Each project recommendation made by the engineer carries an inherent credibility risk; city council's reliance on unverified recommendations is structurally risky
Ongoing, whenever project recommendations are made under the dual arrangement
As a natural consequence of the engineer recommending projects for which he may later receive a commission, the objectivity of his advisory function is structurally undermined, regardless of his subjective intent.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 60-5
although neither the Canons nor the Rules refer specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client. (Case No. 60-5)
Board of Ethical Review in analyzing the dual-role arrangement of the city engineer
Cited to establish the axiomatic principle that a professional may not take action or make decisions that divide loyalties or interests from those of employer or client, even absent explicit canon or rule language on conflict of interest
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 62-7
A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7.
The consultant is in the position of passing engineering judgment on behalf of the Commission on work or contract arrangements which the engineer performed, or in which he participated.
Board of Ethical Review to distinguish the instant case from a two-client conflict scenario
Cited as analogous precedent involving a consulting engineer retained by a county commission for all engineering and advisory services who was simultaneously retained by a private company for design work involving negotiations with the same commission, establishing the conflict of interest standard for dual-client situations
Case No. 60-5 ruling before Case No. 62-7 ruling
Case No. 60-5 is referenced first as a prior precedent, followed by 'A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7,' implying sequential prior rulings.
Case No. 62-7 ruling before current case analysis
A somewhat similar situation was analyzed in Case No. 62-7... The distinguishing fact in the instant case is that the engineer has only one client.
CausalLink_Self-Interest Advisory Recomme
City Municipal Government Client waiver of independent review
Single-Client Dual-Role Self-Review Heightened Caution Obligation
The city client has waived its right to have the engineer's plans reviewed by a separate engineer retained by the city, and because no Canon or Rule mandates independent third-party review as a categorical requirement, this waiver renders the dual capacity arrangement ethically permissible
The client's right to independent review is a waivable entitlement, not a mandatory protection imposed for the public's benefit independent of the client's wishes; when the client knowingly waives it, the engineer's dual capacity does not violate any code provision
Client Waiver of Independent Self-Review Right Permissibility Principle
There is no requirement in either the Canons or Rules that an engineer's plans for a client must be reviewed by an engineer employed or retained by the client. The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case.
Client waiver eliminates the formal conflict concern; heightened caution obligation remains to protect the integrity of the engineer's advisory function
The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case.
There is no requirement in either the Canons or Rules that an engineer's plans for a client must be reviewed by an engineer employed or retained by the client.
Under these circumstances, the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one.
City Council Client Waiver Self-Review Right
The city council retains the same engineer as part-time city engineer for advisory services and plan approval, and as fee-based design engineer for city projects. No canon or rule requires independent review of an engineer's plans by a separate engineer retained by the client. Canon 15 does not bar the arrangement because only one client is involved and that client has consented.
Ethics adjudicators and the part-time city engineer
Client Waiver Self-Review Permissibility Recognition Obligation
Ethics adjudicators and the engineer are obligated to recognize that the city council has waived its right to independent review of the engineer's plans by retaining the same engineer for both advisory and design services, and that this waiver renders the dual-capacity arrangement ethically permissible in the absence of any canon or rule expressly prohibiting it.
At the time of ethical analysis of the dual-capacity arrangement and throughout the engagement
Canon 15 is not a bar to this type of arrangement because there is only one interested party (client) and that party has given its consent.
The city council and ethics adjudicators demonstrated capability to recognize that the city council holds the right to require independent review of the engineer's plans but has waived that right, and that this waiver renders the dual advisory and design arrangement permissible.
Small municipal government retaining part-time city engineer who also designs city projects, where the city council has not required independent review of the engineer's own plans.
Recognition that no canon or rule requires independent review of an engineer's plans by a client-retained engineer, and that the city council's failure to require such review constitutes a waiver making the dual capacity arrangement permissible.
City council's retention of engineer for dual advisory and design roles without independent review
The city council's decision to retain the same engineer for both advisory and design services constitutes an implicit waiver of the right to independent third-party review of the engineer's design work, which is ethically permissible provided the council acts knowingly
The municipal client's knowing acceptance of the dual-role arrangement, including the absence of independent review, validates the arrangement ethically; no NSPE Code provision mandates independent third-party review as an absolute requirement
In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
Client waiver is valid when the council acts knowingly; the engineer's heightened caution obligation compensates for the absence of independent review
Throughout the duration of the part-time city engineer appointment
The duties for the city usually include advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations and approving plans for engineering processes and works
Professional engineer holding official advisory position as city engineer
Termination of the part-time city engineer appointment
Community retains professional engineer to advise city council, offer recommendations, and approve engineering plans
Professional engineer retained part-time as city engineer under monthly retainer also performs design work for the same city on a fee basis, creating structural incentive to favor projects from which the engineer may secure design commissions.
Part-time city engineer serving dual advisory and design roles
Rule 13 Dual-Capacity Advisory Prejudice Avoidance Binding Constraint
The part-time city engineer must not allow the prospect of receiving design commissions from the city council to bias, distort, or prejudice advisory recommendations made to the city council on engineering problems and project considerations.
NSPE Code of Ethics Rule 13; BER Case 63-5
The duties for the city usually include advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations and approving plans for engineering processes and works.
Throughout the duration of the dual advisory and design engagement
In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project.
A professional engineer in full-time private practice is retained part-time as city engineer under a monthly retainer, and may also be retained separately for design work on city projects. The advisory role includes recommending engineering project considerations that could lead to design commissions.
The part-time city engineer is obligated to render all advisory recommendations to the city council on engineering problems and project considerations based solely on objective technical assessment and the city's best interests, without allowing the prospect of obtaining design commissions to influence advisory guidance.
Throughout the duration of the part-time city engineer engagement, whenever advisory recommendations are rendered
City Engineer Advisory Objectivity Maintenance
The part-time city engineer must maintain impartiality in all advisory recommendations to the city council, ensuring that guidance on engineering problems and project approvals is driven solely by objective technical judgment rather than by the secondary interest in obtaining design commissions.
Part-time city engineer advising city council on engineering problems and project approvals while also serving as fee-based design engineer for the same municipality.
Rule 13 duty to avoid prejudicing advisory recommendations and the ethics board caution regarding doubled care in recommending approval of projects that may lead to design commissions.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project.
City Engineer Canon 15 Non-Bar Single Client
Part-time city engineer retained on monthly retainer also prepares plans and specifications for the same city on a fee basis; ethics board analyzes whether Canon 15 bars the arrangement
Canon 15 Single-Client Consent Non-Bar Constraint
Canon 15 does not bar the part-time city engineer from also performing compensated design work for the same municipal client because there is only one interested party and that party has given its consent, removing the predicate condition for Canon 15's application.
NSPE Code of Ethics Canon 15; BER Case 63-5
City Engineer Canon 27 Non-Applicability Recognition
Canon 27 is considered as a potential bar to the dual-capacity arrangement. The Board concludes it does not apply because the engineer is retained part-time as a consultant rather than holding a salaried position. Rule 17 is also inapplicable because it deals only with situations where the engineer is employed by more than one party.
Salaried Position Canon Non-Applicability to Retained Consultant Recognition Obligation
Ethics adjudicators are obligated to recognize that Canon 27, which refers to a salaried position, does not apply to the part-time city engineer who is retained on a consulting basis rather than employed as a salaried employee, and that misapplying Canon 27 to this consulting arrangement would produce an incorrect ethical conclusion.
Canon 27 is not an impediment because it refers to a 'salaried' position, whereas in this situation the engineer is retained on a part-time basis by the city as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee.
At the time of ethical analysis of the dual-capacity arrangement
Rule 17 deals only with situations in which the engineer is employed by more than one party.
City Engineer Canon 27 Non-Applicability Retainer
Part-time city engineer retained on monthly retainer; ethics board analyzes whether Canon 27 governing salaried positions applies to the arrangement
Part-time city engineer retained as consultant
Canon 27 Salaried Position Non-Applicability to Part-Time Retained Consultant Constraint
Canon 27 does not apply to the part-time city engineer because Canon 27 refers to a salaried position and the engineer is retained on a part-time basis as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee.
NSPE Code of Ethics Canon 27; BER Case 63-5
The professional engineer holding this position is engaged in full-time private practice and treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client
Professional relationship between the engineer and the community treated as a client relationship
Community retains professional engineer on part-time basis; engineer treats the part-time service as service to a client
City Engineer Client Relationship Structural Independence
Structural character of the engineer-municipality relationship
Dual Capacity Without Divided Loyalty Permissibility Principle
The part-time city engineer treats the relationship with the small community as a consultant-to-client relationship rather than an employee-to-employer relationship, which preserves the professional independence necessary for objective advisory services in the dual-role arrangement
The consultant-to-client relationship provides the structural independence that makes the dual-role arrangement ethically permissible; the engineer's recommendations are subject to municipal approval rather than employer direction
Engineer-to-Client Versus Engineer-to-Employer Relationship Distinction as Conflict Determinant
The consultant-to-client structure is the foundational condition for ethical permissibility of the dual-role arrangement; it ensures the engineer retains professional independence
Part-Time Municipal Engineer Client-Trustee Relationship Framing Capability
The part-time city engineer possesses the capability to correctly frame the relationship with the municipality as a client-trustee relationship, applying faithful agent and trustee obligations in all advisory and design service interactions with the city council.
Engineer in full-time private practice retained part-time by small community, explicitly framing the arrangement as a client relationship rather than employment
Treating part-time service to the community as service to a client rather than as employment, applying client-trustee obligations accordingly
The professional engineer holding this position is engaged in full-time private practice and treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client.
The engineer receives a monthly retainer for general advisory services and separate professional fees for specific design projects. The dual compensation structure must be transparent to avoid confusion about the scope and nature of each role.
Dual Role Compensation Transparency Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to ensure that compensation received under the monthly retainer for general advisory services is clearly distinguished from compensation received on a professional fee basis for specific design and specification projects, so the city council understands the distinct nature of each engagement.
In addition to general advisory services to the city, the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project. In such cases, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer.
At the outset of and throughout each design engagement, and in all billing and contractual documentation
City Engineer Competence Advisory Design
The engineer advises the city council on engineering problems and prepares plans and specifications for city projects, requiring demonstrated competence across the range of municipal engineering tasks undertaken.
The part-time city engineer is obligated to perform both advisory services and design services for the city only within the engineer's areas of professional competence, ensuring that recommendations and designs meet the technical standards required for municipal engineering projects.
Throughout all advisory and design engagements with the municipal client
City Engineer Conflict of Interest Disclosure
Engineer simultaneously holds advisory retainer and design commission from the same municipal client, requiring disclosure of the dual arrangement and any financial interests that could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest.
The part-time city engineer must disclose to the city council the dual-capacity arrangement -- including both the advisory retainer and the design fee engagement -- so that the client can make an informed decision about whether to consent to the arrangement.
NSPE Code of Ethics Canon 15; Rule 13; BER Case 63-5
At the outset of and throughout the dual-capacity engagement
City Engineer Consulting Relationship Framing
Consulting Relationship Framing Competence
The part-time city engineer must correctly frame and maintain the engagement as a consulting relationship rather than an employment relationship, applying faithful agent and trustee duties to the municipal client in both advisory and design service interactions.
Professional engineer retained part-time by small municipality under monthly retainer as consultant rather than salaried employee, requiring correct framing of the relationship as client-trustee rather than employment.
Ethics board analysis distinguishing the retained consultant arrangement from a salaried position under Canon 27, and framing the engineer's obligations as those of a consultant to a client rather than an employee to an employer.
City Engineer Consulting Relationship Integrity
The engineer is engaged in full-time private practice and treats part-time service to the community as service to a client rather than as an employee, which is ethically material to the permissibility of the dual-role arrangement.
Consulting Relationship Structural Integrity Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to maintain the structural integrity of the consultant-to-client relationship with the small community, treating the engagement as a professional services arrangement rather than an employment relationship, and preserving the independence and loyalty characteristics appropriate to that relationship type.
Throughout the duration of the part-time city engineer engagement
City Engineer Divided Loyalty Axiomatic Prohibition
Ethics board reaffirms the axiomatic principle against divided loyalties as the foundational constraint governing the part-time city engineer's dual-capacity arrangement
It is axiomatic that the part-time city engineer may not take action or make decisions that divide loyalties or interests from those of the municipal client, regardless of whether a specific canon or rule explicitly names the conflict.
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client.
Throughout all professional engagements with the municipal client
City Engineer Domain Competence Advisory Design
The part-time city engineer possesses professional domain expertise in engineering sufficient to advise the city council on engineering problems, recommend project approaches, approve plans and specifications, and prepare design documents for city projects.
Engineer in full-time private practice brings professional engineering domain expertise to both the advisory city engineer role and the fee-based design role for specific city projects
Performing advisory, plan approval, and design services for the municipality across engineering problems and city projects
City Engineer Dual Capacity Advisory Bias Prohibition
Part-time city engineer retained on monthly retainer also prepares plans and specifications for the same city; the dual capacity creates a structural incentive to favor approval of projects from which the engineer stands to benefit financially through design commissions
The part-time city engineer is prohibited from allowing the prospect of securing a design commission to prejudice or bias advisory recommendations made to the city council on projects under consideration, and must render all advisory recommendations solely on objective technical and professional grounds.
Whenever the engineer makes advisory recommendations on projects for which the engineer may also serve as designer
There is no ground to believe that such improper conduct is present, but we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
City Engineer Dual Capacity Heightened Caution
Part-time city engineer in dual advisory and design capacity cautioned by ethics board to exercise heightened scrutiny when recommending approval of projects from which the engineer may benefit financially
Dual Capacity Heightened Caution Constraint
The part-time city engineer must be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of projects for which the city council must look to the engineer for guidance, given the structural incentive created by the prospect of securing a design commission from the same project.
we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance.
Whenever the engineer studies and recommends approval of projects that may lead to design commissions
The engineer serves the same municipal client in both an advisory capacity under a monthly retainer and a design capacity under separate professional fees, creating a potential tension between the advisory duty of objectivity and the commercial interest in obtaining design work.
Faithful Agent Dual Capacity Loyalty Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to maintain undivided loyalty to the small community across both the advisory and design capacities, ensuring that advisory recommendations are not prejudiced in favor of projects for which the engineer may subsequently receive a design commission, and that the design function does not compromise the objectivity of the advisory function.
Throughout the duration of the part-time city engineer engagement, with particular attention when advisory recommendations could lead to design commissions
City Engineer Dual Capacity Loyalty Maintenance
The part-time city engineer must maintain undivided loyalty to the single municipal client across both the advisory and design capacities, recognizing that while the dual capacity does not divide loyalty between two clients, it creates structural temptations requiring heightened vigilance to ensure all actions serve the client's interests.
Part-time city engineer serving single municipal client in both advisory and design capacities, where the dual role creates structural temptations to favor design commission interests over objective advisory service.
Ethics board conclusion that the engineer acts in a dual capacity but not a divided one, combined with Rule 13 duty and caution to be doubly careful, establishing that undivided loyalty must be actively maintained through heightened vigilance.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration.
City Engineer Dual Capacity Permissibility
Dual-role advisory and design arrangement with small community
The part-time city engineer serves the small community in two simultaneous capacities -- as monthly-retainer advisory engineer and as fee-based design engineer -- without dividing loyalty because there is only one client and the arrangement is structured as a consultant-to-client relationship
The dual-capacity arrangement is ethically permissible because the engineer's loyalty is not divided between competing clients; the ethical test is whether advisory recommendations are influenced by design interest, not merely whether dual capacity exists
Engineer Dual Capacity City Advisory Design
Dual capacity without divided loyalty is permissible when the client knowingly accepts the arrangement and the engineer maintains objectivity in the advisory role
he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
City Engineer Dual Capacity Self-Interest Vigilance
The part-time city engineer is required to possess and exercise the capability to recognize the structural temptation created by the dual advisory and design role and to apply doubled care when recommending approval of projects for which the city council depends on the engineer's guidance, ensuring advisory recommendations are not prejudiced by the prospect of securing design commissions.
Part-time city engineer serving single municipal client in both advisory capacity and fee-based design capacity, where approval of projects may lead to securing design commissions.
Obligation under Rule 13 to avoid prejudicing advisory recommendations in favor of design commission interests, and the ethics board caution that the engineer should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of projects.
City Engineer Dual Capacity Single Client
Duration of the part-time city engineer retainer and concurrent design engagement with the city
Single Client Dual Capacity Non-Divided Loyalty State
Engineer retained part-time as city engineer and simultaneously performing design work for the same city
Conclusion of the dual engagement or relinquishment of one role
Engineer accepted both the part-time advisory retainer from the city and a design commission for a project subject to city council approval
A small community retains a professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer
Professional engineer serving as part-time city engineer while maintaining full-time private practice
Community retains professional engineer on part-time basis as city engineer while engineer maintains full-time private practice
NSPE Board of Ethical Review through accumulated case decisions and professional consensus
Professional norms governing part-time city engineer dual advisory and design roles
Municipal Engineer Dual Role Ethics Standard
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in assessing the ethical acceptability of the described arrangement
Provides the professional standard against which the part-time city engineer's simultaneous advisory and design roles for the same municipality are evaluated, including permissibility of additional fee-based compensation for plan preparation beyond the monthly retainer.
City Engineer Heightened Caution Advisory Duty
Engineer Dual Capacity City Advisory Design advisory recommendations
Rule 13 binds the engineer to avoid prejudicing advisory recommendations to the city on the project under consideration, because approval by the city council may lead to the engineer securing a commission for that project; the Board cautions that the engineer should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to the engineer for guidance
The heightened caution obligation is the operative ethical constraint that remains after the loyalty division concern is resolved by the single-client structure; it requires the engineer to be especially rigorous in ensuring advisory recommendations are not influenced by the prospect of securing design commissions
The heightened caution obligation does not prohibit the arrangement but imposes a more demanding standard of objectivity on the engineer's advisory function to compensate for the structural temptation created by the dual capacity
City Engineer Impartiality Design Commission
Engineer advises the city council on engineering problems and project considerations while also being eligible to receive design commissions from the same council, creating a structural incentive that must not be allowed to distort advisory recommendations.
Part-Time City Engineer Design Commission Impartiality Constraint
The part-time city engineer must ensure that advisory recommendations to the city council on engineering project considerations are rendered without division of loyalty or self-interested distortion arising from the prospect of or actual receipt of design commissions from the same client.
Throughout all advisory activities performed for the city where design commission opportunities exist
Advisory recommendations to city council
Engineer's financial self-interest in design fees
The part-time city engineer owes loyalty to the small community as a client, requiring that advisory recommendations serve the community's genuine engineering interests rather than the engineer's interest in securing design commissions
Loyalty in the dual-capacity context means that the engineer's advisory role must not be subordinated to or influenced by the design role; the community's interests must be paramount in both capacities
Loyalty to the single municipal client is maintained provided advisory recommendations are not influenced by design interest; the dual-role arrangement does not divide loyalty between competing clients
Engineer serving in dual advisory and design roles for the same municipal client must ensure full transparency about the nature and financial terms of both engagements to avoid creating misleading impressions about the arrangement.
The part-time city engineer must not misrepresent or obscure the nature of the dual advisory and design arrangement to the city council, and must not allow the commingling of retainer and design fee compensation to create false impressions about the engineer's role or financial interests.
NSPE Code of Ethics; General professional ethics obligations
Engineer Dual Capacity City Advisory Design project recommendations
The engineer must render objective advisory recommendations to the city council on projects for which the engineer also has a design interest, ensuring that the prospect of securing a design commission does not prejudice the professional judgment rendered in the advisory capacity
Objectivity in the dual capacity context requires not merely the absence of actual bias but a heightened affirmative effort to ensure recommendations are grounded in technical merit rather than self-interest
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project
Objectivity is achievable in the dual capacity arrangement but requires the engineer to be doubly careful; the arrangement is not prohibited but demands enhanced vigilance
we would caution that an engineer in these circumstances should be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of a project for which the city council must look to him for guidance
Advisory recommendations on engineering project considerations
Plan approval for city engineering projects
Engineer's financial interest in design commissions
The part-time city engineer must approve plans and specifications for city projects based solely on technical merit, even when the engineer also prepared those plans and has a financial interest in their approval
Objectivity requires that the engineer's plan-approval function not be compromised by the financial interest in design fees; the engineer must be prepared to identify deficiencies in own work and recommend corrections
approving plans for engineering processes and works
Objectivity is maintained through heightened caution and self-scrutiny; the dual-role arrangement is permissible only if the engineer can demonstrate objective advisory judgment independent of design interest
the professional engineer may be retained by the city council for the preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
The part-time city engineer possesses the technical capability to review and approve engineering plans and specifications for city projects, ensuring that approved designs meet applicable technical standards and protect public safety.
Engineer performs plan approval as a standard duty of the part-time city engineer role, including approval of plans for projects the engineer may also have designed
Approving plans for engineering processes and works as part of regular city engineer duties
City Engineer Public Interest Arrangement Justification
Public Interest Arrangement Justification
The part-time city engineer and ethics adjudicators must recognize that the dual advisory and design arrangement serves the public interest of the small community by providing access to competent engineering services, and must ensure the arrangement is structured and executed in a manner that genuinely delivers this public benefit.
Small municipality retaining part-time city engineer in dual advisory and design capacity because the community could not otherwise afford separate advisory and design engineering services.
Ethics board implicit recognition that the arrangement serves the small community's interest in accessing competent engineering services, balanced against the caution requirements that ensure the arrangement genuinely delivers professional service rather than self-interested conduct.
Part-time city engineer and ethics adjudicators
The distinguishing fact in the instant case is that the engineer has only one client, and he is, therefore, not subject to the same pressures to temper his service to one client in order to satisfy the other.
City Engineer Public Interest Recognition
Small Municipality Part-Time Engineering Public Interest Recognition Capability
The part-time city engineer possesses the capability to recognize that the dual advisory-and-design arrangement serves the public interest of the small community by providing access to competent engineering services, and to treat this public interest dimension as shaping the manner in which both advisory and design services are delivered.
Small community retains engineer part-time because it cannot afford full-time engineering staff, making the dual arrangement a practical necessity serving the public interest
Structuring and delivering both advisory and design services in a manner that genuinely serves the small community's engineering needs
A small community retains a professional engineer on a part-time basis to serve as city engineer.
A small community retains a part-time engineer for both advisory and design services, an arrangement justified in part by the community's need for access to competent engineering services. The engineer must honor this public interest justification through conduct.
Public Interest Service Justification Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to ensure that the dual-role arrangement genuinely serves the public interest of the small community by providing competent engineering services the community could not otherwise afford, and to fulfill both advisory and design functions in a manner that advances community welfare rather than primarily serving the engineer's commercial interests.
Engineer in dual advisory and design role is responsible for approving plans and specifications for city engineering works, creating a risk that self-interest in design commissions could compromise safety-critical approval decisions.
Part-time city engineer approving plans and specifications
The part-time city engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public when approving plans for engineering processes and works, and must not allow financial interests in design commissions to compromise safety judgments.
NSPE Code of Ethics Canon 1; General professional engineering safety obligations
Throughout all advisory and design activities performed for the city
City Engineer Public Safety Paramount Advisory Design
Part-time city engineer in dual advisory and design capacity must ensure public safety is not compromised by the structural incentive to favor approval of projects from which the engineer may benefit financially
The part-time city engineer must hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in all advisory recommendations and design work performed for the municipal client, above any personal financial interest in securing design commissions.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration
Throughout all advisory and design services rendered to the municipal client
City Engineer Public Welfare Advisory Role
Engineer's financial interest in design fees
The part-time city engineer's advisory and plan-approval functions serve the public welfare by ensuring that municipal engineering projects meet professional standards, even when the same engineer also prepares the plans being approved
Public welfare requires that the engineer's advisory recommendations and plan approvals be rendered objectively, prioritizing the safety and welfare of the community over the engineer's financial interest in design commissions
Public welfare obligation requires that advisory recommendations not be influenced by the prospect of design commissions; the dual-role arrangement is permissible only if public welfare is not compromised
City Engineer Retainer Design Fee Separation
Engineer receives monthly retainer for general advisory services and is additionally compensated on a normal professional fee basis for specific design work for the same city, requiring clear separation of these compensation streams.
Part-Time City Engineer Retainer-to-Design Fee Separation Constraint
Compensation received under the monthly retainer for general advisory services must be clearly and structurally separated from compensation received on a normal professional fee basis for preparation of plans and specifications for specific city projects.
Throughout the duration of any engagement combining retainer advisory services and project design services for the same client
Part-Time Municipal Engineer Retainer and Fee Separation Capability
The part-time city engineer possesses the capability to distinguish between services covered by the monthly retainer and services warranting separate professional fee compensation for specific design and specification work.
Engineer retained part-time by small community under monthly retainer for advisory services, with separate fee compensation when retained to prepare plans and specifications for specific city projects
Maintaining separate compensation structures for general advisory retainer services and specific project design work billed on a normal professional fee basis
City Engineer Rule 13 Advisory Prejudice Avoidance
Part-time city engineer retained on monthly retainer also prepares plans and specifications for the same city; engineer must advise city council on projects from which the engineer may benefit financially through design commissions
Rule 13 is binding on the part-time city engineer and requires the engineer to avoid prejudicing advisory recommendations to the city council on projects under consideration, because approval by the city council may lead to the engineer securing a design commission for that project.
City Engineer Rule 17 Non-Applicability Single Client
Part-time city engineer retained by single municipality in both advisory and design capacities; ethics board analyzes whether Rule 17 governing multi-party employment applies
Part-time city engineer serving single municipal client in dual capacity
Rule 17 Multi-Party Employment Non-Applicability to Single-Client Dual-Capacity Constraint
Rule 17 does not apply to the part-time city engineer's dual-capacity arrangement because Rule 17 deals only with situations in which the engineer is employed by more than one party, and the engineer here serves only one client.
NSPE Code of Ethics Rule 17; BER Case 63-5
The engineer approves plans for engineering processes and works, including plans the engineer may have prepared, requiring that public safety considerations remain paramount even when self-review creates potential for bias.
The part-time city engineer is obligated to hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public when approving plans and specifications for city engineering projects, ensuring that approval decisions are not compromised by the engineer's dual role as designer of those same plans.
During all plan approval functions throughout the engagement
City Engineer Scope of Practice Advisory Design
Engineer serving in dual advisory and design roles for a small community must ensure that both the advisory recommendations and the design work performed for specific city projects fall within the engineer's professional competence and licensed scope of practice.
The part-time city engineer must perform both advisory services and design services only within the engineer's areas of professional competence, and must not undertake design commissions for city projects that fall outside the engineer's technical expertise.
NSPE Code of Ethics; Professional engineering licensing requirements
City Engineer Self-Interest Advisory Prejudice Avoidance
A professional engineer in full-time private practice is retained part-time as city engineer under a monthly retainer for advisory services and plan approval, and separately receives fees for design and specification work on city projects. Rule 13 is identified as binding on this dual-capacity arrangement.
Part-time city engineer serving in dual advisory and design capacity
Self-Interest Advisory Prejudice Avoidance Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to avoid prejudicing advisory recommendations to the city council on projects under consideration, recognizing that approval of such projects may lead to the engineer securing a design commission, and to be doubly careful in studying and recommending approval of projects for which the city council depends on the engineer's guidance.
Ongoing throughout the dual-capacity engagement, and specifically at the time of evaluating and recommending any project for which the engineer may subsequently receive a design commission
City Engineer Self-Review Bias Recognition
The part-time city engineer must recognize the inherent bias risk that arises when serving as city engineer approving plans that the engineer has also designed, and apply heightened objectivity and doubled care to counteract that structural bias.
Part-time city engineer who also designs city projects is required to approve or recommend approval of plans that the engineer has personally designed, creating a structural self-review bias risk.
Ethics board identification of the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer, and the caution to be doubly careful in such circumstances.
There is still left for decision, however, the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer.
The engineer both prepares plans and specifications for city projects and holds the advisory role that includes approving plans for engineering processes and works, creating a self-review situation requiring heightened vigilance.
Self-Review Heightened Caution Obligation
The part-time city engineer is obligated to exercise heightened caution and objectivity when approving plans and specifications for city projects that the engineer also prepared, applying rigorous technical scrutiny to the engineer's own work as if reviewing work produced by another party.
During the plan approval function whenever the engineer is reviewing work the engineer also designed
City Engineer Self-Review Client Waiver Permissibility
Part-time city engineer prepares plans for the city and also serves as the city engineer who reviews those plans; ethics board finds the arrangement permissible because the client has waived independent review and there is only one client
Part-time city engineer and municipal client
Single-Client Dual-Capacity Self-Review Client-Waiver Permissibility Constraint
The municipal client has the right to waive independent review of the engineer's own plans, and having done so, the engineer's dual capacity as both designer and reviewer does not constitute a prohibited divided loyalty because there is only one client whose interests must be served.
Throughout the dual-capacity engagement where the engineer reviews own plans
City Engineer Self-Review Heightened Caution
Approval of plans and specifications prepared by the engineer for city projects
The part-time city engineer bears a heightened obligation of caution and objectivity when approving plans and specifications for city projects that the engineer also prepared, specifically to avoid allowing the design fee interest to influence advisory approval
Heightened caution requires the engineer to apply the same critical scrutiny to own design work as to work by others; the prospect of design fees must not influence advisory approval decisions
Heightened caution obligation is the mechanism by which the dual-role arrangement remains ethically permissible; without it, the structural temptation to favor own design work would compromise advisory integrity
City Engineer Self Review Bias Awareness
Dual-Capacity Self-Review Advisory Prejudice Avoidance Capability
The engineer serving in dual capacity possesses the capability to recognize the bias risk inherent in approving plans and specifications for projects the engineer has also designed, and to apply heightened objectivity and caution in the approval process.
Engineer may be retained to prepare plans and specifications for a city project and also holds the city engineer role responsible for approving such plans, creating a self-review situation
Exercising heightened caution when approving plans and specifications for city projects that the engineer prepared in the design capacity
City Engineer Single Client Conflict Recognition
Single-Client Dual-Capacity Non-Divided Loyalty Recognition Capability
The engineer serving the city in dual capacity possesses the capability to recognize that serving a single municipal client in both advisory and design roles does not create the divided loyalty concern that arises in two-client situations, provided advisory recommendations are not prejudiced by design commission interests.
Engineer serves only the city in both advisory and design capacities, distinguishing this single-client arrangement from two-client conflict scenarios
Correctly understanding that the dual advisory and design arrangement with a single municipal client is permissible when the client has waived independent review and the engineer maintains advisory objectivity
City Engineer Single Client Dual Capacity
When the engineer is simultaneously under retainer as city engineer and additionally retained to prepare plans and specifications for a city project
Professional engineer serving as both designer of city project plans and advisory engineer who reviews and recommends approval of those same plans for a single municipal client
Completion of the specific project design engagement or termination of the city engineer appointment
City council retains the same engineer who holds the advisory city engineer role to also prepare plans and specifications for a city project
City Engineer Single Client Dual Role Permissibility
Engineer serves a single small community as both part-time city engineer and as designer of city project plans, raising the question of whether the self-review arrangement creates a prohibited conflict of interest; distinguished from two-client conflict in BER Case 62-7.
Part-time city engineer serving as both advisor and designer for the same municipality
The dual-capacity arrangement is ethically permissible only where the single municipal client has given informed consent, the engineer maintains undivided loyalty, and the engineer does not allow advisory recommendations to be prejudiced by the prospect of design commissions.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case 63-5; BER Case 62-7 (distinguished)
City Engineer Supplemental Fee Engagement
When the city council additionally retains the engineer for preparation of plans and specifications for a city project
Professional engineer retained for specific project plan preparation beyond general advisory retainer
Completion of the specific project engagement
In such cases, he is compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
City council retains the engineer for specific project work compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above the monthly retainer
City Engineer Two-Client Conflict Distinguishing
Ethics board distinguishes the single-client dual-capacity arrangement from the two-client conflict precedent in Case 62-7, where a consulting engineer served both a county commission and a private company with potentially opposing interests
Part-time city engineer and ethics board
Single Client Dual Role Permissibility Constraint
The dual-capacity arrangement in the instant case must be distinguished from the two-client conflict in Case 62-7 because the engineer has only one client and is therefore not subject to the same pressures to temper service to one client in order to satisfy the other.
BER Case 62-7; BER Case 63-5; NSPE Code of Ethics
At the time of ethics analysis and throughout the dual-capacity engagement
Even if the engineer acts with the best of intentions, he is put into the position of assessing his recommendations to two clients with possibly opposing interests.
City Municipal Client Independent Review Waiver
Client Independent Review Waiver Recognition and Effect Capability
The small municipal government client possesses the capability to recognize its right to require independent engineering review of the engineer's own plans and to waive that right, understanding that waiver of independent review makes the engineer's dual advisory and design role permissible provided the engineer maintains advisory objectivity.
Small community retains engineer for both advisory city engineer role and design work for specific projects, implicitly waiving independent review of the engineer's own design work
Retaining the same engineer for both advisory services and design work, effectively waiving independent review of the engineer's own plans
{'entity_type': 'Municipal government', 'retainer_structure': 'Monthly retainer for advisory services plus fee-based design commissions', 'review_waiver': "Has waived right to independent review of engineer's own plans"}
The small municipal government retaining the engineer in dual capacity as part-time city engineer and fee-based design engineer. Has waived its right to independent review of the engineer's plans, effectively consenting to the self-review arrangement. Bears authority over project approval and engineering decisions.
{'type': 'consented_to', 'target': 'Dual capacity self-review arrangement'}
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Engineer Dual Capacity City Advisory Design'}
The client has such a right of review by its own engineer, but it may waive its right, as it has obviously done in this case
Canon 15 is not a bar to this type of arrangement because there is only one interested party (client) and that party has given its consent
It is not unethical for an engineer retained by a community on a part-time basis as a city engineer to prepare plans and specifications for a project for the same community, but in so acting the engineer must be scrupulously careful that his advice is not influenced by his secondary interest as the engineer likely to be retained for the design of the project.
Beyond the Board's finding that the dual role is permissible with heightened caution, the timing and manner of disclosure constitute an independent ethical obligation that the Board's conclusion leaves unaddressed. The engineer must disclose to the city council, at the earliest practicable moment — ideally before providing any advisory recommendation on a project — that he holds or intends to seek a financial interest in the design commission for that same project. Failure to make this disclosure at the threshold moment is itself an ethical violation independent of whether the advisory recommendation was substantively biased, because the city council's ability to evaluate the objectivity of the advice depends on knowing the advisor's financial stake. The Board's instruction to be 'scrupulously careful' implicitly assumes the council is already aware of the dual interest, but in practice the retainer arrangement may obscure the supplemental fee relationship from individual council members who did not negotiate the original engagement. The ethical standard therefore requires affirmative, contemporaneous disclosure rather than reliance on the council's general awareness of the arrangement's structure.
The Board's conclusion that the city council may waive independent review and accept the engineer's self-review of plans and specifications he himself prepared is adequate only insofar as the city's interests as a client are concerned. However, where public safety is implicated in the engineering works being approved — as it routinely is in municipal infrastructure — the absence of independent technical review represents a structural deficiency that client waiver alone cannot cure. The engineer's obligation to protect public safety is owed to the public at large, not solely to the city council as client, and the public cannot waive that protection. Accordingly, the Board's permissive conclusion should be understood as applying only to projects where the safety implications are minimal or where the engineer's self-review is supplemented by regulatory or statutory oversight external to the city council relationship. For projects with significant public safety implications, the ethical standard demands that the engineer either insist on independent technical review or decline the design commission, regardless of the city council's willingness to proceed without such review.
The Board's analysis addresses the dual role as a static arrangement evaluated instance by instance, but fails to account for the cumulative pattern risk that emerges when the same engineer systematically advises the city council over an extended period while also receiving supplemental design commissions. Even if each individual advisory recommendation is rendered with genuine caution, the aggregate pattern of recommendations may systematically favor project types, scopes, or timelines for which the engineer is uniquely positioned to be retained as designer, creating a structural self-dealing dynamic that no single act of heightened vigilance can remedy. This pattern risk is particularly acute in small communities where the engineer's advisory influence over the council's engineering agenda is substantial and where the council lacks independent technical capacity to detect systematic steering. The ethical standard implied by the Board's conclusion should therefore be understood to require periodic external review of the overall pattern of advisory recommendations and design commissions — not merely case-by-case caution — to ensure that the advisory function has not been structurally captured by the engineer's supplemental fee interests over time.
The Board's reliance on the small-community resource constraint as a justifying rationale for permitting the dual role implicitly creates a sliding-scale ethical standard that the Board does not explicitly acknowledge. If the permissibility of the arrangement is partly grounded in the practical reality that small communities may have no other access to qualified engineering advisory and design services, then the ethical justification weakens proportionally as the community's resources and access to alternative engineering talent increase. For communities that could reasonably retain separate advisory and design engineers but choose not to for reasons of cost or convenience, the small-community access justification does not apply, and the dual-capacity arrangement should be evaluated under a stricter standard that more closely resembles the two-client conflict analysis the Board distinguished in Case 62-7. The Board's conclusion should therefore be read as context-dependent rather than as a general permission applicable to all part-time city engineer arrangements regardless of the community's actual alternatives.
From a structural standpoint, the Board's conclusion that the engineer must be 'scrupulously careful' that his advice is not influenced by his secondary interest represents a subjective, self-administered standard that is inherently unverifiable and therefore inadequate as a standalone ethical safeguard. The deontological and virtue ethics traditions both suggest that a trustworthy institutional arrangement cannot rest solely on the individual practitioner's self-discipline when the structural incentives systematically favor a particular outcome. A more robust ethical framework would require the engineer to implement observable procedural safeguards — such as documenting the basis for advisory recommendations before any design commission is discussed, recusing from fee negotiations for projects on which he provided advisory input, or requesting that the city council record its independent judgment that the advisory recommendation was sought and evaluated without reference to the design commission — so that the 'scrupulous care' standard has an external, verifiable dimension rather than remaining purely a matter of the engineer's private conscience. Without such procedural anchors, the Board's conclusion provides ethical permission without ethical accountability.
In response to Q101, the obligation to disclose a financial interest in the design commission arises at the earliest moment the engineer forms any intention or reasonable expectation of seeking that commission — not merely at the point of formal retention. If the engineer advises the city council on whether a project should proceed while already contemplating a design fee, and fails to disclose that interest before rendering the advisory recommendation, that failure is itself an independent ethical violation regardless of whether the advice was substantively accurate or unbiased. The integrity of the advisory relationship depends on the city council's ability to weigh the recommendation with full knowledge of the engineer's stake in the outcome. Delayed disclosure, even if eventually made, retroactively taints the advisory record and cannot cure the informational asymmetry that existed when the council acted on the recommendation.
In response to Q102, the absence of independent technical review when an engineer approves plans and specifications that he himself prepared represents a structural deficiency that the city council's waiver cannot fully cure when public safety is implicated. The city council, as a lay body, is competent to waive procedural protections that exist solely for its own benefit as a client — such as the right to competitive bidding or independent cost review. However, the technical review function embedded in plan approval exists not only to protect the city as a client but to protect third parties and the general public who will use the infrastructure. Because those third-party interests cannot be waived by the city council, the engineer's self-review of his own design work remains structurally deficient even with full client consent. The Board's conclusion that the arrangement is permissible with heightened caution does not adequately address this public-safety dimension, and the engineer bears a residual obligation to seek or recommend independent technical verification on any project where public safety is materially at stake.
In response to Q103, the Board's conclusion addresses individual instances of dual-capacity engagement but does not adequately confront the systemic pattern problem. When a part-time city engineer consistently advises the city council on project priorities and consistently receives design commissions for the projects he recommends, the cumulative pattern itself constitutes evidence of structural self-dealing that no single instance of heightened caution can remedy. Even if each individual recommendation is defensible in isolation, a systematic correlation between advisory recommendations and subsequent design retentions creates a structural incentive that distorts the advisory function over time. An ethically rigorous standard would require periodic independent audit of the engineer's advisory recommendations against his design commission history, and would impose a rebuttable presumption of bias when the correlation between recommended projects and awarded commissions is statistically significant. The Board's reliance on subjective self-discipline as the sole safeguard is insufficient to address this longitudinal dimension of the conflict.
In response to Q104, the ethical analysis should explicitly account for the size and sophistication of the city council as a variable that affects the adequacy of consent-based safeguards. The Board's conclusion implicitly treats the city council as a competent principal capable of evaluating whether the engineer's advisory recommendations are objective. However, in a small community with a lay council lacking independent technical expertise, the council is structurally unable to detect subtle advisory bias — it cannot know whether a recommendation to proceed with a particular project type or scope was shaped by the engineer's awareness that he is uniquely positioned to capture the design commission. This epistemic asymmetry means that the council's apparent acceptance of the dual role does not constitute informed consent in any meaningful sense. The ethical standard applicable to the engineer should therefore be more demanding, not less, in small-community contexts, because the absence of sophisticated oversight increases rather than decreases the engineer's responsibility to maintain objective advisory integrity.
In response to Q201, the tension between the Small Community Engineering Access Justification and the City Engineer Public Welfare Advisory Role principle is genuine and the Board resolves it too easily by treating heightened caution as a sufficient bridge. The access justification is instrumentally compelling — small communities may have no practical alternative to a single engineer serving both advisory and design functions — but instrumental necessity does not eliminate the structural contamination of the advisory role. The more defensible resolution is not to declare the arrangement permissible with a caution standard, but to impose procedural conditions that partially substitute for the absent structural independence: mandatory advance disclosure of design interest before any advisory recommendation, documented recusal from advisory votes on projects where the engineer has expressed design interest, and a requirement that the city council affirmatively record its informed acceptance of the dual role for each specific project. These procedural conditions preserve community access while partially restoring the integrity of the advisory function that the access justification otherwise erodes.
In response to Q202, the tension between the Dual Capacity Not Divided Capacity principle and the Divided Loyalty Axiom from Case 60-5 cannot be fully reconciled through the single-client distinction alone. The Board's reasoning holds that serving one client in two capacities is categorically different from serving two clients with competing interests, because there is no external party whose interests pull against the city's. However, this framing obscures the internal division within the engineer's own judgment: the engineer's financial interest in securing the design commission is an interest that is structurally opposed to the city's interest in receiving purely objective advisory counsel. The conflict is not between two external clients but between the engineer's role-based duty of objectivity and his personal financial stake. The Divided Loyalty Axiom applies with equal force to this internal division, and the single-client framing does not dissolve it. The Board's distinction is formally valid but substantively incomplete as an ethical resolution.
In response to Q203, the City Council Waiver Independent Review principle and the City Engineer Objectivity Plan Approval principle are in irresolvable tension when public safety is at stake, and the Board's conclusion does not adequately address this conflict. Client waiver is a valid ethical mechanism for procedural protections that exist solely for the client's benefit. However, the technical objectivity of plan approval serves a public function that transcends the client relationship: it protects users of public infrastructure, neighboring property owners, and the general public who are not parties to the engineer-city relationship and whose interests cannot be alienated by the city council's consent. To the extent that the engineer's self-review of his own plans is less rigorous than independent review — even marginally so due to unconscious confirmation bias — the public bears a safety risk that the city council has no authority to impose on their behalf. The Board should have conditioned permissibility on the engineer's affirmative obligation to flag any project with significant public safety implications for independent technical review, regardless of the city council's willingness to waive that review.
In response to Q204, the tension between the City Engineer Client Relationship Structural Independence principle and the City Engineer Heightened Caution Advisory Duty principle reveals a fundamental inadequacy in the Board's framework. By framing the city as a client at arm's length, the Board implies that the engineer's structural position is one of independence. But by simultaneously requiring heightened caution, the Board implicitly acknowledges that this structural independence is compromised and that the engineer's judgment cannot be fully trusted to be uninfluenced by self-interest. The heightened caution standard is a subjective, unverifiable, and unenforceable remedy for a structural problem. It places the entire burden of ethical compliance on the engineer's internal self-discipline while providing no institutional mechanism for detecting or correcting failures of that self-discipline. A more coherent framework would either accept the structural compromise and impose external procedural safeguards, or acknowledge that the structural independence is sufficiently intact to render heightened caution unnecessary. The Board's hybrid position — structural independence in theory, subjective caution in practice — is internally inconsistent and provides inadequate protection for either the city or the public.
In response to Q301, from a deontological perspective, a categorical duty of recusal is defensible but not absolute. Kant's universalizability test asks whether the maxim 'an engineer may advise on a project and then accept its design commission' could be universalized without contradiction. The maxim does not generate a logical contradiction in the way that lying does, because a world in which all engineers in dual-capacity roles accepted design commissions for projects they advised on is conceivable. However, the maxim does generate a practical contradiction: the advisory role presupposes that the engineer's recommendations are given for the city's benefit alone, and universalizing the practice of accepting design commissions for advised projects would systematically undermine the trustworthiness of all advisory recommendations, thereby destroying the institution of independent engineering advice on which the arrangement depends. This practical contradiction supports a strong deontological presumption in favor of recusal, though it falls short of an absolute categorical prohibition. The presumption can be overcome only by procedural conditions — advance disclosure, documented consent, independent review — that restore the conditions of trustworthiness that the dual role otherwise erodes.
In response to Q302, the consequentialist calculus is more complex than the Board's implicit reasoning suggests. The practical benefit of integrated advisory and design services for small communities is real and quantifiable: reduced transaction costs, continuity of institutional knowledge, and access to qualified engineering judgment that might otherwise be unavailable. However, the systemic risk on the cost side is also real and underweighted by the Board. The risk is not merely that a single engineer might give biased advice on a single project, but that the structural incentive to recommend projects generates a systematic upward bias in project recommendations across all part-time city engineer relationships in all small communities. If this systemic bias results in communities undertaking more projects than are genuinely warranted, or projects of greater scope than necessary, the aggregate welfare cost — in unnecessary public expenditure, opportunity costs, and misallocated infrastructure investment — may substantially exceed the access benefit. A rigorous consequentialist analysis would require empirical data on the frequency and magnitude of advisory bias in dual-capacity arrangements before concluding that the arrangement produces net welfare gains.
In response to Q303, from a virtue ethics perspective, the arrangement reveals a structural tension between the virtues of competence and impartiality that the Board does not adequately resolve. A virtuous engineer in the Aristotelian sense possesses practical wisdom — phronesis — which enables correct judgment about how to act in complex situations. The question is whether an engineer of genuinely excellent character can maintain the virtue of impartiality when the structural incentives of the dual role systematically reward partiality. Virtue ethics does not require that virtuous agents be immune to temptation, but it does require that the institutional arrangements within which they operate support rather than undermine virtuous conduct. An arrangement that places the engineer in a position where recommending a project is financially rewarded and declining to recommend it is financially costly does not support the virtue of impartiality — it structurally corrupts it. A truly virtuous engineer would recognize this structural corruption and either decline the dual role or insist on procedural safeguards that partially restore the conditions for impartial judgment, rather than relying solely on personal vigilance to overcome structural incentives.
In response to Q304, the Board's 'scrupulously careful' standard is insufficient as a duty-based standard because it conflates a subjective behavioral disposition with an objective structural condition. Deontological ethics requires that duties be specifiable, action-guiding, and capable of compliance verification. 'Scrupulous care' satisfies none of these criteria: it cannot be specified in advance as a set of required actions, it provides no action-guidance in the moment of advisory judgment, and it cannot be verified by any external party after the fact. More fundamentally, the structural impossibility of fully separating advisory judgment from the anticipation of design fees means that the engineer cannot comply with the duty even in principle — not because of moral weakness, but because the cognitive processes of advisory recommendation and self-interested anticipation are not separable in the way the standard assumes. A deontologically adequate standard would specify concrete required actions — disclosure, documented recusal, independent review — rather than a subjective quality of attention. The Board's reliance on 'scrupulous care' as the operative standard reflects a consequentialist accommodation of practical necessity rather than a genuinely duty-based analysis.
In response to Q401, mandatory independent engineering review before approving any project for which the part-time city engineer is also the design engineer would substantially mitigate the ethical concerns about advisory bias and would transform the arrangement from conditionally acceptable to more robustly permissible. Independent review addresses the two most serious structural deficiencies simultaneously: it provides a check on the technical adequacy of the engineer's self-reviewed plans, protecting public safety interests that the city council cannot waive; and it creates an external verification mechanism that partially substitutes for the structural independence the engineer lacks. However, independent review alone would not fully resolve the advisory bias problem, because the bias operates at the recommendation stage — before the project is approved and before design work begins — and independent review at the design stage cannot retroactively purify an advisory recommendation that was influenced by anticipated design fees. A complete mitigation framework would require both advance disclosure at the advisory stage and independent technical review at the design approval stage.
In response to Q402, proactive advance disclosure at the moment of providing advisory recommendations would substantially improve the ethical character of the arrangement but would not fully transform it into an unambiguously sound dual engagement. Advance disclosure serves two important functions: it enables the city council to apply appropriate skepticism to the engineer's recommendation, and it creates a documented record that the council's subsequent decision to proceed was made with knowledge of the engineer's interest. However, disclosure does not eliminate the bias — it merely makes it visible. The city council, lacking independent technical expertise, remains unable to evaluate whether the recommendation would have been different absent the financial interest. Furthermore, disclosure creates a perverse dynamic: once the engineer has disclosed an intent to seek the design commission, the city council may feel pressure to retain him in order to avoid the awkwardness of rejecting both his recommendation and his design services simultaneously. Advance disclosure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethical adequacy, and must be combined with structural safeguards — particularly independent technical review — to constitute a genuinely sound arrangement.
In response to Q403, if the small community had sufficient resources to retain a separate design engineer, the small-community access justification would lose its force, but it does not follow automatically that the dual-capacity arrangement would become ethically impermissible. The access justification is one rationale for permissibility, but the Board's analysis also rests on the single-client structural distinction from Case 62-7 and the principle that serving one client in two capacities does not inherently divide loyalty. These rationales are independent of resource constraints and would survive the removal of the access justification. However, the removal of the access justification would shift the ethical burden: without a compelling practical necessity, the engineer would bear a heavier obligation to demonstrate that the dual role serves the city's interests rather than his own, and the city council's decision to retain the same engineer for both advisory and design functions would require more explicit and informed justification. The arrangement would remain permissible in principle but would require more robust procedural safeguards to be ethically defensible in practice.
In response to Q404, the scenario in which the engineer advises against a project and consequently receives no design commission that year is analytically ambiguous and does not resolve the structural incentive problem in either direction. The outcome could demonstrate genuine independence — the engineer prioritized the city's interests over his own financial gain. But it could equally illustrate the asymmetric pressure problem: the engineer had a financial incentive to recommend the project and did not, which means either that the incentive was insufficient to overcome his professional integrity in that instance, or that the project was so clearly inadvisable that recommending it would have damaged his professional reputation more than the foregone fee. Neither interpretation establishes that the structural incentive is generally ineffective. More importantly, the asymmetry of the incentive structure means that the engineer faces financial pressure to recommend projects but no financial pressure to decline them — the baseline is zero design fees, not negative fees. This asymmetry creates a systematic upward bias in project recommendations that a single instance of restraint cannot disprove. The structural incentive problem is probabilistic and longitudinal, not episodic, and can only be assessed across a pattern of advisory recommendations rather than any single outcome.
The Board resolved the tension between Small Community Engineering Access Justification and City Engineer Public Welfare Advisory Role not by eliminating the conflict but by subordinating structural objectivity to a conduct-based standard of heightened personal caution. In effect, the Board treated the practical necessity of small-community access as a threshold condition that unlocks the dual role, while relying on the engineer's subjective vigilance — rather than institutional safeguards — to satisfy the public welfare advisory obligation. This resolution is inherently unstable: it preserves access at the cost of converting an objective structural requirement into a subjective behavioral one, meaning the ethical adequacy of any given arrangement depends entirely on the unverifiable internal discipline of the individual engineer. The case therefore teaches that when access-based justifications are permitted to override structural objectivity requirements, the resulting ethical standard is aspirational rather than enforceable, and the public welfare principle is formally acknowledged but practically subordinated.
The Board's distinction between dual capacity and divided capacity — drawing on the single-client framing to distinguish this case from the two-client conflict precedent in Case 62-7 — partially reconciles the Dual Capacity Not Divided Capacity City Engineer principle with the Divided Loyalty Axiom from Case 60-5, but the reconciliation is incomplete. The single-client framing reduces the formal conflict by eliminating the competing-client dimension, yet it does not eliminate the engineer's competing financial interest in securing design commissions, which is an internal conflict of interest rather than an external one. The Divided Loyalty Axiom, properly understood, is triggered by any secondary financial interest that could influence professional judgment, regardless of whether that interest is held by a second client or by the engineer themselves. The Board's structural distinction therefore resolves the formal doctrinal tension while leaving the substantive ethical concern — that advisory recommendations may be subtly shaped by the prospect of supplemental design fees — unaddressed. This case teaches that single-client framing is a necessary but not sufficient condition for ethical permissibility in dual-capacity arrangements, and that the absence of a second client does not extinguish the conflict-of-interest analysis.
The interaction between City Council Waiver Independent Review and City Engineer Objectivity Plan Approval reveals an unresolved tension that the Board's conclusion does not fully confront: the city council's capacity to waive independent technical review is treated as sufficient to render the self-review arrangement ethically permissible, but the objectivity standard embedded in the plan approval function exists not solely for the client's benefit but for the protection of the public. Because public safety obligations are non-delegable and cannot be extinguished by client consent, the City Council Waiver Independent Review principle can legitimately govern only the client-interest dimension of the arrangement. Where plan approval implicates public safety — as it routinely does in municipal engineering — the City Engineer Objectivity Plan Approval principle operates as a constraint that survives client waiver. The Board's conclusion, by treating client consent as the operative ethical resolution, implicitly conflates the client's right to waive protections designed for its own benefit with a broader authority to waive protections designed for third-party and public benefit, a conflation that the principle structure of the Code does not support. This case therefore teaches that the permissibility of dual-capacity self-review must be assessed separately for its client-interest dimension and its public-safety dimension, and that client waiver is ethically dispositive only as to the former.
Arrangement is formally evaluated and found permissible under heightened caution standard; conflict is acknowledged but not deemed disqualifying; engineer's obligations are now explicitly articulated
During ethics review and discussion analysis
Through reference to prior ethics cases (Case No. 60-5 and Case No. 62-7), the ethics analysis formally identifies that the engineer's dual capacity creates a recognized conflict-of-interest pattern requiring evaluation, even if ultimately found non-disqualifying.
Consulting Engineer County Commission Conflict
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'engagement_type': 'Dual retainer with county commission and private company', 'client_count': 'Two clients with opposing interests', 'conflict_finding': 'Conflict of interest established'}
A consulting engineer referenced from Case No. 62-7 who was retained by a county commission for all engineering and advisory services including plan review and approval, while simultaneously retained by a private company for engineering design on a project involving negotiations with the same county commission. Found to have a conflict of interest due to divided loyalties and the requirement to pass judgment on work in which the engineer participated.
{'type': 'client', 'target': 'County Commission'}
{'type': 'client', 'target': 'Private Company'}
{'type': 'review_authority_over', 'target': 'Own design work submitted to commission'}
County Commission Advisory and Review Engineer
a consulting engineer was retained by a county commission to perform all engineering and advisory services for it, including review and approval of plans submitted by other engineers
the same consultant was retained by a private company to perform engineering design for housing units
Should the engineer apply heightened independent scrutiny when approving plans the engineer personally prepared, or treat self-review as equivalent to reviewing work produced by another party?
The part-time city engineer both prepares and approves plans and specifications for city projects, creating a self-review situation. The core question is whether the engineer can fulfill the safety plan approval obligation with adequate objectivity when reviewing work the engineer personally designed.
Consciously adopt a more rigorous and detached review posture when approving personally prepared plans, explicitly checking each element as if it were submitted by an outside party and documenting the basis for approval.
Apply the same technical review protocol used for any plan submission, relying on professional competence and experience to catch errors without distinguishing between self-prepared and externally prepared documents.
For plans involving significant public safety implications, request informal peer review from a qualified colleague before issuing formal approval, while retaining final approval authority as city engineer.
Should the engineer proceed with the dual designer-and-approver role once the city council has explicitly waived independent review, or must the engineer decline the arrangement regardless of client consent?
The city council, as client, has waived the right to independent review of plans prepared and approved by the same engineer. The question is whether this waiver is ethically permissible and whether the engineer may proceed under the dual-capacity arrangement once the waiver is granted.
Proceed as both designer and approving authority in reliance on the city council's informed waiver, while committing to heightened objectivity and transparent documentation of the approval process.
Decline to serve as both designer and approver on the same projects regardless of the council's waiver, on the grounds that the structural conflict is too significant to be cured by client consent alone, and recommend the city retain a separate reviewing authority.
Accept the dual role for routine or lower-risk projects covered by the waiver, but require independent review for projects above a defined complexity or public safety threshold, negotiating those limits with the council as a condition of the arrangement.
Should the City Engineer proceed in both the advisory and design roles given the city council's waiver of independent review, or must the engineer decline one role to avoid an irresolvable self-review conflict?
The City Engineer serves simultaneously as the city's engineering advisor and as the designer of a project submitted for city approval. The city council has waived its right to independent review, accepting the dual-capacity arrangement. The question is whether this waiver is sufficient to permit the City Engineer to proceed in both roles, or whether the self-review conflict is so fundamental that the engineer must decline one capacity regardless of client consent.
Proceed in both the advisory and design capacities, relying on the city council's informed waiver of independent review and maintaining transparent compensation disclosure, on the basis that a single-client arrangement does not trigger the two-client conflict prohibition.
Temporarily recuse from the advisory role for the specific project under review, allowing the city council to obtain independent technical evaluation of the design, then resume advisory duties after project approval or rejection.
Continue in both roles only if the city council agrees to document the waiver formally and to engage a peer reviewer for safety-critical elements of the design, thereby preserving the engineer's advisory function while reducing the structural self-review bias through procedural checks.
Divided Loyalty Axiom Case 60-5 Reference
Dual capacity municipal engineering arrangements generally
Small Municipality Competent Engineering Access as Public Interest Justification
The Board invokes the axiomatic prohibition from Case No. 60-5 that a professional may not take action or make decisions dividing loyalties or interests from those of employer or client, establishing the baseline principle against which the instant case is evaluated
The axiom operates as a structural test: the question is not whether the engineer intends to act loyally but whether the arrangement structurally divides loyalties between competing interests
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client. (Case No. 60-5)
The axiom is satisfied rather than violated when the engineer has only one client, because single-client dual capacity does not structurally divide loyalty between competing interests
it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client
Dual Capacity Not Divided Capacity City Engineer
The Board concludes that the engineer serving as both part-time city engineer and fee-based design engineer for the same municipal client is acting in a dual capacity but not a divided one, because the single-client structure and the client's waiver of independent review together satisfy the ethical requirements for permissible dual capacity
Dual capacity is permissible when it does not divide the engineer's loyalty between competing clients; the ethical test is the actual structure of loyalties, not the mere existence of two roles
The arrangement is permissible because there is only one client, but the engineer must exercise heightened caution in the advisory role to avoid allowing design interest to prejudice advisory recommendations
part-time city engineer and private practitioner
Appearance of divided loyalty even if actual loyalty remains undivided
Financial incentive to recommend projects that generate additional commissions
Structural dual-capacity situation in which the engineer may later assess his own work
Providing professional engineering services to a community in need of part-time expertise
Treating the municipal engagement with the same professional standards owed to any client
Provide engineering advisory services to the community while sustaining a viable private practice, earning a monthly retainer plus potential project-based fees
Ability to segregate advisory and design roles mentally and procedurally
Self-awareness of financial incentives that could bias recommendations
At the outset of the arrangement, concurrent with or immediately following community retention
The professional engineer accepted a part-time city engineer position while simultaneously maintaining a full-time private engineering practice, treating the municipal role as a client engagement.
Dual Role Acceptance (Action 1) → Dual Role Establishment (Event 1)
The professional engineer accepted a part-time city engineer position while simultaneously maintaining a full-time private practice, directly establishing the structural condition of dual role occupancy
Had the engineer declined the city position or dissolved private practice, no dual role would exist and the foundational conflict of interest condition would not have been created
Absence of role exclusivity requirement from the city
Continued maintenance of private engineering practice
Engineer's volitional decision to accept part-time city role
Acceptance of city position + retention of private practice = dual role established
Engineer now operates under two concurrent professional mandates; conflict-of-interest monitoring becomes continuously active
At the outset of the retainer arrangement
The engineer simultaneously holds a part-time city advisory role and maintains a full-time private practice, creating a structural duality of interests that persists throughout the engagement.
Engineer Conflict of Interest Self-Review
While engineer holds both advisory role and prospect of design commission from same client
Engineer's potential self-interest in securing design commission creating risk of bias in advisory recommendations to city council
Project approval decision made or dual engagement concluded
Engineer's advisory role requires recommending approval of a project for which engineer may receive a design commission
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'engagement_type': 'Part-time retainer plus fee-based design commissions', 'client_count': 'Single client (municipal government)', 'self_review_situation': 'Approves adequacy of own plans in advisory capacity'}
A licensed engineer in full-time private practice retained part-time by a city as city engineer for advisory services and plan approval, and separately retained on a fee basis to prepare plans and specifications for specific city projects. The case concludes this arrangement is permissible because there is only one client, the client has waived independent review, and the dual capacity does not create divided loyalty, but the engineer must exercise heightened care to avoid letting commission prospects bias advisory recommendations.
{'type': 'advisory_authority_over', 'target': 'Own design work submitted for city approval'}
{'type': 'client', 'target': 'Municipal Government Client'}
Dual Capacity Advisory and Design Engineer
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration
the engineer is acting in a dual capacity, but not a divided one
the practical question of the engineer passing on the adequacy of his own plans in his capacity as city engineer
Engineer Dual Role Part-Time Public Private
Duration of concurrent part-time public retainer and private design engagement
the engineer is retained on a part-time basis by the city as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee
Engineer simultaneously holding part-time city engineer retainer and full-time or separate private design practice serving the same city
Engineer accepted both the part-time public retainer and the private design commission from the same client
Engineer Supplemental Design Fee Engagement
Duration of the specific design project engagement beyond the base retainer
Engineer under part-time retainer with city additionally engaged for specific design project compensated separately
Completion of the specific design project
Engineer retained for specific design work in addition to existing part-time advisory retainer
The ethics board demonstrated capability to correctly assess which canons and rules apply to the part-time consultant arrangement, excluding Canon 27 as inapplicable to non-salaried consultants, excluding Rule 17 as inapplicable to single-client arrangements, and identifying Rule 13 as the binding operative provision.
Ethics adjudication determining which provisions of the engineering code of ethics apply to a part-time city engineer retained as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee serving a single municipal client.
Systematic analysis of Canon 15, Canon 27, Rule 17, and Rule 13 to determine which provisions govern the part-time city engineer arrangement, correctly narrowing operative constraints to Rule 13.
Ethics Board Dual vs Divided Capacity Recognition
The ethics board demonstrated capability to articulate and apply the distinction between dual capacity and divided loyalty, concluding that the single-client arrangement creates dual capacity without dividing loyalty, and that the axiomatic prohibition on divided loyalty is not triggered.
Ethics adjudication of part-time city engineer serving single municipal client in advisory and design roles, applying the axiomatic prohibition on divided loyalties from Case No. 60-5 and distinguishing it from the instant single-client arrangement.
Explicit conclusion that the engineer acts in a dual capacity but not a divided one, grounded in the single-client factual distinction and the client's consent under Canon 15.
although neither the Canons nor the Rules refer specifically to a 'conflict of interest,' it is axiomatic that a professional person may not take action or make decisions which would divide his loyalties or interests from those of his employer or client.
Ethics Board Single vs Multi-Client Distinction
Single vs Multi-Client Conflict Distinction
The ethics board demonstrated capability to distinguish the instant single-client dual-capacity case from the two-client conflict precedent in Case No. 62-7, correctly identifying that divided loyalty concerns do not arise when only one client is present.
Ethics adjudication of part-time city engineer serving single municipal client in both advisory and design capacities, distinguishing from prior precedent involving engineer serving both a county commission and a private company.
Distinguishing Case No. 62-7 county commission scenario involving two clients from the instant case involving only one municipal client, and concluding that the engineer acts in a dual capacity but not a divided one.
Ethics Board Two-Client Conflict Distinguishing
The Board distinguishes the instant case from Case No. 62-7, where a consulting engineer was retained by both a county commission and a private company with interests in negotiations before the same commission, creating a two-client conflict. In the instant case, the engineer has only one client -- the small municipality -- and is therefore not subject to the same divided-loyalty pressures.
Two-Client Conflict Distinguishing Obligation
Ethics adjudicators are obligated to distinguish the instant case from Case No. 62-7 on the ground that the engineer has only one client rather than two clients with potentially opposing interests, and to apply conflict-of-interest analysis appropriate to the single-client structural configuration rather than the two-client configuration that governed the prior case.
Ethics Body Precedent Distinguishing Analysis
During the ethics analysis of the instant case, prior to reaching the conclusion that no divided loyalty exists
Two-Client Self-Review Conflict Precedent Distinguishing State
Ethics board analysis distinguishing current single-client dual-capacity case from Case No. 62-7 two-client conflict precedent
Ethics board conclusion that the single-client arrangement is distinguishable and does not constitute a divided loyalty conflict
This would obviously involve the self-interest of the engineer and divide his loyalties. Even if the engineer acts with the best of intentions, he is put into the position of assessing his recommendations to two clients with possibly opposing interests.
Need to determine whether the conflict-of-interest holding in Case No. 62-7 applies to the current single-client arrangement
Community's protection against biased advisory services is reduced to engineer's individual ethical commitment; systemic vulnerability to self-interested recommendations is unmitigated
Throughout the engagement, following Independent Review Waiver
As a consequence of the city council waiving independent review of the engineer's recommendations, no external check exists to detect or correct advisory bias, leaving the community's interests protected only by the engineer's self-regulation.
City council left without an objective second opinion on plans it is being asked to approve
Engineer structurally positioned to evaluate his own work, creating a self-review dynamic
Removal of an independent check on the quality, cost, and appropriateness of the engineer's own design work
Exercising the client's recognized right to waive independent plan review
Providing the consent necessary under Canon 15 to legitimize the dual-capacity arrangement
Client autonomy in structuring professional service arrangements
Protection of public welfare through adequate engineering oversight
Transparency about the structural limitations of the review process
Streamline project delivery by relying on the trusted part-time city engineer for both design and advisory review, avoiding the cost and complexity of retaining a separate reviewing engineer
Municipal governance and procurement judgment
Understanding of the professional and legal implications of waiving independent engineering review
At or around the time of each project engagement, implicit in the structural arrangement rather than a single explicit decision
The city council implicitly decided to waive its right to independent engineering review of the plans and specifications prepared by the part-time city engineer, allowing the same engineer to assess the adequacy of his own work in his advisory capacity.
Independent Review Waiver (Action 5) → Independent Oversight Absent (Event 6)
As a consequence of the city council waiving independent review of the engineer's recommendations, no external check exists to identify or correct recommendations influenced by the engineer's private financial interests
Had the city council mandated independent engineering review of all project recommendations, the self-interested recommendations would have been subject to external scrutiny, potentially identifying bias and protecting the public interest
City council's authority to require independent review
City council's decision not to exercise that authority
No alternative oversight mechanism present
Pre-existing compromised advisory objectivity (Event 5)
City Council (primary); Professional Engineer (contributory)
Waiver of independent review + already-compromised objectivity = complete absence of corrective oversight, making harm to public interest structurally inevitable
National Society of Professional Engineers
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in analyzing the city engineer dual role arrangement
Primary normative authority for evaluating whether a part-time city engineer may also prepare plans and specifications for the same municipality on a fee basis, and whether such arrangements create conflicts of interest or violate faithful agent obligations.
Canon 27 is not an impediment because it refers to a 'salaried' position.
Rule 13 is binding in this case and the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city.
Board of Ethical Review in evaluating the ethical permissibility of the engineer's dual capacity
Referenced throughout as the primary normative authority governing the dual-role arrangement, specifically Canon 15, Canon 27, Rule 17, and Rule 13 are analyzed to determine their applicability and constraints on the engineer acting as both city engineer and design consultant
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'employment_status': 'Full-time private practice', 'municipal_engagement': 'Part-time retainer plus separate fee-based design commissions', 'advisory_duties': 'Advise city council, recommend on project considerations, approve plans'}
A professional engineer in full-time private practice retained part-time by a small community as city engineer under a monthly retainer for general advisory services, and separately eligible to be retained on a fee basis to prepare plans and specifications for specific city projects, treating the municipal relationship as a client relationship.
{'type': 'potential_conflict_between', 'target': 'Advisory Role and Design Commission Role'}
{'type': 'provides_design_services_to', 'target': 'Small Community City Council'}
{'type': 'serves_as_advisor_to', 'target': 'Small Community City Council'}
advising the city council on engineering problems, offering recommendations on engineering project considerations and approving plans for engineering processes and works
compensated on a normal professional fee basis over and above his monthly retainer
engaged in full-time private practice and treats his part-time service to the community as service to a client
Ceding independent oversight of engineering recommendations to the same engineer who may later execute projects
Implicit waiver of independent plan review as a structural consequence of the single-engineer arrangement
Exercising municipal authority to structure professional service engagements
Securing professional engineering guidance for the community
Public welfare and safety through competent engineering oversight
Obtain competent engineering advisory services cost-effectively through a part-time retainer arrangement rather than a full-time salaried position
Municipal procurement and governance judgment
Understanding of professional engineering service structures
Initial engagement, prior to all subsequent project-level decisions
The small community decided to retain a professional engineer on a part-time basis as city engineer, delegating all engineering advisory, recommendation, and plan-approval duties to a single individual who also maintained a private practice.
Part-Time Retention Decision (Action 2) → Conflict of Interest Recognized (Event 4)
Through reference to prior ethics cases (Case No. 60-5 and Case No. 62-7), the ethics analysis formally identifies the part-time retention arrangement combined with project-specific engagement as the structural origin of the conflict of interest
Had the city's retention agreement included explicit conflict-of-interest prohibitions (e.g., barring the advisor's firm from city contracts), the formal conflict of interest finding would not have been triggered even under the same dual-role structure
Conflict of Interest Recognized (Event 4)
Absence of disclosure and recusal protocols
City's decision to retain engineer on part-time basis without conflict-of-interest safeguards
Engineer's simultaneous private practice eligibility for city contracts
Project-specific expansion of advisory mandate (Action 3)
City Council and Professional Engineer (jointly)
Part-time retention without safeguards + private practice eligibility + project-specific advisory authority = sufficient condition for recognized conflict of interest under established professional ethics standards
Engineer placed in position of advising on and approving his own design work in his capacity as city engineer
Financial incentive structure created in which the engineer's advisory recommendations influence his own fee income
Exercising municipal authority to procure engineering design services
Providing consent that satisfies Canon 15 requirements for dual-capacity arrangements
Public welfare through competent project execution
Leverage the existing relationship and the engineer's familiarity with city needs to obtain project design services efficiently and cost-effectively
Evaluation of engineering service proposals
Occurs on a project-by-project basis after the initial general retainer is established
On a project-by-project basis, the city council decided to additionally retain the same part-time city engineer to prepare plans and specifications for specific city projects, compensating him at normal professional fee rates above the monthly retainer.
Project Scope Expansion (Action 3) → Scope Expansion Triggered (Event 3)
On a project-by-project basis, the city council decided to additionally retain the same part-time city engineer, expanding his engagement beyond general advisory services into specific project work for which he could later receive compensation through his private practice
Had the city council retained a separate, independent engineer for project-specific design work, the advisory role and the compensated design role would not have merged, preventing the self-interest dynamic
Absence of competitive procurement separating advisory from design roles
City council's decision to expand engineer's engagement to specific projects
Engineer's private practice remaining active and eligible to bid
Pre-existing dual role structure (Event 1)
Dual role + project-specific expansion + no competitive separation = conflict of interest operationalized on each project cycle
Is a professional engineer retained by a city for general advisory services in violation of the Canons of Ethics by also preparing plans and specifications on projects for the city in which he participated and advised the city council?
At what point in the advisory process must the engineer disclose to the city council that he has a financial interest in being retained for the design work he is recommending, and does failure to disclose at the earliest opportunity itself constitute an ethical violation independent of whether his advice was actually biased?
When the engineer approves plans and specifications that he himself prepared, is the absence of independent technical review a structural deficiency that the city council's waiver alone cannot cure, particularly where public safety is implicated?
Does the Board's conclusion adequately address the scenario where the engineer's advisory recommendations systematically steer the city toward project types or scopes for which he is uniquely positioned to be retained as designer, creating a pattern of self-dealing that no single instance of heightened caution can remedy?
Should the ethical analysis differ based on the size and sophistication of the city council, given that a small community may lack the technical expertise to independently evaluate whether the engineer's advisory recommendations are genuinely objective or subtly shaped by self-interest?
Does the principle of Small Community Engineering Access Justification — which favors permitting the dual role because small communities may have no other practical access to qualified engineering advice — conflict with the City Engineer Public Welfare Advisory Role principle, which demands fully objective counsel uncontaminated by the advisor's financial stake in the outcome?
How can the principle of Dual Capacity Not Divided Capacity City Engineer — which holds that serving both advisory and design roles for one client does not inherently divide loyalty — be reconciled with the Divided Loyalty Axiom from Case 60-5, which treats any secondary financial interest as axiomatically threatening to the integrity of professional advice?
Does the City Council Waiver Independent Review principle — which permits the city to knowingly accept the engineer's self-review — conflict with the City Engineer Objectivity Plan Approval principle, which imposes an objective standard of technical review that exists for the benefit of the public rather than the client alone and therefore cannot be waived by the client?
Is there an irresolvable tension between the City Engineer Client Relationship Structural Independence principle — which frames the city as a client whose interests the engineer serves at arm's length — and the City Engineer Heightened Caution Advisory Duty principle, which implicitly acknowledges that the structural independence is compromised and can only be partially remedied through subjective self-discipline rather than institutional safeguards?
From a deontological perspective, does the part-time city engineer have a categorical duty to recuse themselves from preparing plans and specifications for any project on which they previously provided advisory recommendations to the city council, regardless of whether the city consents to the dual role?
From a consequentialist standpoint, does the practical benefit of allowing small communities to access integrated engineering advisory and design services from a single part-time engineer outweigh the systemic risk that advisory recommendations will be subtly biased toward project scopes that generate supplemental design fees?
From a virtue ethics perspective, does a professional engineer who simultaneously advises the city council on whether a project should proceed and then accepts the design commission for that same project demonstrate the professional integrity and practical wisdom required of a trustworthy public servant, or does the structural self-interest inherent in that arrangement reveal a deficiency in the virtue of impartiality?
From a deontological perspective, is the Board's conclusion that the engineer must be 'scrupulously careful' sufficient as a duty-based standard, or does the structural impossibility of fully separating advisory judgment from self-interest in securing a design commission create a categorical ethical prohibition that no degree of personal vigilance can overcome?
If the city council had been required to obtain an independent engineering review before approving any project for which the part-time city engineer was also the design engineer, would the ethical concerns about advisory bias have been sufficiently mitigated to make the dual role unambiguously permissible rather than merely conditionally acceptable?
If the part-time city engineer had proactively disclosed to the city council, at the moment of providing advisory recommendations on a project, that they intended to seek the design commission for that same project, would such advance disclosure have transformed the arrangement from a latent conflict of interest into a fully transparent and ethically sound dual engagement?
If the small community had sufficient resources to retain a separate design engineer for each project rather than relying on the part-time city engineer for both advisory and design services, would the Board's justification grounded in small-community resource constraints collapse, and would the dual-capacity arrangement then become ethically impermissible?
If the part-time city engineer had advised the city council against proceeding with a project and the city had consequently not retained them for any design work that year, would that outcome demonstrate that the advisory and design roles can be genuinely independent, or would it merely illustrate that the financial incentive to recommend projects creates an asymmetric pressure that is structurally impossible to eliminate through personal vigilance alone?
Engineer is now bound by ongoing professional obligations to the city; the relationship is active and continuous rather than project-specific
At contract execution, beginning of the engagement
A formal ongoing advisory relationship is established between the engineer and the small community via a monthly retainer, creating a continuous fiduciary-adjacent obligation to serve the city's interests.
Salaried Employee Distinction Canon 27 Inapplicability
Part-Time City Engineer Advisory Design Canon 27 and Rule 17 analysis
Canon 27 does not apply to the part-time city engineer because it refers to a salaried position, whereas the engineer is retained on a part-time basis as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee, and Rule 17 similarly does not apply because it deals only with situations where the engineer is employed by more than one party
The structural character of the engagement as a consulting retainer rather than salaried employment determines which code provisions govern; provisions referencing salaried or employed status do not extend to consulting relationships
Salaried-Employee Versus Retained-Consultant Distinction in Ethics Code Application
Canon 27 is not an impediment because it refers to a 'salaried' position, whereas in this situation the engineer is retained on a part-time basis by the city as a consultant rather than as a salaried employee. Rule 17 deals only with situations in which the engineer is employed by more than one party.
Canon 27 and Rule 17 are inapplicable; the applicable provision is Rule 13, which governs the engineer's duty of objectivity in the dual capacity advisory role
Engineer now has direct financial incentive tied to which projects he recommends; advisory objectivity is structurally compromised unless heightened caution is exercised
Over time, after initial retainer established
The engineer's engagement expands beyond general advisory services when the city council additionally assigns preparation of plans and specifications for specific city projects, creating a new compensation layer beyond the retainer.
Advisory recommendations may be consciously or unconsciously colored by the prospect of securing a design commission
Appearance of self-serving advice even when advice is objectively sound
City council relies on the same engineer for guidance it will use to decide whether to hire him further
Exercising professional engineering judgment on behalf of the client
Providing engineering advisory services as required under the retainer
Heightened diligence in dual-capacity situations
Impartiality and objectivity in professional advice
Loyalty to client above personal financial interest
Public safety and welfare as paramount obligation
Provide technically sound engineering advice to the city council to guide project decisions, while fulfilling the advisory duties for which he is retained
Rule 13 — violated if advice is prejudiced by personal financial interest in securing the commission; binding obligation to avoid such prejudice
Objective engineering judgment on project feasibility and merit
Self-awareness and ethical discipline to identify and neutralize personal financial bias
Transparent communication with city council about the dual-capacity structure
During each specific project advisory and recommendation cycle, after initial retention and before project award
During each project advisory cycle, the engineer advised the city council on and recommended approval of specific engineering projects for which he may subsequently receive a design commission, placing him in the position of influencing the very decisions that generate his additional fee income.
Self-Interest Advisory Recommendation (Action 4) → Advisory Objectivity Compromised (Event 5)
As a natural consequence of the engineer recommending projects for which he may later receive a commission or contract through his private practice, the objectivity of those advisory recommendations is structurally and materially compromised
Self-Interest Advisory Recommendation (Action 4)
If the engineer had no financial interest in project outcomes (e.g., private practice ineligible for city contracts), recommendations could be evaluated on technical merit alone; objectivity compromise would not occur
Advisory Objectivity Compromised (Event 5)
Engineer holding advisory role with recommendation authority
Engineer's private practice being eligible to receive contracts on recommended projects
Financial incentive present at time of recommendation
No independent review mechanism to counterbalance biased recommendations
Professional Engineer (primary); City Council (secondary)
Advisory authority + financial stake in outcome + absent independent review = compromised objectivity as structural certainty, regardless of engineer's subjective intent
Single Client Distinguishing Fact Dual Capacity
Part-Time City Engineer Advisory Design dual capacity arrangement
The Board distinguishes the instant case from Case No. 62-7 on the ground that the engineer has only one client, and is therefore not subject to the pressure to temper service to one client in order to satisfy the other, making the dual capacity arrangement permissible subject to heightened caution
The single-client fact is the critical ethical determinant: it removes the structural division of loyalty that makes two-client arrangements prohibited, leaving only the self-review concern which is addressable through heightened caution
Two-Client Versus Single-Client Conflict of Interest Distinguishing Principle
Single-client status resolves the loyalty division concern; the remaining self-review concern is addressed by the client's waiver and the engineer's heightened caution obligation
Small Community Engineering Access Justification
Decision to retain part-time engineer for dual advisory and design roles
The small community's retention of a part-time engineer for both advisory and design services reflects the public interest in ensuring small municipalities have access to competent engineering expertise despite resource constraints that preclude full-time staff engineers
The public interest in competent municipal engineering justifies the dual-role arrangement for small communities; rigid prohibition would deprive such communities of qualified engineering services
Public interest justification supports the dual-role arrangement provided it is structured to minimize actual conflicts and the engineer maintains objectivity
{'entity_type': 'Municipal government', 'size': 'Small community', 'contracting_structure': 'Monthly retainer for advisory services plus separate fee-based design commissions'}
A small community whose city council retains a private-practice professional engineer part-time as city engineer under a monthly retainer for advisory services, and separately retains the same engineer on a fee basis for preparation of plans and specifications for specific city projects.
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Part-Time City Engineer Advisory Design'}
{'type': 'subject_to', 'target': 'Public accountability for engineering decisions'}
city council approval of project before engineer receiving commission for project
its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project.
engineer receiving commission for project
engineer acting as city engineer (advisory capacity) overlaps engineer preparing plans and specifications for city project
engineer acting as city engineer (advisory capacity)
engineer preparing plans and specifications for city project
Entity1 starts before Entity2 and ends during Entity2
engineer's recommendation/approval of a project before engineer securing a commission for that project
the engineer has a duty because of his dual capacity to avoid prejudicing his advice to the city on the project under consideration because its approval by the city council may lead to his securing a commission for that project.
engineer's recommendation/approval of a project
engineer securing a commission for that project
general advisory services retainer before retention for specific project plans and specifications
retention for specific project plans and specifications
part-time city engineer retainer overlaps full-time private practice