating a structural conflict that was irreconcilable from the outset.
Engineer Doe was obligated to refrain from accepting the private consulting commission to prepare subdivision plans that would foreseeably be submitted for review and approval through the governmental channels he controlled as county engineer and planning board member, as the structural conflict was irreconcilable from the moment of engagement.
At the time of accepting the private consulting commission for the subdivision design
Conflict of Interest Recusal Obligation Invoked By John Doe Planning Board Member
Planning board vote to approve subdivision plans prepared by Doe
Civic Duty Elevation to Professional Ethical Duty Principle
The recusal obligation applies with maximum force when the engineer's prior relationship to the submitted work is not merely a former client connection but active authorship of the plans under review — creating both actual bias and an overwhelming appearance of impropriety
Engineer Doe Triple-Role Self-Approval Structural Conflict Non-Acceptance
Engineer Doe prepared subdivision plans in private practice, then as county engineer recommended those plans to the planning board, then as a planning board member voted on those same plans — a triple-role self-approval structure the Board found in direct conflict with Section 8(b).
Engineer Doe was obligated to refrain from simultaneously occupying the roles of private designer of subdivision plans, county engineer recommending those plans, and planning board member voting to approve those plans — a triple-role structure creating an irreconcilable structural conflict of interest.
Throughout the period of simultaneous private design and dual public governmental roles
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'public_roles': ['County Engineer', 'County Planning Board Member'], 'private_role': 'Part-time consulting engineer', 'conflict_type': 'Self-review and self-approval of own private design work through governmental authority'}
Serves as county engineer and simultaneously as a county planning board member; in the county engineer capacity recommended approval of subdivision plans he himself prepared as a private consultant; then voted to approve those same plans as a planning board member — creating a triple-layered conflict of interest through self-review and self-approval of private work product via public authority.
{'type': 'board_member', 'target': 'County Planning Board'}
{'type': 'employer', 'target': 'County Government'}
{'type': 'self_review_conflict', 'target': 'Subdivision Plans (own work product)'}
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'public_role_1': 'County Engineer (recommendation authority)', 'public_role_2': 'County Planning Board Member (voting authority)', 'private_role': 'Private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans', 'conflict_type': 'Self-review and self-recommendation of own private work product in governmental capacity', 'prohibition_character': 'Absolute and mandatory — not excused by disclosure or consent'}
Engineer Doe simultaneously prepared subdivision plans in private practice, served as county engineer with authority to recommend those plans to the planning board, and served as a planning board member with authority to vote on them — triggering an absolute Section 8(b) prohibition that could not be cured by disclosure.
{'type': 'employed_by', 'target': 'County (as County Engineer)'}
{'type': 'governmental_authority_over', 'target': 'Subdivision plans prepared in private practice'}
{'type': 'member_of', 'target': 'County Planning Board'}
{'type': 'private_practice_provider_to', 'target': 'Subdivision plan clients'}
Absolute Conflict Prohibition Public Service Engineer
In his capacity as an engineer in private practice he prepared plans for approval by a governmental body on which he served as a member
Engineer Doe's operations were in direct conflict with Section 8(b) of the Code
He would be in violation of Section 8(b) even if he had not been a member of the county planning board by virtue of his employment as the county engineer and the responsibility of the county engineer to submit the plans to the county planning board with recommendation
Engineer Doe Public Service Disclosure Non-Cure Structural Conflict Absolute Prohibition
Engineer Doe simultaneously served as private consulting engineer preparing subdivision plans, as county engineer with authority to recommend those plans to the planning board, and as a planning board member voting on those plans. He may have disclosed the conflict under general provisions, but the Board held this did not cure the Section 8(b) violation.
Public Service Engineer Disclosure Non-Cure Structural Conflict Absolute Prohibition Obligation
Engineer Doe was obligated to recognize that his disclosure of the conflict under the general provisions of Section 8 and Section 8(a) did not excuse or cure his violation of Section 8(b); the absolute prohibition on public service engineers participating in governmental decisions about their own private work applied regardless of any disclosure made.