Conflict of Interest - Part-Time Service as City Engineer
A2 fulfills the Duty to Avoid Prejudicing Advice even though it is caused by Part-Time Retention Acceptance and itself feeds into Self-Interest Risk Arising, showing that the engineer's guidance by Undivided Loyalty was still channeled into advice that met the rule's requirement despite the conflicted position created by his dual capacity as both retained advisor and commissioned project engineer.
Framing the arrangement as ordinary client service carries no explicit obligation or downstream causal effect in the record, so its normative significance is limited to shaping how the dual relationship is perceived rather than to any concrete duty being met or breached.
Waiving independent review, jointly attributable to the city and the engineer, converts the previously abstract self-interest risk into the concrete outcome of the engineer approving his own plan, so even without a recorded violation label this action represents the practical realization of the conflict that undivided loyalty was meant to prevent.
A1 is guided solely by Undivided Loyalty rather than fulfilling any stated duty, which is significant because it arises from the Independent Review Waiver and directly constitutes the engineer approving his own plan, the very self-dealing arrangement that produced the Self-Interest Risk downstream, so the absence of a fulfilled obligation here underscores that loyalty alone could not legitimize a role with no independent check.
CausalLink_Part-Time Retention Acceptance
Accepting the part-time retention, while guided by the duty of undivided loyalty, matters because it puts the engineer in a position to produce advisory recommendations that later feed directly into the self-interest risk that the loyalty norm is meant to prevent.
CausalLink_Project Commission Acceptance
Accepting the project commission is the pivotal act guided by undivided loyalty because it directly gives rise to dual capacity and, through that, to the very self-interest risk that the loyalty obligation exists to guard against, making this action the crux of the ethical tension.
The city council's retention of the engineer for the project, which causes fee compensation, is normatively inert for the engineer himself since responsibility for this causal link rests with the council, yet it is the financial engine that makes the conflicted dual role economically attractive.
property=appliesTo; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
This precedent case addressed dual compensation from interested parties for the same service
Receiving compensation from multiple interested parties for the same project could bias his advice.
Faithful service requires disclosing and consenting to any dual compensation from interested parties.
Prohibits accepting compensation from multiple interested parties for the same service which directly creates the loyalty division constraint
This role must not accept compensation from multiple interested parties for the same service without consent
Accepting compensation from both roles without consent threatens objective judgment
Reviewing his own plans as city engineer involves compensation from multiple interested parties for related work
This role must not accept dual compensation for the same project work without consent of all parties
The Board explicitly applies Canon 15 to justify that only one interested party exists and consent is given.
Canon 15 governs conflicts when serving multiple interested parties as in dual capacity roles
Canon 15 restricts accepting compensation from more than one interested party without consent
Approving his own plans as city engineer while being paid as the designer represents compensation conflict for the same service
This addresses accepting compensation from multiple interested parties for related services without consent
Accepting compensation for design work while serving as city engineer creates dual compensation without consent of all parties
Retaining the commission for the same project involves compensation from multiple interested parties without consent
This relates to receiving compensation from another party that could conflict with prior service
This precedent case involved use of a salaried position potentially competing unfairly with other engineers
Using the salaried city position to gain unfair advantage would compromise objective advice.
Approving plans or projects for personal advantage would misuse the salaried city role.
The salaried city position could unfairly advantage his private design work over other engineers
Prevents using a salaried position advantage in ways that could conflict with client loyalty obligations
This role must not use the salaried city position to unfairly compete with other engineers
Using the salaried city position to approve his own private work creates unfair competitive advantage
This role must not leverage the city engineer position to gain unfair advantage in securing design work
This addresses using a salaried city position to gain unfair advantage over other engineers
Using the salaried city engineer position to gain private design work unfairly competes with other engineers
Leveraging the city engineer role to secure the private commission unfairly disadvantages other engineers
This relates to leveraging the city position to secure future private commissions unfairly
Canon 27 prohibits using a salaried position advantage to unfairly compete which is a self-interest risk
Analysis-record edge (addressesQuestion)
property=addressesQuestion; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
Analysis-record edge (alignsWithConclusion)
property=alignsWithConclusion; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
property=decidesQuestion; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
Analysis-record edge (involvesConstraint)
property=involvesConstraint; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
Analysis-record edge (involvesObligation)
property=involvesObligation; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
property=explainsQuestion; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
Analysis-record edge (describesResolutionOf)
property=describesResolutionOf; deterministic resolution from the Step-4 synthesis store (positional key, text-verified where carried, endpoint existence- and type-checked; no embedding or LLM)
The engineer must advise the client if the project or arrangement will not succeed or is improper
Advising clients on project viability relates directly to the engineer's advisory competence
Rule 13 is directly cited as the basis for the engineer's duty to avoid prejudicing advice to the city.
This directly requires the engineer to advise the client if a project will not succeed
This rule provides the standard against which the board distinguishes this case from prior precedents
Conflicting interests between his private clients and the city would compromise his impartial advice.
Serving both private clients and the city is permissible only if interests and schedules do not conflict.
Allows multiple employment only when interests do not conflict, directly relating to the loyalty division constraint
This role in private practice may serve multiple parties when interests and schedules do not conflict
Serving multiple parties is permissible only if interests do not conflict, which relates to maintaining objectivity
This role may take on additional project work for the city if interests and time schedules do not conflict with other clients
Rule 17 allows dual employment absent conflicting interests, supporting the consent-based resolution under Canon 15.
Framing service to multiple parties must meet the non-conflicting interests standard set by this rule
Rule 17 addresses when serving multiple parties in a dual role is permissible if interests do not conflict
Rule 17 permits serving multiple parties when interests do not conflict, framing the city role as client service.
This permits serving multiple parties only when interests and schedules do not conflict
This rule permits multiple engagements only when interests and schedules do not conflict which is at issue here
This relates to whether retaining supplemental work conflicts with the city engineer role
Rule 17's conflict-of-interest condition underlies the Board's finding that the engineer serves only one client without divided loyalty.
Capability requirement edge (requiresCapability)
property=requiresCapability; capability requiredForObligations text resolved to the case Obligation(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM multi-select; emitted Obligation -> Capability (the obligation presupposes the capacity to discharge it)
City Engineer Advisory Service Duty; City Engineer Faithful Client Service Duty
property=cause; the cause text of the causal chain resolved to the case individual(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=effect; the effect text of the causal chain resolved to the case individual(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=responsibleAgent; the responsibleAgent text of the causal chain resolved to the case individual(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=causedByAction; the converter-recorded causedByAction reference of the event resolved deterministically to the committed Action individual (fragment remap; no embedding or LLM)
property=initiates; the initiates-state text of the happening resolved to the case State(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM multi-select (Event Calculus fluent transition)
property=fulfillsObligation; the fulfillsObligation text of the action resolved to the case Obligation/Principle individual(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM multi-select (obligation-engagement grounding)
Duty to Avoid Prejudicing Advice (Rule 13)
property=guidedByPrinciple; the guidedByPrinciple text of the action resolved to the case Obligation/Principle individual(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM multi-select (obligation-engagement grounding)
property=isPerformedBy; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=possessedBy; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=citedByAgent; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select; Board-pattern literal resolved deterministically to the case-scoped NSPE Board Agent
property=obligatedParty; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=constrainedEntity; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
property=invokedBy; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select; Board-pattern literal resolved deterministically to the case-scoped NSPE Board Agent
property=invokedBy; component party text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM select
relation_type=hasClient; property=hasClient
A small community retains a professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer.
the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
re-minted 2026-07-11 from the positional provenance nodes; confidence not recorded by the original extraction
The engineer treats his part-time service to the small community as service to a client, extending the client-service posture of his private practice to his municipal duties of advising the city council
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city, since council approval of a project may lead to his securing the commission for it
The Board frames the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans as city engineer
The Board applies the axiom that a professional may not divide loyalties from those of the client, and finds that because the engineer serves only one client, the city, his capacity is dual but not divided.
Because of his dual capacity, the city engineer must avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration, since approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project.
The city engineer must advise the city council on engineering problems, offer recommendations on engineering project considerations, and approve plans for engineering processes and works for the community.
The city engineer must serve the small community faithfully as he would a client of his private practice, treating his part-time municipal service as service to a client.
there is only one interested party, the client, and that party has given its consent to the arrangement.
property=affects; state affectedParties text resolved to the case Agent(s) by embedding shortlist + LLM multi-select
The small community; The city council; The professional engineer
The city council; The small community; The professional engineer
property=activatesObligation; description resolved to the endpoint by embedding shortlist + LLM select
Duty to avoid prejudicing advice to the city on the project under consideration
property=fromEntity; the fromEntity text of the temporal relation resolved to the case Action/Event individual by embedding shortlist + LLM select
A small community retains a professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer... In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project.
property=toEntity; the toEntity text of the temporal relation resolved to the case Action/Event individual by embedding shortlist + LLM select
he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
The professional engineer holding this position is engaged in full-time private practice and treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client.
There is still left for decision, however, the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer.
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission
its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project
The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case. Under these circumstances, the engineer is acting in a dual capacity
property=dcterms:hasPart; deterministic membership: every committed proeth-core:Action/Event individual is a part of the case timeline (no embedding or LLM); ordering carried separately by proeth:temporalSequence / Allen relations / time:hasTime
Adjudicates the present case, holding that the engineer acts in a dual but not divided capacity, that Canon 15 and Canon 27 do not bar the arrangement, that Rule 17 does not apply because only one party employs the engineer, that Rule 13 is binding, and cautioning that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in recommending approval of a project.
rel:adjudicates conduct of -> City Engineer
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration
we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Ethics Review Board Role'
There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present, but we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
Dual Capacity Arising → Self-Interest Risk Arising
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project.
1. Dual Capacity Arising -- Engineer holds both advisory/approval and design roles for the same city
2. Advisory Recommendation -- Engineer advises the council on projects whose approval could yield commissions for him
3. Self-Interest Risk Arising -- Risk emerges that his advice could be prejudiced by the prospect of securing the commission
Without the dual capacity, advice to the city could not benefit the engineer's own commission prospects and the self-interest risk would not arise
Council's reliance on the engineer's guidance for project approval
Dual capacity as advisor/reviewer and prospective project designer
Financial fee compensation flowing from project commissions
Dual capacity combined with the prospect that project approval leads to a fee-bearing commission
The question arose because the engineer's part-time advisory retention created an inherent conflict once he also sought project-specific commissions from the same client, forcing scrutiny of whether one person can simultaneously be an objective advisor and a self-interested designer for the same body.
The question arises because the case data shows an engineer occupying two roles with a built-in incentive for biased advice, and the good outcome in this instance invites debate over whether results alone can excuse a process that violates loyalty and objectivity principles.
The question arises because the engineer's simultaneous occupancy of author and reviewer roles collapses the separation that professional review normally requires, and no external check (client consent, independent review) is confirmed to have addressed this collapse.
This question arose because Case No. 62-7 links the engineer's fee arrangement (Fee Compensation) to the Board's warning against self-interest, but it is unclear whether the Board's warrant was grounded in the financial incentive itself or in the inherent structural conflict of Own Plan Approval, prompting a hypothetical to isolate the true basis of the ruling.
The question arises because the Board's no-violation conclusion rests on classifying the engineer as an independent practitioner serving a client, and this classification is precisely the fact that Canon 27 treats as decisive, so altering that single fact exposes whether the ruling depends on employment form rather than on the underlying loyalty conflict.
The question arose because removing any independent check collapses the separation between the design role and the advisory approval role that previously justified similar dual arrangements, forcing the Board to decide whether its earlier conclusion depended on that missing safeguard.
The question arises because the engineer's ordinary advisory duty to the city, which relies on objective review, is structurally compromised once he becomes the very party being reviewed under the supplemental design commission, creating a foreseeable self-interest conflict.
The question arises because the prospect of a lucrative supplemental commission creates a structural incentive that could bias the engineer's ostensibly objective advisory judgment, and no clear separation between the advisory and design roles is established in the facts.
The question arises because the city engineer's part-time dual role as both designer and approver of the same project creates an inherent structural conflict that the non-technical council cannot resolve, leaving open whether self-review or external review satisfies the duty of objectivity.
The question arises because characterizing municipal service as a client relationship obscures whether the engineer's governing warrant is contractual fidelity or public trust, and the case facts (Rule 13, self-review of own plans) expose this ambiguity.
The question arises because the same set of facts, a part time city engineer advising on a project he could later be paid to design, supports two plausible but conflicting principles, undivided loyalty to the city and self-interest in securing work, and no clear rule specifies which controls absent safeguards like disclosure or independent review.
The question arose because Dual Capacity Arising and Fee Compensation placed the engineer simultaneously inside the advisory role and the design role, so Own Plan Approval became an act that could be read either as competent faithful service or as a structurally biased self-review, and the Board had to decide which warrant should control.
The question emerges because Client Consent to Dual Capacity is offered as a resolving warrant, but the underlying structural conflict, the engineer approving and advising on his own commissioned work, remains unaddressed by consent alone, leaving the Board of Ethical Review to weigh loyalty-based justification against objectivity-based prohibition.
The question arises because the engineer's own actions collapsed the separation between advisor and advisee that the loyalty principle assumes, forcing a choice between judging the arrangement by role structure versus by actual outcome or consent.
Given that the engineer occupied a part-time advisory position and additionally sought the design commission, the board concluded the arrangement was not inherently unethical but conditioned that conclusion on the engineer exercising scrupulous care against letting his design ambitions color his advice.
Given that the engineer both prepares and approves his own plans without independent check, the board concluded that professional integrity is strained because impartial self-review is inherently difficult, making the arrangement's ethical adequacy dependent on the individual engineer's character rather than on the structure of the engagement.
Given that the Board located the ethical risk in the structural incentive to secure future work and maintain the client relationship rather than in the fee itself, it concluded that even a fee-free arrangement would still call for scrupulous care against the engineer's secondary interest.
Because the engineer's status was that of an independent practitioner retained part-time rather than a full-time salaried employee, the Board concluded no Canon 27 violation existed, but recognized that a change to salaried employment status would likely flip this conclusion to a violation.
Because the Board's tolerance of self-review rested on an assumption of heightened diligence, it reasoned that if that diligence were absent and approval were uncontested, the same facts would transform a manageable conflict into an unmitigated structural defect.
Given that both roles served the same client, the city, the Board reasoned that requiring the engineer to exercise scrupulous personal care was an adequate substitute for structurally separating the advisory and design functions.
Because the Board relied on the engineer's presumed diligence rather than mandating independent review, it left the self-review and loyalty conflict structurally unresolved, acknowledging the gap but treating individual conduct as the deciding factor.
Because the city council's consent in this case was general (to retain the engineer) rather than specific (to the conflict of interest), the Board could not rest its approval on informed consent; instead, finding no evidence of compromised judgment, it grounded its conclusion in the engineer's own professional self-restraint as sufficient safeguard.
Because the engineer who prepares the plans is also the one who approves them under his advisory role, the critique concludes that the board's call for scrupulous care leaves the self-review structural gap unaddressed, since no external safeguard is presumed or required.
Given that the design commission pays a separate fee, the board's finding of no inherent violation rests on an assumption that the engineer's integrity will resist this quantifiable incentive at the advisory stage, rather than on any mechanism that removes the incentive itself.
Because the board treated the part-time arrangement as client service rather than employment, it applied Rule 17 and Canon 15 rather than Canon 27, leaving open whether a salaried employment relationship would have changed the ethical analysis.
Given that the engineer's approval authority and design authorship coincide in the same person, the board concludes the self-review structure inherently undermines independence, irrespective of how skilled or well-intentioned the engineer is.
Given that the supplemental design fee is paid on top of the retainer and the advisory recommendation logically precedes the design commission, the board concluded that a foreseeable financial incentive exists that could color the engineer's judgment on project necessity, activating the Advisory Service Duty's requirement of disinterested judgment.
Given that the arrangement is characterized as client service rather than public employment, the board concluded that the ethical obligations are not diminished but rather intensified, because the client-service framing creates an incentive structure absent in a salaried public role.
Given that the advisory and design roles both run to the same city, the board concluded that a strict deontological reading of divided loyalty is questionable, but that reconceiving the duty as a single loyalty to the city preserves ethical fulfillment as long as the engineer subordinates self-interest throughout.
Given that the city received satisfactory plans, a purely consequentialist view would approve the arrangement, but the board concluded this reasoning is incomplete because it ignores the unseen risk of biased advice and alternatives never pursued.
preparation of plans and specifications for specific projects during ongoing part-time city engineer retainer
preparation of plans and specifications for specific projects
ongoing part-time city engineer retainer
Entity1 occurs entirely within the duration of Entity2
full-time private practice overlaps part-time service as city engineer
Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
engineer's preparation of his own plans before engineer passing judgment on (approving) those plans as city engineer
engineer passing judgment on (approving) those plans as city engineer
engineer's advice/recommendation to the city on a project before city council approval of the project
engineer's advice/recommendation to the city on a project
city council approval of a project before engineer securing a commission for that project
engineer securing a commission for that project
Continuing, at each recommendation to the city council
Upon the engineer's acceptance of a project commission while serving as retained city engineer
Following each project commission retention by the city council
Ongoing, inferred from the arrangement as it operates
Recurring, when project plans he prepared come before him for approval
Outset of the engagement, initial arrangement
Recurring, whenever the city council retains him for a specific project
Recurring, after the initial part-time retention, when specific city projects arise
Whenever a project on which the engineer advises could result in a commission for him
The small community retains the professional engineer part-time as city engineer, receives advisory and plan-approval services through its city council, and may additionally retain him for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project, compensating him on a fee basis over and above the monthly retainer.
small community, municipal government acting through its city council
treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Client Role'
A small community retains a professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer. The professional engineer holding this position is engaged in full-time private practice and treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client.
Analytical conclusion 1: Regarding Q101: Yes, the dual role creates an inherent st...
Regarding Q101: Yes, the dual role creates an inherent structural problem because the same individual who exercises City Engineer Plan Approval Competence in his advisory capacity is also the author of the plans he would be approving under the supplemental design commission. Self-review by the plan's own creator undermines the independence that the approval function is meant to provide, regardless of the engineer's technical competence or good faith.
Analytical conclusion 2: Regarding Q102: The prospect of a lucrative supplemental...
Regarding Q102: The prospect of a lucrative supplemental design fee, paid over and above the monthly retainer, constitutes a foreseeable financial incentive that could color the engineer's Advisory Recommendation to the city council on whether a project should proceed at all. This is precisely the secondary interest the Board warns against, since the engineer's Advisory Service Duty requires disinterested judgment on project necessity, timing, and scope prior to any design commission being awarded.
Analytical conclusion 3: Regarding Q104: Framing part-time municipal service as 's...
Regarding Q104: Framing part-time municipal service as 'service to a client' rather than as a public duty does not diminish the engineer's ethical obligations; if anything, it heightens the need for vigilance, because a client-service mentality naturally orients the engineer toward securing follow-on paid work (the design commission) rather than purely toward public interest, whereas a salaried public employee would have no comparable direct financial stake in generating additional billable engagements.
Analytical conclusion 4: Regarding Q301: From a strict deontological view emphasiz...
Regarding Q301: From a strict deontological view emphasizing an unqualified duty of undivided loyalty, the engineer's fulfillment of that duty is questionable, since his loyalty was formally divided between two roles serving the same client but with different incentive structures. However, because both roles ultimately serve the same city, the duty may be reconceived as a single duty of loyalty to the city's interests, provided the engineer subordinates his personal financial interest at every decision point, a demanding but not impossible standard.
Analytical conclusion 5: Regarding Q302: A consequentialist analysis focused solel...
Regarding Q302: A consequentialist analysis focused solely on outcome quality would find the arrangement acceptable if the plans were competent and the city satisfied, but this reasoning is incomplete because it ignores unrealized counterfactual harms, such as projects that should not have been recommended but were, or better independent designs that were never considered. Ethical evaluation of professional conduct rules cannot rest on ex post outcomes alone when the harm at issue is a systemic risk of biased advice.
Analytical conclusion 6: Regarding Q303: Professional integrity, understood as a v...
Regarding Q303: Professional integrity, understood as a virtue of impartial self-scrutiny, is strained when an engineer reviews and approves his own work product, since genuine impartiality toward one's own creation is psychologically difficult even for well-intentioned professionals. The virtue-based lens suggests that maintaining integrity in this dual role depends heavily on the engineer's individual character and discipline rather than on any structural safeguard within the arrangement itself.
Analytical conclusion 7: Regarding Q401: The Board's concern about scrupulous care...
Regarding Q401: The Board's concern about scrupulous care against the engineer's secondary interest would likely persist even absent a separate professional fee, because the incentive to secure future retentions, enhanced professional reputation, and continued client relationship with the city are independent motivators beyond the immediate fee, meaning the structural conflict is rooted in Prospective Commission Incentive generally rather than the fee amount alone.
Analytical conclusion 8: Regarding Q402: If the engineer were a full-time salaried...
Regarding Q402: If the engineer were a full-time salaried city employee, the Board's analysis would likely shift, since Canon 27 explicitly prohibits using a salaried position to compete unfairly with another engineer for outside design work; the current conclusion's permissiveness rests specifically on the engineer's status as an independent practitioner retained on a part-time basis, not as a public employee, making the counterfactual scenario likely to yield a violation rather than the Board's stated non-violation.
Analytical conclusion 9: Regarding Q403: The Board's conclusion of no inherent une...
Regarding Q403: The Board's conclusion of no inherent unethicality is conditioned on the engineer exercising heightened scrupulous care; if it were established that the same engineer gave final, uncontested approval to his own plans with no independent check whatsoever, the conflict of interest would move from a manageable risk to an unmitigated structural defect, and the Board's tolerant conclusion would likely not hold without qualification or added safeguards such as independent review.
Analytical conclusion 1: The Board resolves the tension between Objectivity in Adv...
The Board resolves the tension between Objectivity in Advising City and the engineer's Prospective Commission Incentive not by structurally separating the advisory and design roles, but by imposing a heightened personal duty of vigilance on the engineer himself. This shows that where dual-role conflicts arise from a single professional's overlapping duties to one client, the Board prioritizes an internalized ethical standard ('scrupulous care') over external procedural safeguards, effectively subordinating the principle of strict role-separation to trust in individual professional integrity.
Analytical conclusion 2: The conflict between Self-Review of Own Plans and Undivid...
The conflict between Self-Review of Own Plans and Undivided Loyalty in Dual Capacity remains structurally unresolved in the Board's reasoning: no independent third-party review is required, and the same engineer both prepares and approves the project design. This reveals that the Board treats loyalty and objectivity as compatible in principle only if the engineer's own diligence is sufficient, leaving the case's ethical soundness contingent on individual conduct rather than institutional checks -- a gap the Board's language acknowledges but does not close.
retention as part-time city engineer before retention to prepare plans and specifications for a specific city project
retention to prepare plans and specifications for a specific city project
client's waiver of its right to independent review before engineer acting in dual capacity approving his own plans
client's waiver of its right to independent review
engineer acting in dual capacity approving his own plans
The Board of Ethical Review reasons from prior cases No. 60-5 and No. 62-7 and distinguishes the instant case on the ground that the engineer has only one client, concluding he acts in a dual but not a divided capacity.
The distinguishing fact in the instant case is that the engineer has only one client, and he is, therefore, not subject to the same pressures to temper his service to one client in order to satisfy the other.
Via class 'Precedent Reasoning Capability': Distinguishing the instant case from a cited prior opinion is the canonical Precedent Reasoning Capability; no new class is needed.
A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7. ... The distinguishing fact in the instant case is that the engineer has only one client, and he is, therefore, not subject to the same pressures to temper his service to one client in order to satisfy the other.
Part-Time Retention Acceptance → Advisory Recommendation
The duties for the city usually include advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations and approving plans for engineering processes and works.
1. Part-Time Retention Acceptance -- Engineer in full-time private practice accepts part-time retention as city engineer
2. Client Service Framing -- Engineer treats the community as a client of his private practice
3. Advisory Recommendation -- Engineer advises the council and recommends approval of engineering projects as part of his defined duties
Without accepting the part-time retention, the engineer would have no advisory role and would not be positioned to recommend project approvals to the city council
City delegating advisory and approval duties to the position
Engineer accepting the part-time city engineer position
Ongoing engineering matters requiring council guidance
Acceptance of retention combined with the defined duties of advising and recommending to the council
Project Commission Retention → Fee Compensation
In such cases, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer.
1. Project Commission Retention -- City council retains the same engineer for preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
2. Project Commission Acceptance -- Engineer accepts the design commission from the city he serves
3. Fee Compensation -- Engineer is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
Without the additional project retention, the engineer would receive only the monthly retainer and no professional fee for project design
City council decision to retain the engineer for plans and specifications
Fee arrangement separate from the monthly retainer
Council's retention of the engineer for project work under normal professional fee terms
Project Commission Acceptance → Dual Capacity Arising
Under these circumstances, the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one.
1. Part-Time Retention Acceptance -- Engineer becomes part-time city engineer with approval duties
2. Project Commission Retention -- City council offers the same engineer the project design work
3. Project Commission Acceptance -- Engineer accepts the design commission while retaining the city engineer role
4. Dual Capacity Arising -- Engineer now serves simultaneously as designer and reviewing/approving city engineer
Had the engineer declined the design commission or resigned the advisory post, no dual capacity would exist
Acceptance of the additional design commission from the same city
Both roles serving the same single client
Pre-existing role as part-time city engineer with review and approval duties
Acceptance of the project commission while continuing to hold the city engineer position
Advisory Recommendation → Self-Interest Risk Arising
we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
1. Advisory Recommendation -- Engineer studies and recommends approval of a project to the city council
2. Self-Interest Risk Arising -- Because approval may lead to his securing the commission, a risk of prejudiced advice arises
3. Project Commission Retention -- Council, relying on his guidance, retains him for the approved project's design
4. Fee Compensation -- Engineer receives a professional fee over and above his retainer, completing the self-interest loop
If the engineer refrained from advising on projects he might later design, the specific risk of prejudiced advice would not materialize
Council's exclusive reliance on the engineer for guidance
Engineer's act of advising and recommending project approval to the council
Prospect that project approval leads to a design commission for the engineer
Recommendation of a project by the same engineer who stands to receive the resulting commission
The professional engineer may be retained by the city council, in addition to general advisory services, for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project, compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer. The retention is conditional, but it evidences a design competence he possesses.
Via class 'Engineering Design Capability': The competence to prepare plans and specifications for a project is the same concept as the previously extracted Engineering Design Capability, the competence to produce an engineering design including plans and analyses. Reused rather than minting a near-duplicate.
In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project.
Although Client Consent to Dual Capacity might seem like the natural mechanism to legitimize the engineer's overlapping roles, the case facts do not indicate that the city council gave informed consent to the specific conflict of interest; rather, the Board's approval rests on the engineer's fiduciary self-restraint. This suggests that in the Board's hierarchy of principles, procedural consent by the client is not treated as a necessary or sufficient condition for resolving structural conflicts of interest -- professional self-regulation is prioritized over contractual transparency.
Should the engineer seek explicit informed consent from the city council to the specific self-review conflict in his dual role, or proceed relying on the council's general waiver of independent plan review?
Given that the city generally retained the engineer without specifically consenting to the self-review conflict inherent in his dual role, the engineer must decide whether to seek explicit informed consent or proceed on the basis of the city's general waiver.
1. Seek Explicit Informed Consent to Dual Role: Formally disclose the specific self-review and incentive conflict to the council and obtain documented consent before proceeding.
2. Rely on General Waiver Implicit in Retention: Proceed relying on the city's general waiver of independent review as sufficient basis for performing both advisory and design roles.
3. Engage Independent Reviewer Regardless of Consent: Bypass the consent question by arranging for independent third-party review of the plans as a structural safeguard, irrespective of the council's waiver.
The engineer may proceed on the basis of the city's general waiver of independent review, though seeking explicit informed consent to the specific self-review conflict would better ground his conduct.
The city council retained the engineer generally as part-time city engineer and separately for the design commission, without a documented disclosure specifically addressing the self-review conflict; the city has evidently waived its right to independent review.
Unless the council's general waiver is shown to be uninformed as to the specific self-review risk.
This warrant would not apply if the council's general retention decision failed to reflect actual awareness of the self-review structure, making a separate informed-consent step necessary rather than redundant.
A client's waiver of a right of review is effective when the client has consented to the arrangement giving rise to it; general retention of the engineer in his dual capacity constitutes the city's waiver of independent review of his plans.
the engineer's review of the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer
The Board frames the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans as city engineer, and resolves it by noting the client holds the right of review by its own engineer and may waive that right, as the city has obviously done.
The Canons and Rules impose no requirement that an engineer's plans be reviewed by another engineer retained by the client; the client may waive its right of review, so the self-review concern does not bar the dual-capacity arrangement here.
There is no requirement in either the Canons or Rules that an engineer's plans for a client must be reviewed by an engineer employed or retained by the client. The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case.
the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer
Via class 'Independent Review Principle': The concern about the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans is the self-review value expressed by the existing Independent Review Principle; the Board treats it as waivable by the sole client.
There is still left for decision, however, the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer. There is no requirement in either the Canons or Rules that an engineer's plans for a client must be reviewed by an engineer employed or retained by the client. The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case.
Independent Review Waiver → Own Plan Approval
The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case.
1. Project Commission Acceptance -- Engineer prepares plans and specifications for the city project
2. Independent Review Waiver -- City waives its right to have the plans reviewed by another engineer
3. Own Plan Approval -- Engineer, as city engineer, passes on the adequacy of his own plans
Had the city exercised its right to review by another engineer, the engineer would not pass on the adequacy of his own plans
City's implicit waiver of independent engineering review
Engineer having prepared the plans under the project commission
Engineer's role as the city's approving engineer
Waiver of review combined with the engineer's dual role as preparer and approver of plans
Board conclusion 1: It is not unethical for an engineer retained by a communi...
It is not unethical for an engineer retained by a community on a part-time basis as a city engineer to prepare plans and specifications for a project for the same community, but in so acting the engineer must be scrupulously careful that his advice is not influenced by his secondary interest as the engineer likely to be retained for the design of the project.
Analytical conclusion 1: The Board's requirement of 'scrupulous care' does not res...
The Board's requirement of 'scrupulous care' does not resolve the structural problem that the engineer, in his advisory capacity, is tasked with approving plans and specifications that he himself prepared under the supplemental commission. This self-review function—Own Plan Approval performed by the same individual holding Own Plan Adequacy Review capability—lacks the external check that would normally validate an engineer's approval of another's work. The Board's conclusion that the arrangement is not inherently unethical presumes the engineer's personal discipline can substitute for institutional safeguards such as independent third-party review, but this presumption is not explicitly tested or justified in the reasoning.
Analytical conclusion 2: The Board's admonition to guard against influence from 's...
The Board's admonition to guard against influence from 'secondary interest' implicitly acknowledges a financial incentive structure: the engineer's advisory recommendations about whether and how a project should proceed directly affect the likelihood that he will receive a supplemental, separately compensated design commission. This creates a conflict between the Objectivity in Advising City principle and the Prospective Commission Incentive event, one that exists at the moment of advisory recommendation—prior to and independent of any subsequent self-review of his own plans. The Board's finding of no inherent violation therefore rests on trusting the engineer's professional integrity to resist a financial incentive that is real and quantifiable (the professional fee 'over and above his monthly retainer'), rather than on any structural mechanism removing the incentive itself.
Analytical conclusion 3: The Board's characterization of the part-time city engine...
The Board's characterization of the part-time city engineer's service as 'service to a client' rather than as an internal governmental function is significant: it frames the ethical analysis under Rule 17's multiple-employment provisions and Canon 15's compensation-from-multiple-parties concern, rather than under Canon 27's salaried-position prohibition. Had the engineer instead held a full-time salaried municipal position, the Board's reasoning suggests a different provision (Canon 27, addressing unfair competitive advantage from a salaried role) would likely govern, potentially yielding a different or more restrictive conclusion. The Board's silence on this distinction leaves open whether the 'not unethical' finding is contingent specifically on the engineer's status as an independent, part-time contractor rather than a municipal employee.
Analytical conclusion 3: Although Client Consent to Dual Capacity might seem like...
He will advise his client when he believes a project will not be successful.
When and if the city council retains the engineer for preparation of plans and specifications, in addition to his advisory and plan approval duties
The condition of serving one public client in two compensated capacities makes the faithful agent relationship to the city the concrete frame for evaluating the engineer's advisory, approval, and design duties.
The professional engineer serving as part-time city engineer
Completion of the plans and specifications engagement
In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project. In such cases, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer.
The city council retains the engineer for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
Via class 'Dual Capacity State': The synonym table folds Dual Role Service State, Single Client Dual Capacity State, and Supplemental Engagement State into the canonical DualCapacityState. This condition, one engineer serving the same city as advisor and plan approver while also available for supplemental design retention alongside private practice, is exactly that dual capacity concept.
We have previously noted that "although neither the Canons nor the Rules refer specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client." (Case No. 60-5)
conflict of interest and divided loyalties of a professional toward employer or client
Via class 'Case Precedent': The cited prior board opinions Case No. 60-5 and Case No. 62-7 are precedent cases used for analogical reasoning, which is exactly the canonical Case Precedent class; no new class is needed.
Case No. 60-5 (topic: conflict of interest and divided loyalties of a professional toward employer or client)
Cited to establish the foundational principle that a professional may not act in a way that divides loyalties between employer/client interests, even though the Canons and Rules do not explicitly mention 'conflict of interest.'
A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7. Here it was held that there would be a conflict of interest in a situation in which a consulting engineer was retained by a county commission to perform all engineering and advisory services for it, including review and approval of plans submitted by other engineers
conflict of interest of a consultant serving a county commission and a private company with opposing interests
A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7.
Case No. 62-7 (topic: conflict of interest of a consultant serving a county commission and a private company with opposing interests)
Cited as an analogous prior case involving dual roles for an engineer, but ultimately distinguished because that case involved two separate clients with potentially conflicting interests, whereas the instant case involves only one client.
In his capacity as city engineer, the engineer passes on the adequacy of his own plans for the city project, the city having waived its right to review by another engineer, so his advisory and plan-approval service presupposes this competence.
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Adequacy Assessment Capability'
The city engineer approves plans for engineering processes and works as part of his usual duties for the city, judging whether submitted plans meet the standard required before approval.
approving plans for engineering processes and works
Via class 'Adequacy Assessment Capability': Approving plans for engineering processes and works is the competence to judge whether a submitted plan meets the required standard, which is exactly the existing Adequacy Assessment Capability. The municipal plan-approval subject is context, not a distinct kind.
The Board's admonition to guard against influence from 'secondary interest' implicitly acknowledges a financial incentive structure: the engineer's advisory recommendations about whether and how a project should proceed directly affect the likelihood that he will receive a supplemental, separately compensated design commission. This creates a conflict between the Objectivity in Advising City principle and the Prospective Commission Incentive event, one that exists at the moment of advisory recommendation—prior to and independent of any subsequent self-review of his own plans. The Board's finding of no inherent violation therefore rests on trusting the engineer's professional integrity to resist a financial incentive that is real and quantifiable (the professional fee 'over and above his mo
When advising the council on the project, should the engineer give his recommendation as usual while applying extra scrutiny, or first disclose the incentive or recuse himself to protect objectivity?
When advising the council on whether a project should proceed, the engineer must decide how to handle the fact that his own advisory recommendation affects his prospects for the separately compensated design commission.
1. Recommend With Doubly Careful Scrutiny: Provide the advisory recommendation to the council while applying heightened, doubly careful scrutiny to offset the commission incentive.
2. Recuse From Recommending on Sought Projects: Decline to render an advisory recommendation on any project the engineer intends to pursue for the design commission.
3. Disclose Incentive Before Advising: Disclose the prospective commission interest to the council explicitly before giving the recommendation, letting the council weigh the disclosed incentive.
The engineer should give his advisory recommendation but must be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval, since council approval of the project may lead to his securing the design commission.
The engineer's compensation for the design work is a separate professional fee paid over and above his monthly retainer, and his advisory recommendation logically precedes and affects the likelihood of that commission.
Unless the fee structure or surrounding circumstances create an incentive so strong that neutral judgment cannot reasonably be presumed.
This warrant would not apply if the recommendation and the commission decision were shown to be independent through disclosure and client consent, or if no separate fee incentive existed at all.
Rule 13 imposes a duty on an engineer in dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the client; this requires doubly careful study and recommendation where approval could lead to his own commission.
Treat Role as Client Service and Pursue Commission
The Board's characterization of the part-time city engineer's service as 'service to a client' rather than as an internal governmental function is significant: it frames the ethical analysis under Rule 17's multiple-employment provisions and Canon 15's compensation-from-multiple-parties concern, rather than under Canon 27's salaried-position prohibition. Had the engineer instead held a full-time salaried municipal position, the Board's reasoning suggests a different provision (Canon 27, addressing unfair competitive advantage from a salaried role) would likely govern, potentially yielding a different or more restrictive conclusion. The Board's silence on this distinction leaves open whether the 'not unethical' finding is contingent specifically on the engineer's status as an independent, p
Should the engineer treat his part-time municipal role as client service permitting him to seek the design commission, or hold himself to the stricter salaried-employee standard barring such outside commissions?
The engineer must decide whether to treat his part-time municipal position as private client service, permitting pursuit of the supplemental commission, or to hold himself to the stricter standard applicable to salaried public employees.
1. Treat Role as Client Service and Pursue Commission: Treat the part-time engagement as private client service, permitting pursuit of the supplemental commission under Rule 17 and Canon 15.
2. Adopt Full-Time-Employee Standard and Forgo Commission: Voluntarily hold himself to the stricter Canon 27 standard, declining to pursue outside design work on projects he advises.
3. Seek Council Clarification of Employment Status: Ask the council to formally clarify whether he is retained as an independent consultant or as an employee before deciding whether to pursue the commission.
The engineer may treat the part-time position as client service and pursue the design commission, since he is retained as an independent consultant rather than as a salaried municipal employee.
The engineer is retained part-time and compensated by monthly retainer; the design commission is separately compensated at a normal professional fee rather than a salary.
Provided the engineer's status remains that of an independent part-time consultant rather than a salaried municipal employee.
This warrant would not apply if the engineer's arrangement were reclassified as full-time salaried employment, which would trigger Canon 27's prohibition on competing for outside design work.
Canon 27 prohibits using a salaried position to compete unfairly with another engineer for outside work, while Rule 17 and Canon 15 govern multiple employment and compensation from multiple parties for consultants serving a client; a part-time consultant is governed by the latter, not the former.
Implicit question 3: Should the city be required to obtain independent third-p...
Should the city be required to obtain independent third-party review of plans and specifications prepared by its own part-time city engineer, rather than relying on his self-review or the city council's non-technical oversight?
Principle-tension question 2: Does Self-Review of Own Plans conflict with Undivided Loy...
Does Self-Review of Own Plans conflict with Undivided Loyalty in Dual Capacity, given that the same engineer who advises the city and approves plans is also the one being paid to prepare those plans?
Theoretical question 1: From a deontological perspective, did the engineer fulfil...
From a deontological perspective, did the engineer fulfill his duty of undivided loyalty to the city when he simultaneously held the advisory city engineer role and the paid role of project designer for the same client?
Theoretical question 2: From a consequentialist standpoint, does the fact that th...
From a consequentialist standpoint, does the fact that the city ultimately received competent plans and specifications justify permitting the same engineer to both advise on and design the project, despite the structural incentive for biased advice?
Theoretical question 3: Did the engineer act with professional integrity when he...
Did the engineer act with professional integrity when he reviewed and approved plans and specifications that he himself had prepared for the city project, given the virtue of impartial self-scrutiny expected of a professional?
Counterfactual question 1: If the engineer had received no separate professional fee...
If the engineer had received no separate professional fee for preparing the plans and specifications beyond his monthly retainer, would the Board still have stressed the need for scrupulous care against his secondary interest as prospective project designer?
Counterfactual question 3: If the same engineer who prepared the plans and specifica...
If the same engineer who prepared the plans and specifications were also the one to give final approval on those same plans in his advisory capacity, without any independent check, would the Board's conclusion that the arrangement is not unethical still hold?
While the engineer serves the city in a dual capacity as part-time consultant and prospective project designer
The applicability of Rule 13 transforms the general loyalty owed to the client into a concrete duty to avoid prejudicing advice to the city on the project whose approval may lead to the engineer securing a commission.
The engineer's dual capacity engagement with the city
End of the dual capacity arrangement with the city
Engineer's retention by the city in a dual capacity
Via class 'Regulatory Applicability State': The condition of Rule 13 being in force and binding for the engineer's conduct is the same concept as the existing RegulatoryApplicabilityState, a condition in which a code provision is in force for a party's conduct.
Maintain a consultant-client relationship with the city consistent with his private practice
Understanding of professional engagement structures
The engineer chooses to treat his part-time service to the community as service to a client rather than as salaried employment, which shapes how the Canons and Rules apply to the arrangement.
the engineer's advice to the city on the project under consideration
the engineer's study and recommendation of approval of a project for which the council looks to him for guidance
The Board, citing Rule 13, states the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city, since council approval of a project may lead to his securing the commission for it, and cautions that he should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval.
The dual capacity requires the engineer to keep his advice to the city free from the self-interested pull of securing a commission, and to exercise heightened care when recommending approval; the Board finds no ground to believe improper conduct is present.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project. There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present, but we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project
Via class 'Objectivity Principle': The duty to avoid prejudicing advice because of the prospect of securing a commission is the objectivity value of judgment free from self-interest, matching the existing Objectivity Principle.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project. There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present, but we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council
While the project whose approval may lead to his commission is under consideration by the city council
The prospective commission incentive transforms the general duty of faithful advice into the Rule 13 duty to be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of the project for which the council must look to the engineer for guidance.
an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance
City council consideration of a project on which the engineer advises and for which he may secure the design commission
Via class 'Conflict Of Interest State': The potential commission incentive is a self-interest condition bearing on the engineer's advisory judgment, which folds into the canonical ConflictOfInterestState per the reuse policy for self-interested advisory conditions. The board holds the engineer's capacity is dual but not divided, so the individual records a potential incentive the board cautions about, not an actual divided loyalty.
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project. There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present, but we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
Principle-tension question 1: How should Objectivity in Advising City be balanced again...
How should Objectivity in Advising City be balanced against the engineer's Self-Interest in securing the Project Commission Retention when he advises the council on whether and how to pursue an engineering project?
City Engineer Engineering Advisory Competence
The city engineer's usual duties include advising the city council on engineering problems and offering recommendations on engineering project considerations, a competence he exercises as part of his part-time municipal service treated as service to a client.
The duties for the city usually include advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations
Case-specific individual grounding the Engineering Advisory Capability kind; no individual-level ontology match applies.
The engineer's Rule 13 duty to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city presupposes his capacity to keep his judgment unbiased despite the prospect of securing the project commission, and the Board found no ground to believe improper conduct is present while cautioning him to be doubly careful.
There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present
Via class 'Objectivity Maintenance Capability': The competence to keep advice unprejudiced and be doubly careful under self-interest pressure is exactly the canonical Objectivity Maintenance Capability; the synonym list folds Heightened Self-Review Diligence Capability into it.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project. There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present.
the city's retention of the engineer in a dual capacity as advisor and potential project designer
The Board holds that Canon 15 is not a bar because there is only one interested party, the client, and that party has given its consent to the arrangement.
Where only one client is interested in the arrangement and that client has consented, the arrangement does not present a barred conflict of interest.
Canon 15 is not a bar to this type of arrangement because there is only one interested party (client) and that party has given its consent.
Via class 'Conflict of Interest Disclosure Principle': The Board's reasoning that client consent removes the bar to the dual-capacity arrangement is the client-consent waiver aspect that the synonym table folds into the existing Conflict of Interest Disclosure Principle.
Conflict of Interest Disclosure Principle
The Board's requirement of 'scrupulous care' does not resolve the structural problem that the engineer, in his advisory capacity, is tasked with approving plans and specifications that he himself prepared under the supplemental commission. This self-review function—Own Plan Approval performed by the same individual holding Own Plan Adequacy Review capability—lacks the external check that would normally validate an engineer's approval of another's work. The Board's conclusion that the arrangement is not inherently unethical presumes the engineer's personal discipline can substitute for institutional safeguards such as independent third-party review, but this presumption is not explicitly tested or justified in the reasoning. Regarding Q101: Yes, the dual role creates an inherent structural
Should the engineer approve his own plans and specifications in his advisory capacity, or require an independent third-party review before final approval?
As advisory city engineer, the engineer must decide whether to personally approve the plans and specifications he himself prepared under the supplemental commission, or insist on an independent check.
1. Self-Approve Under Waived Review Right: Review and approve his own plans in his advisory capacity, relying on the city's implicit waiver of independent review.
2. Require Independent Third-Party Review: Request that the city retain a separate reviewing engineer to check the plans before final approval, despite the added cost.
3. Disclose Self-Review Limits and Seek Ratification: Disclose the self-review structure explicitly to the council and obtain documented ratification before giving final approval.
The engineer may pass on the adequacy of his own plans as city engineer, since the client holds the right of review by its own engineer and has evidently waived that right.
The engineer performs the advisory plan-approval function and also received the design commission for the same project; the city did not require independent review of his self-prepared plans.
Provided the city's waiver is understood to be knowing and the engineer maintains rigorous technical competence in self-assessment.
This warrant would not apply if the city's waiver were uninformed as to the self-review risk, or if no mechanism existed to catch self-interested bias in the engineer's own approval of his own work.
A client's right to independent review of an engineer's plans may be waived by the client; where the city has obviously waived that right, self-review by the retained engineer is permitted as part of his advisory duty.
When the engineer is retained for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer, per the terms of the arrangement.
the additional retention by the city council for preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
the part-time city engineer service to the small community
The engineer treats his part-time service to the small community as service to a client, extending the client-service posture of his private practice to his municipal duties of advising the city council, offering recommendations, and approving plans.
In these facts the loyalty value means the engineer regards the community as a client of his practice, so his advisory, recommendation, and plan-approval duties for the city are owed the same faithful client service as work for any private client, including when he is additionally retained and compensated on a normal professional fee basis for plans and specifications.
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Loyalty Principle'
Principle-tension question 3: Is Client Consent to Dual Capacity sufficient to resolve...
Is Client Consent to Dual Capacity sufficient to resolve the tension between Loyalty in City Engineer Service and Objectivity in Advising City, or does the city's consent fail to address the structural conflict of interest inherent in the dual role?
Because the engineer advises the city council on projects whose approval may lead to his securing a design commission, a condition of potential self-interest in his advice arises whenever such a project is under consideration.
The retainer establishes the usual duties of the position, advisory service to the city council, recommendations on project considerations, and approval of plans for engineering processes and works.
While serving under the part-time retainer as city engineer
Via class 'Faithful Agent Obligation': The duty of the part-time city engineer to serve the community as he would a client is the same concept as the existing Faithful Agent Obligation, the duty to act as a faithful agent or trustee of an employer or client under NSPE II.4.
May be retained by the city council, in addition to general advisory services, for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project, in which case he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer. The case states this engagement as conditional, not standing.
compensation: compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
engagement_modality: may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications, a conditional additional engagement, not a standing duty
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Design Engineer Role'
The engineer passes on the adequacy of his own plans
Rely on its retained city engineer for plan review rather than engaging a separate reviewing engineer
The city implicitly waives its right to have the engineer's plans reviewed by another engineer employed or retained by the client, relying instead on the same engineer in his city engineer capacity.
Implicit question 1: Since the engineer approves plans for engineering process...
Since the engineer approves plans for engineering processes and works as part of his advisory duties, does this create an inherent problem when he later approves or reviews his own project designs prepared under the supplemental commission?
Implicit question 4: Does the practice of treating part-time municipal service...
Does the practice of treating part-time municipal service 'as service to a client' rather than as a public duty change the ethical obligations the engineer owes to the city council and the public compared to a full-time municipal employee?
Counterfactual question 2: If the engineer had been a full-time salaried employee of...
If the engineer had been a full-time salaried employee of the city rather than an independent practitioner treating the city as a client, would the Board still conclude there is no violation, given Canon 27's prohibition on using a salaried position to compete unfairly with another engineer?
City Engineer Loyalty Division Prohibition
While the engineer serves the city as his single client in a dual capacity, retained part-time as city engineer and preparing plans for city projects, with the city having consented and waived its right to independent review by another engineer.
The Board holds that because the engineer has only one client, which has consented to the arrangement and waived its right of independent review, he is acting in a dual capacity but not a divided one, so the prohibition on divided loyalties bounds his conduct without being breached in this case.
The city engineer must not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his client, the city, while serving it in a dual capacity as part-time consultant and as the engineer whose own plans come before the city.
Axiomatic conflict of interest principle acknowledged by the Board under the Canons and Rules
For the duration of the engineer's dual capacity engagement with the city
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'ConflictOfInterestAvoidanceConstraint'
We have previously noted that "although neither the Canons nor the Rules refer specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client." ... Under these circumstances, the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one.
Once the engineer, already serving as part-time city engineer, is additionally retained to prepare plans and specifications for a city project, a dual capacity situation comes into being in which he passes on the adequacy of his own plans in his city engineer role.
City Engineer Faithful Client Service Duty
A small community retains the professional engineer on a part-time basis as city engineer while he maintains a full-time private practice, and he treats the municipal service as client service.
For the duration of the part-time retainer as city engineer
Accept Dual Role With Heightened Vigilance
It is not unethical for an engineer retained by a community on a part-time basis as a city engineer to prepare plans and specifications for a project for the same community, but in so acting the engineer must be scrupulously careful that his advice is not influenced by his secondary interest as the engineer likely to be retained for the design of the project. The Board's admonition to guard against influence from 'secondary interest' implicitly acknowledges a financial incentive structure: the engineer's advisory recommendations about whether and how a project should proceed directly affect the likelihood that he will receive a supplemental, separately compensated design commission. This creates a conflict between the Objectivity in Advising City principle and the Prospective Commission In
Should the engineer accept the supplemental commission to design the project he advises on, or decline it to preserve the independence of his advisory role?
The engineer, retained part-time as city engineer, must decide whether to accept a supplemental commission to design the very project he advises the council on, given the risk that the prospective fee could bias his advisory judgment.
1. Accept Dual Role With Heightened Vigilance: Accept the supplemental design commission while remaining the advisory city engineer, applying scrupulous care to keep advisory recommendations uninfluenced by the prospective fee.
2. Decline the Design Commission: Decline the supplemental commission to design the project, preserving the independence of the advisory role and referring the design work to another engineer.
3. Accept Only With Mandated Independent Review: Accept the commission conditioned on the city engaging an independent third-party engineer to review the resulting plans before approval.
The engineer may accept the supplemental design commission while retaining the advisory role, provided he exercises scrupulous care to prevent his prospective fee from influencing his advisory recommendation.
The engineer, retained part-time as city engineer, advised the council on the project and was subsequently retained to prepare its plans and specifications for a separate professional fee paid over and above his monthly retainer.
Provided the engineer exercises scrupulous care against influence from his secondary interest as the likely designer of the project.
This warrant would not apply if the city lacked any independent means to review the engineer's plans or if the separate fee created a demonstrable incentive to favor project approval, undermining the presumption of undivided loyalty.
An engineer serving a single client in a dual capacity does not thereby divide his loyalty, since both roles serve the same client's interest; however, because council approval of a project may lead to his securing the design commission, he must avoid prejudicing his advice, being doubly careful in studying and recommending approval.
For the duration of the part-time retention as city engineer while in full-time private practice
End of the part-time city engineer retention or of the private practice
The community retains the professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer
Implicit question 2: Does the prospect of receiving a lucrative supplemental d...
Does the prospect of receiving a lucrative supplemental design commission create a financial incentive for the engineer to recommend that a project proceed, even if his objective professional judgment might otherwise counsel against it?
Approval of a project by the council may lead to his securing a commission for that project
Passing engineering judgment on his own plans in his city engineer capacity
Earn professional fees for design work beyond the monthly retainer
the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one
The engineer accepts project design commissions from the same city he serves as reviewing and approving city engineer, placing himself in the position of passing on the adequacy of his own plans.
Approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project
Provide sound engineering guidance to the city council on projects under consideration
In his ongoing city engineer capacity, the engineer advises the city council and recommends approval of projects, including projects for which the council may then retain him for design, requiring him to avoid prejudicing his advice for personal gain.
Case-scoped Agent individual materialized at commit for Board-pattern invokedBy/citedByAgent actor literals. Not extracted from the case text; excluded from the actor-resolution candidate pools, so it is never offered to extraction prompts and never matches as a reliance actor (used_by/availableTo).
The deliberative body whose analysis this case record captures. Its agency is authorship of the deliberation (citing precedents, invoking principles), not participation in the case events.
Case 103 Edge Materialization (Board-pattern actor resolution)
[discussion] Canon 27 is not an impediment because it refers to a "salaried" position, whereas in this situation the engineer is retained on a part-time basis by the city as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee
He will not use the advantages of a salaried position to compete unfairly with another engineer." Rules of Professional Conduct
the part-time city engineer arrangement in which the engineer both advises the city and may design city projects
With only one client, the engineer is not subject to pressures to temper service to one client to satisfy another, so the loyalty value is satisfied and the arrangement is a dual capacity, not a divided one.
a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client
Via class 'Loyalty Principle': The Board's axiom of undivided loyalty to the client is exactly the faithful-agent loyalty value expressed by the existing Loyalty Principle class.
We have previously noted that "although neither the Canons nor the Rules refer specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client."
Judging the adequacy of his own work without independent review
Fulfill his city engineer duty of approving plans for engineering processes and works
In his capacity as city engineer, the engineer passes on the adequacy of the plans he himself prepared as a retained consultant for city projects.
[discussion] Rule 17 deals only with situations in which the engineer is employed by more than one party. Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his
An engineer in private practice may be employed by more than one party when the interests and time schedules of the several parties do not conflict.
Participant in this case: performs Independent Review Waiver and Project Commission Retention; is affected by Part Time City Engineer Dual Practice, Prospective Commission Incentive and Rule 13 Binding Condition and 1 more; is the responsible agent in Independent Review Waiver → Own Plan Approval and Project Commission Retention → Fee Compensation. Derived from the committed case graph.
Case 103 Edge Materialization (participant scaffold)
[discussion] Under these circumstances, the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one. Canon 15 is not a bar to this type of arrangement because there is only one interested party (client) and that party has given its consent.
He will not accept compensation, financial or otherwise, from more than one interested party for the same service, or for services pertaining to the same work, without the consent of all interested parties.
The engineer would pass on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer
Obtain plans and specifications for city projects from the engineer already familiar with the city's needs
the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project. In such cases, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer.
The city council additionally retains the same engineer for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project, compensating him on a normal professional fee basis above his monthly retainer.
Serves the small community as part-time city engineer while in full-time private practice, treating the service as service to a client. Duties usually include advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations, and approving plans for engineering processes and works.
client_framing: treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client
engagement_basis: part-time retainer with the community, monthly retainer
other_practice: engaged in full-time private practice
Individual typed as existing ontology class 'Municipal Engineer Role'
Board question 1: Is a professional engineer retained by a city for general...
Is a professional engineer retained by a city for general advisory services in violation of the Canons of Ethics by also preparing plans and specifications on projects for the city in which he participated and advised the city council?
The Board holds Rule 13 binding because the engineer serves the city both as advisory city engineer and as prospective design engineer for the project. It finds no ground to believe improper conduct is present, and adds cautionary guidance that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project on which the council looks to him for guidance.
While the engineer advises the city on the project under consideration and stands to secure the design commission if it is approved
Via class 'Objectivity Obligation': The Board's Rule 13 duty to avoid prejudicing advice to the city in a dual capacity is the dual-capacity bias-avoidance duty, which the reuse policy folds into the canonical Objectivity Obligation, a duty to keep professional advice objective and free of self-interested bias.
Potential future situations of passing on his own work if retained for city projects
Provide ongoing engineering advisory and approval services to the community alongside his private practice
The professional engineer, engaged in full-time private practice, accepts part-time retention by the small community to serve as city engineer, advising the council, offering recommendations, and approving plans.
Participant in this case: performs Advisory Recommendation, Client Service Framing and Own Plan Approval and 2 more; bears City Engineer Advice Objectivity Duty, City Engineer Advisory Service Duty and City Engineer Faithful Client Service Duty; possesses City Engineer Design Competence, City Engineer Engineering Advisory Competence and City Engineer Objectivity Maintenance and 2 more; is constrained by City Engineer Loyalty Division Prohibition; is affected by Part Time City Engineer Dual Practice, Rule 13 Binding Condition and Supplemental Plans Retention Condition; is the responsible agent in Advisory Recommendation → Self-Interest Risk Arising, Dual Capacity Arising → Self-Interest Risk Arising and Independent Review Waiver → Own Plan Approval and 2 more. Derived from the committed case graph.