Absence of Confidentiality Agreement Escalation Threshold Reduction — Engineer A Bridge Inspection
The Board noted as a key distinguishing factor from Case No. 89-7 that no confidentiality agreement existed in the present case, which affected the weight to be given to any implied confidentiality expectation.
Absence of Confidentiality Agreement Escalation Threshold Reduction Constraint
The absence of any explicit confidentiality agreement between Engineer A, VWX, and the public agency materially reduced the threshold for Engineer A's disclosure obligations, distinguishing the present case from Case No. 89-7 where an explicit confidentiality agreement existed.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case No. 97-13 distinguishing BER Case No. 89-7
Another difference between the two cases is that in Case No. 89-7, there was a specific agreement between the engineer and the client to maintain the confidentiality of the information contained in the engineer's report.
Throughout the bridge inspection engagement
In contrast, in the present case, there is nothing to indicate under the facts that an agreement exists between any of the parties to maintain the confidentiality of all or part of any reports prepared by the engineer.
Engineers, in the performance of their professional services, act as 'agents' or 'trustees' to their clients.
engineers as 'agents' or 'trustees' are expected to maintain the confidential nature of the information revealed to them in the course of rendering their professional services
NSPE Board of Ethical Review to ground the confidentiality obligation
Invoked to explain the rationale for engineer confidentiality obligations: engineers acting as agents or trustees are privy to client business affairs and must maintain confidentiality of information revealed in the course of professional services
As articulated in BER Case 89-7 and present case
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case Precedents on Bridge Safety and Out-of-Scope Observations
Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred
asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report since it was not part of his scope of work
Ethics reviewers analyzing Engineer A's conduct
Prior BER cases addressing analogous situations where engineers discovered safety hazards outside their contracted scope and faced client pressure to suppress findings, providing analogical reasoning patterns for Engineer A's situation.
BER Board BER Dual-Precedent Confidentiality-Safety Factual Distinction Synthesis Bridge Case
BER Dual-Precedent Confidentiality-Safety Factual Distinction Synthesis Capability
The Board possessed the capability to retrieve BER Cases No. 89-7 and No. 97-5, identify the material factual distinctions between those precedents and the present case, and synthesize those distinctions into a calibrated ethical conclusion about the appropriate professional response.
The Board applied Cases No. 89-7 and No. 97-5 as precedents, systematically distinguishing the present case on four material factual grounds to reach a calibrated ethical conclusion.
The Board systematically identified four material factual distinctions between Case No. 89-7 and the present case — mode of information conveyance, presence of confidentiality agreement, past-harm versus future-risk, and confirmed versus speculative defect — and synthesized these into a conclusion that Engineer A acted appropriately.
An example of this basic ethical dichotomy was considered by the NSPE Board of Ethical Review in Case No. 89-7 (which the Board also applied in Case No. 97-5).
First, it is clear that, unlike Case No. 89-7... Another difference between the two cases is that... Also in Case No. 89-7...
it is the Board's position that the facts and circumstances in Case No. 89-7, while somewhat similar in nature, are significantly different than the facts in the present case.
BER Board Confirmed-Fatality vs Future-Risk Escalation Threshold Differentiation Bridge Case
Confirmed-Fatality vs Future-Risk Escalation Threshold Differentiation Capability
The Board possessed the capability to recognize and apply the material distinction between the confirmed fatality in the present case and the speculative future risk in Case No. 89-7, while also recognizing that the speculative nature of the defect observation in the present case counterbalances the heightened escalation threshold created by the confirmed fatality.
The Board used the confirmed-fatality vs. future-risk distinction as a key factor in its multi-factor analysis, ultimately concluding that the speculative nature of the defect observation counterbalanced the heightened escalation threshold created by the confirmed fatality.
Board analysis explicitly contrasting the confirmed fatality in the present case with the future-risk scenario in Case No. 89-7, while simultaneously noting that the speculative nature of the defect observation in the present case limits the escalation obligation.
Also in Case No. 89-7, there was the possibility of a dangerous condition developing at some point in the future, while in the present case, loss of life had already occurred.
Importantly however, this circumstance needs to be contrasted with the circumstances in Case No. 89-7, where the client had essentially admitted serious code violations, while, in the present case, the possibility of a defect is merely a matter of speculation and surmise.
It is on this last point that the Board believes this case must hinge.
BER Board Information Conveyance Mode Confidentiality Weight Differentiation Bridge Case
Information Conveyance Mode Confidentiality Weight Differentiation Capability
The Board possessed the capability to recognize that the manner in which information comes to an engineer's attention — client-conveyed versus self-discovered through professional inspection — has material bearing on the weight of the client's confidentiality expectation.
The Board used the distinction between client-conveyed confidential information and engineer-discovered findings as a key factor in differentiating the present case from Case No. 89-7.
Board analysis explicitly identifying the mode of information conveyance as a material distinguishing factor between Case No. 89-7 (client-conveyed) and the present case (self-discovered through inspection).
Presumably, the manner in which information is conveyed to an engineer will have some bearing on the client's expectation of the engineer's maintaining the confidentiality of the particular information.
unlike Case No. 89-7, which involved facts and circumstances that were openly conveyed directly to Engineer A from a client, in the present case, the circumstances bearing on the public safety were revealed to the engineer as part of the engineer's inspection and professional observations.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 89-7
In deciding it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities, the Board noted...
the facts and circumstances in Case No. 89-7, while somewhat similar in nature, are significantly different than the facts in the present case
NSPE Board of Ethical Review for analogical reasoning about confidentiality vs. public safety
Primary analogical precedent: engineer retained to investigate structural integrity of occupied apartment building under confidentiality agreement; Board found it unethical not to report safety violations to public authorities; distinguished from present case on multiple grounds
NSPE Board of Ethical Review Case No. 97-5
NSPE Board of Ethical Review to establish precedential chain
Secondary precedent that applied the reasoning of Case No. 89-7, cited to establish the line of authority on the confidentiality vs. public safety tension
Professional engineering practice norms and regulatory requirements
Engineer A, a civil engineer, as its subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on the bridge
Engineer A states that he will retain the information from his engineering notes but not include it in the final report
Engineer A during bridge inspection and report preparation
Governs the completeness and accuracy obligations of engineers performing bridge inspection services, including the duty to document all observed defects regardless of whether they fall within the contracted scope.
Engineer A is physically present at the bridge site and in a position to observe conditions; professional duty to observe and report is activated; the inspection context places Engineer A in proximity to the pre-existing defective condition
Shortly after Officer B's death, prior to scheduled overhaul
Following Officer B's fatal crash, a bridge inspection is conducted, during which Engineer A is present and examines the structure. This inspection is the direct consequence of the accident and sets the stage for Engineer A's discovery.
CausalLink_Comply with Instruction to Omi
CausalLink_Decline to Report to External
CausalLink_Document Out-of-Scope Defect i
CausalLink_Retain Engineer A as Subconsul
CausalLink_Retain Observation in Field No
CausalLink_Verbally Report Defect to Clie
Client Confidentiality vs. Public Safety Balancing Framework
Engineer A does not report this information to any other public agency or authority
The wall failed to restrain the vehicle, which fell to the river below, killing Police Officer B
Engineer A when evaluating whether to comply with client suppression request
Decision framework for Engineer A to weigh his duty of loyalty to VWX (his client) and the public agency's instruction against his paramount obligation to protect public safety, given that the bridge wall defect may pose ongoing risk to the public.
NSPE Board of Ethical Review through accumulated case law
the facts presented in the case raised a conflict between two basic ethical obligations of an engineer: The obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose confidential information... and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety.
Looking at the facts and circumstances in their totality, the Board is convinced that Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client...
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in evaluating Engineer A's conduct
Central deliberative framework used to weigh engineer's duty of confidentiality to client against paramount obligation to protect public health and safety; applied through multi-factor analysis distinguishing source of information, existence of confidentiality agreement, imminence of harm, and degree of certainty of defect
Client Confidentiality Reliance Factor Modulation — Inspection-Discovered vs. Client-Confided Bridge Wall Defect
The Board distinguished the present case from Case No. 89-7 on the grounds that the manner of information conveyance — inspection discovery vs. client disclosure — affects the client's legitimate confidentiality expectation and therefore the engineer's escalation calibration.
Client Confidentiality Reliance Factor Escalation Modulation Constraint
Because the wall defect information was discovered through Engineer A's independent professional inspection rather than confided by the client, the client's confidentiality reliance factor was materially reduced, modulating Engineer A's escalation approach toward more direct action than would be appropriate for client-confided information.
Throughout the bridge inspection engagement and reporting period
Client Loyalty Public Safety Paramount Balancing — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
The Board framed the entire ethical analysis as a balancing of the two basic ethical obligations — faithful agent duty and public safety paramount duty — and concluded that Engineer A's conduct appropriately balanced both.
Client Loyalty vs. Public Safety Priority Constraint
Engineer A was constrained by the foundational priority ordering between client loyalty and public safety paramount duty — required to hold public safety paramount while simultaneously fulfilling the faithful agent duty to the extent consistent with that paramount obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics I.1; BER Case No. 97-13
Engineers are frequently placed in situations where they must balance the extent of their obligations to their employer or client with their obligations to protect the public health and safety.
the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety.
Client Loyalty Public Safety Priority Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A's faithful agent duty to VWX conflicted with his public safety paramount duty; the confirmed fatality and structural defect on public infrastructure elevated the public safety obligation above client loyalty
When Engineer A's duty of loyalty to VWX (his client) and the public agency's suppression instruction conflicted with his paramount obligation to public safety, the public safety obligation took precedence — constraining Engineer A from fulfilling the client directive to suppress the wall defect finding.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; NSPE Code Section III.4
The public agency contacts VWX Architects and Engineers which then contacts Engineer A and asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report since it was not part of his scope of work.
From the time of receiving the suppression instruction through the completion of the project
Engineer A states that he will retain the information from his engineering notes but not include it in the final report, as requested.
Client Remediation Monitoring Follow-Through Engineer A Bridge Wall Post-Verbal
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect through VWX to the public agency; the public agency then instructed suppression of the finding; Engineer A took no further action to monitor whether corrective action was taken
Client Remediation Monitoring Follow-Through Constraint
After verbally reporting the wall defect through VWX to the public agency and agreeing not to include it in the final report, Engineer A was constrained to monitor whether the public agency took corrective action — prohibiting Engineer A from treating the verbal relay and the public agency's awareness as a complete discharge of his safety obligation without confirming that actual remediation occurred.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER precedent on monitoring follow-through after safety notification
Engineer A verbally reports this information to his client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency.
From the time of verbal notification through confirmation of corrective action by the public agency
Engineer A does not report this information to any other public agency or authority.
Client Suppression Instruction Non-Compliance Engineer A Wall Defect
VWX, acting on the public agency's instruction, asked Engineer A not to include the wall defect finding in his final report on scope grounds; Engineer A complied with this instruction
Client Instruction Report Suppression Prohibition Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from complying with VWX's instruction (relayed from the public agency) to omit the wall defect finding from his final report, as the finding bore directly on public health, safety, and welfare on a public bridge where a fatal accident had occurred.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER precedent on client-directed report suppression
At the time of receiving the suppression instruction through completion of the final report
Competence Boundary Causal Surmise Epistemic Qualification Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A is a civil engineer whose contracted scope was pavement inspection; his assessment of the wall defect's structural significance and causal contribution to the fatal accident was a surmise, not a confirmed expert finding
Gray Area Public Safety Judgment Disclosure Qualification Constraint
Because Engineer A's assessment of the wall defect's causal contribution to the fatal accident was a surmise — not a confirmed structural engineering finding — Engineer A was constrained to disclose the observed condition while explicitly qualifying the disclosure as based on preliminary professional judgment requiring specialist structural engineering review to confirm, prohibiting both silence about the gray area risk and overstatement of its certainty.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER precedent on gray area public safety judgment disclosure
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in his engineering notes.
From the time of forming the causal surmise through any written communication of the finding
Competence Boundary Speculative Structural Observation — Engineer A Non-Structural Engineer
The Board noted that Engineer A had no structural engineering expertise, that his observation was based solely on visual inspection, and that this competence limitation was a key factor in determining that inclusion in the final report would have been irresponsible and that verbal-only escalation was appropriate.
Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise constrained the weight and formality of his wall defect observation — limiting it to a speculative surmise based on visual inspection rather than a confirmed professional finding — and constrained his escalation obligations accordingly.
NSPE Code of Ethics II.2; BER Case No. 97-13
There is nothing noted in the facts to indicate that Engineer A had expertise in structural engineering.
Engineer A's observation appears to be based upon a visual inspection without anything more.
particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.
Comply with Instruction to Omit from Final Report
Omission could later be characterized as suppression of safety-relevant information if the defect contributes to future harm
Omission from the final report reduces the formal evidentiary record of the observed defect
Reliance on the client chain to act on the verbally reported information may prove misplaced if no corrective action is taken
Fidelity to client instructions within reasonable professional bounds
Obligation not to include speculative, unverified conclusions in a formal engineering report
Professional responsibility to limit formal report content to areas of competence and verified findings
Avoidance of unverified speculation in formal engineering documents
Fidelity to client within ethical limits
Professional accuracy and responsibility in formal reporting
Comply with client direction to limit the final report to contracted scope, avoiding inclusion of speculative, unverified structural observations outside his area of expertise, while preserving the information in field notes
Arguably, omission from the formal record weakens the enforceability of the safety concern and reduces accountability for follow-up action
Ongoing obligation to ensure corrective action is taken was not yet discharged at this point
Assessment of when client compliance crosses into ethical violation
Judgment about appropriate content boundaries for formal engineering reports
Understanding of the distinction between field notes and formal deliverables
During final report preparation, after receiving client instruction
After being instructed by VWX (relaying the public agency's directive) not to include the out-of-scope wall condition information in his final report, Engineer A deliberately chose to comply with that instruction and omit the information from the final report.
Comply with Instruction to Omit from Final Report → Decline to Report to External Authorities
After complying with the suppression instruction and retaining the observation in field notes only, Engineer A made a deliberate decision not to report the observed defective wall condition or his suppression concerns to external authorities
Had Engineer A reported to external authorities (e.g., state engineering board, transportation safety authority), the defect would have entered formal remediation channels regardless of the public agency's suppression instruction
Decline to Report to External Authorities
Engineer A's awareness that the defect was not being formally addressed
Engineer A's deliberate choice not to escalate to external regulatory or professional bodies
Engineer A's prior compliance with the suppression instruction, establishing a pattern of deference
Compliance with suppression + retention of information in field notes only + decision not to escalate = complete suppression of safety-critical information from public channels
It was ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in his engineering notes but not include it in the final written report as requested.
Beyond the Board's finding that retaining the wall defect observation in engineering notes while omitting it from the final report was ethical, the Board failed to address a critical documentation gap: a verbal report transmitted through a client chain — from Engineer A to VWX to the public agency — creates no durable, verifiable record of the safety concern. In a context involving a confirmed fatality and a potentially contributing structural defect on public infrastructure, the absence of any written artifact means that if the public agency fails to act, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the concern was ever raised. Engineer A's ethical obligation under the principle of written documentation integrity required him, at minimum, to convert his verbal report into a written memorandum transmitted to VWX, even if he ultimately deferred to VWX's judgment about further escalation. The suppression instruction addressed the final report only; it did not and could not ethically prohibit Engineer A from creating an internal written record of his notification to VWX. By treating verbal disclosure as sufficient, the Board implicitly endorsed a mode of safety communication that is structurally incapable of protecting the public if the client chain fails to act — a result that conflicts with the public welfare paramount principle the Board itself invoked.
The Board's conclusion that omitting the wall defect finding from the final report was ethical because it fell outside Engineer A's contracted scope of work creates a dangerous precedent that scope-of-work boundaries can modulate — and potentially nullify — an engineer's public safety reporting obligations. The NSPE Code's public welfare paramount principle is not scope-conditional: it does not apply only when the hazard falls within the engineer's contracted deliverables. Engineer A's pavement inspection scope did not eliminate his status as a licensed professional engineer with independent duties to the public. The Board's reasoning, if generalized, would mean that an engineer contracted to inspect electrical systems who incidentally observes a collapsing structural wall may ethically omit that observation from any written record simply because structural assessment was not in scope. This outcome is irreconcilable with the Code's requirement that engineers hold public safety paramount. The scope-of-work boundary is properly understood as defining the engineer's affirmative deliverable obligations to the client, not as a ceiling on the engineer's independent safety disclosure obligations to the public. The Board should have explicitly stated that while omission from the pavement-focused final report may have been procedurally defensible, Engineer A retained an independent obligation to ensure the safety concern was documented in a form accessible to the public agency, regardless of scope.
The Board's conclusion that Engineer A's conduct was ethical with respect to report omission implicitly relied on the epistemic humility constraint — that Engineer A's observation was speculative and outside his structural engineering expertise — without adequately reconciling this with the confirmed-fatality context. Epistemic humility appropriately calibrates the confidence with which Engineer A should characterize his finding, but it does not eliminate the obligation to disclose the observation itself. A non-structural engineer who observes an apparent pre-existing defect near the site of a fatal wall failure is not required to certify the causal link before disclosing the observation; the observation's potential relevance to a death is itself the trigger for disclosure. The Board's reasoning conflates the standard of certainty required for a causal conclusion with the standard of concern required for a safety notification. These are distinct thresholds: the former is appropriately high and domain-expertise-dependent, while the latter is appropriately low and triggered by reasonable suspicion of a safety-relevant condition. By allowing Engineer A's speculative framing to justify omission from the final report without requiring any written substitute notification, the Board effectively permitted epistemic humility to function as a shield against accountability rather than as a calibration tool for the form and confidence level of the disclosure.
The Board's conditional approval of Engineer A's non-escalation — ethical only if the public agency takes corrective action within a relatively short period — is structurally deficient because it imposes a monitoring obligation on Engineer A without specifying the timeframe, the corrective action standard, or the verification mechanism that would trigger Engineer A's independent escalation duty. This conditionality creates an unenforceable ethical standard: Engineer A is told he must monitor, but given no criteria for determining when monitoring has failed and escalation is required. In practice, a public agency that has already suppressed a safety finding through its client chain has demonstrated a disposition toward non-disclosure, making it unreasonable to rely on that same agency's self-reporting of corrective action as the trigger for Engineer A's escalation. The Board should have specified that Engineer A's monitoring obligation required him to affirmatively seek confirmation of corrective action — not merely wait passively — and that the absence of verifiable corrective action within a defined period would independently obligate him to report to a relevant regulatory or safety authority. Without these specifications, the Board's conditional approval functions as an unconditional approval in practice, leaving the public exposed to an ongoing structural hazard with no enforcement mechanism.
The Board's deference to Engineer A's subconsultant status — treating VWX's superior contextual knowledge as a justification for Engineer A's non-escalation — improperly insulates Engineer A from his independent public safety obligations under the NSPE Code. The Code's public welfare paramount duty is imposed on every licensed engineer individually, not on the contractual hierarchy in which they operate. A subconsultant's position in the project chain may appropriately sequence the order of escalation — reporting to the prime consultant before going directly to external authorities — but it cannot eliminate the subconsultant's independent obligation to escalate when the prime consultant and client have demonstrably failed to ensure public safety. In this case, the public agency's suppression instruction, relayed through VWX, constituted precisely the kind of client-chain failure that triggers an engineer's independent escalation duty. By treating VWX's contextual superiority as a reason for Engineer A to defer indefinitely rather than as a factor that modulates the timing and form of escalation, the Board effectively converted a sequencing principle into an accountability shield. Engineer A's status as a subconsultant reduced his initial escalation obligation to reporting through the client chain; it did not reduce his subsequent obligation to escalate independently when that chain actively suppressed the safety finding.
The Board's distinction between the present case and NSPE Case No. 89-7 — grounded in the source of information (independent field observation versus client-confided disclosure) and the absence of a confidentiality agreement — is analytically sound as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. The Board correctly identified that Engineer A's observation-derived information carries a lower confidentiality expectation than information confided by a client in a trust relationship. However, the Board failed to draw the full implication of this distinction: if the confidentiality rationale for non-disclosure is weaker in the present case than in Case 89-7, and if Case 89-7 itself required disclosure to public authorities when building code violations posed a public danger, then the present case — involving a confirmed fatality on public infrastructure — should have triggered at least an equivalent, and arguably a stronger, disclosure obligation. The Board's reasoning moves in the opposite direction, finding that the weaker confidentiality expectation justifies a more permissive non-disclosure standard rather than a more demanding disclosure obligation. This inversion is logically inconsistent: reduced confidentiality protection should expand, not contract, the engineer's disclosure latitude. The Board's failure to follow this logic to its conclusion suggests that the source-of-information distinction was used to differentiate the cases in a way that ultimately favored non-disclosure in both, rather than to derive a principled escalation standard applicable across contexts.
It was ethical for Engineer A not to report this information to any other public agency or authority as long as corrective action is taken by the public agency within a relatively short period of time.
In response to Q101: The confirmed death of Police Officer B does independently elevate Engineer A's ethical obligations beyond what the Board's conditional tolerance framework acknowledges. A fatality that is plausibly linked — even speculatively — to a structural defect on public infrastructure represents a qualitatively different risk category than a prospective hazard. The Board's conditional approval of silence, contingent on the public agency taking corrective action 'within a relatively short period,' treats the fatality as background context rather than as an independent trigger. Under the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger principle, the death of a person in circumstances potentially caused by the very defect Engineer A observed should have mandated at minimum a written record transmitted to the public agency directly, not merely a verbal report relayed through a client chain. The verbal-only notification, even if adequate for a speculative prospective hazard, is insufficient when a life has already been lost and no written record exists in any official deliverable. The Board's framework leaves the public agency free to ignore the verbal report with no documentary accountability, which is ethically untenable in a confirmed-fatality context.
In response to Q102: A verbal report transmitted through a client chain — from Engineer A to VWX to the public agency — is ethically and practically insufficient as the sole mode of safety notification when the subject matter involves a potential contributing cause to a confirmed fatality on public infrastructure. The mode of transmission is not a neutral procedural detail; it is itself an ethical variable. Verbal reports leave no documentary trail, cannot be independently verified, are subject to distortion at each relay point, and provide no basis for regulatory accountability or future legal inquiry. In a context where a person has died and the defect potentially contributed to that death, the absence of any written record in any official deliverable means that the public agency can plausibly deny having received adequate notice, and Engineer A has no means of demonstrating that the notification was substantive. The NSPE Code provision requiring engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports implicitly encompasses the obligation to ensure that safety-critical findings are communicated in a form that is durable and verifiable. The verbal-only chain of communication in this case fails that standard independently of whether the content of the report was accurate.
In response to Q103: The Board's conditional approval — that Engineer A's silence is ethical only if the public agency takes corrective action within a 'relatively short period' — is analytically incomplete because it defines neither the corrective action required, the timeframe that qualifies as 'relatively short,' nor the verification mechanism Engineer A must employ to confirm compliance. This omission is not a minor gap; it is a structural defect in the Board's ethical framework. Without a defined threshold, Engineer A has no actionable standard against which to measure the public agency's response, and the public has no assurance that the conditional tolerance will ever convert into a mandatory escalation obligation. The Corrective Action Monitoring Before External Escalation principle, as applied by the Board, places the burden of follow-through monitoring on Engineer A without equipping him with the authority, access, or criteria needed to discharge that burden. Responsibility for defining and monitoring the corrective action threshold cannot rest solely with a subconsultant who has no contractual relationship with the public agency and no enforcement authority. The Board should have specified that Engineer A's monitoring obligation requires him to seek written confirmation from VWX that corrective action has been initiated, and that failure to receive such confirmation within a defined period — measured in weeks, not months — triggers an independent obligation to escalate to a relevant regulatory authority.
In response to Q104: Engineer A's status as a subconsultant does not reduce or eliminate his independent public safety escalation obligation under the NSPE Code; it sequences it. The Board's deference to VWX as the prime consultant with 'superior contextual knowledge' is a reasonable procedural accommodation — subconsultants should ordinarily route safety concerns through the prime before escalating independently — but this sequencing logic has a hard limit: once the prime consultant has relayed the concern and the public agency has responded by issuing a suppression instruction, the sequencing rationale is exhausted. At that point, Engineer A's independent obligation to the public is no longer mediated by the client hierarchy. The NSPE Code imposes the duty to hold public safety paramount on every licensed engineer regardless of contractual position, and no contractual arrangement can insulate a subconsultant from that duty once the client chain has demonstrably failed to produce adequate protective action. The Board's continued deference to VWX's superior contextual knowledge after the suppression instruction was issued inappropriately extends the sequencing accommodation into a permanent shield, effectively allowing the prime consultant's judgment to substitute for Engineer A's independent professional obligation to the public.
In response to Q201: The Epistemic Humility principle and the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger principle are in genuine tension, but they are not irreconcilable, and the Board resolves the tension too heavily in favor of epistemic humility. It is correct that Engineer A, as a civil engineer specializing in pavement inspection rather than structural engineering, should calibrate the confidence level of his assertion about the wall defect's causal role. He should not represent a speculative observation as a confirmed structural finding. However, epistemic humility about the causal mechanism does not justify epistemic humility about the obligation to report. The two are distinct. Engineer A can and should communicate his observation with appropriate qualification — 'I observed what appears to be a pre-existing defect in the wall near the accident site; I am not a structural engineer and cannot confirm causation, but the observation warrants expert review' — while still ensuring that communication reaches the appropriate authority in written form. The confirmed fatality raises the stakes of inaction sufficiently that the appropriate response to uncertainty is to escalate with qualification, not to remain silent pending corrective action that may never materialize. The Board's framework conflates the epistemic question (how confident is Engineer A?) with the action question (what must Engineer A do?), and resolves both in favor of restraint when the fatality context demands that the action question be resolved in favor of documented escalation.
In response to Q202: The Board's conclusion that it was ethical for Engineer A to omit the wall defect finding from the final report improperly subordinates the Client Report Suppression Prohibition to the Faithful Agent Obligation in a context where a confirmed fatality is present. The NSPE Code provision requiring engineers to be objective and truthful in professional reports, and to include all relevant and pertinent information, is not a default rule that yields to client preference; it is a professional integrity standard that defines the minimum content of a competent and honest report. When Engineer A's final report is read by any subsequent engineer, inspector, or public official, it will convey — by omission — that no safety-relevant observations were made during the inspection. That false impression is not neutralized by the existence of private field notes that no one outside the immediate parties will access. The Faithful Agent Obligation requires Engineer A to act in his client's interest, but that obligation is bounded by the Code's prohibition on distorting or altering facts and its requirement of truthfulness in professional reports. Omitting a potentially safety-critical observation from a professional report at client direction, in a context involving a confirmed fatality, crosses that boundary. The Board's conclusion on this point reflects an impermissible subordination of public safety paramountcy to client loyalty.
In response to Q203: The Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation principle, as applied by the Board, creates a dangerous precedent by allowing the contractual scope of work to modulate — rather than merely sequence — an engineer's safety reporting obligations. The Board's reasoning implicitly accepts that because Engineer A was retained only to assess pavement damage, his obligation to report the wall defect is discretionary rather than mandatory, and that the speculative nature of the observation further reduces that obligation. This reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, the NSPE Code's public safety paramount obligation is not scope-conditional; it applies to every licensed engineer in every professional engagement. An engineer who incidentally discovers a life-safety hazard during a contracted inspection does not shed their professional license or their Code obligations at the boundary of their scope of work. Second, allowing scope-of-work to modulate safety reporting obligations creates a perverse incentive structure: engineers and clients can effectively suppress safety findings by ensuring that the relevant hazard falls outside the contracted scope. The correct principle is that scope of work defines what Engineer A is obligated to investigate and report as a matter of contract, but it does not define the ceiling of what Engineer A is permitted or obligated to report as a matter of professional ethics when a life-safety hazard is incidentally discovered.
In response to Q204: The Board's tolerance of Engineer A's silence after the suppression instruction reflects an impermissible weighting of reputational and client-relationship concerns over the public's right to know about a potentially dangerous bridge wall. The Premature External Escalation Reputational Harm principle, as invoked by the Board, is a legitimate consideration in cases where the hazard is speculative, the client chain is functioning, and no harm has yet materialized. None of those conditions fully apply here: a person has died, the client chain has actively suppressed the finding rather than acting on it, and the public agency — the entity responsible for the bridge — has been informed only through an unverifiable verbal relay. The Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation and the Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment obligation both point toward independent reporting as the appropriate response once the client chain has demonstrated that it will not produce a written record of the safety concern. The Board's conditional tolerance effectively allows the public agency to avoid accountability by issuing a suppression instruction and then taking no documented corrective action, with no mechanism to compel Engineer A to escalate. This outcome is inconsistent with the public safety paramount principle and reflects an inappropriate prioritization of professional harmony over public protection.
In response to Q301: From a deontological perspective, Engineer A did not fulfill his categorical duty to protect public safety by making a verbal report and then acquiescing to the suppression instruction. Deontological ethics, particularly in its Kantian formulation, requires that duties be discharged in a manner that is universalizable and that treats persons as ends rather than means. If every engineer in Engineer A's position were to accept a verbal-only report relayed through a client chain as sufficient discharge of the public safety duty — and then comply with a suppression instruction that eliminates any written record of the safety concern — the result would be a systematic erosion of the public's ability to rely on engineering reports as truthful and complete professional documents. The categorical duty to hold public safety paramount is not discharged by a private verbal communication that leaves no documentary trace and that the public agency can ignore without consequence. The fact that a person has already died makes the deontological failure more acute: Engineer A's acquiescence to suppression means that the death of Police Officer B may never be connected in any official record to the defect that potentially contributed to it, depriving the public, future engineers, and the legal system of information that is material to public safety accountability.
In response to Q302: From a consequentialist perspective, the Board's conditional approval framework is inadequate because it creates no enforcement mechanism and assigns no monitoring authority capable of ensuring that the public agency actually takes corrective action. The Board's conclusion that non-escalation is ethical 'only if corrective action is taken within a relatively short period' is a conditional that exists entirely in the abstract: Engineer A has no contractual relationship with the public agency, no authority to compel disclosure, no access to the agency's internal decision-making, and no defined standard for what constitutes adequate corrective action. The expected value calculation for public safety under the Board's framework is therefore deeply unfavorable. If the public agency takes corrective action, the outcome is acceptable but was not guaranteed by any mechanism Engineer A controlled. If the public agency does not take corrective action — a plausible outcome given that it issued a suppression instruction — the bridge wall defect remains unaddressed, the public remains at risk, and Engineer A's conditional ethical compliance converts retroactively into an ethical violation with no practical remedy. A consequentialist framework demands that the ethical standard be designed to maximize the probability of the safety-protective outcome, not merely to permit it under favorable conditions. The Board's framework fails that test.
In response to Q303: From a virtue ethics perspective, Engineer A's passive acquiescence to the suppression instruction — without producing a written record of the safety concern, without seeking written confirmation of corrective action, and without escalating independently after the client chain demonstrated it would not produce a documented response — represents a failure of the virtues of honesty, fortitude, and professional responsibility. A person of professional integrity in Engineer A's position would have recognized that the verbal report, while a necessary first step, was insufficient given the fatality context, and would have had the courage to insist on at minimum a written memorandum to VWX documenting the observation and the suppression instruction. The virtue of fortitude in professional practice does not require Engineer A to immediately escalate to regulatory authorities — the Board is correct that premature escalation carries its own risks — but it does require him to resist the path of least resistance when that path leaves a potentially dangerous public infrastructure defect undocumented in any official record. The fact that Engineer A retained the observation in his private field notes is a partial expression of professional integrity, but it is insufficient: field notes that are never transmitted serve the engineer's personal legal protection more than they serve the public's safety. Virtue ethics demands that the engineer's conduct be oriented toward the public good, not merely toward personal defensibility.
In response to Q304: Engineer A's status as a subconsultant does not diminish or eliminate the independent duty owed directly to the public under the NSPE Code. The Code's public safety paramount obligation is imposed on every licensed engineer by virtue of licensure, not by virtue of contractual position. The subconsultant relationship defines the sequence and routing of Engineer A's professional obligations — he should report to VWX before escalating independently — but it does not define the ceiling of those obligations. Once the client chain has been exhausted and has produced a suppression instruction rather than protective action, Engineer A's independent duty to the public is no longer mediated by the contractual hierarchy. The Board's deference to the prime consultant's superior contextual knowledge is appropriate as a sequencing principle but becomes ethically problematic when it is extended to justify permanent silence after the prime consultant has relayed the concern and the public agency has responded with suppression. At that point, the subconsultant's independent professional obligation to the public — grounded in licensure, not contract — requires independent action. The NSPE Code does not create a tiered system of public safety obligations in which subconsultants bear lesser duties than prime consultants; it creates a uniform duty that is sequenced by professional hierarchy but not diminished by it.
In response to Q401: If Engineer A had converted his verbal safety report into a written memorandum transmitted directly to both VWX and the public agency before the suppression instruction was issued, the public agency would have been in a materially different legal and ethical position. A written memorandum, once transmitted, creates a documentary record that cannot be suppressed retroactively: the public agency could instruct Engineer A not to include the finding in his final report, but it could not un-receive the memorandum or deny awareness of the defect. This would have created a documented chain of notice that would have been available to investigators, regulators, and courts in connection with the death of Police Officer B. The outcome for public safety would likely have been materially better: the public agency, aware that a written record of its notice existed, would have faced stronger institutional incentives to take documented corrective action. The counterfactual reveals that the timing of Engineer A's written documentation — before versus after the suppression instruction — is not merely procedural; it is the critical variable that determines whether the public agency can plausibly deny adequate notice. The Board's framework, by permitting verbal-only notification and acquiescence to suppression, allows the public agency to exploit the absence of a written record in a way that a pre-suppression written memorandum would have foreclosed.
In response to Q402: If the wall defect had been within Engineer A's explicit scope of work rather than incidentally discovered, the Board almost certainly would not have reached the same conclusion permitting omission from the final report. The Board's reasoning relies heavily on the speculative, out-of-scope nature of the observation as a mitigating factor that reduces Engineer A's reporting obligation. When a finding is within scope, the engineer has been specifically retained to identify, assess, and document it; omitting it from the final report at client direction would be an unambiguous violation of the professional report integrity standard and the truthfulness obligation under the NSPE Code. The counterfactual reveals that the Board's framework creates an ethically perverse incentive: findings that are most clearly within an engineer's professional competence and contractual responsibility are most clearly protected from suppression, while findings that are incidental — and therefore potentially less rigorously assessed — are more susceptible to client-directed omission. This inversion is dangerous because incidental discoveries of life-safety hazards are precisely the category of finding where public safety paramountcy should be most robustly enforced, not least, since the engineer has no contractual obligation to investigate further and the public has no other mechanism to ensure the finding is documented.
The Board resolved the tension between Faithful Agent Obligation and Public Welfare Paramount by treating them as sequentially rather than simultaneously operative: Engineer A first satisfied client loyalty by routing the safety concern through the client chain (verbal report to VWX, which relayed it to the public agency), and only after that chain failed to produce corrective action would Public Welfare Paramount independently override client deference. This sequential resolution is ethically coherent in low-certainty contexts but becomes increasingly strained as harm severity rises. Because a fatality had already occurred and the defect was a plausible contributing cause, the Board's sequential model effectively subordinated a confirmed-fatality escalation trigger to a client-loyalty norm that was designed for prospective, speculative risks. The case therefore teaches that when harm has already materialized and a causal link — even speculative — exists, the sequential model should collapse into a simultaneous one: client loyalty and public safety must be satisfied concurrently, not in series, meaning a written record transmitted to both the client and a public authority is the minimum ethical floor, not an optional escalation.
The Epistemic Humility Constraint and the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger were not genuinely reconciled by the Board — they were applied in parallel without acknowledging their direct conflict. The Board used Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise to justify calibrating the disclosure obligation downward (verbal report, omission from final report, no external escalation), while simultaneously acknowledging that a person had died in circumstances potentially linked to the defect. These two principles pull in opposite directions: epistemic humility counsels restraint proportional to uncertainty, while a confirmed fatality demands heightened action proportional to realized harm. The case teaches that domain-competence boundaries cannot function as a ceiling on safety escalation obligations when harm has already been realized. An engineer who lacks the expertise to confirm a defect is not thereby relieved of the obligation to ensure that someone with the requisite expertise formally evaluates it — and the mechanism for ensuring that evaluation is a written, documented report, not a verbal chain that can be suppressed. Epistemic humility should calibrate the engineer's own causal conclusions, not the intensity of the escalation pathway used to bring the concern to qualified attention.
The interaction between the Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation and the Out-of-Scope Safety Observation Discretionary Response reveals a structural ambiguity in how the Board treats incidental safety discoveries: the Board correctly held that scope of work does not shield Engineer A from the obligation to disclose the wall defect at all, but then inconsistently allowed scope of work to justify omission from the final written report. This creates a dangerous precedent in which the mode of disclosure — verbal versus written — is treated as ethically equivalent when it is not. A verbal report through a client chain is suppressible; a written report in a professional deliverable is not. By permitting the client's scope argument to determine the form of disclosure rather than merely the depth of Engineer A's own analysis, the Board effectively allowed scope-of-work to function as a partial shield against the very public safety obligation it nominally rejected. The case teaches that when an engineer incidentally discovers a life-safety hazard, scope of work may legitimately limit the engineer's analytical obligation (how deeply to investigate) but cannot limit the documentation obligation (whether to create a written record accessible to responsible parties). The Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation and the Public Welfare Paramount principle are only coherently reconciled if written documentation is treated as the non-negotiable minimum, independent of scope.
The Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing principle — which the Board used to differentiate the present case from NSPE Case No. 89-7 on the basis that Engineer A's observation was self-generated through inspection rather than confided by a client — reveals that the Board's confidentiality analysis rests on the source of information rather than the nature of the public risk. This distinction is ethically principled in confidentiality law but becomes ethically problematic when applied to public safety escalation obligations. In Case No. 89-7, the engineer's obligation to report to external authorities was triggered by the severity and certainty of the code violations, not merely by the absence of a confidentiality agreement. In the present case, the Board used the reduced confidentiality expectation (no client-confided information) to lower the escalation threshold, but then paradoxically used the speculative nature of the finding to lower it further still — producing a double discount on the escalation obligation that is not justified by either precedent alone. The case teaches that source-of-information distinctions should modulate confidentiality obligations but should not modulate public safety escalation obligations, which must be calibrated to the severity and probability of harm rather than to the provenance of the engineer's knowledge.
The Sub-Consultant Safety Escalation Independence Obligation and the Prime Consultant Contextual Superiority Deference principle were resolved by the Board in favor of deference, but this resolution is only defensible if the prime consultant's superior contextual knowledge is actually exercised in the public interest. The Board's reasoning implicitly assumes that VWX, having received the verbal report and relayed it to the public agency, is better positioned than Engineer A to assess whether further escalation is warranted. This assumption is structurally sound in normal professional hierarchies but fails in the specific context where the prime consultant has participated in — or at minimum acquiesced to — the suppression instruction. Once VWX transmitted the public agency's suppression request to Engineer A rather than resisting it, VWX forfeited its claim to contextual superiority as a justification for Engineer A's deference. The case teaches that subconsultant deference to a prime consultant is ethically conditioned on the prime consultant actively discharging its own public safety obligations. When the prime consultant becomes a conduit for a suppression instruction rather than a guardian of public safety, the subconsultant's independent escalation obligation is not merely preserved — it is activated. Engineer A's continued silence after receiving the suppression instruction through VWX therefore represents an independent ethical failure that the Board's deference framework does not adequately address.
Confidentiality Non-Bar Safety Disclosure Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A independently observed the wall defect during inspection; no explicit confidentiality agreement existed; the public agency's instruction not to include the finding in the report did not create a confidentiality obligation that could override the public safety duty
Confidentiality Non-Bar to Safety-Critical Regulatory Disclosure Constraint
The absence of an explicit confidentiality agreement — combined with the fact that Engineer A independently observed the wall defect rather than receiving it as client-confided information — meant that no confidentiality obligation barred Engineer A from disclosing the wall defect finding to the responsible public authority.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section III.4; BER precedent on confidentiality vs. public safety
Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred.
From the time of observation through the completion of the project
Confirmed Fatality Causal Surmise Written Escalation Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A surmised the wall defect may have contributed to the fatal accident and noted this in his engineering notes; he verbally reported it through VWX but took no further action after the suppression instruction
Confirmed-Fatality Causal Surmise Mandatory Written Escalation Constraint
Engineer A's professional surmise that the wall defect may have causally contributed to Police Officer B's confirmed fatal accident — even without expert-level structural engineering confirmation — created a mandatory written escalation obligation to the responsible public authority that could not be discharged by verbal notification alone or by retention of personal engineering notes.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1, II.1; BER precedent on confirmed-fatality escalation obligations
From the time Engineer A formed the causal surmise during the bridge inspection
Police Officer B loses control of his patrol car. The vehicle crashed into the bridge wall. The wall failed to restrain the vehicle, which fell to the river below, killing Police Officer B.
Confirmed Violation vs. Speculation Proportionality — Case 89-7 vs. Present Bridge Case
The Board identified the speculative vs. confirmed distinction as the hinge point of the case, noting that in Case No. 89-7 the client had essentially admitted serious code violations, while in the present case the possibility of a defect was merely speculation and surmise.
Confirmed Violation vs. Speculation Proportionality Constraint
The speculative, unconfirmed nature of Engineer A's wall defect observation — contrasted with the confirmed code violations admitted by the client in Case No. 89-7 — constrained the scope and immediacy of Engineer A's reporting obligations, permitting a more measured verbal-only escalation approach rather than the direct public authority reporting required for confirmed violations.
At the time of the wall defect observation and reporting decision
Should Engineer A retain the wall defect observation solely in private field notes, produce a written memorandum to VWX documenting the observation and his surmise, or include the finding in the final report despite the client's suppression instruction?
Engineer A, having incidentally observed a pre-existing wall defect during a pavement inspection and professionally surmised it may have contributed to Police Officer B's fatal crash, must decide how to document that observation — whether to retain it only in private field notes, convert it into a written memorandum transmitted to VWX and the public agency, or include it in the final report despite the suppression instruction.
Preserve the wall defect observation exclusively in private engineering field notes, complying with the suppression instruction for the final report and making no separate written communication to VWX or the public agency.
Convert the verbal safety report into a written memorandum transmitted to VWX documenting the observation, the professional surmise of causal connection to the fatality, and the suppression instruction received — creating a durable record without including the finding in the final report.
Include the wall defect observation in the final report with appropriate epistemic qualification — noting it as a speculative, out-of-scope observation warranting expert structural review — despite the client's suppression instruction, on the grounds that the confirmed-fatality context makes omission ethically impermissible.
Should Engineer A resist VWX's instruction to omit the wall defect finding from the final report, comply with the instruction while retaining the observation in field notes, or comply with the instruction while producing a separate written notification to the public agency documenting the suppression?
Engineer A, having verbally reported the wall defect through the client chain and received a suppression instruction relayed from the public agency through VWX, must decide whether to resist the instruction to omit the finding from the final report, comply with it while preserving the observation in field notes, or comply while simultaneously notifying the public agency in writing of the suppression.
Accept VWX's instruction to omit the wall defect finding from the final report, preserving the observation only in private engineering field notes and making no further written communication to any party.
Decline to comply with the suppression instruction and include the wall defect observation in the final report with appropriate epistemic qualification, on the grounds that the confirmed-fatality context makes client-directed omission of a potentially safety-critical finding ethically impermissible.
Comply with the instruction to omit the finding from the final report while simultaneously transmitting a separate written memorandum directly to the public agency documenting the observation, the professional surmise, and the suppression instruction — ensuring a durable written record exists outside the suppressed deliverable.
Should Engineer A report the wall defect finding independently to an external public authority immediately after receiving the suppression instruction, defer independent reporting pending a defined monitoring period for corrective action, or refrain from independent external reporting entirely given his subconsultant status and the speculative nature of his observation?
Engineer A, having verbally reported the wall defect through the client chain and received a suppression instruction, must decide whether to report the finding independently to an external public authority — immediately upon receiving the suppression instruction, after a defined monitoring period during which he seeks written confirmation of corrective action, or not at all given his subconsultant status and the speculative nature of his observation.
Decline to report to any external public authority, relying on the public agency's receipt of the verbal report through VWX as sufficient notification and passively monitoring whether corrective action is taken within a reasonable period.
Defer independent external reporting for a defined short period while affirmatively seeking written confirmation from VWX that the public agency has initiated corrective action, with a commitment to escalate directly to a relevant regulatory or safety authority if written confirmation is not received within that period.
Report the wall defect observation directly to a relevant regulatory or safety authority immediately upon receiving the suppression instruction, on the grounds that the confirmed fatality and the client chain's demonstrated disposition toward non-disclosure independently trigger the mandatory escalation obligation without a monitoring period.
Should Engineer A treat his subconsultant status as sequencing his escalation obligation — deferring to VWX's superior contextual knowledge even after the suppression instruction — or as activating his independent escalation duty once VWX transmitted rather than resisted the suppression instruction?
Engineer A, as a subconsultant whose verbal safety report was relayed through VWX to the public agency and then suppressed by that same agency, must determine whether his subconsultant status sequences his independent public safety escalation obligation — requiring him to exhaust the client chain before acting independently — or whether the prime consultant's transmission of the suppression instruction forfeits VWX's claim to contextual superiority and immediately activates Engineer A's independent escalation duty.
Treat VWX's transmission of the suppression instruction as a professional judgment informed by superior contextual knowledge, continuing to defer to the client chain and monitoring passively for corrective action without independently escalating to external authorities.
Recognize that VWX's transmission of the suppression instruction — rather than resistance to it — forfeits VWX's claim to contextual superiority and immediately activates Engineer A's independent obligation to escalate the safety concern directly to an appropriate public authority.
Before independently escalating, formally communicate to VWX in writing that Engineer A regards the suppression instruction as inconsistent with his professional obligations and request that VWX resist the instruction or confirm in writing that it has done so — escalating independently only if VWX declines to resist.
Should Engineer A calibrate his reporting obligation downward based on the speculative, out-of-scope nature of his wall defect observation, or calibrate it upward based on the confirmed fatality context — and does that calibration determine whether a verbal client-chain report is sufficient or whether written escalation to public authorities is mandatory?
Engineer A must determine how to calibrate his public safety reporting obligation given the tension between epistemic humility — his observation was speculative and outside his structural engineering expertise — and the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger, which holds that Police Officer B's confirmed death plausibly linked to the defect demands heightened mandatory action regardless of the observer's domain expertise or causal certainty.
Treat the speculative, out-of-scope nature of the observation as the dominant calibration factor, accepting that a verbal report through the client chain — with the observation preserved in field notes — satisfies the public safety obligation given Engineer A's lack of structural expertise and the unconfirmed causal link.
Treat the confirmed fatality as the dominant calibration factor, producing a written communication to the public agency — qualified to reflect Engineer A's speculative surmise and lack of structural expertise — that documents the observation and requests formal structural evaluation, on the grounds that epistemic humility governs the confidence level of the assertion, not the obligation to escalate.
Recognize that Engineer A's lack of structural expertise is itself the reason to escalate rather than a reason to remain silent — formally recommend to VWX in writing that a qualified structural engineer be retained to evaluate the wall defect, treating this referral as the mechanism by which Engineer A discharges his public safety obligation without overstepping his domain competence.
Should Engineer A treat his pavement-only scope of work as justifying discretionary, verbal-only disclosure of the incidentally observed wall defect, or as defining only his analytical investigation duty — leaving intact a non-scope-conditional written documentation obligation to ensure the safety concern is accessible to responsible public authorities?
Engineer A must determine whether his scope of work — limited to pavement inspection — legitimately reduces his wall defect reporting obligation to discretionary, or whether the public welfare paramount principle imposes a non-scope-conditional documentation obligation that requires him to produce a written record of the incidentally discovered life-safety hazard regardless of contractual boundaries, particularly given the confirmed fatality context.
Accept that the pavement-only scope of work reduces the wall defect reporting obligation to discretionary, permitting verbal-only disclosure through the client chain and omission from the final report, on the grounds that Engineer A was not retained to assess structural conditions and his observation was speculative and incidental.
Recognize that scope of work defines Engineer A's analytical investigation duty — he need not conduct a structural assessment — but does not define the ceiling of his written documentation obligation, requiring him to produce a written record of the incidentally observed life-safety hazard accessible to responsible public authorities regardless of whether it appears in the pavement-focused final report.
Include the wall defect observation in the final report with a formal recommendation that VWX or the public agency commission a separate structural assessment within an expanded scope, treating the incidental discovery as triggering a professional obligation to flag the need for expert evaluation rather than to conduct that evaluation personally.
Engineer A's ongoing obligation to follow through on corrective action was not yet discharged
Failure to independently report may be viewed as complicity in suppression if the defect is later confirmed as causal in Officer B's death
If the public agency does not take corrective action, the defective condition may persist and cause future harm
Avoidance of premature escalation based on unverified, speculative observations
Fidelity to client relationship within ethical limits
Reasonable deference to the prime consultant and public agency who have broader project authority and context
Deference to those with broader authority and expertise when observation is speculative
Paramount obligation to public health and safety as an ongoing, not one-time, duty
Proportionality in professional response to uncertain safety observations
Defer to the client chain, which had already verbally communicated the information to the public agency, rather than independently escalating a speculative, unverified observation to external authorities, thereby avoiding overreaction and protecting the professional reputations of the client and public agency
Arguably, paramount duty to public health and safety may require independent reporting if client chain fails to act
Obligation to consider alternatives if public agency does not take corrective action (per Discussion)
Ongoing obligation to follow through and ensure corrective action is actually taken, not yet discharged
Assessment of the sufficiency of existing reporting channels
Judgment about when professional observations rise to the level requiring independent external reporting
Understanding of the limits of one's own expertise in evaluating a potential hazard
After final report submission and post-inspection
Engineer A made a deliberate decision not to report the observed defective wall condition or his surmise about its role in the fatal accident to any public authority or agency beyond his immediate client chain, accepting that the verbal reporting chain was sufficient under the circumstances.
The public agency is now formally aware (verbally) of the potential defect; the locus of decision-making authority shifts to the agency; Engineer A's direct reporting obligation is partially discharged, though questions remain about adequacy of verbal-only reporting
Shortly after Engineer A's verbal report to VWX, during post-accident inspection period
After Engineer A verbally reports the defect observation to his client (VWX), VWX verbally relays the information to the public agency. This creates a documented chain of verbal communication that the information reached the responsible authority.
Document Out-of-Scope Defect in Field Notes
Documentation of speculative observations could expose Engineer A or his client to liability
Field notes could become subject to legal discovery in proceedings related to Officer B's death
Retaining the information could create future pressure to act on or disclose it
Duty to preserve information that may bear on public health and safety
Obligation not to alter or suppress professional observations made during the course of work
Professional obligation to maintain accurate and complete engineering field notes
Integrity and honesty in professional documentation
Paramount obligation to public health and safety
Professional responsibility to record observations accurately
Create a contemporaneous professional record of an observed condition that may be relevant to public safety and the prior fatal accident, preserving the information for potential future reference
Judgment to recognize potentially safety-relevant conditions
Professional observation and field documentation skills
Understanding of limits of own expertise
Engineer A made a deliberate professional decision to note an apparent pre-existing defective wall condition, observed during the inspection but outside his contracted scope, in his engineering field notes, including his surmise that it may have contributed to the fatal wall failure.
Document Out-of-Scope Defect in Field Notes → Defect Information Relayed Upward
Engineer A made a deliberate professional decision to note an apparent pre-existing defective wall condition in his field notes, which formed the basis for his subsequent verbal report to VWX, who then relayed the information to the public agency
Had Engineer A not documented and verbally reported the defect, the information would not have reached VWX or the public agency, and the suppression instruction would never have been issued
Engineer A's professional recognition of the defect as significant
His decision to formally document it in field notes
His subsequent verbal report to VWX as his client
Documentation in field notes + verbal report to VWX + VWX's decision to relay information upward to the public agency
Engineer Public Safety Escalation Standard
The public agency contacts VWX Architects and Engineers which then contacts Engineer A and asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report
Engineer A after receiving client instruction not to include wall defect in final report
Governs Engineer A's obligation to escalate the safety-critical wall defect finding to public authorities when the client instructs him to suppress it from the formal report, including whether verbal reporting to the client chain is sufficient or whether direct reporting to a public agency is required.
Engineer Safety Recommendation Rejection Standard
Engineer A states that he will retain the information from his engineering notes but not include it in the final report, as requested
Engineer A after client instructs him to omit the wall defect finding
Governs Engineer A's obligations after the client and public agency effectively reject his safety finding by instructing him not to include it in the final report, including whether he must document the rejection, advise of risks, and escalate to other authorities.
Engineer A Affirmative Public Safety Reporting Action Bridge Wall Defect
Affirmative Public Safety Reporting Action Determination Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to determine the specific affirmative actions required to fulfill his public safety obligation — including identifying to whom the wall defect must be reported in writing, what technical information must be compiled, and what form of reporting was required beyond verbal notification through the client chain.
Post-suppression-instruction determination of affirmative public safety reporting actions
Engineer A did not take affirmative action to report the wall defect to any public agency or authority beyond the verbal report through VWX.
Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidential Report Brief Mention Insufficiency Building Sale
Confidential Report Brief Mention Insufficiency for Public Authority Safety Notification Recognition Capability
In Case No. 89-7, Engineer A lacked the capability to recognize that including a brief mention of the electrical and mechanical code violations in his confidential structural report did not satisfy the independent professional obligation to notify appropriate public authorities of those violations.
In Case No. 89-7, Engineer A's brief mention of code violations in a confidential report was found insufficient to satisfy the obligation to notify public authorities, establishing the precedent applied in the present bridge case.
Engineer A made only a brief mention of the code violations in his confidential report and did not report them to public authorities, which the Board found unethical — demonstrating a failure to recognize the insufficiency of the brief mention for public authority notification purposes.
Engineer A (Case 89-7 Confidentiality-Bound Building Sale Engineer)
in his report, Engineer A made a brief mention of his conversation with the client concerning the deficiencies; however, in view of the terms of the agreement, Engineer A did not report the safety violations to any third party.
In deciding it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities
Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidentiality Pre-emption Public Safety Building Sale
Confidentiality Pre-emption by Public Safety Recognition Capability
In Case No. 89-7, Engineer A possessed — but failed to exercise — the capability to recognize that the confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations in the occupied apartment building were sufficiently serious that the public safety obligation pre-empted the explicit confidentiality agreement with the client, requiring notification to appropriate public authorities.
In the comparative reference case (Case No. 89-7), Engineer A failed to report confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations to public authorities despite knowing they could injure building occupants, relying instead on a brief mention in a confidential report.
The Board found it unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to appropriate public authorities in Case No. 89-7, despite the explicit confidentiality agreement, because the public safety obligation pre-empted the confidentiality duty.
In deciding it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities, the Board noted that the facts presented in the case raised a conflict between two basic ethical obligations of an engineer.
Engineer A made a brief mention of his conversation with the client concerning the deficiencies; however, in view of the terms of the agreement, Engineer A did not report the safety violations to any third party.
the client confided in Engineer A and inform him that the building contained deficiencies in the electrical and mechanical systems, which violated applicable codes and standards.
Engineer A Causal Surmise Wall Defect Police Officer B Fatality
Confirmed-Fatality-Linked Structural Defect Causal Surmise Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to form a professional surmise that the observed wall defect may have causally contributed to the fatal accident involving Police Officer B, and to document this surmise in his engineering notes.
Bridge inspection; wall defect observed near site of confirmed fatal accident three months prior
Engineer A surmised that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and noted this in his engineering notes.
Engineer A Client Relationship as Subconsultant to VWX
From retention by VWX through completion of the bridge inspection engagement
VWX Architects and Engineers retains the services of Engineer A, a civil engineer, as its subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on the bridge.
Engineer A's professional engagement as subconsultant to VWX Architects and Engineers for bridge inspection services
Completion of the inspection engagement and submission of final report
VWX retains Engineer A as subconsultant for bridge inspection services
Engineer A Client Suppression Instruction Recognition Wall Defect
Client Report Suppression Instruction Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to fully exercise the capability to recognize that VWX's instruction — relayed from the public agency — to omit the wall defect finding from the final report constituted a suppression directive that did not extinguish his professional obligation to document and report the finding.
Suppression instruction relayed through prime consultant from public agency client
Engineer A agreed to omit the wall defect from his final report as instructed, without independently escalating to public authorities.
Engineer A Confidentiality Non-Applicability Public Danger Bridge Wall
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Assessment Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to assess whether any implied confidentiality arising from his sub-consultant relationship barred disclosure of the wall defect to public authorities, and to correctly determine that public danger pre-empts confidentiality.
Sub-consultant relationship implied confidentiality vs. public danger disclosure obligation
Engineer A did not report the wall defect to any public agency or authority, implicitly treating the client instruction as a confidentiality constraint that barred independent disclosure.
Engineer A Confidentiality Pre-emption Public Safety Bridge Wall
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to recognize that any implied confidentiality arising from his sub-consultant relationship was pre-empted by the public safety obligation created by the confirmed fatality and structural defect on public infrastructure.
Implied sub-consultant confidentiality vs. public safety pre-emption in bridge wall defect case
Engineer A did not recognize that public safety pre-empted any implied confidentiality, treating the client instruction as a binding constraint on his disclosure obligations.
Engineer A Contextual Safety Reporting Calibration Bridge Fatality Wall Defect
Contextual Safety Reporting Calibration Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to calibrate his public safety reporting obligation to the high-context factors present — confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, and suppression instruction — recognizing that these factors required more than verbal notification through the client chain.
Confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, structural defect, suppression instruction — all present simultaneously
Engineer A did not calibrate his reporting to the elevated context, treating the situation as one requiring only verbal notification through the client chain.
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure
Engineer A Corrective Action Monitoring Bridge Wall Defect Post-Verbal-Report
Corrective Action Follow-Through Monitoring After Verbal Out-of-Scope Report Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize the continuing professional obligation to follow through and monitor whether the public agency took correct corrective action after receiving verbal notification of the wall defect through VWX, and to assess whether the absence of corrective action would trigger an obligation to escalate independently.
After verbally reporting the wall defect through VWX to the public agency and agreeing not to include it in the final report, Engineer A retained an obligation to monitor for corrective action and escalate if none was taken.
The Board found that Engineer A had an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action was taken by the public agency, and that only if the public agency failed to take corrective action should Engineer A consider alternatives.
Engineer A (Corrective Action Monitoring Sub-Consultant)
the Board is of the opinion that Engineer A has an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action is taken by the public agency.
Only if the public agency does not take corrective action should Engineer A consider alternatives.
Engineer A Corrective Action Monitoring Post-Verbal-Report Bridge Wall
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to monitor whether the public agency took corrective action following his verbal report of the wall defect, and to escalate independently if no corrective action was taken.
Post-verbal-report monitoring obligation after agreeing to omit finding from final report
Engineer A agreed not to include the wall defect in his final report and did not subsequently monitor corrective action or escalate when no action was evident.
Engineer A Corrective Action Pursuit Scope Self-Determination Bridge Wall
Corrective Action Pursuit Scope Self-Determination Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to determine how far his obligation to seek corrective action extended beyond his initial verbal report through VWX, recognizing that the obligation was not discharged by a single verbal notification through the client chain.
Post-verbal-notification corrective action pursuit scope determination
Engineer A did not pursue corrective action beyond the initial verbal report, accepting the suppression instruction as the end of his obligation.
Engineer A Domain-Specific Competence Boundary Wall Defect Bridge Case
Domain-Specific Competence Boundary Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that his observation of the wall defect was outside his domain of expertise — he was not a structural engineer — and that this competence boundary limited the weight of his observation and precluded him from including it as a confirmed finding in his formal report.
Engineer A was retained for pavement damage inspection and lacked structural engineering expertise; the Board found this competence boundary relevant to the appropriate scope of his professional response to the wall defect observation.
The Board noted that Engineer A lacked structural engineering expertise, which contributed to the characterization of his wall defect observation as speculative surmise rather than a confirmed professional finding.
Engineer A (Bridge Sub-Consultant Inspector)
it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.
Engineer A Engineering Notes Written Transmission Wall Defect
Engineering Notes Safety Finding Formal Written Transmission Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to translate his engineering notes documenting the wall defect observation into a formal written communication to VWX, the public agency, or appropriate public authorities.
Engineering notes containing safety-relevant finding not converted to formal written communication
Engineer A retained the wall defect information in his engineering notes but did not transmit it in written form to any party beyond the verbal report to VWX.
Engineer A Faithful Agent Client-Safety Balance Navigation Bridge Wall Defect
Faithful Agent Public Safety Paramount Classical Dilemma Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize and navigate the classical ethical dilemma between faithful agent obligations to VWX and the public agency and the paramount obligation to protect public health and safety, correctly balancing these obligations through a graduated response that reported verbally through the client chain while monitoring for corrective action.
The Board found that Engineer A acted reasonably by properly balancing his faithful agent obligations to VWX and the public agency with his paramount obligation to public health and safety.
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX, documented it in field notes, and monitored for corrective action — a graduated response that the Board found appropriately balanced faithful agent and public safety obligations.
the Board is convinced that Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose what might be considered by the client to be confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety.
Engineer A Faithful Agent Trustee Confidentiality Obligation Source Recognition Bridge Case
Faithful Agent and Trustee Confidentiality Obligation Source Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that his confidentiality obligations to VWX and the public agency arose from his dual role as faithful agent and trustee, and that these obligations were rooted in the fiduciary relationship rather than in any explicit contractual confidentiality agreement.
The Board explained that engineers act as agents or trustees to their clients and are expected to maintain confidentiality of information revealed in the course of professional services, providing the normative foundation for Engineer A's confidentiality considerations.
The Board's analysis of the rationale for confidentiality obligations in the NSPE Code, identifying the faithful agent and trustee roles as the source of those obligations, applied to Engineer A's situation.
They are privy to a great deal of information and background concerning the business affairs of their client. The disclosure of confidential information could be quite detrimental to the interests of their client and, therefore, engineers as 'agents' or 'trustees' are expected to maintain the confidential nature of the information revealed to them in the course of rendering their professional services.
Engineer A Field Notes Wall Defect Preservation Non-Alteration Bridge Case
Field Notes Safety Observation Preservation Non-Alteration Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize the absolute obligation to preserve his field notes documenting the wall defect observation in their original, unaltered form, and to document the speculative observation in field notes for possible future reference even though it was excluded from the formal report.
Engineer A documented the incidental wall defect observation in field notes for possible future reference, while excluding it from the formal written report; the Board found field note documentation appropriate and alteration absolutely prohibited.
Engineer A documented the wall defect observation in his engineering field notes and did not alter those notes, consistent with the Board's finding that field note documentation was appropriate and alteration was absolutely prohibited.
However, under no circumstance would it be appropriate for Engineer A to alter his field notes.
While it may be appropriate for Engineer A to note such information in his field notes
the Board concludes that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate.
Engineer A Imminent vs Non-Imminent Structural Risk Calibration Bridge Wall
Imminent vs Non-Imminent Structural Risk Escalation Calibration Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to assess whether the bridge wall defect — already linked to a confirmed fatality — represented an imminent ongoing risk to bridge users, and to calibrate the urgency and scope of his escalation accordingly.
Bridge wall defect with confirmed fatality; assessment of ongoing imminence of risk to bridge users
Engineer A did not assess the imminence of ongoing risk from the wall defect, treating the situation as one where verbal notification through the client chain was a proportionate response.
Engineer A Incidental Out-of-Scope Wall Defect Identification Bridge Case
Incidental Observation Out-of-Scope Safety Deficiency Identification Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize, upon incidental observation during his contracted pavement inspection, that the pre-existing wall condition constituted a potential safety deficiency outside his contracted scope, triggering professional disclosure and notification obligations.
Engineer A, retained for pavement damage inspection, incidentally observed a pre-existing wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident and recognized the obligation to disclose it through the client chain despite it being outside his contracted scope.
Engineer A identified the wall defect during his pavement inspection and recognized it as a safety-relevant observation requiring disclosure to VWX, even though it fell outside his contracted scope of work.
Engineer A was retained to perform a specific task for which he was presumably competent.
the circumstances bearing on the public safety were revealed to the engineer as part of the engineer's inspection and professional observations.
Engineer A Incidental Wall Defect Discovery
From the moment Engineer A notices the wall defect during inspection through the conclusion of the engagement
Incidental Structural Deficiency Discovery State
Engineer A's discovery of apparent pre-existing defective wall condition during bridge inspection
Not terminated — finding persists in engineering notes but is excluded from final report
Engineer A observes apparent pre-existing defective condition in the bridge wall near the accident site while conducting pavement inspection
Engineer A Incidental Wall Defect Identification Bridge Inspection
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize, while performing a contracted pavement inspection, that an out-of-scope pre-existing wall defect constituted a safety-relevant condition triggering professional disclosure obligations.
Bridge pavement inspection sub-consultancy; out-of-scope wall defect observation near fatal accident site
Engineer A noticed the apparent pre-existing defective condition in the bridge wall outside his contracted pavement inspection scope and recognized it as safety-relevant, noting it in his engineering notes.
although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred
Engineer A Mitigating Factor Weighted Obligation Scope Bridge Wall
Mitigating Factor Weighted Safety Obligation Scope Determination Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to weigh all relevant factors — confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, speculative causal surmise, sub-consultant role, verbal notification already given — to determine the calibrated scope of his safety reporting obligation.
Multiple contextual factors bearing on scope of safety reporting obligation in sub-consultant bridge inspection
Engineer A did not systematically weigh these factors, defaulting to compliance with the suppression instruction without independent escalation.
Engineer A verbally reports this information to his client
Engineer A Multi-Agency Jurisdiction Identification Bridge Wall Escalation
Multi-Agency Jurisdiction Identification for Safety Escalation Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to identify all agencies and authorities having jurisdiction over the bridge wall safety concern — including transportation authorities, bridge safety regulators, and law enforcement oversight bodies — to whom independent written escalation could be directed.
Post-suppression-instruction identification of appropriate public authorities for independent escalation
Engineer A did not identify or contact any additional public agency or authority beyond the verbal report through VWX.
Engineer A No-Confidentiality-Agreement Reduced Expectation Assessment Bridge Case
No-Confidentiality-Agreement Reduced Client Confidentiality Expectation Assessment Capability
Engineer A and the Board possessed the capability to recognize that the public agency's confidentiality expectation was materially reduced because no explicit confidentiality agreement existed and the safety-relevant information was discovered through Engineer A's own professional inspection rather than being directly conveyed by the client.
Unlike Case No. 89-7 where an explicit confidentiality agreement existed and the client directly conveyed the information, in the present case no agreement existed and the wall defect was discovered through Engineer A's own inspection.
Board analysis distinguishing the present case from Case No. 89-7 on the grounds that no confidentiality agreement existed and the information was self-discovered through professional observation.
in the present case, it is difficult for this Board to conclude that the client or the public agency could have had a genuine expectation of confidentiality, since nothing of a confidential nature was directly conveyed by the client or the public agency to Engineer A.
in the present case, there is nothing to indicate under the facts that an agreement exists between any of the parties to maintain the confidentiality of all or part of any reports prepared by the engineer.
Engineer A Passive Acquiescence Ethical Insufficiency Wall Defect
Passive Acquiescence Ethical Insufficiency Self-Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to recognize that agreeing to omit the wall defect from his final report — without independently escalating to public authorities — constituted passive acquiescence to a known safety concern, representing an independent ethical failure.
Engineer A's compliance with suppression instruction without independent escalation
Engineer A agreed not to include the wall defect in his final report and did not report the information to any other public agency or authority.
Engineer A Passive Acquiescence Suppression Instruction Ethical Insufficiency Bridge Case
Engineer A possessed — but may not have fully exercised — the capability to recognize that passively acquiescing to the suppression instruction from VWX/public agency, without actively insisting on corrective action or escalating independently, constituted an independent ethical failure requiring active resistance.
Engineer A received a suppression instruction relayed through VWX from the public agency; the Board found that passive acquiescence without corrective action monitoring would have been ethically insufficient.
The Board found that Engineer A had an obligation to follow through to see that correct corrective action was taken, implying that passive acquiescence to the suppression instruction without monitoring for corrective action would have been ethically insufficient.
Engineer A Premature External Authority Reporting Overreaction Recognition Bridge Case
Premature External Authority Reporting Overreaction Recognition Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that reporting the speculative wall defect observation directly to a public authority — before determining whether the client chain had taken corrective action — would have constituted an overreaction that could jeopardize the professional reputations of VWX and the public agency without adequate technical basis.
The Board found that Engineer A's decision not to immediately report the speculative wall defect observation to public authorities was appropriate, and that doing so before corrective action was assessed would have been an overreaction.
Engineer A refrained from directly reporting the speculative wall defect observation to public authorities before the client chain had an opportunity to take corrective action, consistent with the Board's finding that such direct reporting would have been an overreaction.
for Engineer A to have reported this information to a public authority under the circumstances as outlined in the facts, before determining whether corrective action is taken, would have been an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of his client and the public agency.
Engineer A Present-vs-Precedent Factual Distinction Bridge Wall vs Case 89-7
Present-vs-Precedent Factual Distinction Escalation Scope Calibration Capability
Engineer A needed to exercise the capability to distinguish the bridge wall defect case — involving confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, and no explicit confidentiality agreement — from the comparative Case 89-7 involving a private building sale with an explicit confidentiality agreement, and to calibrate his escalation scope accordingly.
Comparative case analysis: bridge wall defect with confirmed fatality vs. building sale with explicit confidentiality agreement
Engineer A did not distinguish the present case from the more confidentiality-constrained Case 89-7 context, applying a similarly restrained approach despite the materially different factual context.
Engineer A Public Infrastructure Fatality Heightened Escalation Threshold Bridge Wall
Public Infrastructure Fatality-Context Heightened Escalation Threshold Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to recognize that the combination of public infrastructure ownership and a confirmed fatality potentially linked to the observed defect created a heightened escalation threshold requiring written notification to public authorities.
Public bridge infrastructure; confirmed fatal accident potentially linked to observed structural defect
Engineer A did not recognize the heightened escalation threshold created by the public infrastructure context and confirmed fatality, treating the situation as one where verbal notification through the client chain was sufficient.
A public agency retains the services of VWX Architects and Engineers to perform a major scheduled overhaul of a bridge.
Engineer A Scope-of-Work Non-Shield Recognition Bridge Wall
Scope-of-Work Non-Excuse for Safety Disclosure Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to fully exercise the capability to recognize that his contracted scope — limited to pavement damage inspection — did not shield him from the obligation to formally report and escalate the wall defect finding.
Client instruction to omit out-of-scope wall defect from final report; Engineer A's compliance with scope-based justification
Engineer A accepted the client's instruction not to include the wall defect in his final report on the grounds that it was not part of his scope of work, demonstrating incomplete application of this capability.
Engineer A Scope-of-Work Non-Shield Safety Disclosure Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that his contracted scope — limited to pavement damage inspection — did not shield him from the obligation to disclose the incidentally observed wall defect to VWX, even though the wall condition fell outside his contracted scope of work.
Engineer A's contracted scope was limited to pavement damage inspection; the Board found that this scope limitation did not shield him from the obligation to disclose the incidentally observed wall defect.
Engineer A disclosed the wall defect observation to VWX despite it being outside his contracted pavement inspection scope, consistent with the Board's finding that scope-of-work limitations do not shield engineers from safety disclosure obligations.
the Board concludes that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information
Engineer A Speculative Wall Defect Report Exclusion Bridge Case
Speculative Out-of-Scope Finding Formal Report Exclusion Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that his speculative, visually-based surmise about the wall defect's causal role in the fatal accident should be excluded from the formal written report, while preserved in field notes and communicated verbally through the client chain.
Engineer A, retained as sub-consultant for pavement damage inspection, incidentally observed a pre-existing wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident; the Board found it appropriate to exclude the speculative finding from the formal report.
Decision to exclude the wall defect observation from the final pavement inspection report, based on recognition that the observation was speculative and lacked structural engineering expertise or testing support.
While it may be appropriate for Engineer A to note such information in his field notes, to place this information in a final report would not be responsible and could unnecessarily inflame the situation.
there is nothing under the facts to indicate anything more than Engineer A's general surmise and speculation about the cause of the structural failure of the wall.
Engineer A Sub-Consultant Independent Escalation Post-Suppression Bridge Wall
Sub-Consultant Suppression-Instruction Independent Written Escalation Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to independently escalate the wall defect finding in writing to appropriate public authorities after receiving the suppression instruction relayed through VWX from the public agency.
Sub-consultant receiving suppression instruction relayed through prime consultant from public agency client
Engineer A complied with the suppression instruction and did not independently report the wall defect to any public agency or authority.
Engineer A Sub-Consultant Verbal Client-Chain Escalation Bridge Wall Defect
Prime Consultant Superior Position Deference in Multi-Party Project Capability
Engineer A possessed the capability to recognize that VWX (the prime consultant) was in a far better position to evaluate the significance of the wall defect observation given its overall project responsibility and superior knowledge of project history, and to defer to VWX by reporting the observation verbally through the client chain rather than independently escalating to public authorities.
Engineer A, as sub-consultant, verbally reported the incidental wall defect observation to VWX (prime consultant), who then relayed it to the public agency, consistent with the Board's finding that this was the appropriate course of action.
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect observation to VWX rather than directly to the public agency or external authorities, recognizing VWX's superior project knowledge and overall responsibility.
Clearly the prime consultant, which has overall responsibility for the project, is in a far better position than Engineer A to understand the interrelationships between various elements of the projects, including the history of previous work performed on the bridge, prior consultants, contractors, etc., in order to make an informed evaluation.
while it might be appropriate for Engineer A to verbally report this information to Engineer A's client, and for the client to report this information to the public agency
Engineer A Verbal-to-Written Finding Conversion Obligation Wall Defect
Verbal-to-Written Finding Conversion Obligation Recognition Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to recognize that his verbal report of the wall defect carried the same professional weight as a written finding, and that the client instruction not to include it in the final report did not extinguish his obligation to document and transmit the finding in writing.
Client instruction to omit verbal finding from final written report
Engineer A accepted the instruction to omit the finding from the final report without recognizing the obligation to transmit it in written form independently.
Engineer A Verbal-to-Written Safety Notification Conversion Wall Defect
Verbal-to-Written Safety Notification Conversion and Monitoring Capability
Engineer A needed but failed to exercise the capability to convert his verbal report of the wall defect to VWX into a written confirmation, and to monitor whether the public agency took corrective action.
Post-verbal-notification obligation to create written record and monitor corrective action
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect but did not follow up with written confirmation and did not monitor corrective action, ultimately not reporting to any public authority.
Engineer A Verbal Safety Report to VWX Wall Defect
Engineer A demonstrated a basic level of public safety escalation capability by verbally reporting the wall defect observation to VWX, his client, initiating the notification chain.
Sub-consultant verbal notification of out-of-scope structural defect to prime consultant
Engineer A's field note documentation before Engineer A's verbal report to client
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in his engineering notes. Engineer A verbally reports this information to his client.
Engineer A's verbal report to client before client's verbal report to public agency
Engineer A's verbal report to client before final report submission
NSPE Board of Ethical Review / NSPE Code of Ethics
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in prescribing Engineer A's follow-up obligations
Establishes that Engineer A has a continuing obligation to follow through to ensure the public agency takes corrective action, and that only if the agency fails to act should Engineer A consider escalating to public authorities
Engineering Notes Written Transmission Wall Defect Engineer A Bridge
Engineer A documented the wall defect observation in his engineering notes but agreed to retain the information only in his notes and not include it in the final report; no formal written transmission was made to any authority
Engineering Notes Safety Finding Written Transmission Constraint
Engineer A's documentation of the wall defect observation and causal surmise in his personal engineering notes created a professional obligation to formally transmit that finding in writing to VWX and the public authority — prohibiting Engineer A from treating the retention of personal notes as a substitute for formal written communication of the safety-relevant finding.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional engineering documentation standards
From the time of documenting the finding in engineering notes through the completion of the project
Faithful Agent Public Safety Balancing Reasonable Conduct — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
The Board concluded that Engineer A acted reasonably by properly balancing the obligation of client fidelity and the obligation to hold paramount public health and safety, finding no ethical violation in Engineer A's overall conduct.
Faithful Agent Public Safety Balancing Reasonable Conduct Recognition Constraint
Engineer A's conduct — verbally reporting the speculative wall defect to VWX, documenting it in field notes, and monitoring for corrective action — constituted a reasonable good-faith balancing of the competing faithful agent and public safety paramount obligations, satisfying both ethical duties under the specific facts and circumstances present.
Looking at the facts and circumstances in their totality, the Board is convinced that Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose what might be considered by the client to be confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety.
Faithful Agent Trustee Confidentiality Rationale — Engineer A VWX Bridge Engagement
The Board articulated the rationale for engineer confidentiality obligations — engineers as agents or trustees are privy to client business affairs and are expected to maintain confidentiality — as the competing constraint against which the public safety paramount duty must be balanced.
Confidential Client Information Constraint
Engineer A's role as faithful agent and trustee to VWX and the public agency constrained his disclosure of client business information, requiring him to balance this confidentiality obligation against the paramount public safety duty.
NSPE Code of Ethics III.4; BER Case No. 97-13
The disclosure of confidential information could be quite detrimental to the interests of their client and, therefore, engineers as 'agents' or 'trustees' are expected to maintain the confidential nature of the information revealed to them in the course of rendering their professional services.
They are privy to a great deal of information and background concerning the business affairs of their client.
Field Notes Preservation Non-Alteration — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A documented the wall defect observation in his engineering field notes. The Board explicitly stated that alteration of field notes would be impermissible under any circumstances, even though the observation was speculative and outside the contracted scope.
Field Notes Preservation Non-Alteration Constraint
Under no circumstances was Engineer A permitted to alter his field notes documenting the wall defect observation, regardless of client instructions, scope limitations, or the speculative nature of the observation.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional engineering standards of conduct
Indefinitely from the time of documentation
Graduated Escalation Calibration Speculative Concern Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A's causal link was speculative (surmise, not confirmed finding); the danger was significant but the defect was pre-existing and the accident had already occurred; Engineer A was a subconsultant with limited direct authority
Graduated Escalation Calibrated to Danger Imminence and Employment Context Constraint
Engineer A was constrained to calibrate his escalation response to the specific context: a speculative (not confirmed) causal link between the wall defect and the fatal accident, combined with public infrastructure, a confirmed fatality, and a subconsultant employment context — requiring at minimum written notification to the public agency and, if unresponsive, escalation to the state transportation authority, rather than either passive acceptance of the suppression instruction or immediate simultaneous multi-authority mobilization.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER precedent on graduated escalation calibration
The defect observation is effectively removed from institutional memory and official record; the public agency, future engineers, and the public have no official access to the information; Engineer A's field notes represent the only surviving documentation; the situation reaches a state of enforced institutional silence
After Engineer A complies with suppression instruction; at time of final report submission
As a result of Engineer A's compliance with the suppression instruction, the defect observation exists only in his private field notes and is absent from any official report or external communication. This creates a state where safety-relevant information is institutionally invisible.
Inspection-Discovered Information Reduced Confidentiality Expectation — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect vs. Case 89-7
The Board distinguished the present case from Case No. 89-7 on the grounds that in 89-7 the client directly confided the safety information to the engineer, while in the present case Engineer A discovered the wall defect through his own inspection — making a genuine confidentiality expectation difficult to sustain.
Public Agency and VWX (as against Engineer A)
Inspection-Discovered Information Reduced Confidentiality Expectation Constraint
The public agency and VWX could not assert a genuine confidentiality expectation over the wall defect observation because Engineer A discovered it through independent professional inspection rather than through information affirmatively confided by the client — materially reducing the confidentiality weight of any suppression instruction.
First, it is clear that, unlike Case No. 89-7, which involved facts and circumstances that were openly conveyed directly to Engineer A from a client, in the present case, the circumstances bearing on the public safety were revealed to the engineer as part of the engineer's inspection and professional observations.
In the present case, it is difficult for this Board to conclude that the client or the public agency could have had a genuine expectation of confidentiality, since nothing of a confidential nature was directly conveyed by the client or the public agency to Engineer A.
Inspection-Discovered Observation Confidentiality Modulation Engineer A Bridge
Engineer A's discovery of the wall defect was through his own visual inspection, not through client disclosure; this distinction weakened any implied confidentiality basis for deferring escalation
Because Engineer A independently observed the wall defect through visual inspection — rather than receiving it as client-confided information — the basis for deferring escalation on confidentiality grounds was weaker, and the basis for immediate direct written action to the public authority was stronger, constraining Engineer A to act more promptly and directly than would be appropriate for client-confided information.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER precedent distinguishing independently observed vs. client-confided information
National Society of Professional Engineers
Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall
Engineer A when deciding whether to comply with client request to omit wall defect from final report
Primary normative authority governing Engineer A's paramount obligation to hold public safety above client instructions, and the duty not to suppress safety-critical findings from engineering reports.
NSPE Code of Ethics for Engineers — Nondisclosure / Confidentiality Provisions
As noted in Case No. 89-7, there are various rationales for the nondisclosure language contained in the NSPE Code.
the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in deliberating Engineer A's obligations
Cited as the source of nondisclosure language and the dual obligations of client faithfulness and public safety paramountcy that must be balanced
Bridge becomes subject to mandatory inspection; public safety emergency declared; legal and investigative processes initiated; Officer B's death triggers institutional response from public agency and engineering consultants
Police Officer B dies when his patrol car crashes through a bridge wall and falls into the river below. This fatal accident occurs three months before the scheduled bridge overhaul begins.
NSPE Code of Ethics and professional engineering practice norms
Out-of-Scope Safety Finding Reporting Standard
Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge
although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall
Engineer A when deciding whether to include the wall defect in his final report despite client objection
Governs the specific threshold question of whether Engineer A, whose contracted scope is limited to pavement damage, has a professional obligation to formally document and report a safety-critical wall defect he incidentally observes, and whether a client's scope-limitation argument can justify suppression of such findings.
Out-of-Scope Wall Defect Disclosure Engineer A Bridge
Engineer A observed apparent pre-existing defective condition in the bridge wall close to where the fatal accident occurred, outside his contracted pavement inspection scope, and was instructed to omit it from his final report
Out-of-Scope Safety Observation Disclosure Constraint
Engineer A was constrained to disclose in writing the incidentally observed pre-existing defective wall condition to VWX and, given the public safety implications and confirmed fatality, to the responsible public authority — prohibiting him from treating the scope boundary as justification for silence.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER Case precedent on out-of-scope safety observation
From the moment of observation during bridge inspection through completion of the project
Passive Acquiescence Suppression Instruction Engineer A Wall Defect Bridge
Engineer A agreed to the suppression instruction without active resistance, insistence on corrective action, or escalation to external authorities
Passive Safety Acquiescence Independent Ethical Violation Constraint
Engineer A's passive compliance with VWX's suppression instruction — agreeing to retain the wall defect information in his notes but not include it in the final report, without active insistence that the finding be addressed — constituted an independent ethical violation distinct from any failure to report to external authorities.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; BER precedent on passive acquiescence to safety violations
At the time of receiving and complying with the suppression instruction
Persistent Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Public Agency Engineer A Bridge Wall
The public agency, acting through VWX, effectively suppressed Engineer A's safety finding; Engineer A took no further action to escalate to any other authority; the bridge wall defect remained unaddressed in the formal record
Persistent Safety Escalation Beyond Unresponsive Authority Constraint
After the public agency effectively suppressed Engineer A's wall defect finding through VWX, Engineer A was constrained to continue pursuing resolution by contacting supervisory officials, alternative agencies with jurisdiction (e.g., state transportation department, bridge safety authority), or other appropriate authorities — prohibiting passive acceptance of the public agency's suppression as a discharge of the safety reporting obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER precedent on persistent escalation beyond unresponsive authorities
From the time of the public agency's effective suppression through the completion of the project and beyond
{'status': 'Deceased', 'role_in_case': "Victim of bridge wall failure; precipitating event for Engineer A's safety observation"}
Lost control of patrol car on the bridge three months before the scheduled overhaul; vehicle crashed through the wall, which failed to restrain it, resulting in Officer B's death. The accident is the precipitating event that draws attention to the potentially defective wall condition observed by Engineer A.
{'type': 'precipitating_event_for', 'target': 'Engineer A Safety Observation'}
{'type': 'victim_of', 'target': 'Bridge Wall Failure'}
Police Officer B loses control of his patrol car.
The vehicle crashed into the bridge wall.
The wall failed to restrain the vehicle, which fell to the river below, killing Police Officer B.
Post-Client-Override Regulatory Escalation Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
The public agency, acting through VWX, overrode Engineer A's safety finding; Engineer A did not escalate to any other authority; the bridge wall defect remained unaddressed in the formal record
Post-Client-Override Public Safety Regulatory Escalation Constraint
After the public agency effectively overrode Engineer A's safety finding by instructing VWX to have Engineer A omit it from the final report, Engineer A was constrained to escalate the concern to the applicable state regulatory or transportation authority, as the gravity of the potential danger — confirmed fatality, structural defect on public bridge — warranted escalation beyond passive acceptance of the override.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER Case 20-4 and analogous precedent
From the time of the public agency's effective override through the completion of the project and beyond
Post-Verbal-Notification Corrective Action Monitoring — Engineer A Public Agency Bridge Wall
The Board held that Engineer A had a continuing obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action was taken by the public agency, and that external escalation before determining whether corrective action was taken would have been an overreaction.
Post-Verbal-Notification Corrective Action Monitoring Conditional External Escalation Constraint
After verbally reporting the wall defect observation through the client chain to the public agency, Engineer A was constrained to monitor whether the public agency took appropriate corrective action, and was prohibited from escalating to external authorities before determining whether corrective action had been taken.
At the same time, the Board is of the opinion that Engineer A has an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action is taken by the public agency.
Following the verbal notification to VWX and the public agency, until corrective action is confirmed or denied
Finally, for Engineer A to have reported this information to a public authority under the circumstances as outlined in the facts, before determining whether corrective action is taken, would have been an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of his client and the public agency.
Engineer A transitions from routine inspection participant to holder of safety-critical information potentially linked to a fatality; the ethical and professional stakes of his subsequent decisions are fundamentally elevated; a new obligation chain is activated
During the post-accident bridge inspection, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition near the accident site and surmises it may have contributed to the wall failure that killed Officer B. This discovery is an observational outcome of the inspection.
Premature External Authority Escalation Reputation Harm Prohibition — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
The Board explicitly held that reporting to a public authority before determining whether corrective action was taken would have been an overreaction that could have jeopardized the professional reputations of the client and the public agency.
Premature External Authority Escalation Reputation Harm Prohibition Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from reporting the speculative wall defect observation directly to a public authority before determining whether the public agency had taken corrective action, because such premature escalation would have constituted an overreaction risking unjustified harm to the professional reputations of VWX and the public agency.
Before the public agency had a reasonable opportunity to respond to the verbal notification of the wall defect
{'responsibility_level': 'Overall project responsibility', 'contextual_knowledge': 'History of previous work, prior consultants, contractors, project interrelationships', 'role_in_escalation': 'Intermediate escalation point between sub-consultant and public agency'}
The prime consultant bears overall responsibility for the bridge inspection/overhaul project, is in the best position to understand interrelationships between project elements, and serves as the appropriate first escalation point for Engineer A's out-of-scope safety observation before any independent public authority notification is considered.
{'type': 'directs', 'target': 'Engineer A Corrective Action Monitoring Sub-Consultant'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'Report-Suppressing Public Agency Client'}
Prime Consultant Bridge Overhaul Engineer
the prime consultant, which has overall responsibility for the project, is in a far better position than Engineer A to understand the interrelationships between various elements of the projects
it might be appropriate for Engineer A to verbally report this information to Engineer A's client, and for the client to report this information to the public agency
Prime Consultant Superior Contextual Knowledge Deference — Engineer A VWX Bridge Project
Engineer A was a subconsultant to VWX with a limited pavement inspection scope. The Board noted that VWX, as prime consultant with overall project responsibility, was in a far better position to understand the interrelationships between project elements and evaluate the speculative observation.
Prime Consultant Superior Contextual Knowledge Escalation Deference Constraint
Engineer A was constrained to defer initial escalation evaluation to VWX (the prime consultant) because VWX held overall project responsibility and superior contextual knowledge of the bridge's history, prior consultants, and prior contractors — placing VWX in a far better position than Engineer A to evaluate whether the speculative wall defect observation warranted further investigation.
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure and notes this in his engineering notes
Engineer A when deciding to exclude the wall defect observation from the final report
Governs whether Engineer A's omission of the wall defect from his final engineering report — at client request — constitutes a violation of the prohibition on selective omission of material facts from professional engineering reports.
NSPE Code of Ethics / professional engineering norms
Engineer A was retained to perform a specific task for which he was presumably competent
it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm
NSPE Board of Ethical Review in assessing the appropriateness of Engineer A's report contents
Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise is used to limit his reporting obligations: speculative observations outside his competence should not appear in a final report; the prime consultant with broader expertise is better positioned to evaluate the interrelationships
{'entity_type': 'Public government agency', 'action': 'Directed suppression of safety finding from final engineering report', 'rationale_given': "Finding was outside Engineer A's contracted scope of work"}
Retains VWX for bridge overhaul; receives verbal notification of out-of-scope structural defect potentially linked to fatal accident; instructs VWX (and through VWX, Engineer A) to exclude the safety finding from the final report on scope grounds.
{'type': 'directs_suppression_toward', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
{'type': 'receives_verbal_safety_notification_from', 'target': 'VWX Architects and Engineers'}
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'VWX Architects and Engineers'}
Public Infrastructure Fatal Accident Scope Non-Shield Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A's scope was limited to pavement damage; the bridge was public infrastructure; a fatal accident had occurred at the same location three months prior; Engineer A observed a structural wall defect that may have contributed to the fatal accident
Public Infrastructure Fatal Accident Scope Non-Shield Constraint
The combination of public infrastructure (a public bridge), a confirmed fatal accident at the same location, and an incidentally observed structural condition that may have contributed to that accident created a heightened public safety imperative that overrode Engineer A's contracted scope limitation — prohibiting Engineer A from treating the pavement-only scope as a complete defense against the obligation to disclose the wall defect finding.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1, II.1; BER precedent on public infrastructure safety obligations
Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to VWX for further review and repair.
From the time of observing the wall defect during the bridge inspection
Public Safety Paramount Client Suppression Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A faced a direct conflict between the client's instruction to suppress the wall defect finding and his paramount obligation to protect public safety on a public bridge where a fatal accident had occurred
Engineer A's paramount obligation to hold public safety above client instructions constrained him from complying with the suppression instruction, as the wall defect on a public bridge — where a fatal accident had already occurred — created an unmitigated risk to public welfare that could not be subordinated to client preferences.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; NSPE Code Section II.1
Throughout the bridge inspection engagement and beyond
Public Safety Paramount Over Confidentiality Engineer A Bridge Wall
No explicit confidentiality agreement existed between Engineer A and VWX or the public agency; the implied confidentiality of the subconsultant relationship could not override the public safety paramount duty given the confirmed fatality
Public Safety Paramount Over Confidentiality Constraint
Any implied confidentiality arising from Engineer A's subconsultant relationship with VWX or the public agency's instruction did not bar Engineer A from disclosing the wall defect finding to appropriate public authorities, as the clear risk to public safety on a public bridge where a fatal accident had occurred pre-empted any confidentiality obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1; BER Cases 76-4 and 90-5
From the time of the suppression instruction through the completion of the project and beyond
Was it ethical for Engineer A to retain the information in his engineering notes but not include it in the final report as requested?
Given that a person died in an accident potentially linked to the defective wall condition, does the confirmed fatality independently trigger a mandatory written escalation obligation that overrides the Board's conditional 'corrective action' tolerance, regardless of whether the public agency has been verbally informed?
Is a verbal report through a client chain — from Engineer A to VWX to the public agency — a legally and ethically sufficient form of safety notification when the subject matter involves a potential contributing cause to a fatality on public infrastructure, or does the mode of transmission itself constitute an independent ethical failure?
What specific corrective action, within what timeframe, and verified by what mechanism, must the public agency take before Engineer A's continued silence becomes an independent ethical violation — and who bears responsibility for defining and monitoring that threshold?
Does Engineer A's status as a subconsultant — rather than the prime consultant — reduce, eliminate, or merely sequence his independent public safety escalation obligation, and does the Board's deference to the prime consultant's 'superior contextual knowledge' inappropriately insulate Engineer A from direct accountability to the public?
Was it ethical for Engineer A not to report this information to any other public agency or authority?
Does the principle of Epistemic Humility — that Engineer A should calibrate his response to his speculative, non-structural-engineer observation — conflict with the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger principle, which holds that a known death linked to the defect demands heightened mandatory action regardless of the observer's domain expertise?
Does the Faithful Agent Obligation — requiring Engineer A to act as a loyal agent and trustee of his client — fundamentally conflict with the Client Report Suppression Prohibition, and if so, does the Board's conclusion that omitting the finding from the final report was ethical improperly subordinate public safety paramountcy to client loyalty in a context involving a confirmed fatality?
Does the Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation principle — which holds that Engineer A's duties are limited to his contracted pavement inspection scope — conflict with the Out-of-Scope Safety Observation Discretionary Response principle and the Public Welfare Paramount principle, and does allowing scope-of-work to modulate safety reporting obligations create a dangerous precedent for engineers who incidentally discover life-safety hazards?
Does the Premature External Escalation Reputational Harm principle — cautioning against reporting before corrective action is assessed — conflict with the Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation principle and the Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment obligation, and does the Board's tolerance of Engineer A's silence improperly weight reputational and client-relationship concerns over the public's right to know about a potentially dangerous bridge wall?
From a deontological perspective, did Engineer A fulfill their categorical duty to protect public safety by merely making a verbal report and then acquiescing to the suppression instruction, given that a person had already died and a structural defect potentially linked to that death remained undocumented in any official record?
From a consequentialist perspective, did the Board's conditional approval — that non-escalation is ethical only if corrective action is taken within a relatively short period — adequately account for the risk that no enforcement mechanism exists to ensure the public agency actually follows through, leaving the public exposed to an ongoing structural hazard?
From a virtue ethics perspective, did Engineer A demonstrate the professional integrity and courage expected of a licensed engineer by accepting the suppression instruction without producing a written record of the safety concern, or did this passive acquiescence represent a failure of the virtues of honesty, fortitude, and professional responsibility?
From a deontological perspective, does Engineer A's status as a subconsultant — rather than a prime consultant — diminish or eliminate the independent duty owed directly to the public, or does the NSPE Code impose that duty on every licensed engineer regardless of contractual position in the project hierarchy?
If Engineer A had converted the verbal safety report into a written memorandum transmitted directly to both VWX and the public agency before the suppression instruction was issued, would the public agency have been legally and ethically unable to request omission of the finding, and would the outcome for public safety have been materially different?
If the wall defect had been within Engineer A's explicit scope of work rather than incidentally discovered, would the Board have reached the same conclusion permitting omission from the final report, or would the scope inclusion have created an unambiguous obligation to document and report the finding regardless of client instruction?
If Engineer A had reported the wall defect finding directly to a relevant regulatory or safety authority immediately after receiving the suppression instruction, rather than waiting to monitor whether the public agency took corrective action, would the Board have considered that escalation premature and professionally harmful, or would the confirmed fatality context have justified immediate independent reporting?
If the facts of this case had been identical to NSPE Case No. 89-7 — where the engineer received information through a confidential client relationship rather than through independent field observation — would Engineer A's obligation to report to external authorities have been stronger, weaker, or equivalent, and what does that comparison reveal about whether the Board's source-of-information distinction is ethically principled or merely pragmatic?
Narrow scope may prevent subconsultant from formally reporting safety conditions observed outside that scope
Scope limitation could create ambiguity about subconsultant's reporting obligations if broader hazards are encountered
Contractual duty to define scope of services clearly
Professional obligation to engage competent specialists for specific tasks
Engagement of competent professionals for defined tasks
Scope management and contractual clarity
Obtain specialized pavement inspection services from a qualified subconsultant within a defined and manageable scope of work
Obligation to structure subconsultant agreements in ways that do not inadvertently suppress public safety reporting
Potential failure to anticipate and address how out-of-scope safety observations by subconsultant would be handled
Assessment of appropriate specialist engagement
Project management and subconsultant coordination
Prior to scheduled overhaul commencement
VWX Architects and Engineers deliberately retained Engineer A as a subconsultant with a narrowly defined scope limited exclusively to identifying pavement damage on the bridge, excluding structural or wall assessment.
Retain Engineer A as Subconsultant → Pre-existing Defect Discovered
VWX Architects and Engineers deliberately retained Engineer A as a subconsultant with a narrowly defined scope, placing him in the position of conducting the post-accident bridge inspection during which the defect was observed
Without Engineer A's retention and presence at the inspection, the pre-existing defect may not have been identified by a less qualified observer, or may have been identified but handled differently by a different subconsultant
Engineer A's presence at the post-accident bridge inspection
Narrowly defined subconsultant scope that nonetheless placed Engineer A at the site
VWX's decision to retain Engineer A specifically
Retention of Engineer A + his physical presence at inspection + his professional competence to identify structural defects
Field notes may be discoverable in litigation related to Officer B's death
Retention in field notes alone may be insufficient to prompt corrective action if the client chain does not follow through
The distinction between field notes and formal report may not be understood or respected by all parties
Integrity in professional documentation, not destroying or altering records of professional observations
Preservation of information that may be relevant to public safety and legal accountability
Professional obligation to maintain accurate and unaltered engineering field notes
Integrity and honesty in professional records
Obligation not to alter field notes under any circumstances
Preservation of professional documentation for accountability
Preserve an accurate professional record of the observed condition for potential future reference, including legal proceedings, while respecting the client's instruction to exclude it from the formal report
Commitment to documentation integrity under client pressure
Judgment about the distinction between field documentation and formal deliverables
Understanding of the professional and legal status of engineering field notes
During and after final report preparation
Engineer A deliberately chose to retain the defective wall condition observation exclusively in his engineering field notes rather than including it in the final report or any other formal document, preserving the information for potential future reference while complying with the client's directive.
Retain Observation in Field Notes Only → Information Confined to Field Notes
As a result of Engineer A's compliance with the suppression instruction, the defect observation exists only in field notes; Engineer A deliberately chose to retain the defective wall condition observation exclusively in his field notes rather than escalating through formal reporting channels
Had Engineer A included the defect in the final report or reported to external authorities, the information would not have been confined to field notes and would have entered actionable safety channels
Engineer A's compliance with the suppression instruction removing defect from final report
Engineer A's decision not to escalate the information to external authorities
Engineer A's decision to retain rather than destroy the field note record
Engineer A (primary compliance decision), Public Agency (suppression instruction originator), VWX (instruction relay and failure to protect Engineer A)
Omission from final report + retention only in field notes + non-escalation = information effectively confined and inaccessible to public safety remediation
Scope-of-Work Non-Exculpation Material Omission Engineer A Bridge Wall Report
Engineer A omitted the wall defect finding from his final report on the grounds that it was outside his contracted scope; the finding was material to the safety of the bridge and the public authority's decision-making
Scope-of-Work Non-Exculpation for Material Evidence Omission Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from invoking his pavement-only scope of work as justification for omitting the wall defect observation from his final bridge inspection report, as the wall defect constituted material evidence bearing on the safety conclusions of the report and the public authority's ability to make informed decisions about the bridge.
NSPE Code of Ethics; professional engineering reporting standards
At the time of preparing and submitting the final bridge inspection report
Scope Non-Shield Wall Defect Engineer A Bridge Inspection
Engineer A was retained as subconsultant to VWX for pavement damage inspection only; he incidentally observed a structural wall defect near the site of a fatal accident and was instructed not to include it in his final report on scope grounds
Scope Limitation Non-Exculpation for Known Safety Risk Constraint
Engineer A's contracted scope — limited solely to pavement damage identification — did not shield him from the obligation to disclose the incidentally observed pre-existing defective wall condition, which posed a risk to public safety on a public bridge where a fatal accident had already occurred.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER precedent on out-of-scope safety observation
From the moment Engineer A observed the wall defect during the bridge inspection
Scope of Practice Boundary — Engineer A Pavement Inspection vs. Structural Assessment
The Board noted that Engineer A was retained to perform a specific task (pavement inspection) for which he was presumably competent, and that the wall defect observation fell outside that contracted scope — a factor in limiting his reporting obligations.
Engineer A's contracted scope of services — limited to pavement damage inspection — constrained the formality and authority of his wall defect observation, establishing that he was retained to perform a specific task for which he was presumably competent, and that structural assessment fell outside that contracted scope.
it is clear that Engineer A was retained to perform a specific task for which he was presumably competent.
Speculative Finding Written Report Exclusion — Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A, a subconsultant to VWX performing pavement damage inspection, incidentally observed a potentially defective wall condition and surmised it may have contributed to Police Officer B's fatal accident. The Board held it would have been improper to include this speculative observation in the final report.
Speculative Finding Written Report Exclusion Constraint
Engineer A was prohibited from including the speculative wall defect observation in his final bridge inspection report because the observation was based solely on visual inspection without domain-competent structural engineering testing or evaluation, and Engineer A lacked structural engineering expertise.
NSPE Code of Ethics; BER Case No. 97-13 reasoning
Under the circumstances it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm.
Speculative Observation Verbal-Only Subconsultant Escalation — Engineer A to VWX
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect observation to VWX, which verbally relayed it to the public agency. The Board found this verbal escalation through the client chain was the appropriate initial response given the speculative nature of the observation.
Speculative Observation Verbal-Only Subconsultant Escalation Permissibility Constraint
Engineer A's initial escalation obligation for the speculative wall defect observation was satisfied by verbally communicating the observation to VWX (the prime consultant), who then relayed it to the public agency, given the speculative nature of the observation and Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise.
At the time of initial discovery and reporting of the wall defect observation
Therefore, the Board concludes that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate.
Subconsultant Independent Escalation Post-Suppression Engineer A Bridge Wall
Engineer A was a subconsultant to VWX; both VWX and the public agency effectively suppressed the wall defect finding; Engineer A took no further action to escalate to any other public authority
Subconsultant Suppression-Instruction Independent External Escalation Constraint
After receiving the suppression instruction relayed through VWX from the public agency, Engineer A was constrained to independently escalate the wall defect finding to an appropriate public authority — such as the state transportation department or another relevant regulatory body — rather than accepting the suppression instruction as a complete discharge of his public safety obligation.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section I.1, II.1; BER precedent on subconsultant escalation obligations
From the time of receiving the suppression instruction through the completion of the project and beyond
Engineer A is now under explicit institutional pressure to omit safety-relevant information from an official report; the ethical decision point is fully crystallized; the chain of command has formally aligned against disclosure; Engineer A's professional independence is directly challenged
After public agency receives verbal report of defect, prior to final report preparation
The public agency instructs VWX, who in turn instructs Engineer A, to exclude the defect observation from the final report on the grounds that it falls outside Engineer A's contracted scope of work. This creates a formal institutional directive to omit safety-relevant information.
Suppression Instruction Issued → Comply with Instruction to Omit from Final Report
The public agency instructs VWX, who in turn instructs Engineer A, to exclude the defect observation from the final report; after being instructed by VWX (relaying the public agency's directive) not to include the out-of-scope defect, Engineer A complied
Had the public agency not issued the suppression instruction, or had VWX refused to relay it, or had Engineer A refused to comply, the defect would likely have appeared in the final report and been subject to formal remediation processes
Engineer A's decision to comply rather than resist or escalate
Public agency's issuance of the suppression directive
VWX's decision to relay rather than refuse the instruction
Public Agency (primary), VWX Architects and Engineers (secondary), Engineer A (tertiary)
Suppression instruction from public agency + VWX's relay of instruction + Engineer A's compliance = omission of defect from final report
VWX Architects and Engineers Prime Consultant
{'firm_type': 'Architecture and Engineering firm', 'role': 'Prime consultant for bridge overhaul', 'action': 'Transmitted safety information upward, then transmitted suppression instruction downward'}
Retained by public agency as prime consultant for major bridge overhaul; retains Engineer A as sub-consultant; receives verbal safety notification from Engineer A; relays it to public agency; then relays public agency's instruction to Engineer A to suppress the finding from the final report.
{'type': 'directs_suppression_of', 'target': 'Engineer A Safety Finding'}
{'type': 'retained_by', 'target': 'Public Agency'}
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Engineer A'}
VWX Architects and Engineers retains the services of Engineer A, a civil engineer, as its subconsultant
his client, which then verbally reports the information to the public agency.
VWX Prime Consultant Sub-Consultant Safety Escalation Sequencing Bridge Wall
Sub-Consultant Employer-Chain Safety Escalation Sequencing Capability
VWX, as prime consultant, needed to exercise the capability to correctly sequence safety escalation obligations when Engineer A's out-of-scope wall defect observation was reported — recognizing that the obligation ran to the public agency client and, if the client failed to act, to appropriate public authorities.
Prime consultant role in relaying sub-consultant safety finding and suppression instruction
VWX relayed Engineer A's verbal report to the public agency but then relayed the suppression instruction back to Engineer A without independently escalating the safety concern.
which then verbally reports the information to the public agency
Verbal-Only Notification Written Follow-Up Engineer A Wall Defect VWX
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX, which verbally relayed it to the public agency; no written record was created in the final report; Engineer A took no further action
Verbal-Only Safety Notification Written Follow-Up Constraint
Engineer A's verbal report of the wall defect to VWX — which VWX then verbally relayed to the public agency — was insufficient to discharge his safety notification obligation; Engineer A was constrained to follow up with written documentation of the finding, particularly given the confirmed fatality and the absence of any written record in the final deliverable.
From the time of verbal notification through the completion of the project and beyond
Verbal Disclosure Non-Substitution Written Public Authority Report Engineer A Bridge
The wall defect finding was communicated only verbally through the client chain; the final written report omitted the finding entirely; the public agency received no written documentation of the safety concern
Verbal Client Disclosure Non-Substitution for Written Public Authority Report Constraint
Engineer A's verbal report of the wall defect through VWX to the public agency did not satisfy his professional obligation to ensure the public authority received a written record of the safety-relevant finding; the public agency's independent interest in complete written information created a non-waivable disclosure obligation that VWX's verbal relay could not extinguish.
NSPE Code of Ethics Section II.1; professional engineering reporting standards
From the time of verbal notification through the completion of the project
Client may choose to suppress or not act on the information
Verbal report may be mischaracterized or lost without a written record
Verbal reporting without written follow-up may limit the enforceability or traceability of the communication
Duty of candor and transparency with client regarding professionally observed conditions
Obligation to bring safety-relevant information to the attention of those with authority and expertise to act
Obligation to hold paramount public health and safety by surfacing potentially relevant hazard information
Appropriate escalation within professional hierarchy
Ensure that the prime consultant was made aware of a potentially safety-relevant condition observed during the inspection, enabling the client chain to evaluate and respond appropriately given their broader project context and expertise
Communication skills to convey technical observations and their limitations clearly
Professional judgment about when to escalate observations beyond contracted scope
Understanding of professional hierarchy and reporting responsibilities
During or immediately following bridge inspection
Arguably, failure to follow up verbal report in writing reduced the enforceability and traceability of the disclosure
Engineer A made a deliberate decision to verbally report the observed pre-existing defective wall condition and his surmise about its potential role in the fatal accident to his client, VWX, rather than remaining silent or waiting for formal reporting channels.
Written Report Completeness Wall Defect Omission Engineer A Bridge
Engineer A omitted the wall defect finding from his final report at client direction, despite having observed and documented it in his engineering notes and verbally reported it through the client chain
Engineer A's final bridge inspection report was constrained to include all relevant and pertinent factual information observed during the inspection — including the wall defect finding — prohibiting selective omission of the known safety-relevant condition even though it was verbally communicated to VWX.
bridge inspection by Engineer A before scheduled bridge overhaul
A public agency retains the services of VWX Architects and Engineers to perform a major scheduled overhaul of a bridge. VWX Architects and Engineers retains the services of Engineer A... to perform bridge inspection services on the bridge.
bridge inspection by Engineer A during scheduled bridge overhaul preparation period
VWX Architects and Engineers retains the services of Engineer A, a civil engineer, as its subconsultant to perform bridge inspection services on the bridge. Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge and report the damage to VWX for further review and repair.
scheduled bridge overhaul preparation period
Entity1 occurs entirely within the duration of Entity2
client's verbal report to public agency before public agency instruction to exclude information from final report
The public agency contacts VWX Architects and Engineers which then contacts Engineer A and asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report.
public agency instruction to exclude information from final report
corrective action assessment by public agency before Engineer A reporting to public authority (conditional)
the Board is of the opinion that Engineer A has an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action is taken by the public agency. Only if the public agency does not take corrective action should Engineer A consider alternatives.
corrective action assessment by public agency
Engineer A reporting to public authority (conditional)
Defeasibility edge from tensionresolution
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.95
The confirmed fatality tips the balance decisively toward public welfare disclosure; scope limitations and client loyalty cannot override the paramount obligation when a death has already occurred.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.93
Client suppression authority does not extend to safety-relevant findings; Engineer A should have insisted on written documentation or escalated to other authorities.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.88
By identifying the four distinguishing factors — particularly the speculation vs. confirmed violation distinction — the Board reaches a different conclusion than Case 89-7 while preserving the underlying public safety framework.
Case 89-7 is distinguishable on confirmed fatality and public infrastructure grounds; its precedent does not provide ethical cover for Engineer A's compliance with suppression in the bridge case.
Confidentiality yields to public danger disclosure obligation; no confidentiality interest in a public bridge's structural safety can override the duty to disclose a fatality-linked defect.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.9
The absence of a confidentiality agreement and the independent-discovery character of the observation together reduce the confidentiality barrier to disclosure, though the speculative nature of the finding ultimately limits the disclosure obligation to verbal reporting through the chain rather than formal public authority notification.
The faithful agent obligation is respected by Engineer A's initial verbal reporting through the chain and deference to the prime consultant's evaluation, rather than immediate external escalation — the ethical limits are preserved by the conditional escalation obligation if corrective action is not taken.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.91
The speculative character of the observation overrides the heightening effect of the confirmed fatality, resulting in a calibrated response that is more measured than Case 89-7 but still requires active monitoring and conditional escalation.
Epistemic humility justifies a measured response — verbal reporting, field note preservation, monitoring — rather than immediate external escalation, without eliminating the underlying obligation to pursue resolution if the public agency fails to act.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.94
Confirmed fatality context decisively elevates public safety obligation; Engineer A's compliance with suppression instruction and failure to escalate to other authorities constitutes an ethical violation.
High-calibration context overrides scope limitations and discretionary response principles; the most stringent reporting obligation applies.
The monitoring obligation bridges the initial verbal reporting and the conditional external escalation obligation, ensuring the public safety interest is pursued without prematurely bypassing internal channels.
The conditional structure — report first, monitor, then escalate externally only if no corrective action — resolves the tension between premature escalation concerns and the ongoing public safety obligation.
Because Engineer A's observation of the wall defect arose from his own professional inspection rather than from a client disclosure, the public agency could not have had a genuine expectation that Engineer A would suppress his own professional observations — weakening the confidentiality rationale for non-disclosure.
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.89
source_field=tensionresolution; confidence=0.92
Passive acquiescence after notification is itself an ethical violation; Engineer A's obligation required more than a verbal report followed by compliance with suppression.
Written follow-up would have created a record making suppression more difficult and positioning Engineer A to escalate further; the verbal-only approach enabled the suppression.
The public welfare obligation is satisfied by a graduated response — verbal reporting, field note preservation, corrective action monitoring, conditional external escalation — rather than immediate formal public authority notification, because the speculative character of the concern calibrates the required response downward.
There is no tension to resolve — the prohibition on field note alteration is presented as absolute and admits no exception, even in circumstances where final report omission is permissible.
The speculative character of the observation and Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise together justify omission from the final report, while the obligation to preserve the observation in field notes and report it verbally ensures the public safety interest is not entirely abandoned.
Scope limitation reduces but does not eliminate public safety obligation; the confirmed fatality context means the principle provides only partial, not complete, ethical cover for omission.
The permissibility of final report omission is conditioned on the speculative character of the finding and the absence of domain expertise; it does not constitute a general license to omit safety observations but is specific to observations that lack factual grounding and technical verification.
Despite the confirmed fatality (which would normally heighten the escalation obligation under the Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger Principle), the speculative character of the causal connection between the wall defect and the fatality limits the disclosure obligation — the Board explicitly states the case 'must hinge' on this distinction.
The speculative character of the observation and the availability of functioning internal channels together justify the reputational harm concern as a legitimate constraint on escalation timing — the constraint dissolves if internal channels fail to act.
Initial deference to the prime consultant is appropriate given contextual superiority; independent escalation obligation activates only if the prime consultant or public agency fails to take corrective action.
Internal note retention is necessary but not sufficient; external written notification to responsible authorities is required to discharge the documentation obligation.
Partial satisfaction of the disclosure obligation is insufficient when the client suppresses the finding; full discharge requires written documentation and escalation if suppressed.
The obligation is discharged by verbal reporting to the client chain; the speculative character of the observation and Engineer A's lack of structural expertise limit the obligation to verbal disclosure rather than formal report inclusion or external escalation.
Sub-consultant independence obligation requires Engineer A to escalate directly when the prime consultant chain is complicit in suppression; deference to the chain is not a complete ethical defense.
fatal accident (Officer B's crash) before bridge inspection by Engineer A
Three months prior to the beginning of the scheduled overhaul of the bridge, Police Officer B loses control of his patrol car... While conducting the bridge inspection... Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred.
fatal accident (Officer B's crash) before scheduled bridge overhaul
Three months prior to the beginning of the scheduled overhaul of the bridge, while traveling across the bridge, Police Officer B loses control of his patrol car.
pre-existing defective wall condition before fatal accident (Officer B's crash)
Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred. Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure.
public agency instruction to exclude information before final report submission
The public agency contacts VWX Architects and Engineers which then contacts Engineer A and asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report... Engineer A states that he will retain the information from his engineering notes but not include it in the final report, as requested.
public agency instruction to exclude information
After the public agency (through VWX) instructed Engineer A to suppress the wall defect finding, Engineer A was obligated to escalate to other public authorities — such as state transportation officials, law enforcement, or the engineering
Engineer A's initial verbal reporting of the out-of-scope wall defect to VWX reflects the discretionary response the principle contemplates; however, the confirmed fatality context may convert this discretionary response into a mandatory on
After the public agency (through VWX) rejected Engineer A's implicit recommendation to include the wall defect finding in the final report, Engineer A was obligated to assess whether this rejection — combined with the confirmed fatality and
The bridge wall defect case must be carefully distinguished from Case 89-7 (building sale confidentiality case): in Case 89-7, there was an explicit confidentiality agreement, no confirmed fatality, and the defect was on private property; i
The Board reasons that Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise, combined with the purely visual character of his observation and the absence of confirmatory testing, places him in an epistemic position that counsels internal r
The Board holds that Engineer A's visual observation of the wall defect, without structural engineering expertise or confirmatory testing, constitutes mere speculation and surmise — which calibrates the disclosure obligation downward to ver
The Board explicitly states that while it would be improper to include the speculative wall defect observation in the final report, under no circumstances would it be appropriate for Engineer A to alter his field notes — establishing field
Engineer A partially satisfied the incidental observation disclosure obligation by verbally reporting the wall defect to VWX, but failed to complete the obligation by allowing the finding to be suppressed from written documentation and decl
Although Engineer A was retained only for a pavement damage inspection, he observed a potentially safety-relevant structural wall defect outside his contracted scope and appropriately disclosed it verbally to his client (VWX) — satisfying t
The Board frames the entire analysis as a balance between the engineer's obligation to be faithful to the client and not disclose confidential information, and the obligation to hold paramount the public health and safety — concluding that
Engineer A, as a sub-consultant, received the suppression instruction through VWX (the prime consultant), which was itself relaying the public agency's instruction. Engineer A's independent professional obligation required him to assess whe
Engineer A retained the wall defect observation in his engineering notes but did not translate this into a written safety notification to VWX, the public agency, or any other authority — satisfying the documentation requirement only interna
The public agency's instruction (relayed through VWX) to Engineer A to omit the wall defect finding from the final report constitutes a client directive to suppress a safety-relevant professional finding; Engineer A's compliance with this i
Engineer A's surmise that the wall defect may have contributed to Police Officer B's fatal crash creates a confirmed-fatality-linked observation that heightens the public safety obligation beyond ordinary out-of-scope discretionary response
The bridge case presents a high-calibration context: confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, professional surmise of causal connection, and client suppression of findings — all factors that collectively demand the mo
The Board invokes the engineer-as-agent/trustee relationship as the rationale for the confidentiality obligation, noting that engineers are privy to client business affairs and are expected to maintain confidentiality as agents and trustees
The Board systematically identifies four material factual differences between Case 89-7 and the present bridge case — source of information, existence of confidentiality agreement, confirmed vs. potential fatality, and admitted violations v
The Board distinguishes between Case 89-7 (where the client directly conveyed code violations to Engineer A, generating a confidentiality expectation) and the present bridge case (where Engineer A independently discovered the wall defect th
The Board's entire analysis demonstrates contextual calibration: the confirmed fatality heightens the concern, but the speculative character of the causal connection, the absence of a confidentiality agreement, and Engineer A's lack of stru
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX, which relayed it to the public agency, but then passively acquiesced to the suppression instruction without insisting on written documentation, remedial action, or escalation to other aut
The Board explicitly states that for Engineer A to have reported the speculative wall defect observation to a public authority before determining whether corrective action would be taken would have been an overreaction that could have jeopa
Engineer A's observation of a pre-existing wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident implicates the paramount obligation to protect public safety, which is not extinguished by the pavement-only scope of his engagement.
Engineer A's contractual scope was limited to pavement damage inspection; the wall defect was outside this scope, and the principle acknowledges that engineers cannot be held to unlimited investigative duties beyond their engagement.
The Board concludes it would have been improper for Engineer A to include the speculative wall defect observation in his final pavement damage report, because the observation was based solely on visual inspection without structural engineer
Engineer A's verbal report of the wall defect to VWX was not followed by a written confirmation, leaving the safety concern undocumented in any official professional communication and enabling its suppression from the final report.
Any confidentiality expectation arising from Engineer A's sub-consultant relationship with VWX or the public agency does not bar Engineer A from disclosing the wall defect finding to appropriate public authorities, because the finding relat
The Board reasons that Engineer A appropriately reported the wall defect observation verbally to his client (VWX) rather than directly to the public agency or external authorities, because VWX as prime consultant has overall project respons
The Board establishes that if the public agency does not take corrective action after receiving verbal notification through the VWX chain, Engineer A must then assess whether external escalation is warranted — making external reporting a co
The Board holds that Engineer A's ethical obligation does not end with verbal reporting to VWX; Engineer A has an ongoing obligation to follow through to ensure that the public agency takes correct corrective action — and only if the public
In Case 89-7, the Board determined it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations to appropriate public authorities, even though the report was subject to a confidentiality agreement —
In Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was obligated to report the confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations to appropriate public authorities notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement, because the confidentiality obligation does not ex
Engineer A was obligated to disclose the incidentally observed wall defect to his client (VWX) even though it fell outside his contracted pavement damage inspection scope, because the observation bore on public safety and the engineer's par
Engineer A was obligated to document the wall defect observation in his engineering field notes for possible future reference, ensuring that the observation was preserved even though it was appropriately excluded from the formal report.
Engineer A was obligated to calibrate his public safety reporting to the high-context factors present — confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, professional surmise of causal connection, public bridge with ongoing tr
Engineer A was obligated, after verbally reporting the wall defect through the client chain and agreeing not to include it in the final report, to monitor whether the public agency took appropriate corrective action within a reasonable peri
Engineer A was obligated, upon observing the pre-existing defective wall condition during his contracted pavement inspection, to disclose that safety risk in writing to VWX and the public agency, even though the wall defect fell outside his
Engineer A was obligated to actively resist the suppression instruction from VWX/public agency and to insist that the wall defect finding be addressed, rather than passively acquiescing by agreeing to omit the finding from the final report.
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that his contracted scope — limited to pavement damage inspection — did not shield him from the obligation to disclose the observed wall structural defect, particularly given its potential causal connec
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that any implied confidentiality arising from his sub-consultant relationship with VWX or the public agency did not bar him from disclosing the wall defect finding to appropriate public authorities, as
Engineer A was obligated, given his professional surmise that the wall defect may have causally contributed to Police Officer B's confirmed fatal crash, to escalate his finding beyond a verbal client-chain report to written notification of
Engineer A was obligated to verbally report the wall defect observation to VWX (the prime consultant) rather than directly to the public agency or external authorities, because VWX, bearing overall project responsibility, was in a far bette
Engineer A was obligated, as a sub-consultant who received a suppression instruction relayed through VWX from the public agency, to independently escalate the wall defect safety concern to appropriate public authorities, recognizing that hi
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from reporting the speculative wall defect observation directly to a public authority before determining whether corrective action was being taken through the client chain, because doing so would have bee
Engineer A was obligated under no circumstances to alter his field notes documenting the wall defect observation, even though the observation was speculative and was appropriately excluded from the formal report.
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from including the speculative wall defect observation — based solely on visual inspection without structural engineering expertise — in his formal pavement damage report, because including speculative fi
Engineer A was obligated to balance his duty as a faithful agent to VWX and the public agency — protecting client confidentiality and business interests — against his paramount obligation to protect public health and safety, and the Board f
Engineer A was obligated to follow through to ensure that the public agency took correct corrective action after receiving verbal notification of the wall defect through VWX, and to consider escalation to external authorities only if the pu
Engineer A was obligated to translate his engineering notes documenting the wall defect observation into a formal written communication to VWX, the public agency, or other appropriate public authorities, rather than retaining the finding so
Engineer A fulfilled his faithful agent duty to immediately advise VWX of the observed wall defect, but failed to extend that notification to written form or to public authorities beyond the client chain.
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that his verbal report of the wall defect through VWX to the public agency did not satisfy his obligation to ensure the safety concern was formally documented in writing for the public authority's decis
Engineer A and the Board were obligated to recognize that the public agency's confidentiality expectation was materially reduced because: (a) no explicit confidentiality agreement existed between the parties, and (b) the wall defect informa
Engineer A was obligated to follow up his verbal report of the wall defect to VWX with written confirmation of the finding, to create a documented record of the safety concern, and to monitor whether corrective action was taken by the publi
Engineer A was obligated to resist VWX's instruction (relayed from the public agency) to omit the wall defect finding from the final report, recognizing that the public agency's instruction did not extinguish his obligation to ensure public
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the bridge wall defect case — involving a confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, and no explicit confidentiality agreement — required a different and more aggressive escalation response than th
{'sale_terms': 'As-is, no remedial action planned', 'confidentiality_agreement': 'Explicit written agreement with engineer', 'disclosure_type': 'Direct voluntary admission of known code violations'}
In the comparative reference case (Case No. 89-7), the client retained Engineer A under an explicit confidentiality agreement to inspect a 60-year-old occupied apartment building being sold 'as is,' disclosed known electrical and mechanical code violations directly to the engineer, and stated no remedial action would be taken prior to sale — generating the ethical conflict between confidentiality and public safety.
{'type': 'imposes_confidentiality_on', 'target': 'Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidentiality-Bound Building Sale Engineer'}
{'type': 'retains', 'target': 'Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidentiality-Bound Building Sale Engineer'}
Building Sale Confidentiality-Imposing Client
the client made clear to Engineer A that the building was being sold 'as is' and that the client was not planning to take any remedial action
the client confided in Engineer A and inform him that the building contained deficiencies in the electrical and mechanical systems
the client had essentially admitted serious code violations
Client-Loyalty vs. Public Safety Paramount Obligation Conflict — Present Case
From Engineer A's discovery of the potential safety concern through the Board's ethical determination
Engineers are frequently placed in situations where they must balance the extent of their obligations to their employer or client with their obligations to protect the public health and safety
Engineer A's simultaneous obligations of client loyalty/confidentiality and public safety paramount duty
Board's determination that Engineer A acted appropriately by reporting verbally to client and documenting in field notes
Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client
a conflict between two basic ethical obligations of an engineer: The obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety
Engineer A discovering a speculative safety concern while operating under client loyalty obligations and without a confidentiality agreement
Comparative Precedent Distinguishing — Present Case vs. Case No. 89-7
Throughout the Board's deliberation on the present case
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing State
Board's ethical analysis comparing the present case to NSPE Case No. 89-7 and Case No. 97-5
Board's conclusion that the present case is materially different on three key dimensions
Also in Case No. 89-7, there was the possibility of a dangerous condition developing at some point in the future, while in the present case, loss of life had already occurred
First, it is clear that, unlike Case No. 89-7, which involved facts and circumstances that were openly conveyed directly to Engineer A from a client
Invocation of Case No. 89-7 as a potentially applicable precedent requiring distinction
Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidentiality-Bound Building Sale Engineer
{'license': 'Professional Engineer', 'specialty': 'Structural engineering', 'confidentiality_agreement': 'Explicit written agreement', 'client_disclosure': 'Client directly admitted code violations in electrical and mechanical systems', 'board_finding': 'Non-disclosure to public authorities was unethical'}
In the comparative reference case (Case No. 89-7), Engineer A was retained under an explicit confidentiality agreement to inspect a 60-year-old occupied apartment building being sold 'as is.' The client directly disclosed known electrical and mechanical code violations. Engineer A noted the disclosure briefly in the report but did not report to public authorities. The Board found this non-disclosure unethical, establishing the baseline against which the present case is distinguished.
{'type': 'obligated_to', 'target': 'Occupants of building (public)'}
{'type': 'retained_by', 'target': 'Building Sale Confidentiality-Imposing Client (Case 89-7)'}
Confidentiality-Bound Building Sale Engineer
Under the terms of the agreement with the client, the structural report written by Engineer A was to remain confidential
Engineer A made a brief mention of his conversation with the client concerning the deficiencies; however, in view of the terms of the agreement, Engineer A did not report the safety violations to any third party
Engineer A Scope-Exceeding Safety Discovery During Bridge Inspection
From discovery of wall defect during inspection through end of engagement
Engineer A's scope of work is solely to identify any pavement damage on the bridge.
Forensic Scope-Exceeding Structural Safety Discovery State
Engineer A's engagement scope limited to pavement damage, with incidental discovery of structurally relevant wall defect
Not terminated — Engineer A complies with suppression instruction and does not report externally
Although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall.
Engineer A surmises that the defective condition may have been a contributing factor in the wall failure.
Engineer A, retained only for pavement damage identification, observes a potentially fatal-accident-contributing wall defect
Engineer A Selective Omission in Final Bridge Inspection Report
From the point of agreeing to omit the finding through submission of the final report
Future users of the bridge inspection report
Selective Information Omission in Professional Report State
Engineer A's final report omitting the wall defect finding at client direction, despite its potential safety relevance
Submission of final report without the finding
Engineer A agrees to exclude wall defect information from final report as requested by VWX/public agency
Engineer A's Obligation to Monitor Public Agency Follow-Through
From Engineer A's verbal report to the client/prime consultant through the public agency's corrective action or failure to act
Engineer A has an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action is taken by the public agency
Regulatory Authority Inaction on Reported Safety Risk State
Engineer A's continuing obligation to monitor whether the public agency takes corrective action after being informed of the concern
Public agency taking adequate corrective action, or Engineer A determining that independent escalation is necessary
Only if the public agency does not take corrective action should Engineer A consider alternatives
for Engineer A to have reported this information to a public authority under the circumstances as outlined in the facts, before determining whether corrective action is taken, would have been an overreaction
Engineer A reporting the speculative concern to the client and prime consultant, creating a secondary obligation to monitor public agency response
Engineer A's Safety Observation Derived from Inspection Not Client Disclosure
From the moment Engineer A made the visual observation through the Board's ethical determination
in the present case, the circumstances bearing on the public safety were revealed to the engineer as part of the engineer's inspection and professional observations
Inspection-Discovered vs. Client-Disclosed Safety Information Distinction State
Engineer A's discovery of potential structural contributing factor through visual inspection
Board's determination that inspection-derived information carries weaker confidentiality expectation than client-disclosed information
Presumably, the manner in which information is conveyed to an engineer will have some bearing on the client's expectation of the engineer's maintaining the confidentiality of the particular information
Engineer A's independent professional inspection revealing a potential contributing cause to the structural wall failure
Engineer A's Speculative Observation — Domain Competence Boundary
From Engineer A's visual observation through the Board's determination that the finding should not appear in the final report
There is nothing noted in the facts to indicate that Engineer A had expertise in structural engineering
Competence-Differentiated Speculation vs. Confirmed Finding State
Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise relative to the speculative causal observation
Board's determination that the speculative, out-of-competence observation should be documented in field notes but excluded from the final report
it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm
while it may be appropriate for Engineer A to note such information in his field notes, to place this information in a final report would not be responsible
Engineer A making a visual observation about a potential structural contributing factor without structural engineering expertise
Graduated Escalation — Speculative Concern Requiring Calibrated Response
From Engineer A's visual observation through the Board's determination of appropriate response
for Engineer A to have reported this information to a public authority under the circumstances as outlined in the facts, before determining whether corrective action is taken, would have been an overreaction and could easily have risked jeopardizing the professional reputations of his client and the public agency
Graduated Escalation Obligation Calibrated to Danger Severity State
Engineer A's obligation to calibrate the intensity of escalation to the speculative, unconfirmed nature of the safety concern
Engineer A's verbal report to client and field note documentation, with monitoring obligation for public agency follow-through
Engineer A identifying a speculative safety concern following a harm event, requiring calibrated rather than maximum escalation
Out-of-Scope Safety Observation Discretionary Response Invoked By Engineer A
Decision not to include finding in written report
Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger Principle
Engineer A's initial verbal reporting of the out-of-scope wall defect to VWX reflects the discretionary response the principle contemplates; however, the confirmed fatality context may convert this discretionary response into a mandatory one.
The principle supports Engineer A's initial verbal report as ethically appropriate discretionary action, but the confirmed fatality context distinguishes this case from ordinary out-of-scope observations, potentially requiring more than discretionary response.
Engineer A Bridge Sub-Consultant Inspector
Out-of-Scope Safety Observation Discretionary Response Principle
although not part of the scope of services for which he was retained, Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall close to where the accident involving Police Officer B occurred.
The discretionary response principle is overridden in the confirmed-fatality context; Engineer A's failure to escalate beyond the suppressed verbal report constitutes an ethical shortfall.
Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation Violated By Engineer A
Assessment of escalation need post-rejection
Client rejection of safety finding inclusion in final report
Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation Principle
After the public agency (through VWX) rejected Engineer A's implicit recommendation to include the wall defect finding in the final report, Engineer A was obligated to assess whether this rejection — combined with the confirmed fatality and structural risk — required escalation to higher authorities, rather than passively complying.
The client's rejection of the safety finding's inclusion does not discharge Engineer A's obligation; the confirmed fatality context required Engineer A to assess and execute escalation to other authorities.
Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment Obligation
asks Engineer A not to include this additional information in his final report since it was not part of his scope of work.
Post-rejection escalation assessment is mandatory when a confirmed fatality is linked to the suppressed finding; Engineer A's failure to conduct this assessment and act on it is an ethical violation.
Post-Harm Speculative Causation — Structural Wall Failure Without Confirmed Defect
From Engineer A's visual inspection observation through the Board's determination of appropriate reporting obligations
there is nothing under the facts to indicate anything more than Engineer A's general surmise and speculation about the cause of the structural failure of the wall
Post-Harm Speculative Causation Without Confirmed Defect State
Engineer A's visual observation of a potential contributing cause to the structural wall failure that resulted in loss of life
Competent specialist evaluation of the suspected cause, or public agency taking corrective action
Engineer A's observation appears to be based upon a visual inspection without anything more
to place this information in a final report would not be responsible and could unnecessarily inflame the situation
under no circumstance would it be appropriate for Engineer A to alter his field notes
Structural wall failure causing loss of life, followed by Engineer A's visual inspection revealing a potential contributing factor without domain competence to confirm it
Prime Consultant Superior Contextual Knowledge Over Subconsultant Engineer A
From Engineer A's discovery of the potential contributing factor through the Board's determination of appropriate escalation sequence
the prime consultant, which has overall responsibility for the project, is in a far better position than Engineer A to understand the interrelationships between various elements of the projects, including the history of previous work performed on the bridge, prior consultants, contractors, etc.
Prime Consultant Superior Contextual Knowledge State
Engineer A's relationship to the prime consultant on the bridge inspection project
Prime consultant taking or failing to take corrective action, which would then trigger Engineer A's secondary escalation obligation
Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference as appropriate
Engineer A, as subconsultant, identifying a speculative safety concern on a project where the prime consultant holds overall responsibility and superior contextual knowledge
Engineer A Corrective Action Monitoring Sub-Consultant
{'license': 'Professional Engineer (implied)', 'specialty': 'Non-structural inspection (specific scope limited)', 'observation_basis': 'Visual inspection only, without structural engineering expertise', 'finding_status': 'Speculative — not confirmed by testing or competent evaluation'}
Engineer A was retained as a sub-consultant for a narrowly scoped bridge inspection task, observed a potential out-of-scope structural defect (based on visual inspection without specialized structural expertise), verbally reported it to the client chain, documented it in field notes, appropriately omitted it from the formal report as speculative, and bears a continuing obligation to monitor whether the public agency takes corrective action before considering independent escalation.
{'type': 'monitors_action_of', 'target': 'Report-Suppressing Public Agency Client'}
{'type': 'sub-consultant_to', 'target': 'Prime Consultant'}
Corrective Action Monitoring Sub-Consultant Engineer
Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information and also by documenting the information for possible future reference
it might be appropriate for Engineer A to verbally report this information to Engineer A's client
Engineer A Wall Defect Field Notes Documentation for Future Reference
Engineer A observed a wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident; the Board affirmed that documenting the observation in field notes was appropriate and that those notes must be preserved for possible future reference.
Engineer A (sub-consultant bridge inspector)
Engineering Notes Safety Finding Written Report Preservation Obligation
At the time of the field observation and throughout the engagement
Epistemic Humility Constraint — Engineer A Lacks Structural Expertise, Calibrates Response Accordingly
Incidental Observation Disclosure Obligation
The Board reasons that Engineer A's lack of structural engineering expertise, combined with the purely visual character of his observation and the absence of confirmatory testing, places him in an epistemic position that counsels internal reporting and monitoring rather than immediate external escalation — his epistemic limitations are a key factor in calibrating the appropriate response.
An engineer who lacks domain expertise in the area of the incidental observation must calibrate the urgency and form of their response to their actual epistemic position; the absence of structural engineering expertise means Engineer A cannot independently verify the significance of the wall defect and must defer to those with superior knowledge and context.
Epistemic Humility Constraint on Escalation Urgency
Engineer A Field Notes Wall Defect Non-Alteration
Engineer A documented the wall defect observation in his engineering field notes; the public agency (through VWX) instructed that the finding be omitted from the final report; the Board affirmed that field notes must not be altered regardless of client instructions.
Field Notes Preservation Non-Alteration Obligation
Ongoing from the time of the field observation through the conclusion of the engagement
While it may be appropriate for Engineer A to note such information in his field notes, to place this information in a final report would not be responsible
Engineer A No External Escalation After Suppression
From receipt of suppression instruction through end of engagement and beyond
Subconsultant Scope-Constrained Safety Escalation Pathway State
Engineer A's position as subconsultant after both VWX and the public agency have suppressed the safety finding, with no further reporting action taken
Not terminated — Engineer A does not report to any other public agency or authority
Both the prime contractor (VWX) and the public agency have been informed and have directed suppression; Engineer A takes no further action
Engineer A Speculative Causal Link — Wall Defect to Accident
From Engineer A's observation of the defect through the completion of the inspection report
Engineer A's surmise (not confirmed finding) that the wall defect may have contributed to the fatal wall failure
Not terminated — the speculative nature of the finding is never resolved through further investigation
Engineer A notes in engineering notes that the defect 'may have been a contributing factor' — language of surmise, not confirmed engineering conclusion
Engineer A Verbal-Only Safety Report Without Written Documentation
From Engineer A's verbal report through submission of final report excluding the finding
Verbal-Only Safety Advisory Without Written Record State
Engineer A's verbal report of wall defect to VWX, which verbally relayed it to the public agency, with no written record in final deliverable
Not terminated — final report excludes the finding, leaving only engineering notes as private record
Engineer A verbally reports wall defect to VWX; VWX verbally reports to public agency; suppression instruction then issued
Engineering Notes Safety Finding Written Transmission Engineer A Wall Defect
Engineer A documented the wall defect in his engineering notes but agreed to retain the finding only in those notes and not include it in the final report, leaving the safety concern without any formal written record accessible to public authorities.
Engineer A was obligated to translate his engineering notes documenting the wall defect observation into a formal written communication to VWX, the public agency, or other appropriate public authorities, rather than retaining the finding solely in private notes.
From the time of documenting the finding in engineering notes through the completion of the inspection engagement
Faithful Agent Structural Hazard Notification Engineer A VWX Wall Defect
Engineer A verbally notified VWX of the wall defect, satisfying the immediate notification component of the faithful agent duty, but did not produce written documentation or escalate beyond the client chain.
Faithful Agent Immediate Structural Hazard Notification Obligation
Upon observation of the wall defect during the bridge inspection
Fatal Accident Harm Materialized — Police Officer B
From the moment of the fatal accident three months prior to the overhaul through the inspection period
Death of Police Officer B resulting from wall failure potentially linked to pre-existing defective condition
Not terminated — harm is permanent and investigation/remediation obligations persist
Police Officer B's patrol car crashes into bridge wall; wall fails to restrain vehicle; Officer B dies
Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation Violated By Engineer A Post-Suppression
Failure to report to other public agencies or authorities
After the public agency (through VWX) instructed Engineer A to suppress the wall defect finding, Engineer A was obligated to escalate to other public authorities — such as state transportation officials, law enforcement, or the engineering licensure board — rather than treating the suppression instruction as the end of his professional obligation.
When the primary client/agency suppresses a safety finding linked to a confirmed fatality, the engineer must escalate to multiple other authorities with jurisdiction rather than accepting the suppression.
Multi-Authority Escalation Obligation for Unresolved Public Safety Threats
Client suppression of a confirmed-fatality-linked finding triggers mandatory multi-authority escalation; Engineer A's failure to escalate is a clear ethical violation.
No Confidentiality Agreement Between Engineer A and Client/Public Agency
Throughout Engineer A's engagement, from initial retention through delivery of findings
in the present case, there is nothing to indicate under the facts that an agreement exists between any of the parties to maintain the confidentiality of all or part of any reports prepared by the engineer
Absence of Confidentiality Agreement Affecting Disclosure Obligation State
Engineer A's engagement with the client and public agency on the bridge inspection
Resolution of the disclosure question by the Board's ethical analysis
it is difficult for this Board to conclude that the client or the public agency could have had a genuine expectation of confidentiality
Engineer A retained without any explicit confidentiality clause in the engagement agreement
Public Safety at Risk — Bridge Wall Structural Integrity
From the fatal accident through the inspection period and beyond, as the defect is not formally documented or remediated
Ongoing public safety risk from potentially defective bridge wall condition that contributed to a fatal accident and remains unaddressed in the formal engineering record
Not terminated — defect is not formally documented or remediated through the inspection process
Engineer A notices an apparent pre-existing defective condition in the wall.
Fatal accident caused by wall failure; Engineer A identifies pre-existing defect; finding suppressed from formal record
Verbal-Only Disclosure Insufficiency Engineer A Wall Defect Public Agency
The wall defect finding was communicated only verbally through the client chain; no written report or formal notification was made to any public authority, leaving the safety concern undocumented in any official record.
Verbal-Only Disclosure Insufficiency for Public Authority Report Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that his verbal report of the wall defect through VWX to the public agency did not satisfy his obligation to ensure the safety concern was formally documented in writing for the public authority's decision-making.
From the time of verbal notification through the completion of the inspection engagement
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing Obligation Case 89-7 vs Bridge Case
Comparison between Case 89-7 building inspection and bridge wall defect case
Determination of whether Case 89-7 precedent supports Engineer A's compliance with suppression
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure
The bridge wall defect case must be carefully distinguished from Case 89-7 (building sale confidentiality case): in Case 89-7, there was an explicit confidentiality agreement, no confirmed fatality, and the defect was on private property; in the bridge case, there is a confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, and a client suppression instruction rather than a pre-agreed confidentiality obligation.
The material factual differences — confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, suppression instruction vs. pre-agreed confidentiality — mean Case 89-7 does not support Engineer A's compliance with the suppression instruction in the bridge case.
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing Obligation
Engineer A Bridge Case Incidental Out-of-Scope Wall Defect Verbal Disclosure
Engineer A was retained only for pavement damage inspection but observed a wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident; the Board affirmed that verbal disclosure to VWX was the appropriate response.
Incidental Observation Safety Disclosure Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to disclose the incidentally observed wall defect to his client (VWX) even though it fell outside his contracted pavement damage inspection scope, because the observation bore on public safety and the engineer's paramount duty extends to incidental safety observations made during contracted work.
Upon observation of the wall defect during the pavement inspection engagement
Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances
Engineer A Bridge Case No Confidentiality Agreement Reduced Expectation Recognition
Unlike Case No. 89-7 where an explicit confidentiality agreement existed and the client directly conveyed code violations, in the bridge case there was no confidentiality agreement and the wall defect was discovered through Engineer A's own inspection observations.
Engineer A (sub-consultant bridge inspector) and NSPE Board of Ethical Review
No-Confidentiality-Agreement Reduced Client Confidentiality Expectation Recognition Obligation
Engineer A and the Board were obligated to recognize that the public agency's confidentiality expectation was materially reduced because: (a) no explicit confidentiality agreement existed between the parties, and (b) the wall defect information was discovered through Engineer A's own professional inspection rather than being directly conveyed by the client — thereby calibrating the disclosure obligation to reflect a weaker confidentiality interest than in Case No. 89-7.
it is difficult for this Board to conclude that the client or the public agency could have had a genuine expectation of confidentiality, since nothing of a confidential nature was directly conveyed by the client or the public agency to Engineer A.
At the time of assessing disclosure obligations following the wall defect observation
Factual Certainty vs. Speculation — Speculative Wall Defect Observation Calibrates Disclosure Obligation
The Board holds that Engineer A's visual observation of the wall defect, without structural engineering expertise or confirmatory testing, constitutes mere speculation and surmise — which calibrates the disclosure obligation downward to verbal reporting through the chain rather than formal public authority notification or final report inclusion.
The speculative character of the observation — contrasted with the confirmed code violations in Case 89-7 — is the pivotal factor determining that Engineer A's public safety obligation is discharged by verbal reporting and field note preservation rather than formal escalation.
Factual Certainty vs. Speculation Distinction in Disclosure Obligation Calibration
the possibility of a defect is merely a matter of speculation and surmise
It is on this last point that the Board believes this case must hinge
Incidental Observation Disclosure Obligation Partially Satisfied By Engineer A
Failure to escalate to other authorities
Engineer A partially satisfied the incidental observation disclosure obligation by verbally reporting the wall defect to VWX, but failed to complete the obligation by allowing the finding to be suppressed from written documentation and declining to escalate to other authorities.
Verbal disclosure to the immediate client satisfies the minimum threshold of the incidental observation disclosure obligation, but does not discharge it when the client suppresses the finding and a confirmed fatality is involved.
Public Welfare Paramount — Balancing Against Client Loyalty in Bridge Case
Faithful Agent Obligation Within Ethical Limits
Premature External Escalation Reputational Harm Avoidance Principle
The Board frames the entire analysis as a balance between the engineer's obligation to be faithful to the client and not disclose confidential information, and the obligation to hold paramount the public health and safety — concluding that Engineer A's verbal reporting through the chain, field note preservation, and corrective action monitoring appropriately balanced these competing obligations given the speculative character of the safety concern.
Public welfare paramount is the foundational principle animating the entire analysis; the Board's conclusion that Engineer A acted reasonably is premised on finding that his actions — verbal reporting, field note preservation, monitoring — adequately served the public welfare interest given the speculative evidentiary basis.
the Board is convinced that Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose what might be considered by the client to be confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety
the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety
Sub-Consultant Safety Escalation Independence Obligation Violated By Engineer A
Sub-consultant independence from prime consultant suppression compliance
Engineer A, as a sub-consultant, received the suppression instruction through VWX (the prime consultant), which was itself relaying the public agency's instruction. Engineer A's independent professional obligation required him to assess whether this hierarchical suppression triggered a duty to escalate directly to public authorities, independent of VWX's compliance with the client's instruction.
Engineer A's professional license creates personal public safety obligations that cannot be discharged by deferring to the prime consultant chain's compliance with client suppression instructions.
Sub-Consultant Safety Escalation Independence Obligation
Written Documentation Requirement Safety Notification Engineer A Engineering Notes
Absence of written external safety notification
Engineer A retained the wall defect observation in his engineering notes but did not translate this into a written safety notification to VWX, the public agency, or any other authority — satisfying the documentation requirement only internally but not externally where it could trigger action.
Internal engineering notes satisfy documentation for personal record-keeping but do not discharge the obligation to provide written notification to responsible authorities; external written communication is required.
Written Documentation Requirement for Safety Notification
Client Chain Suppression of Wall Defect Finding
From the moment VWX contacts Engineer A with the suppression instruction through the submission of the final report
Client-Directed Scope-Limitation Safety Finding Suppression State
VWX and Public Agency instruction to Engineer A to exclude wall defect finding from final report on scope grounds
Engineer A complies — finding is excluded from final report; state persists as Engineer A does not escalate
Public agency contacts VWX, which contacts Engineer A, instructing omission of wall defect information from final report because it was outside scope
Client Report Suppression Prohibition Violated By Engineer A
Wall defect finding linked to fatal accident
The public agency's instruction (relayed through VWX) to Engineer A to omit the wall defect finding from the final report constitutes a client directive to suppress a safety-relevant professional finding; Engineer A's compliance with this instruction violates the prohibition on acquiescing to such directives.
The prohibition applies regardless of scope limitations; the client's authority to direct the scope of work does not extend to directing suppression of safety-relevant findings that have already been made.
Confidentiality Non-Applicability — Case 89-7 Building Code Violations Required Public Authority Notification
In Case 89-7, the Board determined it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations to appropriate public authorities, even though the report was subject to a confidentiality agreement — because the confidentiality obligation did not bar disclosure of an apparent danger to the public interest.
The Case 89-7 precedent establishes that professional confidentiality does not override the obligation to disclose confirmed dangers to public safety — a principle the Board applies as the baseline against which the present bridge case is distinguished.
In deciding it was unethical for Engineer A not to report the safety violations to the appropriate public authorities, the Board noted that the facts presented in the case raised a conflict between two basic ethical obligations of an engineer
In Case 89-7, the confirmed factual character of the code violations (admitted by the client) and the existence of a confidentiality agreement that was nonetheless overridden by public safety obligations established the baseline rule; the present case is distinguished because the safety concern is speculative rather than confirmed.
Confirmed-Fatality Escalation Trigger Invoked By Engineer A Wall Defect
Client instruction to omit finding from final report
Wall defect observation linked to Police Officer B's death
Engineer A's surmise that the wall defect may have contributed to Police Officer B's fatal crash creates a confirmed-fatality-linked observation that heightens the public safety obligation beyond ordinary out-of-scope discretionary response, requiring written documentation and escalation if suppressed.
The confirmed fatality transforms Engineer A's discretionary ethical response into a near-mandatory obligation to document in writing and escalate if the client suppresses the finding.
Contextual Calibration Public Safety Reporting Obligation Bridge Fatality Context
Calibration of reporting obligation given confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, and client suppression
The bridge case presents a high-calibration context: confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, professional surmise of causal connection, and client suppression of findings — all factors that collectively demand the most stringent form of public safety reporting obligation, not a discretionary or minimal response.
The combination of confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, causal surmise, and client suppression places this case at the highest end of the reporting obligation calibration spectrum, requiring written documentation and multi-authority escalation.
Contextual Calibration of Public Safety Reporting Obligation
Engineer A Corrective Action Follow-Through Monitoring Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX; the public agency was notified through VWX; a police officer had already died in a crash potentially linked to the defect; the Board held that Engineer A had an ongoing obligation to monitor corrective action.
Confirmed-Fatality Context Corrective Action Monitoring and Conditional External Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to follow through to ensure that the public agency took correct corrective action after receiving verbal notification of the wall defect through VWX, and to consider escalation to external authorities only if the public agency failed to take corrective action — with the confirmed fatality context elevating this monitoring from discretionary to obligatory.
Following verbal notification to VWX through the period during which corrective action should have been taken
Post-Client-Refusal Escalation Assessment — Conditional External Reporting If No Corrective Action
The Board establishes that if the public agency does not take corrective action after receiving verbal notification through the VWX chain, Engineer A must then assess whether external escalation is warranted — making external reporting a conditional obligation triggered by the public agency's failure to act rather than an immediate duty.
The client's (public agency's) failure to take corrective action after notification transforms the initially discretionary external reporting option into a more pressing obligation that Engineer A must actively consider — consistent with the principle that client rejection of safety recommendations does not discharge the engineer's professional obligation.
the Board is of the opinion that Engineer A has an obligation to follow through to see that correct follow-up action is taken by the public agency
Post-Verbal-Notification Written Confirmation Engineer A Wall Defect VWX
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX, which verbally relayed it to the public agency, but no written confirmation was produced and no monitoring of corrective action occurred.
Post-Verbal-Notification Written Confirmation and Monitoring Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to follow up his verbal report of the wall defect to VWX with written confirmation of the finding, to create a documented record of the safety concern, and to monitor whether corrective action was taken by the public agency.
Following the verbal report to VWX and continuing through the period before the scheduled overhaul
Client Report Suppression Resistance Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A agreed to omit the wall defect finding from his final report at the request of VWX, which was relaying the public agency's instruction, despite the finding's potential causal connection to a confirmed fatality.
Client Report Suppression Resistance Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to resist VWX's instruction (relayed from the public agency) to omit the wall defect finding from the final report, recognizing that the public agency's instruction did not extinguish his obligation to ensure public authorities had accurate safety information.
Upon receiving the suppression instruction through VWX
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing — Bridge Case vs. Case 89-7
The Board systematically identifies four material factual differences between Case 89-7 and the present bridge case — source of information, existence of confidentiality agreement, confirmed vs. potential fatality, and admitted violations vs. mere speculation — to explain why the strong disclosure obligation imposed in Case 89-7 does not automatically apply here.
Ethical obligations are determined by careful comparison with analogous precedents; the Board's obligation to distinguish the present case from Case 89-7 is itself a meta-ethical obligation ensuring that precedent is applied with appropriate sensitivity to material factual differences.
it is the Board's position that the facts and circumstances in Case No. 89-7, while somewhat similar in nature, are significantly different than the facts in the present case
Another difference between the two cases is that in Case No. 89-7, there was a specific agreement between the engineer and the client to maintain the confidentiality
First, it is clear that, unlike Case No. 89-7...
Confidentiality Expectation Source-of-Information Distinction — Bridge Case vs. Case 89-7
The Board distinguishes between Case 89-7 (where the client directly conveyed code violations to Engineer A, generating a confidentiality expectation) and the present bridge case (where Engineer A independently discovered the wall defect through professional inspection, generating no genuine confidentiality expectation from the client or public agency).
Confidentiality Expectation Source-of-Information Distinction Principle
it is difficult for this Board to conclude that the client or the public agency could have had a genuine expectation of confidentiality, since nothing of a confidential nature was directly conveyed by the client or the public agency to Engineer A
it is clear that, unlike Case No. 89-7, which involved facts and circumstances that were openly conveyed directly to Engineer A from a client, in the present case, the circumstances bearing on the public safety were revealed to the engineer as part of the engineer's inspection and professional observations
Contextual Calibration of Public Safety Reporting — Speculative Bridge Defect vs. Confirmed Code Violations
The Board's entire analysis demonstrates contextual calibration: the confirmed fatality heightens the concern, but the speculative character of the causal connection, the absence of a confidentiality agreement, and Engineer A's lack of structural expertise together calibrate the required response to verbal reporting and monitoring rather than formal public authority notification.
The nature and demonstrability of the safety concern — speculative visual observation vs. confirmed admitted code violations — is the primary contextual factor determining the scope and form of the public safety reporting obligation in this case.
the Board is convinced that Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client
Corrective Action Monitoring Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect Post-Verbal-Report
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect, agreed to omit it from the final report, and then took no further action — neither monitoring corrective action nor escalating when no corrective action was evidenced.
Corrective Action Follow-Through Monitoring Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, after verbally reporting the wall defect through the client chain and agreeing not to include it in the final report, to monitor whether the public agency took appropriate corrective action within a reasonable period and to escalate to public authorities if no corrective action was taken.
Following the verbal report and suppression agreement, through the period before the scheduled overhaul
Field Notes Integrity Preservation — Wall Defect Observation Must Not Be Altered
Client Direction Does Not Authorize Ethical Violation
The Board explicitly states that while it would be improper to include the speculative wall defect observation in the final report, under no circumstances would it be appropriate for Engineer A to alter his field notes — establishing field note integrity as an absolute floor even when final report omission is permissible.
Field notes serve as the authentic contemporaneous professional record; their integrity is non-negotiable regardless of client instructions, scope limitations, or the speculative character of the recorded observations. The absolute prohibition on alteration coexists with the permissibility of final report omission.
Field Notes Integrity and Alteration Prohibition Principle
However, under no circumstance would it be appropriate for Engineer A to alter his field notes
Incidental Observation Disclosure — Wall Defect Verbally Reported Despite Being Out of Scope
Scope-of-Work Limitation as Incomplete Ethical Defense
Speculation-Grounded Observation Final Report Omission Permissibility Principle
Although Engineer A was retained only for a pavement damage inspection, he observed a potentially safety-relevant structural wall defect outside his contracted scope and appropriately disclosed it verbally to his client (VWX) — satisfying the incidental observation disclosure obligation even though the observation was outside his scope and area of expertise.
The incidental observation disclosure obligation requires verbal communication of out-of-scope safety observations to the client; it does not require formal report inclusion or direct public authority notification when the observation is speculative and the engineer lacks domain expertise.
while it might be appropriate for Engineer A to verbally report this information to Engineer A's client
Passive Acquiescence After Safety Notification Independent Ethical Failure Engineer A
Failure to escalate to other public agencies
Post-notification compliance with suppression instruction
Engineer A verbally reported the wall defect to VWX, which relayed it to the public agency, but then passively acquiesced to the suppression instruction without insisting on written documentation, remedial action, or escalation to other authorities — constituting an independent ethical failure beyond the initial notification.
Verbal notification followed by passive compliance with suppression is insufficient; the paramount public safety obligation requires active insistence or escalation, not mere mention.
Passive Acquiescence After Safety Notification as Independent Ethical Failure
Passive Acquiescence Suppression Instruction Engineer A Wall Defect
After verbally reporting the wall defect through the client chain, Engineer A received an instruction through VWX to omit the finding from the final report and agreed to do so without further escalation.
Passive Acquiescence to Known Safety Violation Independent Ethical Failure Obligation
Upon receiving the suppression instruction from VWX on behalf of the public agency
Premature External Escalation Reputational Harm — Reporting Before Corrective Action Determination Would Be Overreaction
Good Faith Safety Concern Threshold for External Reporting
The Board explicitly states that for Engineer A to have reported the speculative wall defect observation to a public authority before determining whether corrective action would be taken would have been an overreaction that could have jeopardized the professional reputations of VWX and the public agency — establishing that premature external escalation based on speculation is itself an ethical misstep.
The reputational harm rationale for sequencing internal before external escalation is particularly strong when the underlying concern is speculative; the Board treats premature external reporting not merely as unnecessary but as potentially unethical given the speculative evidentiary basis.
Public Welfare Paramount Invoked By Engineer A Bridge Inspection
Bridge wall structural defect observation
Fatal accident involving Police Officer B
Public welfare paramount requires that Engineer A's safety finding — surmised as contributing to a fatality — be documented, reported, and if suppressed, escalated to public authorities, regardless of scope limitations.
Scope-of-Work Non-Shield Structural Safety Engineer A Bridge Wall
The public agency and VWX invoked Engineer A's scope limitation (pavement damage only) as justification for omitting the wall defect from the final report; Engineer A accepted this justification without further escalation.
Scope-of-Work Non-Shield for Structural Safety Disclosure Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that his contracted scope — limited to pavement damage inspection — did not shield him from the obligation to disclose the observed wall structural defect, particularly given its potential causal connection to a confirmed fatality.
Upon receiving the scope-based suppression instruction from VWX
Speculation-Grounded Observation Final Report Omission — Wall Defect Excluded from Pavement Report
The Board concludes it would have been improper for Engineer A to include the speculative wall defect observation in his final pavement damage report, because the observation was based solely on visual inspection without structural engineering expertise or confirmatory testing — inclusion would have been irresponsible and could have unnecessarily inflamed the situation.
Under the circumstances it would have been improper for Engineer A to include reference to the information in his final report, particularly since it would have been based upon mere speculation and not careful testing or evaluation by a competent individual or firm
While it may be appropriate for Engineer A to note such information in his field notes, to place this information in a final report would not be responsible and could unnecessarily inflame the situation
Comparative Case Precedent Distinguishing Engineer A Bridge vs Case 89-7
The bridge case must be distinguished from Case 89-7: in Case 89-7 there was an explicit confidentiality agreement and no confirmed fatality; in the bridge case there was no explicit confidentiality agreement and a confirmed fatality potentially linked to the observed defect.
Comparative Case Precedent Risk-Calibrated Escalation Scope Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that the bridge wall defect case — involving a confirmed fatality, public infrastructure, and no explicit confidentiality agreement — required a different and more aggressive escalation response than the Case 89-7 building sale scenario, which involved an explicit confidentiality agreement and no confirmed fatality.
At the time of deciding how to respond to the suppression instruction
Confidentiality Non-Applicability to Public Danger Disclosure Bridge Wall Defect
Sub-consultant confidentiality relationship
Any confidentiality expectation arising from Engineer A's sub-consultant relationship with VWX or the public agency does not bar Engineer A from disclosing the wall defect finding to appropriate public authorities, because the finding relates to a public danger — a structural defect linked to a fatal accident on a public bridge.
Professional confidentiality does not protect suppression of public safety findings on public infrastructure; Engineer A may and must disclose to appropriate authorities regardless of any implied confidentiality in the sub-consultant relationship.
Confidentiality Non-Override Public Danger Engineer A Bridge Wall Defect
Engineer A's sub-consultant relationship with VWX created an implied confidentiality context, but the wall defect finding — potentially linked to a confirmed fatality on a public bridge — fell within the public danger exception to professional confidentiality obligations.
Confidentiality Scope Limitation for Public Danger Disclosure Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to recognize that any implied confidentiality arising from his sub-consultant relationship with VWX or the public agency did not bar him from disclosing the wall defect finding to appropriate public authorities, as the finding bore directly on public safety and a confirmed fatality.
From the time of receiving the suppression instruction onward
Contextually Calibrated Escalation Engineer A Bridge Fatality Wall Defect
The bridge case presented multiple high-calibration contextual factors: confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, Engineer A's professional surmise of causal connection, and ongoing public use of the bridge — all of which required more than a verbal report through the client chain.
Contextually Calibrated Public Safety Reporting Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to calibrate his public safety reporting to the high-context factors present — confirmed fatality, structural defect on public infrastructure, professional surmise of causal connection, public bridge with ongoing traffic — which collectively required escalation beyond a verbal client-chain report.
From the time of observation through the completion of the inspection engagement
Faithful Agent Obligation — Engineer as Agent and Trustee of Client
The Board invokes the engineer-as-agent/trustee relationship as the rationale for the confidentiality obligation, noting that engineers are privy to client business affairs and are expected to maintain confidentiality as agents and trustees — while simultaneously recognizing that this obligation operates within ethical limits set by the public safety paramount obligation.
The faithful agent obligation provides the normative foundation for the confidentiality side of the balance; it explains why engineers have confidentiality obligations in the first place and why those obligations deserve serious weight even when public safety concerns are present.
Engineers, in the performance of their professional services, act as 'agents' or 'trustees' to their clients
They are privy to a great deal of information and background concerning the business affairs of their client
Incidental Wall Defect Disclosure Engineer A VWX Bridge Inspection
Engineer A, retained as sub-consultant for pavement damage inspection, observed a pre-existing wall defect near the site of Police Officer B's fatal crash and surmised it may have contributed to the wall failure.
Engineer A was obligated, upon observing the pre-existing defective wall condition during his contracted pavement inspection, to disclose that safety risk in writing to VWX and the public agency, even though the wall defect fell outside his contracted scope of work.
Prime Consultant Contextual Superiority Deference — Sub-Consultant Reports to Prime Before Escalating
The Board reasons that Engineer A appropriately reported the wall defect observation verbally to his client (VWX) rather than directly to the public agency or external authorities, because VWX as prime consultant has overall project responsibility and superior knowledge of the bridge's history, prior work, and interrelationships — making VWX better positioned than Engineer A to evaluate the significance of the observation.
The sub-consultant's initial ethical obligation runs through the prime consultant chain, not directly to external authorities, because the prime consultant's contextual superiority makes them the appropriate first-level evaluator of incidental observations — but this deference is conditional on the prime consultant taking appropriate follow-up action.
Prime Consultant Contextual Superiority Deference Principle
the prime consultant, which has overall responsibility for the project, is in a far better position than Engineer A to understand the interrelationships between various elements of the projects, including the history of previous work performed on the bridge, prior consultants, contractors, etc., in order to make an informed evaluation
Confirmed-Fatality Mandatory Written Escalation Engineer A Wall Defect
Engineer A observed a wall defect potentially linked to a confirmed fatality, verbally reported it through the client chain, then agreed to suppress it from the final report and made no further escalation to any public authority.
Confirmed-Fatality-Linked Incidental Observation Mandatory Written Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, given his professional surmise that the wall defect may have causally contributed to Police Officer B's confirmed fatal crash, to escalate his finding beyond a verbal client-chain report to written notification of appropriate public authorities.
Upon forming the professional surmise that the wall defect may have contributed to the fatal crash, and continuing after the suppression instruction was received
Engineer A Case 89-7 Confidentiality Agreement Building Code Violation Reporting
Case No. 89-7 comparative reference: Engineer A was retained under a confidentiality agreement to inspect a 60-year-old apartment building; the client directly conveyed confirmed code violations; Engineer A failed to report to public authorities; the Board found this unethical.
Engineer A (Case No. 89-7 building sale inspector)
In Case No. 89-7, Engineer A was obligated to report the confirmed electrical and mechanical code violations to appropriate public authorities notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement, because the confidentiality obligation does not extend to bar disclosure of engineering findings that bear on public danger — and failure to report was found unethical.
Upon discovery of the confirmed code violations during the building inspection engagement
the client confided in Engineer A and inform him that the building contained deficiencies in the electrical and mechanical systems, which violated applicable codes and standards
Scope-Bounded Public Safety Obligation Principle Invoked By Engineer A
The scope limitation is a legitimate partial defense for Engineer A's failure to investigate the wall defect in depth, but it does not justify suppressing the observation from written documentation or declining to escalate when a fatality is involved.
Verbal-to-Written Safety Notification Follow-Up Obligation Violated By Engineer A
Absence of written follow-up communication
A verbal-only safety notification is insufficient; Engineer A was obligated to follow up in writing to create an unambiguous, actionable record that could not be suppressed without a clear paper trail.
Verbal-to-Written Safety Notification Follow-Up Obligation
Corrective Action Monitoring Before External Escalation — Engineer A Must Follow Through
The Board holds that Engineer A's ethical obligation does not end with verbal reporting to VWX; Engineer A has an ongoing obligation to follow through to ensure that the public agency takes correct corrective action — and only if the public agency does not take corrective action should Engineer A consider alternatives including external reporting.
Verbal reporting through the chain is a necessary but not sufficient discharge of the public safety obligation; the engineer must actively monitor whether corrective action is taken and escalate independently only if the chain fails to act — making corrective action monitoring an integral part of the public safety obligation.
Remediation Monitoring Obligation Post-Client-Confrontation
Engineer A Wall Defect Verbal Report to VWX Prime Consultant
Engineer A was retained by VWX as a sub-consultant for pavement damage inspection; he observed an out-of-scope wall defect potentially linked to a fatal accident; VWX was the prime consultant with overall project responsibility and superior contextual knowledge.
Sub-Consultant Prime Consultant Deference Verbal Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to verbally report the wall defect observation to VWX (the prime consultant) rather than directly to the public agency or external authorities, because VWX, bearing overall project responsibility, was in a far better position to understand the interrelationships among project elements and to make an informed evaluation.
Upon observation of the wall defect during the inspection engagement
Therefore, the Board concludes that Engineer A did the appropriate thing in coming forward to his client with the information
Sub-Consultant Independent Escalation Engineer A Post-Suppression Bridge Wall
Engineer A received the suppression instruction through VWX (the prime consultant), not directly from the public agency, and treated compliance with VWX's relay of the instruction as sufficient discharge of his professional obligations.
Sub-Consultant Suppression-Instruction Independent Escalation Obligation
Engineer A was obligated, as a sub-consultant who received a suppression instruction relayed through VWX from the public agency, to independently escalate the wall defect safety concern to appropriate public authorities, recognizing that his independent professional duty was not discharged by VWX's intermediary role.
Upon receiving the suppression instruction through VWX and thereafter
Engineer A Wall Defect Premature External Authority Reporting Prohibition
Engineer A's wall defect observation was based on visual inspection without structural engineering expertise; the Board held that immediate external reporting before assessing corrective action would have been an overreaction.
Speculative Out-of-Scope Observation Premature External Authority Reporting Prohibition Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from reporting the speculative wall defect observation directly to a public authority before determining whether corrective action was being taken through the client chain, because doing so would have been an overreaction that could have unjustly jeopardized the professional reputations of VWX and the public agency without adequate technical basis.
Prior to determining whether the public agency had taken corrective action following verbal notification through VWX
Engineer A Speculative Wall Defect Formal Report Exclusion
Engineer A observed a pre-existing wall defect on a bridge during a pavement damage inspection; the defect may have contributed to a fatal accident; Engineer A lacked structural engineering expertise and had only a visual, speculative basis for the observation.
Speculative Finding Written Report Exclusion Obligation
Engineer A was obligated to refrain from including the speculative wall defect observation — based solely on visual inspection without structural engineering expertise — in his formal pavement damage report, because including speculative findings without adequate technical basis would be irresponsible and could unnecessarily inflame the situation.
At the time of preparing the final pavement damage report
Engineer A Faithful Agent Client Loyalty Balance Bridge Wall Defect
The Board framed the entire analysis as a balance between the engineer's faithful agent obligation to the client and the paramount public welfare obligation; Engineer A's verbal reporting and field note documentation were found to appropriately balance these competing duties.
Engineer A was obligated to balance his duty as a faithful agent to VWX and the public agency — protecting client confidentiality and business interests — against his paramount obligation to protect public health and safety, and the Board found he acted reasonably in this balance given the speculative character of the observation.
Throughout the engagement from observation through post-notification monitoring
Engineer A acted reasonably under the circumstances by properly balancing the obligation of the engineer to be faithful to the client and not to disclose what might be considered by the client to be confidential information concerning the business affairs of a client without that client's consent, and the obligation of the engineer to hold paramount the public health and safety.
{'license': 'Civil Engineer (implied PE)', 'specialty': 'Bridge inspection', 'scope_of_work': 'Pavement damage identification and reporting only', 'reporting_action': 'Verbal report to VWX; omission from written report at client direction'}
Retained by VWX as sub-consultant for pavement damage inspection; observes out-of-scope pre-existing wall defect potentially linked to fatal accident; verbally reports through client chain; agrees to omit finding from final report at client direction; does not escalate to any independent public authority.
{'type': 'public_safety_obligation_toward', 'target': 'General Public'}
{'type': 'reports_to', 'target': 'VWX Architects and Engineers'}
{'type': 'sub-consultant_to', 'target': 'VWX Architects and Engineers'}
Safety-Finding-Omitting Sub-Consultant Bridge Inspector