Adopt Strict Sealing Interpretation (Action 3) → Standard Interpretation Gap Identified (Event 3)
One good example was BER Case 86-2, in which the chief engineer within a large engineering firm affixed his seal to some of the plans prepared by registered engineers working under his general direction who did not affix their seals to the plans.
For that reason, we think the Board's conclusion in BER Case 86-2 should be modified to reflect actual practices which exist within engineering and not impose an impossible standard upon practice.
The rendering of the Board's opinion in BER Case 86-2, raised a considerable degree of discussion within the engineering community because to many it appeared to be inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing practices within the engineering profession.
Were we to decide BER Case 86-2 today, we would conclude that it was not unethical for the engineer in that instance to seal plans that were not personally prepared by him as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in deliberating on engineer obligations when signing and sealing CADD-produced documents
Referenced as the primary analogical precedent for the sealing of plans not personally prepared by the signing engineer; the current Board clarifies and modifies its earlier conclusion to allow sealing where plans are checked and reviewed in some detail, rather than requiring personal preparation of all drawings.
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'firm_size': 'Large engineering firm', 'supervision_style': 'General direction and supervision — concept, design requirements, review of progress, technical consultation', 'original_finding': 'Unethical (BER Case 86-2)', 'clarified_finding': 'Not unethical if plans are checked and reviewed in some detail'}
The chief engineer within a large engineering firm who affixed his seal to plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers under his general direction and supervision, without performing detailed review of each design, believing general supervisory confidence in his staff was sufficient. The Board originally found this unethical but later clarified that sealing is permissible with some detailed review.
{'type': 'seals_documents_of', 'target': 'Plans prepared by subordinate engineers'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Non-registered graduate engineers under general supervision'}
{'type': 'supervises', 'target': 'Registered engineers under general direction'}
the chief engineer within a large engineering firm affixed his seal to some of the plans prepared by registered engineers working under his general direction who did not affix their seals to the plans
He believed that he was ethically and legally correct in not doing so because of his confidence in the ability of those he had hired
the engineer found it impossible to give a detailed review or check of the design
BER Case 86-2 Chief Engineer CADD Direction-and-Control Sufficiency Calibration Instance
CADD Direction-and-Control Responsible Charge Sufficiency Calibration Capability
The chief engineer in BER Case 86-2 lacked the capability to correctly calibrate the responsible charge sufficiency standard — believing that general direction and supervision (concept establishment, design requirements, technical consultation) without detailed review was sufficient, when in fact detailed review and check is required.
BER Case 86-2 chief engineer sealed plans without detailed review, believing general supervision was sufficient; the BER's modified standard requires detailed review and check
Failure to conduct detailed review of plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers, relying instead on confidence in subordinates' abilities under general supervision
Because of the size of the organization and the large number of projects being designed at any one time, the engineer found it impossible to give a detailed review or check of the design.
He believed that he was ethically and legally correct in not doing so because of his confidence in the ability of those he had hired and who were working under his general direction and supervision.
BER Case 86-2 Chief Engineer Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard
Chief engineer within a large engineering firm affixed his seal to plans prepared by registered engineers under his general direction and non-registered graduate engineers under his general supervision, finding it impossible to give detailed review due to the size of the organization.
Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard for Supervisory Sealing Obligation
The chief engineer in BER Case 86-2, who sealed plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers under his general direction, was obligated to conduct a detailed review and check of those plans before sealing — and the BER's clarified holding establishes that such detailed review would have been sufficient to satisfy the responsible charge requirement, even without personal preparation of every document.
In deciding that it was unethical for him to seal plans that had not been prepared by him, or which he had not checked and reviewed in detail, the Board read the language in Section II.2.b. quite literally.
At the time of sealing each set of plans
Were we to decide BER Case 86-2 today, we would conclude that the it was not unethical for the engineer in that instance to seal plans that were not personally prepared by him as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail.
BER Case 86-2 ruling before Board's clarification in current case
BER Case 86-2 ruling before community controversy and discussion
BER Case 86-2 ruling before current case (present Board ruling)
BER Ethics Code Living Document BER Case 86-2 Modification
The BER modifies its prior BER Case 86-2 holding that required personal preparation for ethical sealing, finding the prior standard inconsistent with prevailing practice and therefore imposing an impossible standard.
Ethics Code Living Document Prevailing Practice Alignment Obligation
The BER, upon recognizing that its BER Case 86-2 holding imposed a standard inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing engineering practice, was obligated to modify that holding to reflect actual practices — concluding that detailed review (rather than personal preparation) is sufficient for ethical sealing — in order to maintain the code's credibility and adherence.
This Board has long noted that the Code of Ethics is not a static document and must reflect and be in consonance with generally prevailing practices within the engineering profession.
At the time of issuing the clarifying opinion on BER Case 86-2
For that reason, we think the Board's conclusion in BER Case 86-2 should be modified to reflect actual practices which exist within engineering and not impose a impossible standard upon practice.
The Code must not impose an impossible or idealistic standard upon engineers, but rather must establish a bench mark of reasonable and rational methods of practice for it to maintain its credibility and adherence.
BER Ethics Code Living Document BER Case 86-2 Modification Capability Instance
Ethics Code Living Document Temporal Adaptation Capability
The BER demonstrates the capability to recognize that its prior ruling in BER Case 86-2 imposed a standard inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing engineering practice, and to modify that ruling to reflect actual practice while maintaining the underlying ethical purpose of ensuring quality and accountability.
The BER recognizes that BER Case 86-2's strict direction-and-control interpretation was inconsistent with prevailing practice and modifies it to a workable standard
Modifying BER Case 86-2 to replace the personal-preparation requirement with a detailed-review-and-check standard that reflects prevailing practice
BER Impossible Standard Non-Imposition CADD Practice
BER Case 86-2 ruling on sealing of plans not personally prepared was found inconsistent with customary engineering practice, prompting clarification in the current case
Living Ethics Code Current-Conditions Interpretive Constraint
The BER is constrained from perpetuating an interpretation of NSPE Code II.2.b that imposes an impossible or idealistic standard inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing engineering practices; where a prior ruling (BER Case 86-2) placed a significant number of practitioners in conflict with the Code for conduct that is otherwise reasonable and standard, the BER must clarify or modify that ruling to reflect achievable professional benchmarks.
BER Meta-Ethical Principle; NSPE Code of Ethics as Living Document
Ongoing; applicable whenever BER precedent is found inconsistent with prevailing practice
BER Impossible Standard Non-Imposition Recognition Instance
Impossible Standard Non-Imposition Recognition Capability
The BER demonstrates the capability to identify that BER Case 86-2's strict personal-preparation standard was impossible or impractical for large engineering firms, and to articulate a modified workable standard while framing the modification as clarification rather than reversal.
The BER explicitly identifies the prior ruling as imposing an impossible standard and modifies it to a workable benchmark consistent with prevailing practice
Recognizing that requiring personal preparation of all sealed documents would place a significant number of practitioners in conflict with the Code, and reformulating the standard as detailed review and check
We do not believe this represents a reversal of the Board's decision in BER Case 86-2, but rather a clarification, particularly for those who were troubled by the Board's discussion and conclusion in that case.
the Board's conclusion in BER Case 86-2 raised a considerable degree of discussion within the engineering community because to many it appeared to be inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing practices within the engineering profession and would therefore place a significant number of practitioners in conflict with the provisions of the Code.
BER Precedent-Based Ethical Reasoning BER Case 86-2 Analogy Instance
Precedent-Based Ethical Reasoning Capability
The BER demonstrates the capability to retrieve and apply BER Case 86-2 as an analogical precedent for the CADD sealing questions, drawing the relevant parallel between sealing plans prepared by supervised engineers and sealing CADD-produced documents, and then modifying the precedent's holding to reflect current practice.
The BER uses BER Case 86-2 as the primary precedent for analyzing the CADD sealing questions and modifies its holding in light of current practice
Identifying BER Case 86-2 as the relevant precedent, analyzing its holding, recognizing its inconsistency with prevailing practice, and applying a modified standard to the instant CADD questions
Turning to the circumstances of the two instant questions, based upon our discussion clarifying BER Case 86-2, we believe logic would dictate that in either case it would not be unethical for an engineer to sign and seal the drawings in question as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail.
BER Responsible Charge Standard Clarification
From the issuance of the current BER opinion clarifying Case 86-2 onward
Were we to decide BER Case 86-2 today, we would conclude that it was not unethical for the engineer in that instance to seal plans that were not personally prepared by him as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail
Responsible Charge Standard Clarification Active State
The normative standard governing what constitutes sufficient responsible charge for sealing engineering documents, as clarified by the BER's modification of Case 86-2
Further revision of the standard by the BER or superseding code provision
The Code must not impose an impossible or idealistic standard upon engineers, but rather must establish a bench mark of reasonable and rational methods of practice
We do not believe this represents a reversal of the Board's decision in BER Case 86-2, but rather a clarification
BER determination that the prior Case 86-2 ruling imposed an impractical standard inconsistent with prevailing engineering practice, prompting a clarification that detailed review — not personal preparation — is the ethical threshold
CADD-AI Technology Competence Prerequisite
Ongoing from the point at which CADD/AI tools are adopted for use in generating professional engineering documents
Public affected by engineered facilities
The change to CADD provides the BER with concerns that require assurance that the professional engineer has the requisite background, education and training to be proficient with the dynamics of CADD including the limitations of current technology
Computational Tool Competence Prerequisite State
Engineers using CADD and AI-assisted design systems in professional practice
Engineer achieves demonstrated proficiency in the tool including understanding of its limitations, or ceases use
CADD utilized beyond its ability to serve as a valuable tool has a propensity to be utilized as a crutch or substitute for judgement
the engineer must utilize such systems to assist the engineer in the performance of professional services and not employ such systems as a replacement for professional competence and expertise
there may be a temptation for the engineer to incorporate a solution provided by the system which the engineer has neither prepared nor fully understands
Adoption and deployment of CADD and AI design systems in engineering practice, transforming manual design techniques into automated computational processes
CADD-Competence Prerequisite Invoked in Instant Questions
CADD-Using Engineer in Instant Questions
Engineer A Self-Authored Document Sealing Engineer
Engineer B Supervisory Direction-and-Control Sealing Engineer
Technology-Neutral Seal Validity Principle
The BER identifies that engineers using CADD systems to produce documents they will sign and seal must possess requisite background, education, and training in CADD dynamics and limitations — and must not incorporate system-generated solutions they neither prepared nor fully understand, even when they have general confidence in the system.
In this context, the principle requires that CADD proficiency — including understanding of system limitations — is a prerequisite to ethically sealing CADD-produced documents, not merely general engineering competence. The engineer's confidence in the system's reliability from prior experience does not satisfy this obligation.
CADD-Competence Prerequisite for Technology-Assisted Sealing Principle
The change to CADD provides the BER with concerns that require assurance that the professional engineer has the requisite background, education and training to be proficient with the dynamics of CADD including the limitations of current technology.
The BER resolves the tension by holding that CADD is permissible as a tool provided the engineer has requisite CADD competence and conducts detailed review — the technology does not alter the competence and review obligations, it adds a technology-specific competence layer.
In some instances, there may be a temptation for the engineer to incorporate a solution provided by the system which the engineer has neither prepared nor fully understands because the engineer believes, based upon engineer's confidence in the system and upon prior experience, that the system will provide a quality solution on a project.
State engineering licensing boards and professional engineering societies
Engineer A, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents he prepared using a CADD system
Engineer B, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents which are the results of the efforts of others using a CADD system working under Engineer B's direction and control
Engineer A (self-prepared CADD work) and Engineer B (CADD work by supervised others)
Provides the technology-specific professional norms governing when and how a professional engineer may sign and seal documents produced via CADD systems, whether self-prepared or prepared by supervised personnel
CADD-Using Engineer CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite Instant Questions
The BER identifies that engineers using CADD systems to produce documents they will sign and seal must possess requisite background, education, and training to be proficient with CADD dynamics and limitations.
Engineers A and B (both instant questions)
CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite for Sealing Obligation
Both Engineer A and Engineer B, as engineers who sign and seal documents produced using CADD systems, are obligated to possess the requisite background, education, and training to be proficient with the dynamics of CADD — including the limitations of current technology — as a prerequisite to sealing CADD-produced documents.
Before accepting any CADD-assisted engineering assignment that will result in sealed documents
The Code clearly indicates that engineers must not 'affix their signatures to any plans or documents dealing with subject matter which they lack competence, nor to any plan or document not prepared under their direction and control.'
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'tool_used': 'CADD (Computer Assisted Drafting and Design)', 'ethical_question': 'Whether signing and sealing CADD-produced drawings is ethical when the engineer has not personally prepared every element but has reviewed and directed the work'}
The engineer(s) in the two instant questions who sign and seal drawings produced using CADD systems, where the ethical question is whether doing so is permissible provided the engineer checks and reviews the plans in some detail and exercises genuine responsible charge.
{'type': 'responsible_charge_over', 'target': 'CADD-produced engineering documents'}
{'type': 'subject_to_review_by', 'target': 'Board of Ethical Review'}
CADD-Reliant Technology-Dependent Design Engineer
The key requirement is that an engineer possesses sufficient competence, assumes full responsibility for the work product and carefully directs, controls and reviews the material prepared under the engineer's responsible charge.
CADD AI Technology Liability Professionalism Ethics Parallel Constraint
BER's forward-looking discussion of CADD evolution toward AI and the ethical implications for professional judgment
All Engineers Using CADD and Emerging AI Systems
Technology Non-Substitution for Engineering Judgment Constraint
Engineers using CADD and anticipating use of Artificial Intelligence systems are constrained to treat these technologies strictly as tools assisting professional services; the propensity of such systems to be used as a crutch or substitute for judgment creates both liability exposure and ethical violations that must be proactively guarded against as technology evolves.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Discussion on CADD and AI trajectory
None have been more dynamic than the evolution that transformed yesterday's manual design techniques to Computer Aided Design (CAD), thence to Computer Assisted Drafting and Design (CADD) and soon Artificial Intelligence (AE).
Ongoing; applicable as CADD and AI technologies evolve and are adopted in engineering practice
As night follows day one can be assured that CADD utilized beyond its ability to serve as a valuable tool has a propensity to be utilized as a crutch or substitute for judgement. That translates to a scenario for potential liability.
It is critical for engineers to fully understand the role that new technologies such as CADD will play in the performance of professional services.
CADD Document Sealing Practice Standard (current case)
NSPE Board of Ethical Review (derived from NSPE Code Section II.2.b and BER Case 86-2 clarification)
The key point is that the engineer must utilize such systems to assist the engineer in the performance of professional services and not employ such systems as a replacement for professional competence and expertise.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in formulating its opinion on CADD-related sealing obligations
The Board's clarified standard — that an engineer may ethically sign and seal CADD-produced documents not personally prepared, provided the engineer possesses sufficient competence, assumes full responsibility, and carefully directs, controls, and reviews the material under responsible charge — constitutes the operative professional norm developed and applied in this case.
CausalLink_Adopt Strict Sealing Interpret
CausalLink_Clarify and Modify 1986 Ruling
Chief Engineer BER Case 86-2 General Supervision Seal Prohibition
Chief engineer in large firm sealed plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers under general supervision without detailed review due to organizational size and project volume
Responsible Charge Verification Constraint
The chief engineer in BER Case 86-2 was prohibited from sealing plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers under his general supervision without conducting a detailed review or check of the design; general direction and supervision — involving concept establishment, design requirements, and review of project status — was insufficient to satisfy the direction-and-control requirement for sealing.
NSPE Code of Ethics II.2.b; BER Case 86-2 (as clarified)
At the time of sealing plans prepared by supervised engineers
Chief Engineer General Supervision Without Detailed Review
During the period when the chief engineer was sealing plans based on confidence in subordinates rather than detailed personal review
Chief engineer in BER Case 86-2 who sealed plans prepared by registered and non-registered engineers under general supervision without detailed review
BER Case 86-2 ruling (subsequently clarified to require detailed review rather than personal preparation)
In deciding that it was unethical for him to seal plans that had not been prepared by him, or which he had not checked and reviewed in detail
Chief engineer's practice of sealing plans without detailed review due to organizational scale and volume of projects
Competence Assurance Under CADD Tool Adoption For Sealing Engineers
CADD system as engineering production tool requiring professional competence for ethical use and oversight
Both Engineer A (who uses CADD personally) and Engineer B (who supervises CADD users) must possess sufficient understanding of CADD systems to ensure the professional adequacy of the documents they seal — Engineer A must be competent to use CADD correctly, and Engineer B must be competent to review and verify CADD-produced outputs
CADD adoption does not automatically confer competence; the sealing engineer must understand the tool's capabilities and limitations well enough to certify the professional adequacy of the output, whether as author or supervisor
Competence Assurance Under Novel Tool Adoption
Engineer A, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents he prepared using a CADD system. Engineer B, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents which are the results of the efforts of others using a CADD system working under Engineer B's direction and control.
Technology-neutrality permits CADD use; competence assurance ensures that permission is not exploited to circumvent the substantive professional judgment requirement — the two principles together define the ethical envelope for CADD-based engineering practice
Engineer A, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents he prepared using a CADD system.
Engineer B, a registered professional engineer signs and seals documents which are the results of the efforts of others using a CADD system working under Engineer B's direction and control.
Computer Aided Design (CAD) before Computer Assisted Drafting and Design (CADD)
Computer Assisted Drafting and Design (CADD) before Artificial Intelligence (AI) adoption
It was ethical for Engineer A, a registered professional engineer to sign and seal documents he prepared using a CADD system.
Beyond the Board's finding that Engineer A may ethically seal CADD-prepared documents, the ethical validity of that seal is implicitly conditioned on Engineer A possessing sufficient competence in the specific CADD system used to detect systematic errors, misapplied parameters, or software-induced distortions in the output. Technology-neutrality does not dissolve the competence prerequisite embedded in the Code; it merely relocates it. Where hand-drafting required mastery of manual technique, CADD use requires mastery of the tool's logic, limitations, and failure modes. An engineer who seals CADD output without the ability to critically evaluate whether that output faithfully represents sound engineering judgment has not merely used a new medium — they have delegated a portion of their professional judgment to the software itself, which the Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution principle prohibits. Accordingly, the Board's approval of Engineer A's sealing practice should be understood as approval contingent on demonstrated CADD competence, not as a blanket endorsement of sealing regardless of the engineer's familiarity with the system employed.
The Board's approval of Engineer A's sealing practice carries an implicit and ongoing obligation: as CADD technology evolves — incorporating new automation layers, parametric modeling, or AI-assisted generation — Engineer A's ethical authorization to seal documents produced by those systems does not automatically persist. Each material advancement in the tool's capability that outpaces the engineer's trained understanding creates a new competence gap that must be closed before sealing is ethically permissible. The Board's reasoning, grounded in the premise that CADD is a drafting tool under the engineer's control, becomes strained when the tool begins making autonomous design decisions the engineer cannot independently verify. The ethical standard therefore demands periodic re-validation of competence as a living obligation, not a one-time qualification. Failure to maintain that currency while continuing to seal documents produced by unfamiliar system versions or capabilities would constitute a violation of the professional competence standard even if the engineer's original CADD training was adequate at the time of adoption.
The Board's modification of the stricter BER Case 86-2 standard — which had required detailed personal review before sealing — reflects a principled recognition that imposing an impossible standard on team-based CADD workflows would be both practically destructive and ethically counterproductive. However, this modification introduces a critical analytical nuance the Board did not fully articulate: the relaxation of the detailed-review requirement for Engineer B does not reduce the substantive depth of responsible charge; it redefines the mechanism through which that charge is exercised. Engineer B's ethical obligation migrates from post-hoc document review to upstream direction and control — meaning that the ethical weight of the seal is borne by the quality of Engineer B's supervisory engagement throughout the production process, not merely by a final inspection of the completed document. This reframing means that Engineer B who provides robust directional guidance, establishes clear technical parameters, and maintains meaningful engagement with subordinates' work throughout its development satisfies responsible charge even without line-by-line review, while Engineer B who provides only nominal supervision and relies on a cursory final glance does not — regardless of whether the finished document appears correct. The distinction between genuine responsible charge and its mere appearance is therefore the central ethical fault line the Board's ruling implicitly draws.
The Board's dual-mode authorization — treating Engineer A's self-authored sealing and Engineer B's supervisory sealing as ethically equivalent outcomes — obscures a fundamental asymmetry in the epistemic basis for each engineer's confidence in the sealed document. Engineer A, having personally prepared the work, possesses direct first-person knowledge of every design decision embedded in the CADD output. Engineer B, by contrast, possesses only mediated knowledge derived through the supervisory relationship. This epistemic asymmetry does not render Engineer B's sealing ethically impermissible — the Code explicitly accommodates it through the direction-and-control provision — but it does mean that Engineer B bears a qualitatively different and arguably heavier burden of professional accountability. Because Engineer B's knowledge of the document's technical content is necessarily less granular than Engineer A's, Engineer B must compensate through the rigor of the supervisory process itself: establishing clear technical standards, verifying subordinates' qualifications, reviewing critical decision points, and maintaining sufficient engagement to detect errors that subordinates may not recognize as such. The ethical equivalence of the two sealing modes is therefore a functional equivalence in outcome and authorization, not a substantive equivalence in the nature or depth of the professional obligation each engineer must discharge.
The Board's reasoning, while addressed to CADD technology specifically, implicitly establishes an ethical framework that will govern the profession's encounter with increasingly autonomous design tools, including AI-assisted systems that generate not merely drafting output but substantive engineering calculations and design decisions. The critical ethical variable the Board identifies is not the technology's nature but the engineer's meaningful exercise of professional judgment over the output. As that judgment becomes harder to exercise — because the tool's reasoning is opaque, its outputs voluminous, or its autonomous decisions difficult to independently verify — the ethical permissibility of sealing becomes correspondingly more contingent on the engineer's ability to interrogate and validate the system's work. The Board's technology-neutral framework therefore contains within it a technology-sensitive limit: at the point where an engineer can no longer exercise genuine direction and control over a system's outputs, the ethical authorization to seal those outputs dissolves, regardless of whether the system is labeled a drafting tool, a design assistant, or an autonomous engineering agent. The profession should treat this implicit limit as a forward-looking constraint that conditions the adoption of any new technology on the preservation of the engineer's capacity for independent professional judgment.
It was ethical for Engineer B, a registered professional engineer, to sign and seal documents which are the work of others using a CADD system working under his direction and control.
In response to Q101, the Board's framework implies that the competence threshold for sealing CADD-generated documents is not a fixed, externally certified standard but rather a functional one: an engineer must possess sufficient understanding of the CADD system's outputs to independently evaluate their technical accuracy, identify errors, and exercise professional judgment about the work's completeness and correctness. This threshold is not met merely by being able to operate the software; it requires the capacity to critically assess what the software produces. The burden of verifying that this threshold has been met rests primarily on the sealing engineer themselves, consistent with the self-regulatory character of professional licensure. However, when Engineer B supervises subordinates using CADD, a secondary verification obligation arises at the organizational level: Engineer B must have sufficient CADD competence to evaluate the work produced by those subordinates, not merely to manage the workflow. Neither the Board nor the Code delegates this verification to a third party, meaning the sealing engineer bears sole ethical responsibility for confirming their own qualifying competence before affixing a seal.
In response to Q102, when CADD software contains an undetected algorithmic error that propagates through subordinates' work and Engineer B seals those documents without discovering the error, ethical culpability should be apportioned according to the degree of control and the foreseeability of the failure mode. Engineer B bears primary professional and ethical responsibility because the seal represents a personal attestation of technical adequacy; the responsible charge obligation is not discharged merely because an error originated in software rather than in human drafting. The subordinates bear a secondary ethical obligation to flag anomalous outputs and to exercise independent technical judgment rather than uncritically accepting CADD-generated results. The software vendor bears legal product liability but not professional ethical culpability under the engineering code, because the vendor is not a licensed professional exercising responsible charge. Critically, the existence of a software error does not transfer Engineer B's ethical obligation to the vendor; the engineer's duty to review and verify outputs is precisely the safeguard intended to catch such errors. If the error was genuinely undetectable through reasonable professional review, Engineer B's culpability is mitigated but not eliminated, because the competence prerequisite includes understanding the known limitations and failure modes of the tools employed.
In response to Q103, the Board's approval of CADD-assisted sealing does implicitly establish a continuing competence obligation that evolves with the technology. Because the ethical validity of the seal rests on the engineer's capacity to evaluate the CADD system's outputs, and because CADD systems change in capability, interface, and error profile across versions, an engineer who seals documents produced by a system version or capability they have not been trained on cannot satisfy the competence prerequisite. The ethical consequence is that sealing under such conditions would constitute a violation of the obligation to undertake assignments only when qualified by education or experience, even if the engineer holds a valid license and was previously competent on an earlier version of the same software. This does not require formal re-certification, but it does require that engineers proactively assess whether their existing competence extends to new tools or upgraded systems before using them as the basis for sealed documents. Failure to do so transforms the seal from a professional attestation into a procedural formality, undermining the moral authority the seal is intended to convey.
In response to Q104, the responsible charge standard does not categorically require Engineer B to review each individual contributor's discrete portion of the work in isolation, but it does require that the integrated final document be reviewed with sufficient depth to detect errors that any individual contributor may have introduced. A purely holistic review of the final document is ethically sufficient only if Engineer B possesses the technical competence to identify errors that would be visible at the integrated level. However, where the work is modular and errors in one contributor's portion would not be apparent in the final integrated output without examining that portion specifically, a holistic review alone would be inadequate to satisfy the direction-and-control standard. The ethical obligation therefore scales with the architecture of the work: tightly integrated documents may permit holistic review, while modular or independently developed components require targeted review of each contributor's work. This interpretation is consistent with the Board's modification of BER Case 86-2, which rejected an impossibly strict standard while preserving the substantive requirement that the sealing engineer genuinely understand and be accountable for the technical content of the sealed documents.
In response to Q201, the tension between technology-neutral seal validity and the detailed review sufficiency standard is real and not merely theoretical. When CADD output volume or complexity makes genuinely detailed review practically impossible within normal professional workflows, technology-neutrality risks becoming a shield for inadequate oversight rather than a principled equivalence between drafting methods. The resolution lies in recognizing that technology-neutrality does not mean that the review obligations attached to sealing are themselves technology-neutral: the engineer must adapt their review methodology to the characteristics of CADD output, including its scale, its error modes, and its integration complexity. If the volume of CADD-generated documents is so large that no meaningful review is possible, the ethical answer is not to invoke technology-neutrality to justify sealing all of them, but rather to limit the scope of sealed work to what can be genuinely reviewed. The Board's rejection of an impossible standard in BER Case 86-2 cuts in both directions: it relieves engineers of unrealistic review burdens, but it does not license sealing documents that have not been reviewed at all.
In response to Q202, the Precedent Reconciliation Obligation derived from BER Case 86-2 and the Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance principle are not in irreconcilable conflict, but they do require a principled methodology for updating ethical standards as technology evolves. The Board's modification of BER Case 86-2 in the current case demonstrates that precedent is not immutable when the factual assumptions underlying it have been overtaken by technological change. However, deference to precedent serves important values of predictability and consistency, and the threshold for departing from it should be high: the factual change must be material to the ethical reasoning, not merely incidental. As CADD and AI capabilities continue to evolve, the profession faces a recurring obligation to reassess whether existing ethical standards remain consonant with actual practice. The danger of uncritical deference to precedent is that it entrenches standards calibrated to obsolete technology, while the danger of too-ready departure from precedent is that it allows prevailing practice to define ethics rather than the reverse. The appropriate balance is to treat precedent as presumptively valid but rebuttable when technological change materially alters the conditions under which the original ethical judgment was made.
In response to Q203, the apparent paradox between the Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution principle and the Competence Assurance Under CADD Tool Adoption principle dissolves when the two principles are properly scoped. Deep CADD proficiency is not in tension with independent professional judgment; rather, it is a precondition for exercising that judgment effectively in a CADD-enabled practice environment. The Non-Substitution principle prohibits the engineer from treating CADD outputs as self-validating or from allowing the software's authority to displace their own technical reasoning. The Competence Assurance principle requires that the engineer understand the tool well enough to use it reliably. These principles operate at different levels: competence is about knowing how the tool works and what it produces, while non-substitution is about ensuring that the engineer's independent judgment remains the final arbiter of technical adequacy. An engineer who is highly proficient in CADD but who critically evaluates its outputs against their own engineering knowledge satisfies both principles simultaneously. The paradox only arises if competence is misunderstood as deference to the tool, which it is not.
In response to Q204, the tension between the Responsible Charge Integrity principle and the Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle is genuine and reflects a real asymmetry in the epistemic basis for the two modes of sealing. When Engineer A seals documents they personally prepared, the seal rests on direct first-hand knowledge of every technical decision embedded in the document. When Engineer B seals documents prepared by subordinates, the seal rests on a combination of directional oversight, review of outputs, and trust in the competence of those supervised. These are not epistemically equivalent, and treating them as ethically equivalent under the Dual-Mode framework requires that Engineer B's direction-and-control be substantive enough to compensate for the absence of personal preparation. The ethical equivalence is therefore conditional, not absolute: it holds only when Engineer B's supervisory engagement is sufficiently active and technically informed to produce a level of confidence in the document's accuracy that approximates what personal preparation would provide. Where that condition is not met, the Dual-Mode equivalence collapses and Engineer B's seal becomes ethically deficient regardless of the formal authorization the framework provides.
In response to Q301, from a deontological perspective, Engineer B's duty to exercise responsible charge requires more than general directional oversight but does not require personal line-by-line review of every element of CADD-generated documents. The categorical obligation is to be able to truthfully attest, through the act of sealing, that the documents reflect competent engineering work for which the sealing engineer accepts full professional responsibility. This attestation is only honest if Engineer B has engaged with the technical content sufficiently to form an independent judgment about its adequacy. The deontological framework therefore sets a threshold of substantive technical engagement, not a procedural checklist: the duty is satisfied when Engineer B's review is genuine enough to support the moral claim embedded in the seal, and violated when the seal is affixed as a formality without that genuine engagement. The direction-and-control standard articulated in Code Section II.2.c is best understood deontologically as a structural condition that makes honest sealing possible, not as a substitute for the underlying duty of honest attestation.
In response to Q302, from a consequentialist perspective, the Board's permissive standard for Engineer B's supervisory sealing is likely to produce better aggregate outcomes for public safety than a strict personal-preparation requirement, provided that the direction-and-control condition is genuinely enforced. A strict personal-preparation rule would create severe bottlenecks in engineering production, concentrate sealing authority in ways that reduce the diversity of technical review, and potentially discourage adoption of CADD technology that, when properly used, reduces drafting errors and improves document quality. The supervisory model, by contrast, allows engineering teams to leverage specialized competencies while maintaining a single accountable professional who integrates and validates the work. However, the consequentialist case for the permissive standard depends critically on the quality of supervisory oversight actually exercised: if the direction-and-control requirement becomes a nominal formality, the public safety benefits of the supervisory model evaporate and the permissive standard produces worse outcomes than the strict alternative. The consequentialist analysis therefore supports the Board's standard conditionally, and implies that robust enforcement of the substantive direction-and-control requirement is essential to the standard's ethical justification.
In response to Q303, from a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A demonstrates professional integrity when sealing CADD-generated documents only if the use of CADD is integrated into a practice of active technical engagement rather than passive acceptance of software outputs. The virtue at stake is intellectual honesty: the engineer must genuinely believe, on the basis of their own technical judgment, that the documents are accurate and complete before affixing a seal that represents that belief to the world. CADD tools that automate drafting do not threaten this virtue as long as the engineer retains the capacity and the habit of critically evaluating what the tools produce. The erosion of independent engineering judgment that virtue ethics warns against occurs not through the use of CADD per se, but through the gradual atrophy of the engineer's own technical reasoning when it is never exercised because the software always provides an answer. The virtuous CADD-using engineer therefore maintains their independent technical competence not as a redundant check on the software but as the primary basis for professional judgment, with CADD serving as a tool that extends that judgment rather than replacing it.
In response to Q304, from a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer B exhibits genuine professional courage and accountability when sealing CADD documents prepared by subordinates only if the act of sealing reflects authentic ownership of the work rather than a procedural delegation of risk. The virtue of accountability requires that Engineer B be willing to stand behind the technical content of the sealed documents as if they had prepared them personally, which in turn requires that Engineer B's supervisory engagement be deep enough to make that stance intellectually honest. The risk of moral diffusion across the engineering team is real: when multiple subordinates contribute to a document and Engineer B reviews the integrated output, it is psychologically easy for each participant to assume that someone else has caught any errors, producing a collective failure of accountability that no individual feels responsible for. The virtuous response to this risk is for Engineer B to cultivate a supervisory practice that explicitly assigns and verifies individual accountability within the team, while personally assuming ultimate responsibility through the seal. Where Engineer B seals documents as a procedural formality without this genuine ownership, the seal becomes a moral fiction that undermines the profession's claim to public trust.
In response to Q401, had the Board not modified the stricter standard of BER Case 86-2 requiring detailed personal review before sealing, Engineer B's conduct of sealing CADD documents prepared by subordinates under general direction and control would have been deemed unethical under that earlier standard. The practical consequences for engineering firms relying on team-based CADD production workflows would have been severe: either firms would have been required to have the sealing engineer personally review every technical detail of every document, creating unsustainable bottlenecks and effectively prohibiting the division of labor that makes large-scale engineering projects feasible, or firms would have continued their existing practices while technically violating the ethical standard, producing a widespread gap between formal ethics and actual professional conduct. The Board's modification was therefore not merely a clarification but a substantive recalibration of the responsible charge standard to reflect the realities of modern engineering practice. This recalibration was ethically justified because the stricter standard, applied literally to CADD-enabled team workflows, would have imposed an impossible burden that served no additional public safety purpose beyond what genuine direction-and-control supervision already provides.
In response to Q402, if Engineer A had used an AI-assisted design system that autonomously generated structural calculations and layout decisions rather than a CADD system that merely automated drafting, the Board's technology-neutral reasoning would not straightforwardly support the ethical validity of Engineer A's seal without significant qualification. The critical distinction is between tools that automate the execution of engineering decisions already made by the engineer and tools that autonomously generate the engineering decisions themselves. CADD in its traditional form falls in the former category: it automates drafting but does not substitute for the engineer's structural analysis, design judgment, or technical decision-making. An AI system that autonomously generates structural calculations introduces a qualitatively different challenge: the engineer sealing the documents must be able to independently verify the correctness of machine-generated engineering judgments, not merely review the accuracy of machine-executed drafting. If the AI's reasoning is opaque or its outputs cannot be independently verified through the engineer's own technical analysis, the seal would lack the epistemic foundation that makes it ethically valid. The Board's technology-neutral framework therefore has implicit limits: it applies to tools that extend the engineer's capacity to execute decisions, but requires additional scrutiny when applied to tools that purport to make engineering decisions autonomously.
In response to Q403, if Engineer B had failed to exercise meaningful direction and control — approving CADD documents prepared by subordinates without reviewing their technical content — the seal affixed by Engineer B would constitute an ethical violation equivalent in character to the misconduct identified in BER Case 86-2, and potentially more serious given the explicit direction-and-control requirement in Code Section II.2.c. The profession must distinguish genuine responsible charge from its appearance by reference to the substantive quality of the engineer's engagement with the technical content: genuine responsible charge requires that the sealing engineer be able to articulate the technical basis for the work, identify the key design decisions embedded in the documents, and explain why those decisions are appropriate. An engineer who cannot do these things has not exercised responsible charge regardless of the organizational structure nominally in place. The appearance of supervisory oversight — attending project meetings, signing off on deliverables, being listed as the engineer of record — does not satisfy the ethical standard if it is not accompanied by genuine technical engagement. Distinguishing genuine from nominal responsible charge requires examining the engineer's actual knowledge of the work's technical content, not merely their formal role in the project hierarchy.
In response to Q404, if Engineer A lacked sufficient competence in the specific CADD system used to produce the documents — being unable to detect systematic errors introduced by the software — the seal would not be ethically valid under the Board's framework, even though that framework is formally technology-neutral. The technology-neutral principle establishes that CADD-generated documents are not inherently inferior to hand-drafted ones and that the medium of production does not itself disqualify a document from being sealed. But technology-neutrality does not suspend the competence prerequisite; it operates within it. The ethical validity of the seal depends on the engineer's capacity to evaluate the technical content of the documents, and that capacity is tool-specific when the tool is capable of introducing systematic errors that are not apparent without understanding the tool's behavior. This effectively creates a technology-specific qualification requirement that conditions the permissibility of sealing: an engineer who is technically competent in the underlying engineering discipline but incompetent in the specific CADD system used cannot ethically seal documents produced by that system, because they lack the means to verify that the system has not introduced errors. This conclusion is consistent with Code Section II.2.a, which requires qualification by education or experience in the specific technical field, interpreted to include the tools through which that technical work is executed.
The Board resolved the tension between Technology-Neutral Seal Validity and the Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard not by eliminating the review requirement but by recalibrating what 'sufficient' review means in light of how CADD work is actually produced. Rather than demanding that a sealing engineer personally retrace every drafting step, the Board accepted that competent direction and control over the process — setting parameters, verifying outputs, and exercising independent technical judgment at key decision points — satisfies the review obligation. This resolution teaches that the Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard is not a fixed procedural checklist but a purposive standard: its purpose is to ensure the engineer genuinely understands and vouches for the document's technical content, and that purpose can be fulfilled through supervisory engagement as well as personal drafting. The risk flagged in Q201 — that technology-neutrality becomes a shield for inadequate oversight — is real but is addressed by insisting that direction and control be substantive, not nominal. Technology-neutrality therefore operates as a permissive principle that expands the range of acceptable workflows, while Detailed Review Sufficiency operates as a limiting principle that prevents that permission from collapsing into rubber-stamping.
The Board's modification of BER Case 86-2 illustrates how the Precedent Reconciliation Obligation and the Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance principle interact when factual circumstances evolve. The earlier case's stricter standard — prohibiting sealing without detailed personal review — was not wrong on its own terms; it reflected the epistemic conditions of a drafting environment where supervision was harder to verify and CADD workflows were novel. By the time of the instant case, CADD had become sufficiently integrated into professional practice that treating it as categorically different from hand-drafting would have imposed an impossible standard on legitimate engineering workflows. The Board's reasoning implicitly establishes a meta-principle: ethical standards derived from precedent must be tested against the factual assumptions that gave them their justificatory force, and when those assumptions no longer hold, fidelity to the underlying ethical value — ensuring engineers genuinely own what they seal — requires updating the standard rather than mechanically applying the old rule. This has direct implications for Q202 and Q402: as AI-assisted design systems increasingly generate not just drafting output but substantive engineering judgments, the same meta-principle demands that the direction-and-control standard be re-examined again, because the epistemic gap between the sealing engineer and the document's technical content may widen to a point where the current standard no longer reliably secures the underlying value.
The most structurally significant tension in this case is between the Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle — which treats Engineer A's self-authored sealing and Engineer B's supervisory sealing as ethically equivalent — and the Responsible Charge Integrity principle, which demands that the seal represent genuine personal accountability for the document's technical soundness. These two principles are reconcilable only if the Competence Assurance Under CADD Tool Adoption principle and the Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution principle are treated as jointly necessary conditions that both engineers must satisfy. The reconciliation works as follows: Engineer A's seal is ethically valid because personal preparation, combined with CADD competence and preserved independent judgment, gives Engineer A direct epistemic access to the document's content. Engineer B's seal is ethically valid because substantive direction and control, combined with CADD competence and active technical engagement, gives Engineer B a functionally equivalent — though structurally different — epistemic basis for accountability. The paradox identified in Q203, where deep CADD reliance simultaneously satisfies competence requirements and risks substituting machine output for professional judgment, is resolved by insisting that competence in CADD means knowing when and how to override, verify, and critically interrogate the system's output, not merely knowing how to operate it. The Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution principle thus functions as an internal constraint on what counts as genuine CADD competence, preventing the Competence Assurance principle from being satisfied by mere operational fluency. Together, these four principles establish that the ethical validity of sealing in either mode depends on the engineer maintaining an independent technical judgment that the CADD system serves but does not replace.
Should Engineer A sign and seal engineering documents that Engineer A personally prepared using a CADD system, treating CADD as a production tool equivalent to hand-drafting, or should Engineer A refrain from sealing CADD-produced documents absent additional verification steps specific to the technology?
Engineer A, a registered professional engineer, personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and then signs and seals those documents. The core question is whether the use of CADD as the production medium — rather than hand-drafting — alters the ethical validity of the seal, and whether Engineer A's personal authorship of the CADD-produced work satisfies the responsible charge requirement.
Sign and seal CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared, treating CADD as a production tool equivalent to hand-drafting, provided Engineer A possesses sufficient competence in the CADD system to critically evaluate its outputs and detect tool-specific errors.
Treat CADD-generated documents as requiring a separate independent technical verification step — beyond personal preparation — before sealing, on the grounds that automated drafting tools may introduce systematic errors that the preparing engineer cannot self-detect.
Condition the ethical validity of sealing on Engineer A obtaining formal or employer-certified CADD proficiency documentation, treating tool-specific competence as a prerequisite that must be externally verified rather than self-assessed before any CADD-produced document may be sealed.
Engineer A — Self-Authoring CADD Practitioner
Should Engineer B sign and seal CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised subordinates under Engineer B's direction and control — relying on substantive supervisory engagement and detailed review as the basis for responsible charge — or must Engineer B personally prepare or conduct line-by-line technical review of every element before sealing?
Engineer B, a registered professional engineer, signs and seals engineering documents that were produced by other personnel — registered or non-registered engineers — using a CADD system, where those personnel worked under Engineer B's direction and control. The question is whether supervisory direction and control, combined with detailed review, is sufficient to satisfy responsible charge for CADD-produced documents prepared by others, and how the BER Case 86-2 precedent bears on this determination.
Sign and seal CADD documents prepared by supervised subordinates, provided Engineer B exercised genuine upstream direction and control throughout production — setting technical parameters, reviewing intermediate outputs at key decision points, and conducting a detailed substantive review of the integrated final documents sufficient to independently attest to their technical adequacy.
Decline to seal CADD documents prepared by subordinates unless Engineer B has personally prepared the documents or conducted a line-by-line technical review of every element, applying the stricter BER Case 86-2 standard on the grounds that supervisory direction alone cannot substitute for the epistemic certainty of personal authorship.
Sign and seal CADD documents prepared by subordinates based on Engineer B's organizational supervisory authority and general project oversight, without conducting detailed technical review of the documents' content, on the grounds that the direction-and-control requirement is satisfied by the formal supervisory relationship.
Engineer B — Supervisory CADD Sealing Engineer
Should Engineer A and Engineer B treat CADD competence as a self-assessed functional threshold — requiring the capacity to critically evaluate outputs and detect tool-specific errors — or should they condition sealing on externally verified proficiency standards, and must that competence obligation be periodically re-validated as CADD technology evolves?
Both Engineer A and Engineer B must determine the minimum level of CADD competence required before ethically sealing CADD-generated documents. The question encompasses not only what the competence threshold is — operational proficiency versus the capacity to critically evaluate outputs and detect tool-specific errors — but also who bears responsibility for verifying that the threshold has been met, and whether that obligation is self-assessed or externally certified.
Treat CADD competence as a self-assessed functional threshold requiring the capacity to critically evaluate outputs, detect tool-specific errors, and exercise independent professional judgment over the system's results — with the sealing engineer bearing primary responsibility for confirming that threshold is met before sealing, and re-assessing competence as the technology materially evolves.
Condition the ethical permissibility of sealing CADD-produced documents on the engineer obtaining employer or firm certification of CADD proficiency — including periodic re-certification as system versions change — on the grounds that self-assessment is insufficient to guard against competence gaps the engineer may not recognize.
Treat general professional competence in the underlying engineering discipline as sufficient for sealing CADD-produced documents, without imposing a separate tool-specific competence requirement, on the grounds that CADD is merely a drafting medium and that technology-neutrality means the competence standard should not vary by production tool.
Sealing Engineer — CADD Competence Threshold Determination
When Engineer B seals CADD documents containing an undetected error propagated through subordinates' work, should Engineer B accept full primary professional and ethical responsibility for the error as an unqualified consequence of sealing, or should Engineer B's culpability be assessed proportionally based on the quality of supervisory engagement and the detectability of the error through reasonable professional review?
When Engineer B seals CADD documents prepared by subordinates and those documents contain an undetected error — whether introduced by the CADD software algorithmically, by subordinate personnel, or through the interaction of both — the question of how professional liability and ethical culpability should be apportioned arises. The Full Responsibility Assumption Upon CADD Document Sealing Obligation holds that the seal constitutes an unqualified professional certification, but the degree to which Engineer B's culpability is mitigated by the genuinely undetectable nature of an error, or by the software vendor's role, requires analysis.
Accept full primary professional and ethical responsibility for the error as an unqualified consequence of having affixed the seal, recognizing that the seal constitutes a personal attestation of technical adequacy that cannot be disclaimed on the grounds that the error originated in software or was introduced by subordinate personnel.
Acknowledge primary professional responsibility while asserting that ethical culpability should be assessed proportionally — reduced when the error was genuinely undetectable through reasonable professional review and when Engineer B's supervisory engagement was substantive — and that subordinates and the software vendor bear secondary responsibility for their respective contributions to the failure.
Contend that primary ethical culpability rests with the software vendor for the algorithmic defect or with the subordinate personnel who produced the erroneous work, on the grounds that Engineer B's supervisory review could not reasonably have been expected to detect an error originating outside Engineer B's direct technical control.
Engineer B — Responsible Charge Accountability Upon Error Discovery
Should the Board treat its modification of BER Case 86-2 as establishing a stable technology-neutral framework for all future design-generation tools — including AI systems that autonomously produce engineering calculations — or should the Board articulate a technology-sensitive limit that conditions the ethical validity of sealing on the engineer's capacity to independently verify the tool's substantive engineering judgments?
The Board's modification of the stricter BER Case 86-2 standard — which had required detailed personal review before sealing — raises the question of how the Precedent Reconciliation Obligation and the Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance principle should be balanced when evolving technology renders earlier factual assumptions obsolete. This decision point also encompasses the forward-looking question of whether the same meta-principle that justified modifying BER Case 86-2 for CADD will require further modification as AI-assisted design systems increasingly generate autonomous engineering judgments rather than merely automating drafting.
Establish that the technology-neutral framework contains an implicit technology-sensitive limit — the engineer's capacity to exercise genuine direction and control over the tool's outputs — such that the ethical permissibility of sealing AI- or CADD-generated documents is always contingent on the engineer's ability to independently verify the tool's substantive engineering judgments, with the standard requiring re-examination as autonomous design-generation capabilities advance.
Treat the technology-neutral framework as a stable, forward-applicable standard for all design-generation tools including AI systems, on the grounds that the direction-and-control requirement already captures the necessary ethical constraint and that imposing additional technology-specific standards would create unpredictable and unenforceable obligations as technology evolves.
Resolve the CADD question under the modified BER Case 86-2 framework without articulating forward-looking principles for AI-assisted design systems, leaving the ethical treatment of autonomous design-generation tools to future case-by-case analysis as specific AI applications present concrete ethical questions to the Board.
BER Ethics Board — Precedent Modification and Forward-Looking Standard Setting
Should Engineer B treat the Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle as conferring ethical equivalence between supervisory sealing and self-authored sealing unconditionally — relying on the formal direction-and-control relationship as sufficient — or must Engineer B demonstrate that supervisory engagement was substantive enough to produce a level of technical confidence in the document's accuracy that approximates what personal preparation would provide?
The Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle treats Engineer A's self-authored sealing and Engineer B's supervisory sealing as ethically equivalent outcomes, but the epistemic basis for each engineer's confidence in the sealed document differs fundamentally. This decision point addresses whether the ethical equivalence of the two modes is absolute or conditional, and what quality of supervisory engagement Engineer B must demonstrate to compensate for the epistemic asymmetry between personal preparation and mediated supervisory knowledge — including the virtue-ethics question of whether Engineer B's sealing reflects genuine professional ownership or a procedural formality that masks diffusion of moral responsibility.
Treat the Dual-Mode equivalence as conditional — sealing CADD documents prepared by subordinates only when Engineer B's supervisory engagement was substantive enough to produce genuine technical confidence in the document's accuracy, including active direction throughout production, review of critical decision points, and the capacity to articulate the technical basis for key design choices embedded in the sealed documents.
Treat the Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle as conferring ethical equivalence unconditionally once the formal direction-and-control supervisory relationship is established, on the grounds that Code Section II.2.c expressly authorizes supervisory sealing and that imposing a further substantive-equivalence condition creates an unworkable standard that undermines the Code's explicit accommodation of team-based engineering workflows.
Address the epistemic asymmetry and moral diffusion risk by requiring that subordinate engineers who prepared the CADD documents also sign the documents — with Engineer B's seal representing supervisory certification and subordinates' signatures representing authorship attestation — distributing accountability explicitly rather than concentrating it solely in Engineer B's seal.
Engineer B — Dual-Mode Seal Authorization and Responsible Charge Integrity
Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard Applied to BER Case 86-2 Modification
Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance Obligation
The BER modifies its prior holding in BER Case 86-2, concluding that it was not unethical for the chief engineer to seal plans not personally prepared by him, provided those plans were checked and reviewed in some detail — rejecting the strict personal-preparation interpretation while maintaining the requirement for substantive review.
In this context, 'some detail' of checking and review is the operative threshold distinguishing ethical supervisory sealing from impermissible nominal oversight. General supervision, confidence in staff, and involvement in concept-setting alone are insufficient; the engineer must actually check and review the documents.
Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard for Supervisory Sealing Principle
The BER resolves the tension between the strict personal-preparation standard (which would place many practitioners in violation) and the public protection function of the seal (which requires genuine engineer accountability) by adopting the 'some detail' review standard as a reasonable middle ground consistent with prevailing practice.
Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard Applied to Instant Questions
Applying the modified BER Case 86-2 standard to the two instant questions, the BER concludes that it is not unethical for an engineer to sign and seal CADD-produced drawings provided those plans are checked and reviewed in some detail — regardless of whether the engineer personally produced the drawings.
In this context, the principle applies equally to self-authored CADD documents (Engineer A) and supervisory CADD documents (Engineer B) — in both cases, the ethical requirement is satisfied by detailed checking and review, not personal drafting. The CADD medium does not alter the review obligation.
based upon our discussion clarifying BER Case 86-2, we believe logic would dictate that in either case it would not be unethical for an engineer to sign and seal the drawings in question as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail.
The BER finds no tension requiring resolution in the instant questions — both scenarios satisfy the ethical standard through the detailed review requirement, and the CADD technology does not create additional ethical barriers beyond the competence and review obligations.
In either case, we are not of the view that an engineer must personally prepare the drawings, plans and other documents involved.
Drafting Technology Evolution (Event 1) → AI Anticipation Registered (Event 5)
Drafting Technology Evolution (Event 1) → BER 86-2 Controversy Emerges (Event 2)
Dual-Mode Seal Authorization Instantiated In Two-Engineer Scenario
CADD-produced engineering documents in both self-authored and supervised production contexts
Responsible Charge Integrity and Seal Authority Principle
The case presents the two canonical modes of ethical seal authorization side by side: Engineer A exemplifies the self-authorship mode (personally prepares CADD documents then seals them) and Engineer B exemplifies the supervisory direction-and-control mode (directs others using CADD, then seals their output); both are ethically permissible under their respective conditions
The two-engineer scenario is a pedagogical illustration of the dual-mode framework; neither mode is categorically preferred, but each imposes distinct obligations — personal judgment for Engineer A, substantive oversight for Engineer B
No conflict between the modes; they are parallel, not competing, pathways to ethical seal authorization. The framework resolves potential confusion about whether supervisory sealing is ethically inferior to self-authored sealing by affirming both as valid under their respective conditions
Professional engineering licensing boards and NSPE
Engineer Stamped Document Responsibility Standard
Engineer A (self-prepared CADD documents) and Engineer B (documents prepared by supervised others)
Governs the professional responsibility that attaches when Engineer A and Engineer B sign and seal documents, establishing that the sealing engineer bears ongoing accountability for the work so certified
Engineer A CADD Competence Prerequisite Seal Authorization
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and seeks to sign and seal those documents
Engineer A may sign and seal CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared only if Engineer A possesses the requisite background, education, and training to be proficient with the CADD system's dynamics and limitations; absence of such competence renders sealing ethically impermissible regardless of self-authorship.
NSPE Code of Ethics II.2.b; BER Discussion on CADD competence prerequisite
At the time of signing and sealing CADD-produced documents
The key requirement is that an engineer possesses sufficient competence, assumes full responsibility for the work product.
Engineer A CADD Personal Preparation Seal Permissibility
CADD Personal Preparation Seal Permissibility Constraint
Engineer A, who personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system, is ethically permitted to sign and seal those documents provided Engineer A possesses sufficient CADD competence; personal authorship satisfies the direction-and-control requirement of NSPE Code II.2.b without requiring a separate detailed review step.
NSPE Code of Ethics II.2.b; BER Clarification of BER Case 86-2
At the time of signing and sealing self-prepared CADD documents
Engineer A CADD Self-Authored Document Seal Validity
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and then signs and seals those documents as a registered professional engineer.
CADD Self-Authored Document Seal Validity Obligation
Engineer A is obligated to recognize that signing and sealing CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared is ethically valid and satisfies the responsible charge requirement, and must ensure that the documents sealed are genuinely self-authored rather than delegated to others.
At the time of affixing signature and seal to each CADD-produced document
Engineer A CADD Self-Authored Document Seal Validity Recognition
CADD Self-Authored Document Seal Validity Recognition Capability
Engineer A possesses the capability to recognize that signing and sealing CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared is ethically valid, understanding that personal authorship — regardless of the drafting medium — provides the legitimate basis for affixing a professional seal.
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and then signs and seals those self-authored documents as a registered professional engineer.
Engineer A's practice of signing and sealing documents personally prepared using a CADD system, consistent with the ethical standard that the seal is valid when the engineer is the document's author.
Engineer A CADD Self-Authored Seal Validity
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and then signs and seals those documents as the responsible professional engineer.
CADD Self-Authored Document Seal Validity Constraint
Engineer A is constrained to seal only those CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared, and only when Engineer A possesses sufficient competence in the CADD system to evaluate the technical accuracy and completeness of the output; self-authorship satisfies the responsible charge requirement but does not eliminate the tool-competence prerequisite.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER clarified standard on CADD document sealing
At the time of signing and sealing each CADD-produced document
Engineer A CADD System Output Technical Evaluation
CADD System Output Technical Evaluation Capability
Engineer A must possess sufficient competence in the CADD system used to prepare documents to evaluate the technical accuracy and completeness of the CADD-produced outputs before affixing a professional seal.
Engineer A uses a CADD system to personally prepare engineering documents and must be competent in that system to ensure the documents meet professional standards before sealing.
Engineer A's obligation to understand the CADD system's functionality and output characteristics well enough to certify the technical adequacy of self-authored CADD documents through the act of sealing.
Engineer A CADD Technology Non-Crutch Judgment Preservation
Engineer A (self-authoring CADD engineer)
CADD Technology Non-Crutch Professional Judgment Preservation Obligation
Engineer A, who personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system, is obligated to use the CADD system strictly as a tool assisting professional judgment and not as a substitute for competence — ensuring that every solution incorporated from the CADD system is one that Engineer A has independently prepared or fully understands.
Throughout the preparation and sealing of CADD-produced documents
CADD utilized beyond its ability to serve as a valuable tool has a propensity to be utilized as a crutch or substitute for judgement.
Engineer A CADD Technology Non-Crutch Judgment Preservation Capability Instance
Technology-as-Tool Boundary Judgment Capability
Engineer A must possess the capability to use the CADD system strictly as a tool assisting professional judgment and not as a substitute for engineering competence, recognizing the propensity of CADD to become a crutch when used beyond its proper role.
Engineer A personally prepares and seals CADD-produced engineering documents; the BER warns that CADD utilized beyond its ability to serve as a tool has a propensity to be used as a crutch or substitute for judgment
Personal preparation of CADD documents while maintaining independent professional judgment over design decisions rather than accepting CADD-generated solutions not fully understood
the engineer must utilize such systems to assist the engineer in the performance of professional services and not employ such systems as a replacement for professional competence and expertise.
Engineer A CADD Technology Non-Crutch Prohibition
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system
Engineer A, who personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system, is prohibited from using the CADD system as a substitute for independent professional engineering judgment; Engineer A may not incorporate CADD-generated solutions that Engineer A has neither prepared nor fully understands, even based on confidence in the system or prior experience.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Discussion on CADD as tool vs. crutch
Throughout the preparation and sealing of CADD-produced engineering documents
As night follows day one can be assured that CADD utilized beyond its ability to serve as a valuable tool has a propensity to be utilized as a crutch or substitute for judgement.
Engineer A CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite Capability Instance
AI Tool Competence Assessment Capability
Engineer A must possess the capability to assess whether Engineer A has the requisite background, education, and training to be proficient with CADD — including understanding the limitations of current CADD technology — before signing and sealing self-authored CADD documents.
The BER requires that engineers have requisite background, education, and training to be proficient with CADD dynamics including limitations of current technology before sealing CADD documents
Self-assessment of CADD proficiency including understanding of system limitations prior to sealing CADD-produced documents
Engineer A CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite for Sealing
Engineer A uses a CADD system to personally prepare engineering documents that are subsequently signed and sealed.
Engineer A is obligated to possess sufficient competence in the CADD system used to prepare documents to evaluate the technical accuracy and completeness of the output before affixing a professional seal.
Ongoing, throughout the use of CADD tools in document preparation and at the time of sealing
Engineer A CADD Tool Competence Sealing Prerequisite
Engineer A uses a CADD system to prepare documents; competence in that system is a prerequisite to valid sealing regardless of self-authorship.
Engineer A is constrained from signing and sealing CADD-produced documents unless Engineer A possesses sufficient understanding of the CADD system's functionality, accuracy, and limitations to independently evaluate the technical correctness of the output before affixing a professional seal.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2; Competence requirements for professional engineering practice
Ongoing, throughout use of CADD system in professional practice
Engineer A Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard Instant Questions
Instant question 1: Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and signs and seals those documents.
Engineer A (self-authoring CADD engineer, instant questions)
Engineer A, who personally prepares CADD documents and seals them, satisfies the detailed review sufficiency standard by virtue of personal authorship — and is not required to conduct a separate detailed review of self-authored work, though must ensure the work reflects genuine professional competence and judgment.
At the time of sealing self-authored CADD documents
Engineer A Full Professional Responsibility Assumption CADD Self-Prepared Sealing
Engineer A personally prepares and seals CADD-produced engineering documents
Full Professional Responsibility Assumption Upon Sealing Constraint
Upon signing and sealing CADD-produced documents that Engineer A personally prepared, Engineer A assumes full professional responsibility for the entire work product and cannot subsequently disclaim or limit that responsibility on the basis that the documents were produced by a CADD system.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Discussion on full responsibility upon sealing
From the moment of signing and sealing, ongoing
That translates to a scenario for potential liability.
Engineer A Full Responsibility Assumption CADD Document Sealing
Engineer A personally prepares and seals CADD-produced engineering documents.
Full Responsibility Assumption Upon CADD Document Sealing Obligation
Engineer A, upon signing and sealing self-authored CADD documents, assumes full professional responsibility for the entire work product and cannot disclaim responsibility for any portion on the grounds that it was generated by the CADD system.
Upon and after affixing the professional seal
Engineer A Sealed Document Completeness Pre-Certification Self-Assessment CADD
Sealed Document Completeness Pre-Certification Self-Assessment Capability
Engineer A must possess the capability to conduct a rigorous self-assessment of the completeness and professional adequacy of CADD-produced self-authored documents before signing and sealing them, recognizing that the act of sealing constitutes a professional certification of adequacy.
Engineer A personally prepares and then seals CADD documents, requiring pre-certification self-assessment of document adequacy.
Engineer A's pre-sealing review of self-authored CADD documents to verify they meet professional standards before affixing the seal.
{'license': 'Registered Professional Engineer', 'document_preparation': 'Personal/self-authored', 'tool': 'CADD system', 'sealing_basis': 'Personal authorship and direct preparation'}
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer B Supervisory Direction-and-Control Sealing Engineer'}
Engineer A Self-Prepared CADD Document Sealing
Throughout the preparation and sealing of CADD documents by Engineer A
Clients or public relying on sealed documents
Engineer A's relationship to the documents they personally prepared and sealed
Completion and delivery of sealed documents
Engineer A personally prepares documents using a CADD system
Engineer A Stamped CADD Document Continuing Accountability
Engineer A seals CADD-produced documents they personally prepared, accepting the professional accountability that attaches to the seal.
Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability Non-Abandonment Constraint
Engineer A, by affixing a professional seal to self-prepared CADD documents, is constrained to retain ongoing professional accountability for the technical integrity of those documents and may not subsequently disavow or abandon responsibility for the work product.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional engineering seal standards
Indefinitely following the act of sealing
Engineer A Stamped Document Continuing Technical Accountability CADD
Engineer A personally prepares and seals CADD documents, creating an ongoing bond of professional accountability for the technical content.
Stamped Document Continuing Technical Accountability Obligation
Engineer A, by affixing a professional seal to CADD-produced self-authored documents, accepts continuing professional accountability for the technical integrity of those documents, including after project completion.
Engineer A Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability CADD Self-Authored
Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability Capability
Engineer A, by affixing a professional seal to CADD-produced self-authored documents, must possess the capability to recognize and honor the continuing professional accountability that attaches to those sealed documents.
Engineer A seals self-authored CADD documents, creating continuing accountability for their technical content.
Engineer A's acceptance of ongoing professional responsibility for the technical content of CADD-produced documents bearing the professional seal.
Engineer A Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability CADD Self-Authored Instance
Engineer A must possess the capability to recognize that sealing self-authored CADD documents creates full, continuing professional accountability for the entire work product — including accountability for the technical accuracy of CADD-generated outputs.
The BER holds that an engineer who seals CADD documents assumes full responsibility for the work product
Acceptance of full professional responsibility upon sealing CADD-produced self-authored documents
Engineer A Technology-as-Tool Boundary Judgment CADD Self-Authored
Engineer A must recognize and maintain the boundary between using CADD as a tool that supplements professional engineering judgment versus allowing the CADD system to substitute for that judgment — ensuring that the CADD system serves as a drafting and design tool while Engineer A's professional competence remains the authoritative basis for the sealed documents.
Engineer A uses a CADD system to prepare engineering documents, requiring recognition that CADD is a tool that does not replace professional engineering judgment.
Engineer A's use of CADD as a drafting tool while retaining personal professional judgment and accountability for the engineering content of self-authored documents.
Engineer B CADD Competence Prerequisite Supervisory Seal Authorization
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel using a CADD system under Engineer B's direction and control
Engineer B may sign and seal CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel only if Engineer B possesses sufficient understanding of the CADD system and its outputs to conduct a substantive technical review; lack of CADD competence prevents Engineer B from conducting the required detailed review and therefore bars sealing.
At the time of signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel
Engineer B CADD Direction-and-Control Responsible Charge Sufficiency Calibration Instance
Engineer B must possess the capability to calibrate what level of direction, control, and detailed review of CADD-produced documents satisfies the responsible charge standard — recognizing that personal preparation is not required but that detailed review and check is, and that involvement in concept, design requirements, and technical question resolution is necessary.
The BER clarifies BER Case 86-2 to hold that sealing CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel is permissible as long as plans are checked and reviewed in some detail — Engineer B must know where this threshold lies
Establishing design concepts and requirements, responding to technical questions, reviewing design progress, and conducting detailed check of CADD documents before sealing
it would not be unethical for an engineer to sign and seal the drawings in question as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail.
By general direction and supervision, the Engineer meant that he was involved in helping to establish the concept, the design requirements, and the review elements of the design or project status as the design progressed.
Engineer B CADD Supervision Technology Non-Substitution for Judgment
Engineer B seals CADD-produced documents prepared by others; the CADD system's automated outputs cannot substitute for Engineer B's independent engineering judgment in the direction, control, and review process.
Engineer B is constrained from treating the CADD system's outputs as a substitute for independent engineering judgment when supervising others and sealing the resulting documents; the CADD tool must function as a supplement to, not a replacement for, Engineer B's professional expertise and decision-making.
Throughout the supervisory and sealing process
Engineer B CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Competence Verification
CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Competence Verification Capability
Engineer B must possess the capability to verify, before sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, that those documents were prepared under Engineer B's genuine direction and control — assessing whether the supervisory engagement was substantive enough to satisfy the responsible charge standard.
Engineer B signs and seals documents produced by other personnel using a CADD system working under Engineer B's direction and control, requiring verification that the direction-and-control prerequisite is genuinely met.
Engineer B's self-assessment of whether the direction and control exercised over CADD-using subordinates was sufficient to ethically justify affixing a professional seal to their work product.
Engineer B CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Seal Authorization
Engineer B signs and seals documents produced by other personnel using a CADD system working under Engineer B's direction and control; the ethical validity of the seal depends entirely on the adequacy of that direction and control.
CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Seal Authorization Constraint
Engineer B is constrained from signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by other personnel unless Engineer B exercised genuine direction and control over the preparation of those documents — including active involvement in engineering decisions and a detailed substantive review sufficient to reconstruct the work — and may not seal based on general supervision or post-hoc review alone.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b; BER Case 86-2 and clarified standard; State licensure law
At the time of signing and sealing each CADD-produced document prepared by others
Engineer B CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Seal Prerequisite
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel using a CADD system, where those personnel work under Engineer B's direction and control.
CADD Supervisory Direction-and-Control Seal Prerequisite Obligation
Engineer B is obligated to ensure that all CADD-produced documents prepared by other personnel and subsequently signed and sealed by Engineer B were produced under Engineer B's genuine direction and control — meaning active technical supervision, substantive review of intermediate outputs, and the level of engagement constituting responsible charge — before affixing the professional seal.
Throughout the document preparation process and at the time of sealing
Engineer B CADD Supervisory Seal Detailed Review Sufficiency
Engineer B may sign and seal CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel only if Engineer B has checked and reviewed those documents in some detail — more than general supervision or cursory review, sufficient to assume full professional responsibility — prohibiting sealing based solely on confidence in subordinates' abilities or general oversight of project progress.
Prior to and at the time of signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel
Engineer B CADD System Output Technical Evaluation Supervisory
Engineer B must possess sufficient understanding of the CADD system and its outputs to conduct a substantive technical review of documents prepared by supervised personnel before affixing a professional seal, including the ability to identify potential errors or omissions in CADD-generated work product.
Engineer B reviews and seals CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, requiring competence in evaluating CADD system outputs.
Engineer B's technical review of CADD-produced documents prepared by others, requiring competence in evaluating CADD system outputs to verify professional adequacy before sealing.
Engineer B CADD Technology Non-Crutch Judgment Preservation
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel working under Engineer B's direction and control using a CADD system.
Engineer B (supervisory direction-and-control sealing engineer)
Engineer B, who signs and seals engineering documents produced by personnel using CADD systems under Engineer B's direction and control, is obligated to ensure that CADD outputs are not incorporated into sealed documents without Engineer B's substantive understanding and verification — and that neither Engineer B nor supervised personnel treat the CADD system as a replacement for professional judgment.
Throughout the direction, review, and sealing of CADD-produced documents
Engineer B CADD Technology Non-Crutch Judgment Preservation Capability Instance
Engineer B must possess the capability to ensure that supervised personnel using CADD systems employ those systems as tools rather than substitutes for engineering judgment, and that Engineer B's own supervisory review does not rely on CADD outputs as a replacement for substantive technical evaluation.
Engineer B signs and seals CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel; the BER warns against incorporating CADD solutions the engineer has neither prepared nor fully understands
Maintaining substantive direction-and-control over CADD-produced documents and conducting detailed review rather than deferring to CADD system outputs
there may be a temptation for the engineer to incorporate a solution provided by the system which the engineer has neither prepared nor fully understands because the engineer believes, based upon engineer's confidence in the system and upon prior experience, that the system will provide a quality solution on a project.
Engineer B CADD Technology Non-Crutch Supervisory Prohibition
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel using a CADD system
Engineer B, who signs and seals CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, is prohibited from treating the CADD system's outputs as a substitute for independent engineering judgment; Engineer B must critically evaluate all CADD-generated solutions and may not passively accept outputs on the basis of confidence in the system or in the supervised personnel.
Throughout the direction, control, review, and sealing of CADD-produced engineering documents
Engineer B CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite Capability Instance
Engineer B must possess the capability to assess whether Engineer B has sufficient competence in the CADD system and its outputs to conduct a substantive technical review of documents prepared by supervised personnel before sealing them.
Engineer B seals CADD documents prepared by others; the BER requires the engineer to possess sufficient competence to evaluate CADD outputs
Evaluation of CADD system outputs and understanding of CADD limitations sufficient to conduct detailed review of supervised personnel's work
Engineer B CADD Tool Competence Prerequisite for Sealing
Engineer B supervises personnel who use a CADD system to produce engineering documents, and Engineer B subsequently signs and seals those documents.
Engineer B is obligated to possess sufficient understanding of the CADD system and its outputs to conduct a substantive technical review of documents prepared by supervised personnel before sealing, ensuring that CADD-specific errors, modeling assumptions, or output artifacts are identified and resolved.
Ongoing, throughout supervision of CADD-using personnel and at the time of sealing
Engineer B CADD Tool Competence Sealing Prerequisite
Engineer B supervises others using CADD and seals the resulting documents; competence in the CADD system is a prerequisite to meaningful direction, control, and review.
Engineer B is constrained from signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by others unless Engineer B possesses sufficient understanding of the CADD system and its outputs to conduct a substantive technical review and evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the work product before sealing.
Ongoing, throughout supervisory use of CADD system in professional practice
Engineer B Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard Instant Questions
Instant question 2: Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel working under Engineer B's direction and control using a CADD system.
Engineer B (supervisory direction-and-control sealing engineer, instant questions)
Engineer B, who signs and seals CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel, is obligated to conduct a detailed review and check of those documents before sealing — satisfying the responsible charge requirement through detailed review rather than personal preparation, provided Engineer B also possesses sufficient competence, assumes full responsibility, and carefully directs and controls the preparation.
Before sealing each set of CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel
Engineer B Full Professional Responsibility Assumption CADD Supervisory Sealing
Engineer B signs and seals CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel
Upon signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, Engineer B assumes full professional responsibility for the entire work product and cannot subsequently disclaim or limit that responsibility on the basis that the documents were produced by supervised personnel using a CADD system.
Certainly this point must be heeded in the parallel area of professionalism and ethics.
Engineer B Full Responsibility Assumption CADD Document Sealing
Engineer B signs and seals CADD-produced documents prepared by personnel under Engineer B's direction and control.
Engineer B, upon signing and sealing CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel, assumes full professional responsibility for the entire work product — including all CADD-generated content — and cannot disclaim responsibility on the grounds that the documents were prepared by subordinate personnel or generated by automated CADD processes.
We believe this approach is consistent with the language contained in the Code.
Engineer B Insufficient Responsible Charge Risk
Concurrent with Engineer B's sealing activity, pending determination of whether direction and control is substantively adequate
The latent risk that Engineer B's direction and control may not meet the threshold required for responsible charge, rendering the seal ethically or legally impermissible
Confirmation that Engineer B maintained active, experience-based supervisory direction throughout; or finding of inadequate oversight
Engineer B affixes seal to documents prepared by others, raising the question of whether supervisory oversight was sufficient
Engineer B Responsible Charge Active Engagement CADD Supervision
Engineer B supervises others using CADD and seals the resulting documents; responsible charge requires active engagement throughout, not merely review after the fact.
Responsible Charge Active Engagement Constraint
Engineer B is constrained to be actively engaged in the engineering process from conception through completion when supervising others using a CADD system, and may not treat post-preparation review of CADD drawings alone as a substitute for genuine responsible charge before sealing.
NSPE Code of Ethics; NSPE Position Statement No. 10-1778; BER clarified standard
Throughout the design and preparation process for each set of CADD-produced documents
Engineer B Responsible Charge Active Engagement CADD Supervisory
Responsible Charge Active Engagement Capability
Engineer B must maintain active, substantive engagement in the engineering process when bearing responsible charge over CADD-using personnel, personally making or directly supervising engineering decisions rather than merely ratifying completed CADD-produced work after the fact.
Engineer B signs and seals CADD-produced documents prepared by others under direction and control, requiring active responsible charge engagement throughout the work process.
Engineer B's ongoing supervisory engagement with personnel using CADD systems, ensuring that direction and control is exercised throughout the document preparation process rather than only at the sealing stage.
Engineer B Responsible Charge Detailed Review Before Sealing CADD Documents
Engineer B's ethical authority to seal CADD-produced documents prepared by others depends entirely on whether Engineer B's direction and control constitutes genuine responsible charge, not merely nominal supervisory title.
Responsible Charge Detailed Review Before Sealing Obligation
Engineer B is obligated to conduct a detailed, substantive review of CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel — sufficient to constitute responsible charge — before affixing a professional seal, and must refrain from sealing such documents based on general supervisory involvement alone without detailed review.
Prior to affixing signature and seal to each CADD-produced document prepared by others
Engineer B Responsible Charge Supervisory Sealing
Throughout the period in which others prepare documents under Engineer B's direction and control, culminating in Engineer B's signature and seal
Responsible Charge Supervisory Seal Authorization State
Engineer B's supervisory relationship over others preparing CADD documents that Engineer B seals
Completion and delivery of sealed documents; or breakdown of supervisory relationship
Engineer B directs and controls others using a CADD system to prepare engineering documents, then signs and seals the resulting work
Engineer B Responsible Charge Verification Before Sealing CADD Documents
Engineer B seals documents produced by others using CADD; the BER's clarified standard requires detailed review sufficient to construct or reconstruct the work, distinguishing this from the general supervision found insufficient in BER Case 86-2.
Engineer B is constrained to conduct a detailed, substantive review of CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel — sufficient to establish genuine responsible charge — before affixing a professional seal; cursory or general supervisory review does not satisfy this constraint.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b; BER Case 86-2 clarified standard
Immediately prior to signing and sealing each set of CADD-produced documents
Engineer B Signed and Sealed Document Integrity Significance Recognition CADD
Signed and Sealed Document Integrity Significance Recognition Capability
Engineer B must understand and apply the full professional and legal significance of signing and sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by others — recognizing that the seal signifies responsible charge (direct control and personal supervision) over the work, and that this accountability mechanism must be protected by ensuring genuine direction-and-control was exercised.
Engineer B seals documents produced by CADD-using personnel under direction and control, requiring full understanding of what the seal signifies in the supervisory context.
Engineer B's recognition that sealing CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel carries the same professional significance as sealing personally authored documents, requiring genuine direction-and-control as the ethical prerequisite.
Engineer B Stamped CADD Document Continuing Accountability Supervisory
Engineer B seals documents produced by others using CADD under Engineer B's direction and control; the seal transfers full professional accountability to Engineer B regardless of who operated the CADD system.
Engineer B, by affixing a professional seal to CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, is constrained to retain ongoing professional accountability for the technical integrity of those documents and may not subsequently disavow or abandon responsibility for the work product on the basis that others physically prepared it.
Engineer B Stamped Document Continuing Technical Accountability CADD Supervisory
Engineer B supervises others who use CADD to produce documents and then seals those documents, creating an ongoing bond of professional accountability for the technical content regardless of who operated the CADD system.
Engineer B, by affixing a professional seal to CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, accepts continuing professional accountability for the technical integrity of those documents, including after project completion, and cannot disclaim responsibility by attributing authorship to subordinate CADD operators.
Engineer B Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability CADD Supervisory
Engineer B, by affixing a professional seal to CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel, must possess the capability to recognize and honor the continuing professional accountability that attaches to those sealed documents — understanding that the seal creates enduring responsibility for the technical content regardless of who physically produced the CADD drawings.
Engineer B seals CADD-produced documents prepared by others under direction and control, creating continuing accountability for their technical content.
Engineer B's acceptance of ongoing professional responsibility for the technical content of CADD-produced documents bearing the professional seal, even when those documents were prepared by others.
Engineer B Stamped Document Ongoing Technical Accountability CADD Supervisory Instance
Engineer B must possess the capability to recognize that sealing CADD documents prepared by supervised personnel creates full, continuing professional accountability for the entire work product — and that this accountability cannot be deflected to the supervised personnel or to the CADD system.
The BER holds that an engineer who seals CADD documents prepared by others assumes full responsibility for the work product
Acceptance of full professional responsibility upon sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by supervised personnel
{'license': 'Registered Professional Engineer', 'document_preparation': 'By subordinates/others', 'tool': 'CADD system operated by others', 'sealing_basis': 'Direction and control over subordinates', 'ethical_issue': 'Responsible charge adequacy; potential plan-stamping concern'}
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel working under Engineer B's direction and control using a CADD system, raising questions about the adequacy of responsible charge and the ethics of sealing others' work.
{'type': 'peer', 'target': 'Engineer A Self-Authored Document Sealing Engineer'}
{'type': 'supervisor', 'target': 'CADD system operators / subordinate engineers'}
Supervisory Direction-and-Control Sealing Engineer
Engineer B Technology-as-Tool Boundary Judgment CADD Supervisory
Engineer B must recognize that CADD is a tool used by supervised personnel and that the CADD system's role as a drafting tool does not alter the responsible charge requirements — Engineer B's professional judgment and direction-and-control remain the authoritative basis for sealed documents, regardless of the CADD medium used to produce them.
Engineer B supervises personnel using CADD systems and seals the resulting documents, requiring recognition that CADD is a tool that does not alter the direction-and-control requirements for responsible charge.
Engineer B's maintenance of professional direction-and-control over CADD-using personnel, ensuring that the technology serves as a tool within a properly supervised engineering process rather than as a substitute for professional oversight.
Engineer Sealing CADD-Generated Plans Under Responsible Charge
At the point of sealing documents generated through CADD or prepared by others under the engineer's supervision
it would not be unethical for an engineer to sign and seal the drawings in question as long as those plans were checked and reviewed by the engineer in some detail
Engineer signing and sealing drawings generated by CADD systems or prepared by subordinates under the engineer's direction
Documents sealed with adequate review completed, or engineer declines to seal
The key requirement is that an engineer possesses sufficient competence, assumes full responsibility for the work product and carefully directs, controls and reviews the material prepared under the engineer's responsible charge
engineers must not affix their signatures to any plans or documents dealing with subject matter which they lack competence, nor to any plan or document not prepared under their direction and control
Engineer is asked to sign and seal drawings produced via CADD or by subordinate engineers/non-registered graduates under the engineer's direction
Professional engineering licensing boards
Engineer B as supervising professional engineer over CADD operators working under direction and control
Governs the scope and adequacy of direction and control that Engineer B must exercise over those using the CADD system before Engineer B may legitimately sign and seal the resulting documents
Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance Applied to BER Case 86-2 Modification
The BER modifies its BER Case 86-2 holding on the grounds that the strict personal-preparation interpretation was inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing practices within the engineering profession and would place a significant number of practitioners in conflict with the Code — invoking the principle that the Code must reflect prevailing practice and not impose impossible or idealistic standards.
In this context, the prevailing-practice consonance principle operates as a constraint on strict textual interpretation of the Code's 'direction and control' language — the BER's prior literal reading is modified because it produced an impossible standard inconsistent with how competent engineers actually practice.
Ethics Code Living Document Adaptation Principle
The BER resolves the tension between strict code language and prevailing practice by adopting a 'detailed review' standard that preserves the public protection function of the seal while accommodating legitimate team-based and technology-assisted engineering practice.
The rendering of the Board's opinion in BER Case 86-2, raised a considerable degree of discussion within the engineering community because to many it appeared to be inconsistent with customary and generally prevailing practices within the engineering profession and would therefore place a significant number of practitioners in conflict with the provisions of the Code.
National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE)
Engineer A and Engineer B as registered professional engineers
Primary normative authority governing the professional obligations of Engineer A and Engineer B when signing and sealing CADD-produced documents, including obligations of responsible charge, competence, and supervision
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.2.b - Direction and Control Provision
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers, Section II.2.b
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in analyzing the ethical obligations of engineers signing and sealing CADD-produced documents
Cited as the authoritative textual basis for the requirement that engineers not affix their signatures to plans or documents not prepared under their direction and control; interpreted by the Board to require detailed review and responsible charge rather than personal preparation of every drawing.
Precedent Reconciliation Obligation Applied to BER Case 86-2 Clarification
The BER explicitly addresses the tension between its prior BER Case 86-2 holding and the prevailing practice standard, characterizing its modification not as a reversal but as a clarification — acknowledging the community discussion the prior decision generated and providing a coherent framework for future application.
In this context, the BER's obligation to reconcile its prior precedent with current reasoning leads it to frame the modification as clarification rather than reversal — preserving institutional continuity while updating the operative standard to reflect prevailing practice.
Precedent Reconciliation Obligation in Ethics Board Reasoning
The BER resolves the precedent tension by adopting the 'clarification' framing, which allows it to update the standard without formally overruling the prior decision — a pragmatic reconciliation that acknowledges the community's concern while maintaining institutional coherence.
Professional Accountability Invoked for Full Responsibility Assumption in CADD Sealing
The BER requires that the engineer who signs and seals CADD-produced documents assumes full responsibility for the work product — regardless of whether the engineer personally produced the documents or directed others who produced them using CADD — establishing that the seal represents a personal professional accountability that cannot be delegated to the technology or to subordinates.
In this context, professional accountability requires the sealing engineer to own the technical adequacy of all sealed documents — the CADD system's role in producing the documents does not dilute or transfer this accountability.
The BER resolves potential tension by holding that full accountability is maintained through detailed review — the engineer who reviews in detail can genuinely vouch for the work and therefore bear full responsibility for it.
Professional Competence Invoked for CADD-Assisted Engineering
The BER invokes professional competence as the foundational requirement for ethical CADD use — requiring that engineers possess sufficient competence in both their engineering domain and in the CADD technology before signing and sealing CADD-produced documents, and that they assume full responsibility for the work product.
In this context, professional competence encompasses both substantive engineering expertise and technology-specific proficiency — an engineer who lacks CADD competence cannot ethically seal CADD-produced documents regardless of general engineering qualifications.
No tension — professional competence and CADD-specific competence are complementary requirements, both necessary for ethical sealing of CADD-produced documents.
Was it ethical for Engineer A, a registered professional engineer to sign and seal documents he prepared using a CADD system?
At what minimum level of CADD competence must Engineer A and Engineer B demonstrate proficiency before they are ethically permitted to sign and seal CADD-generated documents, and who bears responsibility for verifying that competence threshold has been met?
If CADD software contains an undetected algorithmic error that propagates through Engineer B's subordinates' work, and Engineer B seals those documents without discovering the error, how should professional liability and ethical culpability be apportioned between Engineer B, the subordinates, and the software vendor?
Does the Board's approval of CADD-assisted sealing implicitly establish an obligation for engineers to periodically re-validate their CADD competence as the technology evolves, and what ethical consequences follow if an engineer seals documents using a CADD system version or capability they have not been trained on?
When CADD output is produced collaboratively by multiple subordinates under Engineer B's direction, does the ethical obligation of responsible charge require Engineer B to review each individual contributor's portion of the work, or is a holistic review of the integrated final document sufficient to satisfy the direction-and-control standard?
Was it ethical for Engineer B, a registered professional engineer, to sign and seal documents which are the work of others using a CADD system, working under his direction and control?
Does the Technology-Neutral Seal Validity principle, which permits sealing of CADD-generated documents on equal footing with hand-drafted ones, conflict with the Detailed Review Sufficiency Standard when CADD output volume or complexity makes genuinely detailed review practically impossible, thereby risking that technology-neutrality becomes a shield for inadequate oversight?
How should the Precedent Reconciliation Obligation derived from BER Case 86-2 be balanced against the Ethics Code Prevailing Practice Consonance principle when evolving CADD and AI capabilities render the earlier case's factual assumptions obsolete, and does deference to precedent risk entrenching an ethical standard that no longer reflects the realities of modern engineering practice?
Does the Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution principle, which demands that engineers preserve independent professional judgment and not treat CADD as a crutch, conflict with the Competence Assurance Under CADD Tool Adoption principle when deep reliance on CADD functionality is itself the mark of competent modern practice, creating a paradox where greater CADD proficiency may simultaneously satisfy one principle while threatening the other?
When the Responsible Charge Integrity principle invoked by Engineer B's supervisory mode demands active engagement and detailed review, does it come into irreconcilable tension with the Dual-Mode Seal Authorization principle that treats Engineer A's self-authored sealing and Engineer B's supervisory sealing as ethically equivalent, given that the epistemic basis for confidence in document accuracy differs fundamentally between the two modes?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer B's duty to exercise responsible charge require a specific threshold of detailed technical review before sealing CADD-generated documents prepared by subordinates, or is general supervisory direction and control sufficient to satisfy that categorical obligation?
From a consequentialist perspective, does permitting Engineer B to seal CADD documents prepared by subordinates under direction and control produce better outcomes for public safety than a stricter rule requiring personal preparation, given that such a rule might discourage adoption of productivity-enhancing technology or concentrate sealing authority in ways that reduce overall engineering output quality?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does Engineer A demonstrate the professional integrity and intellectual honesty expected of a competent engineer when sealing CADD-generated documents, particularly with respect to ensuring that reliance on automated drafting tools does not erode the independent engineering judgment that gives the seal its moral authority?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does Engineer B exhibit the character trait of professional courage and accountability when assuming full responsibility for CADD documents prepared by others under their direction, and does the act of sealing such documents reflect genuine ownership of the work or merely a procedural formality that could mask a diffusion of moral responsibility across the engineering team?
If the Board had not modified the stricter standard established in BER Case 86-2 — which prohibited sealing without detailed personal review — would Engineer B's conduct of sealing CADD documents prepared by subordinates under general direction and control have been deemed unethical, and what practical consequences would that stricter standard have imposed on engineering firms that rely on team-based CADD production workflows?
What if Engineer A had used an AI-assisted design system that autonomously generated structural calculations and layout decisions rather than a CADD system that merely automated drafting — would the Board's technology-neutral reasoning still support the ethical validity of Engineer A's seal, or would the degree of autonomous machine judgment require a different ethical standard for responsible charge?
If Engineer B had failed to exercise meaningful direction and control — for example, by approving CADD documents prepared by subordinates without reviewing their technical content — would the seal affixed by Engineer B constitute an ethical violation equivalent to the misconduct identified in BER Case 86-2, and how should the profession distinguish between genuine responsible charge and the mere appearance of supervisory oversight?
What if Engineer A lacked sufficient competence in the specific CADD system used to produce the documents — for instance, being unable to detect systematic errors introduced by the software — would the seal still be ethically valid under the Board's technology-neutral framework, or does the competence prerequisite effectively create a technology-specific qualification requirement that conditions the permissibility of sealing?
Responsible Charge Engagement Obligation For Engineer B
CADD-produced documents prepared by personnel under Engineer B
Engineer B's ethical validity in sealing CADD-produced documents prepared by others depends entirely on whether Engineer B's direction and control constitutes genuine, substantive responsible charge — active engagement in the technical decisions, review of outputs, and verification of adequacy — rather than nominal supervisory title
The phrase 'direction and control' in the case facts is the operative ethical condition; if Engineer B's oversight is substantive, sealing is ethically permissible; if merely nominal, the seal would misrepresent the nature of Engineer B's professional involvement
Responsible charge engagement is the necessary condition that makes the supervisory sealing mode ethically valid; the two principles are complementary, with engagement being the operationalization of the seal authority principle in the supervisory context
Responsible Charge Integrity Invoked By Engineer A Self-Authorship
CADD-produced engineering documents personally prepared by Engineer A
Engineer A personally prepares engineering documents using a CADD system and then signs and seals those self-authored documents, satisfying the seal authority principle through the self-authorship pathway — the engineer's own professional judgment is directly embodied in the documents being certified
In the self-authorship context, the seal certifies that the engineer's own professional judgment produced the document; CADD is merely a drafting tool, analogous to a pencil or drafting table, and does not alter the self-authorship character of the work
No tension: self-authorship via CADD fully satisfies the responsible charge and seal authority requirements; the production technology is ethically irrelevant to the validity of the seal
Responsible Charge Integrity Invoked By Engineer B Supervisory Mode
CADD-produced engineering documents prepared by personnel under Engineer B's direction and control
Engineer B signs and seals engineering documents produced by other personnel using CADD systems, relying on the direction-and-control pathway of the seal authority principle — the seal certifies that Engineer B exercised genuine responsible charge over the work product, not that Engineer B personally drafted it
In the supervisory mode, the seal certifies responsible charge — substantive professional oversight, direction, and verification — rather than personal authorship; this is ethically valid provided the direction and control is genuine and not merely nominal
The direction-and-control pathway is ethically valid but imposes a heightened obligation on Engineer B to ensure genuine substantive oversight; the use of CADD by subordinates does not diminish this obligation
Seal Others' CADD Documents (Action 2) → Sealing Standard Moderated (Event 4)
Signed and Sealed Report Integrity Standard
Engineer A and Engineer B as sealing professional engineers
Establishes the inviolability and professional weight of documents once signed and sealed by a licensed professional engineer, applicable to both Engineer A's self-prepared CADD documents and Engineer B's supervised CADD documents
Stamped Document Professional Accountability For Both Engineers
CADD-produced engineering documents sealed by Engineer A and Engineer B respectively
Both Engineer A and Engineer B, by affixing their professional seals to CADD-produced documents, accept continuing professional accountability for the technical integrity of those documents — accountability that is not diminished by the use of CADD technology and that persists beyond the moment of sealing
The seal is not a formality but a professional certification creating ongoing accountability; for Engineer A this accountability flows from personal authorship, for Engineer B from the exercise of direction and control — in both cases the accountability is real and continuing
Stamped Document Ongoing Professional Accountability
Technology-neutrality and ongoing accountability are complementary: CADD use does not reduce accountability, and ongoing accountability is the reason technology-neutrality cannot be used to evade responsible charge obligations
Standard Interpretation Gap Identified (Event 3) → Clarify and Modify 1986 Ruling (Action 4)
Technology-Neutral Seal Validity Applied To Engineer A CADD Use
CADD system as production tool for self-authored engineering documents
Engineer A's use of a CADD system to prepare documents does not diminish the ethical validity of subsequently sealing those documents; CADD is a production tool, and the self-authorship character of the work is determined by who exercised professional judgment in creating the content, not by the medium through which that content was rendered
The ethical question is not whether CADD was used but whether the engineer's professional judgment is genuinely embodied in the documents; for Engineer A, who personally prepared the documents using CADD, the answer is affirmative
No conflict: technology-neutrality affirms CADD use is permissible; competence assurance requires Engineer A to be competent in using CADD to produce technically adequate documents — both principles are satisfied simultaneously
Technology-Neutral Seal Validity Applied To Engineer B CADD Supervision
CADD system as production tool for documents prepared by supervised personnel
Engineer B's sealing of documents produced by others using CADD is not rendered ethically problematic by the use of CADD technology itself; the ethical question is whether Engineer B exercised genuine direction and control, not whether the production tool was CADD, hand-drafting, or any other medium
Technology-neutrality means the CADD medium is ethically irrelevant to the sealing question; what matters is the quality and substantiveness of Engineer B's supervisory oversight, which must meet the same standard that would apply if the documents were hand-drafted
Technology-neutrality removes CADD as a confounding variable; the ethical analysis collapses to the pre-existing responsible charge standard, which Engineer B must satisfy regardless of the production technology used
Technology-as-Tool Non-Substitution Invoked in CADD Discussion
The BER articulates that CADD and similar systems must be used to assist the engineer in performing professional services and must not be employed as replacements for professional competence and expertise — warning that CADD used beyond its proper role becomes a crutch or substitute for judgment, creating liability exposure.
In this context, the principle draws a bright line between CADD as a legitimate drafting and design assistance tool and CADD as an impermissible substitute for the engineer's independent professional judgment. The engineer must remain the decision-maker; the system executes the engineer's decisions.
Technology Non-Substitution for Domain Expertise Principle
No tension requiring resolution — the principle operates as a constraint on how CADD may be used, complementing rather than conflicting with the sealing and competence obligations.
community controversy and discussion before Board's clarification/modification of BER Case 86-2
detailed review and check of design before affixing engineer's seal
engineer's involvement in concept and design requirements before review of design or project status as design progressed
manual design techniques (drafting) before Computer Aided Design (CAD)
preparation of drawings by others under direction before engineer signing and sealing documents